bowtie implementation roadmap - nucleus · ilizastigui, p.f.; ilizastigui, a.i. introduction...
TRANSCRIPT
Ilizastigui, P.F.; Ilizastigui, A.I.
INTRODUCTION
IAEA-IEM 9-15
SAFETY REPORT PRODUCTION PROCESS
National Centre for Nuclear Safety IAEA – CN-236/05
Historically, the majority of nuclear safety reports have been produced and applied under prescriptive legislative regimes, with emphasis placed on demonstrations of the robustness of
the facility’s design against technical standards and rules set by the Regulatory Body. As a result, they are often “inaccessible” to key “users” (those who actually exercise direct control
of the hazards and risks at the plant as well as the managers who hold specific accountabilities and responsibilities for ensuring safe facility’s operation). This situation has a detrimental
effect on the safety of the facility particularly during operations, when the Safety Report is intended to be actively used by those key users as an effective tool to support informed
decision making in relation to the day-to-day management of operational risks. This paper explores the strengths of the Bowtie risk management methodology in producing fit-for-
purpose, accessible and usable Safety Reports that will support current efforts undertaken by the nuclear industry to ensure “Right First Time Safety Cases”.
RESULTS
HA
ZID
● Check HAZID for completeness
● Identification of potential accident scenarios
Ris
k Es
tim
atio
n
● Estimation of risk of accident scenarios
● Selection of accident scenarios for risk reduction with Bowtie
Bo
wti
e R
evie
w
Wo
rksh
op
● Preparation of “Draft” Bowties
● Facilitation of Bowtie Workshops with facility personnel
● Barrier Effectiveness rating
● Assignment of responsibilities for barriers
● Identification of Safety Critical Tasks (SCTs)
Bo
wti
e A
LAR
P
Wo
rksh
op
● ALARP definition (Qualitative)
● Conduction of Bowtie/ALARP Workshops
● Compilation of Plan of Remedial Actions
Man
age
me
nt
of
Safe
ty
Cri
tica
l Sys
tem
s (S
CS)
● Register of SCSs from the final Bowtie diagrams
● Review of SCS adequacy
● Confirmation of SCTs
● Development of Performance Standards
● Development of Summary of Operational Boundaries (SOOB) Matrices
● Development of Key Performance Indicators
BOWTIE IMPLEMENTATION ROADMAP
CONCLUSIONS
“I am concerned that the
exponential growth of ‘the
Safety Case industry’ has led
to a culture of ‘paper safety’ at
the expense of real safety”
C. Haddon-Cave
• The implementation steps described in the paper can serve as a practical “roadmap” for the production of safety reports that can be “actively embraced” by the
non-nuclear sectors, particularly by the emerging technologies in the industrial and medical sectors. These modern technologies “deserve” modern safety
reports that incorporate state-of-the-art risk management methodologies that not only ensure compliance with existing regulatory requirements but produce
usable, accessible and easy-to-understand and update Safety Reports. This will undoubtedly have a major effect in the reduction of risks from radiation sources
used in those industries.
• So far, the IAEA Safety Case concept has successfully integrated the safety assessment with the Safety Report. The next logical step would be to integrate the
safety assessment with the safety management system and make this integration “visible” within the Safety Report. This will significantly contribute to the
demonstration that the existing safety management is indeed effective in supporting engineering controls upon which the safety of the facility is based. The
Bowtie methodology will be the advisable option to show the manner in which safety critical tasks forming part of SMS ensure the ongoing integrity of those
engineering controls and monitor their performance.
UK Nuclear Safety Case Forum