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Rights and obligations between husband and wife

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127406. November 27, 2000]ELIA P. TY,petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M.

REYES, respondents.D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING,J.:This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24, 1996, of theCourt of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV 37897, which affirmed the decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the marriage contract

between private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null

and voidab initio. It also ordered private respondent to pay P15,000.00 asmonthly support for their children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes.

As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna

Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in

Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on

August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City

declared their marriage null and voidab initio for lack of a valid marriagelicense. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null

and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria,

private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in

ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982,

they also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the

RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null

and void. He alleged that they had no marriage license when they gotmarried. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was stillmarried to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the

decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree

of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980,

while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.

Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed outthat his claim that their marriage was contracted without a valid license is

untrue. She submitted their Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario,

Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question this

document when it was submitted in evidence. Petitioner also submitted thedecision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated

August 4, 1980, which declared null and voidhis civil marriage to Anna Maria

Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church marriage to saidAnna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were submitted as evidence

during trial and, according to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof ofthe facts therein. The fact that the civil marriage of private respondent and

petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring his prior

marriage as null andvoidis undisputed. It also appears indisputable that privaterespondent and petitioner had a church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982.[1]

The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit and declared hismarriage to herein petitioner null and void ab initio in its decision dated

November 4, 1991. Both parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On

July 24, 1996, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision. It ruled that

a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be

secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. Said theappellate court:

We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendants counsel that

no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. It

does not say, however, that a second marriage may proceed even without a

judicial decree. While it is true that if a marriage is null and void, ab initio, thereis in fact no subsisting marriage, we are unwilling to rule that the matter of

whether a marriage is valid or not is for each married spouse to determine for

himself for this would be the consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed to a

second marriage even before a competent court issues a judicial decree of nullity

of his first marriage. The results would be disquieting, to say the least, and couldnot have been the intendment of even the now-repealed provisions of the Civil

Code on marriage.

x x x

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed

Decision in this wise:1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private respondent] Eduardo

M. Reyes and defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null

and void ab initio;2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support in the

amount of P15,000.00 to his children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyesfrom November 4, 1991; and

3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.

SO ORDERED.[2]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant

petition asserting that the Court of Appeals erred:

I.BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING FOR

THE VALIDITY OF PETITIONERS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A

JUDICIAL DECREE NOT REQUIRED BY LAW.

IIIN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING INDOMINGO VS.COURT OF APPEALS.

IIIIN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING

THE CIVIL EFFECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION WHICH USEDTHE SAME MARRIAGE LICENSE.

IVIN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY

DAMAGES TO THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first

marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered intovalidly? To resolve this question, we shall go over applicable laws and pertinent

cases to shed light on the assigned errors, particularly the first and the second

which we shall discuss jointly.

In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage ofpetitioner to private respondent null and voidfor lack of a prior judicial decree ofnullity of the marriage between private respondent and Villanueva. The appellate

court rejected petitioners claim thatPeople v. Mendoza[3]and People v.Aragon[4]are applicable in this case. For these cases held that where a marriageis voidfrom its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish itsinvalidity. But the appellate court said these cases, decided before the enactmentof the Family Code (E.O. No. 209 as amended by E.O No. 227), no longer

control. A binding decree is now needed and must be read into the provisions of

law previously obtaining.[5]

In refusing to consider petitioners appeal favorably, the appellate court

also said:Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory precedentfor this case. Although decided by the High Court in 1992, the facts situate it

within the regime of the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code, as in the

instant case.

x x x

For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a secondmarriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void abinitio is essential. . . .[6]

At the outset, we must note that private respondents first and second

marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed by theprovisions of the Civil Code. The present case differs significantly from the

recent cases ofBobis v. Bobis[7]andMercado v. Tan,[8] both involvinga criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous marriage was contracted during

the effectivity of the Family Code,[9]under which a judicial declaration of nullity

of marriage is clearly required.Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides

that:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime

of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouseshall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of thesecond marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being

alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, isgenerally considered as dead and before any person believed to be so by the

spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the

absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so

contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a

competent court.As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is

necessary, the Civil Code contains no express provision to that

effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be conflicting.

Originally, inPeople v. Mendoza,[10]and People v. Aragon,[11] this Courtheld that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the nullity of a voidmarriage. Both cases involved the same factual milieu. Accused contracted a

second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. After the death of

his first wife, accused contracted a third marriage during the subsistence of the

second marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy. The Court

acquitted accused on the ground that the second marriage is void, having beencontracted during the existence of the first marriage. There is no need for a

judicial declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the second marriage

is void, and the first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two

subsisting valid marriages. Hence, there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes

dissented in both cases, saying that it is not for the spouses but the court to judgewhether a marriage is void or not.

In Gomez v. Lipana,[12]and Consuegra v. Consuegra,[13]however, werecognized the right of the second wife who entered into the marriage in good

faith, to share in their acquired estate and in proceeds of the retirement insurance

of the husband. The Court observed that although the second marriage can bepresumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage wasstill subsisting, still there was a need for judicial declaration of such nullity (of

the second marriage). And since the death of the husband supervened before

such declaration, we upheld the right of the second wife to share in the estate they

acquired, on grounds of justice and equity.[14]

But in Odayat v. Amante (1977),[15] the Court advertedtoAragon andMendoza as precedents. We exonerated a clerk of court of thecharge of immorality on the ground that his marriage to Filomena Abella in

October of 1948 was void, since she was already previously married to one Eliseo

Portales in February of the same year. The Court held that no judicial decree isnecessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. This ruling was affirmed

in Tolentino v. Paras.[16]

Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),[17] the Court held that there is aneed for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Liliamarried Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she married another man, Wiegel. Wiegelfiled a petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to declare his

marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid marriage. The

Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that:[18]

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior

marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such amarriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration

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(citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she wouldstill be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with

respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and

respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. (Emphasis supplied).

In Yap v. Court of Appeals,[19]however, the Court found the secondmarriage void without need of judicial declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat,

Mendoza andAragon rulings.At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the

Family Code. Our rulings in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegelwere eventuallyembodied in Article 40 of the Family Code. [20]Article 40 of said Code expresslyrequired a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes

of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous

marriage void.

In Terre v. Terre (1992)[21]the Court, applying Gomez,Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a judicial declaration of nullity ofa void marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for contracting a

bigamous marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that

his first marriage in 1977 was void since his first wife was already married in

1968. We held that Atty. Terre should have known that the prevailing case law isthat for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a

second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and

void ab initio is essential.The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. InDomingo v. Court of

Appeals (1993),[22] the Court held:

Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflictingjurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now

explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of

the Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to

be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basisacceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a

final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See

also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148).[23]

However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar

circumstances of the case. InApiag v. Cantero, (1997)[24]the first wife charged amunicipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage. The

judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into

marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first

marriage, we applied Odayat,Mendoza andAragon. We held that since thesecond marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before the

promulgation ofWiegeland the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no needfor a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing

jurisprudence at that time.

Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondentwas entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule wasfound in Odayat, Mendoza andAragon. The first marriage of private respondent

being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial

declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case,

therefore, we conclude that private respondents second marriage to petitioneris valid.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be

retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested

rights of petitioner and of her children. As held inJison v. Court of Appeals,[25]the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vestedrights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the

children is patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent to the

appellate courts finding that despite private respondents deceit and perfidy in

contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her silence on the

issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony whereinpetitioner married private respondent using the marriage license used three years

earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter

properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondents allegation

that he wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find there

was a marriage license, though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979and used in both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony

was confirmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate

court erred when it refused to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said

canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this

matter as affirmative defense during trial. She argues that such failure does notprevent the appellate court from giving her defense due consideration and

weight. She adds that the interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of

marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such technicality. In our

view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential and

formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid licensein the first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the

celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereofin the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the

latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The appellate

court might have its reasons for brushing aside this possible defense of thedefendant below which undoubtedly could have tendered a valid issue, but which

was not timely interposed by her before the trial court. But we are now

persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the

wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls his own deceit and perfidy.

On the matter of petitioners counterclaim for damages and attorneysfees. Although the appellate court admitted that they found private respondent

acted duplicitously and craftily in marrying petitioner, it did not award moral

damages because the latter did not adduce evidence to support her claim.[26]

Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be

awarded in the present case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriageto private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her

status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her

husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which

caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and

alienation from her parents. Should we grant her prayer, we would have a

situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or commonfunds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not

common sense, militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not

comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of

breach of a marital obligation.[27]

There are other remedies.[28]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of theCourt of Appeals dated July 24, 1996 and its Resolution dated November 7, 1996,

are reversed partially, so that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private

respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND

SUBSISTING; and the award of the amount of P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and

MAINTAINED as monthly support to their two children, Faye Eloise Reyes andRachel Anne Reyes, for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally

entitled thereto. Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, andDe Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-39587 March 24, 1934ALEKO E. LILIUS, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,vs.

THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, defendant-appellant.Harvey and O'Brien for plaintiffs-appellants.Jose C. Abreu for defendant-appellant.VILLA-REAL,J.:This case involves two appeals, one by the defendant the Manila Railroad

Company, and the other by the plaintiffs Aleko E. Lilius et al., from the judgment

rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila, the dispositive part of whichreads as follows:

Wherefore, judgment is rendered ordering the defendant company to pay to the

plaintiffs, for the purposes above stated, the total amount of P30,865, with the

costs of the suit. And although the suit brought by the plaintiffs has the nature ofa joint action, it must be understood that of the amount adjudicated to the said

plaintiffs in this judgment, the sum of P10,000 personally belongs to the plaintiff

Sonja Maria Lilius; the sum of P5,000, to the plaintiff Brita Marianne Lilius; the

sum of P250, to Dr. Marfori of the Calauan Hospital, Province of Laguna, and the

balance to the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius.In support of its appeal, the appellant the Manila Railroad Company assigns nine

alleged errors committed by the trial court in its said judgment, which will be

discussed in the course of this decision.

As a ground of their appeal, the appellants Aleko E. Lilius et al., in turn, assign

two alleged errors as committed by the same court a quo in its judgment inquestion, which will be discussed later.

This case originated from a complaint filed by Aleko E. Lilius et al., praying,

under the facts therein alleged, that the Manila Railroad Company be ordered to

pay to said plaintiffs, by way of indemnity for material and moral damages

suffered by them through the fault and negligence of the said defendant entity'semployees, the sum of P50,000 plus legal interest thereon from the date of the

filing of the complaint, with costs.

The defendant the Manila Railroad Company, answering the complaint, denies

each and every allegation thereof and, by way of special defense, alleges that the

plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius, with the cooperation of his wife and coplaintiff,negligently and recklessly drove his car, and prays that it be absolved from the

complaint.

The following facts have been proven at the trial, some without question and the

others by a preponderance of evidence, to wit:

The plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius has, for many years, been a well-known and reputedjournalist, author and photographer. At the time of the collision in question, he

was a staff correspondent in the Far East of the magazines The AmericanWeekly of New York and The Sphere of London.Some of his works have been translated into various languages. He had others in

preparation when the accident occurred. According to him, his writings nettedhim a monthly income of P1,500. He utilized the linguistic ability of his wife

Sonja Maria Lilius, who translated his articles and books into English, German,

and Swedish. Furthermore, she acted as his secretary.

At about 7 o'clock on the morning of May 10, 1931, the plaintiff, his wife Sonja

Maria Lilius, and his 4-year old daughter Brita Marianne Lilius, left Manila intheirStudebakercar driven by the said plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius for themunicipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, on a sight-seeing trip. It was thefirst time that he made said trip although he had already been to many places,

driving his own car, in and outside the Philippines. Where the road was clear and

unobstructed, the plaintiff drove at the rate of from 19 to 25 miles an hour. Priorthereto, he had made the trip as far as Calauan, but never from Calauan to

Pagsanjan, via Dayap. He was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the

road at said points and had no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing at

Dayap. Before reaching the crossing in question, there was nothing to indicate its

existence and inasmuch as there were many houses, shrubs and trees along theroad, it was impossible to see an approaching train. At about seven or eight

meters from the crossing, coming from Calauan, the plaintiff saw an autotruck

parked on the left side of the road. Several people, who seemed to have alighted

from the said truck, were walking on the opposite side. He slowed down to about

12 miles an hour and sounded his horn for the people to get out of the way. Withhis attention thus occupied, he did not see the crossing but he heard two short

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whistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling itself upon him,

which turned out to be locomotive No. 713 of the defendant company's train

coming eastward from Bay to Dayap station. The locomotive struck the plaintiff's

car right in the center. After dragging the said car a distance of about ten meters,

the locomotive threw it upon a siding. The force of the impact was so great thatthe plaintiff's wife and daughter were thrown from the car and were picked up

from the ground unconscious and seriously hurt. In spite of the efforts of engineer

Andres Basilio, he was unable to stop the locomotive until after it had gone about

seventy meters from the crossing.On the afternoon of the same day, the plaintiff's entered St. Paul's Hospital in theCity of Manila where they were treated by Dr. Waterous. The plaintiff Aleko E.

Lilius suffered from a fractured nose, a contusion above the left eye and a

lacerated wound on the right leg, in addition to multiple contusions and scratches

on various parts of the body. As a result of the accident, the said plaintiff was

highly nervous and very easily irritated, and for several months he had greatdifficulty in concentrating his attention on any matter and could not write articles

nor short stories for the newspapers and magazines to which he was a contributor,

thus losing for some time his only means of livelihood.

The plaintiff Sonja Maria Lilius suffered from fractures of the pelvic bone, the

tibia and fibula of the right leg, below the knee, and received a large laceratedwound on the forehead. She underwent two surgical operations on the left leg for

the purpose of joining the fractured bones but said operations notwithstanding,

the leg in question still continues deformed. In the opinion of Dr. Waterous, the

deformity is permanent in character and as a result the plaintiff will have some

difficulty in walking. The lacerated wound, which she received on her forehead,

has left a disfiguring scar.The child Brita Marianne Lilius received two lacerated wounds, one on the

forehead and the other on the left side of the face, in addition to fractures of both

legs, above and below the knees. Her condition was serious and, for several days,

she was hovering between life and death. Due to a timely and successful surgicaloperation, she survived her wounds. The lacerations received by the child have

left deep scars which will permanently disfigure her face, and because of the

fractures of both legs, although now completely cured, she will be forced to walk

with some difficulty and continuous extreme care in order to keep her balance.

Prior to the accident, there had been no notice nor sign of the existence of thecrossing, nor was there anybody to warn the public of approaching trains. The

flagman or switchman arrived after the collision, coming from the station with a

red flag in one hand and a green one in the other, both of which were wound on

their respective sticks. The said flagman and switchman had many times absentedhimself from his post at the crossing upon the arrival of a train. The train left Bay

station a little late and therefore traveled at great speed.

Upon examination of the oral as well as of the documentary evidence which the

parties presented at the trial in support of their respective contentions, and after

taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case, this court is of theopinion that the accident was due to negligence on the part of the defendant-

appellant company, for not having had on that occasion any semaphore at the

crossing at Dayap, to serve as a warning to passers-by of its existence in order

that they might take the necessary precautions before crossing the railroad; and,

on the part of its employees the flagman and switchman, for not havingremained at his post at the crossing in question to warn passers-by of the

approaching train; the stationmaster, for failure to send the said flagman and

switchman to his post on time; and the engineer, for not having taken the

necessary precautions to avoid an accident, in view of the absence of said

flagman and switchman, by slackening his speed and continuously ringing thebell and blowing the whistle before arriving at the crossing. Although it is

probable that the defendant-appellant entity employed the diligence of a good

father of a family in selecting its aforesaid employees, however, it did not employ

such diligence in supervising their work and the discharge of their duties because,

otherwise, it would have had a semaphore or sign at the crossing and, on previousoccasions as well as on the night in question, the flagman and switchman would

have always been at his post at the crossing upon the arrival of a train. The

diligence of a good father of a family, which the law requires in order to avoid

damage, is not confined to the careful and prudent selection of subordinates or

employees but includes inspection of their work and supervision of the dischargeof their duties.

However, in order that a victim of an accident may recover indemnity for

damages from the person liable therefor, it is not enough that the latter has been

guilty of negligence, but it is also necessary that the said victim has not, through

his own negligence, contributed to the accident, inasmuch as nobody is aguarantor of his neighbor's personal safety and property, but everybody should

look after them, employing the care and diligence that a good father of a family

should apply to his own person, to the members of his family and to his property,

in order to avoid any damage. It appears that the herein plaintiff-appellant Aleko

E. Lilius took all precautions which his skill and the presence of his wife andchild suggested to him in order that his pleasure trip might be enjoyable and have

a happy ending, driving his car at a speed which prudence demanded according tothe circumstances and conditions of the road, slackening his speed in the face of

an obstacle and blowing his horn upon seeing persons on the road, in order to

warn them of his approach and request them to get out of the way, as he did whenhe came upon the truck parked on the left hand side of the road seven or eight

meters from the place where the accident occurred, and upon the persons who

appeared to have alighted from the said truck. If he failed to stop, look and listen

before going over the crossing, in spite of the fact that he was driving at 12 miles

per hour after having been free from obstacles, it was because, his attentionhaving been occupied in attempting to go ahead, he did not see the crossing in

question, nor anything, nor anybody indicating its existence, as he knew nothing

about it beforehand. The first and only warning, which he received of the

impending danger, was two short blows from the whistle of the locomotive

immediately preceding the collision and when the accident had already becomeinevitable.

In view of the foregoing considerations, this court is of the opinion that the

defendant the Manila Railroad Company alone is liable for the accident by reason

of its own negligence and that of its employees, for not having employed the

diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of the said employees in

the discharge of their duties.The next question to be decided refers to the sums of money fixed by the court aquo as indemnities for damages which the defendant company should pay to the

plaintiffs-appellants.

With respect to the plaintiff-appellant Aleko E. Lilius, although this courtbelieves his claim of a net income of P1,500 a month to be somewhatexaggerated, however, the sum of P5,000, adjudicated to him by the trial court as

indemnity for damages, is reasonable.

As to the sum of P10,635 which the court awards to the plaintiffs by way of

indemnity for damages, the different items thereof representing doctor's fees,

hospital and nursing services, loss of personal effects and torn clothing, have dulybeen proven at the trial and the sum in question is not excessive, taking into

consideration the circumstances in which the said expenses have been incurred.

Taking into consideration the fact that the plaintiff Sonja Maria Lilius, wife of the

plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius is in the language of the court, which saw her at the

trial "young and beautiful and the big scar, which she has on her foreheadcaused by the lacerated wound received by her from the accident, disfigures her

face and that the fracture of her left leg has caused a permanent deformity which

renders it very difficult for her to walk", and taking into further consideration her

social standing, neither is the sum of P10,000, adjudicated to her by the said trial

court by way of indemnity for patrimonial and moral damages, excessive. In the

case ofGutierrezvs. Gutierrez (56 Phil., 177), the right leg of the plaintiffNarciso Gutierrez was fractured as a result of a collision between the autobus in

which he was riding and the defendant's car, which fractured required medical

attendance for a considerable period of time. On the day of the trial the fracture

had not yet completely healed but it might cause him permanent lameness. Thetrial court sentenced the defendants to indemnify him in the sum of P10,000

which this court reduced to P5,000, in spite of the fact that the said plaintiff

therein was neither young nor good-looking, nor had he suffered any facial

deformity, nor did he have the social standing that the herein plaintiff-appellant

Sonja Maria Lilius enjoys.1vvphi1.ne+As to the indemnity of P5,000 in favor of the child Brita Marianne Lilius,

daughter of Aleko E. Lilius and Sonja Maria Lilius, neither is the same excessive,

taking into consideration the fact that the lacerations received by her have left

deep scars that permanently disfigure her face and that the fractures of both herlegs permanently render it difficult for her to walk freely, continuous extreme

care being necessary in order to keep her balance in addition to the fact that all of

this unfavorably and to a great extent affect her matrimonial future.

With respect to the plaintiffs' appeal, the first question to be decided is that raised

by the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius relative to the insufficiency of the sum of P5,000which the trial court adjudicated to him by way of indemnity for damages

consisting in the loss of his income as journalist and author as a result of his

illness. This question has impliedly been decided in the negative when the

defendant-appellant entity's petition for the reduction of said indemnity was

denied, declaring it to be reasonable.As to the amount of P10,000 claimed by the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius as damages

for the loss of his wife's services in his business as journalist and author, which

services consisted in going over his writings, translating them into English,

German and Swedish, and acting as his secretary, in addition to the fact that such

services formed part of the work whereby he realized a net monthly income ofP1,500, there is no sufficient evidence of the true value of said services nor to the

effect that he needed them during her illness and had to employ a translator to act

in her stead.

The plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of P2,500 for the loss

of what is called Anglo-Saxon common law "consortium" of his wife, that is, "herservices, society and conjugal companionship", as a result of personal injuries

which she had received from the accident now under consideration.

In the case ofGoitia vs. Campos Rueda (35 Phil., 252, 255, 256), this court,interpreting the provisions of the Civil Marriage Law of 1870, in force in these

Islands with reference to the mutual rights and obligations of the spouses,contained in articles 44-48 thereof, said as follows:

The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix

the duties and obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist,

and support each other. The husband must live with and protect his wife. The

wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes hisdomicile or residence, except when he removes to a foreign country. . . .

Therefore, under the law and the doctrine of this court, one of the husband's rights

is to count on his wife's assistance. This assistance comprises the management of

the home and the performance of household duties, including the care and

education of the children and at tention to the husband upon whom primarilydevolves the duty of supporting the family of which he is the head. When the

wife's mission was circumscribed to the home, it was not difficult to assume, byvirtue of the marriage alone, that she performed all the said tasks and her physical

incapacity always redounded to the husband's prejudice inasmuch as it deprived

him of her assistance. However, nowadays when women, in their desire to bemore useful to society and to the nation, are demanding greater civil rights and

are aspiring to become man's equal in all the activities of life, commercial and

industrial, professional and political, many of them spending their time outside

the home, engaged in their businesses, industry, profession and within a short

time, in politics, and entrusting the care of their home to a housekeeper, and theirchildren, if not to a nursemaid, to public or private institutions which take charge

of young children while their mothers are at work, marriage has ceased to create

the presumption that a woman complies with the duties to her husband and

children, which the law imposes upon her, and he who seeks to collect indemnity

for damages resulting from deprivation of her domestic services must prove suchservices. In the case under consideration, apart from the services of his wife Sonja

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Maria Lilius as translator and secretary, the value of which has not been proven,

the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius has not presented any evidence showing the existence

of domestic services and their nature, rendered by her prior to the accident, in

order that it may serve as a basis in estimating their value.

Furthermore, inasmuch as a wife's domestic assistance and conjugalcompanionship are purely personal and voluntary acts which neither of the

spouses may be compelled to render (Arroyo vs. Vazquez de Arroyo, 42 Phil.,54), it is necessary for the party claiming indemnity for the loss of such services

to prove that the person obliged to render them had done so before he was injuredand that he would be willing to continue rendering them had he not been

prevented from so doing.

In view of the foregoing considerations this court is of the opinion and so holds:

(1) That a railroad company which has not installed a semaphore at a crossing an

does not see to it that its flagman and switchman faithfully complies with his duty

of remaining at the crossing when a train arrives, is guilty of negligence and iscivilly liable for damages suffered by a motorist and his family who cross its line

without negligence on their part; (2) that an indemnity of P10,000 for a

permanent deformity on the face and on the left leg, suffered by a young and

beautiful society woman, is not excessive; (3) that an indemnity of P5,000 for a

permanent deformity on the face and legs of a four-year old girl belonging to awell-to-do family, is not excessive; and (4) that in order that a husband may

recover damages for deprivation of his wife's assistance during her illness from

an accident, it is necessary for him to prove the existence of such assistance and

his wife's willingness to continue rendering it had she not been prevented from so

doing by her illness.

The plaintiffs-appellants are entitled to interest of 6 percent per annum on theamount of the indemnities adjudicated to them, from the date of the appealed

judgment until this judgment becomes final, in accordance with the provisions of

section 510 of Act No. 190.

Wherefore, not finding any error in the judgment appealed from, it is herebyaffirmed in toto, with the sole modification that interest of 6 per cent per annumfrom the date of the appealed judgment until this judgment becomes final will be

added to the indemnities granted, with the costs of both instances against the

appellant. So ordered.

Malcolm, Hull, Imperial, and Goddard, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 3405. June 29, 1998]

LIETA B. NARAG,complainant

,vs.

ATTY. DOMINADOR M.NARAG, respondent.D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every

member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of

moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice

law.On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative

complaint[1]for disbarment against her husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag,

whom she accused of having violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of

Ethics for Lawyers.[2]

The complainant narrated:The St. Louis College of Tuguegarao engaged the services of Atty. Dominador

M. Narag in the early seventies as a full-time college instructor in the College of

Arts and Sciences and as a professor in the Graduate School. In 1984, Ms. Gina

Espita, 17 years old and a first year college student, enrolled in subjects handled

by Atty. Narag. Exerting his influence as her teacher, and as a prominentmember of the legal profession and then member of the Sangguniang Bayan of

Tuguegarao, Atty. Narag courted Ms. Espita, gradually lessening her resistance

until the student acceded to his wishes.

They then maintained an illicit relationship known in various circles in the

community, but which they managed to keep from me. It therefore came as aterrible embar[r]assment to me, with unspeakable grief and pain when my

husband abandoned us, his family, to live with Ms. Espita, in utterly scandalous

circumstances.

It appears that Atty. Narag used his power and influence as a member of the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan to cause the employment of Ms. Espita atthe Department of Trade and Industry Central Office at Makati, Metro

Manila. Out of gratitude perhaps, for this gesture, Ms. Espita agreed to live with

Atty. Narag, her sense of right[e]ousness and morals completely corrupted by a

member of the Bar.

It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty. Dominador M. Naraghas abandoned us, his family, to live with a 22-year-old woman, who was his

former student in the tertiary level[.][3]

This Court, in a Resolution dated December 18, 1989, referred the case to

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and

recommendation.[4]

On June 26, 1990, the office of then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan

received from complainant another letter seeking the dismissal of the

administrative complaint. She alleged therein that (1) she fabricated the

allegations in her complaint to humiliate and spite her husband; (2) all the love

letters between the respondent and Gina Espita were forgeries; and (3) she wassuffering from emotional confusion arising from extreme jealousy. The truth,

she stated, was that her husband had remained a faithful and responsible family

man. She further asserted that he had neither entered into an amorous

relationship with one Gina Espita nor abandoned his family .[5]Supporting her

letter were an Affidavit of Desistance[6] and a Motion to Dismiss,[7]attached asAnnexes A and B, which she filed before the IBP commission on bar

discipline.[8]In a Decision dated October 8, 1991, the IBP Board of

Governors[9] dismissed the complaint of Mrs. Narag for failure to prosecute.[10]

The case took an unexpected turn when, on November 25, 1991, this

Court[11]received another letter[12]from the complainant, with her seven

children[13]as co-signatories, again appealing for the disbarment of herhusband. She explained that she had earlier dropped the case against him because

of his continuous threats against her.[14]

In his Comment on the complainants letter of November 11, 1991, filed in

compliance with this Courts Resolution issued on July 6, 1992,[15]

respondentprayed that the decision of the Board of Governors be affirmed. Denying that hehad threatened, harassed or intimidated his wife, he alleged that she had

voluntarily executed her Affidavit of Desistance [16]and Motion to Dismiss,[17]even

appearing before the investigating officer, Commissioner Racela, to testify under

oath that she prepared the Motion to Dismiss and Affidavit of Desistance on her

own free will and affirmed the contents thereof.In addition, he professed his love for his wife and his children and denied

abandoning his family to live with his paramour. However, he described his wife

as a person emotionally disturbed,viz.:What is pitiable here is the fact that Complainant is an incurably jealous and

possessive woman, and every time the streak of jealousy rears its head, she firesoff letters or complaints against her husband in every conceivable forum, all

without basis, and purely on impulse, just to satisfy the consuming demands of

her loving jealousy. Then, as is her nature, a few hours afterwards, when her

jealousy cools off, she repents and feels sorry for her acts against the

Respondent. Thus, when she wrote the Letter of November 11, 1991, she was

then in the grips of one of her bouts of jealousy. [18]

On August 24, 1992, this Court issued another Resolution referring the

Comment of respondent to the IBP.[19] In the hearing before IBP Commissioner

Plaridel C. Jose, respondent alleged the following:[20]

2. Your Respondent comes from very poor parents who have left him noteven a square meter of land, but gave him the best legacy in life: a purposeful

and meaningful education. Complainant comes from what she claims to be very

rich parents who value material possession more than education and the higher

and nobler aspirations in life. Complainant abhors the poor.

3. Your Respondent has a loving upbringing, nurtured in the gentle ways oflove, forgiveness, humility, and concern for the poor. Complainant was reared

and raised in an entirely different environment. Her value system is the very

opposite.

4. Your Respondent loves his family very dearly, and has done all he could inthirty-eight (38) years of marriage to protect and preserve his family. He gave his

family sustenance, a comfortable home, love, education, companionship, and

most of all, a good and respected name. He was always gentle and

compassionate to his wife and children. Even in the most trying times, he

remained calm and never inflicted violence on them. His children are all nowfull-fledged professionals, mature, and gainfully employed. x x x

x x x x x x x x x

Your Respondent subscribes to the sanctity of marriage as a social institution.

On the other hand, consumed by insane and unbearable jealousy, Complainant

has been systematically and unceasingly destroying the very foundations of theirmarriage and their family. Their marriage has become a torture chamber in which

Your Respondent has been incessantly BEATEN, BATTERED, BRUTALIZED,

TORTURED, ABUSED, and HUMILIATED, physically, mentally, and

emotionally, by the Complainant, in public and at home. Their marriage has

become a nightmare.For thirty-eight years, your Respondent suffered in silence and bore the pain of

his misfortune with dignity and with almost infinite patience, if only to preserve

their family and their marriage. But this is not to be. The Complainant never

mellowed and never became gentl[e], loving, and understanding. In fact, she

became more fierce and predatory.Hence, at this point in time, the light at the tunnel for Your Respondent does not

seem in sight. The darkness continues to shroud the marital and familial

landscape.

Your Respondent has to undergo a catharsis, a l iberation from

enslavement. Paraphrasing Dorfman in Death and the Maiden, can the torturerand the tortured co-exist and live together?

Hence, faced with an absolutely uncomprehending and uncompromising mind

whose only obsession now is to destroy, destroy, and destroy, Your Respondent,

with perpetual regret and with great sorrow, filed a Petition for Annulment of

Marriage, Spl. Proc. No. 566, RTC, Branch III, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. x x x.5. Complainant is a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending. But

your Respondent never revealed these destructive qualities to other people. He

preserved the good name and dignity of his wife. This is in compliance with the

marital vow to love, honor or obey your spouse, for better or for worse, in

sickness and in health. . . Even in this case, Your Respondent never revealedanything derogatory to his wife. It is only now that he is constrained to reveal all

these things to defend himself.On the other hand, for no reason at all, except a jealous rage, Complainant tells

everyone, everywhere, that her husband is worthless, good-for-nothing, evil and

immoral. She goes to colleges and universities, professional organizations,religious societies, and all other sectors of the community to tell them how evil,

bad and immoral her husband is. She tells them not to hire him as professor, as

Counsel, or any other capacity because her husband is evil, bad, and immoral. Is

this love? Since when did love become an instrument to destroy a mans dearest

possession in life - his good name, reputation and dignity?Because of Complainants virulent disinformation campaign against her husband,

employing every unethical and immoral means to attain his ends, Your

Respondent has been irreparably and irreversibly disgraced, shamed, and

humiliated. Your Respondent is not a scandalous man. It is he who has been

mercilessly scandalized and crucified by the Complainant.[21]

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To prove the alleged propensity of his wife to file false charges,

respondent presented as evidence the following list of the complaints she had

filed against him and Gina Espita:

3.1 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty x x x

3.2 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty, DILG, Adm. Case No. P-5-90. x x x3.3 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutors Office of Cagayan. I.S No.

89-114. x x x

3.4 Complaint for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices and concubinage. OMBUDSMAN

Case No. 1-92-0083. x x x3.5 Complaint for Civil Support. RTC, Tuguegarao, Civil Case No.

4061. DISMISSED.

3.6 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutors Office of Cagayan. I.S. No.

92-109. DISMISSED. (x x x). Complainant filed Motion for

Reconsideration. DENIED. (x x x).

3.7 Complaint for Disbarment (x x x) with S[upreme] C[ourt]. Withdrawn (x xx). DISMISSED by IBP Board of Governors (x x x). Re-instituted (x x x).

3.8 Complaint for Disbarment, again (x x x). Adm. Case No. 3405. Pending.

3.9 Complaint for Concubinage, again (x x x). Third MCTC, Tumauini,

Isabela. Pending. x x x[22]

In his desperate effort to exculpate himself, he averred:I. That all the alleged love letters and envelopes (x x x), picture (x x x) are

inadmissible in evidence as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Cecilia Zulueta

vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996. (x x x).

x x x x x x x x x

II. That respondent is totally innocent of the charges: He never courted Gina

Espita in the Saint Louis College of Tuguegarao. He never caused theemployment of said woman in the DTI. He never had or is having any illicit

relationship with her anywhere, at any time. He never lived with her as husband

and wife anywhere at any time, be it in Centro Tumauini or any of its barangays,

or in any other place. He never begot a child or children with her. Finally,respondent submits that all the other allegations of Mrs. Narag are false and

fabricated, x x x

x x x x x x x x x

III. Respondent never abandoned his family[.] Mrs. Narag and her two sons

forcibly drove respondent Narag out of the conjugal home. After that, Atty. Naragtried to return to the conjugal home many times with the help of mutual friends to

save the marriage and the family from collapse. He tried several times to

reconcile with Mrs. Narag. In fact, in one of the hearings of the disbarment case,

he offered to return home and to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. But Mrs. Naragrefused all these efforts of respondent Narag. x x x

IV. Complainant Julieta B. Narag is an unbearably jealous, violent, vindictive,

scandalous, virulent and merciless wife since the beginning of the marriage, who

incessantly beat, battered, brutalized, tortured, abuse[d], scandalized, and

humiliated respondent Atty. Narag, physically, mentally, emotionally, andpsychologically, x x x.

V. Complainant Julieta Narags claim in her counter-manifestation dated

March 28, 1996, to the effect that the affidavit of Dominador B. Narag, Jr., dated

February 27, 1996 was obtained through force and intimidation, is not

true. Dominador, Jr., executed his affidavit freely, voluntarily, and absolutelywithout force or intimidation, as shown by the transcript of stenographic notes of

the testimonies of Respondent Atty. Narag and Tuguegarao MTC Judge

Dominador Garcia during the trial of Criminal Case No. 12439, People vs.

Dominador M. Narag, et. al., before the Tuguegarao MTC on May 3, 1996. x x

x.x x x x x x x x x

VI. Respondent Atty. Narag is now an old man - a senior citizen of 63 years -

sickly, abandoned, disgraced, weakened and debilitated by progressively

degenerative gout and arthritis, and hardly able to earn his own keep. His very

physical, medical, psychological, and economic conditions render him unfit andunable to do the things attributed to him by the complainant. Please see the

attached medical certificates, x x x, among many other similar certificates

touching on the same ailments. Respondent is also suffering from

hypertension.[23]

On July 18, 1997, the investigating officer submitted his report,[24] recommending the indefinite suspension of Atty. Narag from the practice of

law. The material portions of said report read as follows:

Culled from the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by

the contending parties, two (2) issues are relevant for the disposition of the case,

namely:a) Whether there was indeed a commission of alleged abandonment of

respondents own family and [whether he was] living with his paramour, Gina

Espita;

b) Whether the denial under oath that his illegitimate children with Gina

Espita (Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador) as appearing on paragraph 1(g) ofrespondents Comment vis-a-vis his handwritten love letters, the due execution

and contents of which, although he objected to their admissibility for beingallegedly forgeries, were never denied by him on the witness stand much less

presented and offered proof to support otherwise.

Except for the testimonies of respondents witnesses whose testimonies tend todepict the complaining wife, Mrs. Narag, as an incurably jealous wife and

possessive woman suffering everytime with streaks of jealousy, respondent did

not present himself on the witness stand to testify and be cross-examined on his

sworn comment; much less did he present his alleged paramour, Gina Espita, to

disprove the adulterous relationship between him and their having begotten theirillegitimate children, namely: Aurelle Dominic N. Espita and Kyle Dominador N.

Espita. Worse, respondents denial that he is the father of the two is a ground for

disciplinary sanction (Morcayda v. Naz, 125 SCRA 467).

Viewed from all the evidence presented, we find the respondent subject to

disciplinary action as a member of the legal profession.[25]

In its Resolution[26]issued on August 23, 1997, the IBP adopted and

approved the investigating commissioners recommendation for the indefinite

suspension of the respondent.[27]Subsequently, the complainant sought the

disbarment of her husband in a Manifestation/Comment she filed on October 20,

1997. The IBP granted this stiffer penalty and, in its Resolution dated November30, 1997, denied respondents Motion for Reconsideration.

After a careful scrutiny of the records of the proceedings and the evidence

presented by the parties, we find that the conduct of respondent warrants the

imposition of the penalty of disbarment.The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and

support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice

law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalousmanner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Thus, good moral character is not only a condition precedent[28]to

the practice of law, but a continuingqualification for all members of thebar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be

suspended or disbarred.[29]

Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful,

flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and

respectable members of the community.[30]Furthermore, such conduct must not

only be immoral, butgrossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as toconstitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high

degree[31] or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as toshock the common sense of decency.[32]

We explained inBarrientos vs. Daarol[33]that, as officers of the court,lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to

be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moralstandards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer

of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the

keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing

the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.

Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning hisfamily in order to live with Gina Espita. The burden of proof rests upon the

complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she

establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.[34]

Presented by complainant as witnesses, aside from herself, [35]were: CharlieEspita,[36]Magdalena Bautista,[37] Bienvenido Eugenio,[38] Alice Carag,[39]Dr.

Jervis B. Narag,[40] Dominador Narag, Jr.,[41]and Nieves F. Reyes.[42]

Charlie Espita, brother of the alleged paramour Gina Espita, corroborated

complainants charge against respondent in these categorical statements he gave

to the investigating officer:

Q Mr. Witness, do you know Atty. Narag?Yes, Your Honor, he is the live-in partner of my sister, Gina Espita.If Atty. Narag is here, can you point [to] him?Yes, sir.

(Witness pointed to the respondent, Atty . Dominador Narag)Why do you know Atty. Narag?

ATTY. NARAG:Already answered. He said I am the live-in partner.

CONTINUATION OF THE DIRECTBecause he is the live-in partner of my sister and that they are now living together

as husband and wife and that they already have two children, Aurelle Dominicand Kyle Dominador.

x x x x x x x x x[43]

During cross-examination conducted by the respondent himself, Charlie

Espita repeated his account that his sister Gina was living with the respondent,with whom she had two children:

Q Mr. Espita, you claim that Atty. Narag is now living with your sister as husbandand wife. You claim that?

Yes, sir.Why do you say that?Because at present you are living together as husband and wife and you have

already two children and I know that that is really an immoral act which youcannot just allow me to follow since my moral values dont allow me that my

sister is living with a married man like you.How do you know that Atty. Narag is living with your sister? Did you see them in

the house?Yes, si[r].

x x x x x x x x x

You said also that Atty. Narag and your sister have two children, Aurelle Dominicand Kyle Dominador, is it not?

Yes, sir.How do you know that they are the children of Atty. Narag?Because you are staying together in that house and you have left your family.[44]

In addition, Charlie Espita admitted (1) that it was he who handed to Mrs.

Narag the love letters respondent had sent to his sister, and (2) that Atty. Naragtried to dissuade him from appearing at the disbarment proceedings.[45]

Witness Bienvenido Eugenio strengthened the testimony of Charlie Espita

in this wise:

Q Mr. Witness, do you know the respondent in this case?I know him very well, sir.Could you please tell us why do you know him?Because he was always going to the house of my son-in-law by the name of

Charlie Espita.x x x x x x x x x

Mr. Eugenio, do you know the residence of Atty. Dominador M. Narag?At that time, he [was] residing in the house of Reynaldo Angubong, sir.

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Q And this is located where?A Centro Tamauini, Isabela, sir.Q And you specifically, categorically state under oath that this is the residence of

Atty. Narag?A Yes, sir.

x x x x x x x x x

Q And under oath this is where Atty. Narag and Gina Espita are allegedly living ashusband and wife, is it not?

A Yes, sir.[46]

Witness Nieves Reyes, a neighbor and friend of the estranged couple,testified that she learned from the Narag children -- Randy, Bong and Rowena --

that their father left his family, that she and her husband prodded the complainant

to accept the respondent back, that the Narag couple again separated when the

respondent went back to his woman, and that Atty. Narag had maltreated his

wife.[47]

On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the complainant was

able to establish that respondent abandoned his family and lived with another

woman. Absent any evidence showing that these witnesses had an ill motive to

testify falsely against the respondent, their testimonies are deemed worthy of

belief.Further, the complainant presented as evidence the love letters that

respondent had sent to Gina. In these letters, respondent clearly manifested his

love for Gina and her two children, whom he acknowledged as his own. In

addition, complainant also submitted as evidence the cards that she herself had

received from him. Guided by the rule that handwriting may be proved through a

comparison of one set of writings with those admitted or treated by therespondent as genuine, we affirm that the two sets of evidence were written by

one and the same person.[48] Besides, respondent did not present any evidence to

prove that the love letters were not really written by him; he merely denied that

he wrote them.While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the

duty not only to himself but also to the court to show that he is morally fit to

remain a member of the bar. Mere denial does not suffice. Thus, when his moral

character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished

profession is imperiled, he must meet the charges squarely and present evidence,to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to

have his name in the Roll of Attorneys.[49]This he failed to do.

Respondent adamantly denies abandoning his family to live with Gina

Espita. At the same time, he depicts his wife as a violent husband-beater,vitriolic and unbending, and as an insanely and pathologically jealous woman,

whose only obsession was to destroy, destroy and destroy him as shown by her

filing of a series of allegedly unfounded charges against him (and Gina

Espita). To prove his allegation, he presented ninety-eight (98) pieces of

documentary evidence[50]and ten (10) witnesses.[51]

We note, however, that the testimonies of the witnesses of respondent did

not establish the fact that he maintained that moral integrity required by the

profession that would render him fit to continue practicing law. Neither did their

testimonies destroy the fact, as proven by the complainant, that he had abandoned

his family and lived with Gina Espita, with whom he had two children. Some ofthem testified on matters which they had no actual knowledge of, but merely

relied on information from either respondent himself or other people, while others

were presented to impeach the good character of his wife.

Respondent may have provided well for his family -- they enjoyed a

comfortable life and his children finished their education. He may have alsoestablished himself as a successful lawyer and a seasoned politician. But these

accomplishments are not sufficient to show his moral fitness to continue being a

member of the noble profession of law.

We remind respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties

e.g., to support, educate and instruct their children according to right preceptsand good example; and to give them love, companionship and understanding, as

well as moral and spiritual guidance.[52]As a husband, he is also obliged to live

with his wife; to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render help and

support.[53]

Respondent himself admitted that his work required him to be often awayfrom home. But the evidence shows that he was away not only because of his

work; instead, he abandoned his family to live with his paramour, who bore him

two children. It would appear, then, that he was hardly in a position to be a good

husband or a good father. His children, who grew up mostly under the care of

their mother, must have scarcely felt the warmth of their fathers love.Respondents son, Jervis B. Narag, showed his resentment towards his

fathers moral frailties in his testimony:

Q My question is this, is there any sin so grievous that it cannot be forgiven, is therea fault that is so serious that it is incapable of forgiveness?

A That depends upon the sin or fault, sir, but if the sin or fault is with the emotionalpart of myself, I suppose I cannot forgive a person although I am a God-fearingperson, but I h[av]e to give the person a lesson in order for him or her to at leastrealize his mistakes, sir.

x x x x x x x x x

COMR. JOSE:I think it sounds like this. Assuming for the sake of argument that your father isthe worst, hardened criminal on earth, would you send him to jail and have himdisbarred? That is the question.

CONTINUATION.A With the reputation that he had removed from us, I suppose he has to be given a

lesson. At this point in time, I might just forgive him if he will have to experienceall the pains that we have also suffered for quite sometime.

Q Dr. Narag, your father gave you life, his blood runs in your veins, his flesh is yourflesh, his bones are your bones and you now disown him because he is the worstman on earth, is that what you are saying.

A Sort of, sir.

You are now telling that as far [as] you are concerned because your father hassinned, you have no more father, am I correct?

Long before, sir, I did not feel much from my father even when I was still a kidbecause my father is not always staying with us at home. So, how can you saythat? Yes, he gave me life, why not? But for sure, sir, you did not give melove.[54]

Another son, Dominador Narag, Jr., narrated before the investigating

officer the trauma he went through:

In connection with that affidavit, Mr. Witness, which contains the fact that yourfather is maintaining a paramour, could you please tell this HonorableCommission the effect on you?

This has a very strong effect on me and this includes my brothers and sisters,especially my married life, sir. And it also affected my children so much, that Iand my wife ha[ve] parted ways. It hurts to say that I and my wife partedways. This is one reason that affected us.

Will you please tell us specifically why you and your wife parted ways?Because my wife wa[s] ashamed of what happened to my family and that she could

not face the people, our community, especially because my wife belongs to awell-known family in our community.

How about the effect on your brothers and sisters? Please tell us what are those.Well, sir, this has also affected the health of my elder sister because she knows so

well that my mother suffered so much and she kept on thinking about my mother.x x x x x x x x x

Why did your wife leave you?The truth is because of the things that had happened in our family, Your Honor.

In your wifes family?In our family, sir.And what do you mean by that?What I meant by that is my father had an illicit relationship and that my father

went to the extent of scolding my wife and calling my wife a puta in provincialgovernment, which my mother-in-law hated him so much for this, which reallyaffected us. And then my wife knew for a fact that my father has an illicitrelationship with Gina Espita, whom he bore two children by the name of Aurelle

Dominic and Kyle Dominador, which I could prove and I stand firm to this, YourHonor.[55]

Although respondent piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage,

his acts prove otherwise. A husband is not merely a man who has contracted

marriage. Rather, he is a partner who has solemnly sworn to love and respect his

wife and remain faithful to her until death.We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova[56]The moral delinquency

that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes

conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community,

conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution

of marriage.In Toledo vs. Toledo,[57] the respondent was disbarred from the practice of

law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who

had borne him a child.

Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,[58]the respondent was disbarred after thecomplainant proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterousrelationship with a married woman. This Court declared that respondent failed to

maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the

bar.

In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and

convincing evidence, that respondent had breached the high and exacting moralstandards set for members of the law profession. As held inMaligsa vs.Cabanting,[59]a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his

professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral

character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an

officer of the court.WHEREFORE, Dominador M. Narag is herebyDISBARRED and his

name is ORDERED STRICKENfrom the Roll o