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click here for freelancing tutoring sitesRepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANC G.R. No. L-21723 November 26, 1970HILARION BERONILLA, petitioner, vs.GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, its BOARD OF TRUSTEES, ET AL., respondents.Hilarion Beronilla in his own behalf.L. Monasterial and L. A. Diokno, Jr. for respondents GSIS, etc., et al.T. Besa and J. Jimenez for respondent Rafael S. Recto.Office of the Solicitor General for respondent Auditor General. BARREDO, J.:A special civil action for prohibition seeking to declare Resolution No. 1497 of the Board of Trustees of the respondent Government Service Insurance System of August 9, 1963 to the effect that petitioner "Mr. (Hilarion) Beronilla be considered compulsorily retired from the service (as Auditor of the Philippine National Bank) effective January 14, 1963" as null and void for having been issued, in the words of the petition, "in excess of the powers granted to it by law, a wanton abuse of discretion, violation of contracts, removal or forced retirement without due process of law and to declare all acts heretofore taken in implementation thereof

also void, and to prohibit said respondent and its representatives from carrying out or implementing the aforesaid resolution." Acting on petitioner's prayer for preliminary injunction, on August 26, 1963, this Court issued the writ prayed for upon petitioner's filing an injunction bond in the amount of P1,000.00.At the time of the filing of the present petition on August 23, 1963, petitioner was acting as and performing the duties of Auditor of the Philippine National Bank. Before that, he had occupied many other positions in the government and had been a member of the GSIS during all times required by law.In his application for employment, his applications for life and retirement insurance as well as his application to be allowed to take civil service examinations, ten times from 1917 to 1925, petitioner uniformly indicated that his date of birth is January 14, 1898. He also indicated the same date of birth in his Member's Service Record which he submitted to the GSIS on October 29, 1954 pursuant to the provisions of Section 13-A, Republic Act No. 660.On September 29, 1959, he requested the Commissioner of Civil Service, thru the Auditor General, that his date of birth indicated in the records be changed to January 14, 1900. According to the petition, it was only in 1955, before the demise of his mother that petitioner discovered that his true date of birth is January 14, 1900; that his mother told him that in 1916, his uncle, Alvaro Beronilla, purchased a cedula for him showing in the same that he was already 18 years old for the reason that his uncle wanted to take advantage of his being able to vote for him in La Paz, Abra in 1919, when he would be already twenty-one years of age and the uncle a candidate for vice-president of the municipality; that since then he had been looking for people who could attest to his true date of birth and it was only in September, 1959 that he came upon two old persons of their town, Felix Alberne and Ricardo Lalin who could do so; that the former had been a member of the provincial board and the latter is a retired justice of the peace; and that his letter to the Civil Service Commissioner was supported by the affidavits of these two persons. This letter was endorsed by the Commission to the GSIS for action "without the intervention of the Civil Service Commission."In the GSIS, petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Legal Counsel who, on October 22, 1959, denied the same since "all official records point to January 14, 1898 as the birthday of Mr. Hilarion Beronilla." Upon learning of this denial, petitioner submitted additional evidence to support his request. This evidence consisted of photostat copies of the yearbooks of the Philippine Institute of Accountants in 1954 and 1958 wherein his date of birth is shown as January 14, 1900. This additional evidence notwithstanding, on March 21, 1960 the Legal Counsel reiterated his former denial. Whereupon, on May 21, 1960 petitioner appealed to the General Manager of the System who at that time was Mr. Rodolfo Andal. Upon favorable recommendation of the 2nd Assistant General Manager, Mr. F. G. Araña in a memorandum dated May 30, 1960, on June 2, 1960, Mr. Andal placed "OK." at the foot thereof over his initials, thus indicating approval of the requested change.Based on this action of the General Manager, notes of the adjustment of the date of birth of petitioner to January 14, 1900 were sent to the Auditor General and the Commissioner of Civil Service and the proceeds of petitioner's policy was re-computed. The Legal Counsel whose title and rank had been meanwhile changed to Assistant General Manager for Legal Affairs later communicated the aforesaid decision of the General manager to the Philippine National Bank on November 2, 1962 and the Deputy Auditor General on November 12, 1962, by letter and indorsement, respectively. As emphasized by petitioner, in the letter to the Philippine National Bank, it is stated that "his date of birth has been adjusted by this office, after careful study and deliberation." On the other hand, in the 2nd indorsement to the Deputy Auditor General, it was made clear that relative to petitioner's life insurance policy No. N-2065 which had matured on November 30, 1957, corresponding adjustment or recomputation of the maturity value had been effected on the basis of his changed date of birth. In the meantime, upon application of petitioner, on October 1, 1960, he was issued a new life policy No. 335778 indicating his date of birth as January 14, 1900. Regarding his above-mentioned policy No. N-2065, on July 7, 1960, demand was made upon petitioner to pay the System additionally the sum of P131.09, due to the adjustment of his date of birth, which demand, petitioner promptly complied with.Almost three years after Mr. Andal approved the change of petitioner's date of birth, more specifically, on May 6, 1963, Mr. Ismael Mathay, then Auditor of the Central Bank detailed to the Philippine National Bank, wrote the Board of Trustees of the GSIS about the service of petitioner and stated that "in the course of the audit of the transactions of the Philippine National Bank, it was found that Mr. Hilarion Beronilla has been continuously paid since January 15, 1963, his salary allowances and other fringe benefits as Auditor of said Bank notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Beronilla has attained his sixty-fifth (65th) birthday last January 14, 1963, the date of his automatic and compulsory retirement from the

government service as fixed under Republic Act No. 3096 approved June 16, 1961." Acting on this letter, the Board referred the same to Assistant General Manager and Actuary, Dr. Manuel Hizon, then in charge of the Claims Department. The latter submitted a memorandum on August 6, 1963 stating the facts and evidence in the GSIS records concerning the determination of the date of birth of petitioner, including the actions aforementioned taken thereon by Mr. Andal and the Legal Counsel. On August 9, 1963, the Board adopted the disputed resolution without even notifying petitioner of Mr. Mathay's letter and without giving him any opportunity to be heard regarding the same.Upon these facts, it is the theory of petitioner that the approval by General Manager Andal of his request for the change of the date of his birth in the official records of the GSIS from January 14, 1898 to January 14, 1900, after the same had been previously denied by the Legal Counsel, could not be legally altered or modified by the Board of Trustees, not only because the power to decide such matter finally is legally lodged in the General Manager and not in the Legal Counsel, nor in the Board, but also because even if the Board were assumed to have authority to review the acts of the General Manager, it was either guilty of laches or estopped from revising the same; and, furthermore, in approving the resolution in dispute, the Board of Trustees had denied due process to petitioner and impaired the obligations of the contract between petitioner and the GSIS regarding his retirement. In other words, the main issue before Us in this case is one of power and does not call for Our determination of whether petitioner's real date of birth is January 14, 1898 or January 14, 1900. Accordingly, all We have to decide is whether or not the GSIS Board of Trustees acted within its powers when it reversed the approval by General Manager Andal of petitioner's request for the change of his date of birth, taking all circumstances into account including petitioner's allegations of res adjudicata, laches, estoppel, denial of due process and unconstitutional impairment of contractual obligations. After carefully going over the facts on record and considering all pertinent legal principles and statutory provisions, particularly Commonwealth Act 186, the Charter of the GSIS, as amended, together with the relevant resolutions of the Board of Trustees, We have decided to uphold the superior authority of the Board over the General Manager and to dismiss this petition.We do not deem it necessary to pass upon petitioner's initial proposition, pressed vigorously, to be sure, to the effect that as between the previous denial by the Legal Counsel and the subsequent approval by General Manager Andal of his request for the change of his date of birth in the records, the latter, which was precisely the action on his appeal from the Legal Counsel's denial, should prevail. Even granting it to be true that, pursuant to what is generally the practice and the rule, applications for retirement annuities in the GSIS are subject to final approval by the General Manager after its being approved by one of the Assistant General Managers and/or one or two Department Managers,  1 it is clear to Us that under the GSIS charter, the General Manager's approval is not beyond review and reprobation by the Board of Trustees. It must be borne in mind that under Section 16 of said charter, the System "shall be managed by the Board of Trustees ... " and Section 17 adds that the Board "shall have the following powers and authority: (a) to adopt by-laws, rules and regulations for the administration of the System and the transaction of its business." On the other hand, the extent of the functions and powers of the General Manager are defined in Section 18 as follows:SEC. 18. Personnel. — The Board shall have the power to appoint a general manager, who shall be a person of recognized experience and capacity in the subject of life and social insurance, and who shall be the chief executive officer of the System, one or more assistant general managers, one or more managers, a medical director, and an actuary, and fix their compensation. The general manager shall, subject to the approval of the Board, appoint additional personnel whenever and wherever they may be necessary to the effective execution of the provisions of this Act, fix their compensation, remove, suspend, or otherwise discipline them, for cause. He shall have the power to prescribe their duties, grant leave, prescribe certain qualifications to the end that only competent persons may be employed, and appoint committees: Provided, however, That said additional personnel shall be subject to existing Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.xxx xxx xxxIt is thus obvious that by express statutory authority, the Board of Trustees directly manages the System and the General Manager is only the chief executive officer of the Board. In the exercise of its power to adopt rules and regulations for the administration of the System and the transaction of its business, the Board may lodge in the General Manager the authority to act on any matter the Board may deem proper, but in no wise can such conferment of authority be considered as a full and complete delegation resulting in the diminution, much less exhaustion, of the Board's own statutorily-based prerogative and responsibility to manage the affairs of the System and, accordingly, to decide with finality

any matter affecting its transactions or business. In other words, even if the Board may entrust to the General Manager the power to give final approval to applications for retirement annuities, the finality of such approval cannot be understood to divest the Board, in appropriate cases and upon its attention being called to a flaw, mistake or irregularity in the General Manager's action, of the authority to exercise its power of supervision and control which flows naturally from the ultimate and final responsibility for the proper management of the System imposed upon it by the charter. Incidentally, it may be added that the force of this principle is even more true insofar as the GSIS is concerned, for the fiduciary character of the management of the System is rendered more strict by the fact that the funds under its administration are partly contributed by the thousands upon thousands of employees and workers in all the branches and instrumentalities of the government. It is indeed well to remember at all times that the System and, particularly, its funds do not belong to the government, much less to any administration which may happen to be temporarily on the saddle, and that the interests of the mass of its members can only be duly safeguarded if the administrators of the System act with utmost fidelity and care. Not for nothing is its controlling and managing board called the Board of Trustees. It results, therefore, that the first contention of petitioner cannot be sustained and We hold that any authority conferred upon the General Manager by the Board of Trustees notwithstanding, the said Board may in appropriate cases and in the exercise of its own sound discretion review the actions and decisions of the General Manager. The mere fact that the resolution granting the authority expressly gives the character of finality to the General Manager's acts does not constitute such a representation to third persons dealing with the System that such finality is definite even vis-a-vis the Board as to create any estoppel, for the simple reason that it is not legally possible for the Board to divest itself of an authority which the charter of the System places under its direct responsibility. From another point of view, since the law clearly vests the management in the Board and makes the General Manager only its chief executive officer, all parties dealing with the System must be deemed to be on guard regarding the ultimate authority of the Board to modify or reverse any action of the General Manager and they cannot complain should the Board exercise its powers in the premises.Petitioner posits, however, that even assuming that the Board may have the power to reverse or modify any action of the General Manager in the exercise of his authority, because of the failure of the Board to act from June 2, 1960, when General Manager Andal acted favorably on his request to August 9, 1963, when the Board approved the herein impugned Resolution No. 1497, or for more than three years, during which time corresponding adjustments were made in his GSIS records, payment and life insurance policies and due notices were served by the GSIS itself on all parties concerned on the basis of his changed date of birth, respondent should be considered as guilty of laches or held in estoppel to change or alter the action of Mr. Andal. While petitioner's posture is not entirely without logic, it falls short of the requirements for the successful invocation of the pleas of laches and estoppel. We have carefully considered the lengthy and rather impressive discussion by petitioner of these points in his petition, memorandum and reply to respondent's memorandum as well as the equally detailed and authority-supported contrary arguments in the answer and memorandum of the respondent, and We have arrived at the conclusion that petitioner's position cannot be sustained.It may be stated at the outset that petitioner's twin points of laches and estoppel actually boil down in this particular case to nothing more than estoppel by silence. With this clarification, it is meet to recall that "mere innocent silence will not work estoppel. There must also be some element of turpitude or negligence connected with the silence by which another is misled to his injury" (Civil Code of the Philippines by Tolentino, Vol. IV, p. 600) and that "the doctrine of estoppel having its origin in equity and therefore being based on moral and natural justice, its applicability to any particular case depends, to a very large extent, upon the special circumstances of the case." (Mirasol v. Municipality of Tabaco, 43 Phil. 610, 614.) Important also it is not to overlook that as regards the actuations of government officials, the general rule is that their mistakes and omissions do not create estoppel. (Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., L-18841, January 27, 1969, citing Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807; and Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724. See also: Republic vs. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., L-26862, March 30, 1970, and the cases therein cited.)Moreover, in computing the period of alleged silence or inaction of the Board, what is relevant is not the actual or, what petitioner calls, imputable knowledge of said Board of the favorable action of Mr. Andal. Even if such knowledge had come earlier than May 6, 1963, the date of Mr. Mathay's letter, what is decisive is that it was only thru Mr. Mathay's letter that the Board got notice of the error in Mr. Andal's action.

Precisely because it was not incumbent upon the Board, as petitioner himself alleges, to spontaneously or in the ordinary course review the action of the General Manager, any knowledge thereof by the Board, whether actual or imputable, could not, in logic and conscience, have placed the Board on notice of any error or irregularity therein. Consequently, the immediate steps taken by the Board to have the facts alleged in Mr. Mathay's letter verified are inconsistent with the charge of unreasonable delay, much more of laches.The compulsory retirement of government officials and employees upon their reaching the age of 65 years is founded on public policy which aims by it to maintain efficiency in the government service and at the same time give to the retiring public servants the opportunity to enjoy during the remainder of their lives the recompense, inadequate perhaps for their long service and devotion to. the government, in the form of a comparatively easier life, freed from the rigors of civil service discipline and the exacting demands that the nature of their work and their relations with their superiors as well as the public would impose upon them. Needless to say, therefore, the officials charged with the duty of implementing this policy cannot be too careful in insuring and safeguarding the correctness and integrity of the records they prepare and keep. In this case, all that the Board has done is to set aside what it found to be an erroneous decision of the General Manager in approving the change of date of petitioner's birth, because from the evidence before it, the Board was convinced that the originally recorded date of birth should not be disturbed. We cannot see where the charged inequity of such action of the Board could lie.Above all, it is a must consideration whenever principles of equity are invoked that for such invocation to succeed, it must appear that if the plea is not heeded the party making the plea will suffer, in truth and in fact, inequity and injury, whether pecuniary or moral or, at least, in a juridical sense. Such is not the case with petitioner. Examining the circumstances of this case, We see nothing inequitous to petitioner in the questioned resolution of the Board of Trustees. For decades back, repeatedly and uniformly, petitioner made it appear in all material government and public records and in all his representations to respondent System that his date of birth is January 14, 1898. His rather belated request for a change of said date to January 14, 1900 which would unquestionably favor his interests, pecuniarily or otherwise, and correspondingly adversely affect those of the System and, of course, its members, was duly investigated and found not to be sufficiently grounded to merit favorable action by the Legal Counsel in whom is lodged the authority to evaluate such request. True this negative action was reversed by the General Manager, albeit by virtue of a procedure not strictly in accordance with the established one as outlined in footnote 1 of this opinion, but on the other hand, the favorable action of the General Manager was in turn reversed by the Board of Trustees, the final legal authority in the System, upon its being informed of the error thereof. It is to be noted that, after all, it was always the petitioner who made representations to the respondent System as to his date of birth, and not the other way around. All that the System did was to take his representations for what they were worth. He was not believed by the Legal Counsel, but the General Manager did; on the other hand, the authority higher than the General Manager found the action of the General Manager erroneous. Under these circumstances, how could the System be in estoppel where the conflicting representations are of the petitioner rather than of the System?Anent petitioner's contention that he was denied due process when the Board of Trustees acted on the letter of Mr. Mathay, without notifying him thereof or hearing him thereon, suffice it to say that since there is no showing that under the procedure established in the GSIS, such notice and hearing are required, considering that the System operates as a business corporation and generally notice and hearing are not indispensable for due process in corporations, and in any event, inasmuch as what was considered by the Board was nothing more than petitioner's own conflicting representations, and if petitioner really believed he should have been heard, he could have filed a motion for reconsideration or reopening, it cannot be said that indeed he had not had due opportunity to present his side.Finally, as regards petitioner's argument that the Board's resolution in question constitutes an impairment of the obligations of his contract of insurance, it is obvious that the constitutional injunction that is evidently the basis of such argument refers to the legislature and not to resolutions even of government corporations. Besides, petitioner's life insurance policy, apart from not having any real relevance in this case, what is involved being his retirement, contains specific provisions contemplating the correction of any error or mistake in the date of birth of the insured. On the other hand, the retirement of government employees is imposed by law and is not the result of any contractual stipulation.

WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is dismissed, with costs against petitioner, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued herein is hereby dissolved.Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur.Concepcion, C.J., and Fernando, J., concur in the result.Castro, J., reserves his vote.Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave. # Footnotes1 With respect to the procedure for approval of applications for retirement, the Board of Trustees has from time to time approved the following resolutions:1. On January 15, 1952, Resolution No. 15 providing:"In order to expedite action on applications for retirement annuities, the Board resolved to authorize the Manager of the Administrative Department of the System to process and approve such applications, subject to final approval of the General Manager and Actuary." (Emphasis supplied)2. On March 24, 1954, Resolution No. 145 as follows:"2. Retirement Applications"Retirement applications shall be approved by the General Manager, Administrative Department, the Assistant General Manager, and the Associate Actuary and Acting Manager, Production Department."In the following cases, approval of the following officials shall also be required in addition to those named hereinabove:a. No beneficiary or where there is legal problem involved — By the Legal Officer.b. No premium payments — By the Manager, Accounting Department."3. On November 3, 1954, Resolution No. 627 reading:"Retirement applications shall be approved by 3 officials as follows: Manager, Claims Department, either one of the Assistant General Managers, and either the Actuary or Associate Actuary."In the following cases, approval of the following officials shall also be required in addition to those named hereinabove:a. No beneficiary or where there is legal problem involved — By the Legal Officer.b. No premium payments — By the Manager, Accounting Department."4. On July 3, 1957, Resolution No. 1591 thus:"Where the records show conflicting dates of birth of an applicant for retirement and no birth or baptismal certificate can be submitted due to its loss or destruction, the matter is referred to the Corporate Counsel of the System, together with all secondary evidence in relation to the date of birth of the applicant. The Corporate Counsel in turn determines the correct date of birth, for purposes of retirement and life insurance, after evaluating the relative evidentiary value of the documents submitted, in accordance with the Rules of Court." (Emphasis supplied)It is the theory of petitioner that Resolutions Nos. 627 and 1591 must be understood as subject to the condition in Resolution No. 15 that the approval of the other subordinate managers or officials referred to therein must be approved by the General Manager whose action shall be final. Respondents deny this, specially as regards Resolution No. 1591 which they claim makes the Corporate Counsel of the System the final authority on the matters therein mentioned, which include controversies or discrepancies as to the date of birth of any applicant for retirement. The Court sees no necessity, as stated in the above opinion, of passing on the secondary issue, the same being subordinate, after all, to the main proposition that the General Manager's decision is subject to the review and final action of the Board of Trustees.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANC G.R. No. 97419 July 3, 1992GAUDENCIO T. CENA, petitioner, vs.THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and THE HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, respondents. MEDIALDEA, J.:May a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government service, be allowed to continue in the service to complete the15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the benefits of an

old-age pension under Section 11 par. (b) of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977? This is the issue raised before this Court by petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena, a Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila.The facts are not disputed.Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena entered the government service on November 16, 1978 as Legal Officer II of the Law Department of Caloocan City where he stayed for seven (7) years until his transfer on November 16, 1986 to the Office of the Congressman of the First District of Caloocan City where he worked for only three (3) months, or until February 15, 1987, as Supervising Staff Officer.On July 16, 1987, he was appointed as Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila, the position he held at the time he reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years on January 22, 1991. By then, he would have rendered a total government service of 11 years, 9 months and 6 days. Before reaching his 65th birthday, he requested the Secretary of Justice, through Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the 15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with full benefits of old-age pension under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. 1146.The LRA Administrator, for his part, sought a ruling from the Civil Service Commission whether or not to allow the extension of service of petitioner Cena as he is covered by Civil Service Memorandum No. 27, series 1990. In his 2nd Indorsement dated August 6, 1990, the LRA Administrator observed that if petitioner's service as of January 22, 1991 of 10 years, 6 months and 6 days (should be 11 years, 9 months and 6 days) would be extended to 15 years, he would have to retire on April 15, 1994 at the age of 68 years.On July 31, 1990, the Civil Service Commission denied petitioner Cena's request for extension of service in its CSC Resolution No. 90-681, declaring therein, that Mr. Cena shall be considered retired from the service on January 22, 1991, the date when he shall reach the compulsory retirement age ofsixty-five (65) years, unless his retention for another year is sought by the head of office under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990.Petitioner Cena filed a motion for reconsideration. On October 17, 1990, the Civil Service Commission set aside its CSC Resolution No. 90-681 and allowed Gaudencio Cena a one-year extension of his service from January 22, 1991 to January 22, 1992, citing CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, series of 1990, the pertinent of which reads:1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who are regular members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be granted for a period not exceeding one (1) year.On January 22, 1991, petitioner's second motion for reconsideration was denied in its CSC Resolution No. 91-101.Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari alleging that the Civil Service Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion when it granted the extension of petitioner's service as Registrar of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila, for a period of only one (1) year pursuant to CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, instead of three (3) years and three (3) months to complete the 15-year service requirement for his retirement with full benefits as provided under Section 11, par. (b) of Presidential Degree No. 1146, otherwise known as the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977.Petitioner contends that reliance of the Commission on par. (1) of Memorandum Circular No. 27 allowing an extension of service of a compulsory retiree for a period not exceeding one (1) year is both erroneous and contrary to the "benevolent and munificent intentions" of Section 11 of P.D. 1146. Petitioner points out that par. (b), Section 11 of P.D. No. 1146 does not limit nor specify the maximum number of years the retiree may avail of to complete the 15 years of service.The Solicitor-General agrees with petitioner Cena. He argues that the questioned provision being generally worded, Section 11 par. (b), P.D. 1146 has general application, thus respondent CSC has no authority to limit through CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 the privilege under said section to government employees who lack just one year to complete the 15-year service requirement.The Civil Service Commission, however, contends that since public respondent CSC is the central personnel agency of the government, it is vested with the power and authority, among others, to grant or allow extension of service beyond retirement age pursuant to Section 14 par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). In interpreting Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146, public respondent CSC contends that the phrase "Provided, That if he has less than fifteen years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years", is qualified by the clause: "Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities," which means

that the extension of service must be first authorized by the Commission, as the appropriate authority referred to in Section 11, par. (b), P.D. 1146, before the service of a compulsory retiree (one who has already reached age of 65 years with at least 15 years of service) can be extended.We grant the petition.Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (November 24, 1987) cannot be interpreted to authorize the Civil Service Commission to limit to only one (1) year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 without having completed 15 years of service, when said limitation his no relation to or connection with the provision of the law supposed to be carried into effect.Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides thus:Sec. 12. Powers and Functions. — The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:xxx xxx xxx(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service including extension of service beyond retirement age;As a law of general application, the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot authorize the modification of an express provision of a special law (Revised Government Service Insurance of 1977). Otherwise, the intent and purpose of the provisions on retirement and pension of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 (P.D. 1146) would be rendered nugatory and meaningless.Section 11 paragraph (b) of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 expressly provides, thus:Sec. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension. — (a) Old-age pension shall be paid to a member who:xxx xxx xxx(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an employee of sixty-five years of age with at least fifteen years of service: Provided, That if he has less than fifteen years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years. (Emphasis supplied)Being remedial in character, a statute creating a pension or establishing retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security and well-being of government employees may be enhanced (Bautista vs. Auditor General, 104 Phil 428; Ortiz vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-78957, June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA 812).The Court stated in Abad Santos vs. Auditor General, 79 Phil. 176, that a pension partakes of the nature of "retained wages" of the retiree for a double purpose: (1) to entice competent men and women to enter the government service, and (2) permit them to retire from the service with relative security, not only for those who have retained their vigor, but more so for those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident.We have applied the liberal approach in interpreting statutes creating pension or establishing retirement plans in cases involving officials of the Judiciary who lacked the age and service requirement for retirement. We see no cogent reason to rule otherwise in the case of ordinary employees of the Executive Branch, as in the case of petitioner Cena, who has reached 65 but opted to avail of the statutory privilege under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement in order to avail of old-age pension.In Re: Application for Gratuity Benefits of Associate Justice Efren I. Plana, Adm. Matter No. 5460, En Banc Resolution, March 24, 1988, the Court, applying the liberal approach, ruled that Justice Plana, who at the time of his courtesy resignation on March 25, 1986 lacked a few months to meet the age requirement for retirement under the law, is entitled to full retirement benefits under R.A. 910 because his accrued leave credits would have entitled him to go on leave until beyond the age requirement for retirement.The above ruling of the Court was reiterated in Re: Application for Retirement under Rep. Act No. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B. Britanico of the Intermediate Appellate Court, Adm. Matter No. 6484 — Ret., May 15, 1989. By liberally interpreting Section 3 of R.A. 910, as amended, in favor of the persons intended to be benefited by them, the Court also allowed the conversion of the application for disability retirement of Justice Ruperto Martin under said Section 3 of R.A. 910, as amended (10-year lump sum without the lifetime annuity) into an application for voluntary retirement under Section 1(5-year lump sum with lifetime annuity) eleven years after his disability retirement was approved on January 10, 1978 (In Re: Application for Life Pension under Rep. Act 910. Ruperto G. Martin, applicant, 187 SCRA 477). The ten-year lump sum which he had received was considered by the Court as payment under Section 1 of the five-year

lump sum, to which he was entitled, and of his monthly pensions for the next five years.However, the Court pointed out in Re: Gregorio G. Pineda, Adm. Matter No. 2076-RET., July 13, 1990, and its six (6) companion cases, 187 SCRA 469, that when the Court allows seeming exceptions to fixed rules for certain retired Judges or Justices, there are ample reasons behind each grant of an exception. The crediting of accumulated leaves to make up for lack of required age or length of service is not done indiscriminately. It is always on case to case basis.There is thus no justifiable reason in not allowing ordinary employees in the Executive Branch on a case to case basis, to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement to avail of the old-age pension under Section 11 of P.D. 1146. By limiting the extension of service to only one (1) year would defeat the beneficial intendment of the retirement provisions of P.D. 1146.In resolving the question whether or not to allow a compulsory retiree to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service, there must be present an essential factor before an application under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 may be granted by the employer or government office concerned. In the case of officials of the Judiciary, the Court allows a making up or compensating for lack of required age or service only if satisfied that the career of the retiree was marked by competence, integrity, and dedication to the public service (Re: Gregorio Pineda, supra). It must be so in the instant case.It is interesting to note that the phrase "he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years" found in Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146 is a reproduction of the phrase in the original text found in Section 12 (e) of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended, otherwise known as the "Government Service Insurance Act" approved on November 14, 1936. There is nothing in the original text as well as in the revised version which would serve as the basis for providing the allowable extension period to only one (1) year. There is likewise no indication that Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 contemplates a borderline situation where a compulsory retiree on his 65th birthday has completed more than 14, but less than 15 years of government service., i.e. only a few months short of the 15-year requirement which would enable him to collect an old-age pension.While it is true that the Administrative Code of 1987 has given the Civil Service Commission the authority "to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service including extension of service beyond retirement age", the said provision cannot be extended to embrace matters not covered by the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 (Sto. Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, "citing 12 C.J. 845-46). The authority referred to therein is limited only to carrying into effect what the special law, Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977, or any other retirement law being invoked provides. It cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle that administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions (People vs. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).The pronouncement of the Court in the case of Augusta Toledo vs. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 92646-47, October 4, 1991, squarely applies in the instant case. We declared in the case of Toledo that the rule prohibiting 57-year old persons from employment, reinstatement, orre-employment in the government service provided under Section 22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies (CSRPAP) cannot be accorded validity, because it is entirely a creation of the Civil Service Commission, having no basis in the law itself which it was meant to implement and it cannot be related to or connected with any specific provision of the law which it is meant to carry into effect. The Court, speaking thru Justice Edgardo L. Paras, stated, thus:The power vested in the Civil Service Commission was to implement the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply perceived omissions in it. "By its administrative regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended; said regulations cannot amend an act of Congress." (Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration, 33 SCRA 585, 589 [1970], citing Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419 [1960]; see also, Animos v. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, 174 SCRA 214, 223-224 [1989] in turn citing Teoxon).

The considerations just expounded also conduce to the conclusion of the invalidity of Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP. The enactment of said section, relative to 57-year old persons, was also an act of supererogation on the part of the Civil Service Commission since the rule has no relation to or connection with any provision of the law supposed to be carried into effect. The section was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect. (Emphasis supplied)The governing retirement law in the instant case is P.D. 1146 otherwise known as the "Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977." The rule on limiting to only one (1) year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but has less than 15 years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 s. 1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no relation to or connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil Service Commission has no power to supply perceived omissions in P.D. 1146.As a matter of fact, We have liberally applied Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 in two (2) recent cases where We allowed two employees in the Judiciary who have reached the age of 65 to continue in the government service to complete the 15-year service requirement to be entitled to the benefits under P.D. 1146.In a resolution dated January 23, 1990 in A.M. No. 87-7-1329-MTC, We allowed Mrs. Florentina J. Bocade, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court, Dagami, Leyte, who at the time she reached the age of 65 years on October 16, 1987 had only 10 years of government service, to continue her services until October 10, 1992. Thus, she was given a period of 5 years, to complete the15-year service requirement to be entitled to the retirement benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146. The Court observed that Mrs. Bocade is still performing her duties without any adverse complaints from her superior and that she is physically fit for work per report of the Medical Clinic.The Court, in a resolution dated April 18, 1991, in A.M. No. 91-3-003-SC.-Re: Request for the extension of service of Mrs. Crisanta T. Tiangco, allowed Mrs. Crisanta T. Tiangco, Budget Officer V, Budget Division, Fiscal Management and Budget Office of the Supreme Court to continue her services until February 10, 1995. She was granted a period of 3 years, 10 months and 13 days because she has to her credit only 11 years, 1 month and 17 days of government service at the time she reached the age of 65 years on March 29, 1991 in order that she be entitled to the retirement benefits under P.D. No. 1146.It is erroneous to apply to petitioner Cena who has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government service, Section 12, par. (b) of P.D. 1146 which provides that "a member who has rendered at least three (3) years but less than 15 years of service at the time of separation shall, . . . upon separation after age sixty, receive a cash equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of service."The applicable law should be Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 which allows him to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days to complete the 15-year of service consistent with the beneficial intendment of P.D. 1146 and which right is subject to the discretion of the government office concerned.Section 12 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 does not apply to the case of herein Cena, because he opted to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement pursuant to Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146. The completion of the 15-year service requirement under Section 11 par. (b) partakes the nature of a privilege given to an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but has less than 15 years of service. If said employee opted to avail of said privilege, he is entitled to the benefits of the old-age pension. On the other hand, if the said employee opted to retire upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of 65 years although he has less than 15 years of service, he is entitled to the benefits provided for under Section 12 of P.D. 1146 i.e. a cash equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of service.The right under Section 11, par. (b) is open to all employees similarly situated, so it does not offend the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law. There is nothing absurd or inequitable in rewarding an employee for completion of the 15-year service beyond the retirement age. If he would be better off than the one who has served for 14 years but who is separated from the service at the age of 64, it would be only just and proper as he would have worked for the whole period of 15 years as required by law for entitlement of the old-age pension. Indeed, a longer service should merit a greater reward. Besides, his entitlement to the old-age pension is conditioned upon such completion. Thus, if the service is not completed due to death or incapacity, he would be entitled to the benefit under Section 12, par. (b), i.e. cash equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of service.

Finally, in view of the aforesaid right accorded under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. 1146, petitioner Cena should not be covered by Memorandum Circular No. 65 issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig on June 14, 1988. Memorandum Circular No. 65 allowing retention of service for only six (6) months for "extremely meritorious reasons" should apply only to employees or officials who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years but who, at the same time, have completed the 15-year service requirement for retirement purposes. It should not apply to employees or officials who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who opted to avail of the old-age pension under par. (b), Section 11 of P.D. 1146, in which case, they are allowed, at the discretion of the agency concerned, to complete the 15-year service requirement.ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) of the Department of Justice has the discretion to allow petitioner Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government service to complete the 15-year service so that he may retire with full benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.   Separate Opinions PADILLA, J.: concurring:I concur in the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Leo D. Medialdea, with a slight modification. The majority opinion would vest upon the Land Registration Authority "the discretion to allow petitioner Gaudencio Cena to extend his eleven (11) years, nine (9) months and six (6) days of government service to complete the fifteen (15) years service so that he may retire with full benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146" (decision, p. 16). A reading of the cited provision of law which reads as follows:Sec. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension.xxx xxx xxx(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an employee of sixty-five years of age with at least fifteen years of service: Provided, That if he has less than fifteen years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years.would indicate, in my opinion, that the government employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age but has rendered less than fifteen (15) years of service, has THE RIGHT to continue in the service to complete fifteen (15) years, and that the government office or agency where he is employed cannot but allow the exercise of such right of the subject employee. In short, the employing government office or agency must allow the government employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age, but has rendered less than fifteen (15) years of service, the opportunity to complete the fifteen (15) years of service in order to enjoy the benefits of old-age pension. It follows from this that if such government employee is no longer fit to complete the remainder of the fifteen (15) year service (after reaching age 65), he should be terminated for cause, after appropriate proceedings, otherwise, he has the right to continue in the service for purposes of completing his fifteen (15) years of service.GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.: dissenting:The issue raised in this petition for review of the Resolution No. 90-935 dated October 17, 1990 of the Civil Service Commission, is whether the government service of petitioner Gaudencio Cena as Registrar of Deeds for Malabon, Metro Manila, may be extended for a period of one (1) year only (from January 22, 1991 up to January 22, 1992) and not for as long as necessary to enable him to complete 15 years service so that he may retire with full benefits.After a careful consideration of related provisions of the retirement laws, I submit that inasmuch as P.D. No. 1146 is silent on the matter, the Civil Service Commission, pursuant to the authority granted to it in the Administrative Code of 1987, "to take appropriate action on . . . all personnel matters in the Civil Service, including extension of service beyond retirement age" (paragraph 14, Section 12, Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V), appropriatelypromulgated Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, limiting the extension of service to "not exceeding one year." The pertinent provisions of the circular are quoted below:1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who are regular members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be granted for a period not exceeding one (1) year.

2. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retiree to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement who entered the government service at 57 years of age or over upon prior grant of authority to appoint him or her, shall no longer be granted.3. Any request for the extension of service to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement shall be filed not later than three (3) years prior to the date of compulsory retirement.4. Any request for the extension of service of a compulsory retiree who meets the minimum number of years of service for retirement purposes may be granted for six (6) months only with no further extension. (pp. 64-65, Rollo; emphasis supplied.)The maximum allowable extension of "not exceeding one year" fixed in paragraph 1 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 is reasonable, just, and consistent with the general rule that "retirement shall be automatic and compulsory at the age of 65 years" (Sec. 12[e], Com. Act 186).I believe that Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D. 1146 contemplates a borderline situation where a compulsory retiree on his 65th birthday has completed more than 14, but less than 15, years of government service, or a few months short of the 15-year requirement which would enable him to collect an old-age pension. Pursuant to the beneficent objectives of our retirement laws, said retiree may be granted an extension of not more than one year to enable him to complete 15 years of government service and receive full retirement benefits including old-age pension which, otherwise, he would not be entitled to receive. Such extension will enable him to retire after his 65th birthday, but before he attains 66 years of age, hence, still within the mandatory retirement age of 65 years fixed by law, for as a matter of fact, one is 65 years old upon reaching his 65th birthday until the eve of his 66th.Since Cena, on his 65th birthday, had rendered service to the government for a total of only 11 years, 9 months and 6 days, he is not entitled to an extension of his service to complete 15 years for it would illegally and unreasonably stretch his retirement age beyond his 68th birthday, or long after he shall have ceased to be 65 years old.As Cena would not be able to complete 15 years of government service even if he were given a one-year extension of service, paragraph 1 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 may not be availed of by him. The applicable legal provision to him would be paragraph (b), Section 12 of P.D. 1146 which provides that "a member who has rendered at least three (3) years but less than 15 years of service at the time of separation shall, . . . upon separation after age sixty, ** receive a cash payment equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of service." He is not entitled to an old-age pension, length of service being the determinant of whether or not a retired employee would be entitled to such pension.The petitioner's theory that a compulsory retiree (one who is 65 years old) should be allowed an extension of his service for any number of years to complete the 15-year-service requirement under Section 11(b), P.D. 1146, can produce absurd and inequitable results. An employee who has rendered only 3 years of government service at the age of 65 can have his service extended for 12 years and finally retire at the age of 77 and receive a life pension, while one who has served for 14 years, but whose service is terminated by death or incapacity at the age of 64, will only receive a cash gratuity equivalent to one month pay for every year of service in the government, without a life pension, under "Section 12, paragraph (b), P.D. No. 1146.Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that extending the service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-comers in the government service and in effect discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment of qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the various government examinations but must wait for jobs to be vacated by "extendees" who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government service to complete 15 years so they may qualify for old-age pension.While I agree with the stand of the Civil Service Commission that an extension of service may not exceed one year, I do not agree with the grant to Cena of a service extension of one (1) year from January 23, 1991, or until January 22, 1992 under paragraph 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 27 for that paragraph should apply to a compulsory retiree who needs an extension of "not exceeding one year" (Cena needs more than 3 years) to complete the 15-year-service requirement for old-age pension benefits. There is no point in granting to a 65-year-old retiree a one-year extension of service, if, anyway, as in Cena's case, the extension will not enable him to complete 15 years of government service. Applicable to Cena is paragraph (b), Section 12 of P.D. 1146 which provides that "a member who has rendered . . . less than 15 years of service upon separation after age sixty, (shall) receive a cash payment

equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of service."I therefore vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari.ROMERO, J.: dissenting:I adopt the arguments in the dissenting opinion of my esteemed colleague, J. Carolina Griño-Aquino, which are at once logical and reasonable even as it takes into account the sociological implications of a contrary ruling. At the same time, I add my own.J. Aquino's interpretation is in consonance with the spirit of practically all existing retirement laws fixing thecompulsory retirement age of government employees at sixty-five. The precursor of Presidential Decree No. 1146, Commonwealth Act No. 186, explicitly provided that retirement should be "automatic and compulsory at the age of sixty-five years." The phrase "automatic and compulsory" with reference to the retirement age of sixty-five years had been retained in subsequent amendatory laws, specifically Republic Act Nos. 660, 728 and 3096.The word "compulsory" should be understood in its legal signification: involuntary or forced in contradistinction to voluntary. 1 Considering the use of the word "compulsory" in connection with age sixty-five, the same word in Sec. 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 should refer only to the specified retirement age and not to the fifteen-year service mentioned therein. This paragraph merely cites one class of prospective retirees which would be eligible to receive old-age pension and that is, those who have reached the age of sixty-five years while at the same time having to their credit "at least fifteen years of service." That this is the intendment of the law is borne out by the succeeding proviso that contemplates the possibility that the same sixty-five year old may have served "less than fifteen years of service."Moreover, to interpret the law as meaning that the age limit and the fifteen-year length of service should concur before a government employee is allowed the old-age pension may well give rise to a situation wherein a person who enters government service a year before reaching age sixty-five would have to wait until he is seventy-nine years old to be entitled to the old-age pension provided for in P.D. No. 1146, which is an absurdity. Hence, to give substance to the real signification of the law, the proviso in Sec. 11 (b) which states that a government employee who has "less than fifteen years of service, . . . shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years," should contemplate a situation wherein the employee has only a minimal period of time left to complete the fifteen-year period. What this minimal period is, the Civil Service Commission has correctly declared to be "not exceeding one year." Otherwise, the government may well be saddled with a corps of civil servants that may be regarded graphically as liabilities instead of assets.Moreover, encouraging the retention of employees well beyond the age of sixty-five years would, in effect, swell the numbers of the qualified but unemployed many who, even now, face the bleak prospect of being edged out of the labor market by those who can but offer to the government and the people their diminishing physical and mental vitality.Attention should be called to the fact that the dissenting opinion is in consonance with the present policy on retirement as well as trends being laid down by the other branches of the government on the matter.For instance, there are bills now pending in Congress that seek to lower the compulsory retirement age of the bureaucracy. House Bill No. 33769 sponsored by Congressman Roco and other Congressmen would lower it from sixty-five to sixty. 2

Its counterpart bill in the Senate, S. No. 561 whose author is Senator Tamano, likewise would amend the present law by lowering the compulsory age of retirement to sixty. 3

House Bill No. 25903 earlier authored by Congressmen Monfort and Estrella would further reduce the compulsory retirement age to fifty-six in order to give the young retirees the opportunity to engage in gainful employment or otherwise utilize their skills and experiences while they are still relatively strong.Along the same line of thinking, the proposed Civil Service Code would set the compulsory age of retirement at sixty.On the specific issue of whether a compulsory retiree who has not served fifteen years should be allowed an extension for as long as necessary to enable him to complete the fifteen years of service required for entitlement to a life pension (which is the position of the petitioner) or just a maximum period of "not exceeding one year" as fixed in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 which is supported by the dissenting opinion, it is worthwhile calling attention to Memorandum Circular No. 65 4 issued by Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. Amending Memorandum Circular No. 163 dated March 5, 1968, it categorically states:Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not be retained in the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months.

According to the ponencia, this Circular "should apply only to employees or officials who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years but who, at the same time, have completed the 15-year service requirement for retirement purposes." A close reading of the title of Memorandum Circular No. 65, as well as the relevant provision quoted above, leaves no room for ambiguity or interpretation inasmuch as there is no phrase that qualifies the scope of the law to those employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years "but who, at the same time, have completed the15-year service requirement for retirement purposes." To read into the Memorandum Circular this qualifying phrase is to unduly expand the coverage of the law to cases not intended by the Office of the Executive Secretary.The ponencia proffers the argument that since the Court has allowed the officials and employees of the Judiciary who have reached the compulsory age of retirement but lacked the fifteen-year service requirement to continue working until they complete said period, there is "no cogent reason to rule otherwise in the case of ordinary employees of the Executive Branch as in the case of petitioner Cena". But there is a cogent reason Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena, being an employee of the Land Registration Authority under the Department of Justice, falls under the Executive Department. Accordingly, Memorandum Circular No. 65 quoted in the above preceding paragraph which allows a retention or extension of only six months and this, only for "extremely meritorious reasons" should be applicable to his case.Needless to say, it would conduce to sound management practice in the government if this rule could be rationalized and applied uniformly to all government employees, with the exceptions provided by law. Separate OpinionsPADILLA, J.: concurring:I concur in the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Leo D. Medialdea, with a slight modification. The majority opinion would vest upon the Land Registration Authority "the discretion to allow petitioner Gaudencio Cena to extend his eleven (11) years, nine (9) months and six (6) days of government service to complete the fifteen (15) years service so that he may retire with full benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146" (decision, p. 16). A reading of the cited provision of law which reads as follows:Sec. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension.xxx xxx xxx(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an employee of sixty-five years of age with at least fifteen years of service: Provided, That if he has less than fifteen years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years.would indicate, in my opinion, that the government employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age but has rendered less than fifteen (15) years of service, has THE RIGHT to continue in the service to complete fifteen (15) years, and that the government office or agency where he is employed cannot but allow the exercise of such right of the subject employee. In short, the employing government office or agency must allow the government employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age, but has rendered less than fifteen (15) years of service, the opportunity to complete the fifteen (15) years of service in order to enjoy the benefits of old-age pension. It follows from this that if such government employee is no longer fit to complete the remainder of the fifteen (15) year service (after reaching age 65), he should be terminated for cause, after appropriate proceedings, otherwise, he has the right to continue in the service for purposes of completing his fifteen (15) years of service.GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:The issue raised in this petition for review of the Resolution No. 90-935 dated October 17, 1990 of the Civil Service Commission, is whether the government service of petitioner Gaudencio Cena as Registrar of Deeds for Malabon, Metro Manila, may be extended for a period of one (1) year only (from January 22, 1991 up to January 22, 1992) and not for as long as necessary to enable him to complete 15 years service so that he may retire with full benefits.After a careful consideration of related provisions of the retirement laws, I submit that inasmuch as P.D. No. 1146 is silent on the matter, the Civil Service Commission, pursuant to the authority granted to it in the Administrative Code of 1987, "to take appropriate action on . . . all personnel matters in the Civil Service, including extension of service beyond retirement age" (paragraph 14, Section 12, Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V), appropriatelypromulgated Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, limiting the extension of service to "not exceeding one year." The pertinent provisions of the circular are quoted below:1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement shall

be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who are regular members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be granted for a period not exceeding one (1) year.2. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retiree to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement who entered the government service at 57 years of age or over upon prior grant of authority to appoint him or her, shall no longer be granted.3. Any request for the extension of service to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement shall be filed not later than three (3) years prior to the date of compulsory retirement.4. Any request for the extension of service of a compulsory retiree who meets the minimum number of years of service for retirement purposes may be granted for six (6) months only with no further extension. (pp. 64-65, Rollo; emphasis supplied.)The maximum allowable extension of "not exceeding one year" fixed in paragraph 1 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 is reasonable, just, and consistent with the general rule that "retirement shall be automatic and compulsory at the age of 65 years" (Sec. 12[e], Com. Act 186).I believe that Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D. 1146 contemplates a borderline situation where a compulsory retiree on his 65th birthday has completed more than 14, but less than 15, years of government service, or a few months short of the 15-year requirement which would enable him to collect an old-age pension. Pursuant to the beneficent objectives of our retirement laws, said retiree may be granted an extension of not more than one year to enable him to complete 15 years of government service and receive full retirement benefits including old-age pension which, otherwise, he would not be entitled to receive. Such extension will enable him to retire after his 65th birthday, but before he attains 66 years of age, hence, still within the mandatory retirement age of 65 years fixed by law, for as a matter of fact, one is 65 years old upon reaching his 65th birthday until the eve of his 66th.Since Cena, on his 65th birthday, had rendered service to the government for a total of only 11 years, 9 months and 6 days, he is not entitled to an extension of his service to complete 15 years for it would illegally and unreasonably stretch his retirement age beyond his 68th birthday, or long after he shall have ceased to be 65 years old.As Cena would not be able to complete 15 years of government service even if he were given a one-year extension of service, paragraph 1 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 may not be availed of by him. The applicable legal provision to him would be paragraph (b), Section 12 of P.D. 1146 which provides that "a member who has rendered at least three (3) years but less than 15 years of service at the time of separation shall, . . . upon separation after age sixty, ** receive a cash payment equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of service." He is not entitled to an old-age pension, length of service being the determinant of whether or not a retired employee would be entitled to such pension.The petitioner's theory that a compulsory retiree (one who is 65 years old) should be allowed an extension of his service for any number of years to complete the 15-year-service requirement under Section 11(b), P.D. 1146, can produce absurd and inequitable results. An employee who has rendered only 3 years of government service at the age of 65 can have his service extended for 12 years and finally retire at the age of 77 and receive a life pension, while one who has served for 14 years, but whose service is terminated by death or incapacity at the age of 64, will only receive a cash gratuity equivalent to one month pay for every year of service in the government, without a life pension, under "Section 12, paragraph (b), P.D. No. 1146.Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that extending the service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-comers in the government service and in effect discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment of qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the various government examinations but must wait for jobs to be vacated by "extendees" who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government service to complete 15 years so they may qualify for old-age pension.While I agree with the stand of the Civil Service Commission that an extension of service may not exceed one year, I do not agree with the grant to Cena of a service extension of one (1) year from January 23, 1991, or until January 22, 1992 under paragraph 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 27 for that paragraph should apply to a compulsory retiree who needs an extension of "not exceeding one year" (Cena needs more than 3 years) to complete the 15-year-service requirement for old-age pension benefits. There is no point in granting to a 65-year-old retiree a one-year extension of service, if, anyway, as in Cena's case, the extension will not enable him to complete 15 years of government service. Applicable to Cena is paragraph (b), Section 12 of P.D. 1146 which

provides that "a member who has rendered . . . less than 15 years of service upon separation after age sixty, (shall) receive a cash payment equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of service."I therefore vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari.ROMERO, J.: dissenting:I adopt the arguments in the dissenting opinion of my esteemed colleague, J. Carolina Griño-Aquino, which are at once logical and reasonable even as it takes into account the sociological implications of a contrary ruling. At the same time, I add my own.J. Aquino's interpretation is in consonance with the spirit of practically all existing retirement laws fixing thecompulsory retirement age of government employees at sixty-five. The precursor of Presidential Decree No. 1146, Commonwealth Act No. 186, explicitly provided that retirement should be "automatic and compulsory at the age of sixty-five years." The phrase "automatic and compulsory" with reference to the retirement age of sixty-five years had been retained in subsequent amendatory laws, specifically Republic Act Nos. 660, 728 and 3096.The word "compulsory" should be understood in its legal signification: involuntary or forced in contradistinction to voluntary. 1 Considering the use of the word "compulsory" in connection with age sixty-five, the same word in Sec. 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 should refer only to the specified retirement age and not to the fifteen-year service mentioned therein. This paragraph merely cites one class of prospective retirees which would be eligible to receive old-age pension and that is, those who have reached the age of sixty-five years while at the same time having to their credit "at least fifteen years of service." That this is the intendment of the law is borne out by the succeeding proviso that contemplates the possibility that the same sixty-five year old may have served "less than fifteen years of service."Moreover, to interpret the law as meaning that the age limit and the fifteen-year length of service should concur before a government employee is allowed the old-age pension may well give rise to a situation wherein a person who enters government service a year before reaching age sixty-five would have to wait until he is seventy-nine years old to be entitled to the old-age pension provided for in P.D. No. 1146, which is an absurdity. Hence, to give substance to the real signification of the law, the proviso in Sec. 11 (b) which states that a government employee who has "less than fifteen years of service, . . . shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years," should contemplate a situation wherein the employee has only a minimal period of time left to complete the fifteen-year period. What this minimal period is, the Civil Service Commission has correctly declared to be "not exceeding one year." Otherwise, the government may well be saddled with a corps of civil servants that may be regarded graphically as liabilities instead of assets.Moreover, encouraging the retention of employees well beyond the age of sixty-five years would, in effect, swell the numbers of the qualified but unemployed many who, even now, face the bleak prospect of being edged out of the labor market by those who can but offer to the government and the people their diminishing physical and mental vitality.Attention should be called to the fact that the dissenting opinion is in consonance with the present policy on retirement as well as trends being laid down by the other branches of the government on the matter.For instance, there are bills now pending in Congress that seek to lower the compulsory retirement age of the bureaucracy. House Bill No. 33769 sponsored by Congressman Roco and other Congressmen would lower it from sixty-five to sixty. 2

Its counterpart bill in the Senate, S. No. 561 whose author is Senator Tamano, likewise would amend the present law by lowering the compulsory age of retirement to sixty. 3

House Bill No. 25903 earlier authored by Congressmen Monfort and Estrella would further reduce the compulsory retirement age to fifty-six in order to give the young retirees the opportunity to engage in gainful employment or otherwise utilize their skills and experiences while they are still relatively strong.Along the same line of thinking, the proposed Civil Service Code would set the compulsory age of retirement at sixty.On the specific issue of whether a compulsory retiree who has not served fifteen years should be allowed an extension for as long as necessary to enable him to complete the fifteen years of service required for entitlement to a life pension (which is the position of the petitioner) or just a maximum period of "not exceeding one year" as fixed in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 which is supported by the dissenting opinion, it is worthwhile calling attention to Memorandum Circular No. 65 4 issued by Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. Amending Memorandum Circular No. 163 dated March 5, 1968, it categorically states:Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not be retained in the service, except for extremely

meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months.According to the ponencia, this Circular "should apply only to employees or officials who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years but who, at the same time, have completed the 15-year service requirement for retirement purposes." A close reading of the title of Memorandum Circular No. 65, as well as the relevant provision quoted above, leaves no room for ambiguity or interpretation inasmuch as there is no phrase that qualifies the scope of the law to those employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years "but who, at the same time, have completed the15-year service requirement for retirement purposes." To read into the Memorandum Circular this qualifying phrase is to unduly expand the coverage of the law to cases not intended by the Office of the Executive Secretary.The ponencia proffers the argument that since the Court has allowed the officials and employees of the Judiciary who have reached the compulsory age of retirement but lacked the fifteen-year service requirement to continue working until they complete said period, there is "no cogent reason to rule otherwise in the case of ordinary employees of the Executive Branch as in the case of petitioner Cena". But there is a cogent reason Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena, being an employee of the Land Registration Authority under the Department of Justice, falls under the Executive Department. Accordingly, Memorandum Circular No. 65 quoted in the above preceding paragraph which allows a retention or extension of only six months and this, only for "extremely meritorious reasons" should be applicable to his case.Needless to say, it would conduce to sound management practice in the government if this rule could be rationalized and applied uniformly to all government employees, with the exceptions provided by law.FootnotesGRIÑO-AQUINO, J.: concurring:** Separation at age sixty-five is separation "after age sixty."ROMERO, J.: dissenting:1 8 Words and Phrases 465 and 15A C.J.S. 312 both citing State v. Bradley, 230 P. 2d 216, 220.2 The pertinent provision is reproduced below:(INTRODUCED BY CONGRESSMEN ROCO, BAUTISTA, SR., PONCE DE LEON, BELTRAN, JR., MONFORT, CONGRESSWOMAN PLAZA (C), CONGRESSWOMEN JAVIER (R), BANDON, JR., ANIAG, JR., CONGRESSWOMEN COSETENG, LOBREGAT, CONGRESSMEN DANS, MITRA, DRAGON, BACALTOS, MONTEJO, MIRAN, VALDEZ, MASKARINO, TY, PUZON, CALINGASAN, PALACOL, DOMINGUEZ, ROMERO, YULO, MENDIOLA, DIMAPORO (M.A.B.), NAVARRO, SR., ROXAS, JR., CONGRESSWOMAN RAYMUNDO, CONGRESSMEN GILLEGO, MARTINEZ, JR., TIROL, BORJAL, LACSON, DUREZA, DEL MAR, BAGATSING (A), ESTRELLA (E), CONGRESSWOMEN ALMARIO, LABARIA, CONGRESSMEN WEBB, NOGRALES, SINGSON (L.) AND VILLAREAL, SR. PER COMMITTEE REPORT NO. 1318)"Sec. 11. Conditions for [Old-Age Pension] OPTIONAL AND COMPULSORY RETIREMENT. — (a) [Old-Age pension] OPTIONAL RETIREMENT shall be [paid] AVAILABLE to a member who:(1) Has at least [fifteen] TWELVE years of service;(2) Is at least [sixty] FIFTY-FIVE years of age; and(3) Is [separated from] LEAVING the service.(b) [Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities,] RRetirement shall be compulsory for an employee at [sixty-five] SIXTY years of age with at least [fifteen] TWELVE years of service: Provided, That, if he has less than [fifteen] TWELVE years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the [fifteen] TWELVE years: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT ALL SERVICES RENDERED IN THE GOVERNMENT IRRESPECTIVE OF STATUS OF APPOINTMENT DULY ACCREDITED SHALL BE COUNTED AS GOVERNMENT SERVICE FOR RETIREMENT UNDER THIS ACT; PROVIDED, FURTHER, THAT ALL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES WHO, AT THE TIME OF THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT, ARE SIXTY-ONE YEARS OF AGE AND ABOVE SHALL RETIRE UNDER THE FOLLOWING PHASES:(1) THOSE WITHIN THE AGES OF SIXTY-FOUR TO SIXTY-FIVE YEARS OLD SHALL BE RETIRED ON THE FIRST YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS ACT;(2) THOSE WITHIN THE AGES OF SIXTY-TWO TO SIXTY-THREE YEARS OLD SHALL BE RETIRED ON THE SECOND YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION; AND(3) THOSE SIXTY-ONE YEARS OF AGE SHALL BE RETIRED ON THE THIRD YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION,"PROVIDED, FINALLY, THAT PAYMENT OF ALL RETIREMENT BENEFITS TO A RETIREE SHALL BE MADE IN LUMP-SUM AND

PAID NOT LATER THAN THE EFFECTIVITY DATE OF HIS RETIREMENT."3 The pertinent provision runs thus:"Sec. 11. Condition for Old-Age Pension. —(a) Old-Age Pension shall be paid to a member who:(1) has at least [fifteen] TWENTY years of service;(2) is at least [sixty] FIFTY-FIVE years of age; and(3) is separate from the service.(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an employee at [sixty-five] SIXTY years of age with at least [fifteen] TWENTY years of service; Provided, That if he has less than [fifteen] TWENTY years of service he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the (fifteen) TWENTY years."4 This Circular states:"MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 65FURTHER AMENDING CIRCULAR NO. 163, DATED MARCH 5, 1968, AS AMENDED, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS THE RETENTION IN THE SERVICE OF PERSONS WHO HAVE REACHED THE COMPULSORY RETIREMENT AGE OF 65 YEARS.WHEREAS, this Office has been receiving requests for reinstatement and/or retention in the service of employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, despite the strict conditions provided for in Memorandum Circular No. 163, dated March 5, 1968, as amended.WHEREAS, the President has recently adopted a policy to adhere more strictly to the law providing for compulsory retirement age of 65 years and, in extremely meritorious cases, to limit the service beyond the age of 65 years to six (6) months only.WHEREFORE, the pertinent provision of Memorandum Circular No. 163 on the retention in the service of officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, is hereby amended to read as followsOfficials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not be retained in the service; except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months.All heads of departments, bureaus, offices and instrumentalities of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations, are hereby enjoined to require their respective offices to strictly comply with this circular.This Circular shall take effect immediately.By authority of the President(Sgd.)CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.Executive SecretaryManila, June 14, 1988

FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 113470.  March 26, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO CORBES Y OLAZO, MANUEL, VERGEL Y PASCUAL, and six (6) JOHN DOEs,accused. DANILO CORBES Y OLAZO and MANUEL VERGEL Y PASCUAL, accused-appellants.D E C I S I O NBELLOSILLO, J.:

DANILO CORBES y OLAZO and MANUEL VERGEL y PASCUAL appeal from the decision dated 27 December 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Br. 124, finding them guilty as principals by conspiracy of the crime of robbery with homicide under par. 1, Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua plus damages.[1]

The antecedents:  At about nine o'clock  in the morning of 17 November 1990 six (6) armed men entered the premises of the Caloocan Consortium Corporation at No. 305 Cordero Street, Caloocan City, and took away from the establishment P169,000.00 in cash and P4,500.00 from Mateo Figuracion, an employee therein.  They also took with them the .38 calibre revolver of security guard Timoteo Palicpic whom they shot to death.  The malefactors then ran towards 8th Avenue where Daniel Corbes and Manuel Vergel had parked their getaway vehicle, a blue passenger jeep.  They then sped away.

That same day, Manuel Vergel went to the Caloocan Police Station and reported the incident.  He claimed that the robbers used his passenger jeep in fleeing from the Caloocan Consortium Corporation, but he denied any previous knowledge of the robbery or of any intentional participation therein.  However, upon further interrogation by P/Cpl Daniel G. Del Rosario, Supervisor of the Dayshift Investigation Section, Caloocan City Investigation Division, Vergel retracted his earlier statements and pointed to Danilo Corbes who together with the other accused allegedly

planned the robbery  and convinced him to drive for them.[2] When apprehended and brought to the police station, Corbes in turn pointed to a certain "Benny" as the brains behind the crime.[3]

Corbes, Vergel and six (6) John Does (still at large) were charged as principals by conspiracy.  On the witness stand Vergel however diverged from his earlier story and insisted that the jeep he was driving was merely hired by Corbes and Benny on the pretext of hauling scrap metal from Caloocan City.  As soon as he parked his jeep along  8th Avenue,  Benny alighted from the jeep leaving him with Corbes.  Vergel maintained that at that time he knew nothing of the robbery being perpetrated at the Caloocan Consortium Corporation and that he became aware of it only when Benny came back from the direction of Cordero Street about ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes later with several armed men who boarded the jeep and threatened him with bodily harm if he would not start its engine and drive.  So he did as they ordered.  After the men alighted at 9th Avenue, he proceeded to the house of Avelino Vergel, the owner of the jeep, and together they went to the Caloocan City Police Station to report the matter.

Daniel Corbes likewise professed innocence.  Although he admitted having approached Vergel, he contended that he did so only to accommodate Benny who had sought his help in looking for a jeep for  hire.  Being the Vice-President of DAMATA (Damayan ng Maralitang Tahanan), a neighborhood association in Letre, Malabon, he accompanied Benny to Sangandaan and there waited for Vergel who agreed to have the jeep he was driving hired for a fee of P250.00.  Then together with Vergel and Benny he left for Caloocan City allegedly upon Vergel's invitation.

The trial court rejected the pretensions of Corbes and Vergel;  instead, it convicted the two (2) accused on the basis of the eyewitness account of Elena San Jose whose testimony established their participation in the robbery as lookout and driver, respectively.

Specifically, Elena San Jose testified that while she was rocking her baby to sleep in the veranda of her house at 8th Avenue she noticed a blue-colored jeep parked about three (3) meters away.    Vergel was at the driver's seat.  She saw Vergel alight several times from the jeep ostensibly to inspect its engine and other parts as if something was wrong with them, while Vergel's companion whom she identified as Corbes walked to and fro along 8th Avenue up to the corner of Cordero Street.  Half an hour later Elena saw four (4) men in a jolly mood approaching and shouting "Yahoo! Yahoo!" from the direction of Cordero Street.  They immediately boarded the jeep as Vergel hurried them up:  "Dalian n'yo, baka tayo  mahuli!"  The vehicle then drove  away in the direction of F. Roxas Street.[4]

The court a quo accorded evidentiary weight to the testimony of Dante Despida, owner of the Gulf-Pacific Security Agency, Inc., who testified that on 19 November 1990 Vergel and Corbes admitted to him inside the Caloocan Police Station that they participated in the robbery holdup as driver of the getaway vehicle and as lookout, respectively.  Thus, Vergel and Corbes were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua  and ordered to pay jointly and severally,  (a) the amount of cash stolen, (b) the value of the .38 cal. revolver taken, and (c) P50,000.00 as consequential damages to the heirs of Timoteo Palicpic.

Appellants contend in this appeal that conspiracy was not sufficiently proved since it cannot be inferred solely  from their mere presence at the crime scene.  In additon, Vergel disparages the testimony of Elena San Jose as being rehearsed and replete with inconsistencies, while that of Dante Despida relative to the oral confessions allegedly made to him inside the Caloocan Police Station as  unworthy of belief considering that  he  had  no  business  inside  the  detention cell since he was not even a police investigator, and considering further that he was the uncle[5] of security guard Timoteo Palicpic who was gunned down during the robbery.

We sustain the claim of appellants that the evidence failed to meet the quantum of proof required by law to establish conspiracy which jurisprudence dictates must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself.[6] No less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required.[7]

In the instant case, no conclusive proof was presented that appellant Manuel Vergel conspired with the other accused to commit robbery.  What is indubitable is that he was approached by Corbes who was tasked to look for a getaway vehicle and was persuaded to act as driver in fetching the group from the venue of the robbery.  Vergel's feigned ignorance of any prior knowledge of the robbery is negated by his remark, "Dalian n'yo, baka  tayo  mahuli!" made to the robbers as they were boarding the jeep.  Such utterance, which indicates knowledge of the criminal design of the malefactors, coupled with his act of driving for the robbers, makes appellant Vergel guilty as an accomplice, i.e., one who knows the criminal design of the principal and cooperates knowingly or intentionally therewith by an act which even if not

rendered the crime would be committed just the same.[8] In one case,[9] we held that the driver   of   the   taxicab,   knowing   that  his co-accused  were  going  to commit robbery per mitted them to use his taxicab in going to the place where the robbery was committed, is an accomplice.

As regards appellant Danilo Corbes, there is  similarly a lack of adequate evidence of conspiracy.  The evidence merely points out that Corbes looked for a jeep to be used as getaway vehicle of the robbers and, to that end, he intentionally sought out and convinced Manuel Vergel to act as driver.  Moreover, he went with Vergel and Benny to Caloocan City where the robbery was staged.  We have also held that the liability of one whose participation was limited to looking for a banca and providing one to a gang of bank robbers,[10] or one who went with the actual perpetrators of a crime without conspiring with them, is only that of an accomplice.[11] Where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the doubt created as to whether accused acted as principal or accomplice will always be resolved in favor of the milder form of liability, that of a mere  accomplice.[12] Besides, in several cases wherein the Court confirmed the existence of conspiracy, some accused were held liable as mere accomplices only because their role in the commission of the crime was not indispensable; in other words, minor.[13] Courts sometimes draw the inference of guilty participation in the criminal design from concerted acts in the consummation of the criminal act and from the form and manner in which assistance is rendered.  To reiterate, in case of doubt, the courts naturally lean to the milder form of responsibility.[14]

Furthermore, we reduce appellants' liability to the crime of robbery only.  It was not established by the evidence that the other accused, who are at large, had agreed to kill if necessary to carry out successfully the plan to rob.  On the contrary, the records show that one of the robbers berated the gunman for having shot the security guard. [15] Therefore, what  appellants may be said to have joined was merely the criminal design to rob, which makes them accomplices.  Their complicity must accordingly be limited to the robbery, not to the  killing of Timoteo Palicpic.  Waiting only at the parked jeep at 8th Avenue could not have given them the opportunity to prevent the killing, as is required of one seeking relief from liability for assaults committed during the robbery.[16] The Court had occasion to rule that the jeep driver, who was unaware of the  killing perpetrated inside the building as he stayed always near his jeep, could  not be deemed a co-conspirator in the killing of the guards, as the killing was not part of the original plan but arose only during the exigency of the moment.[17]

The penalty for robbery under par. 5, Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code is prision correccional  in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period the duration of which is four (4) years two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years.  As the robbery was committed by a band under Art. 295 the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period.   Since accused-appellants are found guilty only as accomplices to the robbery in band, the imposable penalty shall be one degree lower which is arresto mayor  in its maximum period to prision correccional  in its medium period or four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.  Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if only for the purpose of determining the penalty to be imposed, the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., destierro  in its maximum period to arresto mayor  in its medium period or four (4) years two (2) months and one (1) day ofdestierro to four (4) months of arresto mayor medium,  while the maximum shall be taken from the maximum of the imposable penalty as herein before stated or four (4) years and two (2) months of  prision correccional  medium.   Both  accused-appellants  having already been detained since 20 November 1990,[18] or more than the maximum of their indeterminate penalty, they should now be immediately  released from custody pursuant to B. P. Blg. 85.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is MODIFIED.  Accused-appellants DANILO CORBES y OLAZO and MANUEL VERGEL y PASCUAL are declared GUILTY merely as ACCOMPLICES to the crime of robbery and sentenced accordingly to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor  medium as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional  medium as maximum.

Accused-appellants Danilo Corbes y Olazo and Manuel Vergel y Pascual having already been detained for more than the maximum of their indeterminate penalty, their immediate release from custody is likewise ordered  unless they are held for another lawful cause.  Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.Padilla, (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr.,

JJ, concur.

Decision penned by Judge Rene Victoriano, RTC-Br. 124, Caloocan City; Rollo, pp.  22-31.

TSN, 1 April 1991, pp. 16-17.Id.; Exh. "G," Folder of Exhibits.TSN, 6 February 1991, pp. 4-9.Id., 28 January 1991, p. 2.People v. Jorge,  G.R. No. 99379, 22 April 1994, 23 SCRA 693;

People v. Argawanon, G.R. No. 106538, 30 March 1994, 231 SCRA 614; People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 94817, 4 November 1992, 215 SCRA 349; People v. Donato, G.R. No. 94530, 6 March 1992, 207 SCRA 125; People v. Campos, G.R. No. 91716, 3 October 1991, 202 SCRA 387; People v. Laurio,  G.R. No. 95351, 9 August 1991, 200 SCRA 465; People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 74048, 14 November 1990, 191 SCRA 377; Bayan v. Court of Appeals,  G.R. No. 77050, 6 February 1990, 181 SCRA 844; De la Concepcion v.  People,  G.R. No. 73854, 9 May 1989, 173 SCRA 253; Valdez v. People, G.R. Nos. 75896-99, 5 May 1989, 173 SCRA 163; People v. Sabilano, Nos. L-32866-7, 21 September 1984, 132 SCRA 83; People v. Custodio, No. L-30463, 30 October 1972, 47 SCRA 289, 302.

Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101545, 3 January 1995, 240 SCRA 13; Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50691, 5 December 1994, 238 SCRA 655; People v. Villagonzalo, G.R. No. 105388, 18 November 1994, 238 SCRA 215; People v. Manuel, G.R. Nos. 93926-28, 28 July 1994, 234 SCRA 532; People v. Orehuela,  G.R. Nos. 108780-81, 29 April 1994, 232 SCRA 82; People v. Gaoat, G.R. No. 97028, 21 May 1993, 222 SCRA 385; People v. Divina, G.R. Nos. 93808-09, 7 April 1993, 221 SCRA 209; People v. Camaddo, G.R. No. 97934, 18 January 1993, 217 SCRA 162; People v. Lacao Sr., G.R. No. 95320, 4 September 1991, 201 SCRA 317; Perezv. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 76203-04, 6 December 1989, 180 SCRA 9; People v. Tacaa, No. L- 35652, 29 September 1989, 178 SCRA 56; Castañeda v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 61243, 16 March 1989, 171 SCRA 263; Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84423, 31 January 1989, 169 SCRA 861; People v. Elizaga, G.R. No. 78794, 21 November 1988, 167 SCRA 516; People v. Drilon  Jr., No. L- 33431, 28 June 1983, 123 SCRA 72.

People v. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5, 12 (1955); People v. Fronda, G.R. Nos. 102361-62, 14 May 1993, 222 SCRA 71; People v. Custodio, No. L-30463, 30 October 1972, 47 SCRA 289.

People v. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5, 12 (1955); see also People v. Ubiña, 97 Phil. 515 (1955); People v. Balotan, 45 Phil. 573, 576 (1923) citing United States v. Lagmay, No. L-15009, G.R. No. 15009, 30 August 1919 (unreported).

[10] People v. Doble, No. L- 30028, 31 May 1982, 114 SCRA 131.[11] People v. Balili, No. L-14044, 5 August 1966, 17 SCRA 892.[12] People v. Bongo, No.L-26909, 22 February 1974, 55 SCRA 547;

People v. Torejas, No. L-29935, 31 January 1972, 43 SCRA 158; People v. Tolentino, No. L-29419, 31 August 1991, 40 SCRA 514; People v. Pastores, No. L-29800, 31 August 1971, 40 SCRA 498; People v. Ablog, No. L-15310, 31 October 1962, 6 SCRA 437.

[13] People v. San Miguel, Nos. L-30722-30725, 31 July 1981, 106 SCRA 290; People v. Doble,  No. L-30028, 31 May 1982, 114 SCRA 131; People v. Nierra, No. L-32624, 12 February 1980, 96 SCRA 1; People v. Crisostomo, 46 Phil. 775 (1923).

[14] People v. Tolentino, No. L-29419, 31 August 1971, 40 SCRA 514; People v. Tatlonghari, No. L-22094, 28 March 1969, 27 SCRA 726; People v. Clemente, No. L-23463, 28 September 1967, 21 SCRA 261; People v. Tividad, No. L-21469, 30 June 1967, 20 SCRA 549; People v. Riveral, No. L-14077, 31 March 1964, 10 SCRA 462.

[15] TSN, 5 June 1991, p. 18.[16] Art. 296, The Revised Penal Code; People v. Doble, No. L-30028, 31 May

1982, 114 SCRA 131; People v. Hamiana, 89 Phil. 225, (1951).[17] People v. Adriano, Nos. L-25977, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 107.[18] Records, p. 194.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 108366 February 16, 1994JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL., petitioners, vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLITO S. FERNANDEZ, respondents.Erlinda B. Espejo for petitioners.C.B. Carbon & Associates for private respondent. PUNO, J.:The legal dispute between the parties began when the petitioners filed Civil Case No. Q-45567 for support against the private respondent before the RTC of Quezon City. The complaint was dismissed on December 9, 1986 by Judge Antonio P. Solano, 1 who found that "(t)here is nothing in the material allegations in the complaint that seeks to compel (private respondent) to recognize or acknowledge (petitioners) as his illegitimate children," and that there was no sufficient and competent evidence to prove the petitioners filiation. 2

Petitioners plodded on. On February 19, 1987, they file the case at bench, another action for recognition and support against the private respondent before another branch of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 87. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-50111.The evidence shows that VIOLETA P. ESGUERRA, single, is the mother and guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, CLARO ANTONIO FERNANDEZ and JOHN PAUL FERNANDEZ, met sometime in 1983, at the Meralco Compound tennis courts. A Meralco employee and a tennis enthusiast, Carlito used to spend his week-ends regularly at said courts, where Violeta's father served as tennis instructor.Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed that they started their illicit sexual relationship six (6) months after their first meeting. The tryst resulted in the birth of petitioner Claro Antonio on March 1, 1984, and of petitioner John Paul on not know that Carlito was married until the birth of her two children. She averred they were married in civil rites in October, 1983. In March, 1985, however, she discovered that the marriage license which they used was spurious.To bolster their case, petitioners presented the following documentary evidence: their certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Carlito as their father; the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro which also states that his father is respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the baptism of petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra.Petitioners likewise presented as witnesses, Rosario Cantoria,  3 Dr. Milagros Villanueva, 4 Ruby Chua Cu, 5 and Fr. Liberato Fernandez. 6 The first three witnesses told the trial court that Violeta Esguerra had, at different times,7 introduced the private respondent to them as her "husband". Fr. Fernandez, on the other hand, testified that Carlito was the one who presented himself as the father of petitioner Claro during the latter's baptism.In defense, respondent Carlito denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the two petitioners. He averred he only served as one of the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro. This claim was corroborated by the testimony of Rodante Pagtakhan, an officemate of respondent Carlito who also stood as a sponsor of petitioner Claro during his baptism. The Private respondent also presented as witness, Fidel Arcagua, a waiter of the Lighthouse Restaurant. He disputed Violeta's allegation that she and respondent Carlito frequented the said restaurant during their affair. Arcagua stated he never saw Violeta Esguerra and respondent Carlito together at the said restaurant. Private respondent also declared he only learned he was named in the birth certificates of both petitioners as their father after he was sued for support in Civil Case No.Q-45567.Based on the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners, viz.:In view of the above, the Court concludes and so holds that the plaintiffs minors (petitioners herein) are entitled to the relief's prayed for in the complaint. The defendant (herein private respondent) is hereby ordered to recognize Claro Antonio Carlito Fernandez, now aged 6, and John Paul Fernandez, now aged 41/2 as his sons. As the defendant has admitted that he has a supervisory job at the Meralco, he shall give the plaintiffs support in the amount of P2,000 each a month, payment to be delivered to Violeta Esguerra, the children's mother and natural guardian, with arrears reckoned as of the filing of the complaint on February 19, 1987.SO ORDERED.On appeal, the decision was set aside and petitioners complaint dismissed by the respondent Court of Appeals 8in its impugned decision, dated October 20, 1992. It found that the "proof relied upon by the (trial) court (is) inadequate to prove the (private respondent's) paternity and filiation of (petitioners)." It further held that the doctrine of res judicata applied because of the dismissal of the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. Q-45567. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on December 22, 1992.Petitioners now contend that the respondent appellate court erred in: (1) not giving full faith and credit to the testimony in of Violeta Esguerra;

(2) not giving weight and value to the testimony of Father Liberato Fernandez; (3) not giving probative value to the numerous pictures of respondent Carlito Fernandez taken during the baptismal ceremony and inside the bedroom of Violeta Esguerra; (4) not giving probative value to the birth certificates of petitioners; (5) giving so much credence to the self-serving and incredible testimony of respondent Carlito Fernandez; and (6) holding that the principle of res judicata is applicable in the case at bar.We find no merit in the petition.The rule is well-settled that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals may be reviewed by this court only under exceptional circumstances. One such situation is when the findings of the appellate court clash with those of the trial court as in the case at bench. It behooves us therefore to exercise our extraordinary power, and settle the issue of whether the ruling of the appellate court that private respondent is not the father of the petitioners is substantiated by the evidence on record.We shall first examine the documentary evidence offered by the petitioners which the respondent court rejected as insufficient to prove their filiation. Firstly, we hold that petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence of the private respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro (Exh. "B-8", Exh. "B-12", Exh. "H" and Exh. "I"). These photographs are far from proofs that private respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained by the private respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro. His testimony was corroborated by Rodante Pagtakhan.Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private respondent showering affection to Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity (Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2", "B-7", "B-14" and "B-15"). As we held in Tan vs. Trocio, 192 SCRA 764, viz:. . . The testimonies of complainant and witness Marilou Pangandaman, another maid, to show unusual closeness between Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him and giving him paternity. The same must be said of . . . (the) pictures of Jewels and Respondent showing allegedly their physical likeness to each other. Said evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity and much less would prove violation of complaint's person and honor. (Emphasis supplied)Thirdly, the baptismal certificates (Exh. "D") of petitioner Claro naming private respondent as his father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that private respondent participated in its preparation. On this score, we held in Berciles vs. Systems, et al. 128 SCRA 53 (1984):As to the baptismal certificates, Exh. "7-A", the rule is that although the baptismal record of a natural child describes her as a child of the record the decedent had no intervening, the baptismal record cannot be held to be a voluntary recognition of parentage. . . . The reason for this rule that canonical records do not constitute the authentic document prescribed by Arts. 115 and 117 to prove the legitimate filiation of a child is that such canonical record is simply proof of the only act to which the priest may certify by reason of his personal knowledge, an act done by himself or in his presence, like the administration of the sacrament upon a day stated; it is no proof of the declarations in the record with respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or of prior and distinct facts which require separate and concrete evidence.In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), we also ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child's paternity.Fourth, the certificates of live birth (Exh. "A"; Exh. "B") of the petitioners identifying private respondent as their father are not also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do no show that private respondent had a hand in the preparation of said certificates. In rejecting these certificates, the ruling of the respondent court is in accord with our pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050 (1958),viz:. . . Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines explicity prohibited, not only the naming of the father or the child born outside wedlock, when the birth certificates, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him, but, also, the statement of any information or circumstances by which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child. (Emphasis supplied)We reiterated this rule in Berciles, op. cit., when we held that "a birth certificate no signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not competent evidence of paternity."We have also reviewed the relevant testimonies of the witnesses for the petitioners and we are satisfied that the respondent appellate court properly calibrated their weight. Petitioners capitalize on the testimony of

Father Liberato Fernandez who solemnized the baptismal ceremony of petitioner Claro. He declared on the witness stand:Q Do you recall Father, whether on that occasion when you called for the father and the mother of the child, that both father and mother were present?A Yes.Q Would you able to recognized the father and the mother who were present at that time?A Yes.Q Please point to the court?A There (witness pointing to the defendant, Carlito Fernandez).Q For instance, just give us more specifically what question do you remember having asked him?A Yes, like for example, do you renounce Satan and his works?Q What was the answer of Fernandez?A Yes, I do.Q I just want to be sure, Father, will you please look at the defendant again. I want to be sure if he is the person who appeared before you on that occasion?A I am sure.(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 14-16)However, on cross examination, Father Fernandez admitted that he has to be shown a picture of the private respondent by Violeta Esguerra to recognize the private respondent, viz:Q When was the, approximately, when you were first shown this picture by Violeta Esguerra?A I cannot recall.Q At least the month and the year?A It must be in 1986.Q What month in 1986.A It is difficult. . .Q When was the first time you know you are going to testify here?A Let us see, you came there two times and first one was you want to get a baptismal certificate and then the second time was I asked you for what is this? And you said it is for the court.Q On the second time that Ms. Violeta Esguerra went to your place, you were already informed that you will testify here before this Honorable Court?A Yes.Q And you were informed by this Ms. Violeta Esguerra that this man wearing the blue T-shirt is the father?A Yes, sir.Q So, it was Violeta Esguerra who. . .A Yes.(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 18 to 22)Indeed, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close friend of Violeta Esguerra and the private respondent which should render unquestionable his identification of the private respondent during petitioner Claro's baptism. In the absence of this proof, we are not prepared to concede that Father Fernandez who officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can remember the parents of the children he has baptized.We cannot also disturb the findings of the respondent court on the credibility of Violeta Esguerra. Her testimony is highly suspect as it is self-serving and by itself, is insufficient to prove the paternity of the petitioners.We shall not pass upon the correctness of the ruling of the respondent appellate court applying the doctrine of res judicata as additional reason in dismissing petitioners action for recognition and support. It is unnecessary considering our findings that petitioners evidence failed to substantiate their cause of action.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED and the Decision of the respondent court in CA-G.R. CV No. 29182 is AFFIRMED . Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, and Nocon, JJ., concur. #Footnotes1 Presiding judge of Branch 86, RTC Quezon City.2 In this regard, Judge Solano held:xxx xxx xxx(Petitioners') certificates of birth imputing filiation to defendant as the putative father are incompetent evidence.The baptismal certificates, upon the other hand, is not an indubitable writing that is impressed with authority to establish filiation with those alleged as the parents of the child baptized.The oral testimony of Violeta Esguerra, uncorroborated as it were, to sustain a conclusion that defendant indeed is the father of plaintiffs.3 She is neighbor of Violeta Esguerra.

4 She is the obstetrician who delivered the petitioners. Dr. Villanueva is the mother-in-law of Violeta Esguerra's brother.5 She is a friend and former officemate of Violeta Esguerra.6 He is the priest who officiated over the baptism of petitioner Claro Antonio Fernandez. Fr. Fernandez actually testified in Civil Case No. Q-45567. The whole records of the earlier case were presented as evidence in this case.7 In the case of Rosario Cantoria, she first met private respondent Carlito (who was introduced by Violeta as her "husband") when she (Rosario) was taking care of Fernandez. Dr. Villanueva was first introduced to Carlito (as Violeta's "husband") on March 1, 1984, after she (Dr. Villanueva) delivered petitioner Claro Antonio Fernandez. Ruby Chua Cu met Violeta's "husband" (Carlito) at the baptism of petitioner Claro Antonio Fernandez.8 Through its Fifth Division, composed of Associate Justices Serafin E. Camilon (chairman), Jorge S. Imperial (ponente), and Cancio C. Garcia. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 29182.

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANC G.R. No. 92284 July 12, 1991TEODORO J. SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs.THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and the GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.Leven S. Puno for petitioner.Cesar R. Vidal for respondent GSIS. CRUZ, J.:pThe basic issue presented in this case is the correct interpretation of Executive Order No. 966, Section 9, providing as follows:Sec. 9. Highest Basic Salary Rate. — The compensation of salary or pay which may be used in computing the retirement benefits shall be limited to the highest salary rate actually received by an official/employee as fixed by law and/or indicated in his duly approved appointment. This shall include salary adjustments duly authorized and implemented by the presidential issuance(s) and budget circular(s), additional basic compensation or salary indicated in an appointment duly approved as an exception to the prohibition on additional or double compensation, merit increases, and compensation for substitutionary services or in an acting capacity. For this purpose, all other compensation and/or fringe benefits such as per diems, allowances, bonuses, overtime pay, honoraria hazard pay, flying time fees, consultancy or contractual fees, or fees in correcting and/or releasing examination papers shall not be considered in the computation of the retirement benefits of an official/employee.The question was raised by the petitioner in connection with the computation of his retirement benefits which he claims was not made in conformity to the above-quoted requirement.The petitioner was employed in the Commission on Audit as State Auditor IV with a monthly salary of P7,219.00. In 1988, he was assigned to the COA Auditing Unit at the Department of Transportation and Communications and detailed to the Manila International Airport Authority. On July 1, 1988, the board of directors of the MIAA passed the following resolution: 1

RESOLUTION NO. 88-70RESOLVED, that, as recommended by Management, the designation of Mr. Teodoro J. Santiago, Jr., as Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration, effective 15 August 1988, be approved, as it is hereby approved, subject to the following conditions:1. He will retain his plantilla position in COA;2. His compensation from MIAA, shall be the difference between the salary of AGM for Finance and Administration (MIAA) and that of State Auditor IV (COA); and3. His retirement benefits shall be chargeable against COA.This resolution was duly communicated to the COA on July 11, 1988, with a request for the petitioner's indefinite detail to the MIAA. In reply, Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo wrote MIAA on July 14, 1988, as follows: 2

. . . please be informed that we are authorizing such detail through appropriate office order up to February 15, 1989. The order includes authority to collect representation and transportation allowances (RATA) of P1,200.00 each month and other allowances attendant to the position chargeable against the funds of the NAIAA.

As regards your proposal that Mr. Santiago be allowed to collect the difference in salary of his position in the COA as State Auditor IV and his designated position as Assistant General Manager thereat, likewise chargeable against the funds of that office, this Commission interposes no objection to the proposal to pay him the difference between his present monthly salary of P7,219.00 and that of Assistant General Manager which reportedly amounts to P13,068.00 a month or a monthly difference of P5,849.00, provided that he is formally designated (not appointed) Assistant General Manager by the Board of Directors, NAIAA, and that payment of his salary differential is approved by the same office.xxx xxx xxxOn August 10, 1988, Secretary Reinerio O. Reyes, concurrently chairman of the MIAA board of directors, issued an office order formally designating the petitioner as Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration, effective August 16, 1988. 3

The petitioner served in this capacity and collected the differential salary of P5,849.00 plus his salary of P7,219.00 for a total compensation of P13,068.00. He received this compensation until December 5, 1988, when he was transferred to the Presidential Management Staff under COA Office Order No. 8811448 dated December 6, 1988.On March 1, 1989, the petitioner retired after working in the government for 44 years.In computing his retirement benefits, the Government Service Insurance System used as basis the amount of P13,068.00, considering this the highest basic salary rate received by the petitioner in the course of his employment. 4 The COA disagreed, however, and paid his retirement benefits on the basis of only his monthly salary of P7,219.00 as State Auditor IV. 5

The petitioner requested recomputation based on what he claimed as his highest basic salary rate of P13,068.00. This was denied on December 8, 1989, and he was so notified on February 5, 1990. On March 7, 1990, he came to this Court to seek reversal of the decision of the COA on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.We note at the outset that there is no dispute regarding the legality of the petitioner's occupying the second position in the MIAA and receiving additional compensation for his services therein. As the Solicitor General observed. "What the petitioner was receiving from the MIAA was the additional compensation allowed under Section 17 of Act No. 4187 which, in turn, is allowed under Section 8, Paragraph B, Article IX of the Constitution." 6

In Quimzon v. Ozaeta, 7 this Court held that double appointments are not prohibited as long as the positions involved are not incompatible, except that the officer or employee appointed cannot receive additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law. The additional compensation received by the petitioner is not an issue in the case at bar because of its express approval by the COA and the admission of the Solicitor General that it is allowed under the cited provision.More specifically, Section 17 of Act No. 4187 provides:Any existing act, rule or order to the contrary notwithstanding, no full time officer or employee of the government shall hereafter receive directly or indirectly any kind of additional or extra compensation or salary including per diems and bonuses from any fund of the government, its dependencies, and semi-government entities or boards created by law except:(1) Officers serving as chairman or members of entities and enterprise organized, operated, owned or controlled by the government, who may be paid per them for each meeting actually attended or when an official travel;(2) Auditors and accountants;(3) Provincial and municipal treasurers and their employees;(4) Employees serving as observers of the Weather Bureau; and(5) Those authorized to receive extra or additional compensation by virtue of the provision of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)The Solicitor General argues, albeit not too strongly, that the additional compensation received by the petitioner was merely an honorarium and not a salary. As a mere honorarium, it would not fall under the provision of Section 9 and so should not be added to his salary in computing his retirement benefits.We cannot accept this contention. An honorarium is defined as something given not as a matter of obligation but in appreciation for services rendered, a voluntary donation in consideration of services which admit of no compensation in money. 8 The additional compensation given to the petitioner was in the nature of a salary because it was receive by him as a matter of right in recompense for services rendered by him as Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration. In fact, even Chairman Domingo referred to it in his letter dated July 14, 1988, as the petitioner's "salary differential."The Solicitor General's main argument is that the petitioner cannot invoke Section 9 because he was not appointed to the second position in

the MIAA but only designated thereto. It is stressed that under the said provision, "the compensation of salary or pay which may be used in computing the retirement benefits shall be received by an official employee as fixed by law and/or indicated in his duly approved appointment." The petitioner's additional salary was fixed not in a duly approved appointment but only in a designation.Belittling this argument, the petitioner maintains that there is no substantial distinction between appointment and designation. He cites Mechem, who defines appointment as "the act of designation by the executive officer, board or body, to whom that power has been delegated, of the individual, who is to exercise the functions of a given office."  9 He also invokes Borromeo v. Mariano, 10 where this Court said that "the term "appoint," whether regarded in its legal or in its ordinary acceptation, is applied to the nomination or designation of an individual."Strictly speaking, there is an accepted legal distinction between appointment and designation. While appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office, designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment (or election). 11 Thus, the appointed Secretary of Trade and Industry is, by statutory designation, a member of the National Economic and Development Authority.12 A person may also be designated in an acting capacity, as when he is called upon to fill a vacancy pending the selection of a permanent appointee thereto or, more usually, the return of the regular incumbent. In the absence of the permanent Secretary for example, an undersecretary is designated acting head of the department. 13

As the Court said in Binamira v. Garrucho: 14

Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.Nevertheless, we agree with the petitioner that in the law in question, the term "appointment" was used in a general sense to include the term "designation." In other words, no distinction was intended between the two terms in Section 9 of Executive Order No. 966. We think this to be the more reasonable interpretation, especially considering that the provision includes in the highest salary rate "compensation for substitutionary services or in an acting capacity." This need not always be conferred by a permanent appointment. A contrary reading would, in our view, militate against the letter of the law, not to mention its spirit as we perceive it. That spirit seeks to extend the maximum benefits to the retiree as an additional if belated recognition of his many years of loyal and efficient service in the government.As thus interpreted, Section 9 clearly covers the petitioner, who was designated Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration in the office order issued by Secretary Reyes on August 10, 1988. The position was then vacant and could be filled either by permanent appointment or by temporary designation. It cannot be said that the second position was only an extension of the petitioner's office as State Auditor IV in the Commission on Audit as otherwise there would have been no need for his designation thereto. The second office was distinct and separate from his position in the Commission on Audit. For the additional services he rendered for the MIAA, he was entitled to additional compensation which, following the letter and spirit of Section 9, should be included in his highest basic salary rate.It is noteworthy that the petitioner occupied the second office not only for a few days or weeks but for more than three months. His designation as Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration was not a mere accommodation by the MIAA. On the contrary, in his letter to Chairman Domingo requesting the petitioner's services. MIAA General Manager Evergisto C. Macatulad said, "Considering his qualifications and work experience, we believe that a finance man of his stature and caliber can be of great help in the efficient and effective performance of the Airport's functions."Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life to the public service, he deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely

expressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his services. That generosity is the least he should expect now that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well, and was rewarded for it.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution is SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered DIRECTING the computation of the petitioner's retirement benefits on the basis of his Highest Basic Salary Rate of P13,068.00, It is so ordered.Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.Gancayco, J., is on leave. Footnotes1 Rollo, p. 20.2 Ibid., p. 22.3 Id., p. 24.4 Id., p. 26.5 Id., pp. 27-28.6 Id., p. 65.7 98 Phil. 705.8 McDonald v. Napier 14 Ga 89.9 Public Office and Officers, Sec. 102.10 41 Phil. 322.11 Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 188; Gonzales, Political Law Review (1969), pp. 184-185.12 Sec 5, Chapter 2(C), Title II of Book V, Revised Administrative Code of 1987.13 Sec. 10(5), Chapter 2 of Book IV, Revised Administrative Code of 1987.14 188 SCRA 158-159.

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