G.R. No. 174935 April 30, 2008CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. TRISTAN C. COLANGGO,** respondents.D E C I S I O NCORONA, J.:This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the February 22, 2006 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79047 and its resolution denying reconsideration.3On October 25, 1992, respondent Tristan C. Colanggo took the Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) and obtained a passing rate of 75.98%. On October 1, 1993, he was appointed Teacher I and was assigned to Don Ruben E. Ecleo, Sr. Memorial National High School in San Jose, Surigao del Norte.Subsequently, a complaint questioning the eligibility of teachers in Surigao del Norte was filed in the Civil Service Commission (CSC) CARAGA Regional Office No. XIII (CSC-CARAGA) in Butuan City. The CSC-CARAGA immediately investigated the matter. In the course of its investigation, the CSC-CARAGA discovered significant irregularities in respondent's documents. The photographs of "Tristan C. Colanggo" attached respectively to the PBET application form and to the October 25, 1992 picture seat plan did not resemble respondent. Furthermore, the signature found in the PBET application form was markedly different from that affixed on respondent's personal data sheet (PDS). It appeared that someone other than respondent filed his PBET application and still another person took the exam on his behalf. Thus, the CSC-CARAGA filed a formal charge for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service against respondent on January 13, 1999.4 On September 27, 2000, respondent filed an answer denying the charges against him and moved for a formal hearing and investigation. The CSC granted the motion and scheduled a hearing on October 31, 2000. Respondent failed to appear on the said date but subsequently filed an omnibus motion for the production of original documents relative to the charges against him and the presentation of persons who supervised the October 25, 1992 PBET. His motion was granted and the concerned proctor and examiners were subpoenaed. After evaluating the evidence, the CSC found: On the basis of the photographs attached [to] the PBET application form and the picture seat plan, it is evident that the person who filed the application form for the PBET is not the same person who actually took the said examination on October 25, 1992. This disparity of physical features of the former and latter are evident. The person who filed the PBET has fuller cheekbones and slanted eyes, thinner lips and has a different hairstyle from that of the John Doe who took the said examination. On the other hand, the latter has thinner cheekbones, elongated chin, full lips with a moustache and round eyes. Also, the signatures appearing of the PBET applicant and that of the PBET examinee are also in different strokes, curves and slants. Comparing the signatures on the [PBET application form] and [picture seat plan] vis--vis those affixed on the PDS of respondent more evidently reveals that the three are different persons. The photographs and signatures appearing on the [PBET application form] and [picture seat plan] are far and different from the facial features and signatures from both John Does. Respondent looks older, has full cheekbones, flatter nose and thin lips. In other words, the picture and signatures affixed on the PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS undoubtedly belong to three different persons which clearly serve a ground to establish a just cause for CSC-CARAGA to issue a formal charge on January 13, 1999 against respondent.5 (emphasis supplied) The CSC concluded that respondent did not apply for and take the PBET exam. Thus, in Resolution No. 021412, the CSC found respondent guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service and ordered his dismissal. 6Respondent moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied.7 Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA alleging that the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 021412.8 He pointed out that the pieces of evidence against him were inadmissible as they were unauthenticated photocopies of the PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS. On February 22, 2006, the CA granted the petition.9 It ruled that the photocopies of the PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS should have been authenticated.10 Only documents or public records duly acknowledged or certified as such in accordance with law could be presented in evidence without further proof.11 Consequently, the CA annulled and set aside Resolution No. 021412 and ordered the dismissal of charges against respondent.12 The CSC moved for reconsideration13 but was denied.14 Hence, this petition. The CSC essentially avers that the CA erred in finding that it committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering Resolution No. 021412.15 The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service16 (Uniform Rules) does not require strict adherence to technical rules of evidence. Thus, it validly considered the photocopies of the PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS in resolving the formal charge against respondent in spite of the fact that they were not duly authenticated.The petition is meritorious. Administrative rules of procedure are construed liberally to promote their objective and to assist parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses.17 Section 39 of the Uniform Rules provides: Section 39. The direct evidence for the complainant and the respondent consist of the sworn statement and documents submitted in support of the complaint or answer as the case may be, without prejudice to the presentation of additional evidence deemed necessary but was unavailable at the time of the filing of the complaint and the answer upon which the cross-examination, by the respondent and the complainant respectively, shall be based. Following the cross-examination, there may be re-direct or re-cross examination. Either party may avail himself of the services of counsel and may require the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence in his favor through the compulsory process of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum. The investigation shall be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the truth without necessarily adhering to technical rules applicable in judicial proceedings. It shall be conducted by the disciplining authority concerned or his authorized representatives. (emphasis supplied) The provision above clearly states that the CSC, in investigating complaints against civil servants, is not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable in judicial proceedings. The CSC correctly appreciated the photocopies of PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS (though not duly authenticated) in determining whether there was sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges against the respondent. Worth noting was that respondent never objected to the veracity of their contents. He merely disputed their admissibility on the ground that they were not authenticated. As a general rule, a finding of guilt in administrative cases, if supported by substantial evidence (or "that amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion"),18 will be sustained by this Court.19 The CSC graciously granted respondent's motions to ensure that he was accorded procedural due process. Moreover, it exhaustively discussed the differences in appearances of respondent and the persons whose photographs were attached to the PBET application form and the picture seat plan. It likewise compared the various signatures on the said documents. Resolution No. 021412 reveals that the CSC carefully evaluated the allegations against respondent and thoroughly examined and weighed the evidence submitted for its consideration. The penalty (of dismissal) imposed on respondent was therefore fully in accord with law20 and jurisprudence.21 We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The February 22, 2006 decision and August 17, 2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-S.P. No. 79047 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Resolution No. 021412 dated October 22, 2002 and the May 19, 2003 resolution of the Civil Service Commission finding respondent Tristan C. Colanggo GUILTY of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service and dismissing him from the service with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits and disqualifying him from reemployment in the government service are REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. NO. 161067 March 14, 2008DOMINADOR C. FERRER, JR., Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, HON. FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ, JR., and HON. RODOLFO G. PALATTAO, as Members of the Sandiganbayan, Second Division, ANNA MARIA L. HARPER, ESPERANZA G. GATBONTON, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.D E C I S I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:Does a finding of lack of administrative liability of a respondent government official bar the filing of a criminal case against him for the same acts?Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, Second Division (public respondent) dated July 2, 20031 and October 22, 20032 in Criminal Case No. 26546. The Resolution of July 2, 2003 denied the Motion for Re-determination of Probable Cause filed by accused Dominador G. Ferrer (petitioner), while the Resolution of October 22, 2003 denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Quash.The following are the factual antecedents:On January 29, 2001, an Information3 for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 was filed against petitioner, as follows:That on or about August 20, 1998 or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, DOMINADOR C. FERRER, JR., being the Administrator of the Intramuros Administration (IA), Manila, while in the performance of his official and administrative functions as such, and acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits to Offshore Construction and Development Company, by causing the award of the Lease Contracts to said company, involving Baluarte de San Andres, Ravellin de Recolletos, and Baluarte de San Francisco de Dilao, Intramuros, Manila, without conducting any public bidding as required under Joint Circular No. 1 dated September 30, 1989 of the Department of Budget and Management, Department of Environment and Natural Resources and Department of Public Works and Highways, and by allowing the construction of new structures in said leased areas without any building permit or clearance required under the Intramuros Charter (P.D. 1616) and the National Building Code, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.CONTRARY TO LAW.Manila, Philippines, January 29, 2001.4and assigned to the Sandiganbayan's Second Division.On April 4, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, alleging that the Office of the Ombudsman disregarded certain factual matters which, if considered, will negate the finding of probable cause.5On July 13, 2001, public respondent issued a Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reinvestigation.6 It held that petitioner's contentions are all evidentiary in nature and may be properly considered only in a full-blown trial.On September 12, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.7 Shortly thereafter, he filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, asserting that the complainants were guilty of forum shopping, due to the earlier dismissal of the administrative case against him.8On December 11, 2001, public respondent issued a Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration.9Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion for Reconsideration.10 Again, he cited as his ground the alleged forum shopping of the private complainants.On April 29, 2002, public respondent issued a Resolution denying the Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion for Reconsideration.11 It held that there was no forum shopping since the administrative and criminal cases are two different actions, so neither resolution on the same would have the effect of res judicata on the other. The public respondent dismissed the second motion for reconsideration as a pro forma and prohibited motion.Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 153592, which assailed the Resolution of public respondent dated April 29, 2002 as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. On July 1, 2002, the Court dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time and for failure to pay the required docket fees.12Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 which the Court denied with finality in its Resolution dated September 4, 2002.14On May 19, 2003, before he can be arraigned, petitioner filed yet another motion with public respondent, this time a Motion for Re-determination of Probable Cause,15 invoking the ruling of the Office of the President (OP), dated February 29, 2000,16 which absolved petitioner of administrative liability. The OP reviewed the administrative case filed against petitioner with the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) and held that petitioner acted in good faith and within the scope of his authority.On July 2, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued herein assailed Resolution denying the Motion for Re-determination of Probable Cause, stating as follows:The Court resolves to deny the motion for re-determination of probable cause, the argument advanced therein having been passed upon and resolved by this Court in accused's motion to dismiss as well as motion for reconsideration and where the resolution of this Court was sustained by the Supreme Court.17On August 4, 2003, upon his receipt of the Resolution, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Quash Information,18 arguing that the Supreme Court's dismissal of his petition for certiorari was based on a mere technicality.1avvphi1 He reiterated his argument that since he has been cleared of administrative liability, the criminal case that was pending against him should likewise be dismissed.The public respondent denied the motion in the other assailed Resolution dated October 22, 2003, stating as follows:Finding no merit in the accused [sic] Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Quash dated August 4, 2003 and considering the Opposition of the prosecution, the same is DENIED.Indeed, the dismissal of the administrative complaint does not negate the existing criminal case pending before the Court. Moreover the grounds and arguments raised thereat could be considered matter of defense that is more and properly to be considered during a full blown trial.WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Quash by the accused is denied for lack of merit.x x x xSO ORDERED.19Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari, seeking to annul the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of and/or without jurisdiction.Petitioner insists that the Sandiganbayan should have dismissed the criminal case filed against him, since the alleged wrongful acts complained of in the case are the same as those alleged in the administrative case against him which have been dismissed.Both the public and private prosecutors contend that the issues raised by petitioner have already been raised and passed upon; and that the assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan merely reiterate its earlier Resolutions denying petitioner's motion for reinvestigation and various motions forreconsideration questioning the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause.20 They claim that the issue became settled and final as early as the December 11, 2001 Resolution of the public respondent, which denied petitioner's motions for reinvestigation.21 They further argue that this Court's denial of petitioner's earlier petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 153592) barred petitioner from filing the present petition.The respondents cite jurisprudence, which states that the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts.22The petition is devoid of merit.In Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,23 the Court denied a similar petition to dismiss a pending criminal case with the Sandiganbayan on the basis of the dismissal of the administrative case against the accused. The Court ratiocinated, thus:Petitioners call attention to the fact that the administrative complaint against petitioner Honrada was dismissed. They invoke our ruling in Maceda v. Vasquez that only this Court has the power to oversee court personnel's compliance with laws and take the appropriate administrative action against them for their failure to do so and that no other branch of the government may exercise this power without running afoul of the principle of separation of powers.But one thing is administrative liability. Quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same act. Our determination of the administrative liability for falsification of public documents is in no way conclusive of his lack of criminal liability. As we have held in Tan v. Comelec, the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative complaint.24 (Emphasis supplied.) It is clear from Paredes that the criminal case against petitioner, already filed and pending with the Sandiganbayan, may proceed despite the dismissal of the administrative case arising out of the same acts.The same rule applies even to those cases that have yet to be filed in court. In Tan v. Commission on Elections,25 it was held that an investigation by the Ombudsman of the criminal case for falsification and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and an inquiry into the administrative charges by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) are entirely independent proceedings, neither of which results in or concludes the other. The established rule is that an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa.26 The dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative complaint.27The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from these rules.Petitioner argues that the criminal case against him requires a higher quantum of proof for conviction -- that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt -- than the administrative case, which needs only substantial evidence. He claims that from this circumstance, it follows that the dismissal of the administrative case should carry with it the dismissal of the criminal case.This argument, however, has been addressed in jurisprudence. In Valencia v. Sandiganbayan,28 the administrative case against the accused was dismissed by the Ombudsman on a finding that the contract of loan entered into was in pursuance of the police power of the accused as local chief executive,29 and that the accused had been re-elected to office.30 The Ombudsman, however, still found probable cause to criminally charge the accused in court.31 When the accused filed a petition with the Supreme Court to dismiss the criminal case before the Sandiganbayan, the Court denied the petition, thus:In the final analysis, the conflicting findings of the Ombudsman boil down to issues of fact which, however, are not within our province to resolve. As has been oft-repeated, this Court is not a trier of facts. This is a matter best left to the Sandiganbayan.Petitioners argue that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the administrative case against them based on the same subject matter should operate to dismiss the criminal case because the quantum of proof in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt, while thatin administrative cases is only substantial evidence. While that may be true, it should likewise be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime.Moreover, one of the grounds for the dismissal of the administrative case against petitioners is the fact that they were re-elected to office. Indeed, a re-elected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still re-elects him, then such re-election is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.However, the re-election of a public official extinguishes only the administrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred by him during his previous term of office x x x.x x x xThere is, thus, no reason for the Sandiganbayan to quash the Information against petitioners on the basis solely of the dismissal of the administrative complaint against them.32To sustain petitioner's arguments will be to require the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman to merely adopt the results of administrative investigations which would not only diminish the powers and duties of these constitutional offices, but also violate the independent nature of criminal and administrative cases against public officials. This will also amount to untold delays in criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and Ombudsman, as every criminal trial and investigation before these bodies will be made to await the results of pending administrative investigations. Such is not the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the laws governing public officers.Petitioner cites Larin v. Executive Secretary33 to support his arguments. That case, however, is not on all fours with the present case.In Larin, the accused was first convicted by the Sandiganbayan for violation of the National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. On the basis of this conviction, an administrative case was filed against him. On appeal of the criminal conviction to the Supreme Court, however, he was acquitted upon a finding that the acts he had committed were neither illegal nor irregular. When the accused sought a similar dismissal of the administrative case, the Supreme Court sustained him and ruled that since the same acts for which he was administratively charged had been found neither illegal nor irregular, his acquittal in the criminal case should entail the dismissal of the administrative case.The present case differs from Larin because here, the administrative case was filed independently of the criminal case. The administrative case was not filed on the basis of a criminal conviction, as in fact, the administrative case was dismissed without regard for the results of the criminal case. This is in contrast with Larin, where the administrative case was dismissed only after its basis, the criminal conviction, was overturned on appeal.We cannot reverse Larin by ruling that petitioner's discharge from the administrative action should result in the dismissal of the criminal case. The argument cannot be sustained without violating settled principles. The rule is that administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liabilities.34 In Larin, no less than the Supreme Court acquitted the accused of charges of wrongdoing; in the case at bar, no court of justice has yet declared petitioner not guilty of committing illegal or irregular acts.The independent nature of a criminal prosecution dictates that the Sandiganbayan must determine petitioner's criminal liability without its hands being tied by what transpired in the administrative case. The court is duty-bound to exercise its independent judgment.35 It is not ousted of its jurisdiction by the ruling in the administrative proceeding. It is axiomatic that when the court obtains jurisdiction over a case, it continues to retain it until the case is terminated.36Under the Rules of Court, petitioner's absolution from administrative liability is not even one of the grounds for a Motion to Quash.37Moreover, petitioner lacked the right to file the instant petition. Petitioner already raised the issue of his discharge from administrative liability in his supplemental motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated July 13, 2001.38 When the motion was denied, he again alleged such fact in his motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration.39 Both motions have already been denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolutions dated December 11, 200140 and April 29, 2002.41 Petitioner's argument on private respondents' alleged forum shopping was not sustained by the Sandiganbayan, since administrative and criminal cases are two independent actions. It correctly held that neither action barred the filing of the other, and that both cases did not pray for a common relief or share the same parties.42Thus, the question on the effect of the administrative case on the criminal case before the Sandiganbayan was settled as early as the Resolution dated December 11, 2001. When petitioner questioned this ruling before the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 153592, he again raised the issue of forum-shopping, but his efforts failed because he filed his petition out of time. With the dismissal of G.R. No. 153592, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated December 11, 2001 has become final.Such finality was evident in the public respondent's Resolution dated July 2, 2003,43 which denied petitioner's Motion for the Re-determination of Probable Cause. In it, the public respondent aptly stated:The Court resolves to deny the motion for re-determination of probable cause, the argument advanced therein having been passed upon and resolved by this Court in accused's motion to dismiss as well as motion for reconsideration and where the resolution of this Court was sustained by the Supreme Court.44 (Emphasis supplied)Thus, the petition now before the Court, which raises the same issues, must necessarily fail.Petitioner's tactics to delay his arraignment and trial cannot be countenanced. In utter contempt of the Court's efforts to expedite all judicial proceedings, he has filed a petition which merely raises issues that have long been resolved with finality. By so doing, petitioner has gone beyond merely exhausting his available remedies and trodden in the realm of abusing legal processes.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Sandiganbayan is ordered to proceed with the arraignment and trial of Criminal Case No. 26546. Petitioner and his counsel are ADMONISHED not to engage further in delaying tactics. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 173918 April 8, 2008REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), petitioner, vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, respondent.D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO, J.:This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision dated 4 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 82183.1 The appellate court reversed the Decision2 dated 19 August 2003 of the Office of the President in OP NO. Case 96-H-6574 and declared that Ministry of Finance (MOF) Circular No. 1-85 dated 15 April 1985, as amended, is ineffective for failure to comply with Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book 7 of the Administrative Code of 1987,3 which requires the publication and filing in the Office of the National Administration Register (ONAR) of administrative issuances. Thus, surcharges provided under the aforementioned circular cannot be imposed upon respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.Respondent is a corporation duly organized existing under the laws of the Philippines. It is engaged in the business of refining oil, marketing petroleum, and other related activities.4The Department of Energy (DOE) is a government agency under the direct control and supervision of the Office of the President. The Department is mandated by Republic Act No. 7638 to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects and activities of the Government relative to energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation.On 10 October 1984, the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) was created under Presidential Decree No. 1956 for the purpose of minimizing frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustments and/or increase in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products.5Letter of Instruction No. 1431 dated 15 October 1984 was issued directing the utilization of the OPSF to reimburse oil companies the additional costs of importation of crude oil and petroleum products due to fluctuation in foreign exchange rates to assure adequate and continuous supply of petroleum products at reasonable prices.6Letter of Instruction No. 1441, issued on 20 November 1984, mandated the Board of Energy (now, the Energy Regulatory Board) to review and reset prices of domestic oil products every two months to reflect the prevailing prices of crude oil and petroleum. The prices were regulated by adjusting the OPSF impost, increasing or decreasing this price component as necessary to maintain the balance between revenues and claims on the OPSF.7On 27 February 1987, Executive Order No. 137 was enacted to amend P. D. No. 1956. It expanded the sources and utilization of the OPSF in order to maintain stability in the domestic prices of oil products at reasonable levels.8On 4 December 1991, the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA), now the DOE, informed the respondent that respondents contributions to the OPSF for foreign exchange risk charge for the period December 1989 to March 1991 were insufficient. OEA Audit Task Force noted a total underpayment of P14,414,860.75 by respondent to the OPSF. As a consequence of the underpayment, a surcharge of P11,654,782.31 was imposed upon respondent. The said surcharge was imposed pursuant to MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended by Department of Finance (DOF) Circular No. 2-94,9 which provides that:2. Remittance of payment to the OPSF as provided for under Section 5 of MOF Order No. 11-85 shall be made not later than 20th of the month following the month of remittance of the foreign exchange payment for the import or the month of payment to the domestic producers in the case of locally produced crude. Payment after the specified date shall be subject to a surcharge of fifteen percent (15%) of the amount, if paid within thirty (30) days from the due date plus two percent (2%) per month if paid after thirty days.10 (Emphasis supplied.)On 9 December 1991, the OEA wrote another letter11 to respondent advising the latter of its additional underpayment to the OPSF of the foreign exchange risk fee in the amount of P10,139,526.56 for the period April 1991 to October 1991. In addition, surcharges in the amount of P2,806,656.65 were imposed thereon.In a letter dated 20 January 1992 addressed to the OEA, respondent justified that its calculations for the transactions in question were based on a valid interpretation of MOF Order NO. 11-85 dated 12 April 1985 and MOE Circular No. 85-05-82 dated 16 May 1985.12On 24 March 1992, respondent paid the OEA in full the principal amount of its underpayment, totaling P24,554,387.31, but not the surcharges.13In a letter14 dated 15 March 1996, OEA notified the respondent that the latter is required to pay the OPSF a total amount of P18,535,531.40 for surcharges on the late payment of foreign exchange risk charges for the period December 1989 to October 1991.In a letter15 dated 11 July 1996, the DOE reiterated its demand for respondent to settle the surcharges due. Otherwise, the DOE warned that it would proceed against the respondents Irrevocable Standby Letter of Credit to recover its unpaid surcharges.On 19 July 1996, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal before the Office of the President. The Office of the President affirmed the conclusion of the DOE, contained in its letters dated 15 March 1996 and 11 July 1996. While it admitted that the implementation of MOF Circular No. 1-85 is contingent upon its publication and filing with the ONAR, it noted that respondent failed to adduce evidence of lack of compliance with such requirements. The aforementioned Decision reads:16Given the foregoing, the DOEs implementation of MOF Circular 1-85 by imposing surcharges on Pilipinas Shell is only proper. Like this Office, the DOE is bound to presume the validity of that administrative regulation.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Department of Energy, contained in its letters dated 15 March 1996 and 11 July 1996, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 19 August 2003 of the Office of the President, which was denied on 28 November 2003.17Respondent filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals wherein it presented Certifications dated 9 February 200418 and 11 February 200419 issued by ONAR stating that DOF Circular No. 2-94 and MOF Circular No. 1-85 respectively, have not been filed before said office.The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the Office of the President in O.P. CASE No. 96-H-6574 and ruled that MOF Circular 1-85, as amended, was ineffective for failure to comply with the requirement to file with ONAR. It decreed that even if the said circular was issued by then Acting Minister of Finance Alfredo de Roda, Jr. long before the Administrative Code of 1987, Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book 7 thereof specifies that rules already in force on the date of the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987 must be filed within three months from the date of effectivity of said Code, otherwise such rules cannot thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.20 According to the dispositive of the appellate courts Decision:21WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated August 19, 2003 and the Resolution dated November 28, 2003 of the Office of the President, are hereby REVERSED.ACCORDINGLY, the imposition of surcharges upon petitioner is hereby declared without legal basis.On 25 September 2006, petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, wherein the following issues were raised:22ITHE SURCHARGE IMPOSED BY MINISTRY OF FINANCE (MOF) CIRCULAR No. 1-85 HAS BEEN AFFIRMED BY E.O. NO. 137 HAVING RECEIVED VITALITY FROM A LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT, MOF CIRCULAR NO. 1-85 CANNOT BE RENDERED INVALID BY THE SUBSEQUENT ENACTMENT OF A LAW REQUIRING REGISTRATION OF THE MOF CIRCULAR WITH THE OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL REGISTERIIASSUMING THAT THE REGISTRATION OF MOF NO. 1-85 IS REQUIRED, RESPONDENT WAIVED ITS OBJECTION ON THE BASIS OF NON-REGISTRATION WHEN IT PAID THE AMOUNT REQUIRED BY PETITIONER.This petition is without merit.As early as 1986, this Court in Taada v. Tuvera23 enunciated that publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect, to wit:We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (Emphasis provided.)Thereafter, the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted, with Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII thereof specifically providing that: Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection. (Emphasis provided.)Under the doctrine of Tanada v. Tuvera,24 the MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, is one of those issuances which should be published before it becomes effective since it is intended to enforce Presidential Decree No. 1956. The said circular should also comply with the requirement stated under Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 filing with the ONAR in the University of the Philippines Law Center for rules that are already in force at the time the Administrative Code of 1987 became effective. These requirements of publication and filing were put in place as safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern and, therefore, require strict compliance.In the present case, the Certifications dated 11 February 200425 and 9 February 200426 issued by ONAR prove that MOF Circular No. 1-85 and its amendatory rule, DOF Circular No. 2-94, have not been filed before said office. Moreover, petitioner was unable to controvert respondents allegation that neither of the aforementioned circulars were published in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation. Thus, failure to comply with the requirements of publication and filing of administrative issuances renders MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, ineffective.In National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Board,27 this Court emphasized that both the requirements of publication and filing of administrative issuances intended to enforce existing laws are mandatory for the effectivity of said issuances. In support of its ruling, it specified several instances wherein this Court declared administrative issuances, which failed to observe the proper requirements, to have no force and effect:Nowhere from the above narration does it show that the GRAM Implementing Rules was published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Significantly, the effectivity clauses of both the GRAM and ICERA Implementing Rules uniformly provide that they "shall take effect immediately." These clauses made no mention of their publication in either the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Moreover, per the Certification dated January 11, 2006 of the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR), the said implementing rules and regulations were not likewise filed with the said office in contravention of the Administrative Code of 1987.Applying the doctrine enunciated in Taada v. Tuvera, the Court has previously declared as having no force and effect the following administrative issuances: (1) Rules and Regulations issued by the Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee regarding the accreditation of hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories; (2) Letter of Instruction No. 1416 ordering the suspension of payments due and payable by distressed copper mining companies to the national government; (3) Memorandum Circulars issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration regulating the recruitment of domestic helpers to Hong Kong; (4) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by the Philippine International Trading Corporation regulating applications for importation from the Peoples Republic of China; (5) Corporation Compensation Circular No. 10 issued by the Department of Budget and Management discontinuing the payment of other allowances and fringe benefits to government officials and employees; and (6) POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2 Series of 1983 which provided for the schedule of placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority holders. In all these cited cases, the administrative issuances questioned therein were uniformly struck down as they were not published or filed with the National Administrative Register. On the other hand, in Republic v. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc, the Court declared that the 1993 Revised Rules of the National Telecommunications Commission had not become effective despite the fact that it was filed with the National Administrative Register because the same had not been published at the time. The Court emphasized therein that "publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect."Petitioners argument that respondent waived the requisite registration of MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, when it paid in full the principal amount of underpayment totaling P24,544,387.31, is specious. MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended imposes surcharges, while respondents underpayment is based on MOF Circular No. 11-85 dated 12 April 1985.Petitioner also insists that the registration of MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, with the ONAR is no longer necessary since the respondent knew of its existence, despite its non-registration. This argument is seriously flawed and contrary to jurisprudence. Strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be annulled by a mere allegation that parties were notified of the existence of the implementing rules concerned. Hence, also in National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Board, this Court pronounced:In this case, the GRAM Implementing Rules must be declared ineffective as the same was never published or filed with the National Administrative Register. To show that there was compliance with the publication requirement, respondents MERALCO and the ERC dwell lengthily on the fact that parties, particularly the distribution utilities and consumer groups, were duly notified of the public consultation on the ERCs proposed implementing rules. These parties participated in the said public consultation and even submitted their comments thereon.However, the fact that the parties participated in the public consultation and submitted their respective comments is not compliance with the fundamental rule that the GRAM Implementing Rules, or any administrative rules whose purpose is to enforce or implement existing law, must be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The requirement of publication of implementing rules of statutes is mandatory and may not be dispensed with altogether even if, as in this case, there was public consultation and submission by the parties of their comments.28 (Emphasis provided.) Petitioner further avers that MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, gains its vitality from the subsequent enactment of Executive Order No. 137, which reiterates the power of then Minister of Finance to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the executive order. Such contention is irrelevant in the present case since the power of the Minister of Finance to promulgate rules and regulations is not under dispute. The issue rather in the Petition at bar is the ineffectivity of his administrative issuance for non-compliance with the requisite publication and filing with the ONAR. And while MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, may be unimpeachable in substance, the due process requirements of publication and filing cannot be disregarded. Moreover, none of the provisions of Executive Order No. 137 exempts MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended from the aforementioned requirements. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated 4 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 82183 is AFFIRMED. No cost. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 165416 January 22, 2008OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. FLORITA A. MASING and JOCELYN A. TAYACTAC, respondents.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 165584 January 22, 2008OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. FLORITA A. MASING, respondent.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xG.R. No. 165731 January 22, 2008PAUL L. CANSINO, FELICIDAD MOJICA, VENERANDO MOJICA and RICARTE L. MAMPARO, petitioners, vs. FLORITA A. MASING and JOCELYN A. TAYACTAC, respondents.D E C I S I O NPUNO, C.J.:These cases involve the issue of whether the Ombudsman may directly discipline public school teachers and employees, or merely recommend appropriate disciplinary action to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). In G.R. Nos. 165416 and 165731, respondent Florita A. Masing was the former Principal of the Davao City Integrated Special School (DCISS) in Bangkal, Davao City. Respondent Jocelyn A. Tayactac was an office clerk in the same school. In 1997, respondents were administratively charged before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao for allegedly collecting unauthorized fees, failing to remit authorized fees, and to account for public funds. The cases were docketed as follows: 1. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-193 for grave misconduct and neglect of duty, against respondent Masing only;2. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-249 for violation of Republic Act No. 6713, against respondent Masing and a schoolteacher;3. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-253 for violation of Republic Act No. 6713, against respondents Masing and Tayactac, and several schoolteachers;4. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-254 for violation of Republic Act No. 6713, against respondent Masing and several schoolteachers.The complainants were parents of children studying at the DCISS, among whom were the petitioners in G.R. No. 165731, namely, Paul L. Cansino, Felicidad Mojica, Venerando Mojica, and Ricarte L. Mamparo. On July 2, 1998, respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over them. Respondents alleged that the DECS has jurisdiction over them which shall exercise the same through a committee to be constituted under Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4670, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers." The motion was denied, as well as respondents motion for reconsideration. On June 30, 2000, the Ombudsman for Mindanao rendered a joint decision finding respondents Masing and Tayactac guilty, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds substantial evidence that:1. Respondent Florita Masing is guilty of gross misconduct, neglect of duty and violation of Section 4, paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of RA 6713 in relation to the collection of unauthorized fees, non-remittance of authorized fees and failure to account for public funds; and of misconduct in relation to the complaint of Felicidad Mojica, and she is hereby DISMISSED FROM [THE] SERVICE with all the accessory penalties including forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from holding public office; and 2. Respondent Jocelyn Tayactac is guilty of simple neglect of duty, and is hereby suspended for a period of six (6) months. A repetition of the same offense will be met with stiffer penalty. x x x x1Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which the Ombudsman denied in an Order dated September 26, 2000. Respondents sought recourse to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 61993. On February 27, 2004, the Court of Appeals granted the petition, viz:WHEREFORE, the joint decision of June 30, 2000 and the Order of September 26, 2000 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and Administrative Cases Nos. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-193, OMB-MIN-ADM-97-249, OMB-MIN-ADM-97-253, and OMB-MIN-ADM-97-254 of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao are hereby DISMISSED.The IMMEDIATE REINSTATEMENT of the petitioners with full backwages and other benefits is further ORDERED in the interest of justice.2 On April 13, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman, which was not impleaded as respondent in the cases, filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene and for Reconsideration.3 The Court of Appeals denied the omnibus motion on the grounds that (1) intervention is not proper because it is sought by the quasi-judicial body whose judgment is on appeal, and (2) intervention, even if permissible, is belated under Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.4 Hence, the petition before us by the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as G.R. No. 165416. The complainant-parents filed their own petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision dated February 27, 2004, docketed as G.R. No. 165731.In G.R. No. 165584, respondent Florita A. Masing faced yet another administrative case before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao filed by Erlinda P. Tan.5 The charges were oppression, serious misconduct, discourtesy in the conduct of official duties, and physical or mental incapacity or disability due to immoral or vicious habits. As in the other administrative cases, respondent Masing filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case. The motion was denied, as well as respondents motion for reconsideration.On December 27, 1999, the Ombudsman for Mindanao found respondent Masing guilty as charged and ordered her suspension for six (6) months without pay. The DECS Regional Director, Regional Office No. XI, was ordered to implement the decision upon its finality. Respondent Masing filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 58735. On July 31, 2003, the Court of Appeals set aside the assailed Ombudsman decision, viz:WHEREFORE, finding merit in the herein petition, the same is hereby given due course and the decision of the agency a quo in Case No. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-282 is hereby SET ASIDE, and petitioner is further declared as entitled to her salary which she failed to receive during the period of her flawed suspension.6The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene and for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated September 30, 2004.7 Hence, this petition by the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as G.R. No. 165584.We consolidated G.R. Nos. 165416 and 165584 in our Resolution dated November 9, 2005. G.R. No. 165731 was consolidated per Resolution dated June 21, 2006. The Office of the Ombudsman contends8 I.THE x x x COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IGNORED THE CLEAR LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS NO AUTHORITY TO DISCIPLINE ERRING MEMBERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS), THIS CONSIDERING THAT:(A) THE TAPIADOR [TAPIADOR VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, 379 SCRA 322 (2002)] CASE CITED BY THE APPELLATE COURT A QUO IS NOT APPLICABLE, AS THE TAPIADOR OBITER DICTUM CAN NEVER BE CITED AS A VALID RATIO DECIDENDI;(B) THE FABELLA [FABELLA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 282 SCRA 256 (1997)] CASE, WHICH INVOLVED AN ILLEGAL CONSTITUTION OF AN INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE IN THE DECS, IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE DISCIPLINARY CASE AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PUBLIC SCHOOL PRINCIPAL AND OFFICE CLERK OF THE DECS;(C) SECTION 9 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670 (MAGNA CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS) HAS NOT ADDED PUBLIC SCHOOL PRINCIPALS, TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES, LIKE HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, TO THE LIST OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGED CLASSES OF PUBLIC SERVANTS EXEMPTED FROM THE OMBUDSMANS ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY UNDER THE SUBSEQUENT 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND ANY SUCH INTERPRETATION SUFFERS FROM THE VICE OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY;(D) THE CONCEDED ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION OF THE PETITIONER OMBUDSMAN OVER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, A PUBLIC SCHOOL PRINCIPAL AND AN OFFICE CLERK OF THE DECS, WHICH IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770 (THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989) AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE, CANNOT BE SUPPLANTED BY SECTION 9 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670 (MAGNA CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS); AND (E) THE POWER OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO DISCIPLINE PUBLIC SERVANTS NOT EXEMPTED FROM ITS JURISDICTION AND TO IMPLEMENT ITS JUDGMENTS HAS BEEN AFFIRMED IN LEDESMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 161629, 29 JULY 2005.9(F) THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS CONCURRENT INVESTIGATIVE AND DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY WITH THE DECS OVER PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS, INCLUDING HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENT MASING, AS THERE IS SIMPLY NO REPUGNANCE BETWEEN THE LAWS CONFERRING INVESTIGATIVE AND DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION ON THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (ART. XI, 1987 CONSTITUTION AND R.A. 6770) AND THE LAWS CONFERRING THE SAME INVESTIGATIVE AND DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION TO DECS (R.A. 4670 [MAGNA CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS] AND P.D. 807, NOW BOOK V OF E.O. 292 [CIVIL SERVICE LAW]).10 II.CONTRARY TO THE APPELLATE COURT A QUOS RULING, THE PETITIONER OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN TIMELY AND RIGHTFULLY FILED ITS OMNIBUS MOTION TO INTERVENE AND FOR RECONSIDERATION ON A PATENTLY ERRONEOUS DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WHICH HAS NOT YET ATTAINED FINALITY.11 The petitioners in G.R. No. 165731 contendI.TAPIADOR V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (379 SCRA 322) CITED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT APPLICABLE, AS THE TAPIADOR OBITER DICTUM CAN NEVER BE CITED AS A VALID RATIO DECIDENDI. MOREOVER, THE TAPIADOR RULING HAS EFFECTIVELY BEEN ABANDONED BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN SUBSEQUENT CASES EVEN AS TAPIADOR FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE PROPER CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY BASES OF THE OMBUDSMANS DISCIPLINARY POWER OVER ALL APPOINTIVE AND ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES.II.TO INSIST THAT PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS PURSUANT TO THE RULING IN FABELLA V. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. NO. 110379, 28 NOVEMBER 1997) CAN ONLY BE PROCEEDED AGAINST ADMINISTRATIVELY THROUGH THE "COMMITTEE" UNDER SECTION 9 OF R.A. NO. 4670 WOULD BE AN UNDUE, UNWARRANTED AND INVALID "CLASSIFICATION" BY JUDICIAL FIAT OF A CERTAIN GROUP OF PUBLIC SERVANTS WHICH IS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION. MOREOVER, THE SAID LAW DOES NOT CONFER JURISDICTION ON THE "COMMITTEE."III.SECTION 9 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670 HAS NOT ADDED PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS TO THE LIST OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGED CLASSES OF PUBLIC SERVANTS EXEMPTED FROM THE OMBUDSMANS ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND ANY SUCH INTERPRETATION SUFFERS FROM THE VICE OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. IV.THE CONCEDED ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN OVER THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS, WHICH IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770 AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE CANNOT BE SUPPLANTED BY SECTION 9 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670. In sum, the pivotal issues are (1) whether the Office of the Ombudsman may intervene and seek reconsideration of the adverse decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals, and (2) whether the Office of the Ombudsman may directly discipline public school teachers and employees.First, the procedural issue. The Office of the Ombudsman was not allowed by the Court of Appeals to intervene because (1) the motions to intervene were filed after the decisions have already been rendered in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 58735 and 61993, and (2) the Office of the Ombudsman was the quasi-judicial body which rendered the impugned decisions. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for intervention may be filed before rendition of judgment, viz: SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties. (emphasis ours)We have ruled however that allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court12 after consideration of the appropriate circumstances.13 Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice.14 Its purpose is not to hinder or delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.15 Thus, interventions have been allowed even beyond the prescribed period in the Rule in the higher interest of justice. Interventions have been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court,16 when the petition for review of the judgment was already submitted for decision before the Supreme Court,17 and even where the assailed order has already become final and executory.18 In Lim v. Pacquing,19 the motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties. In the cases at bar, the rulings of the Court of Appeals adversely affected the all-important jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. The rulings aggrieved the Office of the Ombudsman for they have serious consequences on its effectiveness as the body charged by the Constitution with the prosecution of officials and employees of the government suspected of violating our laws on graft and corruption. In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,20 we recognized the standing of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed its decision finding Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism and ordering his dismissal from the service. Although the CSC was the quasi-judicial body which rendered the decision appealed to the Court of Appeals, it became the party aggrieved or adversely affected by its decision which "seriously prejudices the civil service system."21 In Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania,22 we likewise ruled that the CSC may seek a review of decisions of the Court of Appeals that are detrimental to its constitutional mandate as the central personnel agency of the government.23 However, rather than remand the cases at bar to the Court of Appeals for a ruling on the merits of the Ombudsmans motions for reconsideration, we shall resolve the legal issues involved in the interest of speedy justice. The authority of the Ombudsman to act on complaints filed against public officers and employees is explicit in Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, viz: The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof. (emphasis ours)Article XI, Section 13 of the same Constitution delineates the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman as follows: (1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts and transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, to the Commission on Audit for appropriate and report any irregularity action.(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.(8) Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.The enumeration of these powers is non-exclusive.24 Congress enacted R.A. No. 6770,25 otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, on November 17, 1989 giving the Office such other powers that it may need to efficiently perform the task given by the Constitution,26 viz: Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.- The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the Government, the investigation of such cases;(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties;(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act; Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer; (4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as it may provide in its rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action;(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents;(6) Publicize matters covered by is investigation of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) hereof, when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence: Provided, That the Ombudsman under its rules and regulations may determine what cases may not be made public: Provided, further, That any publicity issued by the Ombudsman shall be balanced, fair and true;(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud and corruption in the Government, and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency;(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records;(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein;(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shall ensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein or hereinafter provided;(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein. x x x x27 In fine, the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority in accord with the constitutional deliberations.28 Unlike the Ombudsman-like agencies of the past the powers of which extend to no more than making findings of fact and recommendations, and the Ombudsman or Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution who may file and prosecute criminal, civil or administrative cases against public officials and employees only in cases of failure of justice, the Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 is intended to play a more active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other offenses committed by public officers and employees.29 The Ombudsman is to be an "activist watchman," not merely a passive one.30 He is vested with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.31 Respondents, however, insist that the findings of the Ombudsman are mere recommendations, and that he may not directly impose administrative sanctions on public officials and employees, citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman32 where the following statement is found, viz:x x x x Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner was administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only "recommend" the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned. The foregoing is now a settled issue. In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,33 we explained Tapiador and ruled categorically that: x x x x Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided:Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:. . .(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. (Emphasis supplied)Petitioner insists that the word "recommend" be given its literal meaning; that is, that the Ombudsmans action is only advisory in nature rather than one having any binding effect, citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, thus:. . . Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only "recommend" the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned.For their part, the Solicitor General and the Office of the Ombudsman argue that the word "recommend" must be taken in conjunction with the phrase "and ensure compliance therewith." The proper interpretation of the Courts statement in Tapiador should be that the Ombudsman has the authority to determine the administrative liability of a public official or employee at fault, and direct and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In other words, it merely concerns the procedural aspect of the Ombudsmans functions and not its jurisdiction.We agree with the ratiocination of public respondents. Several reasons militate against a literal interpretation of the subject Constitutional provision. Firstly, a cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the failure of the complainant therein to present substantial evidence to prove the charges of the administrative case. The statement that made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying interpretations x x x x [h]ence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial examination. (emphases ours) We reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja,34 where we emphasized that "the Ombudsmans order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually mandatory."35 Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.36 Recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals,37 we also heldWhile Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman has the power to "recommend x x x removal, suspension, demotion x x x" of government officials and employees, the same Section 15(3) also states that the Ombudsman in the alternative may "enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21" of RA 6770. (emphasis supplied) Finally, respondent Masing contends that she may be administratively dealt with only by following the procedure prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 or the The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. She cites Fabella v. Court of Appeals.38 Section 9, R.A. No. 4670 providesSection 9. Administrative Charges.- Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who should at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of Public Schools. The Committee shall submit its findings, and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings; Provided, however, That where the school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education. In Fabella, several public schoolteachers were administratively charged by then DECS Secretary Isidro Cario for taking part in mass actions in violation of civil service laws and regulations. A committee was constituted to hear the charges. The teachers assailed the procedure adopted by the committee in a petition for certiorari filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In affirming the regional trial courts decision which declared illegal the constitution of the committee, we ruledx x x x Section 9 of RA 4670 x x x reflects the legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. x x x [R]ight to due process of law requires compliance with these requirements laid down by RA 4670.39 Fabella, however, does not apply to the cases at bar. The public schoolteachers in Fabella were charged with violations of civil service laws, rules and regulations in administrative proceedings initiated by the DECS Secretary. In contrast, herein respondents Masing and Tayactac were administratively charged in letter-complaints duly filed before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. The charges were for violations of R.A. No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, collecting unauthorized fees, failure to remit authorized fees, failure to account for public funds, oppression, serious misconduct, discourtesy in the conduct of official duties, and physical or mental incapacity or disability due to immoral or vicious habits. In short, the acts and omissions complained of relate to respondents conduct as public official and employee, if not to outright graft and corruption. The authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is beyond cavil.40 As the principal and primary complaints and action center41 against erring public officers and employees, it is mandated by no less than Section 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution.42 In conjunction therewith, Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 grants to the Ombudsman the authority to act on all administrative complaints,43 viz:Sec. 19. Administrative complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which:(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agencys functions, though in accordance with law;(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification. Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due process. It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers an exclusive disciplinary authority on the DECS over public school teachers and prescribes an exclusive procedure in administrative investigations involving them.44 R.A. No. 4670 was approved on June 18, 1966. On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite in 1987 while R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989. It is basic that the 1987 Constitution should not be restricted in its meaning by a law of earlier enactment. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 were quite explicit in conferring authority on the Ombudsman to act on complaints against all public officials and employees, with the exception of officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over members of Congress and the Judiciary.45 If an issue should ever arise, therefore, it should rather be whether the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 have abrogated R.A. No. 4670. However, repeals by implication are not favored, and courts have the duty to harmonize, so far as it is practicable, apparently conflicting or inconsistent provisions. Therefore, the statement in Fabella that Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 "reflects the legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers" should be construed as referring only to the specific procedure to be followed in administrative investigations conducted by the DECS.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals dated February 27, 2004 and July 31, 2003, as well as its Resolutions dated September 27, 2004 and September 30, 2004, in CA-G.R. SP No. 61993 and CA-G.R. SP No. 58735, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Joint Decision dated June 30, 2000 of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao in Administrative Case Nos. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-193, OMB-MIN-ADM-97-249, OMB-MIN-ADM-97-253 and OMB-MIN-ADM-97-254 and its Decision dated December 27, 1999 in OMB-MIN-ADM-97-282, as well as its orders denying reconsideration, are REINSTATED.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 111091 August 21, 1995ENGINEER CLARO J. PRECLARO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.KAPUNAN, J.:On 14 June 1990, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with a violation of Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information against him read as follows:That on or about June 8, 1990, or sometime prior thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the Project Manager/ Consultant of the Chemical Mineral Division, Industrial Technology Development Institute, Department of Science and Technology, a component of the Industrial Development Institute (ITDI for brevity) which is an agency of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST for brevity), wherein the Jaime Sta. Maria Construction undertook the construction of the building in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, with a total cost of SEVENTEEN MILLION SIX HUNDRED NINETY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P17,695,000.00) jointly funded by the Philippine and Japanese Governments, and while the said construction has not yet been finally completed, accused either directly requested and/or demanded for himself or for another, the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00), claimed as part of the expected profit of FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P460,000.00) in connection with the construction of that government building wherein the accused had to intervene under the law in his capacity as Project Manager/Consultant of said construction said offense having been committed in relation to the performance of his official duties.CONTRARY TO LAW. 1On 20 July 1990, during arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to the charges against him.On 30 June 1993, after trial on the merits, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion reads as follows:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Claro Preclaro y Jambalos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH, as the minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as the maximum, perpetual disqualification from public office and to pay the costs of this action.SO ORDERED. 2The antecedent facts are largely undisputed.On 1 October 1989, the Chemical Mineral Division of the Industrial Technology Development Institute (ITDI), a component of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) employed Petitioner under a written contract of services as Project Manager to supervise the construction of the ITDI-CMD (JICA) Building at the DOST Compound in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila. 3The contract was to remain in effect from October 1, 1989 up to the end of the construction period unless sooner terminated. 4 Petitioner was to be paid a monthly salary drawn from counter-part funds duly financed by foreign-assisted projects and government funds duly released by the Department of Budget and Management. 5In November 1989, to build the aforementioned CMD Structure, DOST contracted the services of the Jaime Sta. Maria Construction Company with Engr. Alexander Resoso, as the company's project engineer. 6How petitioner committed a violation of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act is narrated in the Comment of the Solicitor General and amply supported by the records. The material portions are hereunder reproduced:xxx xxx xxx3. In the month of May, 1990, Alexander Resoso, Project Engineer of the Sta. Maria Construction Company, was in the process of evaluating a Change Order for some electricals in the building construction when petitioner approached him at the project site (p. 11, 25, Ibid.).4. Unexpectedly, petitioner made some overtures that expenses in the Change Order will be deductive (meaning, charged to the contractor by deducting from the contract price), instead of additive (meaning, charged to the owner). Petitioner intimated that he can forget about the deductive provided he gets P200,000.00, a chunk of the contractor's profit which he roughly estimated to be around P460,000.00 (pp. 12-13, 22, Ibid.).5. Having conveyed the proposal to Jaime Sta. Maria, Sr., the owner of Sta. Maria Construction Company, Resoso thereafter asked petitioner if he wanted a rendezvous for him to receive the money. Petitioner chose Wendy's Restaurant, corner E. Delos Santos Avenue and Camias Street, on June 6, 1990 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening (p. 14, Ibid.).6. However, Sta. Maria, Sr. asked for two (2) more days or until the 8th of June, perceiving financial constraints (Ibid.).7. Petitioner relented, saying "O.K. lang with me because we are not in a hurry." (p. 15, Ibid.) Petitioner was thereafter asked to bring along the result of the punch list (meaning, the list of defective or correctible works to be done by the contractor) (p. 15, Ibid.; p. 10, TSN, 18 Oct. 1991).8. On 7 June 1990, Sta. Maria, Sr. and Resoso proceeded to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to report the incident (p. 15, 35, Ibid.).9. The NBI suggested an entrapment plan to which Sta. Maria, Sr. signified his conformity (p. 16, TSN, 12 Oct. 1990). Accordingly, Sta. Maria, Sr. was requested to produce the amount of P50,000.00 in P500.00 denomination to represent the grease money (p. 37, TSN, 6 Sept. 1990).10. The next day, or on 8 June 1990, Resoso delivered the money to the NBI. Thereafter, the money was dusted with flourescent powder and placed inside an attache case (pp. 16-17, Ibid.). Resoso got the attache case and was instructed not to open it. Similarly, he was advised to proceed at the Wendy's Restaurant earlier than the designated time where a group of NBI men awaited him and his companion, Sta. Maria, Jr. (pp. 17-18, Ibid.).11. Hence, from the NBI, Resoso passed by the Jade Valley Restaurant in Timog, Quezon City, to fetch Sta. Maria, Jr. (Ibid.).12. At around 7:35 p.m., Resoso and Sta. Maria, Jr. arrived at the Wendy's Restaurant. They were led by the NBI men to a table previously reserved by them which was similarly adjacent to a table occupied by them (pp. 18-19, Ibid.).13. Twenty minutes later, petitioner arrived. Supposedly, the following conversation took place, to wit:JUSTICE BALAJADIA:q. When Dave Preclaro arrived, what did he do?a. We asked him his order and we talked about the punch list.q. What was his comment about the punch list?a. He told us that it is harder to produce small items than big ones.q. How long did you converse with Engr. Claro Preclaro?a. I think thirty minutes or so.q. Was Preclaro alone when he came?a. Yes, Your Honor.xxx xxx xxxPROS. CAOILI:q. When you talk[ed] about his punch list, did you talk about anything else?a. Engineer Sta. Maria, Jr., they were conversing with Dave Preclaro and he told [him], "O, paano na."JUSTICE ESCAREAL:q. Who said "Paano na?"a. Engineer Sta. Maria, [Jr.]. And then Preclaro told [him], "Paano, How will the money be arranged and can I bring it?" he said.And then Jimmy Sta. Maria, Jr. told him it was arranged on two bundles on two envelopes.And then Dave Preclaro told, "Puede" and he asked Jimmy Sta. Maria, Jr. if there is express teller and could he deposit during night time but Engineer Sta. Maria, Jr. told him, "I do not have any knowledge or I do not have any express teller you can deposit. I only know credit card."PROS. CAOILI:q. When Engr. Sta. Maria intervened and interviewed him that way, was there anything that happened?a. Jimmy Sta. Maria, Jr. handed two envelopes to Preclaro.q. Did Claro Preclaro receive these two envelopes from Engineer Sta. Maria?a. Yes, sir. (pp. 19-21, Ibid., See also pp. 13-14, TSN, 29 Oct. 1990.)14. From the moment petitioner received the two envelopes with his right hand, thereafter placing them under his left armpit, he was accosted by the NBI men (p. 22, TSN, 12 Oct. 1990).15. A camera flashed to record the event. Petitioner instinctively docked to avoid the taking of pictures. In such manner, the two envelopes fell (p. 23, Ibid.).16. The NBI men directed petitioner to pick up the two envelopes. Petitioner refused. Hence, one of the NBI men picked up the envelopes and placed them inside a big brown envelope (p. 27, Ibid.)17. Petitioner was thenceforth brought to the NBI for examination (p. 28; Ibid.).18. At the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section, petitioner's right palmar hand was tested positive of flourescent powder. The same flourescent powder, however, cannot be detected in petitioner's T-shirt and pants (p. 5, TSN, 29 Oct. 1990). 7xxx xxx xxxThus, as brought out at the outset, an information was filed against petitioner which, after due hearing, resulted in his conviction by the Sandiganbayan. Not satisfied with the decision, petitioner instituted the present petition for review, ascribing to the Sandiganbayan the following errors:1. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE, INSTEAD OF DISMISSING IT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION, THE [PETITIONER] NOT BEING A PUBLIC OFFICER; and2. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND/OR THAT THE GUILT OF THE [PETITIONER] HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.We find the petition unmeritorious.On the first issue, petitioner asserts that he is not a public officer as defined by Sec. 2(b) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019 as amended), because he was neither elected nor appointed to a public office. Rather, petitioner maintains that he is merely a private individual hired by the ITDI on contractual basis for a particular project and for a specified period 8 as evidenced by the contract of services 9 he entered into with the ITDI. Petitioner, to further support his "theory," alleged that he was not issued any appointment paper separate from the abovementioned contract. He was not required to use the bundy clock to record his hours of work and neither did he take an oath of office. 10We are not convinced by petitioner's arguments.Petitioner miscontrues the definition of "public officer" in R.A. No. 3019 which, according to Sec. 2(b) thereof "includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government. . . ."The word "includes" used in defining a public officer in Sec. 2(b) indicates that the definition is not restrictive. The terms "classified, unclassified or exemption service" were the old categories of positions in the civil service which have been reclassified into Career Service and Non-Career Service 11 by PD 807 providing for the organization of the Civil Service Commission 12 and by the Administrative Code of 1987. 13Non-career service in particular is characterized by (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made.The Non-Career Service shall include:(1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal or confidential staff(s);(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or confidential staff;(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency; and(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel. (Emphasis ours.) 14From the foregoing classification, it is quite evident that petitioner falls under the non-career service category (formerly termed the unclassified or exemption service) of the Civil Service and thus is a public officer as defined by Sec. 2(b) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019).The fact that petitioner is not required to record his working hours by means of a bundy clock or did not take an oath of office became unessential considerations in view of the above-mentioned provision of law clearly including petitioner within the definition of a public officer.Similarly, petitioner's averment that he could not be prosecuted under the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act because his intervention "was not required by law but in the performance of a contract of services entered into by him as a private individual contractor," 15 is erroneous. As discussed above, petitioner falls within the definition of a public officer and as such, his duties delineated in A