1. [G.R. No. 127198. May 16, 2005] LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, San Fernando, Pampanga, and JOSE R. CAGUIAT represented by Attorneys-in-fact JOSE T. BARTOLOME and VICTORIO MANGALINDAN, respondents. DECISION TINGA, J.: This is a Petition for Review[1] dated December 6, 1996 assailing the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court[3] dated July 5, 1996 which ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) to pay private respondents the amount of P30.00 per square meter as just compensation for the States acquisition of private respondents properties under the land reform program. The facts follow. On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of just compensation for their agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The petition named as respondents the DAR and Land Bank. With leave of court, the petition was amended to implead as co-respondents the registered tenants of the land. After trial, the court rendered the assailed Decision the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners and against respondents, ordering respondents, particularly, respondents Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the Philippines, to pay these lands owned by petitioners and which are the subject of acquisition by the State under its land reform program, the amount of THIRTY PESOS (P30.00) per square meter, as the just compensation due for payment for same lands of petitioners located at San Vicente (or Camba), Arayat, Pampanga. Respondent Department of Agrarian Reform is also ordered to pay petitioners the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as Attorneys Fee, and to pay the cost of suit. SO ORDERED.[4] DAR and Land Bank filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by the trial court in its Order[5] dated July 30, 1996 for being pro forma as the same did not contain a notice of hearing. Thus, the prescriptive period for filing an appeal was not tolled. Land Bank consequently failed to file a timely appeal and the assailed Decision became final and executory.

Land Bank then filed a Petition for Relief from Order Dated 30 July 1996,[6] citing excusable negligence as its ground for relief. Attached to the petition for relief were two affidavits of merit claiming that the failure to include in the motion for reconsideration a notice of hearing was due to accident and/or mistake.[7] The affidavit of Land Banks counsel of record notably states that he simply scanned and signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing[8] due to his heavy workload. The trial court, in its Order[9] of November 18, 1996, denied the petition for relief because Land Bank lost a remedy in law due to its own negligence. In the instant petition for review, Land Bank argues that the failure of its counsel to include a notice of hearing due to pressure of work constitutes excusable negligence and does not make the motion for reconsideration pro forma considering its allegedly meritorious defenses. Hence, the denial of its petition for relief from judgment was erroneous. According to Land Bank, private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DARs valuation of their properties. Private respondents thus failed to exhaust administrative remedies when they filed a petition for the determination of just compensation directly with the trial court. Land Bank also insists that the trial court erred in declaring that PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228) are mere guidelines in the determination of just compensation, and in relying on private respondents evidence of the valuation of the properties at the time of possession in 1993 and not on Land Banks evidence of the value thereof as of the time of acquisition in 1972. Private respondents filed a Comment[10] dated February 22, 1997, averring that Land Banks failure to include a notice of hearing in its motion for reconsideration due merely to counsels heavy workload, which resulted in the motion being declared pro forma, does not constitute excusable negligence, especially in light of the admission of Land Banks counsel that he has been a lawyer since 1973 and has mastered the intricate art and technique of pleading. Land Bank filed a Reply[11] dated March 12, 1997 insisting that equity considerations demand that it be heard on substantive issues raised in its motion for reconsideration. The Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[12] Both parties complied.[13] The petition is unmeritorious. At issue is whether counsels failure to include a notice of hearing constitutes excusable negligence entitling Land Bank to a relief from judgment. Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Sec. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside. As can clearly be gleaned from the foregoing provision, the remedy of relief from judgment can only be resorted to on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.[14] Measured against this standard, the reason profferred by Land Banks counsel, i.e., that his heavy workload prevented him from ensuring that the motion for reconsideration included a notice of hearing, was by no means excusable. Indeed, counsels admission that he simply scanned and signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing speaks volumes of his arrant negligence, and cannot in any manner be deemed to constitute excusable negligence. The failure to attach a notice of hearing would have been less odious if committed by a greenhorn but not by a lawyer who claims to have mastered the intricate art and technique of pleading.[15] Indeed, a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is nothing but a mere scrap of paper. The clerk of court does not even have the duty to accept it, much less to bring it to the attention of the presiding judge.[16] The trial court therefore correctly considered the motion for reconsideration pro forma. Thus, it cannot be faulted for denying Land Banks motion for reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. It should be emphasized at this point that procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While in certain instances, we allow a relaxation in the application of the rules, we never intend to forge a weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal interpretation and application of rules apply only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Party litigants and their counsel are well advised to abide by, rather than flaunt, procedural rules for these rules illumine the path of the law and rationalize the pursuit of justice.[17] Aside from ruling on this procedural issue, the Court shall also resolve the other issues presented by Land Bank, specifically as regards private respondents alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the question of just compensation. Land Bank avers that private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DARs valuation instead of filing a petition to fix just compensation with the trial court.

The records reveal that Land Banks contention is not entirely true. In fact, private respondents did write a letter[18] to the DAR Secretary objecting to the land valuation summary submitted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office and requesting a conference for the purpose of fixing just compensation. The letter, however, was left unanswered prompting private respondents to file a petition directly with the trial court. At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals,[19] we declared that there is nothing contradictory between the DARs primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings. In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.[20] Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice. Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacaang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, [21] we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensation. Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657)[22] before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche.[23] Section 17 of RA 6657 which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the determination of just compensation, reads as follows: Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation.In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the

non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation. It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DARs failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.[24] In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their property, taking into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value, assessors value and the volume and value of its produce. This Court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the amount of just compensation due private respondents in accordance with, and guided by, RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. 2. [G.R. No. 159145. April 29, 2005] DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB) of the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (DAR), REPRESENTED by DAR SECRETARY ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN, petitioner, vs. JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her capacity as Assignee of the rights and interest of FEDERICO SUNTAY, respondent. DECISION TINGA, J.: Before this Court is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66710 granting herein respondents petition for prohibition and its Resolution[2] denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration. This Court adopts the appellate courts narration of facts. On August 4, 2000, Federico Suntay, now deceased, filed a petition for fixing and payment of just compensation under Presidential Decree No. 27 against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the DAR Regional Director for Region IV and the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank).[3] Docketed as DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00, the case was filed before the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) and raffled to Adjudicator Conchita Mias. Subject of the case was Suntays landholdings covering a total area of 948.1911 hectares situated in Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro and embraced under Transfer Certificate of Title T-31. The DAR and Land Bank determined its

value at Four Million Two Hundred Fifty-One Thousand One Hundred Forty-One Pesos and 68/100 (P4,251,141.68) or Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Seven Pesos and 50/100 (P4,497.50) per hectare, which valuation according to Suntay, was unconscionably low and tantamount to taking of property without due process of law.[4] After summary administrative proceedings, the RARAD rendered a Decision[5] on January 24, 2001 in favor of Suntay, ordering Land Bank to pay the former the amount of One Hundred Fifty-Seven Million Five Hundred Forty-One Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-One Pesos & 30/100 (P157,541,951.30) as just compensation for the taking of a total of 948.1911 hectares of Suntays properties. Land Bank sought reconsideration of the RARAD decision for not being supported by clear and convincing evidence and for its conclusions which are contrary to law. However, in an Order[6] dated March 14, 2001, the RARAD denied Land Banks motion. Land Bank received a copy of the order of denial on March 26, 2001.[7] On April 20, 2001, Land Bank filed a petition for just compensation[8] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro against Suntay, DAR, and RARAD. The petition, docketed as Agrarian Case No. R-1241, prayed that just compensation for the taking of Suntays landholdings be declared in the amount of Four Million Two Hundred Fifty One Thousand, One Hundred Forty-One Pesos (P4,251,141.00). Suntay moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of capacity to sue, lack of cause of action, and res judicata. After Land Bank filed its comment on Suntays motion to dismiss, the RTC, sitting as a special agrarian court, dismissed on August 6, 2001 Land Banks petition for failure to pay the docket fees within the reglementary period.[9] The special agrarian court also denied Land Banks Motion for Reconsideration for being pro-forma.[10] Thereafter, Land Bank appealed the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals by filing a Notice of Appeal with the special agrarian court.[11] While the petition for just compensation was pending with the special agrarian court, upon motion of Suntay, the RARAD issued an Order[12] on May 22, 2001, declaring its January 24, 2001 Decision as final and executory after noting that Land Banks petition for just compensation with the special agrarian court was filed beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period in violation of Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.[13] In its July 10, 2001 Order,[14] the RARAD denied LBPs motion for reconsideration of the order of finality. On July 18, 2001, the RARAD issued a Writ of Execution,[15] directing the Regional Sheriff of DARAB-Region IV to implement its January 24, 2001 Decision. Thus, Land Bank filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction[16] before the DARAB on September 12, 2001 against Suntay and RARAD. The petition, docketed as DSCA No. 0252, prayed for the nullification of the following issuances of the RARAD: [1] the January 24, 2001 Decision directing Land Bank to pay Suntay just compensation in the amount of P157,541,951.30; [2] the Order dated May 22, 2001 declaring the finality of the aforesaid Decision; [3] the July 10, 2001 Order denying Land Banks motion for reconsideration; and [4] the Writ of Execution dated July 18, 2001. On September 12, 2001, the DARAB issued an Order[17] enjoining the RARAD from momentarily implementing its January 24, 2001 Decision and

directing the parties to attend the hearing for the purpose of determining the propriety of issuing a preliminary/permanent injunction. On September 20, 2001, Josefina Lubrica, the successor-in-interest of Suntay, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition,[18] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66710. The petition, impleading DARAB and Land Bank as respondents, sought to enjoin DARAB from further proceeding with DSCA No. 0252, mainly on the theory that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, which confers adjudicatory functions upon the DAR, does not grant DAR jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari. On the same day, the Court of Appeals granted Lubricas prayer for a temporary restraining order.[19] This notwithstanding, DARAB issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction[20] on October 3, 2001, directing RARAD not to implement its January 24, 2001 Decision and the other orders in relation thereto, including the Writ of Execution. On October 8, 2001, DARAB filed a Comment[21] in CA-G.R. SP No. 66710, arguing that the writ of certiorari/injunction was issued under its power of supervision over its subordinates/delegates like the PARADs and RARADs to restrain the execution of a decision which had not yet attained finality. In an omnibus motion filed on October 10, 2001, Lubrica sought to nullify the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by DARAB in DSCA No. 0252 and to cite the DARAB for contempt.[22] Land Bank also filed its Comment[23] on October 15, 2001, raising the prematurity of Lubricas petition for prohibition. It contended that the issue of whether or not DARAB can take cognizance of Land Banks petition for certiorari may be elevated to the Office of the DAR Secretary, in accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Land Bank also questioned Lubricas personality to file the petition for prohibition considering that she never intervened in the proceedings before the RARAD. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision[24] on August 22, 2002. The appellate court ruled that petitioner DARAB had no personality to file a comment on Lubricas petition for prohibition filed with the Court of Appeals because DARAB was a mere formal party and could file a comment only when specifically and expressly directed to do so. The appellate court also ruled that DARABs exercise of jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari had no constitutional or statutory basis. It rejected DARABs contention that the issuance of the writ of certiorari arose from its power of direct and functional supervision over the RARAD. In sum, the Court of Appeals declared that DARAB was without jurisdiction to take cognizance of DSCA No. 0252 and issued a Writ of Prohibition, perpetually enjoining DARAB from proceeding with DSCA No. 0252 and ordering its dismissal. Hence, the instant petition, in which DARAB assigns the following errors to the Court of Appeals: The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it ruled: 1. THAT THE PETITIONER (DARAB), BEING A FORMAL PARTY, SHOULD NOT HAVE FILED COMMENT TO THE PETITION AND INSTEAD, IT SHOULD

HAVE BEEN CO-RESPONDENT LAND BANK, THE FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY OF CARP; 2. THAT PETITIONER HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER DSCA 0252 WHICH IS A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI; AND 3. THAT WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ISSUED BY DARAB IN DSCA 0252 WAS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN ISSUED IN VIOLATION OF THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IT ISSUED.[25] This Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the DARAB does not have jurisdiction over Land Banks petition for certiorari. Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action, must exist as a matter of law.[26] It is settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law.[27] It is never derived by implication. Indeed, while the power to issue the writ of certiorari is in some instance conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the particular courts which have such power are expressly designated.[28] Pursuant to Section 17 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 229 and Section 13 of E.O. No. 129A, the DARAB was created to act as the quasi-judicial arm of the DAR. With the passage of R.A. No. 6657, the adjudicatory powers and functions of the DAR were further delineated when, under Section 50 thereof, it was vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture, Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the Special Agrarian Courts. The same provision granted the DAR the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, require submission of reports, compel the production of books and documents and answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized officers, and the broad power to adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases before it.[29] Section 13 of E.O. No. 129-A also authorized the DAR to delegate its adjudicatory powers and functions to its regional offices. To this end, the DARAB adopted its Rules of Procedure, where it delegated to the RARADs and PARADs the authority to hear, determine and adjudicate all agrarian cases and disputes, and incidents in connection therewith, arising within their assigned territorial jurisdiction.[30] In the absence of a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to issue the said extraordinary writ of certiorari, the DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body with only limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise jurisdiction over Land Banks petition for certiorari. Neither the quasi-judicial authority of the DARAB nor its rule-making power justifies such selfconferment of authority.

In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency.[31] The grant of original jurisdiction on a quasi-judicial agency is not implied. There is no question that the legislative grant of adjudicatory powers upon the DAR, as in all other quasi-judicial agencies, bodies and tribunals, is in the nature of a limited and special jurisdiction, that is, the authority to hear and determine a class of cases within the DARs competence and field of expertise. In conferring adjudicatory powers and functions on the DAR, the legislature could not have intended to create a regular court of justice out of the DARAB, equipped with all the vast powers inherent in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The DARAB is only a quasi-judicial body, whose limited jurisdiction does not include authority over petitions for certiorari, in the absence of an express grant in R.A. No. 6657, E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A. In addition, Rule XIII, 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure allows a party who does not agree with the RARADs preliminary valuation in land compensation cases fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice to bring the matter to the proper special agrarian court, thus: SECTION 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration. In Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Court of Appeals,[32] this Court affirmed the dismissal of a landowners petition for judicial determination of just compensation for its failure to file the petition within the fifteen-day reglementary period provided under Rule XIII, 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure. In the instant case, Land Bank received a copy of the RARAD order denying its motion for reconsideration on March 26, 2001. Land Bank filed the petition for just compensation with the special agrarian court only on April 20, 2001, which is doubtlessly beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period. Thus, the RARAD Decision had already attained finality in accordance with the afore-quoted rule, notwithstanding Land Banks recourse to the special agrarian court. DARAB takes exception to the general rule that jurisdiction over special civil actions must be expressly conferred by law before a court or tribunal can take cognizance thereof. It believes that this principle is applicable only in cases where the officials/entities contemplated to be subject thereof are not within the administrative power/competence, or in any manner under the control or supervision, of the issuing authority. This Court is not persuaded. The function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of

discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.[33] In the instant case, the RARAD issued the order of finality and the writ of execution upon the belief that its decision had become final and executory, as authorized under Section 1, Rule XII of the DARAB Rules of Procedure. It is worth noting that in its petition, DARAB maintains that in preventing the RARAD from implementing its decision, it merely exercised its residual power of supervision, to insure that the RARAD acted within the bounds of delegated authority and/or prevent/avoid her from committing grave and serious disservice to the Program.[34] DARABs action, therefore, is a rectification of what it perceived as an abuse of the RARADs jurisdiction. By its own admission, DARAB took upon itself the power to correct errors of jurisdiction which is ordinarily lodged with the regular courts by virtue of express constitutional grant or legislative enactments. This Court recognizes the supervisory authority of the DARAB over its delegates, namely, the RARADs and PARADs, but the same should be exercised within the context of administrative supervision and/or control. In the event that the RARADs or PARADs act beyond its adjudicatory functions, nothing prevents the aggrieved party from availing of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is ordinarily within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. That the statutes allowed the DARAB to adopt its own rules of procedure does not permit it with unbridled discretion to grant itself jurisdiction ordinarily conferred only by the Constitution or by law. Procedure, as distinguished from jurisdiction, is the means by which the power or authority of a court to hear and decide a class of cases is put into action. Rules of procedure are remedial in nature and not substantive. They cover only rules on pleadings and practice.[35] While the Court of Appeals held that the DARAB should not have participated in the proceedings before said court by filing a comment in CA-G.R. SP No. 66710, this Court considers satisfactory the explanation of the DARAB that it has a peculiar interest in the final outcome of this case. As DARAB pointed out, while it is only an adjunct of, it is at the same time not totally independent from it. The DARAB is composed of the senior officials of the DAR, who are guided by the States main policy in agrarian reform when resolving disputes before the DARAB. The DARABs interest in the case is not purely legal but also a matter of governance; thus, it cannot be strictly considered as a nominal party which must refrain from taking an active part in the proceedings. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED. 3. G.R. No. 77663 April 12, 1988 PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, petitioner, vs. HON. EMMANUEL G. PEA, as Presiding Judge, RTC, NCJR, Br. CLII,

Pasig, Metropolitan Manila, and YEUNG CHUN KAM, YEUNG CHUM HO and ARCHIE CHAN represented by YIM KAM SHING, respondents.

TEEHANKEE, C.J.: This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order seeks to set aside the orders, dated February 16 and March 5, 1987, rendered by respondent trial judge on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. The main issue is whether regional trial courts have jurisdiction over the petitioner Presidential Commission on Good Government (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) and properties sequestered and placed in its custodia legis in the exercise of its powers under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, as amended, and whether said regional trial courts may interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the Commission. The Court holds that regional trial courts do not have such jurisdiction over the Commission and accordingly grants the petition. To eliminate all doubts, the Court upholds the primacy of administrative jurisdiction as vested in the Commission and holds that jurisdiction over all sequestration cases of illgotten wealth, assets and properties under the past discredited regime fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to review exclusively by this Court. * The antecedent facts are: On March 25, 1986, the Commission issued an order freezing the assets, effects, documents and records of two export garment manufacturing firms denominated as American Inter-fashion Corporation and De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation. Said firms had both been organized by joint venture agreement on July 2,1984 with the approval of the Garments & Textile Export Board. Two-thirds or 67% of the stock of both corporations were subscribed by so-called Local Investors represented by Renato Z. Francisco and Atty. Gregorio R. Castillo and one-third or 33% thereof were subscribed by the so-called Hongkong Investors, namely respondents Yeung Chun Kam and Yeung Chun Ho. The Commission appointed Ms. Noemi L. Saludo as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the said corporations with full authority to manage and operate the same. On June 27, 1986, the Commission designated the OIC, Saludo, and Mr.Yeung Chun Ho private respondent herein, as authorized signatories to effect deposits and withdrawals of the funds of the two corporations. On September 4, 1986, the Commission designated Mr. Yim Kam Shing as co-signatory, in the absence of Mr. Yeung Chun Ho and Mr. Marcelo de Guzman, in the absence of Ms. Saludo. However, in a memorandum dated February 3, 1987, and addressed to depository banks of the said two corporations, Ms. Saludo revoked the authorizations previously issued upon finding that Mr. Yim Kam Shing was a Hongkong Chinese national staying in the country on a mere tourist visa, and

designated James Dy as her co-signatory and Enrico Reyes Santos as the other authorized signatory with Teresita Yu as the latter's co-signatory. The said memorandum was approved by then Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista of the Commission. On February 11, 1987, the OIC withdrew the amount of P400,000.00, more or less, from the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company against the accounts of the said corporations for payment of the salaries of the staff, employees and laborers of the same for the period from February 1 to 15 of 1987. On February 13, 1987, respondents Yeung Chun Kam Yeung Chun Ho and Archie Chan who are all in Hongkong, instituted through Yim Kam Shing an action for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the said bank, the Commission, then Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista and the OIC, Saludo, docketed as Civil Case No. 54298 of Branch 152 of the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila, presided by respondent judge, and questioning the aforesaid revocation of the authorization as signatory previously granted to Mr. Yim Kam Shing as private respondents' representative. On February 16, 1987, respondent judge issued ex-parte the questioned temporary restraining order enjoining the bank, its attorneys, agents or persons acting in their behalf "from releasing any funds of American Inter-fashion Corporation without the signature of plaintiff Yim Kam Shing and to desist from committing any other acts complained of ..." and the Commission "from enforcing the questioned memorandum dated February 3, 1987" (Annex "J" Petition). On February 20, 1987, the Commission filed a motion to dismiss with opposition to plaintiffs' (private respondents herein) prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the Commission or over the subject of the case and that assuming arguendo its jurisdiction, it acted with grave abuse of discretion since private respondents as 33% minority shareholders are not entitled to any restraining order or preliminary injunction. On March 5, 1987, respondent judge issued the other assailed order denying the Commission's motion to dismiss and granting private respondents prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on a P10,000 bond (Annex "L," Petition). On March 20, 1987, the Commission filed the petition at bar questioning the jurisdiction of respondent judge's court over it and praying for (a) the nullification of the aforesaid February 16 and March 5, 1987 orders and (b) the issuance of a writ of prohibition ordering the respondent judge to cease and desist from proceeding with the said case. On March 24, 1987, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, "ordering respondent judge to cease and desist from enforcing his orders dated February 16 and March 5, 1987 and from proceeding with Civil Case No. 54298 ... subject to the condition that the amounts that the petitioner may withdraw from the accounts of (the sequestered corporations) with the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc., shall be limited to the 'necessary operating expenses of the two companies and for the payment of the salaries, wages and allowances of the

companies" staff, employees and laborers" ... and that the proceeds and income received shall likewise in due course be deposited with the said companies' accounts with the said Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc." On the issue of jurisdiction squarely raised, as above indicated, the Court sustains petitioner's stand and holds that regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals for that matter have no jurisdiction over the Presidential Commission on Good Government in the exercise of its powers under the applicable Executive Orders and Article XVIII, section 26 of the Constitution and therefore may not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the Commission. Under section 2 of the President's Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the Commission regarding "the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees" 1 whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the "exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan" 2 and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. 3 The Constitution and the applicable Executive Orders and established legal principles and jurisprudence fully support the Court's ruling at bar. 1. The very first Executive Order issued by President Corazon C. Aquino after her assumption of office and the ouster of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos on February 25, 1986 was Executive Order No. 1 issued on February 28, 1986 creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government, charging it with the task of assisting the President in regard to the "recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship." 4 In the discharge of its vital task "to recover the tremendous wealth plundered from the people by the past regime in the most execrable thievery perpetrated in all history," 5 or "organized pillage" (to borrow a phrase from the articulate Mr. Blas Ople 6 ), the Commission was vested with the ample power and authority (a) x x x (b) to sequester or place or cause to be placed under its control or possession any building or office wherein any ill-gotten wealth or properties may be found, and any records pertaining thereto, in order to prevent their destruction, concealment or disappearance

which would frustrate or hamper the investigation or otherwise prevent the Commission from accomplishing its task. (c) to provisionally takeover in the public interest or to prevent the disposal or dissipation of business enterprises and properties taken over by the government of the Marcos Administration or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos, until the transactions leading to such acquisition by the latter can be disposed of by the appropriate authorities. (d) to enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of acts by any person or entity that may render moot and academic, or frustrate or otherwise make ineffectual the efforts of the Commission to carry out its task under this Order. ... 7 As stressed in Baseco "So that it might ascertain the facts germane to its objectives, it [the Commission] was granted power to conduct investigations; require submission of evidence by subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum; administer oaths; punish for contempt. It was given power also to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of (its creation)." 8 2. These ample powers and authority vested in the Commission by the President in the exercise of legislative power granted her in the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution 9 were confirmed in said Constitution and in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the Freedom Constitution (Proc. No. 3) mandated that 'The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to: .. (d) recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts. ..." 10 The Constitution overwhelmingly ratified by the people in the February 2, 1987 plebiscite likewise expressly confirmed that: Sec. 26. The authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 in relation to the recovery of ill- gotten wealth shall remain operative for not more than eighteen months after the ratification of this Constitution. However, in the national interest, as certified by the President, the Congress may extend said period. A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case. The order and the list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith be registered with the proper court. For orders issued before the ratification of this Constitution, the corresponding judicial action or proceeding shall be filed within six months from its ratification. For those issued after such ratification,

the judicial action or proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the issuance thereof. The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is commenced as herein provided.11

3. As can be readily seen from the foregoing discussion of the duties and functions and the power and authority of the Commission, it exercises quasijudicial functions. In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, the Commission is a co-equal body with regional trial courts and "co-equal bodies have no power to control the other." 12 The Solicitor General correctly submits that the lack of jurisdiction of regional trial courts over quasi-judicial agencies is recognized in section 9, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), which otherwise vests exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals over all final judgment, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of regional trial courts and quasi judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions. But as already indicated hereinabove, the Court of Appeals is not vested with appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over the Commission. Executive Order No. 14, which defines the jurisdiction over cases involving the ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his wife, Imelda, members of their immediate family, close relatives, subordinates, close and/or business associates, dummies, agents and nominees, specifically provides in section 2 that "The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof." Necessarily, those who wish to question or challenge the Commission's acts or orders in such cases must seek recourse in the same court, the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by this Court. 4. Having been charged with the herculean task of bailing the country-out of the financial bankruptcy and morass of the previous regime and returning to the people what is rightfully theirs, the Commission could ill-afford to be impeded or restrained in the performance of its functions by writs or injunctions emanating from tribunals co-equal to it and inferior to this Court. Public policy dictates that the Commission be not embroiled in and swamped by legal suits before inferior courts all over the land, since the loss of time and energy required to defend against such suits would defeat the very purpose of its creation. Hence, section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 has expressly accorded the Commission and its members immunity from suit for damages in that: "No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this order." The law and the courts frown upon split jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity of actions. To paraphrase the leading case of Rheem of the Phil., Inc. vs. Ferrer,

et al, 12-a to draw a tenuous jurisdiction line is to undermine stability in litigations. A piecemeal resort to one court and another gives rise to multiplicity of suits, To force the parties to shuttle from one court to another to secure full determination of their suit is a situation gravely prejudicial to the administration of justice. The time lost, the effort wasted, the anxiety augmented, additional expenses incurred, the irreparable injury to the public interest are considerations which weigh heavily against split jurisdiction. Civil Case No. 54298 pending before respondent judge is expressly denominated as one "for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction" (Annex "I," petition) filed by private respondents against the Commission and then Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista. The said case is clearly barred by the aforequoted immunity provision of Executive Order No. 1, as buttressed by section 4(b) thereof which further provides that: "No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance." Executive Order No. 1 thus effectively withholds jurisdiction over cases against the Commission from all lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, except the Sandiganbayan in whom is vested original and exclusive jurisdiction and this Court. Early on, in special civil actions questioning challenged acts of the Commission, its submittal that the cited Executive Order bars such actions in this Court was given short shrift because this Court, as the third great department of government vested with the judicial power and as the guardian of the Constitution, cannot be deprived of its certiorari jurisdiction to pass upon and determine alleged violations of the citizens' constitutional and legal rights under the Rule of Law. 5. The rationale of the exclusivity of such jurisdiction is readily understood. Given the magnitude of the past regime's "organized pillage" and the ingenuity of the plunderers and pillagers with the assistance of the experts and best legal minds available in the market, it is a matter of sheer necessity to restrict access to the lower courts, which would have tied into knots and made impossible the Commission's gigantic task of recovering the plundered wealth of the nation, whom the past regime in the process had saddled and laid prostrate with a huge $27 billion foreign debt that has since ballooned to $28.5 billion. To cite an example as recorded in Baseco, "in the ongoing case filed by the government to recover from the Marcoses valuable real estate holdings in New York and the Lindenmere estate in Long Island, former PCGG chairman Jovito Salonga has revealed that their names do not appear on any title to the property. Every building in New York is titled in the name of a Netherlands Antilles Corporation, which in turn is purportedly owned by three Panamanian corporations, with bearer shares. This means that the shares of this corporation can change hands any time, since they can be transferred, under the law of

Panama, without previous registration on the books of the corporation. One of the first documents that we discovered shortly after the February revolution was a declaration of trust handwritten by Mr. Joseph Bernstein on April 4, 1982 on a Manila Peninsula Hotel stationery stating that he would act as a trustee for the benefit of President Ferdinand Marcos and would act solely pursuant to the instructions of Marcos with respect to the Crown Building; in New York." 13 Were it not for this stroke of good fortune, it would have been impossible, legally and technically, to prove and recover this ill-gotten wealth from the deposed President and his family, although their ownership of these fabulous real estate holdings were a matter of public notoriety Hence, the imperative need for the Government of the restored Republic as its first official act to create the Commission as an administrative and quasi- judicial commission to recover the ill-gotten wealth "amassed from vast resources of the government by the former President, his immediate family, relatives and close associates." 14 This is the only possible and practical way to enable the Commision to begin to do its formidable job. Thus, in the fifties in an analogous case, the Court taking cognizance of the trend to vest jurisdiction in administrative commissions and boards the power to resolve specialized disputes ruled that Congress in requiring the Industrial Court's intervention in the resolution of labor-management controversies likely to cause strikes or lockouts meant such jurisdiction to be exclusive, although it did not so expressly state in the law. The court held that under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction ... the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and of the regulatory statute administered. 15 In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable. For example, the Court in the case of Ebon vs. de Guzman 16 noted that the lawmaking authority, in restoring to the labor arbiters and the NLRC their jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in labor cases, as against the previous P.D. amendment splitting their jurisdiction with the regular courts, "evidently..... had second thoughts about depriving the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC of the jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases because that setup would mean duplicity of suits, splitting the cause of action and possible conflicting findings and conclusions by two tribunals on one and the same claim." 6. The Court recently had occasion to stress once more, in G.R. No. 82218, Reyes vs. Caneba March 17, 1988, that "(T)he thrust of the related doctrines of

primary administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. Acts of an administrative agency must not casually be overturned by a court, and a court should as a rule not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency acting within the perimeters of its own competence." Applying these fundamental doctrines to the case at bar, the questions and disputes raised by respondents seeking to controvert the Commission's finding of prima facie basis for the issuance of its sequestration orders as well as the interjection of the claims of the predecessor of American Inter-fashion and De Soleil Corporations, viz. Glorious Sun Phil., headed by Nemesis Co are all questions that he within the primary administrative jurisdiction of the Commission that cannot be prematurely brought up to clog the court dockets without first resorting to the exhaustion of the prescribed administrative remedies. The administrative procedure and remedies for contesting orders of sequestration issued by the Commission are provided for in its rules and regulations. Thus, the person against whom a writ of sequestration is directed may request the lifting thereof, in writing; after due hearing or motu proprio for good cause shown, the Commission may lift the writ unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may deem necessary, taking into consideration the evidence and the circumstances of the case. The resolution of the Commission is appealable to the President of the Philippines. The Commission conducts a hearing, after due notice to the parties concerned to ascertain whether any particular asset, property or enterprise constitutes ill-gotten wealth. The Commission's order of sequestration is not final, at the proper time, the question of ownership of the sequestered properties shall be exclusively determined in the Sandiganbayan, whose own decisions in turn are subject to review exclusively by the Supreme Court. It should be emphasized here, as again stressed by the Court in the recent case of Republic, et al. vs. De los Angeles, et al., G.R. No. L-30240, March 25, 1988, that "it is well-recognized principle that purely administrative and discretionary function may not be interfered with by the courts. In general, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of government. This is generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and findings of fact. There should be no thought of disregarding the traditional line separating judicial and administrative competence, the former being entrusted with the determination of legal questions and the latter being limited as a result of its expertise to the ascertainment of the decisive facts." This is specially true in sequestration cases affected by the Commission for the recovery of the nation' s plundered wealth that may affect the nation's very survival, in the light of the constitutional mandate that such sequestration or freeze orders "shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case" 17 and the settled principle that findings by administrative or quasijudicial agencies like the Commission are entitled to the greatest respect and are practically binding and conclusive, like the factual findings of the trial and

appellate courts, save where they are patently arbitrary or capricious or are not supported by substantial evidence. 7. The Solicitor General has herein picturesquely submitted its "more than prima facie evidence" for its sequestration and provisional take-over of the subject assets and properties as follows: ... the subject sequestered assets are completely owned and/or completely utilized and/or otherwise taken over by the Marcoses, with due 'compensation' to their co-participants in terms of tacitly agreed upon 'mutual benefits,' for their personal benefits and selfish economic interests, including particularly the salting, stashing and secreting of dollars abroad, cum loculo et pera as witness the following, by way of summarizing PCGG's submission, ... as supported by more than prima facie evidence: The fun: Glorious Sun, Phils., headed by Nemesio G. Co and with private respondents herein holding 40% of the shares of stock, soon after its incorporation on June 8, 1977, engaged in dollar salting, among other business unlawful manipulations. This was unearthed by the Garments and Textiles Export Board (GTEB) in January 1984. At that time, in the reign of Marcos, it had been decreed that the matter of dollar salting was the exclusive domain of the so-called 'Binondo Central Bank,' and any other person or en entity found engaging therein was guilty of 'economic sabotage,' more so where the 'saboteurs' are aliens like the herein private respondents who are otherwise known as the 'Hongkong investors. The squeeze: GTEB, under the Ministry of Trade, under then .Minister Roberto V. Ongpin, on April 27,1984 choked the lifeliness of Glorious Sun in terms of cancelling its export quotas, export authorizations, and license to maintain bonded warehouses and of disqualifying its 'major stockholders and officers from engaging in exports.' With protestations of innocence, Glorious Sun on May 25, 1984 even had the temerity to file a Petition with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 67180). How did Glorious Sun extricate itself from the tightening .screws let loose upon its neck by the then reigning Ceasar with his apparently legal contretemps? Easy: Give unto Ceasar what is Ceasar's. In July, 1984, herein private respondents came up with two (2) joint venture agreements. and within the month, respondents themselves withdrew their Petition in G.R. No. 67180. Pursuant to the two (2) joint venture agreements, American Inter-Fashion Co. was incorporated on August 22, 1984 and De Soleil on September 3, 1984, in each of

which herein private respondents, the Hongkong investors, held 33% of the shares of stock while the 'Filipino investors' held 67%. The sting: In August, 1984, the GTEB informed Glorious Sun, Phils., that the substantial portion of the latter's cancelled export quotas had been awarded to American Inter-Fashion and De Soleil. But while the Yeung brothers control only 33% of the two corporations, they, however, operated and managed said corporation and utilized 100% of their export quota allocations. The Yeung brothers paid the nominees of the Filipino investors controlling 67%, the amount of $3.75 per dozen as royalty for the utilization of the 67% export quota of said two corporations. It may also be stated that even before the export quota allocations were awarded to American Inter-Fashion and De Soleil Glorious Sun, Phils., despite the GTEB decision, Annex A hereof, was allowed to ship out garments worth US $1,261,794.00 under its [previously cancelled] quota from April 27 to May 30,1984. And on petition of a foreign buyer, Generra Sports Company of Seattle, Washington, Glorious Sun, Phils., was allowed to fin its 3rd and 4th fashion-quarter orders of 186,080 pieces valued at about US $1,159,531.00. As a result, Glorious Sun, Phils. continued to operate its bonded manufacturing warehouse ordered closed by the GTEB (Please see GTEB Comment dated June 4, 1984 in G.R. No. 67180.). (pp. 9-10, Consolidated Reply, May 15, 1987). The end of the fun: All was fun that ended in fun for all the participants in the fun, the squeeze and the sting, until of course the EDSA Revolution, when PCGG shortly sequestered the subject assets and provisionally took over the conservation thereof pursuant to law (Secs. 2 & 3, Executive Order No. 1 and related issuances) and pursuant to the very Baseco case cited ironically in the Motion at bar. Again, with protestations of innocence, the herein private respondents through their counsel and now Congressman Francisco Sumulong with the game temerity have gone to the courts and other forum (Civil Case No. 54298 entitled Yeung Chun Kam et al. vs. PCGG, et al., RTC, Branch 151, Pasig, Metro Manila: SEC Case No. 003144 entitled Yeung Chun Kam et al. vs. PCGG, et al., Securities and Exchange Commission) just as Nemesio Co

allegedly President and owner of Glorious Sun, through counsel Benjamin C. Santos, has gone to the courts with the same protestations of innocence and equal temerity (Civil Cases Nos. 8637220 and 86-37221 before RTC, Branches 33 and 36, Manila; Civil Cases Nos. 761-87 and 762-87, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 56, Malabon; Civil Case No. 54911, RTC, Branch 151 Pasig, Metro Manila) and with his own 'brand' of private army to boot, resorted to the midnight plunder of the subject sequestered assets under a "midnight" writ (issued in Civil Case No. 54911 by Judge Eutropio Migrio). Obviously, the herein private respondent as well as Nemesio Co would like to continue their fun. 18 Such proliferation of suits filed against the Commission in the trial courts, and gross disregard of the Commission's primacy of administrative jurisdiction has of course compelled the Commission to question in turn in this Court and obtain restraining orders against the lower courts' usurpation of jurisdiction, in the following pending cases: 1. G.R. No. 79901 (PCGG v. Hon. Eutropio Migrio Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig and Glorious Sun Fashion Manufacturing Co., Inc. and Nemesio Co ) 2. G.R. No. 80072 (PCGG v. Emilio Opinion, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 56, Malabon, Metro Manila; Glorious Sun Fashion Manufacturing Co., Inc. and Nemesio Co ) 3. G.R. No. 80121 (PCGG v. Hon. Maximo M. Japzon as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Manila; Glorious Sun Fashion Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc. and Nemesio Co.) 4. G.R. No. 80281 (PCGG v. Hon. Felix Barbers as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Manila, Deputy Sheriff Salvador A. Pueca and Glorious Sun Fashion Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc. and Nemesio Co ) 5. G.R. No. 80395 (PCGG v. Hon. Emiho C. Opinion as Presiding Judge of Branch 56 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Malabon, Metro Manila; Glorious Sun Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc. and Nemesio Co) Going back to the pre-EDSA squeeze and scam, it need only be added that everything at the time seemingly ended to everybody's satisfaction. Nemesio Co's Glorious Sun, Phil. notwithstanding the GTEB's closure order, continued to operate its bonded warehouse and to ship out millions of dollars of garments under its supposedly cancelled export quotas and peremptorily withdrew on August 20, 1984 19 its petition in G.R. No. 67180 from this Court . The two new

substitute corporations American Inter-Fashion Co. and De Soleil cropped out of nowhere to take over the factories and export quotas and it was of public notoriety, particularly in the trade, that the family had taken over. 8. This is the thrust of the complaint filed on July 16, 1987 [well ahead of the Constitutional deadline of August 2, 1987]by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Commission representing Plaintiff Republic of the Philippines docketed as Civil Case No. 0002, PCGG-3, with the Sandiganbayan, against therein defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Imelda (Imee) R. Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, Irene R. Marcos Araneta, Gregorio Ma. Araneta III and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages, involving, among others, the subject matter of the petition at bar, namely, American Inter-Fashion and De Soleil Corporations, together with their assets, shares of stocks, effects, evidence and records, which the Commission avers, based on documents in its possession, were "illegally acquired by said defendants in unlawful concert with one another and with gross abuse of power and authority. ... 20 The Commission correctly submits that "questions on whether or not the Plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is entitled to reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting or damages in respect of the above-subject matter is for the Sandiganbayan to resolve" not in any of the scattershot cases that respondents have filed in the various courts of the land. The Court has so held in various cases, among them, Ofelia Trinidad vs. PCGG, et al., G.R. No. 77695, June 16, 1987, wherein We pointed out that "The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts: it cannot conceivably go over all the minute evidence that may be presented by the PCGG. What is significant is that this Court believes that in the instant case no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion has been exercised by the PCGG," and Agro-Industrial Foundation Colleges of Southern Philippines, et al. vs. Regional XI Operating Team No. Five and/or the PCGG, G.R. No. 78116, July 28, 1987, wherein We ruled that the parties affected "may raise their defenses at the appropriate time and before the proper forum [the Sandiganbayan]. They will have their day in court." 9. What has not been appreciated by respondents and others similarly situated is that the provisional remedies (including the encompassing and rarely availed of remedy of provisional takeover) granted to the Commission in pursuing its lifeand-death mission to recover from a well-entrenched plundering regime of twenty years, the ill-gotten wealth which rightfully belongs to the Republic although pillaged and plundered in the name of dummy or front companies, in several known instances carried out with the bold and mercenary, if not reckless, cooperation and assistance of members of the bar as supposed nominees, the full extent of which has yet to be uncovered, are rooted in the police power of the State, the most pervasive and the least limitable of the powers of Government since it represents "the power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its domain." 21 Police power has been defined as the power inherent in the State "to prescribe regulations to promote the health,

morals, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people." 22 Police power rests upon public necessity and upon the right of the State and of the public to self-protection. 23 " Salus populi suprema est lex" the welfare of the people is the supreme law. For this reason, it is coextensive with the necessities of the case and the safeguards of public interest. Its scope expands and contracts with changing needs. 24 "It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare." 25 That the public interest and the general welfare are subserved by sequestering the purported ill-gotten assets and properties and taking over stolen properties of the government channeled to dummy or front companies is stating the obvious. The recovery of these ill-gotten assets and properties would greatly aid our financially crippled government and hasten our national economic recovery, not to mention the fact that they rightfully belong to the people. While as a measure of self-protection, if, in the interest of general welfare, police power, may be exercised to protect citizens and their businesses in financial and economic matters, it may similarly be exercised to protect the government itself against potential financial loss and the possible disruption of governmental functions. Police power as the power of self-protection on the part of the community that the principle of self-defense bears to the individual. 26 Truly, it may be said that even more than self-defense, the recovery of ill-gotten wealth and of the government's own properties involves the material and moral survival of the nation, marked as the past regime was by the obliteration of any line between private funds and the public treasury and abuse of unlimited power and elimination of any accountability in public office, as is a matter of public record and knowledge. 10 Despite all the complexities and difficulties, the original Commission created under Executive Order No. 1 headed by its first chairman, now Senate President Jovito R. Salonga, and composed of Hon. Ramon Diaz, the incumbent chairman, now Associate Justice Pedro L. Yap of this Court, Hon. Raul Daza, now a ranking member of the House of Representatives, and Hon.. Mary Concepcion Bautista, now chairman of the Human Rights Commission, and the present Commission headed by Chairman Ramon Diaz have produced unprecedented positive results for which they fully deserve the inadequately expressed ( at times ) appreciation and gratitude of the nation. The report as of the end of 1987 of Chairman Ramon Diaz shows the great extent of the Commission's accomplishments despite its limited resources, but fortunately bolstered by the spontaneous and welcome assistance of friendly foreign governments and lawyers, in the brief period of less than two years since its creation and which are regarded yet as the tip of the iceberg: PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT SUMMARY OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS As of January 05, 1988

1. CASH & OTHER CASH ITEMS Funds turned over to the treasury Gen. Fund 592,350,799.00 Proceeds of Sale of Princeton Property with PNBNew York 20,500,000.00 Proceeds of New Jersey Settlement 9,669,781.00 Proceeds of Auction Sale 17,231,429.00 Proceeds of Sale of Paintings 8,879,500.00 SBTC (1st payment Seq. T/Ds) 250,000,000.00 UPCB Bal of Profit Sharing 77,678,854.00 Other Cash Items (Certificate of Time Deposits) 1,492,951.00 Contribution to CARP 140,000,000.00 Sub-Total P1,117,803,314.00

2. OTHER RECOVERED FUNDS Government Funds in TRB/ National Treasury

(Casino Funds) 1,138,000,000.00 T-Bills delivered to the office of the President 100,020,000.00 Funds from Filbakers 59,884,453.00 P1,297,904,453.00 3. RECEIVABLES Projected Proceeds of Sale of knick-knacks and Furnitures from Hachensach in Olympic Towers 20,720,000.00 Projected Proceeds of New York Properties (Lindenmere, Olympic Towers Apartments, Makiki Properties) $9.0M 184,500,000.00 SBTC Certificates of Time Deposits 731,407,842.00 Sub-total P936,627,842.00

4. FUNDS HELD IN TRUST Funds with the Treasury 71,975,722.00 Funds with PNB-Ortigas 52,535,298.00 Sub-Total P124,511,020.00

GRAND TOTAL P3,476,846,629.00

5. JEWELRY

Estimated Value P250 M

6. COMPANIES WHICH WERE AFFECTED BY SEQUESTRATION ORDER INCLUDING RADION AND TV STATIONS 297 Companies were subject to sequestration (including those whose sequestrations was lifted and those surrendered companies by J.Y. Campos and those holding companies whose investments in shares were affected by Writs of Sequestration)

74 Companies have available financial statements with estimated total assets of P44B 223 Companies still without financial statements 18 TV Stations were sequestered

38 Radio Stations were sequestered

7. REAL PROPERTIES (BUILDING AND IMPROVEMENTS)

Coconut Palace 13 Houses and improvements 12 Condominium units Offices of R.S. Benedicto, E. Garcia, etc. 2 National Art and Museum Centers 2 Fishponds

8. SEQUESTERED LANDS (INCLUDING IMPROVEMENTS)

450 parcels of land (including improvements) have been issued with specific Writs of Sequestration of which only 148 have an area of 19,276,970.76 sq. m.

23 Haciendas of which 13 haciendas constituting RSB Farms, Inc. have

an area of 27,859,207.00 sq m.

9. SURRENDERED LANDS BY JOSE YAO CAMPOS

Total area in sq. m. of all surrendered properties 19,684,435.45 sq. m.

Disposed to DAR (202 IRC titles) with total area of 13,997,529 sq. m.

Remaining balance of 75 titles recommended for disposal, with total area of 5,686,906.45 sq. m.

OTHER INFORMATION:

81 Sequestered Vehicles 29 Sequestered Aircrafts 13 Sequestered Vessels 11. A final word about the alleged misdeeds of the OIC which the Solicitor General has denounced as false and unfounded. 27 Such alleged misdeeds, even if taken as true for the nonce, do not and cannot detract from the Commission's accomplishments in the unselfish service of the nation, rendered with integrity and honor and without the least taint of scandal and self-interest (in welcome contrast to the past regime's rape and plunder sub-silentio of the nation!). In our free and democratic space now, with full restoration of a free press and the people's liberties, it should be acknowledged with some sort of appreciation that any such misdeeds on the part of the Commission's representative or agents

have been subjected to full public exposure and the erring parties dismissed and replaced. ACCORDINGLY, the writs of certiorari and prohibition shall issue. The orders of respondent Judge dated February 16, 1987 and March 5, 1987 are hereby set aside as null and void. Respondent Judge is ordered to cease and desist from any further proceeding in Civil Case No. 54298 which is hereby ordered DISMISSED. This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY, **

4. G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991 HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:p The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice or government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication? The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present action. These facts, together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court or otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth. 1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight"

their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3 Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4 2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5 3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others, named respondents, 6 the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cario dated December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8 4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cario), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on

certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals, and "other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be impleaded." 5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. 10 6. Their complaints and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cario requiring his attendance therein. 11 On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cario) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12 The Commission thereafter issued an Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following disposition: To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers are now suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cario, of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence. xxx xxx xxx

7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14 8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.: a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cario in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cario to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges." 17 9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cario's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra). It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner Cario, has commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition. The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to try

and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues: 1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and 2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or strike. The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still timely. The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights. The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasijudicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22 The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights.

The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23 Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following 25 (1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights; (2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court; (3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection; (4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities; (5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights; (6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families; (7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights; (8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority; (9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions; (10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and (11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law. As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution

clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26 But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings. "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29 "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to