Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 189466 February 11, 2010

DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, Petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 189506

CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR., Petitioner, vs.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET), DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., CRISTINA PALABAY, RENATO M. REYES, JR., ERLINDA CADAPAN, ANTONIO FLORES and JOSELITO

USTAREZ,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

ABAD, J.:

These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.

The Facts and the Case

In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.

Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all registered voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.

Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative. She moreover lost her bid as party-list representative of the party-list organization called An Waray in the immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004.

Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she belonged to the women sector. Abayon also claimed that although she was the second nominee of An Waray party-list organization during the 2004 elections, she could not be regarded as having lost a bid for an elective office.

Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with him collaterally attacked the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.

On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon.1 The latter moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied the same on September 17, 2009,2 prompting Abayon to file the present petition for special civil action of certiorari.

In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito Ustarez are members of some other party-list groups.

Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with respondent HRET a petition forquo warranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparan, in HRET Case 07-040. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan committed gross human rights violations against marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.

Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.

On July 23, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition against Bantay for the reason that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list group fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System Act. HRET, however, defended its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner Palparan’s qualifications.3 Palparan moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied it by a resolution dated September 10, 2009,4 hence, the recourse to this Court through this petition for special civil action of certiorari and prohibition.

Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court has caused their consolidation.

The Issue Presented

The common issue presented in these two cases is:

Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections.

The Court’s Ruling

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which parties or organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but were chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.

If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority belongs to the COMELEC which already upheld her qualification as nominee of Aangat Tayo for the women sector. For Palparan, Bantay’s personality is so inseparable and intertwined with his own person as its nominee so that the HRET cannot dismiss the quo warranto action against Bantay without dismissing the action against him.

But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,5 identifies who the "members" of that House are:

Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party - list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members x x x who shall be elected from legislative districts" and "those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." This means that, from the Constitution’s point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not their parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties to which such party-list representatives belong.

Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.

It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as "members of the House of Representatives," thus:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring supplied)

As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections,6 a party-list representative is in every sense "an elected member of the House of Representatives." Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.

Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution, states:

Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.1avvphi1

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.

In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent."7

It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee—the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization—in the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated him. This is true, initially. The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them.8 But where an allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.

Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC seems to believe, when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an incident of its authority to approve the registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need not resolve this question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties.

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.10

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions and AFFIRMS the Order dated July 16, 2009 and Resolution 09-183 dated September 17, 2009 in HRET Case 07-041 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal as well as its Order dated July 23, 2009 and Resolution 09-178 dated September 10, 2009 in HRET Case 07-040.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABADAssociate Justice

EN BANC

G.R No. 188078 January 25, 2010

VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, and MINERVA ALDABA MORADA, Petitioners,

vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591), creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.

Antecedents

Before 1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through four legislative districts. The First Legislative District comprised of the city of Malolos1 and the municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and Paombong. On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos’ City Charter,2 by creating a separate legislative district for the city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in 2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162 (later converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986, the population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that "the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000."3

Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed this petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.

In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that Congress’ use of projected population is non-justiciable as it involves a determination on the "wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature to determine compliance with [a constitutional requirement]."4

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution

The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have "a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand."5 The only issue here is whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is unconstitutional.

House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region III of the National Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the City of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010." The Certification states that the population of "Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291." The Certification further states that it was "issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed creation of Malolos City as a lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan."6

The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the "immediately following election"7 after the attainment of the 250,000 population.

First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year.

Section 6 of Executive Order No. 1358 dated 6 November 1993 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos provides:

SECTION 6. Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of Population sizes Pursuant to Section 7, 386, 442, 450, 452, and 461 of the New Local Government Code.

(a) The National Statistics Office shall issue certification on data that it has collected and processed as well as on statistics that it has estimated.

(b) For census years, certification on population size will be based on actual population census counts; while for the intercensal years, the certification will be made on the basis of a set of demographic projections or estimates declared official by the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB).

(c) Certification of population census counts will be made as of the census reference date, such as May 1, 1990, while those of intercensal population estimates will be as of middle of every year.

(d) Certification of population size based on projections may specify the range within which the true count is deemed likely to fall. The range will correspond to the official low and high population projections.

(e) The smallest geographic area for which a certification on population size may be issued will be the barangay for census population counts, and the city or municipality for intercensal estimates. If an LGU wants to conduct its own population census, during off–census years, approval must be sought from the NSCB and the conduct must be under the technical supervision of NSO from planning to data processing.

(f) Certifications of population size based on published census results shall be issued by the Provincial Census Officers or by the Regional Census Officers. Certifications based on projections or estimates, however, will be issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. (Emphasis supplied)

The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic projections he certified have been declared official by the NSCB. The records of this case do not also show that the Certification of Regional Director Miranda is based on demographic projections declared official by the NSCB. The Certification, which states that the population of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010," violates the requirement that intercensal demographic projections shall be "as of the middle of every year." In addition, there is no showing that Regional Director Miranda has been designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic projections in Region III. In the absence of such official designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator can be given credence by this Court.

Moreover, the Certification states that "the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291." The Certification also states that the population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per year between 1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population of Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010.

Also, the 2007 Census places the population of Malolos at 223,069 as of 1 August 2007.9 Based on a growth rate of 3.78%, the population of Malolos will grow to only 248,365 as of 1 August 2010. Even if the growth rate is compounded yearly, the population of Malolos of 223,069 as of 1 August 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of 1 August 2010.10

All these conflict with what the Certification states that the population of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010." Based on the Certification’s own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 before the 10 May 2010 elections. Incidentally, the NSO has no published population projections for individual municipalities or cities but only for entire regions and provinces.11

Executive Order No. 135 cannot simply be brushed aside. The OSG, representing respondent Commission on Elections, invoked Executive Order No. 135 in its Comment, thus:

Here, based on the NSO projection, "the population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995-2000." This projection issued by the authority of the NSO Administrator is recognized under Executive Order No. 135 (The Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of Population Sizes), which states:

x x x

(d) Certification of population size based on projections may specify the range within which the true count is deemed likely to fall. The range will correspond to the official low and high population projections.

x x x

(f) Certifications of population size based on published census results shall be issued by the Provincial Census Officers or by the Regional Census Officers. Certifications based on projections or estimates, however, will be issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer.12 (Emphasis supplied)

Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be unreliable or speculative.

Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution provides:

Any province that may be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. xxx. (Emphasis supplied)

A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the "immediately following election." In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative. There is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has attained or will attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010 elections.

Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected, prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately following election after the supposed attainment of such population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislative district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.

On the OSG’s contention that Congress’ choice of means to comply with the population requirement in the creation of a legislative district is non-justiciable, suffice it to say that questions calling for judicial determination of compliance with constitutional standards by other branches of the government are fundamentally justiciable. The resolution of such questions falls within the checking function of this Court under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.13

Even under the 1935 Constitution, this Court had already ruled, "The overwhelming weight of authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts."14 Compliance with constitutional standards on the creation of legislative districts is important because the "aim of legislative apportionment is ‘to equalize population and voting power among districts.’"15

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We DECLARE Republic Act No. 9591 UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate Justice

DISSENTING OPINION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about a law that establishes a new legislative district based on a projected population of the National Statistics Office (NSO) to meet the population requirement of the Constitution in the reapportionment of legislative districts.

The Facts and the Case

The City of Malolos and the Municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and Paombong comprise the current first district of the province of Bulacan. In 2007 the population of Malolos City was 223,069. The NSO projected that, using the established population growth rate of 3.78 percent between 1995 and 2000, its population in 2010 will be 254,030.

On May 1, 2009 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 9591, to amend Section 57 of R.A. 8754, the charter of the City of Malolos, making the city a separate district from the existing first legislative district of Bulacan.

The Challenge

On June 16, 2009 petitioners Victorino Aldaba, Carlo Jolette S. Fajardo, Julio G. Morada, and Minerva Aldaba Morada, all claiming to be taxpayers from Malolos City, filed the present action, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9591. They point out a) that the law failed to comply with the requirement of Section 5(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that a city must have a population of at least 250,000; (2) that the creation of a separate district amounts to a conversion and requires the conduct of a plebiscite; and (3) that the law violates Section 5(3), Article VI which provides that each district shall comprise as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.

The Dissenting View

First. Section 5, paragraphs (3) and (4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

For a city to merit one representative it should have a population of at least 250,000. A province, however, is entitled to one representative no matter what its population size. In this case, the basis of House Bill 3696 is the certification of the NSO that the projected population of the City of Malolos by 2010, the coming election year, will be 254,030. Thus, said the NSO:

National Statistics OfficeRegion III

CERTIFICATION

To whom it may concern:

This is to certify that based on the 2000 census of population in housing census 2000 conducted by the National Statistics Office, the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291.

This is to certify that the results of the census 2000 were proclaimed and declared official by the President of the Philippines under Proclamation No. 28, dated April 18, 2001.

It is further certified that the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000. Please note that the computation was just based on the conventional method and not taking into account other factors that may affect the base population. Hence, the projected population may reach more than 250,000 in consideration of the other factors like future or past fertility, mortality, and migration within the locality for the year 2010.

This certification is issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed creation of Malolos City as a lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan.

By authority of the Administrator

(Sgd.) ALBERTO N. MIRANDARegional Director1

I cannot agree with petitioners’ claim that the Congress gravely abused its discretion in relying on the 2010 projected population of Malolos City as basis for its reapportionment law. The Court has always been reluctant to act like a third chamber of Congress and second guess its work. Only when the lawmakers commit grave abuse of discretion in their passage of the law can the Court step in. But the lawmakers must not only abuse this discretion, they must do so with grave consequences.2

Here, nothing in Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution prohibits the use of estimates or population projections in the creation of legislative districts. As argued by the Solicitor General, the standard to be adopted in determining compliance with the population requirement involves a political question. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion or patent violation of established legal parameters, the Court cannot intrude into the wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature.

In fact, in Macias v. Commission on Elections,3 the Court upheld the validity of a reapportionment law based on the NSO’s "preliminary count of population" which may be subject to revision. The Court held there that "although not final, and still subject to correction, a census enumeration may be considered official, in the sense that Governmental action may be based thereon even in matters of apportionment of legislative districts."

Majority opinion ably written by Justice Antonio T. Carpio points out, however, that "no legal effect" can be accorded to the certification of demographic projection for Malolos City issued by the NSO Region III Director because it violates the provisions of Executive Order 135 dated November 6, 1993 of President Fidel V. Ramos, which requires that such demographic projection be declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board and that the certification be issued by the NSO administrator or a designated officer. In addition, the intercensal population estimates must, according to the Executive Order, "be as of middle of every year."

But Executive Order 135 cannot apply to this case for the following reasons:

a. The President issued Executive Order 135 specifically to provide guidelines on the issuance of Certification of Population sizes pursuant to the following provisions of the Local Government Code: Section 7 (the creation and conversion of local government units); Section 386 (the

creation of a barangay), Section 442 (the creation of a municipality); Section 450 (the conversion of a municipality or a cluster of barangay into a component city); Section 452 (the creation of highly urbanized cities); and Section 461 (the creation of urbanized cities).

Since R.A. 9591 is not concerned with the creation or conversion of a local government unit but with the establishment of a new legislative district, which is by no means a local government unit, the same is not governed by the requirements of Executive Order 135.

b. R.A. 9591 is based on a "legislative" finding of fact that Malolos will have a population of over 250,000 by the year 2010. The rules of legislative inquiry or investigation are unique to each house of Congress. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Executive Department can dictate on Congress the kind of evidence that will satisfy its law-making requirement. It would be foolhardy for the Court to suggest that the legislature consider only evidence admissible in a court of law or under the rules passed by the Office of the President. Obviously, the Judicial Department will resist a mandate from Congress on what evidence its courts may receive to support its decisions.

c. At any rate, the certification issued by the NSO Region III Director, whose office has jurisdiction over Malolos City, partakes of official information based on official data. That Malolos had a population of 175,291 as of May 1, 2000 is, as the certification states, based on the 2000 census of population conducted by the NSO. The President of the Philipines proclaimed and declared that census official under Proclamation 28 dated April 18, 2001. On the other hand, the population growth rate of 3.78% used in the 2010 population projection for Malolos derived from the difference between the results of the official population census taken in 1995 and that taken in 2000. The Regional Director did not make the projection by counting the trees from the mountaintops. The data are based on evidence that is admissible even in a court of law.

The majority opinion claims that the NSO Regional Director’s projection of the population of Malolos by 2010 is erroneous. Given that the total population of Malolos as of May 1, 2000 was 175,291 and its growth rate was 3.78% per year, its population will grow, according to the dissenting opinion, to only 241,550 in 2010.

But the majority opinion uses the following formula: 175,291 x 37.80% (arrived at by multiplying the 3.78 annual growth rate by 10 for the 10 years between 2000 and 2010) = 241,550. It uses a growth rate of 37.80% per 10 years to substitute for the stated official growth rate of 3.78% per year. It ignores logic and the natural cumulative growth of population.

In contrast, the NSO Regional Director’s computation applies the growth rate of 3.78% per year, which is more logical in that the base is adjusted annually to reflect the year to year growth. Thus:

Base Rate Growth Year

175,291 x 3.78% = 181,917 2001

181,917 x 3.78% = 188,793 2002

188,793 x 3.78% = 195,929 2003

195,929 x 3.78% = 203,335 2004

203,335 x 3.78% = 211,021 2005

211,021 x 3.78% = 218,998 2006

218,998 x 3.78% = 227,276 2007

227,276 x 3.78% = 235,867 2008

235,867 x 3.78% = 244,783 2009

244,783 x 3.78% = 254,036 2010

Second. The constitutional check against "gerrymandering," which means the creation of representative districts out of separate points of territory in order to favor a candidate,4 is found in Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution. It states that "each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory."

It should be noted, however, that this rule is qualified by the phrase "as far as practicable." Hence, the fact that the creation of a legislative district for Malolos would separate the town of Bulacan from the rest of the towns comprising the first district, would not militate against the constitutionality of R.A. 9716. This is so because there is no showing that Congress enacted R.A. 9591 to favor the interest of any candidate. A city can aspire to have one representative who will represent its interest in Congress.

Third. Contrary to petitioners’ claim, R.A. 9591 is a reapportionment bill. It does not require the conduct of a plebiscite for its validity. As the Court held in Bagabuyo v. Commission on Elections,5 the holding of a plebiscite is not a requirement in legislative apportionment or reapportionment. A plebiscite is necessary only in the creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of local government units, which is not the case here.

I vote to dismiss the petition.

ROBERTO A. ABADAssociate Justice

EN BANC

G.R. No. 190681 June 21, 2010

DR. EDILBERTO ESTAMPA, JR., Petitioner, vs.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF DAVAO, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the failure of a city’s medical health officer and disaster coordinator to respond to a catastrophic bombing incident upon the excuse that he needed to attend first to the needs of his family.

The Facts and the Case

On February 1, 2001 the City Government of Davao appointed petitioner Dr. Edilberto Estampa, Jr. as Medical Officer VI at its City Health Office. The position made him head of a Task Force Unit assigned to deal with any untoward event taking place in the city and Disaster Coordinator for the Davao City Health Office under the Davao City Disaster Coordinating Council.

On March 4, 2003, at around 6 p.m., a powerful bomb exploded at the passengers’ terminal of the Davao International Airport, killing 22 persons and injuring 113 others. Dr. Estampa had just arrived home at that time and was taking care of his one-year-old daughter. He learned of the bombing incident between 7 to 8 p.m. His wife arrived at 9 p.m. from her work at the Davao Medical Center where most of the bombing victims were brought for treatment. She prevailed on Dr. Estampa to stay home and he did.

On March 6, 2003 Dr. Roberto V. Alcantara, Officer-in-Charge of the Davao City Health Office, required Dr. Estampa to explain in writing why he failed to respond to the bombing incident. Dr. Estampa submitted his explanation. Apparently satisfied with the explanation and believing that Dr. Estampa’s presence in the aftermath of the bombing was not indispensable considering the presence of other medical practitioners, Dr. Alcantara considered the case closed. The latter did not, however, bother to endorse the case to a superior officer or to the City Legal Office with his recommendation.

About 10 months later or on January 26, 2004 Dr. Josephine J. Villafuerte, the Davao City Health Officer, queried the head of the City’s Human Resource Management Office (HRMO) regarding the status of the case against Dr. Estampa for failing to respond to the bombing incident. Reacting to this, the HRMO endorsed the matter to the City Legal Office for verification and investigation. Subsequently, the Assistant City Legal Officer required Dr. Estampa to answer the charge against him. But he did not do so.

On March 19, 2004 the Assistant City Legal Officer submitted an Investigation Report, finding a prima facie case against Dr. Estampa for neglect of duty1 and recommending the filing of a formal charge against him. The city mayor approved the report and signed the formal charge. On receiving the same, Dr. Estampa filed his answer and supporting documents.

At the pre-trial, Dr. Estampa waived his right to counsel. The parties agreed to dispense with a formal hearing and to just submit their position papers or memoranda. On November 12, 2004 the City Legal Officer found Dr. Estampa guilty of "grave" neglect of duty and recommended his dismissal. On February 8, 2005 the city mayor approved the recommendation and dismissed Dr. Estampa. The latter moved for reconsideration but this was denied, prompting him to appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

On June 2, 2006 the CSC denied Dr. Estampa’s appeal, corrected the denomination of his offense to gross neglect of duty, and affirmed his dismissal. The CSC also denied Dr. Estampa’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Dr. Estampa appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for review under Rule 43. The CA denied his application for issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction and eventually rendered a

decision on March 30, 2009, denying his petition and affirming the resolutions of the CSC. The CA also found no merit in his motion for reconsideration.

The Issue Presented

The only issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the rulings of the City Legal Officer and the CSC that found Dr. Estampa guilty of gross neglect of duty for failing to respond to the March 4, 2003 Davao City bombing.

The Ruling of the Court

Dr. Estampa points out that his dismissal was void because: (1) neither a proper complaint nor a formal charge initiated the case against him; (2) the CA considered and appreciated evidence not presented at the hearing before the City Legal Officer; (3) the delay in the preliminary investigation of Dr. Estampa’s case violated his rights to due process and speedy disposition of his case; (4) he could not be held liable for "gross" neglect of duty since the charge against him was only for simple neglect of duty; and (5) the evidence presented did not support the findings against him.

1. But, as the Davao City government pointed out, Executive Order (E.O.) 292 (the 1987 Administrative Code)2 and the CSC Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases vest in heads of cities the power to investigate and decide disciplinary actions against their officers and employees.3 E.O. 292 also allows the heads of local units, like the mayor, the authority to initiate administrative actions against subordinate officials or employees4 even without the complaints being subscribed and sworn to.5 In these proceedings, a person is considered formally charged a) upon charges initiated by the disciplining authority or b) upon the finding by such disciplining authority of a prima facie case against him based on a private person’s complaint.6

The Davao City Health Officer’s inquiry into the status of Dr. Estampa’s case did not partake of a complaint under E.O. 292 as he suggests. That inquiry was a mere follow up of the fact-finding investigation that Dr. Alcantara began. Nor did the City Legal Officer’s order during the preliminary investigation, which required Dr. Estampa to file his answer and supporting documents, constitute the "complaint" under the law. That order was merely an incident of the preliminary investigation.71avvphi1

The real formal charge against Dr. Estampa was that which the city mayor signed, charging the doctor, in his capacity as Disaster Coordinator of the City Health Office, with neglect of duty for failing to respond to the March 4, 2003 bombing in Davao. That formal charge directed him to submit his answer, accompanied by the sworn statements of his witnesses, and to indicate if he preferred a formal trial or would rather waive it. He was thus properly charged.

2. Dr. Estampa claims that the CA considered and appreciated evidence that was not presented before the City Legal Officer, in particular referring to the letters of Dr. Villafuerte (to the HRMO inquiring about the status of the case against him), Mr. Escalada, HRMO head (endorsing the case to the City Legal Office), and the affidavit of Dr. Samuel G. Cruz, Assistant City Health Officer (that Dr. Estampa failed to answer phone calls to him after the bombing and that he ignored the driver who was sent to fetch him). Dr. Estampa was not furnished with copies of these

documents which were mentioned for the first time only on appeal to the CSC in the City Government’s Comment.

The letters of Dr. Villafuerte and Mr. Escalada are official communications and form part of the records of the case. They are public documents. As to the affidavit of Dr. Cruz, the City Government admits that it was not presented in evidence although it still formed part of the case records since it was officially endorsed to the City Legal Office by Dr. Cruz.

The decisions of the CSC and the CA are not based only on these documents. Dr. Estampa’s guilt is evidenced by his own evidence and inaction, as will be shown later on. The letters of Dr. Villafuerte and Mr. Escalada merely show the process of investigation of the case. Dr. Cruz’s affidavit is also merely corroborating at best and may even be dispensed with.

3. Dr. Estampa cannot complain that he was not heard on his defense. The record shows that, initially, his immediate superior asked him to explain why he did not respond to the bombing incident and he submitted his explanation. In the next instance, he was asked during the preliminary investigation to file his answer and submit evidence in his defense although he chose not to do so. After being formally charged, he was again asked to file his answer to the charge. And he filed one, accompanied by supporting documents. He also took part at the pre-trial and elected to have the case decided based on the parties’ position paper or memorandum. Surely, Dr. Estampa has no reason to complain of denial of his right to due process.

Dr. Estampa laments that almost a year passed from the time his immediate superior asked him to submit a written explanation of the incident to the time when preliminary investigation of his case began. The delay, according to him, violated his right to the speedy disposition of his case.

But, Dr. Alcantara’s action cannot be regarded as part of the administrative proceeding against Dr. Estampa. It was but a fact-finding investigation done by an immediate superior to determine whether disciplinary action was warranted in his case. And, although Dr. Alcantara was later heard to say that he regarded the matter closed after reading Dr. Estampa’s explanation, Dr. Alcantara took no step to formalize his finding by reporting the matter to his superior, the Davao City Health Officer, with his recommendation.

Besides, to reiterate what the CA said, the right to speedy disposition of cases may be deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In this case, the Assistant City Legal Officer finished the preliminary investigation of Dr. Estampa’s case in only a little over three weeks from the time it began.

4. The claim of Dr. Estampa that he could not be found guilty of "gross" neglect of duty when he was charged only with simple neglect of duty is unmeritorious. The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of the information in a criminal action. It is enough that he is informed of the substance of the charge against him. And what controls is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense in the formal charge.8 Here, the formal charge accused him of failing to respond, as was his duty as Disaster Coordinator of the City Health Office, to the March 4, 2003 bombing incident that saw many people killed and maimed. It was a serious charge although the formal charge failed to characterize it correctly as "gross neglect of duty."

Gross neglect of duty denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty.9 It has been held that gross negligence exists when a public official’s breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.10

5. Dr. Estampa claims that the city failed to show that he had an obligation to respond to the Davao City bombing and that no one advised him of his duties and responsibilities as city health office’s Coordinator to the Disaster Coordinating Council. But Dr. Estampa cannot claim ignorance of his duties. The local government code, the provision of which he may be assumed to know, provides that a government health officer has the duty, among others, to be in the frontline of the delivery of health services, particularly during and in the aftermath of man-made and natural disasters and calamities.11 Furthermore, as Medical Officer VI, one of his specified duties was "to act as head of a task force unit for any untoward events in his area of responsibility." It was precisely because of his position as Medical Officer VI that he had been designated Disaster Coordinator for his office.

When Dr. Estampa accepted his post and swore to perform his duties, he entered into a covenant with the city to act with dedication, speed, and courage in the face of disasters like the bombing of populated places in the city. As the CA pointed out, the bombing incident on March 4, 2003 caused so many deaths and injuries that the victims had to be farmed out among several hospitals in the city. Plainly, the City needed public health officers to come to the rescue of the victims in whatever way their sufferings or those of their families could be assuaged. As disaster coordinator, the city needed Dr. Estampa to organize and coordinate all efforts to meet the emergency. Yet, although he knew of the bombing, he chose to stay at home.

In his letter-explanation, Dr. Estampa justified his absence from the emergency rooms of the hospitals to attend to the bombing victims with the claim that he needed to attend to his family first. Initially, he could not leave his one-year-old daughter because they had no house help. When his wife arrived from work shortly, he also could not leave because she was six months pregnant. Further, a bomb was found some meters from their apartment a few weeks earlier. Dr. Estampa said in his letter that he was unable from the beginning to give full commitment to his job since he gave priority to his family. He simply was not the right person for the job of disaster coordinator.

Dr. Estampa’s defense is not acceptable. A person’s duty to his family is not incompatible with his job-related commitment to come to the rescue of victims of disasters. Disasters do not strike every day. Besides, knowing that his job as senior medical health officer entailed the commitment to make a measure of personal sacrifice, he had the choice to resign from it when he realized that he did not have the will and the heart to respond.

Assuming that he had a one-year-old daughter in the house, he could have taken her to relatives temporarily while his wife was still on her way from work. But he did not. And when his wife arrived shortly at 9 p.m., he still did not leave under the pretext that his wife was six months pregnant. Yet, he had in fact permitted her to work away from home up to the evening. What marked his gross irresponsibility was that he did not even care to call up his superior or associates to inform them of his inability to respond to the emergency. As a result, the city health office failed to provide the needed coordination of all efforts intended to cope with the disaster. Who knows? Better coordination and dispatch of victims to the right emergency rooms could have saved more lives.

The Court finds no excuse for reinstating Dr. Estampa to the position he abandoned when it needed him.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision dated March 30, 2009 and resolution dated November 20, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 02191-MIN.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABADAssociate Justice

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 180764 January 19, 2010

TITUS B. VILLANUEVA, Petitioner, vs.

EMMA M. ROSQUETA, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the right to recover damages for alleged abuse of right committed by a superior public officer in preventing a subordinate from doing her assigned task and being officially recognized for it.

The Facts and the Case

Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her courtesy resignation from that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office. But five months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against her will on orders of her superior.1

Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera (Valera) to respondent Rosqueta’s position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva), then Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial Court2 (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case 01-101539. On August 27, 2001 the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), enjoining Villanueva and the Finance Secretary3 from implementing Valera’s appointment. On August 28, 2001 the trial court superseded the TRO with a writ of preliminary injunction.4

Petitioner Villanueva, Valera, and the Secretary of Finance challenged the injunction order before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 the CA issued its own TRO, enjoining the implementation of the RTC’s injunction order. But the TRO lapsed after 60 days and the CA eventually dismissed the petition before it.

On November 22, 2001 while the preliminary injunction in the quo warranto case was again in force, petitioner Villanueva issued Customs Memorandum Order 40-2001, authorizing Valera to exercise the powers and functions of the Deputy Commissioner.

During the Bureau’s celebration of its centennial anniversary in February 2002, its special Panorama magazine edition featured all the customs deputy commissioners, except respondent Rosqueta. The souvenir program, authorized by the Bureau’s Steering Committee headed by petitioner Villanueva to be issued on the occasion, had a space where Rosqueta’s picture was supposed to be but it instead stated that her position was "under litigation." Meanwhile, the commemorative billboard displayed at the Bureau’s main gate included Valera’s picture but not Rosqueta’s.

On February 28, 2002 respondent Rosqueta filed a complaint5 for damages before the RTC of Quezon City against petitioner Villanueva in Civil Case Q-02-46256, alleging that the latter maliciously excluded her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia. Further, she claimed that he prevented her from performing her duties as Deputy Commissioner, withheld her salaries, and refused to act on her leave applications. Thus, she asked the RTC to award her P1,000,000.00 in moral damages, P500,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P300,000.00 in attorney’s fees and costs of suit.

But the RTC dismissed6 respondent Rosqueta’s complaint, stating that petitioner Villanueva committed no wrong and incurred no omission that entitled her to damages. The RTC found that Villanueva had validly and legally replaced her as Deputy Commissioner seven months before the Bureau’s centennial anniversary.

But the CA reversed the RTC’s decision,7 holding instead that petitioner Villanueva’s refusal to comply with the preliminary injunction order issued in the quo warranto case earned for Rosqueta the right to recover moral damages from him.8 Citing the abuse of right principle, the RTC said that Villanueva acted maliciously when he prevented Rosqueta from performing her duties, deprived her of salaries and leaves, and denied her official recognition as Deputy Commissioner by excluding her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia. Thus, the appellate court ordered Villanueva to pay P500,000.00 in moral damages, P200,000.00 in exemplary damages and P100,000.00 in attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Villanueva filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

The Issue Presented

The key issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable in damages to respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued in the quo warranto case (Civil Case 01-101539), thus denying her of the right to do her job as Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau and to be officially recognized as such public officer.

The Court’s Ruling

Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code,9 a person must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are Articles 2010 and 2111 of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers because of such abuse of right or duty.12

Petitioner Villanueva claims that he merely acted on advice of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) when he allowed Valera to assume the office as Deputy Commissioner since respondent Rosqueta held the position merely in a temporary capacity and since she lacked the Career Executive Service eligibility required for the job.

But petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave him. Surely, a government official of his rank must know that a preliminary injunction order issued by a court of law had to be obeyed, especially since the question of Valera’s right to replace respondent Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved.

That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy Commissioner. His exclusion of her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia was not an honest mistake by any reckoning. Indeed, he withheld her salary and prevented her from assuming the duties of the position. As the Court said in Amonoy v. Spouses Gutierrez,13 a party’s refusal to abide by a court order enjoining him from doing an act, otherwise lawful, constitutes an abuse and an unlawful exercise of right.1avvphi1

That respondent Rosqueta was later appointed Deputy Commissioner for another division of the Bureau is immaterial. While such appointment, when accepted, rendered the quo warranto case moot and academic, it did not have the effect of wiping out the injuries she suffered on account of petitioner Villanueva’s treatment of her. The damage suit is an independent action.

The CA correctly awarded moral damages to respondent Rosqueta. Such damages may be awarded when the defendant’s transgression is the immediate cause of the plaintiff’s anguish 14 in the cases specified in Article 221915 of the Civil Code.16

Here, respondent Rosqueta’s colleagues and friends testified that she suffered severe anxiety on account of the speculation over her employment status.17 She had to endure being referred to as a "squatter" in her workplace. She had to face inquiries from family and friends about her exclusion from the Bureau’s centennial anniversary memorabilia. She did not have to endure all these affronts and the angst and depression they produced had Villanueva abided in good faith by the court’s order in her favor. Clearly, she is entitled to moral damages.

The Court, however, finds the award of P500,000.00 excessive. As it held in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Alejandro,18 moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the defendant’s grief and suffering. Moral damages should reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done. Here, that would be P200,000.00.

The Court affirms the grant of exemplary damages by way of example or correction for the public good but, in line with the same reasoning, reduces it to P50,000.00. Finally, the Court affirms the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses but reduces it to P50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV 85931 with MODIFICATION in that petitioner Titus B. Villanueva is ORDERED to pay respondent Emma M. Rosqueta the sum of P200,000.00 in moral damages, P50,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 in attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABADAssociate Justice