causes of the first world war text

7/23/2019 Causes of the First World War Text

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Causes of the First World War

Past Exam Questions:

Paper 2 -

Compare and contrast the causes of the First World War and the Second World War (May

2008)

Compare and contrast the reasons for Germanys involvement in the First and Second

World Wars (ov 200!)

"#amine the part played $y each of the follo%in& in the out$rea' of the First World Waralliances mo$ili*ation +al'an nationalism, (ov 200-)

.n %hat %ays did the causes of the Second World War differ from the causes of the First

World War/ (May 200)

Paper 3 -

1Wars freuently $e&in ten years $efore the first shot is fired,3 4o %hat e#tent does this

statement e#plain the out$rea' of the First World War/ (Specimen)

4o %hat e#tent %as nationalism the ma5or factor $ehind the out$rea' of the First World War

in 6u&ust 77/ (ov 200)

Why did the First World War $rea' out in 77/ (May 200)

6ssess the relative importance of the lon&9term and short9term causes of the First World

War, (May 200!)


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.n %hat %ays: and to %hat e#tent: %ere German and 6ustrian policies responsi$le for the

out$rea' of the First World War/ (ov 200;)

Mar'scheme notes for these uestions

"4 W"+S.4"


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After 1871, the war atmosphere engendered by the secret alliances led to an

armaments race among the powers. The race was particularly serious between 1900 and

1914, as the international situation became much worse than before. There was a significant

rise in the army and naal estimates of the !uropean powers in these years.

All the "ontinental !uropean powers had adopted the conscription system since

1870. #rance had conscription since the $eolutionary %ars, Austria&'ungary since 18(8,

)ermany since 1870, *taly since 187+ and $ussia since 1874. nly -ritain did not hae

conscription. After 1890, the deteriorating diplomatic relations among the powers

accelerated their military epansion programme.

#rom 191+ to /uly 1914, )ermany increased her standing forces by 170,000 men. #rance

lengthened her period of military serice from two to three years. $ussia lengthened her

term of serice from three to three and a half years. -ritain did not introduce conscriptionbut had prepared her armed forces for both !uropean epedition and for home defence. *n

general, all the powers increased their stocs of arms, produced more modern weapons of

war and built more strategic railways.

-ritain and )ermany were the chief rials at sea. nder Admiral Tirpit2, 3tate

3ecretary of the *mperial aal ffice from 1897, a long&term shipbuilding programme began.

The )erman ay 5aw of 1898 increased the )erman battleships from nine cruisers to twele.

*n 1900 )ermany passed a ay 5aw which doubled the )erman battle fleet.

*n the meantime, -ritain produced her first 6readnought literally, the word means fear

nothing. 6readnoughts were large, fast and heaily armed battleships with 1inch guns. They

set a new standard in naal armaments and rendered all preious battleships obsolete. The naal

race became intense. -etween 1909 and 1911 )ermany built nine 6readnoughts while -ritain


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completed 18 6readnoughts. *n 191+, )ermany widened the :iel "anal to allow the easy

passage of her 6readnoughts from the -altic to the orth 3ea while -ritain built new naal

bases for the 6readnoughts in northern 3cotland.

#or centuries the powers of !urope had clashed oer their competing interests around

the globe. 6uring the nineteenth century, they usually reerted to diplomacy to sort through

their differences, but in the early twentieth century, the networ of alliances emboldened both

sides and diplomatic responses soon gae way to militaristic ones. To ad;ust to aggressie new

order of international relations each of the powers began rapidly building up their arsenals, for

it had become clear that the brawniest power would get its way.

*ncreased military and naal rialry led not only to the belief that war was coming The

)erman ruling group felt that only through a war could )ermany become a world power.


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4ripple alliance Germany: 6ustria9Dun&ary and .taly4he countries had promised to aid each other militarily in the event %ar,

4riple entente E: France and @ussiaSettled colonial disputes@eco&ni*ed Germany as the common enemyo military a&reements

6lliances 9 ho% important %as this as a cause of the %ar/

Hn the one hand: yes94he alliance systems in "urope escalated the +al'an affair (insta$ility and disputes $et%een 69Dand Ser$ia) to a "uropean %ar, Firstly: Germany &ave the $lan' cheue to 69D: %hich &ave 69D theconfidence to invade Ser$ia, 4his %ould never had happen if they %ere not allied, Secondly:Germany mo$ili*es as a result of its military pact %ith Ser$ia, 4hen Germany &oes to %ar $ecause ithas to honor its alliance %ith 69D, 4hen France and E &o to %ar $ecause they have to honor thetriple entente,9Created tension $et%een the ; &reat po%ers in "urope and spread feelin& of fatalism in "uropeanpolitical %orld

96lliances promoted arms races9Hn the other hand: no94he alliances %ere IlooseI military pacts: it %as far from certain that for e#ample Germany %ould$ac' 6ustria9Dun&ary %hen %ar $ro'e out $et%een Ser$ia and 69D or that the countries of the tripleentente %ould stic' to&ether, 4here %ere even internal stresses in the triple entente that had arisenfrom colonial disputes in Bersia $et%een E and @ussia, 6s late as in 777 6?B 4aylor consideredthe triple entente to $e virtually Iin the process of disinter&rationI,96nther important point that disproves the ar&uement that alliances %ere not a cause of the WW7 isthe fact that there %ere no military o$li&ations in the triple entente: F: @ and E did not have tosupport one another,9Jet another point to consider is the fact that the alliances %ere created in defensive purposes: thisshould have led to &reater restraint,

!ationalism - ho& important &as this as a cause of the &ar' (o& did it ma)e &ar moreli)el%' *id it ma)e the out+rea) of &ar inevita+le'

+ac'&round

6ustria9Dun&ary fearin& @ussian e#pansion: the "mpire sa% its future

in the economic penetration of the +al'ans, .mportant rail%ays %ere constructed and the rise of

Slav nationalism $ecame an increasin& concern to a state %ith such as lar&e Slav population,

.n 70A: in& 6le#ander of Ser$ia %as assasinated and the accession to the throne %as

pro9@ussian Beter .,


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4he ne% &overnment made it very clear that they favoured a policy of ISouth SlavismI and

the customs union concluded in 70 $et%een Ser$ia and +ul&aria encoura&ed the vie% that

Ser$ia %as Ithe Biedmont of the South SlavsI,

+y 708 the +al'ans had $een free of ma5or political crises for a little more than a decade:

despite the emer&ence of the e#pansionist &overnment in Ser$ia, Do%ever: in ?uly that year therevolution $y the IJoun& 4ur'I movement overthre% the corrupt rule of Sultan 6$dul Damid and

offered the prospect to other po%ers to easy &ain in the +al'ans %hile 4ur'ey %as occupied %ith

domestic pro$lems,

.n septem$er 708: 69D anne#ed the provinces of +osnia and Der*e&ovina and after this

success: $oth Germany and 69D felt stron& enou&h to demand from @ussia and Ser$ia formal

ac'no%led&ements of Da$s$ur& authority,

.n March 70 $oth &ave their ac'no%led&ements $ut @ussia suffered hu&e humiliation and

the result in Ser$ia %as the &ro%th of nationalist terrorist or&anisations,

Distorian .manuel Geiss ar&ues that Ithe +osnian crisis %as a 'ind of dress rehersal for the

First World WarI,

4he +al'an Crisis 772977A4he 6&adir crisis $rou&ht "uropean politics ro a pitch of tension and the implications spreadeast%ards do%n the Meditterranean, .talys attempt in 777 to improve its o%n standin& in orth

6frica led to an unprovo'ed attac' upon the 4ur'ish possession of 4ripoli, 4his stretchin& of 4ur'ishresources led to even more temptation in the +al'an states to free themselves from the influence of4ur'ey: for &ood, From this emer&ed: in the early months of 772: the,al)an ea.ue of #er+ia/,ul.aria/ 0reece and Montene.ro1

4he first +al'an %ar $et%een the +al'an lea&ue and 4ur'ey $e&an in Hcto$er 772 and $y

the end of that month: 4ur'ey had suffered hu&e defeats and $een driven out of their "uropean

possessions apart from a fe% cities,

4ension arose from the division of spoils9 69D attemped to secure its control $y insistin&

upon the esta$lishment of an independent 6l$anian state and the e#lusion of Ser$ia frmo the

6driatic coastline,

More immediate tensions arose amon&st the victors9 +ul&arias attempts to clear

Macedonia of Ser$ian and Gree' forces in ?une 77A led to the Second +al'an %ar,

"ffects

4here is certainly evidence of hei&htened tension at political levels in France and Germany

and of increased military preperations,

France sou&ht closer military ties %ith @ussia and sho%ed less interest in restrainin& her:

and althou&h a&reements only committed France to support @ussia if attac'ed $y Germany: @ussia


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could also e#pect Frances aid in the event of a clash %ith Germany tri&&ered $y the confrontation

of 69D,

.n Germany: the &overnment %as more reluctant to $ecome involved in the +al'an crisis $ut

sho%ed clear si&ns of political unease and military preperations in case of a future crisis,

+y Hcto$er 77A: at the time of Kiennas ultimatum to Ser$ia over 6l$anias independence:

the 'aiser %as ur&in& his ally to ta'e a firm stand and that they had uns%ervin& German support,

France9@ussian and 6ustro9&erman committments %ere ti&hter than ever: the confidence of

Ser$ia %as at its pea' and the presti&e of 69D and @ussia %as so lo% that they %ould $e una$le to

tolerate any further $lo%,

German nationalism9 I6 Blace in the SunI

German desire to increase colonial influence evetually resulted in the t%o Moroccan crises

in 70; and 777 %hich increased tensions and military preparations of the ma5or "uropean states,

4he aiser: in the course of a Mediterranean cruise too' land at 4an&ier in Morocco and

throu&h pu$lic speeches and $ehaviour implied that the reco&ni*ed the Sultan of Morocco as an

independent monarch and called into uestion 6n&lo9French a&reements over the colonial status of

these terriroties,

Hne vie% is that the 'aiser %as s'een to demonstrate that no international uestion could

$e solved %ithout reference to Germany or possi$ly $y forcin& France to &ive &round on the issue:

%ea'en 6n&lo9French relations,

Hutcome ho%ever %as humiliatin& for Germany as it had to accept confirmation of French

predominance in the sultanate after the 6l&eciras conference in 5anuary9March 70-,

.n the first crisis: no military preparations %ere made $y any po%er $ut the defeat %as seen

to confirm German fears of Ipolicy of encirclementI and accordin& to historian .manuel Geiss:

Germany turned its $ac' upon international conferences as a means of settlin& international

disputes,

4he 6&adir crisis in 777 ho%ever had even force effects

.t %as unli'ely to have lead to a &eneral %ar due to @ussia lac' of interest in the affair $ut it

contri$uted to the li'elihood of a future $rea'do%n in international relations,

.t %orsened relations $et%een +ritain and Germany and %ea'ened support for reduction innaval $uildin& pro&rammes,

Germanys attempt to spread its influence also destroyed the administration of ?oseph

Caillau# %hose main aim had $een to achieve some measure of reconciliation %ith Germany,

"mperialism and colonial rivalries - ho& important &as this as a cause of the &ar' (o& did itma)e &ar more li)el%' *id it ma)e the out+rea) of &ar inevita+le'


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6fter 78!0: the "uropean nations $e&an to acuire colonies in 6sia: 6frica and the Bacific,

4heir imperialistic activities accelerated from 7880 on%ards, +et%een 78; and 70; imperialistic

e#pansion reached its clima#,Colonial rivalry %as a cause of the First World War, First of all:

colonial rivalry led to strained relations amon& the "uropean po%ers, .n 6frica: all the "uropean

po%ers e#cept 6ustria and @ussia had colonies there, 4hus there %ere many clashes amon&France: +ritain: Germany and .taly, For e#ample: France rivalled %ith .taly over 4unis and %ith

Germany over Morocco,

Secondly: colonial rivalry led indirectly to the formation and stren&thenin& of alliances and

ententes, .taly turned to Germany and 6ustria %hen she lost 4unis to France in 7887, @ussia and

+ritain could patch up their differences and form an entente in 70! as a result of their mutual fear

of Germanys e#pansionist activities in the +al'ans, @ussia: +ritain and France could $ecome firm

friends after 70! partly $ecause of a&&ressive attitude of Germany in $oth the first and the second

Moroccan crises,

4hirdly: colonial rivalry led to an intensification of the arms race, 6s mentioned earlier: in

78- Lr, ?ameson made a raid into the Lutch @epu$lic of 4ransvaal in South 6frica, Germany found

that: %ithout a navy: she could not send much military help to the Lutch, Shortly after the event:

6dmiral von 4irpit*: the German Minister of Marine: proclaimed the need of a stron& navy, From

788 on%ards: Germany $uilt more $attleships,

Fourthly: colonial rivalry led to much hostility amon& the po%ers, .n the first and the second

Moroccan crises: %ar nearly resulted, France and +ritain nearly came to %ar over their rivalry in the

Sudan in 788,

he Morrocan Crisis


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!urope was presented with four ma;or crises between 190= and 191+, two between

#rance and )ermany oer the orth African sultanate of


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-ut after 190= colonial issues became less important as the powers turned bac to

!urope and !urope remained their centre of rialry. As stated earlier, from 1904 to 1907,

-ritain, #rance and $ussia were able to settle their colonial disputes by the Anglorench

!ntente and the Anglo&$ussian !ntente. -y 1914 colonial disputes had greatly diminished.

Thus colonial rialry had little to do with the outbrea of the #irst %orld %ar.

&ful .overnments i1e1 the 4ul% crisis and diplomatic failures5 - ho& important &as this as acause of the &ar' (o& did it ma)e &ar more li)el%' *id it ma)e the out+rea) of &arinevita+le'

+ritish Forei&n Secretary: Sir "d%ard Grey

4he ?uly Crisis of 77

Sara5evo and the response of 69D

IFifty years %ere spent on the process of ma'in& "urope e#plosive, Five days %ere enou&h

to detonate itI9 +asil Dart,

Hn 28th of ?une 77: the final crisis %as tri&&ered $y the assassination of 6rchdu'e Fran*

Ferdinand 9 heir to the 69D throne $y a Ser$ian terrorist &roup called the +lac' Dand,

4he Lual Monarchy %as $ac'ed $y Germany in sendin& an ultimatum to Ser$ia on 2Ard of

?uly in such e#treme terms that it %as almost impossi$le for Ser$ia to accept (for e#ample Ser$ian

&ovt had to suppress all anti96ustrian or&anisations and propa&anda and dismiss any officials to

%hom the Kienna &ovt mi&ht o$5ect),

Some historians have ar&ued that this %as partly the fault of the aiser himself: as 69D

mi&ht not have acted as they did if they had not $een assured of German support (especially as

Ser$ia %as in an alliance %ith @ussia),

4he spread of the +al'an Crisis


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Within a %ee' "urope %as at %ar and this %as mostly due to the reaction of @ussia9

althou&h Ser$ia did not have much of a choice in re5ectin& the ultimatum: 69D declared %ar on

Ser$ia 28 ?uly,

For @ussia to remain inactive it %ould have stripped her of any influence in the +al'nas as

%ell as $e devaluated as an ally in the eyes of France,

@ussia started to mo$ili*e its forces on the southern $orders and from here on: due to the

military plan of Germany9 the Schleiffen plan9 the %ar %as set into motion,

7 6u&ust Germany declared %ar on @ussia,

Hne could ar&ue that @ussia mo$ili*ation %as not necessarily for %ar purposes: instead

merely defensive: ho%ever the Schleiffen plan made it impossi$le for &ermany to %ait due to the

fear of a It%o front %arI,

6,?,B 4aylor ar&ues that all participants mis5ud&ed the nature of the conflict in %hich they

%ere committin& themselves 9 no &reat strains upon society,

4he ?uly Crisis did not necessarily ma'e the %ar inevita$le as had the crisis $een contained only tothe +al'an area: it %ould not have involved a total %ar %here all ma5or po%ers in "urope %eredra&&ed in, Do%ever: the German Schleiffen plan and the mis5ud&ement of "uropes leadersultimately resulted in the First World War,

(istorio.raph%: the Fischer thesis and a 6uestion of +lame'

4he German historian Frit* Fischer ar&ues that the German rulin& elite is to $lame for the WW7,Fischer uses a document called Iseptme$er pro&rammeI that %as issued $y +ethman Dollo%e&(German chanchellor) in 77 to support his thesis, 4he document outlines Germanys aim for %orlddomination, Fischer claims that the document proved that the rulin& elite in Germany had e#treme

e#pansionist aims: %hich a %ar %ould allo% them to fulfill, War %ould also consolidate their po%er inGermany and deal %ith the threat of socialism,

4his ar&ument is persuasive as he lin's lon&9term German policies to ho% German &overnmentacted in the ?uly crisis (Germany &ave $lan' cheue to 69D to tri&&er a "uropean %ar),

Criticism of the Fischer thesis94here is limited evidence to prove that Germany had e#pansionist aims $efore 7794oo much focus is on Germany: %hich led to that Fischers ne&lects other factors: ma'in& hisar&ument un$alanced,

Do%ever: many other historians have completely differnet opinions of the causes of the first %orld%ar and %ho %as to $lame for it,

4ohn $ee.anFocuses on events in the ?uly crisis, 6lthou&h there %ere lon&9term causes: %ar %as neverinevita$le, ee&an sayas %ar $ro'e out $ecause of the lac' of communication $et%een the &reatpo%ers durin& the ?uly crisis, one of them had communicated their their o$5ectives clearly durin&the crisi, 6s a result: @ussias mo$ili*ation and German ultimatum to @ussia to stop mo$ili*e led toa &eneral "uropean %ar,

4ames 4oll6ttri$utes the out$rea' of the %ar to disastrous decision made $y politicans in the ?uly crisis in


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77,

!iall Fer.usonGermany is not to $lame $ecause there is evidence that the social democrat party influenced theGerman aiser so much that he a$andoned his e#pansionist aims, Fer&uson sees E as thecountry that contri$uted to the %ar the most as Sir "d%ard Grey completely misinterpretedam$itions and decided to &o into the %ar to stop German e#pansionism,

>enin (77-)

Sydney Fay (7A0)

Frit* Fischer (7-7)

6,?,B 4aylor (7;)

*id 0erman% cause the &ar' Quotes on this 6uestion of who or what caused the &ar:

Htto von +ismarc': nineteenth9century statesman Ithe next war will start from some

damn fool thing in the Balkans


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German head of army: von Molt'e: 772 I hold war to be inevitable and the sooner the

better"

German Chancellor +ethmann9Doll%e&: %hen as'ed a$out ho% WW7 came a$out:

77 "Oh - if only I knew!

Von der Golt*: a German %riter "a long and bitter war was necessary for the sake of

Germany's 'health"

>ord Grey: +ritish Forei&n Secretary on the arms race 7he moral is obvios# it is thatgreater armaments lead to war $ he enormos growth of armaments in %ro&e the sense

of insecrity and fear cased by them - it was these that made war inevitable

ES am$assador in >ondon: 77 "German militarism which is the crime of the last

fifty years had been working for this for twenty-five years It is the logical reslt of their

doctrine It had to come"

Fran' McLonou&h: +ritish historian (7!) I(ower lies at the heart of nearly every

ex&lanation of why nations go to war he inflence of &owerfl leaders their aims &olicies

and decisions are crcial to any nderstanding of why nations go to war )* +owever the

most crcial factor in &romoting war or &eace is the &revailing balance of &ower It is clear

that an ineffective balance of &ower &romotes war",

8he ,irst orld ar was really the clmination of a long drawn-ot crisis within the%ro&ean system"

Ihe rise of Germany was a &rimary factor which &rodced tensions among the ma.or%ro&ean &owers"

Lavid >loyd Geor&e: War Memoirs(7A) Ihe nations slithered over the brink into the

boiling caldron of war withot any trace of a&&rehension or dismay he nations backed

their machines over the &reci&ice not one of them wanted war/ certainly not on this

scale"


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6merican Distorical ?ournal: $oo' revie% (200A) Ihere was no "slide" to war no war

cased by "inadvertence"/ bt instead a world war cased by a fearfl set of elite statesmen

and rlers making deliberate choices

causes of the first world war text

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