chadee cover.indd vii 1/14/2011 8:26:11 pm...doctoral degree in social psychology at the university...

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Theories in Social Psychology

Chadee_ffirs.indd iChadee_ffirs.indd i 12/13/2010 2:12:49 PM12/13/2010 2:12:49 PM

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Theories in Social Psychology

Edited by

Derek Chadee

A John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Publication

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This edition first published 2011

© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Theories in social psychology / edited by Derek Chadee.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-4443-3122-6 (hardcover : alk. paper) – ISBN 978-1-4443-3123-3 (pbk. : alk. paper)

1. Social psychology. I. Chadee, Derek.

HM1033.T434 2011

302.01–dc22

2010041341

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Set in 10/13 Minion by SPi Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India

1 2011

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To my daughter, Rúhíyyih – providing another perspective

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List of Contributors ixAcknowledgments xiv

Introduction 1

Part I Social Cognition 11

1 Toward Freedom: Reactance Theory Revisited 13 Derek Chadee

2 Inconsistency in Cognition: Cognitive Dissonance 44 Paul R. Nail and Kurt A. Boniecki

3 Attribution Theories: How People Make Sense of Behavior 72 Bertram F. Malle

4 The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion: Thoughtful and Non-Thoughtful Social Influence 96

Benjamin C. Wagner and Richard E. Petty

Part II Social Comparison 117

5 Social Comparison: Motives, Standards, and Mechanisms 119 Katja Corcoran, Jan Crusius, and Thomas Mussweiler

6 Relative Deprivation: Understanding the Dynamics of Discontent 140 Jenny Carrillo, Alexandra F. Corning, Tara C. Dennehy,

and Faye J. Crosby

Part III Social Reinforcement 161

7 Evaluating Fairness: Critical Assessment of Equity Theory 163 Denise M. Polk

Contents

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viii Contents

8 Interdependence in Social Interaction 191 Ann C. Rumble

Part IV Self 209

9 Self-Categorization and Social Identification: Making Sense of Us and Them 211

Katharina Schmid, Miles Hewstone, and Ananthi Al Ramiah

10 Social Categorization Theories: From Culture to Cognition 232 Richard J. Crisp and Angela T. Maitner

11 Symbolic Interactionism: From Gestalt to Cybernetics 250 Andreas Schneider

12 Impression Management: Influencing Perceptions of Self 280 Meni Koslowsky and Shani Pindek

Author Index 297Subject Index 301

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Contributors

Derek Chadee is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Behavioural Sciences and Director of the ANSA McAL Psychological Research Centre, University of the West Indies, St. Augustine Campus. His current research interests include the social psychology of fear of crime and general fear, antecedents of emotions, copycat behavior, the media, HIV/AIDS and jury decision-making. In 2004, he was a Fulbright Scholar undertaking research on fear of crime in two American universities. He has maintained a cross-cultural research agenda.

Ananthi Al Ramiah is a Leverhulme Postdoctoral Research Associate at the Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, and her research interests lie broadly in the area of intergroup conflict and cooperation. One line of her research assesses how social identity, threat, and status differentials contribute to intergroup conflict. In addition, her research aims to uncover the role that ethno-religious diversity plays in explaining percep-tions of intergroup trust and the extent to which these relationships are moderated by intergroup contact. Another line of work assesses how the intergroup context is perceived and contributed to by members of majority- and minority-status groups in an effort to find models of intergroup harmony in diverse settings.

Kurt A. Boniecki is Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of Central Arkansas and gained his Ph.D. in social psychology from the University of Florida in 1997. His research primarily examines the causes of prejudice and stereotyping. He also has academic interests in the teaching of psychology, interpersonal attraction, and the home-field advan-tage in sports.

Jenny Carrillo is Senior Vice President of External Affairs and Organizational Effectiveness at Planned Parenthood of Southern New England (PPSNE). Her work at PPSNE is consist-ent with her doctoral research at Yale University on women’s and immigrant health and the acculturative process. Prior to this, she worked with adolescents focused on social justice and education. She is active as a board member in several non-profit organizations that

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x Contributors

center on health, education, and racial disparities. She previously worked as a consultant with McKinsey & Co. and at Pace University.

Katja Corcoran (née Rüter) currently works as an Assistant Professor at the University of Cologne, Germany. She studied psychology in Tübingen and Berlin in Germany, and Amherst, USA. She gained her Ph.D. at the University of Würzburg, Germany, in 2004, and spent one year at Northwestern University, USA, with a Feodor Lynen fellowship granted by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. Her research focuses on social comparisons, especially on standard selection processes and aspects of efficiency. She has published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, and Social Cognition.

Alexandra F. Corning is professor in the Department of Psychology, University of Notre Dame. Her research is concerned with problems that affect groups unevenly. Much of her work is aimed at identifying and explaining the mechanisms underlying the perception of discrimina-tion; in particular, how people arrive at the conclusions that discrimination has or has not taken place when the situation is ambiguous. Taking a social-cognitive approach, her research is focused on identifying individual-difference as well as situational factors that influence these perceptions. She also conducts research aimed at identifying the processes that influence young women’s and girls’ body dissatisfaction and eating problems.

Richard J. Crisp is Professor of Psychology in the Centre for the Study of Group Processes, University of Kent. He completed his BA in experimental psychology at Oxford University and his Ph.D. at Cardiff University. He has published widely on the psychology of prejudice, social categorization, group processes, and intergroup relations. He is a past winner of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues Louise Kidder Early Career Award and was the 2006 recipient of the British Psychological Society’s Spearman Medal. He is cur-rently Associate Editor of the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology and in 2009 he was elected an Academician of the Academy of Social Sciences.

Faye J. Crosby is Professor in the Psychology Department, University of California, Santa Cruz. She is a scholar, writer, consultant, and social activist. She received her Ph.D. in 1976. Previous faculty appointments include Rhode Island College, Yale University, the Kellogg School of Management, and Smith College. Crosby has authored or coauthored five books and has edited or co-edited a further ten volumes, and over 150 articles and chapters. Most of her work concerns sex and race discrimination and focuses on remedies. She is the recip-ient of numerous awards and is the founder of Nag’s Heart, an organization whose mission is the replenishment of the feminist spirit.

Jan Crusius is an Assistant Professor in Social Psychology at the University of Cologne, Germany. After studying psychology in Jena, Germany, and Seville, Spain, he finished his doctoral degree in Social Psychology at the University in Cologne in 2009. He is interested in the role of social comparisons in emotion, judgment and decision making, and con-sumer behavior.

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Contributors xi

Tara C. Dennehy is a graduate student in the Mind, Brain, & Behavior Program at San Francisco State University. She received her BA in 2007 with highest honors in psychology from the University of California, Santa Cruz. Her main research interests lie in the inter-section between cognitive psychology and social cognition. Specifically, she conducts research examining the relationship between categorization and psychological essentialism, and research on the action-related determinants of entry into attentional awareness.

Miles Hewstone is Professor of Social Psychology and Fellow of New College, University of Oxford. He has published widely on the topics of social cognition and intergroup relations. He was awarded the British Psychological Society’s Spearman Medal in 1987 and its President’s Award for Distinguished Contributions to Research in 2001. He was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California 1987–8 and 1999–2000, and is a Fellow of the British Academy.

Meni Koslowsky is Professor at Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel. He received his Ph.D. in psychology from Columbia University and is presently a Professor in the Psychology Department of Bar-Ilan University. His main focus of research includes organizational behavior, the stress–strain relationship, social power, and methodological issues. He has written more than 100 articles, authored and edited five books, and has presented at nearly 100 conferences.

Angela T. Maitner is currently an Assistant Professor of Psychology at the American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. She completed her Ph.D. at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Broadly, her research investigates intergroup relations from a social cognitive perspective. More specifically she investigates the impact of exposure to diversity and multiple categorization on person perception and stereotyping, and the regu-latory role of emotion in intergroup relations.

Bertram F. Malle is Professor in the Department of Cognitive, Linguistic and Psychological Sciences, Brown University. He received his Ph.D. at Stanford University in 1995 and joined the University of Oregon Psychology Department. He received the Society of Experimental Social Psychology Outstanding Dissertation award in 1995 and a National Science Foundation CAREER award in 1997. His research focuses on social cognition and the folk theory of mind, exploring such issues as intentionality judgments, mental state inferences, behavior explana-tions, and moral judgments. Malle is currently writing a book on Social Cognitive Science.

Thomas Mussweiler has been Professor at the University of Cologne since 2004. His research examines a variety of issues in social cognition, social judgment, and decision making, in particular how comparison processes shape human judgment, affect, and behavior. He has published in the Psychological Review, Psychological Science, the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, and the Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, among others. His research has been recognized by awards including the European Science Foundation’s European Young Investigator Award, the German Science Foundation’s Gottfried-Wilhelm Leibniz award, and the European Association of Social Psychology’s Jos Jaspars award.

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xii Contributors

Previously Mussweiler taught at the University of Würzburg, Germany, was a postdoctoral fellow at Northwestern University, USA, and received his Ph.D. from the University of Trier, Germany.

Paul R. Nail has been Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of Central Arkansas since 2005 and holds a Ph.D. in experimental psychology from Texas Christian University (1981). Previously, he was a Professor at Southwestern Oklahoma State University for 25 years. He has published articles in the Psychological Bulletin, the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, the Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, and Basic and Applied Social Psychology, among others. Besides cognitive dissonance theory, his research interests include social influence in groups, contemporary theories of racism, political psychology, and indi-vidual differences in psychological defensiveness. He is currently an Associate Editor of the interdisciplinary journal Social Influence.

Richard E. Petty is Distinguished University Professor of Psychology at Ohio State University. He received his BA from the University of Virginia and his Ph.D. from Ohio State. His research focuses on understanding changes in attitudes and behaviors. He has published eight books and over 250 articles and chapters. Honors received include the Scientific Impact Award from the Society of Experimental Social Psychology, Distinguished Scientific Contribution Awards from the Society for Personality and Social Psychology (SPSP) and the Society for Consumer Psychology, and service as President of SPSP and the Midwestern Psychological Association. He is past Editor of the Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin.

Shani Pindek is a doctoral student in the Psychology Department of Bar-Ilan University, with particular interests in impression management, organizational citizenship behavior, and altruism.

Denise M. Polk is Associate Professor in the Department of Communication Studies at West Chester University of Pennsylvania. Her teaching and research areas focus mainly in the areas of interpersonal communication, work–family integration, conflict resolution, and health communication. She has focused mostly on romantic and family relationships. She holds a BA from Baldwin-Wallace College, a Master’s from Miami University, and a Ph.D. from Kent State University.

Ann C. Rumble is Assistant Professor of Psychology at Ohio University-Chillicothe. She received her Ph.D. from Washington State University in 2003, with a specialization in inter-dependent behavior and social dilemmas. She continued her work with Marilynn Brewer at Ohio State University as a National Institute of Mental Health postdoctoral fellow, following which she accepted a position at Ohio University-Chillicothe.

Katharina Schmid is currently a Research Fellow and Lecturer in Psychology at New College, University of Oxford. She previously held appointments at the Max-Planck-Institute for the study of ethnic and religious diversity in Germany, and at Royal Holloway University of

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Contributors xiii

London, and completed her Ph.D. in Social Psychology at Queen’s University Belfast. Her research interests lie broadly in the areas of social identity and intergroup relations. Her research focuses in particular on the role of multiple categorization processes, and espe-cially social identity complexity, in intergroup relations.

Andreas Schneider is Associate Professor of Sociology at Texas Tech University. While study ing social psychology, sociology, management, and marketing at Mannheim University, Germany, he visited Indiana University in 1987 and became fascinated with the new emerg-ing cybernetic symbolic interactionist model of Affect Control Theory. He received his Ph.D. in sociology from Indiana University, Bloomington, in 1997. His publications in Social Psychology Quarterly, the Journal of Mathematical Sociology, Quality & Quantity, and Organization Studies demonstrate his research interests in the methodological development of symbolic interactionism and the cross-cultural application in the fields of deviance, sex-uality, and management.

Benjamin C. Wagner is a doctoral candidate in social psychology at Ohio State University, studying under Richard E. Petty. His research interests include attitudes and persuasion, embodied cognition, metacognition, moral reasoning, and emotion. In 2007, he earned his Master’s degree in psychology from Ohio State, having completed his BA two years earlier at Denison University, Granville, Ohio.

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This book would have been impossible were it not for the assistance of the following persons and institutions. Thanks to the staff at Wiley-Blackwell, in particular, Andrew McAleer, Annie Rose, Karen Shield, and Juanita Bullough, for their efficiency and help at every stage. To all the contributors, I am grateful for your contributions. Specifically I express my gratitude to Ananthi Al Ramiah, Kurt Boniecki, Jenny Carrillo, Katja Corcoran, Alexandra Corning, Richard Crisp, Faye Crosby, Jan Crusius, Tara Dennehy, Miles Hewstone, Meni Koslowsky, Angela Maitner, Bertram Malle, Thomas Mussweiler, Paul Nail, Richard Petty, Shani Pindek, Denise Polk, Ann Rumble, Katharina Schmid, Andreas Schneider, and Benjamin Wagner. I am grateful for and acknowledge the comments by the publisher’s anonymous reviewers, which were instructively helpful in the preparation of the final manuscript.

I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Ramesh Deosaran for his valuable mentorship, and to the University of the West Indies for its support, particularly the ANSA McAL Psychological Research Centre, of whose academic output this publication is a part. I am grateful to and thank everyone who provided the necessary technical and other support leading up to final publication, and wish to express my deepest gratitude for the assistance of anyone whom I may have inadvertently left unacknowledged.

Acknowledgments

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Gordon Allport (1968) defined social psychology as “an attempt to understand and explain how the thoughts, feelings and behavior of individuals are influenced by the actual, imag-ined or implied presence of others.” As limited as definitions are, this definition of social psychology captured the dynamism, focus, and direction of the discipline. Important to an understanding of social psychological behavior is taking into consideration not only what is happening socially to the person but also what is occurring internally and cognitively to the individual which, in turn, affects social behavior. From its genesis rooted in the work of William James’s Principles of Psychology to current development of the discipline, there has always been an emphasis on the individual within the social interaction paradigm. Theorization, therefore, within the discipline has fallen within this paradigm, which is now extended to include the neurological functioning of human beings within the social psy-chological context.

The early works on social psychology by the psychologist William McDougall (1908) and the sociologist Edward Ross (1908) weighted social behavior on instinctual or social factors, respectively. Later, Floyd Allport (1924) emphasized a behaviorist stimulus–response para-digm for the understanding of social psychological behavior. Theories of psychology and sociology during this early period seem to have been competing to understand a realm that had neither the theorization nor the research sophistication to claim discovery status. Much of the work undertaken in social psychology has been done within the discipline of psy-chology, with sociological social psychology contributions being relatively sparse. Notably, the discipline of sociology has contributed tremendously to the early development of the concept and theorization of self, especially via theories of symbolic interactionism, phe-nomenology, and, later, ethnomethodology. On the other hand, psychological social psy-chology’s contributions have been crucial to the genesis and development of both the pure and applied branches of the discipline.

Introduction

Theories in Social Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Derek Chadee.© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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2 Introduction

Social psychology has seen numerous studies testing hypotheses drawn from concepts or theories. However, less frequent in the literature is the emergence of theories – a renaissance that is much needed for the development and impetus of the discipline. However, many of the theories that currently exist within social psychology are as important to the discipline as they were over forty years ago. A renaissance starts with a reassessment of the efficacy of current theories.

Theories have the power of insight and understanding, allowing scientists to see phe-nomena that previously they would have been unable to conceptualize. Albert Einstein is quoted as saying, “Whether or not you can observe a thing depends on the theory you use. It is the theory which decides what can be observed.” The assumptions, proposi-tions, hypotheses, and supporting confirmed “facts” all provide the theory with a power of vision. The assumptions are givens that the theorist is allowed to utilize in the con-struction of his theory. They are like the basic tools of a carpenter. These assumptions are grounded on some philosophy or principle, and are often not the bases on which a theory is criticized. However, assumptions give a theory direction. On the other hand, a theory’s power of vision is myopic, limited by the same tools that give the theory its power. This is a dilemma that the finite scientist must explore in any discipline. However, the beach-ball approach to the understanding of the world within one’s discipline is a compromise accepted by social psychologists. That is, it is recognized that a theory is an academic creation, in this sense, and has limitations. The adoption of a number of theo-retical positions provides a more comprehensive understanding of the multidimensional nature of a phenomenon.

A theory can be criticized on a number of grounds, including consistency – how logically well the theory holds together with its propositions and hypotheses; external – standing up to criticisms of other theories (theory A vs. theory B); historical – temporal perseverance of the theory (e.g., does Freud’s psychoanalytical theory or Heider’s attribution theory still hold today?); applicability – the generalizing of findings from research to social situations; and methodological – the strengths and weakness of the methodology used in the construc-tion of the theory, especially if the theory is an empiricist one.

The recent social psychological literature has been lacking a volume systematically dedi-cated to a range of theories within the discipline. The emphasis of this book, therefore, is on social psychological theories, with an evaluation of some of the main theories still discussed and relevant to understanding behavior. The volume is divided into four parts. Part I presents critical assessments of social cognitive theories – from their genesis to their current development.

Derek Chadee revisits Brehm’s theory of psychological reactance, identifying the genesis of this theory in the womb of cognitive dissonance theory. However, the baby grew with many different characteristics from the mother. Both theories of cognitive dissonance and psychological reactance are theories of motivational arousal and reduction. The theory of psychological reactance, however, attempts to explain people’s reactions to perceived or actual threat to loss of freedom. The theory builds on several assumptions of human behav-ior, with a major underlying assumption of human persistence in maintaining free behav-iors and the consequences that arise as a result of threats to importantly defined free behaviors. The early emphasis of reactance theorizing and research was on psychological


Introduction 3

reactance as being aroused by the situation. However, later studies have given emphasis to reactance as dispositional – a reactant personality. Numerous instruments have been designed to measure reactance as a disposition. The merit and demerits of these measures are discussed.

This first chapter critically assesses the relationship between reactance and dissonance, proposing reactance as a special case of dissonance though identifying the distinctness of reactance. Critical to this chapter is the identification of the systematic void in the literature concerning any discussion on affect in reactance. The last part of the chapter evaluates the relationship between affect and reactance, proposing a reactance emotion theory. Chadee concludes by noting that reactance theory is an important theory in the discipline of social psychology and has contributed to an understanding of reactance behavior to actual or perceived threats in a wide variety of settings. The theory is as useful today as it was over forty years ago. However, the theory needs modification.

Paul Nail and Kurt Boniecki critically assess Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance and related theories, from dissonance theory’s inception and rise to prominence in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, to its near-death by the early 1980s, to its rebirth in the 1990s and 2000s. The original statement of the theory was stunning in its simplicity – that an unpleasant psychological state called cognitive dissonance exists whenever one important thought is in conflict with another. Yet this very simplicity was a major factor that has led to a large number of academic debates and controversies over the years. Nail and Boniecki describe how the germ of the theory got started when Festinger read of the events surrounding a massive earthquake that occurred in India in 1934.

They review Festinger’s major theoretical constructs and how these gave rise, early on, to a series of counterintuitive predictions that were generally supported by the empirical evidence. Most famous is the finding of Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) that research par-ticipants reported a greater liking for boring laboratory tasks if they were paid $1 as opposed to $20 for performing them. Nail and Boniecki summarize major paradigms that were created to test dissonance theory, followed by rival theoretical accounts, such as Bem’s (1967) self-perception theory. The success of these accounts eventually caused inter-est in the theory to wane, but more recently has led to a flurry of empirical interest in dis-sonance and related phenomena, reviewed by Nail and Boniecki, which persists to the present day. One major focus of the chapter are the “self ” theories of dissonance (e.g., Aronson, 1968, 2007; Steele, 1988), which hold that dissonance processes have their origins in the need for self-esteem rather than in a need for logic-like consistency, as originally conceived by Festinger (1957). Another focus is individual differences, e.g., how the differ-ent versions of dissonance theory make conflicting predictions for those varying in self-esteem. The chapter evaluates the theory in terms of its applicability, efficiency, heuristic value, and originality. Nail and Boniecki close by calling for new research that could possibly reestablish Festinger’s (1957) version as the single most adequate account of dis-sonance phenomena.

Bertram Malle examines the history of research on behavior explanations, identifies missing pieces, and introduces a theoretical model that is meant to account for explana-tions at the conceptual, psychological, and linguistic levels. Heider (1958) was the first to examine systematically how people make sense of each others’ behavior. He introduced the


4 Introduction

notion of personal causality – ordinary people’s conception of how purposeful behavior works. When a behavior obeys personal causality, it is seen as caused by the agent’s inten-tion, whereas such an intention is absent in behavior that obeys impersonal causality. Thus, Heider captured what was later called intentionality – a core distinction in people’s under-standing of human behavior.

Subsequent attribution research turned to different directions. Jones and Davis (1965) shifted from considerations of intention inferences toward considerations of personality and attitude inferences. Kelley (1967) set aside Heider’s distinction between personal and impersonal causality and instead focused on a distinction between person (internal) and situation (external) causes. This internal–external dimension, however, applies only to people’s explanations of unintentional events, not to their explanations of intentional action.

Decades passed before Heider’s original concern with intentionality and people’s inferences of motives and reasons became a topic of research again. Committed to these concerns, the second part of the chapter introduces the folk-conceptual theory of behav-ior explanation (Malle, 1999, 2004). It locates explanations in the network of folk con-cepts people use to make sense of human behavior and specifies the psychological processes and linguistic manifestations of explanations. For example, people offer very different kinds of explanations for intentional and unintentional behavior. Unintentional behavior is explained by causes, which can be classified in a variety of ways, including an internal–external dimension. Intentional behavior, by contrast, is more complex. People offer either reason explanations (referring to the beliefs and desires in light of which the agent formed an intention to act) or causal history of reason explanations (referring to factors that led to those reasons in the first place – upbringing, personality, unconscious mental states, etc.). People’s choice between these two explanation modes reflects both cognitive and motivational processes and is sensitive to the explainer’s role (actors vs. observers), the type of agent (group vs. individuals), and the explainer’s impression-management goals.

Thus, the folk-conceptual theory tries to carve out the concepts and processes that mat-ter when people construct and respond to explanations; and these distinctions reveal a rich, sophisticated system of folk-behavior explanations. Malle’s chapter is a dynamic contribu-tion to the evolution of the field of attribution.

Benjamin Wagner and Richard Petty examine the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), which is a general theory of persuasion that is also applicable to social judgment (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The ELM holds that people’s attitudes can be modified in both relatively effortful (central route) and non-effortful (peripheral route) ways. Persuasion via the cen-tral route depends on the strength and cogency of the arguments contained in the message and is determined by the number, valence, and confidence people have in their thoughts to the advocacy. Persuasion via the peripheral route is determined largely by reliance on sim-ple cues and heuristics that are not necessarily central to the merits of the advocacy (e.g., being in a good mood). The extent of elaboration is the chief determinant of the route to persuasion, and several factors have been shown to influence the extent of thinking. Broadly speaking, these factors relate to motivation (e.g., personal relevance of the topic) and ability (e.g., knowledge about the topic) to think about the advocacy. With greater motivation and


Introduction 5

ability comes an increased likelihood that a person will extensively elaborate a persuasive message and be less reliant on issue-irrelevant cues. Importantly, attitudes formed under the central route are generally more durable and impactful than are attitudes formed under the peripheral route.

An important component of the ELM is the idea that any variable can serve multiple roles in persuasion. Specifically, persuasion variables such as source expertise or momen-tary emotions can operate in five roles: (a) as simple cues to persuasion (e.g., “experts are usually right”), (b) as arguments that are relevant to a particular conclusion (e.g., “an expert’s endorsement speaks to the product’s quality”), (c) by biasing the thoughts that a person generates (i.e., expert sources lead to more favorable thoughts concerning the message than non-expert sources), (d) by affecting the amount of thinking a person does (i.e., expert sources enhance thinking about the arguments since they seem more wor-thy), and (e) by affecting whether people use their thoughts in response to the message in forming their attitudes toward the topic (i.e., “if my thoughts were provoked by an expert, they must be valid”).

The ELM has not only integrated research in persuasion but has also been applied in diverse areas of application such as consumer attitudes, health promotion, and legal domains. The model continues to generate interesting and important research findings, both at the basic and applied levels.

Social comparison has evolved and been modified since the 1950s. The social compari-son process is a process that is present in numerous theories. Relative deprivation assumes the presence of social comparison. Both social comparison and relative deprivation are discussed in Part II.

Katja Corcoran, Jan Crusius, and Thomas Mussweiler provide a comprehensive over-view of social comparison theory. Social comparisons – comparisons between the self and others – are a fundamental psychological mechanism influencing people’s judg-ments, experiences, and behavior. In this chapter, they review the social psychological theorizing and research on social comparison. They start by summarizing the basic tenets of Leon Festinger’s seminal social comparison theory and continue by addressing three questions that are central to Festinger’s ideas and to the research that followed his initial work. The first question is: Why do people engage in social comparisons? While social comparison is mostly understood as a process which is engaged to fulfill funda-mental needs like self-evaluation, self-enhancement, and self-improvement, the chapter discusses logical reasons for social comparisons and considers the efficiency advantage of comparative information-processing. The second question is: To whom do people compare themselves? The chapter explores how motivational concerns influence the selection of comparison standards and how routine standards can provide an efficient means to fulfill the need to self-evaluate. The third question is: How do social compari-sons influence the self? The diverse factors that lead to assimilation or contrast of the self as a consequence of social comparison are reviewed. Furthermore, these factors are dis-cussed in light of the Selective Accessibility Model, which explains them by the changes of accessible self-knowledge during social comparisons. Finally, Corcoran et al. address the role of social comparisons in health psychology and the impact of idealized media images on self-evaluation as applied examples of social comparison research. Their


6 Introduction

review shows that comparative processes are marked by striking complexity and multi-facetedness and that consequences of social comparisons span all core areas of human psychological functioning. They argue that future research could benefit from a perspec-tive that integrates cognitive, motivational, and affective determinants and consequences of social comparisons.

Underlying the theory of relative deprivation is the social comparison process. Relative deprivation (RD) theory helps social scientists predict who will become dissatisfied under what conditions. RD theory is a theory of perceived social inequity which helps to explain why some people with paltry resources experience contentment while some others with abundant access to a wealth of resources are dissatisfied. Jenny Carrillo, Alexandra Corning, Tara Dennehy, and Faye Crosby review the history, development, and utility of RD. After detailing the initial writings about the concept of RD, they trace the development of various models of RD articulated from the 1960s to the 1980s and assess the more contemporary work on RD, focusing on the distinction between personal and group-based feelings of relative deprivation and on a validated means of measuring the construct that was pre-sented in 2000. Directions for the future application of RD theory to social problems are considered.

Part III assesses two theories that start with the behavioral premise that human beings are hedonistic. The theories also assume that actions are governed by a reinforcement–punishment structure which extends into interpersonal interaction. The power dynamics of interpersonal interaction is absent from equity theory but elaborated in interdependency theory.

Denise Polk’s chapter provides a useful understanding of equity theory. The theory stems from principles of reinforcement and basic principles of economics. The basic premise of the theory is that people evaluate their relationships in terms of inputs and outcomes. The principle of distributive justice is core to equity theory (Deutsch, 1985). Imbalances in input–outcome ratios result in inequity. Two types of inequity can occur. People may be underbenefited, or they may be overbenefited. However, according to equity theory, people are driven to restore equity once they perceive inequity. When peo-ple experience inequity, they may attempt to restore actual equity or psychological equity. Polk posits that because no magic formula for equity exists, relational partners must determine equity for themselves. Equity is a key consideration in relationships because people’s perceptions about equity shape people’s feelings, decisions, and actions toward their relational partners (Adams, 1965; Sprecher & Schwartz, 1994), so equity theory is appropriate to help explain the development, maintenance, and dissolution of relation-ships. Polk explores research which has tested equity for links with many variables including personality, emotions, gender, the distribution of domestic duties, and rela-tional quality.

The chapter by Ann Rumble explores interdependence theory, as developed by John Thibaut and Harold Kelley. Thibaut and Kelley employed outcome matrices in order to understand an actor’s available behavior choices and outcomes. The given matrix repre-sents the choices and outcomes that are available to the actors in a specific situation, and through the transformation process develops into the effective matrix (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). By examining the components of the given and effective matrix, we will be


Introduction 7

able to explain human behavior in a number of interdependent situations, including close relationships.

The final part of the book is devoted to theories related to self and identity and covers social identity, social categorization, symbolic interactionism, and impression manage-ment. Katharina Schmid, Miles Hewstone, and Ananthi Al Ramiah’s chapter provides a general overview of social psychological theory on social identity, including social iden-tity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). However, this chapter takes a somewhat more encompassing approach to portraying what is commonly referred to as the social identity perspective (Abrams & Hogg, in press). The authors thus not only focus on social iden-tity theory and self-categorization theory but also pay particular attention to defining the concept of social identity, and consider the consequences of social identity phenomena for intergroup relations, above and beyond the predictions of social identity theory, taking into consideration the extent to which multiple categorization processes help explain intergroup relations.

The chapter is organized into four sections, the first two of which conceptually define self-categorization and social identification, whereas the last two examine the extent to which self-categorization and social identification are involved in, and help explain, intergroup relations. Section one of this chapter provides a brief definition of self- categorization and describes the theoretical foundations of self-categorization theory. The authors describe in detail what is meant by self-categorization, and how, why, and when individuals make use of social categories. In Section two, they define social iden-tification as a psychological process associated with group membership and explain that identification is a multidimensional phenomenon. Section three presents a detailed description of social identity theory, with reference to the findings that emerged from the minimal group paradigm. Schmid, Hewstone, and Al Ramiah address, with refer-ence to the predictions of social identity theory, the extent to which self-categorization and social identification are related to intergroup attitudes and behavior. Finally, Section four is devoted to an overview of multiple categorization and its consequences for inter-group relations, showing how more complex consideration of others and oneself in terms of multiple group memberships is associated with tolerance and improved inter-group relations.

Richard Crisp and Angela Maitner’s chapter complements the previous chapter. They argue that in contemporary society the traditional boundaries that have previously defined social group memberships are being steadily eroded and replaced with more complex con-ceptualizations of identity. Crisp and Maitner review classic and contemporary theories of social categorization in the context of this increasing social and cultural diversity. They argue that broad-ranging and pervasive changes to the categorical structure of society have fundamental implications for how individuals perceive, represent, and understand their social environments. They review existing social cognitive, self-categorization, and situ-ated cognition accounts, arguing that an increasing focus on the context-specific nature of social categorization reflects the more fluid and fluctuating nature of identity in contem-porary society. They conceptualize a diversity-driven social categorization theory, arguing that the functional nature of human cognition implies that exposure to diversity must


8 Introduction

change how individuals psychologically engage with their social worlds. The authors con-clude that to understand fully the evolving nature of social categorization psychologists should seek to incorporate a broader multidisciplinary analysis of the changing nature of culture and society.

Andreas Schneider’s chapter is a comprehensive overview of symbolic interactionism (SI). Today the framework of symbolic interactionism has been delineated into many theo-retical approaches using qualitative and quantitative methods of investigation that are applied in numerous areas of research. SI has evolved a long way from early philosophies of North American pragmatism to the computer simulation of human interaction. Describing this path, this chapter overcomes dichotomies such as the Chicago school versus the Iowa school, or quantitative versus qualitative, that have been used in the past to pigeonhole one or the other line of research. Instead it portrays the development from the grandfathers and their philosophical backgrounds to explain the different agendas addressed by the founding fathers of the Chicago school. This historical context is necessary to understand contemporary contrasting schools of thought and their roots in social psychology, as well as sociology. This chapter then shows how ideas and methodologies of these qualitative and quantitative approaches are integrated into the most recent development of cybernetic control models in SI. Finally it is demonstrated how SI is applied in the fields of deviance, sexuality, children, gender, emotions, organization/management, cross-cultural compari-son, and ethnomethodology/conversation analysis. Descriptions of these applications are supported by interviews of key researchers in the respective fields.

Meni Koslowsky and Shani Pindek’s chapter on impression management (IM) is a refreshing contribution to the literature. They note that IM is an activity which takes place in many, if not most, interactions between people. In this chapter they start by exploring the different definitions of the construct, from a narrow view of IM as a set of manipulative behaviors, performed mainly in order to present them in a positive light, to a more expan-sive definition which assumes that all people unconsciously manage their impressions in ways that assist in achieving goals both at the individual and group level. This expansive view of IM allows us to deal with its association to constructs such as the self-concept, indi-viduals’ social identities, and other social phenomena.

When applying or measuring IM, behaviors are usually considered as belonging to one of several distinct subcategories. These categories include verbal/nonverbal behaviors, defensive/promotional, positive/negative, and several other related taxonomies. The chap-ter also explores specific antecedents and outcomes of IM. Prominent among the former are gender, self-monitoring, and self-regulation, as well as demographic and personality variables. In addition, research on situational antecedents and on IM outcomes has been conducted in applied settings such as human resource management. Since the work envi-ronment supplies the individual with many incentives as well as opportunities to benefit from impressions that are well managed, this area has been the focus of much of the research in recent years.

Finally, they identify several areas for future researchers to consider so as to better explain the phenomenon.


Introduction 9

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Part I

Social Cognition

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Theories in Social Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Derek Chadee.© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Reactance theory was developed by Jack W. Brehm and articulated in his Theory of Psychological Reactance (1966). Leon Festinger and Stanley Schachter were the editors of the monograph series which included Brehm’s seminal work. In fact, Brehm’s Ph.D. supervisor was Leon Festinger and his Ph.D. dissertation tested the free-choice dissonance paradigm which later appeared in 1956 in the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology as the first empirical research on cognitive dissonance. Later, Brehm systematically wrote on cognitive dissonance (e.g., Brehm, 1962; Brehm & Cohen, 1962).

The genesis of the theory of psychological reactance appears to have taken place in the womb of cognitive dissonance theory. However, the baby grew with many different characteristics from the mother. Both theories of cognitive dissonance and psychological reactance are theories of motivational arousal and reduction. In fact, Miron and Brehm (2006, p. 9) recognize that

Festinger had constructed a theory (cognitive dissonance) that assumed an inner motivational

process rather than assuming that all influences between stimuli and behavior were simple and

direct. It was in this context that Brehm and Cohen (1962), both in the Yale Attitude Change

Program at the time, carried out an extensive program of research on persuasion, largely based

on dissonance theory, but with some attention to special cases of resistance to social influence.

After [Brehm] … became more interested in the occurrence of resistance to social influence,

and that interest eventuated in the formulation of reactance theory.

Assumptions

The theory of psychological reactance attempts to explain people’s reactions to a perceived or actual threat to loss of their freedom(s). The concept of freedom is defined “as a belief that one can engage in a particular behavior” (Brehm & Brehm, 1981, p. 35). Brehm (1966, p. 9) defines “psychological reactance as a motivational state directed toward the

1

Toward Freedom: Reactance Theory Revisited

Derek Chadee

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14 Derek Chadee

reestablishment of the free behaviors which have been eliminated or threatened with elimination.” The theory makes no assumption about psychological reactance being aroused to acquire a freedom but refers solely to reinstating a threatened or eliminated freedom (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Psychological reactance, therefore, arouses an individual and motivates toward restoration of freedom. As Miron and Brehm (2006) point out, reac-tance is not a proactive force but is reactive to actual or perceived threats toward freedoms.

The theory makes a number of assumptions about human behavior. Brehm (1966, p. 1) notes the following about human behavior: First, freedom of behavior is pervasive. Second, it is an important aspect of human interaction and living. Third, human beings are goal-oriented and incessantly reflect on themselves and the external environment in assessing what, how, and when they will undertake particular behaviors. He states: “They consider their wants and needs, the dangers and benefits available in their surroundings, and the ways in which they can accomplish various ends” (1966, p. 1). Many times people undertake behaviors when they are not fully aware of the rationale that drives the behaviors. At other times behaviors are performed while they are fully aware of constraints and lack of freedom in the performance of the behaviors. As a fourth assumption, however, Brehm assumes that most of the time human beings feel relatively free to participate in a range of behaviors. Fifth, the theory assumes that people have a set of behaviors to engage in. These behaviors have been engaged in in the past, are engaged in in the present, and will be engaged in in the future. He refers to these behaviors as the individual’s “free behaviors” and identifies a number of criteria to define a behavior as a free behavior. These include the behaviors being practically achievable, the individual having the physical and psychological capacity to engage in these behaviors, and individuals also being fully cognizant that they can partici-pate in these behaviors. Such awareness of engagement emerges from social norms, cus-toms, legislations, and other kinds of formal agreement and informal interaction. Worchel (2004) elaborates on how particular actions over time are perceived as free behavior. For reactance to occur an individual must believe in the possession (perceived or actual) of a freedom (Miron & Brehm, 2006). A threat to this freedom creates the arousal – reactance.

Threat

A threat emerges from any power or force that attempts to reduce or eliminate the expres-sion of a specific freedom (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Threats can be explicit or implicit (i.e., subtle by implication). Brehm and Brehm (1981) describe threats to freedom as either external or internal. Internal threats arise out of choices and decisions we make from alter-natives, accepting and rejecting among options. On the other hand, external threats have two dimensions – impersonal versus personal and social versus nonsocial. Impersonal threats are not easily perceived, unlike personal threats in which motives and intentions of threats can be identified by the individual and have implications for perception of future threats. Specifically, personal threats will carry greater implications for future threats from the same source because of possible future interaction. Impersonal threats, however, create less reactance arousal, since they are not directly focused at the individual, and therefore no implications for future threats. However, the term personal, as Brehm and Brehm (1981)

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