Chancellorsville and Gettysburg

Lesson 10

Chancellorsville• Hooker replaced Burnside after Fredericksburg• “You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds,

does good rather than harm; but I think that during General Burnside’s command of the Army you have taken counsel with your ambition, and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country…. I have heard, in such way as to believe t, of your recently saying that both the Army and the Government needed a Dictator. Of course it was not this, but in spite of it, that I have given you command. Only those generals who gain success can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship…”– Abraham Lincoln

Chancellorsville

• Hooker had about 110,000 troops and Lee had just 59,500

• Hooker planned to envelop Lee with Sedgwick fixing Lee across the Rappahannock from Fredericksburg and Hooker moving southeast from Chancellorsville to crush him

Chancellorsville

• Lee discovered Hooker’s plan, concluded Hooker’s divided army presented an opportunity, and planned his own envelopment

• “[Lee’s] very name might be Audacity!”– Colonel Joseph

Ives

Chancellorsville

• As Lee began to attack, Hooker lost his nerve and ordered a withdrawal

• Hooker’s generals couldn’t believe it– “Nobody but a crazy man

would give such an order when we have victory in sight! I shall go and see General Hooker myself, and if I find out that you have spoken falsely, you shall be shot on my return.”

• General Henry Slocum to the messenger who delivered him Hooker’s order

Chancellorsville

• In the Civil War, the cavalry served an important intelligence-gathering function, acting as the commanders “eyes and ears”

• Especially at the beginning of the war, the Confederacy enjoyed a marked advantage in cavalry– Jeb Stuart in particular provided valuable and timely

reconnaissance for Lee. – Stuart had a great knack for interpreting what he saw on

his rides and providing Lee with a perceptive intelligence summation.

– The Federal Army had no counterpart equivalent to Stuart, and Federal commanders had great difficulty in determining the location and strength of Confederate forces.

Chancellorsville

• Hooker had ill-advisedly dispatched his cavalry on a raid against Lee’s communications– Hooker therefore had no good

intelligence about Lee

• On the other hand, Stuart had brought Lee information that Hooker’s flank was “in the air”

Chancellorsville

• Lee planned an envelopment

• Kept 14,000 men to attack Hooker’s front and sent Jackson with 28,000 to attack Hooker’s flank

Chancellorsville

• Jackson crashed into the exposed Federal right flank – “…. every sort of

organization that lay in the path of the mad current of panic stricken men, had to give way and be broken into fragments.”

• Major General Oliver Howard, commander XI Corps

Chancellorsville

• Brilliant Confederate victory– But at the cost of

Jackson who was mistakenly shot by his own men while on reconnaissance

– Jackson “has lost his left arm; but I have lost my right arm.”

• Lee on learning of Jackson’s wound

Chancellorsville: Leadership

• Why did Hooker fail?– Shell shocked?– Coward?– Drunk?– Not drunk?– Nervous breakdown?– Out-generalled?– Unintelligent?– Afraid of Lee?

Chancellorsville: Leadership

• “For once I lost confidence in Hooker, and that is all there was to it.”– Hooker explaining his performance at

Chancellorsville

• …. but, if superior leadership won Chancellorsville for the Confederates, the loss of Jackson would present profound future leadership challenges for Lee

Confederate Command

• As Lee prepared his second invasion of the North, he possessed several command challenges

• With Jackson, Lee had grown accustomed to issuing broad orders and having Jackson respond in an aggressive, semi-independent fashion

• Jackson’s death required Lee to reorganize– Created three corps (Longstreet, Ewell, and A. P. Hill)– Ewell and Hill were new to corps command and Lee did

not have the relationship with them he had with Jackson

Confederate Command

• Furthermore, Longstreet, Lee’s only veteran corps commander, had misgivings about Lee’s offensive designs

• Instead, Longstreet felt that once the Army of Northern Virginia crossed into northern territory, the Federals would be compelled to attack.

• If the Confederates could select a good defensive position from which to receive this attack, they might gain another inexpensive victory like at Fredericksburg.

Confederate Command

• Lee will fail to adjust his leadership style to meet the needs of his new subordinates– “If I [would have]

had Stonewall Jackson at Gettysburg, I would have won that fight.”

Gettysburg• Confederacy had to choose between Eastern

and Western theaters– Grant closing in on Vicksburg in the West

• Davis, Longstreet, Johnston, Beuaregard, and others all leaned toward a western priority

• However, based on Lee’s tremendous prestige, his argument for the Eastern theater was accepted– Relieve pressure on Virginia– Gain a victory on Northern soil

• Possibility of foreign recognition and a negotiated peace

– Take Union attention of off Vicksburg

Gettysburg

• On June 27, 1863, George Meade was ordered to take command of the Army of the Potomac after Lee had already advanced into northern territory and the Union Army had pursued into Frederick, Maryland. – Meade said the order was

“totally unexpected” and confessed “ignorance of the exact condition of the troops and position of the enemy”

• Meade assumed command under extremely difficult circumstances and would resolve to play it safe.

Gettysburg, Day 1• Stuart was off riding around Federal army

– Deprived Lee of his eyes• Lee “had become dependent upon [Stuart] for

information on the enemy’s position and plans, and in Stuart’s absence, he had no satisfactory form of military intelligence… The injudicious employment of the Confederate horse during the Gettysburg campaign was responsible for most of the other mistakes on the Southern side.” – (Freeman, R. E. Lee vol III, 147-148).

Gettysburg, Day 1• Battle began July 1 as

forces met northwest of town– Both sides committed

reinforcements– Confederate forces

were closer and gained upper hand

– Day ended with Confederates driving Federals south of town and Federals defending from Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill in a fish hook configuration

Gettysburg, Day 1

• Lee’s orders– Told Ewell to

capture Cemetery Hill “if practicable”, but didn’t insist on it

– Ewell decided not to– Federals able to

keep Cemetery Hill and use it as the foundation for their defensive line

Gettysburg, Day 2

• Longstreet recommended the Confederates move south and east across Meade’s line of communications, find a strong defensive position, and force Meade into a costly attack.

• Longstreet was surprised when Lee insisted upon attacking instead and later wrote that he told Lee, “We could not call the enemy to position better suited to our plans. All that we have to do is to file around his left and secure good ground between him and his capital.”

Gettysburg, Day 2

• In spite of his misgivings, Longstreet’s corps was to conduct main attack on 2 July against Federal left.

• Attack began late at 4:30 and without recon.

– Consisted of massed artillery followed by massed infantry.

– Severe fighting on Little Round Top saved the day for the Federals.

Little Round Top and OAKOC

OAKOC

• Obstacles

• Avenues of Approach

• Key Terrain

• Observation and Fields of Fire

• Cover and Concealment

General G. K. Warren

• Warren surveyed the scene from the top of Little Round Top to the east and noted its criticality.

• Finding no Federal troops on Little Round Top he dispatched aides to find troops to defend the hill.

• Meade’s Chief of Engineers

• “Endowed with an excellent feel for ground.”– Clark, Gettysburg:

The Confederate High Tide, p. 77

Obstacles• “From the orchard, another ridge ran off to the southeast,

terminating about 1,100 yards in a fantastic jumble of huge granite boulders called Devil’s Den. Between Devil’s Den and Little Round Top, 500 yards to the east, was a marshy, rock-strewn swale that would soon be known as the valley of death; through it flowed a little stream named Plum Run.”

• Clark, p.76“This was miserable ground

(The valley between Devil’s

Den and Round Tops) for a

fight, the rocks and gullies

breaking up formation so

that there seemed to be no

connecting lines of any

kind.”

• Catton p.291

Avenues of Approach

“An even fold of high land ran off southeast from the Peach

Orchard in the direction of the Round Tops. This ground was

rugged, with little hills and ravines and woods and rocky ledges,

and if the Rebels got in there they would be squarely on the Federal

left flank and it might be extremely hard to dislodge them.”

-- Catton, P.286

Key Terrain• “ The citadel of the field”

• James Longstreet• “With this little mountain in the Confederate’s possession, the

whole position would be untenable.”• PVT Theodore Garrish

• “With half an hour I could convert Little Round Top into Gibraltar that I could hold against ten times the number of men that I had.”

• COL William Oates• “If the Rebels ever got Little Round Top the whole of

Cemetery Ridge would have to be abandoned and the battle would be lost once and for all.”

• Catton, p.291

Observation/Fields of Fire• “In plain view of the Union signal station on Little Round Top, some of (Lee’s) forces were compelled to make a wide detour.. to avoid observation.”

• Storrick, The Battle of Gettysburg, P.26• “In front of and to the left, open fields stretched away…”

• Photographic Sketchbook of the Civil War, Gardner, Plate 38

• “A portion of Gettysburg…, located in front of Little Round Top, is known as the Slaughter Pen. Upon the conclusion of that engagement, the ground was found in many places to be almost covered with the dead and the wounded.”

• Gardner, Plate 44• “If Little Round Top were lost, the Union line on Cemetery Hill would be exposed to a deadly enfilading fire.”

• Catton, AH Picture History, P.335

Observation/Fields of Fire

• Little Round Top had been recently cleared of timber

• Therefore it had better observation and fields of fire than the more heavily wooded but taller Big Round Top

Cover and Concealment• “Very craggy and full of boulders”

• Catton, P. 285

• “Breastworks of stone and timber…instantaneously thrown up ….each change in the lines…was marked by defenses of stones, our troops never neglecting thus to protect themselves.”

• Gardner Plate 38

Gettysburg, Day 3

• Longstreet opposed renewing the attack and again urged a turning movement

– Lee ordered an attack nonetheless

• Result was “Pickett’s Charge”

– Inelegant massed artillery and massed infantry frontal assault

– Confirmed the lethality of the defense and weakness of the tactical offense

– “Highwater mark of the Confederacy”

Frontal attack

• The frontal attack is frequently the most costly form of maneuver, since it exposes the majority of the attackers to the concentrated fires of the defenders.

• As the most direct form of maneuver, however, the frontal attack is useful for overwhelming light defenses, covering forces, or disorganized enemy resistance.

• Commanders may direct a frontal attack as a shaping operation and another form of maneuver as the decisive operation.

Gettysburg

• Lincoln urged Meade to follow up on his victory– “The opportunity to attack

[Lee’s] divided forces should not be lost. The President is urgent and anxious that your army should move against [Lee] by forced marches.”

• Meade made a halfhearted show of pursuing, but Lee withdrew back to Virginia

Meade and his staff. Gouverneur Warren and Henry Hunt would staunchly defend Meade’s decision not to aggressively pursue Lee.

Gettysburg

• “Meade was on the road with his troops, an infinitely weary man with dust on his uniform and his gray beard, feeling responsibility as a paralyzing weight. He had been one of the few men who could have lost the war irretrievably in one day, and he had managed to avoid the mistakes that would have lost it. He would continue to avoid mistakes, even if he had to miss opportunity… Meade could see all the things that might go wrong…” – Bruce Catton

Union dead at Gettysburg

Gettysburg

• Lincoln believed Meade had failed– “I do not believe you appreciate

the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee’s escape. He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. As it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely.”

• On Nov 19, Lincoln went to Gettysburg to dedicate a portion of the battlefield as a cemetery and delivered the “Gettysburg Address”

Gettysburg Results

• Army of Northern Virginia lost 20,000 (1/3 of strength)

– Lee’s offensive capability blunted for rest of war

“It’s All My Fault” by Mort Kunstler

Next

• Grant’s Grand Strategy