charles i and the confederation of kilkenny, 1643-9

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Charles I and the Confederation of Kilkenny, 1643-9Author(s): John LoweSource: Irish Historical Studies, Vol. 14, No. 53 (Mar., 1964), pp. 1-19Published by: Irish Historical Studies Publications LtdStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30006355 .

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IRISH HISTORICAL STUDIES

VOL. XIV No. 53 MARCH 1964

Charles i and the confederation

of Kilkenny, i643-9 The negotiations between Charles I and the Confederation of

Kilkenny' endured, except for brief intervals, from the signing of a truce on 15 September 1643 until two weeks before the

king's death (30 January I649), when, too late, they culminated in a treaty. On the royalist side they were officially directed by the

marquis of Ormond, but in practice a number of agents were active at various times on the king's behalf. Of essentially secondary interest to Charles, the negotiations absorbed much of the time and

energy of the confederation and undoubtedly contributed to its eventual downfall.

I

What were the respective objects of the two sides? From first to last Charles I treated with the confederates only because he wished to make strategic use of Ireland and its resources. Indeed, after he had failed to crush the parliamentary armies in the field his chief hope of salvation lay in the large-scale intervention of an Irish catholic army. If he could have dispensed with their help and continued to treat them as rebels, he would have done so.

1The use of this term and its derivative 'the confederates' is now so well established that there is no point in trying to avoid it. Nevertheless, as Professor J. C. Beckett has pointed out, it was not contemporary usage but a title coined as late as the nineteenth century. The article in which Professor Beckett made this observation is by far the most original and penetrating study of the nature, aims and problems of the confederation that has yet been published, and I am greatly indebted to it. See J. C. Beckett, 'The confederation of Kilkenny reviewed' in M. Roberts (ed.), Historical Studies, ii (1959), PP. 29-41.

B



2 CHARLES I AND THE CONFEDERATION

The attitude of the confederates was quite different, however, for though often dilatory and obtuse they were genuinely concerned to reconcile themselves with the crown and regarded the negotiations as of primary importance. Thus they never ceased to protest their loyalty, insisted that they had been compelled to take to arms by the repressive policy of the lords justices, and claimed that far from challenging the king's sovereignty they had been seeking to defend it from the attacks of the puritan opposition. At the same time, they were determined to preserve the gains afforded by the 'rebellion' and so offered aid to Charles on carefully prescribed conditions. In essence these were so designed as to secure a large measure of political independence, permanent tenure of their lands, safeguards against reprisals, and a guarantee that the whole settlement would be so enshrined in law as to obviate the danger of treachery. What they required above all was an independent parliament so that they could deal with the crown on the same terms as the English parliament. As for their religion, they initially desired the repeal of the penal laws and the right of catholics to share state offices, but later on, in June 1645, as the result of a momentous debate in the general assembly, they further insisted that the clergy should be allowed to keep the ecclesiastical buildings and lands re-possessed since October

i641. Though both sides were anxious to come to terms, it turned out

to be extremely difficult to arrange a satisfactory compromise. The main stumbling-block was that Charles considered the confederate terms to be excessive. Not only were they calculated to weaken the position of the established church in Ireland, but they would also entail a derogation of his own sovereignty. In other words, Charles found that he was being asked to yield to the Irish catholics power which he had refused to the opposition in England. There was no

escape from this dilemma but to make promises that he might be unable to honour. With his views on divine right, Charles I was quite capable of this sort of duplicity.2 Unfortunately, the confederates refused to be fobbed off with expressions of his good intentions and sought convincing proof of his sincerity.

Charles's problem was aggravated by the hatred felt for the Irish catholics by the mass of his supporters. Even his principal advisers were reluctant to recommend a treaty in case their reputations

2 See, for example, his letter to Prince Rupert, dated 3 Aug. 1645 (T. Carte, Life of James, duke of Ormonde, i851, vi. 311-12).



OF KILKENNY, 1643-9 3 should suffer for it. This became only too clear during the Oxford conference (April-May 1644), when, as George Digby wittily reported to Ormond :

every body that is faithfule to the kinge's interests apprehendes the necessitye of a peace, both for the preservation of the protestants in Ireland, and the support of our affayres heere; but every body alsoe is seekinge, as the ape did, to pull the chesnutt out of the fire with the puppye's foote, and to cast of[f] the councell of graunting the Irish any thinge at all to his neighbour.3

The Irish royalists were singularly hostile. Despite their military weakness the great majority of them4 took the view that no concessions whatsoever should be made to the 'rebels '. It was not

simply that they had been incensed by the alleged massacres of their co-religionists in i64x but that they could not bear the thought of equal treatment being given to Irish catholics. Since the later

years of Elizabeth they and their ancestors had enjoyed a privileged economic position which they were grimly resolved to maintain. In addition, many of them, including a large number of churchmen, had been forced to flee from their properties and were afraid that these would be lost forever by the terms of any treaty likely to be

arranged. What is more, it was only natural that they should become

progressively less enthusiastic in the king's cause in proportion as the star of parliament rose in England. By 1646 there could have been few royalists left in Ireland who were not preparing to make their

peace with parliament. It is only fair to add that those protestants living in the northern part of the country who wished to remain

loyal to Charles had always to face a particularly cruel decision, since the royalist army based on Leinster could not assist them, and

they could not maintain themselves without the support of the Scots. As if the intransigence of the faithful were not a sufficient

handicap, Charles and Ormond had also to deal with the subversive activities of a group of crypto-parliamentarians. Some of these men were puritans by conviction and all of them evidently approved of the repressive plans for the Irish catholics that had been adopted by the English parliament. Their influence was notably strong until

July 1643, when Sir William Parsons, who had previously been removed from the office of lord justice, was expelled from the council

S Ibid., vi. 1x 9. 4 Not all; see R.I.A., box 29, tract 14, vol. 34-




along with Loftus, Meredith and Temple. Even after the expulsion of this quartet it would seem that the council was lukewarm about arranging a treaty. More evidence is required before judgment can be passed on the attitude of individual members. It is clear, however, from Ormond's correspondence that at all times a dissident element in Dublin formed a dangerous opposition, even within the Irish parliament. Four of the principals were selected to attend the Oxford conference for the express purpose of preventing an agreement between Charles and the confederate delegation.5

Charles was fully aware of the intense anti-Irish feeling among his followers. At an early stage he recognised that a public treaty with the confederates might provoke a general exodus to the parliamentarian camp, particularly on the part of royalists in Ireland. This knowledge may well have induced him to make a secret approach to the confederates, using the earl of Glamorgan as his intermediary.

The terms that Charles found so exorbitant were the minimum the confederates could have been expected to propose in view of their relatively strong bargaining position. Indeed, in the eyes of most of them they were far from satisfactory. Lack of unity on this as on so many points was the chief weakness of the confederation. The antagonism between the old English on the one hand and the old Irish and the church on the other may have been exaggerated in the past by historians, but there is no doubt that there was a cleavage of interests that steadily widened." The differences between the two sections were fundamental, based as they were on economic, social, and religious grounds, and their influence on the progress of the negotiations with Charles was such that they must be regarded as a major factor.

The old English, particularly those inhabiting the Pale, formed a comparatively homogeneous group, a fact that helped to explain their early ascendancy. By 1641 they had profited sufficiently from the king's weakness to have recovered much of their old prestige, and had been happy to collaborate with the protestants in the Irish

5 A full account of their activities was published in a contemporary tract (R.I.A., box 37, tract 12, vol. 41).

6 In general, we need to know more than we do about the back- ground and aims of the personnel at Kilkenny and about the views of the population at large in the country. A great deal of invaluable information is contained in the unpublished thesis of Rev. Donal F. Cregan, 'The Confederation of Kilkenny: its organisation, personnel and history' (National University of Ireland, i947)-



OF KILKENNY, 1643-9 5

parliament in striving to exact further concessions from him. Con- sequently, far from supporting the revolt, a good many of them had offered to assist the government in suppressing it. Only when convinced that the lords justices intended to make reprisals against themselves as well as against the Ulster Irish had they reluctantly taken to arms. Even then, they never accepted for a moment that they were in a state of rebellion against their lawful sovereign, but, on the contrary, promised their aid to Charles in his struggle with parliament.

Nevertheless, having burnt their boats, the old English were prepared to use the king's difficulties as a way of obtaining political control of the kingdom and redress of their particular grievances. Their general purpose was to recover the influence and privileges which had been enjoyed by their ancestors before the Tudors began the process of disciplining Ireland and planting colonies. More especially, they wished to see an end to the court of wards and liveries' and the humiliating system that enabled upstarts from England to garner rank, wealth and favour at their expense. The following typical comment conveyed a wealth of resentment: 'the earl of Corke reputed worth £20,000 a year in 1641, tho' not worth £I oo when he went to Ireland '.'

It was no part of the design of the old English, however, to angle for a settlement that would confer equal power on the church and the old Irish; their own interests always came first. Thus, while sincerely devoted to the catholic religion and adamant that the penal laws should formally be abrogated, they were opposed to the church being restored as an independent institution exercising authority in its own right. As they insinuated in a welcoming letter to Rinuccini, they expected him to confine his attentions to religious matters and not to meddle in temporal affairs." This attitude towards the church was at least partly based on concern for their property. Such prominent figures as Bellings, Bagnall and Fennel had come by church lands within recent times and were afraid of having to surrender them, despite the pope's assurance that they were secure.

7 The operations of the court of wards and liveries and their effect on the temper of the old English are described in H. F. Kearney, 'The court of wards and liveries in Ireland, 1622-41 ', in R.I.A. Proc., Ivii, sect. C, no. 2, pp. 29-68. ' The war and rebellion in Ireland began in 1641 (N.L.I., MS 345, Carte's Abstract, p. 675)-

9 Comment Rinucc., i. 728-32.




This fear may have lain behind their increased anxiety to reach agreement after the appointment of a papal nuncio had been announced.'" In their attitude towards the old Irish, disdain was mingled with fear. Social contempt conditioned the feelings of many of the old English towards their less well-bred countrymen. The following observation was made about the old Irish clergy: 'These clergy were poor creatures, few of extraction of gentlemen and coming to the possession of wealth . . . forgot their former condition of nullity. They presently took upon themselves to be councillors in state affairs, none more saucily impudent and abusive than those upstarts '." Never could the old English ignore the possibility that the old Irish might dominate them by sheer weight of numbers, destroy them as a social caste, and deprive them of their lands, which some people with a sense of history claimed had been illegally acquired in the thirteenth century.

By the end of the Oxford conference in May 1644 the leaders of the old English were already prepared to accept the king's terms

provided they had his word for further concessions at a more

auspicious time. And the terms finally agreed with Ormond in March

I646 met more or less all their demands.12 However, though various factors, which are examined below, also hindered them, it was

primarily their inability to turn aside the opposition of the church before it could become too strong which prevented them from

consummating their policy. As for the old Irish, although they no more thought of renouncing

the crown than did the old English, their demands upon it were

necessarily greater since it was upon them that the chief effects of Tudor and Stuart policy had fallen. Yet they who had started the rebellion soon found they were likely to profit least from it. Their

grievances were scarcely mentioned in the long and detailed list of demands presented to the king,1" and it quickly became apparent that the old English were not so much concerned to undo the effects

10 Rinuccini himself stated that they had circulated the rumour that he had come to Ireland for the purpose of restoring Ireland to the Holy See (A. Hutton, The embassy in Ireland of Monsignor G. B. Rinuccini, trans. of the Nunziatura, ed. G. Aiazzi, p. 134). Though he himself knew this report to be false, it did not occur to him that they might well have believed it to be true.

11 N.L.I., MS 345, Carte's Abstract, pp. 777-8. 12 Gilbert, Ir. confed., v. 286-308. 1, Ibid., iii. 128-33.



OF KILKENNY, 1643-9 7 of past confiscations as to safeguard their own estates against ex- propriation in the future. Rory O'More, who had engineered the revolt, was not given office and vanished from the political scene until 1648. Even more pointedly, Owen Roe O'Neill, the one confederate general with some capacity for leadership and claim to military skill, was cold-shouldered from the time of his return from Flanders. Yet there is scant evidence that the old Irish managed to formulate their demands"4 let alone present a common front, and it is unlikely that they constituted an organised group in the deliberations at Kilkenny. In fact, had the church not given a lead, presumably they would have remained disgruntled and frustrated but nonetheless inert to the bitter end.

The secular priests tended on the whole to be identified with the old Irish, which was not unexpected in view of the fact that most of them were of the same extraction. The hierarchy, on the other hand, was split and it was, of course, their influence that carried weight. The instinct of several bishops together with a large number of regulars was to collaborate with the old English and three

bishops always belonged to that party." However, as Dr H. F.

Kearney has recently established, 'the leaders of the hierarchy ... all represented a point of view which opposed compromise with the

English crown '.' It was for this reason that, when the pope after some hesitation acknowledged the status of the confederation by sending an agent to Kilkenny in June 1643, and when, all too soon, it also became apparent that the old English landowners were more concerned to promote their own interests than to enhance the authority of the church, the majority of the bishops became impatient. Seeing that their initiative had led to the inauguration of the confederation in the first place, it was inevitable that they should take an uncom-

promising stand, and they eventually insisted in June 1645 that no

treaty should be arranged that failed to guarantee them the retention of ecclesiastical property re-possessed since I641 and unrestricted

14 Since most of the records of the general assembly have been lost irrevocably, it is impossible to be categorical on this point. But it would seem that the Ulstermen acted at most as some sort of pressure group. In any case, in so far as opposition to the old English was organised, the clergy provided the binding element.

"5 Rothe of Ossory, Dease of Meath, and Tirry of Cork (died 1646). 'L 'Ecclesiastical politics and the counter-reformation in Ireland,

1618-1648 ', in Journal of Ecclesiastical History, no. x, pp. 202-I2. 44




freedom to exercise their spiritual jurisdiction." The adoption of this resolution had a destructive effect on the negotiations with Ormond, for neither he nor the Irish protestants would ever approve these two demands. It is a curious fact that, although three of the four metropolitans stood out against the second Ormond treaty and although the uncompromising stand of June I645 was taken before Rinuccini's arrival, Rinuccini himself sometimes implied that the hierarchy were not sufficiently militant. For example, according co him the old bishops disliked having to pay for the war and the cost involved in reverting to the use of their full regalia."8 This may have been so. The fact remains, however, that they had voluntarily set aside no less than two-thirds of their revenues for the military budget.

The towns either sided with the clergy all the time or had come to do so by 1646. Certainly, when the decisive split occurred in that year, most of them, if not all, backed the papal nuncio; even Kilkenny adhered to him in the final resort. The mood of the towns was reflected in their harsh treatment of Ulvester King of Arms in

I646."' No doubt they were partly motivated by self-interest, for they appear to have been anxious to preserve the virtual autonomy they had been enjoying since I641; but the work of the counter- reformation had also had its effect. The towns had become strong- holds of the counter-reformation movement.

Numerically, the clergy, the old Irish and the towns must have comprised the overwhelming majority of the total population. Never- theless, open conflict with the old English was avoided until the concluding debates took place over acceptance of the first Ormond peace, that is, until the spring of I646. Up to that point, however aggrieved they may have felt, they tacitly acknowledged the political leadership of the old English. Indeed, but for the advent of the militant papal nuncio, Rinuccini, there would have been nothing to stop the old English from carrying through their policy of recon- ciliation with the crown on their own terms.

Rinuccini was always careful to disparage his own part in organising the resistance to the peace party. Yet, that he alone was

-" Gilbert, Ir. confed., iv. 278-9. '" Comment, Rinucc., ii. 174-5. ' Cf. Roberts' relation of his journey to proclaim the peace,

i Sept. 1646 (Bodleian Library, Carte Papers, xviii. 213). Poor Roberts obtained a medical report of the cuts and contusions inflicted on him at Limerick (ibid., xviii. 186).




responsible for its creation is scarcely open to question. But for his energetic leadership, it is virtually certain that the first Ormond peace would have been enforced. It was he who had summoned congregation to meet at Waterford for the express purpose of denouncing the treaty.20 Not for nothing were his supporters almost instantly designated 'nuncioists' or 'the nuncio's party'.

At the same time, it must be admitted that Rinuccini articulated, as indeed his precursor, Scarampi,21 had tried to do, the doubts and fears of most catholic Irishmen. He felt that Charles I could not be trusted, not necessarily because he was dishonest but because the intransigent protestants would never permit him to fulfil his promises when the day of reckoning came. For this reason, a victory for the royalists, would be only marginally preferable to a victory for parliament; the old English might well make relative gains but the grievances of the church and the old Irish would remain unredressed. It was the probable consequence of Rinuccini's policy, not his sentiments, that failed to appeal to the Irishmen' of the seventeenth century. Only a few extremists were willing to pursue his line of thought to its logical conclusion - that the confederates should seize absolute control of Ireland while they had the opportunity and arm themselves to the teeth so that no matter who won in England they could repel an invasion. When faced with a choice between an Italian bishop and the king of England, catholic Ireland chose the king. This explains why the peace party that had been routed in September I646 was able to make a recovery, and why a majority of bishops and any number of the old Irish, including, significantly, Rory O'More, supported the second Ormond peace in spite of Rinuccini's reproofs. Professor Beckett makes the telling point: 'It is not, of course, surprising that the old English, while defying the censures of the bishops, should insist on their loyalty to the church; but it is easy to overlook the fact that the native Irish, while refusing to come to terms with Ormond, were equally insistent on their loyalty to the king '.22

It has been shown that while hampered by the need to defer to the prejudices of his own supporters Charles I was also dealing with a movement that was itself disunited. Moreover, all his public

20 Cf. Embassy, p. 498. 21 From the first moment of his arrival Scarampi was advocating a strong line in the negotiations with Charles. Cf. Gilbert, Ir. confed., 11. 32 1-7.

22 Historical Studies, ii. 36.



IO CHARLES I AND THE CONFEDERATION

correspondence had to be channelled through the privy council in Dublin, the majority of whose members actively disliked the

negotiations. In face of these conditions he could not have continued to retain hopes of Irish assistance had he not been able to rely on the marquis of Ormond both to hold his supporters together and to negotiate with the confederation. About Ormond's aims and character views differ. The old Irish blamed him for all their woes. In this they have been followed by Professor T. Coonan28 who denigrates Ormond's character and claims that he deliberately tried to wreck the negotiations. Now it may be true that Ormond suffered from defects of temperament that made him unsuitable as a

negotiating agent on behalf of Charles I. Yet, there was no one to take his place and in any case there is no evidence that he actively contrived to sabotage the negotiations. Indeed, since he believed that if the king fell he would fall with him, he had every reason for wishing to see the negotiations succeed.24 What inhibited him was his sincere attachment to the anglican church and corresponding dislike of the catholic church, and his patrician lack of sympathy for the Irish cause.

Besides Ormond, the earl of Clanricarde also played a prominent part in the negotiations. His strength lay in his ability to preserve an appearance of probity and neutrality. There is no question that the existence of one or two go-betweens of his calibre helped to

keep open the channels between Dublin and Kilkenny. The presence in Ireland of the Scots and the many parliament-

arian supporters further bedevilled an already complicated situation.

Though rarely mentioned in the exchanges between Ormond and the confederation their activities tended to influence the attitudes of both sides at any given moment. One of the abiding aims of the confederates was to induce Ormond to make common cause

against what they naturally regarded as the common enemy,25 and it was a constant source of grievance that he always refused to declare himself. Such faithful royalists as Clanricarde, Dillon and

28 The Irish catholic confederacy and the puritan revolution (Dublin 1954). 24 See his remarkable letter to his financial agent, Edward Comerford, written on 6 Apr. I644 (Ormonde MSS at Kilkenny, 25 Mar.-I Aug. I644, pp. 13-17).

25 See, for example 'Wee conceive them (the Scots) to be our Common enemyes and doe desyre they should be repelled with our ioynt endeavours' (Bodleian Library, Carte Papers, x. I6I).



OF KILKENNY, I)643-9 II

Taaffe also strongly advocated that the Scots should be declared enemies of the crown and attacked by Ormond.28 Whenever the Scots threatened to move south, the confederates invariably con- ducted their side of the negotiations with a heightened sense of urgency." It is particularly important to notice that when Rinuccini led the opposition at Kilkenny to adopt what seemed to Ormond an extreme position, the parliamentarians became the key factor in the negotiations. Ormond threatened to surrender to them as a means of bringing the confederates to heel and it then became a question of whether or not Rinuccini would call his bluff.

II

The first fact to be noted with regard to the actual conduct of the negotiations is that they were rarely informed by a sense of urgency. Even so, progress of a sort was being made all the time. As each series ended, it could be assumed that some of the points at issue had been settled once for all. The king, in particular, steadily made concessions as his strength declined. However, even if there had not been fundamental incompatibility between the two parties, the negotiations would still have dragged on for two important reasons: communications were bad; the policy-making machinery of both sides was pathetically inefficient.

In Ireland itself communications were reasonably good. Messages between Dublin and Kilkenny usually took less than three days and occasionally less than one day, a fact which is easily ascertained by examining the dates of receipt on the letters received by Ormond. Delay was not unusual, however, when, for instance, Ormond was out campaigning or when members of the supreme council were

away on public or private business. Between Oxford and Dublin, on the other hand, delays were countless, and all too often letters miscarried. Perhaps fewer messages went astray than court officials

sought to imply, since they may have found it a convenient excuse when they had neglected to reply promptly to letters received or to send copies of documents that had been requested. George Digby,

26 See their letter to the king, 15 July 1644, in Carte, Ormonde, vi. 159-62.

27 I have attempted elsewhere to discuss the importance of the military factor during this period. See 'Some aspects of the wars in Ireland' in The Irish Sword, iv, no. 15 (1959), pp. 81-7.




for one, seems to have fallen back on this excuse. Nevertheless, for proof of the hazards of the route to and from Ireland both by land and by sea it is sufficient to refer to the quantity of captured documents published by parliament. All the time territory was

changing hands, ports were being lost, and naval activity in the Irish Sea was increasing. A messenger from Ireland had to assume that the king was at Oxford unless given reliable information to the

contrary. Very often he might report to Oxford, however, only to find that the king was elsewhere. A messenger bound for Ireland had a particularly nerve-racking job. Having evaded parliamentary patrols on land, he had to choose a port in royalist hands, rely on finding a friendly ship and then slip through the cordon of parliamentary vessels hovering near the Irish coast and from time to time sealing off Dublin Harbour. In order to slip out of Dublin Harbour it might be necessary to get the captain of a parliamentary vessel drunk.28 It was no wonder that on one occasion Ormond did not receive instructions in reply to a request made in November until the following March.2'

The choice of messengers was also a problem. These were usually men of some standing who, having a personal reason for

crossing to or from England, were given verbal as well as written

messages to convey. Daniel O'Neill frequently acted as an envoy as also did Ormond's personal servant, Will Somers. But one messenger employed by the king was distrusted by Ormond, Sir Bryan O'Neill, cousin to Daniel. When Ormond protested that he was the kind of man to be dealt with only 'at stave's end '," Digby pointed out that he was the king's choice; he personally would have preferred to use Dick Power, a good protestant.8 Ormond's judgment of O'Neill was vindicated in February 1645 when an intercepted letter from O'Neill described him as a knave.32 Digby's only comment was that he had credited O'Neill with more wits if not honesty."33

28 See Ormond to Digby, 7 Nov. I644, in Carte, Ormonde, vi. 214. 29 On 4 Nov. I644 Sir James Ware and two others left Dublin

for England in order to obtain instructions for Ormond from the king. On the return journey they were captured at sea and forced to jettison their despatches. In consequence, Ormond did not receive his answer until March I645.

so 22 July I644, in Carte, Ormonde, vi. 177. 31 Ibid., vi. 193- 32 Ibid., vi. 26o. "3 Ibid., vi. 286.



OF KILKENNY, 1643-9 13 In an attempt to overcome this problem of communications, the

king finally empowered Ormond to use his own discretion,34 but this gesture proved almost worthless. Not only was Ormond temper- amentally incapable of showing much initiative, as has been seen, he also recognised, as indeed had the far more enterprising Strafford, that the authority of any subordinate under an absolute monarch, however irresolute, was strictly limited. Furthermore, though utterly loyal, Ormond was too circumspect to forget Strafford's fate. The importance Ormond attached to receiving clear instructions was revealed on a number of occasions. On 2 November I644, for instance, he wrote to Digby, 'And if his majestie will haue mee to

shape my course soe heere, as may be most for his advantage in England, or least hurtfull to him; it is of necessity that I receiue cleere instruction, else it is ods, but that thorough my ignorance, or by a suddaine change, which may be more probably foreseene there then here, I shall vnwillingly fall into some pernitious error '." In short, for all that he was susceptible to suggestion, only the king could formally initiate policy. This meant that his directives con- cerning Ireland usually lagged in the wake of events.

At least four further reasons may be adduced to explain why the king's policy was unsound in conception and incompetently managed. First, and the root of the trouble, was his own instability. Though obstinate in so many respects, Charles was easily deflected from a straight course. At any given moment his views were as

likely as not those of the person with whom he had last conversed. As Clarendon wrote of his misplaced trust in George Digby: 'The

king himself was the unfittest person alive to be served by such a counsellor, being too easily inclined to sudden enterprises and as

easily amazed when they were entered upon '." In any case, he cared little about Ireland for its own sake and never really came to

grips with its problems. His overriding aim was to extricate himself from the struggle with parliament with as little sovereignty lost as

possible and he regarded Ireland as no more than a strategic pawn. The curious thing is that he had the insight to appreciate that, fully exploited, Irish resources might turn the scales in his favour, yet he was apparently unable to concentrate his efforts upon obtaining them. Instead he picked up the skein of Irish negotiations whenever

84 13 Aug. I644, (ibid., vi. 194). C5 Carte, Ormonde, vi. 209. 3 Rebellion, ed. W. D. Macray, ii. 485.




he felt particularly desperate, issued ad hoc, and frequently vague, instructions to Ormond,37 and then turned his mind to other matters. Thus, at the end of the Oxford conference in May 1644 the confederate commissioners promised to try to persuade their com- patriots to accept the king's terms. It might have been thought that Charles would have ordered Ormond immediately to open discussions in Ireland. On the contrary: as late as July 1644 Ormond was moved to complain that although the commissioners had landed at Waterford more than a fortnight previously he had no notion what had happened and was 'in the darke as to his majestie's pleasure '."

A second reason why the king's policies seldom prospered is to be found in the fact that the royalist intelligence service was defective. As a consequence, court officials were ignorant of what was happening in Ireland. Inconvenient though this was, they made matters worse by giving rein to their incurable optimism. Thus, while over-estimating Ormond's powers of persuasion and the anxiety of the confederates to reach agreement, they under-estimated the bitter opposition of the Irish protestants and, without valid reason, constantly assumed that peace had been declared or was about to be

declared, even that Irish troops were already on the seas for England. On I3 July 1645 Digby reported fancifully to Prince Rupert:

. . . and that the news be true ... that my lord of Glamorgan is landed in Angelsea with a very great body of Irish '." It is not then remarkable that the king's advisers showed themselves such poor statesmen in dealing with Irish affairs.

Thirdly, the struiggle for place and power at court also impaired the king's hopes of Ireland. The letters of Ormond's English corres-

pondents40 frequently contained details of the latest intrigues at

court, of the most recent arrival who was seeking this or that favour

17 Ormond was always finding it necessary to ask for elucidation of his instructions. Daniel O'Neill put a revealing gloss on the situation:' . . . you are to stand or fall by what is good in your one

eyes. This iss not what I knowe you expect or desire; butt lett mee assure you, 'tis all the direction that can bee hoped from the present condition of affaires, or from our cautious counsellors; . . . ' (i3 Aug. I645, Carte, Ormonde, vi. 188).

38 Ibid., vi. 153- " E. Warburton, Memoirs of Prince Rupert and the cavaliers

(London, 1849), iii. 143. 40 Notably Arthur Trevor, Sir George Radcliffe and the archbishop

of York.



OF KILKENNY, 1643-9 15 in Ireland. These manoeuvres need not have had serious consequences if the king had ignored the intriguers and rebuffed the petitioners. But this he could not or would not do. If someone came forward with a private scheme for extracting aid from Ireland, he would agree that it should be tried out without seeming to notice that so many enthusiasts were engaged in the same task that there was bound to be duplication of effort if not utter confusion. Thus, during the period June-July 1645 the earl of Glamorgan, Colonel Oliver Fitzwilliam, Daniel O'Neill and Sir Marmaduke Langdale were all trying independently to obtain military aid. Again, offices and privileges were sometimes granted without reference to Ormond, with results which were not unusually catastrophic. The most fateful of the king's appointments was that of Lord Portland to the lord presidency of Munster in 1644. This office had been sought by Inchiquin and Ormond had urged that he be given it. On hearing he had been overlooked, Inchiquin was so indignant that he went over to parliament taking with him the bulk of his forces and the territory under his control. No wonder that Ormond found his policies obstructed and his personal authority undermined.

Finally, Charles could not count upon the support of his advisers. It is difficult to define the individual views of the privy councillors on Irish policy. At least two, Hyde and Colepepper,1 were frankly hostile to the Confederation. The remainder, with the exception of Digby, do not seem to have held strong views but, as has been seen, they were not prepared to endorse major concessions to the confederates for fear of repercussions on their public reputations.

Of all the king's ministers, George Digby had most to do with Ireland. He was not antipathetic towards catholicism, as were most of the other councillors, and indeed eventually became a convert.

Consequently, he worked hard for an agreement with the confederates. Unfortunately, his lively, fertile mind made him an apt confidant for, and indeed sponsor of, the intrigues that the king found so irresistible. Since he was also unscrupulous, his influence tended to

bring out the worst in the king.

41 See for example, A. Trevor to Ormond, 25 Mar. I644, in Carte, Ormonde, vi. 70: 'Sir Edward and sir John Colepepper are suspected to bee something rigide in the business of the Irish. This from lord primate, who is yett well.' That Hyde was hostile is plain from his particular account of Irish affairs during the civil war period: A short view of the state and condition of the kingdom of Ireland (cf. The history of the rebellion and civil wars in England, edn. 1849, vii.).




On the confederate side the formulation of policy was also a

protracted and cumbersome business. Ultimate sovereignty resided in the general assembly, which consisted mainly of elected

representatives42 and which, when sitting, functioned as an executive as well as a legislative body.43 Nevertheless, although appointed by the general assembly, it was the supreme council which tended in

practice to wield effective power. The council normally had twenty- four members elected on the basis of six for each province." Any twelve councillors were always supposed to be resident in Kilkenny or in a body at some other place if they should find it convenient. A quorum was nine and a minimum of seven votes was required to ratify any resolution. The president was nominated by the

assembly and was also one of the twelve residents; in the event of his death or incapacity the other residents had to elect his successor.

Though not granted plenary powers the supreme council exercised

virtually absolute authority during the frequently long recesses between meetings of the assembly. Moreover, according to Rinuccini, it was given sole power to conduct peace negotiations at an early stage." Even without the superior knowledge and political experience its members gained from continuity in office, it would still have been influential because of the relatively high quality of its members.

Only the coming of the papal nuncio in 1646 changed the situation, for he tried with some success to incite a majority in the assembly to use their latent strength to weaken the council.

42 The peers and commoners sat together after the first assembly. 43 There were nine general assemblies in all, the dates of which

have been worked out as follows by Rev. Dr Donal Cregan ('The Confederation of Kilkenny; its organisation, personnel and history'):

i. 24 October-21 November 1642.

ii. 20 May-18-19 June 1643. iii. 7 November (approx)-I December 1643. iv. 20 July-31 August 1644. v. 15 May (adjourned 5 July: re-assembled 27 August) -

dissolved soon'after 31 August I645. vi. 7 February (approx)-4 March 1646.

vii. Io January-3-4 April 1647. viii. 12 November-24 December 1647.

ix. 4 September I648-17 January I649. 44Castlehaven claimed that he was made an additional member

(J. Touchet, earl of Castlehaven, The earl of Castlehaven's review, or his memoirs of his engagement and carriage in the Irish wars (Dublin, 1815), p. 33).

45 Embassy, p. 128.




However, issues connected with peace and war were always dealt with by the assembly in the first instance; so much so, that most assemblies were apparently summoned for the express purpose of debating whether to start negotiations or to resume negotiations already begun.46 The assembly also claimed the power to appoint the commissioners who were to conduct negotiations, as well as a sub-committee, known as the committee of instructions,47 whose function seems to have been to give the commissioners their original orders and to act as a kind of reserve court to which the commissioners could refer back in case of doubt. In spite of this, it must be

emphasised that, although it was the assembly which resolved to set

negotiations in motion, it could only give the broadest indication of the lines they were to follow. Moreover, while on one occasion at least the commissioners were empowered to make peace under a specific restriction,48 in general they were given plenary powers. Thus, like the supreme council, the commissioners came to have

virtually independent authority. The clergy were represented both in the general assembly as

delegates of their constituencies, so to speak, and the supreme council; in the first council there were two archbishops and three bishops, and of the twelve resident members in I645 no fewer than four were bishops: Armagh, Cashel, Tuam and Clogher.49 In addition, they exerted pressure through the ecclesiastical congregations which came to meet concurrently with the assemblies. Presumably this

practice was at first adopted for sound administrative reasons. Many members of the assembly were also members of congregation and

46 In spite of this, each assembly seems to have fixed the opening date of the next one at the end of each final session. But the agreed opening dates were rarely observed, and in any case they were usually chosen in the light of the anticipated duration of the next phase in the negotiations.

47 'They [the general assembly] appointed others for preparing instructions for those that were to treat, whom they named commissioners of instruction' (Bishop French, Historical works, i. 42).

48 Namely, that '.. . as to the demands made by the lord marquesse of Ormonde, lord lieftenant of Ireland, to the commissioners for the treaty of peace, for the restoring of the churches to the protestant clergy, the commissioners shall give an absolute denyeall, and the committee of instructions are to prepare an instruction to this affect (Resolution of the general assembly, 9 June I645, in Gilbert, Ir. confed., iv. 278-9).

49 Gilbert, Ir. confed., iv. 28o.

0




they were thereby saved one journey. It was obviously convenient, too, that the assembly should be able to test clerical opinion in matters

affecting the church. With the arrival of the papal nuncio, however, congregation became a second estate, its influence rising to a climax in the weeks and months following publication of the first Ormond

peace on 31 July 1646. It must be emphasised that until 1646 the leading members of

the assembly, the council, and the peace commissions, tended to be one and the same and that almost all reflected the views of the old English. The suddenness of the emergency lent itself to this narrow concentration of power, for few men had the acumen and the

necessary worldly experience to take part in government. No wonder that former members of the Irish house of commons and men educated at the inns of court preponderated. During Rinuccini's short-lived sway, there was still obligarchical rule; only the political standpoint had changed.

The homogeneity of the ruling clique at Kilkenny ought to have made for the rapid and untroubled determination of policy. Yet for several reasons it failed to do so. In the first place, the supreme council was too unwieldy for decisive action even allowing for the

high rate of absenteeism that undoubtedly obtained. Indeed, according to Rinuccini, its membership had swollen to forty by I646 through the addition of supernumeraries drawn from among the peace commissioners who had represented the confederation at Dublin and

Oxford.So In the second place, despite their supremacy the old

English were afraid of arousing the sleeping strength of the native Irish and the church. In consequence, they squandered time in

justifying their policies with more or less convincing argument. Time was also lost in voting, for every resolution had to be approved by the required majority, and it would seem that matters trivial and

weighty were given equal attention." Thirdly, the politicians at

Kilkenny were essentially amateurs, given to confusing the excitement of intellectual debate with practical action. So far as can be judged from reports of public debates, from contemporary pamphlets and from the records of their interminable discussions with Ormond,

50 In March I646 the membership of the council was reduced to nine including the secretary. Cf. Comment. Rinucc., ii. I49.

51 Cf. ' . . . it followed that time was lost and affairs of importance were not properly examined by the wearied Council, who had to sit for many hours together, both in the morning and evening' (Embassy, p. 133)-




they admired oratory and dialectics for their own sakes, but this is

perhaps under-estimating the political adroitness of the old English leaders for it is possible that they sometimes deliberately practised delaying tactics. Fourthly, as the supreme councillors and the commissioners of peace obviously had private as well as public interests, they were often widely dispersed. This would not have mattered had the rule stipulating that twelve councillors be always resident in the same place been strictly enforced. As it was, the re-assembling of members frequently wasted precious time. In the fifth place, just as the king was at grips with many problems besides obtaining military aid from Ireland, so the confederation had to deal with other matters than the negotiations with Ormond. For example, in May I644 hours of debate and much spleen were spent on resolving the rival claims of the earls of Antrim and Castlehaven to supreme command of the army. And, lastly, while the commissioners of peace enjoyed plenary powers, these were assumed to be defunct whenever negotiations were formally adjourned. After each adjourn- ment, a new general assembly had to be summoned at the cost of delay.

One factor in the negotiations between Charles I and the confederation that has never been given due prominence calls for special mention: they were not restricted to England and Ireland alone. After taking up residence in France in the autumn of i644 Henrietta Maria made spasmodic efforts to exert both direct and indirect pressure upon both the confederation and Ormond. She also tried on two occasions to arrange a settlement with the papacy in which the interests of the Irish and English catholics were treated as inseparable. The parts played in the negotiations by Urban VIII and Innocent X, whose pontificates coincided with the confederate period, as well as by the governments of France and Spain, were also very important."

JOHN LOWE

52 See my unpublished thesis 'The negotiations between Charles I and the Confederation of Kilkenny, I642-9' (University of London, I960), pp. 367-408 and passim.



charles i and the confederation of kilkenny, 1643-9

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