chinook full report

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REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL | HC 512 Session 2007-2008 | 4 June 2008

Ministry of Defence

Chinook Mk3 Helicopters


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The National Audit Oice scrutinises

public spending on behal o

Parliament. The Comptroller and

Auditor General, Tim Burr, is anOicer o the House o Commons.

He is the head o the National Audit

Oice which employs some 850 sta.

He and the National Audit Oice are

totally independent o Government.

He certiies the accounts o all

Government departments and a wide

range o other public sector bodies;

and he has statutory authority to report

to Parliament on the economy,

eiciency and eectiveness with

which departments and other bodieshave used their resources. Our work

saves the taxpayer millions o pounds

every year: at least 9 or every

1 spent running the Oice.


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LONDON: The Stationery Ofce

7.70

Ordered by theHouse o Commons

to be printed on 2 June 2008

Ministry of Defence

Chinook Mk3 Helicopters

REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL | HC 512 Session 2007-2008 | 4 June 2008


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This report has been prepared under Section 6o the National Audit Act 1983 or presentationto the House o Commons in accordance withSection 9 o the Act.

Tim Burr

Comptroller and Auditor GeneralNational Audit Ofce

30 May 2008

The National Audit Ofcestudy team consisted o:

Dan Jenkins and Stewart Lingard, under thedirection o Tim Banfeld

This report can be ound on the National Audit

Ofce web site at www.nao.org.uk

For urther inormation about theNational Audit Ofce please contact:

National Audit OfcePress Ofce157-197 Buckingham Palace RoadVictoriaLondonSW1W 9SP

Tel: 020 7798 7400

Email: [email protected]

National Audit Ofce 2008


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sUMMAry 4

PArt one

Probles with the original procreent 7

PArt tWo

Developent of soltions 10

PArt tHree

manageent of the Reversion project 14

APPenDices

1 Std ethodolog 18

2 The united States Ar 20Chinoo helicopters

3 Battlefield Helicopters: Coittee of 21Pblic Acconts Conclsions andRecoendations concerning Chinoom3 and Treasr minte response

4 united kingdo militar Airworthiness 23 e principles

Photographs courtesy o Qinetiq Group PLC

CONTENTS


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SummARy

4 CHINOOk mk3 HELICOPTERS

1 The Ministry o Deence (the Department) operates

a leet o 40 Chinook Mk2/2a helicopters, primarily in

support o Army and special operations. In 1995 theDepartment ordered 14 Chinook Mk2a helicopters

rom Boeing o which six were retained as Mk2a and

have lown satisactorily since they were delivered.

The other eight, however, were modiied as Mk3 to meet

a longstanding requirement or dedicated helicopters

or special operations. Those eight Chinook Mk3

helicopters cost some 259 million and the Department

took delivery o them rom Boeing in December 2001.

Although Boeing met its contractual obligations, the

avionics sotware ell short o United Kingdom military

airworthiness standards and the helicopters have not

lown on operations.

2 In 2004, the Committee o Public Accounts

described the original procurement o the Chinook Mk3

Helicopter as one o the worst examples o equipment

procurement that it had seen. This report ollows on

rom the Committees concerns and examines whether

the Department has taken appropriate steps to make the

eight Chinook Mk3s operational. Our methodology is set

out at Appendix 1.


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SummARy

5CHINOOk mk3 HELICOPTERS

The decision making process

3 There was no immediate solution on how the

Chinook Mk3 helicopters could be made operational.

In September 2004 the Department identiied a Fix

to Field project as the best value or money solution.This project involved replacing or modiying the cockpit

display and other systems, which would deliver more

capable helicopters or special operations. It would also

reduce shortalls in helicopter lit by reeing up Mk2/2a

helicopters that had been modiied to deliver the special

operations capability in the interim.

4 The Department began a preparation phase or the

Fix to Field solution in September 2004, and the project

was estimated to deliver in-service helicopters in 2008.

In the end it took 30 months or the Department and

Boeing to agree an aordable programme o work.Although the preparation phase was protracted, it did

result in a robust business case with which to take the

project orward. The inal estimate or the in-service date

was 2011-12 with a predicted cost o 215 million.

Change o strategy the generalshortage o helicopters

5 The delay in making these Chinooks airworthy

contributed to the overall shortall in helicopter lit

and meant that the Department had a smaller Chinookleet rom which to provide capability in Aghanistan.

Assuming an appropriate level o pilots and logistic

support, additional Chinook lying hours could have

been used to carry out operations with greater lexibility

including more non-essential military tasks in support o

the international mission in Aghanistan.

6 In July 2006 the Department announced that the

number o troops stationed in Aghanistan would be

increased rom 3,500 to 4,000 and in January 2007 the

number was increased to 7,700. As a matter o urgency,

the Department began to search or ways to increasesigniicantly the levels o helicopter capability available

to commanders in operational theatres, especially in

Aghanistan. The Chinook is the most capable support

helicopter in the adverse hot and high conditions o

Aghanistan. In March 2007 the Department thereore

decided to make the eight Mk3 Chinooks available or

operations as soon as possible. The Fix to Field project

was cancelled in avour o converting (or reverting) the

Mk3 to the Mk2/2a standard. The Department estimated

that the Reversion project would make them available or

operations two years earlier than the Fix to Field project.

In March 2007 the Department also purchased six Merlinhelicopters or use in Iraq.

7 The need or more helicopters in Aghanistan and

elsewhere was recognised and the decision to cancel

the Fix to Field project and revert the Chinook Mk3 was

undertaken quickly. The timescale imperative meant

that the Department undertook limited analysis o the

operational beneits and drawbacks, and the costs andrisks o this decision. However, detailed Business Cases

were subsequently prepared and approved in accordance

with the Departments regular approvals processes beore

the main contract was signed in December 2007.

8 The Department and Boeing are conident that the

Reversion project can deliver the additional operational

capability by 2009-10. They have, or example, adopted

ast track procurement arrangements and, building on the

earlier investment in the Fix to Field project, developed

a saety management plan, agreed by Boeing, which is

expected to deliver an airworthy helicopter. In March 2007,the cost o Reversion was estimated at 53 million.

The Department acknowledged at that time that the

estimate was immature and had been produced quickly.

By the time the Department had developed a mature

estimate in November 2007, the cost estimate had

risen to 90.1 million (an increase o 70 per cent).

This excludes 22.5 million o speciic equipment

required or Aghanistan unded by the Treasury rom

the Contingency Reserve.

9 Since 2002, the Department has met the needs or

demanding very low light special operations by usingChinook Mk2/2a helicopters modiied with a Night

Enhancement Package. The ergonomics o the modiied

cockpit are imperect and, while the Department is

content that the modiied Chinook Mk2/2a helicopters are

sae to ly, it accepts that there are saety and operating

risks associated with the Night Enhancement Package.

The Department has partially mitigated these risks. As part

o the latest equipment planning round the Department has

earmarked unding to introduce an enhanced partial digital

cockpit across the entire Chinook leet to address these

concerns, maintain commonality and increase operational

lexibility. The Department expects the enhanced Chinooks

or special operations to start to enter service early in the

next decade, sooner than under the Fix to Field project.

The ull special operations capability, using the Chinook

Mk3 helicopters at uel tanks, will be met but later

than planned under the Fix to Field project. The costs o

the project are commercially sensitive as negotiations are

on going.


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SummARy


Conclusions

10 Our conclusions on the progress o the project are:

n The Departments progress up to the point o

committing to reversion in March 2007 on the

Chinooks and how they could be made operational

was protracted. As a result the shortage o helicopters

to support operations has been exacerbated.

n Had the Department progressed the Fix to Field

project more quickly the Reversion project would

have been unnecessary.

n The Departments decision to revert the Chinook

Mk3 helicopters will make them available, to meet

the overriding priority or additional helicopter

lit, two years earlier than would have been the

case under the Fix to Field project and will result

in a largely common cockpit across the leet with

consequent improvements in operational lexibility.

The Department expects this will also result in a

lower level o support costs.

n Although the Department has met the needs or

special operations by adapting Chinook Mk2/2a

helicopters the solution has been sub-optional.

n Early in the next decade, to solve the risks

associated with the cockpit ergonomics o the Night

Enhancement Package, the Department plans to

introduce an enhanced partially digital cockpit

across the Chinook leet, which will enable the

prosecution o special operations with greater

lexibility and less operational risk.

n The timescale imperative meant that the March 2007

decision to revert the Chinook Mk3 helicopters,

whilst inormed by a high level consideration o

options, was not based on the level o detailed

analysis that we would usually expect to see or

an investment o this magnitude. The project hassubsequently passed through the Departments

regular approvals process.

n The total costs associated with the Chinook Mk3

helicopters rom their initial procurement through

to completion o the Reversion project will be some

422 million (Figure 1) some 85 million less than

the Fix to Field project. This igure does not however

include urther expenditure required to sustain the

Night Enhancement Package which is currently

being negotiated with industry and is thereore

commercially sensitive.

1 Estiated costs of procring the eight Chinoos,

aing the operational and sstaining thespecial operations capabilit

Source: National Audit Office analysis of Ministry of Defence data

NOTES

1 Estiated costs and In-service date of Fix to Field post capabilit andcost redction exercise and re-bid in 2006-07.

2 Sstainent costs for the Night Enhanceent Pacage arecoerciall confidential ntil a contract is let.

fx fld c rv c( mll)1 ( mll)

Total expenditre on m3s 474.56 389.41

Total expenditre on Night 32.3 32.3 + X2Enhanceent Pacagefor m2/2a

Total expenditre 506.86

Expected In-service Dates 2011-12 2009-10


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PART ONE


1.1 The Chinook helicopter is a highly capable

and versatile support helicopter that can operate in

environments ranging rom cold weather arcticconditions to desert warare operations. Chinook

helicopters are manuactured by The Boeing Company

(Boeing) in the United States and are used in the

United Kingdom primarily in support o Army and special

operations. The Ministry o Deence (the Department)

operates the second largest leet o Chinook helicopters

ater the United States Army with a total o 40 helicopters

(see Appendix 2 or details about the United States

Armys leet). Currently the Chinook is the Departments

most capable support helicopter, able to operate all year

round in the adverse high altitude and hot conditions in

Aghanistan whilst carrying an operationally useul load.Figure 2 provides more inormation about the United

Kingdoms Chinook leet.

Airworthiness issues

1.2 In 1995 the Department ordered 14 Chinook Mk2a

helicopters rom Boeing o which six were retained as

Mk2a and have lown satisactorily since they were

delivered. The other eight, however, were upgraded to

a Mk3 standard. The Mk3 helicopters were itted with

specialist equipment and larger (at) uel tanks to extend

their range (Figure 3 overlea). The at tanks avoid the needto carry uel inside the helicopter thereby allowing more

personnel and equipment to be carried on long range

missions. The Chinook Mk3 helicopters eatured unique

cockpit avionics which, relecting aordability constraints,

were a hybrid o analogue and digital systems.

1.3 The Chinook Mk3 helicopters have not lown on

operations because the Department reused to grant the

helicopters an airworthiness certiicate. Although Boeing

met its contractual obligations the avionics sotware

could not be shown to meet United Kingdom standards.

The helicopters can ly but are restricted to lying on

cloudless days above 500 eet where the pilot cannavigate via landmarks. In 2004, the Committee o Public

Accounts report1 described the procurement o the

Chinook MK3 Helicopter as one o the worst examples o

equipment procurement that it had seen. The Committees

conclusions and recommendations are listed in

Appendix 3. The helicopters cost some 259 million

and had a projected in-service date o January 2002.

The Department took delivery o the helicopters rom

Boeing in December 2001.

Problems with theoriginal procurement

2 ke facts abot the united kingdos Chinoo

helicopter fleet

Source: National Audit Office

n Each Chinoo helicopter can carr p to 55 troops,ten tonnes of cargo or two Land Rovers in the cabin, whilsta variet of additional loads can be carried externall.

n The have seen service in the Fallands, Northern Ireland,kwait, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan.

n The Chinoo m2 and m2a helicopters crrentl haveot-of-service dates of 2015 and 2025 respectivelalthogh the Departent expects to extend these to 2040.

n Chinoos are operated b the Joint Helicopter Coandwhich brings together the battlefield helicopters of the RoalNav, Ar and Roal Air Force. As well as the Chinoo,

the Joint Helicopter Coand operates a frther sevenhelicopter tpes, in total over 250 helicopters.

n The united kingdos fleet of Chinoos are flown b threeRoal Air Force operational sqadrons (No 7, No 18 andNo 27) which are based at RAF Odiha in Hapshire.

n A frther eight Chinoo m3 helicopters were held instorage at the Departents Boscobe Down facilit bt arenow being wored pon as part of the Reversion project.

1 Committee o Public Accounts, Ministry o Deence: Battleield Helicopters, Eighth Report 2004-05 (HC 386).


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PART ONE


1.4 Since their delivery to the United Kingdom in

2001, the Chinook Mk3 helicopters have been kept

in climate controlled, de-humidiied aircrat shelters

at the Departments acility at Boscombe Down.

The helicopters are inspected once a week and moved

out o the shelters every two years or more detailed

inspections to be perormed. These activities have so

ar cost the Department an estimated 560,000.

1.5 By the time the airworthiness issues with the ChinookMk3 helicopters became apparent, emerging legislation

and operational requirements meant that the helicopters

would need to be modiied beore they could be deployed

on operations. In early 2003 the use o light recorders

(Black Boxes) and Health and Usage Monitoring Systems

on all aircrat lying in the United Kingdom was mandated.

As well as being important to understand air accidents,

these monitoring systems are also used to enable analysis

o lying hours, aircrat atigue and maintenance schedules.

The need or improved deensive systems and night vision

capability urther challenged the Department which was

already limited by the unding available to address theairworthiness and modiication issues.

1.6 In order to meet the Departments airworthiness

standards, (Appendix 4), analysis and testing o the

sotware source code or the Mk3 cockpit was required

to reduce the possibility o unoreseen system and saety

problems during light. The Department had ailed

to speciy access to the source code in the original

procurement and thereore had no leverage with which

to negotiate with Boeing or release o the source code.

Boeing and its sub-contractors, or their part, in seeking

to protect their intellectual property rights, resisted theDepartments requests or access to the source code.

Even i it had been able to access the source code, the

Department estimated that it might take up to two years

to analyse the source code with no guarantee that the

code would be written in a way which might make it

comprehensible or analysis purposes.

3 The Chinoo m2/2a and m3 helicopters

Source: Ministry of Defence and Qinetiq Group PLC

chk Mk2/2a chk Mk3

EnhancedEngines

Larger FatFel Tans


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PART ONE


1.7 When aced with similar diiculties accessing

source code to prove airworthiness on other United States

aircrat with digital cockpits, such as the C17 aircrat, the

Department has accepted data and assumptions provided

by United States authorities and lies these aircrat within

the United States Air Force operating limits. In other casesthe Department has sought to overcome airworthiness data

issues by looking at similar systems on other aircrat. At the

time United States Chinooks were not itted with digital

cockpits and the Department investigated whether there

was suicient commonality with the digital cockpit that

Boeing had itted to Chinook helicopters used by the Royal

Netherlands Air Force to enable the preparation o an

appropriate saety case. This turned out not to be the case.

1.8 A 2004 report prepared by experts in the Department

supported these judgements and concluded that the

unique nature o the Mk3 cockpit and the lack o evidenceprovided by Boeing meant that it would have been diicult

to recommend anything other than stringent restrictions on

the operation o the aircrat. The Director o United States

Army Aviation concurred with this view and said that given

the standards operated by the United Kingdom authorities,

the Department took the right course o action in not

granting an airworthiness certiicate to the Mk3 helicopters.

1.9 In 2002 the Department equipped eight o the

Chinook Mk2/2a leet to meet requirements or special

operations. The delay in making the Chinook Mk3

helicopters airworthy contributed to the overall shortallin helicopter lit and meant that the Department had a

smaller Chinook leet to provide capability in Aghanistan.

Assuming an appropriate level o pilots and logistic

support, additional Chinook lying hours could have

been used to carry out operations with greater lexibility

including more non-essential military tasks in support o

the international mission in Aghanistan.


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PART TWO

2.1 This Part examines how the Department developed

a Fix to Field solution to enable the helicopters to ly

on operations; and the Departments eventual change inapproach which involved cancelling the Fix to Field project

and reverting the Mk3 helicopters to the Mk2/2a standard.

Analysis o options

2.2 In 2002 the Department began work on various

options or how it might proceed with the Chinooks.

The analysis considered whether the requirement or

eight Chinooks or special operations was still necessary

and generated a range o ully appraised options which

included assessing the impact o each on both support

helicopters and the special operations capability.In parallel the Department explored the scope to sell the

helicopters but was unable to ind a suitable buyer.

2.3 By February 2004, the Department had analysed

twelve options, o which eight were rejected because they

either did not meet requirements or special operations,

had late in-service dates, or because o poor cost-

eectiveness. In June 2004, the Department decided

to undertake urther analysis o our options which are

summarised in Figure 4.

2.4 In September 2004 the Department decided toexplore urther a Fix to Field solution which involved

the replacement or modiication o the cockpit display

systems, the communications systems and uel quantity

gauging, together with the integration o special

operations equipment and a comprehensive Deensive

Aids Suite. Although this option was the most expensive

(at 149 million) the Department assessed that it oered

the best value or money solution: it would reduce

shortalls in both standard helicopter lit (by reeing up

the eight Mk2/2a helicopters currently used or special

operations) and would meet the requirement or dedicated

special operation helicopters.

2.5 To provide additional assurance, the Department

commissioned ERA Technology, QinetiQ and the Deence

Scientiic Advisory Council to examine the easibility othe Fix to Field option. Each conirmed that the solution

was technically easible, had a sound approach to

airworthiness and would enable the Chinook Mk3 to be

declared an operationally eective helicopter to be used

on special operations.

Development o the Fix to Field project

2.6 In September 2004, the Department began a

preparation phase, initially expected to last eight months,

to ully develop the technical solution, the underpinning

initial saety case and an in-service support plan toestablish a irm price. The Departments expectation was

that the irst helicopters would be available in 2008 and

the total cost o the project, including the price o the

Boeing contract, would be 163 million. In the end it

took 30 months or the Department to agree an aordable

programme o work with Boeing. There were two main

reasons or the delay:

n It took longer than expected to agree on a

programme o work with Boeing. A detailed work

project in which all parties could have conidence

was not agreed by the Department and Boeingssenior management until April 2005. This meant the

preparation phase was extended to July 2006.

n In March 2006 Boeing submitted a proposal which

was 105 million more than the Department

had budgeted or and considered aordable.

In subsequent negotiations the Department, working

closely with Boeing, sought to reduce the price, in

part by trading non-essential elements o capability

whilst maintaining the minimum capability required

to meet the needs o special operations. This process

took until November 2006.

Development o solutions


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PART TWO


2.7 The delays to the preparation phase meant that the

in-service date o the Chinook Mk3 helicopters slipped

to 2011-12 and the total costs, including the price o the

Boeing contract, rose to 215 million. These costs include

the estimated cost o the preparation phase which had

increased rom 13.25 million to 23.5 million.

2.8 Although the preparation phase or the Fix to Field

project was protracted, the resultant project was well

planned, technically mature, and aordable and wasstill assessed by the Department as oering the most

cost eective solution to meet the special operations

requirement. In particular:

n Steps were taken to minimise the technical risks to

the project. For example, Boeing selected Thales

Limited to provide its Top-Deck digital cockpit

which is rom the same amily as the cockpit itted to

the Departments own A400M transport aircrat and

the Nimrod MRA4.

n The Department worked closely with Boeing

and QinetiQ (the independent saety assessor

working or the Department) to ensure that earlier

airworthiness problems would not be repeated.

Boeing personnel were trained in United Kingdom

saety regulations and worked with the Department

to develop a saety management plan. Arrangements

were made so that QinetiQ could provide direct

advice to Boeing on generic saety issues to assist

them in the development o the airworthiness case.In November 2006, QinetiQ reported that the Fix

to Field project would meet saety requirements

and that airworthiness certiication would almost

certainly be given at the end o the project.

n A Gateway review by the Oice o Government

Commerce conducted in December 2006 and a

review (Red Team) led by the United States Army

Director o Army Aviation concluded that the Fix to

Field project was a high quality project which would

succeed in delivering the required capability.

4 In Jne 2004 the Departent decided to exaine for options in detail


op

Do nothing

Do ini

Fix to Field

Sell m3 andrel on Spportand AphibiosBattlefield Rotorcraft

Dal

Rn the existing odified mk2/2a helicoptersto the end of their operational life; asse thatno additional fnding is available to sstain thespecific eqipent. use the mk3 as spares for themk2/2a fleet. Asse that no soltion is availablethrogh the Spport and Aphibios BattlefieldRotorcraft Project1.

Contine to se the odified mk2/2a helicopters,asse that fnding is ade available to sstain thespecific eqipent to its ot of service date. use them3 as spares for the m2/2a fleet.

mini odifications reqired to pgrade the m3helicopter to ensre that it is at least as capable asthe odified m2/2a helicopters.

maintain the odified mk2/2a helicopters ntilthe entr in to service of the ftre Spport andAphibios Battlefield Rotorcraft helicopter,odified for se on special operations. Sell theChinoo m3 helicopters.

c savg mll

21

62

149

62

rul h Dpam aal

Redces effectiveness, b nearl20 per cent.

Onl aintains the crrentcapabilit for a short period of tieand redces the effectiveness b10 per cent when the Spport andAphibios Battlefield Rotorcrafthelicopter reaches its in-service date.

Increases effectiveness b26 per cent and allows the retrnof the 8 m2/2a helicopters to theSpport Helicopter fleet.

Althogh it appears to be cheaperthan Fix to Field it does notinclde the procreent of thehelicopters which wold provide theftre capabilit.

NOTE

1 In 2005 the Spport and Aphibios Battlefield Rotorcraft Prograe was absorbed within the Departents Ftre Rotorcraft Capabilit Prograewhich ais to provide a coherent ftre prograe for all tpes of helicopter.


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PART TWO


Change o strategy

2.9 From mid 2006 the Department began to urgently

search or ways to quickly and signiicantly increase the

levels o helicopter capability available to commanders in

operational theatres. The imperative was made acute bythe increased tempo o war ighting and reconstruction

operations in Aghanistan and by the wider geographical

distribution o United Kingdom orces. The threat rom

road-side bombs also increased and alternatives

were sought to moving troops and materiel by road.

In July 2006 the Department announced that the number

o troops stationed in Aghanistan would be increased

rom 3,500 to 4,000. In January 2007 the number was

urther increased to 7,700.

2.10 In early 2007, in response to the increased troop

levels, the Department examined a range o options(Figure 5) to increase the helicopter capacity available to

support United Kingdom orces in Aghanistan. As a result

in March 2007 the Department decided it was imperative

to make the eight Mk3 Chinook helicopters available or

operations in Aghanistan as soon as possible. The Joint

Helicopter Command judged that it had suicient

aircrew to cover the increase, although it could mean

the guidelines setting out the amount o time Armed

Forces personnel are required to be away rom home on

operational duty (the harmony guidelines) would be

urther stretched.

2.11 The Fix to Field project was thereore cancelled

in avour o a project known as the Chinook Mk3

Reversion to convert the helicopters to a similar

standard as the Mk2/2a Chinook helicopters. Converting

the helicopters involves removing the existing Mk3

hybrid digital/analogue cockpit and replacing it with the

analogue cockpit itted to the Mk2/2a, itting a health

and usage monitoring system, United Kingdom speciic

communications equipment and deensive systems.

2.12 The Department estimated that the Reversion project

would deliver an extra eight Chinook helicopters rom

2009-10 (some two years earlier than Fix to Field)

and with lower technical risk. The Director o United

States Army Aviation agreed with the Departments

assessment that, given the United Kingdom airworthinessrequirements, reversion to the Mk2/2a cockpit standard

would be the quickest way to bring the Mk3 into service.

5 ke options to increase helicopter capacit

in Afghanistan


n B bag chk m h u. The globalshortage of Chinoos eant that, despite strenos effortsb the Departent, none were available either to bor loan. For exaple, the united States Ar told s itwas approxiatel 100 Chinoos short of their overall

reqireent of 489 helicopters.n B mdg xg hlp to enable their se in the

hot and high conditions of Afghanistan. For exaple, newrotor blades have been fitted to Sea king helicopters at acost of 5.25 illion.

n B aqug h p upp hlp. Inmarch 2007 the Departent prchased six merlinhelicopters which had been ordered b the Roal DanishAir Force for 198 illion (of which 48 illion was spenton spare parts and new rotor blades to provide enhancedperforance). The merlin helicopters are ndergoing aconversion project to eet united kingdo reqireentsand are being eqipped with a odern defensive aids

site. The initial operating capabilit was achieved ontie in march 2008, the fll operating capabilit is ontrac for Jl 2008. merlin helicopters have replaced theSea king helicopters in Iraq, which have been redeploedto Afghanistan.

n B alg maa aagm to enable orefling hors to be achieved. The Departent, woringclosel with Boeing and the Defence Aviation RepairAgenc has increased the nber of fling hors achievedb the Chinoo fleet fro 12,000 hors in 2005-06 to13,000 in 2006-07.


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PART TWO


2.13 The decision to cancel the Fix to Field project

and revert the Chinook Mk3 helicopters was undertaken

quickly. The timescales meant that the Department only

undertook limited analysis o the operational beneits

and drawbacks, and the costs and risks o this decision.

In particular, we note that:

n There was recognition within the Department and

more widely that additional helicopter assets were

needed in Aghanistan. The capability o Chinook in

the demanding operational conditions o Aghanistan

was a key actor in consideration o the options to

provide more helicopter assets.

n The timescale imperative meant that the March 2007

decision to revert the Chinook Mk3 helicopters was

not based on the level o detailed analysis that we

would usually expect to see or an investment o

this magnitude. However, detailed BusinessCases were subsequently prepared and approved

by the Departments Investment Approvals

Board in accordance with the normal approvals

processes beore the main contract was signed in

December 2007.

n Boeing was not consulted beore the initial decision

was made about the potential cost o the project or

whether there were any alternatives to Reversion

which could make the Chinook Mk3 helicopters

available or operations earlier.

n In July 2007, the Departments Investment ApprovalBoard, the senior committee o the Ministry o

Deence with responsibility or investment decisions,

approved a business case or the reversion o the

Chinooks as the only viable option to deliver

additional Chinook helicopter capability within the

appropriate timescale. In early August the Chairman

o the IAB noted the Boards disappointment that

the paper submitted had not included a more

robust explanation o the operational imperative or

providing additional Chinook aircrat in the battleield

support role within two to three years.

n At the time the decision was taken, the Department

acknowledged that risks associated with the long

term delivery o special operations capability

remained to be addressed and has since earmarked

unding to introduce an enhanced partial digital

cockpit across the entire Chinook leet to address

these concerns.


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PART THREE

3.1 The Reversion project aims to deliver the eight

Chinook Mk3 helicopters to a standard such that they

can be deployable to Aghanistan in 2009-10. This Partexamines how the Department aims to deliver the

Reversion project to time; the consequences o

the Reversion project or longer term helicopter

capability; and the overall costs o making the Mk3

helicopters operational.

Timetable

3.2 The Department and Boeing are conident that the

Reversion project can deliver the additional operational

capability quickly with one helicopter delivered to

operational commanders by the end o 2009 and the

remainder by May 2010. Their conidence is based upon

the adoption o a ast track timetable, a comprehensive

approach to ensuring airworthiness and commercial

incentives (Figure 6 provides details). The Department is

conident that the project is currently on track to deliver to

time and cost.

Cost o Reversion

3.3 In March 2007, the cost o Reversion was estimated

at 53 million. The Department acknowledged at the

time that the estimate was immature and had been

produced quickly. It had not been agreed with industry

and elements such as risk and theatre-entry equipment

had not been included. By the time the Department had

developed a mature estimate in November 2007, the cost

estimate had risen to 90.1 million, or 112.6 million

including modiications made speciically or operations in

Aghanistan. In December 2007, the Department agreed

with the Treasury that it would be able to re-claim the

cost o modiications rom the contingency reserve or

expenditure on military operations in Iraq and Aghanistan.

Long term consequences

Capability3.4 In order to ly operations in very low light the

modiied Chinook Mk2/2a (paragraph 1.9) were itted

with specialist equipment, called the Night Enhancement

Package, which included items such as navigation units,

thermal imagers, moving map displays and night vision

goggles. The Package was installed in 2002 as a short

term modiication to meet operational requirements in

Aghanistan and used bolt-on equipment that was not

ully integrated into the cockpit in order to accelerate its

entry into service. The cockpit ergonomics are imperect

because some components o the Package are placed in

positions in the cockpit that lead to increased workload on

the aircrew when lying (see Figure 7). Senior sta in the

Joint Helicopter Command also told us that the saety issues

surrounding the Night Enhancement Package were among

its top concerns.

3.5 The modiied Chinook Mk2/2a helicopters were

released to service as sae to ly, by the Assistant Chie

o the Air Sta, on the basis that the saety and operating

risks associated with the ergonomic aspects o the Night

Enhancement Package were outweighed by the increased

operational risk i the Chinook Mk2/2a helicopters were

to operate without the Night Enhancement Package and

could be mitigated by training procedures and time

bounding the risks.

3.6 In originally issuing the clearance or the modiied

Chinook Mk2/2a in 2003, the Assistant Chie o the Air

Sta received assurances that the Department would

develop a unded project in order to mitigate the air saety

risks associated with the Night Enhancement Package.

Management o theReversion project


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PART THREE


6 Wh the Departent and Boeing are confident that the Reversion project can deliver operational capabilit qicl


n The adoption of a parallel approach to design, installationand testing. For exaple, trial installation wor has begn

now that sfficient atre design inforation is available.The Departent estiates that this will deliver the helicopterssix onths earlier than adopting a ore traditionalseqential process.

n Boeing has a strong trac record in the design and deliver ofChinoo helicopters. It is the Design Athorit for the Chinooand provides throgh life sppor t for the united kingdosm2/2a fleet.

n To aintain their engineering resorces and enable the toqicl start p the new project, Boeing has preserved itstea of personnel dring the gap between cancellation of Fixto Field and the start of the Reversion project to enable it tobild on the Fix to Field preparation phase wor. Boeing tolds that the were fll coitted to the Reversion project.

n Boeing has categorised the m3 Reversion project as aprestigios Focs project, sall onl assigned to highonetar projects worth over $500 illion (250 illion).

n Boeing has engaged QinetiQ to condct the trial installationon the first two helicopters and installation of the reainingsix. QinetiQ has been integrall involved with the m3helicopters and has a good nderstanding of the aircraft andassociated safet and airworthiness isses.

n To help develop good woring practices and to bild strongcollaborative relationships, e representatives fro the

Departent, Boeing and QinetiQ have ndertaen jointtraining, notabl on Boeings prograe anageent corse.

n The Departent agreed a 62 illion contract with Boeingto deliver the Chinoos. The contract inclded a tie-basedincentive fee agreeent to encorage earl deliver.The contract rewards Boeing for earl deliver of threeilestones, the final design review, deliver of the firstaircraft and deliver of the seventh aircraft.

n Learning fro its original procreent difficlties, theDepartent has ade it a contractal reqireent thatBoeing satisf the reqireents of the Departents safetanageent plan which incldes the acceptance of safetcritical software. Ris redction activities will also bendertaen earlier in the procreent ccle, inclding designanalsis, to identif and resolve an design safet isses.

n Airworthiness riss are lower becase the helicopters arebeing reverted to a siilar standard to the existing m2/2afleet for which safet inforation is available and theDepartent has appointed a dedicated safet anager.

7 The Chinoo m2/m2a Night Enhanceent Pacage

Source: Ministry of Defence

L had pl kp rgh had pl kp

Pilots NightEnhanceent

PacageDispla

Co-Pilots NightEnhanceent PacageDispla (Obscres theforward view)


18/28

PART THREE


3.7 The cancellation o the Fix to Field project meant

that another way had to be ound to address these risks

and as a result the Assistant Chie o the Air Sta stated, in

March 2007, that without urther unding, the clearance

to continue using the Night Enhancement Package could

not be assured. The Department acknowledged that therisks associated with the Night Enhancement Package

still needed to be addressed and subsequently earmarked

unding and started a project which it is conident will

address these risks earlier than the Fix to Field project.

3.8 This project will introduce an enhanced partial

digital cockpit across the entire Chinook leet to maintain

commonality and operational lexibility. The ull special

operations capability, using the Chinook Mk3 helicopters

at uel tanks, will be met but later than planned under

the Fix to Field project. The costs o the project are

commercially sensitive as negotiations are on going.

Training

3.9 The Chinook Mk3 Reversion project will introduce a

largely common cockpit coniguration across the Chinook

leet, which would not have been achieved under the Fix

to Field project. This will reduce the burden on pilot and

crew training, although speciic training on the use o the

Night Enhancement Package will continue to be required.

The Department is managing a number o issues to ensure

the reverted Chinook Mk3 helicopters are successully

integrated in to the Chinook leet including:

n Increasing the number o aircrew by 40 and

engineers by 60 personnel, and running concurrent

courses or both air and ground instruction, where

previously they had been consecutive. In doing so

there has been no requirement or additional training

sta to deliver the increased output, but it does mean

there will be greater demands placed on them.

n The Department is conident that it should be

possible to qualiy crews to operate Mk2/2a and Mk3

helicopters under a single all Marks qualiication

since the aim o the Mk3 Reversion project is to

mirror as closely as possible the cockpit and controls

o the Mk2/2a, thus producing a common cockpitacross all Chinook helicopter variants and

allowing any appropriately trained pilot to ly

any Chinook helicopter.

n Common training or both the Chinook Mk3 and

Chinook Mk2/2a helicopters which takes into

account the dierent light handling characteristics

due to the larger uel tanks which are inherent to the

design o Chinook Mk3.

n Current training light simulators do not match

the requirements or lying the current Chinook

helicopters. To mitigate this risk, the Department willmodiy the existing Chinook light simulators beore

the end o 2009.

Delivery costs

3.10 Figure 8 shows that the costs associated with the

Chinook Mk3 helicopters rom their initial procurement

through to completion o the Reversion project will

be some 422 million. The costs take into account the

original purchase price o the Chinooks, the procurement

costs or the Night Enhancement Package and thecosts o storing and maintaining the Mk3 helicopters at

Boscombe Down.

3.11 For comparison purposes Figure 8 also includes the

costs o the Fix to Field project. It shows that the total cost

o the Fix to Field project would have been 507 million,

some 85 million more than the Reversion project.

However, the reversion costs do not include urther

expenditure required to sustain the Night Equipment

Package which is currently being negotiated with industry

and are thereore commercially sensitive.


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PART THREE


3.12 Although the Fix to Field project would have

ultimately met the requirement or special operations

missions it would not have met the timescale imperative

to provide more Chinook capacity to operations in

Aghanistan. The Reversion project will provide an

increase in Chinook helicopters two years earlier.

3.13 Cancellation o the Fix to Field project also meant

some inancial losses or industry. Thales Limited, or

example, invested in the development o the Fix to Field

solution in order to shorten the delivery timescales and

incurred a small inancial loss when the project did not

proceed. Boeing lost any proit it may have made through

the preparation phase o the contract.

8 Estiated costs of procring the eight Chinoo m3 helicopters and aing the operational and sstaining the

special operations capabilit


Ma xpdu m

Original procreent

Reversion project, inclding Afghan theatre specific eqipent

Expenditre on Fix to Field before cancellation2

Fix to Field

Storage, inspection and aintenance of eight helicopters at Boscobe Down

tal xpdu Mk3

Night Enhanceent Pacage installed in eight helicopters in 2001

Sstainent and Integration of the Night Enhanceent Pacage for eight helicopters

tal xpdu

Expected In-service Dates

fx fld c

( mll)1

259

215

0.56

474.56

32.3

506.86

2011-12

rv c

( mll)259

112.6

17.25

0.56

389.41

32.3

X3

2009-10

NOTES

1 Estiated costs and In-service date of Fix to Field post capabilit and cost redction exercise and re-bid in 2006-07.

2 The Departent told s that soe of the activities arising fro the preparation phase cold be sed on the Reversion and other projects althogh the extentof this has not been qantified.

3 Costs are coerciall confidential ntil a contract is let.


20/28


Study methodology

1 This Appendix sets out the scope o our examination

o the Chinook Mk3 and the methodologies we used in

the course o our study.

We examined the ollowing areas:

n Whether concerns arising rom earlier reports by the

National Audit Oice2 and the Committee o Public

Accounts3 have been addressed.

n The steps the Department has taken to make the

eight Chinook Mk3 helicopters ully operational

since 2001, including the Fix to Field project and the

Reversion project.

n Whether decisions to make the helicopters

operational have been taken expeditiously and based

on sound advice.

n How the Department has managed shortalls in

special operations capability due to the lack o

availability o the Chinook MK3s.

n The arrangements the Department has in place to

ensure that the helicopters, when delivered under the

Reversion project, will be airworthy or operations,

and that other risks have been minimised.

n The costs o making the Chinooks operational and

how these have been controlled.

We undertook a series o interviews:

2 We carried out a series o interviews with

Departmental sta rom:

n The Departments Deence Equipment and Support

organisation responsible or the management o the

Chinook Mk3 and its associated ielding projects.

n The Directorate o Equipment Capability (Air and

Littoral Manoeuvre) in order to ully understand the

original planning, requirements and procurement othe Chinook Mk3 along with the development o the

subsequent ielding projects.

n Joint Helicopter Command personnel at

Headquarters Land Command in Wilton to gain

an understanding o how the aircrat are used and

how the introduction o the Mk3 may aect the

availability and operational perormance o the

Chinook leets.

n Chinook aircrew rom 7, 18 and 27 Squadron RAF

along with ground crew and station personnel at

RAF Odiham. We gained awareness o the day today challenges associated with the Chinook aircrat

along with the challenges aced by the station

personnel in direct support o the Chinook leet.

We examined Departmental documents:

3 We examined Departmental documents including:

n Post-project appraisals o the original Chinook Mk3

procurement.

n Papers prepared or, and approvals made by, the

Departments Investment Approvals Board.

n Technical and economic appraisals o the Fix to Field

and Reversion projects.

n Airworthiness standards.

n Other relevant inormation such as guidance

and manuals.

APPENDIX ONE

2 National Audit Oice: Ministry of Defence: Battlefield Helicopters, HC 486 Session 2003-2004: 7 April 2004.3 Committee o Public Accounts: Ministry of Defence: Battlefield Helicopters, Eighth Report 2004-05 (HC 386).


21/28


We discussed the Chinook Mk3projects with industrial providersand experts and observed theChinooks at Boscombe Down

4 We interviewed representatives rom industrial

providers:

n Boeing was the main contractor or the original

procurement and the Fix to Field project and is

the main contractor or the Reversion project.

We interviewed representatives o the company

responsible or Chinooks at their Philadelphia actory

in the United States.

n QinetiQ are contracted by the Department to provideindependent advice on airworthiness and saety.

We interviewed representatives at Boscombe Down.

n Thales was to provide the helicopter cockpit or the

Fix to Field project. We interviewed representatives

in London.

5 We observed the Chinook Mk3 helicopters in their

storage acilities at Boscombe Down and interviewed

those responsible or their maintenance and inspection.

We interviewed the United StatesDirector o Army Aviation

n We met with the United States Director o Army

Aviation in the United States in order to provide

greater insight to the use o Chinook helicopters by

the United States Army and Special Forces.

Summary o the stakeholderswithin the Department and otherorganisations which we visited

Deence Equipment and Support

Director General Helicopters

Director Future Rotor Crat Capability

Chinook Integrated Project Team

Chinook Future Heavy Lit Project Team

Ministry o Deence

Directorate Equipment Capability

(Air and Littoral Manoeuvre)

Director General Scrutiny and Analysis

Deence Science Technology Laboratory

Directorate Special Forces

Royal Air Force

Headquarters Joint Helicopter Command

RAF Odiham

IndustryThe Boeing Company

QinetiQ

Thales Limited

United States Army

Director o Army Aviation

APPENDIX ONE


22/28


The United States ArmyChinook helicopters

1 The United States army currently operates our

dierent versions o the Chinook Helicopter.

2 The Chinook D model which is similar to the United

Kingdom Chinook Mk2/2a and the Chinook E model a

Special Forces variant o the D model, similar to the United

Kingdom Chinook Mk3 but with a ully analogue cockpit.

An upgrade project is currently converting the D helicopters

rom analogue to digital cockpits and upgrading the already

digital E model helicopters to the F and G model Chinooks,

which will become the basis or the US Armys leet o

standard and Special Forces helicopters.

3 The United States Army will buy Chinooks orm the

Boeing until approximately 2019, on the current delivery

schedule, to meet their overall requirement o 489 aircrat.The acquisition project involves a combination o

remanuacturing a total o 393 CH-47D and CH-47E

model Chinooks into CH47F and G models with an

additional new buy o 120 CH-47F.

4 The United States operational requirement or

Chinooks in the Aghanistan theatre

n Each o the our Combat Aviation Brigades brings its

CH-47 company o 12 aircrat, however;

n Operation Enduring Freedom requires an additional

1215 Chinook aircrat above that provided by the

Combat Aviation Brigades; this augmentation is

generally supported by a National Guard unit.

APPENDIX TWO

9 The united States Ars crrent and planned fleet

of Chinoo helicopters

Source: United States Army

Aalgu ckp Dgal ckp tal

Reglar Ar 371 x CH 47D 35 x CH 47F 406

160th Special 15 x mH 47E 40 x mH 47G 55OperationsAircraft Regient


23/28


APPENDIX THREE

Battleield Helicopters:Committee o Public

Accounts Conclusionsand Recommendationsconcerning Chinook Mk3and Treasury Minute response

cmm Publ Aulu ad mmda

The Departent has boght eightChinoo m3 helicopters whichhave not entered service andwhich it cannot se.

The Departent was nable tosa who was responsible forthe flawed procreent of theChinoo m3.

tau Mu p

The Departent agrees that there were significant probles with the acqisition of the Chinoo m3helicopter. major changes, nder the Sart Acqisition initiative, have been incorporated into theDepartents woring practices to ensre that these probles wold not occr now. Areas thathave been addressed inclde a ore rigoros prioritisation of the reqireent, clear gidelines onresponsibilities, iproved militar Aircraft Release procedres and a rigoros project review andassrance process. In the Reqireents manageent process essential eleents are identifiedas ke user Reqireents. In particlar, the developent of prioritised, hierarchical reqireentsdocents and a thorogh process to trac these reqireents throgh contracts into a deliveredcapabilit is a e sccess of Sart Acqisition. In parallel, it has also been recognised that thetrading of perforance, cost and tie is necessar to balance the desire to provide everthing thata Cstoer wants against affordabilit in order to ensre best vale for one.

Crrent processes also reqire that significant ris redction activit taes place prior to the aininvestent decision. Perforance, Tie and Cost riss are considered and no coitent is ade

to a project ntil an acceptable level of atrit and ris is attained. ke staeholders in theseprocesses inclde the Integrated Project Tea, Cstoer and Indstr.

The Departent agrees with the Coittees conclsion on appointing a single point ofaccontabilit for projects. All eqipent projects have a noinated individal responsible foroverseeing all aspects of the project to ensre that riss are anaged and that the fll benefitsof the project are achieved. This individal is answerable for the introdction of capabilit intoservice and the coherent and integrated deliver of eqipent; training and personnel; logistics;infrastrctre; concepts; doctrine and other coponents of ilitar capabilit.

For each eqipent and bsiness change project which involves sbstantial change, significantcoplexit and/or deanding integration across bondaries, the Departent has appointed aSenior Responsible Owner with responsibilities and reporting arrangeents set ot in foral tersof reference. For all other eqipent acqisition projects, the appropriate Director of Eqipent

Capabilit has been designated as the single point of accontabilit for ensring the deliver of allcoponents of ilitar capabilit inherent in an eqipent investent decision. The Chinoo m3procreent however, predates the adoption in the Departent of both Senior Responsible Ownerand single point of accontabilit constrcts.

A e part of the Senior Responsible Owner and single point of accontabilit role is to resolveconflicting priorities and deands in order to achieve the reqired benefits against e strategicpriorities and within tie, cost and perforance paraeters. With the increasing coplexit andintegration of eqipent projects, the role of the Senior Responsible Owner and single point ofaccontabilit will be vital in ensring effective deliver of new ilitar capabilit to the front line.


24/28


tau Mu p

The Departent agrees that there have been significant probles with the acqisition of theChinoo m 3 helicopter and options for the ftre of the aircraft are being prsed.

Crrent indications are that odifing the aircraft to provide the reqired capabilit and to eetthe militar Aircraft Release reqireent will offer the best vale for one soltion and addressthe shortfall in battlefield helicopter lift capabilit, as highlighted in the National Adit OfficeReport. The option to sell the aircraft reains open pending satisfactor copletion of this technicaland indstrial preparator wor.

The vale of the Chinoo m3 aircraft has been written down at present to a vale eqivalent todisposal or se as spares, bt this is becase of prdent acconting practice, and is not a reflectionof ftre intent.

cmm Publ Aulu ad mmda

The Departent shold deterinewhether there is an beneficial

se that can be ade of theChinoo m3.

APPENDIX THREE


25/28


APPENDIX FOuR

United KingdomMilitary Airworthiness key principles

1 Airworthiness is essentially a technical attribute o

materiel; it is concerned with airborne saety aspects that

are dependent on the design o a particular aircrat type.The ormal deinition o airworthiness is:

n The ability o an aircrat, or other airborne equipment

or system to operate without signiicant hazard to

aircrew, ground crew passengers or to the general

public over which such airborne systems are lown.

2 Airworthiness characteristics stem rom the design

o a particular aircrat and thereore determine not only

the coniguration o the aircrat, but also the requirements

and limits o both its maintenance and operation.

The granting o Airworthiness Authority to areas within

the Deence Equipment and Support organisation limitstheir ability to change either the design or the operating

or maintenance requirements which are derived rom the

design o the aircrat.

3 Additionally, Aircrat Operating Authorities, in

the case o the Chinook, Commander Joint Helicopter

Command, have the responsibility to preserve the

airworthiness o individual aircrat by ensuring that

their personnel operate and maintain aircrat within the

requirements and limits speciied in the Release to service

and Aircrat Document Set. This responsibility is explicitly

stated in the authority to operate aircrat delegated romthe Secretary o State through the Chies o Sta and hence

through to Aircrat Operating Authorities.

4 The authority to operate and regulate United Kingdom

military aircrat is vested in Secretary o State. The Secretary

o State requires all aircrat, associated equipment and

sotware to be designed, constructed, maintained and

operated in such a manner that they are airworthy.

5 The Secretary o State requires that the airworthiness

arrangements or military aircrat should be at least as

eective as those or civil aircrat contained in the AirNavigation Order, which sets out the regulations to which

all civilian air traic in the United Kingdom must adhere,

and should comply with the Health and Saety at Work

Act where relevant. This is particularly important in roles

that are paralleled in civil operations, such as where

passengers are carried.

6 The Departments Aviation Regulatory and Saety

Board, chaired by the Assistant Chie o the Air Sta, sets

out the Military Airworthiness Regulations in Joint Service

Publication 553.

7 Joint Service Publication 553 describes the Saety

Management System or the management o airworthiness

o UK Military Aircrat. The Saety Management System

deines the planning, organising, implementing and

controlling o airworthiness management activities.

It covers policy aspects o the management o design,

procurement maintenance and operation o military

aircrat that aect airworthiness, and, where appropriate

delineates responsibilities. Within the project Saety

Management System, the Saety Case provides the

objective justiication or the airworthiness o an aircrat

and is thus the on-going basis o aircrat releases.

The Release to Service

8 The Release to Service is central to the management

o airworthiness or any given aircrat. A Release to

Service is only authorised ollowing the presentation o a

robust, independently assessed Saety Case or any new

aircrat and subsequent modiication. It disseminates the

authorised limits, procedures and operating inormation

to the personnel (aircrew and engineers) who operate the

aircrat. The content o the Release to Service is divided

into seven sections (Figure 10 overlea).


26/28


10 manageent of Release to Service

Source: Ministry of Defence

Pa A Awh ad Dum Maagm. This partcovers the sections related to the airworthiness and athorisation

fnctions of the Release together with sections that are foranageent of the aircraft or general Release docentation.

Pa B Aa Dg ad Hadlg Lma.This partcovers the inforation to aircrew, for liitations that are basic tofling the aircraft withot external stores or other role eqipentfitted. Ths it covers ites sch as: Speed, Altitde, manoevres,Environent Conditions, and Tae-off & Landing.

Pa c sm Lma ad ca. This part covers theliitation aspects of operating the aircraft that are applicable tothe aircraft sstes, rather than fling the aircraft. Ths it coversites sch as: Engine, Fel Sste, Electrical Sste, Atopilot,Conications, and Radar.

Pa D rl Lma ad ca. This part covers the

liitations that are sortie dependent; i.e. var between flights,rather than related to the role of the basic aircraft. Ths itcovers ites sch as: Athorised Stores Configrations; StoresCarriage, Release and Jettison Liits; Passenger and FreightLiits; Winch Operations; Air-Drop etc. There are an possiblesection headings that fit into this Part, bt the tend to sb-divideaccording to the tpe of aircraft, for exaple, Fast Jets, Transportand Spport and Helicopters.

Pa e Maagm tmpa ima. Clearancesinclded in this section are to be of a geninel transitor natre:

for exaple, the clearance of a Special Trial Fit for a shortdration trial after which it will be reoved; or inclded within thispart throgh operational necessit as a teporar aendent,pending its inclsion in the appropriate part at the next foralaendent of the Release to Service. All sch inforation stbe spported b a safet case. This section a also be sed toprolgate other rgent inforation to aircrew pending foralaendent of aircrew pblications (for exaple, operating datain spport of a new clearance).

Pa f claa wh Lmd evd. The prpose of Part F isto record where inforation has been inclded within the Releaseto Service that has not been derived fro a fll sbstantiatedsafet case; sch clearances are tered Clearances with LiitedEvidence. Sch clearances are norall sbject to periodic

review, freqent aendent, and soe a be applicable onlto certain ars, operating nits or even individal airfraes.Following a periodic review or change to sch clearance, theapplicabilit and validit of the Clearance a change.

Pa G Aud tal. This part covers the Adit trail fnctionreqired to ensre airworthiness, and will be all the eleents ofthe whole aircraft Safet Case. It is a record of all the Safet Casedata that has been sed in copiling the Release and providesjstification for all eleents of the Release content.

APPENDIX FOuR

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