CASES:1. Raymundo v. CA, 213 SCRA 457 (1992):A claim of attorney's fees is only incidental to its principal cause of action and therefore not determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. An action to remove the illegal and unauthorized installation of glasses at a condominium unit is not capable of pecuniary estimation and falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation the criterion is first to ascertain the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the MTC or in the RTC would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by the RTC.

2. Ortigas v. Herrera, 120 SCRA 89 (1983) Facts: Ortigas and respondent entered into an agreement whereby Ortigas agreed to sell to the respondent a parcel of land with a special condition that should respondent as purchaser complete the construction including the painting of his residential house on said lot within 2 years from purchase, Ortigas would refund to respondent the amount of P10 per square meter. When the aforesaid special condition was fulfilled, respondent notified Ortigas in writing and requested for his refund. Upon failure of Ortigas to pay his obligation, respondent filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with the City Court. Ortigas fails in his attempt to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.Held: The action involved in this case is one for specific performance and not for a sum of money and therefore incapable of pecuniary estimation because what private respondent seeks is the performance of petitioner's obligation under a written contract to make a refund but under certain specific conditions still to be proven or established. In a case for the recovery of a sum of money, as the collection of a debt, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation because the obligation to pay the debt is not conditioned upon any specific fact or matter. But when a party to a contract has agreed to refund to the other party a sum of money upon compliance by the latter of certain conditions and only upon compliance therewith may what is legally due him under the written contract be demanded, the action is one not capable of pecuniary estimation and is within the jurisdiction of the RTC. The payment of a sum of money is only incidental which can only be ordered after a determination of certain acts the performance of which being the more basic issue to be inquired into. Counterclaim filed in MTC in excess of the MTCs jurisdictional amount is considered waived (Agustin v. Bacalan, GR L-46000). NOTE: case of specific performance for delivery of title of real property from people engaged in the realty business is within the primary jurisdiction of the HLURB.

3. Primero v. IAC, 156 SCRA 435 (1987): Labor arbiters now have jurisdiction to award damages. Failure to claim moral damages in the illegal dismissal case before the Labor Arbiter bars the subsequent claim for moral damages in a regular court.

4. Tipait v. Reyes, 218 SCRA 592 (1993)Facts: Labor Arbiter orders M.E Enterprises and Milagros Veloso and Angel Veloso (employers) to reinstate the employee and to pay backwages and emergency allowance after they are unjustly dismissed. Decision became final and writ of execution was issued. The employer now files a civil action for prohibition to restrain enforcement of the writ of execution of their properties by the decision of the Regional Director of the Department of LaborHeld: A civil case to restrain enforcement of a writ of execution issued by labor officials is in the nature of a motion to quash such writ of execution. It is the labor officials who has jurisdiction over the case, not the civil courts. The writ of execution is just incidental to the labor case filed by the employees against the employer. The proper remedy that private respondents should have taken, instead of instituting Civil Case No. R-20975, was to file the necessary petition or motion before the Secretary of Labor who has the power and authority to take any measure under existing laws to ensure compliance with the decisions, orders and awards of the Department of Labor. Despite the finality of the decision of the Regional Director, the Secretary of Labor retains control over its execution and implementation.

5. Manliguez v. CA, 232 SCRA 427 (1994)Facts: Employer was ordered in a final judgment to pay its employees. Writ of execution was issued and enforced by levying on property. Manliguez filed a complaint which sought the lifting of the levy over, and annulment of the sale of, the property on the ground that Manliguez was the owner of such property and that the employer was just leasing it from him.Held: Where the civil case is to lift levy over and annulment of the sale of the property on the ground that it was not owned by the respondent in the labor case, the civil court has jurisdiction. Where the action attacked the regularity of the issuance of the writ of execution in the labor case, the labor officials have jurisdiction. If the action does not attack the issuance, but the manner of execution, the civil courts have jurisdiction. ***Note: In Tipait, there was an employer-employee relationship between the plaintiff in the civil case and the judgment obligee in the labor case. In Manliguez, there was no such relationship.

6. Trade Union of the Phils. v. Coscolluela, 140 SCRA 302 (1985)Facts: Super Garments and Rustan Commercial Corporation have separate compartments in the same building. TUPAS filed a notice of strike against Super Garments. Alleging that goods of Super Garments were spirited out of its strike-bound premises thru Rustan's warehouse, TUPAS picketed Rustan as well. Rustan thus files a petition for injunction and damages before the RTC and NLRC to enjoin the union from picketing its premises. RTC after finding no employer-employee relationship between the parties, issued the writ of preliminary injunction. TUPAS files a case of Unlawful delegation of Legislative Power (ULP) against both Super Garments and Rustan alleging that the former is but the manufacturing arm of the latter. TUPAS claims that the RTC has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction because the case is a labor dispute, that the prerogative belongs to the Secretary of Labor and Employment.Held: Where no employer-employee relation exists between the parties, there is no labor dispute. The civil courts, not labor officials, has jurisdiction. There is no labor dispute between the TUPAS and Rustan. Therefore Rustan was justified in seeking relief in before the RTC. The ULP complaint filed by TUPAS does not prove a labor relationship. Furthermore, it was improper for Rustan to have filed a case with the NLRC.

7. Painaga v. Cortes, 202 SCRA 245 (1991) Power and authority given to the Director of Lands to alienate and dispose of public lands does not divest the regular courts of their jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants or applicants against others to protect their respective possessions and occupations. While the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve disposition of public lands, the power to determine who has the actual, physical possession or occupation or the better right of possession over public lands remains with the courts. A protest filed before the Bureau of Lands seeking the cancellation of OCT on the ground of fraud differs from Civil Case for injunction to protect prior possession. The administrative protest boils down to the question of ownership of the area in controversy, while the court action is concerned merely with possession.

8. Pestanas v. Dyogi, 81 SCRA 574 (1978) Summary:Appellants filed with the Bureau of Lands a petition for the cancellation of the free patent issued to the private respondents. While the petition was pending investigation by the Bureau, appellants filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance to have the same patent declared null and void. Appellee moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action and because the filing was premature due to the pending administrative action. Appellants contended that it had sufficient cause of action and that exhaustion of the administrative remedies was not necessary since the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources had not acted on the petition notwithstanding the lapse of more than one year from the date of the filing. The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint on the ground of non-exhaustion of the administrative remedies.

Where a party seeks the cancellation of a free patent with the Bureau of Lands, he must pursue his action in the proper Department and a review by the Courts will not be permitted unless the administrative remedies are first exhausted.Note: In Painaga, the action before the courts was for mandatory injunction to stop invasion into its property. In Pestanas, the action was for cancellation of patent.