COVER: Civilian relief workers unloadfood supplies at a village near Baidoa asa Marine escort stands by.

DVIC DN-ST-93-O1 389

Restoring Hope:In Somalia with the

Unified Task Force, 1992 - 1993

U.S. Marines in Humanitarian Operations

byColonel Dennis P. Mroczkowski

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)

History DivisionUnited States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C.2005

Other Publications in the Series

U.S. Marines in Humanitarian Operations

Humanitarian Operations in Northern iraq, 1991. With Marines in Operation ProvideComfort. (1995)

Angels From the Sea: Relief Operations in Bangladesh, 199]. (1995)

A Skillful Show of Strength: U.S. Marines in the Caribbean, 199] - 1996. (2003)

On Mamba Station: U.S. Marines in West Africa, 1990 - 2003. (2004)

PCN 190 0041 3500

Foreword

This story of Operation Restore Hope relates how many issues uniqueto operations other than war were addressed and resolved by the com-manding general of the Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) and hisstaff. Because it is written specifically from the perspective of the com-mand element and drawn from interviews, notes, and after action reportsmade at the time or shortly thereafter, this is a study of command, limit-ed to that discrete portion of American involvement in Somalia that wasthe United States-led coalition under the command of Marine LieutenantGeneral Robert B. Johnston. It does not follow the actions of the indi-vidual components or members of the units that made up the coalitionforce beyond how they may have affected the work and mission ofUNITAF.

Modern military operations other than war are, in many ways, similarto pacification operations conducted in Latin America and the Far East acentury ago. In fact, the lessons learned sections of many modern afteraction reports are familiar to anyone who has read the Marine Corps'1940 Small Wars Manual, a treatise of the Corps' experience in theBanana Wars, which was written before World War ii. Sections of thatmanual emphasized that civic actions often affected mission accomplish-ment more than military actions, and stressed that Marines must bothbecome attuned to local culture and remain aloof from domestic politicalsquabbles to be successful.

The last decade of the 20th century brought great changes to theworld, many of which affected the United States military. If the years1980 to 1989 were a time of reformulating military doctrine and inte-grating new technologies, the years from 1990 to 1999 were a time fortesting those thoughts and instruments.

The final defeat of communism in Europe, the fall of the Warsaw Pact,and the dissolution of the Soviet Union were great ends in themselves.But they were the heralds of the new world order proclaimed shortlyafter by President George H. W. Bush. On the one hand, these occur-rences allowed the United States and its allies to act decisively in thePersian Gulf against Iraq in 1990 and 1991; but the loss of the Cold Warcounterbalance of the Soviet Union and its strategic aims meant theUnited States would find it easier to become involved in regional con-flicts and localized civil strife. For the remainder of the decade, UnitedStates military personnel bore a burden of increasing operational temporarely known in eras of peace.

Following the Persian Gulf War and its related Kurdish relief opera-tion, the next major military commitment was to Somalia. The crisis inthat country was such that the humanitarian mission of the United Statesand its coalition allies could only be met by military means. Theresponse to the crisis was named Operation Restore Hope and was sig-nificant for its size and international support. It also provided useful les-sons for succeeding humanitarian operations. Brigadier General AnthonyC. Zinni, one of America's foremost experts on operations other than

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war, saw the need for the Marine Corps to train a new generation ofMarines able to think in new directions to solve the problems of human-itarian operations conducted in support of sometimes obscure and limit-ed national goals. Many of the issues faced in Somalia by planners andexecutors (the Marines and soldiers on the ground) have resurfaced inHaiti, Bosnia, Rwanda, and other hotspots.

The author, Colonel Dennis P. Mroczkowski, retired from the UnitedStates Marine Corps Reserve on 1 March 1999, with nearly 31 years ofservice. During that time, he served in Vietnam as an artillery forwardobserver with two rifle companies, as an observer and advisor with the37th Vietnamese Ranger Battalion, and the officer in charge of an inte-grated observation device (laser range finder) team on an outpost in theQ ue Son mountains. As a reservist, he later served in a variety of posi-tions at the battery level with Battery H, 3d Battalion, 14th Marines.While on the staff of the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic ReserveAugmentation Unit, he served as a liaison officer with the British Armyon six NATO exercises. He was the G-3 plans officer with the 2d MarineExpeditionary Brigade from 1988 to 1990. During the early days of thePersian Gulf War, he was recalled to active duty as a senior watch teamcommander in the crisis action center of the II Marine ExpeditionaryForce. He later received orders to proceed to Saudi Arabia as a field his-torian with the 2d Marine Division. He served with that unit throughoutOperation Desert Storm. He was again recalled to active duty inDecember 1992 to serve as a field historian with the headquarters of theUNITAF in Somalia. In October 1994, he was re6alled to active duty toserve in Haiti as the joint task force historian with the multinationalforce during Operation Restore Democracy. On 1 January 1996, hereturned to active duty as the historian assigned to United StatesEuropean Command to document Operation Joint Endeavor, duringwhich he served in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bosnia, and Croatia. For thelast years of his military career he was the officer in charge of the FieldOperations Branch of the Marine Corps History and Museums Division.During this time, he served with members of the general staff of thePolish Armed Forces on three occasions in Poland and the United Statesin the Partners For Peace program. He was recalled from retirement dur-ing the Global War on Terror in March 2003 and served as a historian forthe Special Operations Command. He served overseas with a specialoperations air detachment and two battalions of U.S. Army SpecialForces in Kuwait and Iraq.

Colonel Mroczkowski is the author of U. S. Marines in the PersianGulf, 1990-1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Operations DesertShield and Desert Storm, and co-author of Fort Monroe: The Key To TheSouth. He also has written several articles on military subjects. In civillife, he is the director of the U. S. Army's museum at Fort Monroe,Virginia, a position he has held since January 1986.

C.D. MelsonActing Director of Marine Corps History

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Preface

Operation Restore Hope was a complicated and unusual operation. From theinitial commitment of United. States Armed Forces on 9 December 1992 until theturnover to the United Nations in May 1993, there was little need for direct mili-tary action by large units, although the Unified Task Force Somalia (IJNITAF)command was not loath to use force when necessary. Rather, the need to keep aneutral and balanced approach to the situation in Somalia was more important tothe success of the mission. Small unit actions, patrolling, maiming key points,convoy security, and crowd control were the order of the day. For a military his-torian, it has been an important task to identify the critical issues, often politicalin nature, which were of importance to the command and its conduct of the oper-ation, and to follow these issues as events unfolded. This is far easier in a classicmilitary operation with well-defined missions and objectives, and in which theeffects of enemy actions or capabilities are readily discemible. The history of thisoperation is more about the evolution of ideas and command structures than it isabout the engagement of enemy forces.

I have no reservations in claiming that the operation was successful; LieutenantGeneral Robert B. Johnston and his coalition staff skillfully accomplished themission of the Unified Task Force, which was to create a secure environment forthe shipment of relief supplies and the establishment of the second United Nationsforce in Somalia, UNOSOM II. The Unified Task Force was able to turn over tothe United Nations a country that, though still beset by problems, was beginningto recover and in which the famine had been broken. What occurred after 4 May1993 is another story, of which Operation Restore Hope was the prologue.

The narrative is drawn from interviews, notes, and after action reports createdat the time or shortly thereafter. As the historian assigned to UNITAF headquar-ters, I was in a notable position to have access to what was discussed and planned,but was also able to directly observe the resulting operations. I attended meetingsand daily briefings and was able to travel throughout the theater, eventually reach-ing each of the humanitarian relief sectors. This gave me the opportunity to con-duct interviews in the field with commanders, staff officers, and individual sol-diers, Marines, airmen, and sailors. It also gave me the opportunity to see thediversity of action in each sector and to appreciate the complex nature and vastscope of operations: Somalia was not just Mogadishu, and Operation RestoreHope was more than the daily round of patrols and spot reports. The greatest dif-ficulty I faced was in the very size of the area of responsibility (which was itselfbut a small part of the entire country of Somalia.) Travel was both time consum-ing and physically demanding; it could easily take at least three days to reachsome of the farther cities, conduct a few interviews, and then return. Whethergoing by motorized convoy or aircraft, a day would be spent in travel each way,and a full day or two would be spent on the ground. All had to be timed to trans-portation schedules that could change with little or no advance notice. Failure toconnect left one stranded until the next convoy or aircraft departed. Also, since Icould not presume to impose on the hospitality of others, I had to be prepared tobring everything that I might require for food, water, or accommodation."Humping" through the dust from a dirt airfield along a desert track with a fullcombat load, several liters of bottled water, a full Alice pack and a cot was not

something to look forward to. But the camaraderie shown in each sector certain-ly was, and the information gathered was worth the effort.

I also was fortunate to have met several persons with whom I got to work close-ly, or who helped me accomplish my mission. The first of these was Colonel BillyC. Steed, the UNITAF chief of staff, who gave me the latitude to go where I need-ed, provided me with access to meetings, and ensured that I reviewed importantdocuments. Next was Captain David A. "Scotty" Dawson, who was the historianfor the Marine Forces, and who had been overseeing the UNITAF headquartersportion as well until I arrived. He very quickly showed me around, and he wasindefatigable and always full of enthusiasm. Much of my working time was spentin the operations center under the watchful eye of Colonel James B. "Irish" Egan,whose colorful manner made more bearable a daily grind in uncomfortable cir-cumstances. He also demonstrated that the more important, but less noted, part ofmilitary professionalism often lies in the attention to routine duty and detail. I wasfortunate to share a cramped, hot and airless working space in UNITAF head-quarters with a distinguished civilian, Dr. Katherine A. W. McGrady, an employ-ee of the Center for Naval Analyses. She provided insight in what was going onand kept me apprised on what happened while I was out traveling. More impor-tantly, we shared the documents and information we collected, making the effortmore complete than it would otherwise have been. I had the opportunity to visiton a few occasions with the 10th Mountain Division's historian, Captain Drew R.Meyerowich, USA. In addition to discussing the collection of documents andinformation, he spoke of his desire to get away from his desk and be more active-ly involved in the operation. He got his wish a few months later as the com-manding officer of Company A, 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, which, as part of thequick reaction force for the raid on General Mohamed Farah Hassan Aideed'sheadquarters on 3 October, fought its way through the streets of Mogadishu.Captain Meyerowich was awarded the Silver Star for his valor and leadership.Several outstanding Marine Corps combat artists also documented OperationRestore Hope. The first of these was Colonel Peter "Mike" Gish, who had an abil-ity to see the essence of a scene and capture it in his sketchpad in just a fewstrokes. His good humor and endurance belied the age of a man whose serviceextended back to his time as an aviation cadet in the latter days of World War II,and who had seen active service during the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Persian Gulf,and in the Kurdish relief operation. He and I shared many travels and many a din-ner of meals, ready to eat, atop the chancery building in Mogadishu. He was anexcellent mentor who taught me how to properly use the authority of a full colonelto accomplish one's mission. The lessons came in handy in later years in Haiti,Europe, and eventually back in Iraq. Lieutenant Colonel Donna J. Neary alsodeployed to Somalia, and I had the opportunity to watch her talent in the field. Agifted artist, she also had a knack for photography that was used to create a port-folio of coalition uniforms and arms. Captain Burton Moore brought his experi-ence as an infantry officer during Vietnam, and worked as an artist with theMarine Forces. He created some remarkable works of Marines in action. Two ofthese artists are represented in this volume. I was very fortunate in meeting MajorDaniel M. Lizzul, who was working as a liaison officer with the Italian forces. Henot only assisted in interpreting interviews, but also ensured I got to accompanythe Italians on some of their operations. I count him as a good friend and a high-ly professional officer. Warrant Officer Charles G. Grow, who 1 had known dur-ing Desert Storm, continued his excellent performance as both a combat photog-rapher and artist. He was an invaluable liaison with the Joint Combat CameraTeam. Sergeant B. W. Beard, a writer with the Joint Information Bureau, accom-panied me on a memorable journey to Gialalassi in late December. His articles,

vi

written for the local coalition forces' newspaper and service magazines, capturedthe spirit of what was happening for the Marines and soldiers who were out on thestreets. Finally, there were all of the officers and soldiers of the various servicesof the coalition forces who responded to my requests for interviews and informa-tion. These men and women were often busy with their own duties, but they man-aged to find time to speak with me and help me to gather a full impression of theirwork.

Of course, not everyone who contributed to my work in the field or to this his-tory was with me in Somalia. As I left Somalia, my good friend and comrade,Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Cureton, took my place. He was leading the firstJoint History Team to deploy in support of an active operation, composed of fivemen besides himself: Commander Roger T. Zeimet, USNR; Major Robert K.Wright, Jr., USAR; Major Robert L. Furu, USAR; Major Jimmy Miller, USAFR;and Sergeant Michael Eberle, USA. Lieutenant Colonel Cureton led a highlyorganized and thorough field history program. These officers were able to conductscores of interviews and collect thousands of documents. Their prodigious col-lection effort has been compiled into a volume entitled Resource Guide: UnifiedTask Force Somalia December 1992-May 1993 Operation Restore Hope, pub-lished by the U.S Army Center of Military History. This book has been of tremen-dous value in researching and writing this monograph.

Back in the United States, I owed my position to Brigadier General Edwin H.Simmons, Director of Marine Corps History and Museums. When the call camefor a historian to go to Somalia with UNITAF, he selected me from a field of veryqualified candidates. His deputy, Colonel Marshall B. Darling, kept me informedof what was happening back home and forwarded anything that I requested. Thedirector of the Joint History Office, Brigadier General David A. Armstrong, USA(Retired), also provided me with briefings, information, and encouragement, andhelped me to secure the opportunity to deploy to Somalia as a historian. I certainlywish to thank those who reviewed the draft of this history, most especiallyLieutenant Colonel Charles H. Cureton, and Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown.Both of these officers have been friends and comrades in the service of the histo-ry of our Corps. Lieutenant Colonel Brown, a Basic School classmate, made sev-eral recommendations that helped with the clarity of some of the more technicalaspects of this history. Brigadier General Gregory Gile, USA (Retired), alsoreviewed the chapter that details the work of the coalition forces in the relief sec-tors. Brigadier William J. A. Mellor DSC, AM, Royal Australian Army, did thesame for those portions that involved Australia's participation.

I also wish to thank Mr. Charles D. Melson, chief historian, Mr. Charles R.Smith, senior historian, and Mr. Scott N. Summerill, senior editor, for their thor-ough review of the final draft. My gratitude also goes to Mr. W. Stephen Hill,who designed the maps, and to Mrs. Catherine A. Kerns, who prepared the man-uscript for publication, and again to Mr. Charles R. Smith for illustrating the his-tory and preparing the index.

Not everything in the field worked as planned. A rare, sudden thunderstormcaught me in an open vehicle shortly after I arrived. The water caused havoc withmy tape recorder. Thereafter, I was forced to use a notebook to record conversa-tions with members of UNITAF while in the field. This is referred to as my fieldnotebook in the pages that follow to distinguish it from my journal. In that lattervolume, I recorded the information from briefings and meetings, as well as per-sonal observations about the operation. Whenever I was working in the UINITAFheadquarters compound, I could use the services of the Joint Combat CameraTeam to record my interviews with commanders and staff officers. Unfortunately,

vii

most of these were unavailable to me while I was writing this history. Fortunately,I kept notes of these interviews and have used these.

I chose to allow the materials used to guide the writing of the history and to fol-low the development of issues. I have endeavored to use sources collected bymyself or by others at the time of the operation, or shortly thereafter. The viewsand comments presented most nearly coincide with those perceptions held by theparticipants at the time. Where I have used secondary sources, I have tried to useones that gave insight into the more non-military aspects of the operation, such asSomali culture, politics, United Nations participation, etc. Here again, I have usedstudies that were prepared just a few years after the operation.

There are now several excellent studies of the operations in Somalia, but whichwere not used for the preparation of this work. Many of these deal with the moredramatic events of October 1993, which is outside the scope of this monograph.Interested scholars are directed to Somalia and Operation Restore Hope by JohnL. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, and Policing The New World Disorder: PeaceOperations and Public Security, edited by Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic,and Eliot M. Goldberg. Of importance for an understanding of the UnitedNations' perspective and the relationships of UNITAF with UNOSOM I and II isvolume VIII of the United Nations blue book series, The United Nations andSomalia, 1992-.i 996. Mark Bowden's Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern Waris a moving account based on interviews with participants of the raid of 3 October1993. It is by far the best of several that have been published in recent years. Inaddition, there have been many excellent articles in military journals and the mil-itary forces of several of the coalition nations have written after-action reports orofficial histories of their contributions to the operation.

In the middle of January 1993, shortly after the death in action of Private FirstClass Domingo Arroyo, I was traveling by helicopter to an interview with CaptainJohn W. Peterson, USN. While waiting at the helipad near the airport, a smallgroup of Marines joined the party. They were members of Task Force Mogadishu.As we waited, a first lieutenant and I struck up a conversation, as Marines oftenwill when thrown together for a short time. After explaining what we each did, heasked me, referring to Private First Class Arroyo's death, "Sir, was it worth it?" Icould not answer his question then, knowing how keenly this loss had been felt.Most certainly to Arroyo's family, friends, and comrades, the price was too great.But there were also the scores of thousands of Somalis, many of them innocentchildren, who had been saved by the efforts of Marines, soldiers, and sailors likePrivate First Class Arroyo. For these and their families there could be no greatergift. If, in the end, America and her coalition partners were repaid with callousevil by some men, that does not mean the attempt ought not to have been made.Someday, perhaps, one of those children, grown-up and grateful for what hadbeen done, will lead his country out of the fear, evil, and despair that haveengulfed it.

D. P. MroczkowskiColonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)

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Table of Contents

Foreword .iii

Preface v

Table of Contents ix

Part I - A Crisis in the Making

Chapter 1 Descent Into Despair 1The Beginning 1

Clans and Colonization 2A Trust Territory 4Unification and Independence 4A Failed State 5

Operation Eastern Exit 6Civil War and Anarchy 7

Part II - Operation Restore Hope

Chapter 2 The Widening Mission 11Historic Decision to Intervene 11

Initial Planning 12

First Steps 13

Organizing Tasks 15

Support Command 18Coalition Partners 19

Chapter 3 Plans and Preparations 21Working with Central Command 21Somali Opposition 22Somali Terrain 24Specified Tasks 25Psychological Operations 27Phases of the Operation 27The Flow of the Force 29

Chapter 4 Coming Ashore 31Initial Landings 31

Logistical Buildup 35Force Buildup 36mb the Interior 42Securing the Relief Sectors 43

Chapter 5 Politics, Peace Talks, and Police 51Military-Political Cooperation 51Weapons Control and the use of Force 52Reconciliation Conferences 55Somali Police Forces 58

Chapter 6 Moving to the Third Phase 63Settling In and Daily Work 63

ix

Mogadishu .66Bale Dogle .76Baidoa 77Bardera 82Oddur 83Gialalassi 85Merka 90BeletWeyne 91Kismayo 94Morale and Restraint 98

Chapter 7 Drawing Down the Forces 103Naval Operations 103Air Operations 104End Game 110Restructuring and Redeployment 112UINIITAF Redeployment 113Coalition Shifts 117

Chapter 8 Normality Begins to Return 119Logistics 119Medical Care and Health Issues 124Engineering 130Communications 134Psychological Operations 137Civil-Military Operations 40

Part III - Getting Out

Chapter 9 Transition and Return 147United Nations Relationship 147Slow Transition to U.N. Control 150Epilogue 155

Notes 159

AppendicesAppendix A: Unified Task Force Somalia Organization 169Appendix B: Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations and Somali Spelling 179Appendix C: Chronology of Events and Operations 183Appendix D: Citation 187

Index 189

x

Chapter 1

Descent Into Despair

The Beginning

By the summer of 1992, almost everyAmerican was familiar with the problems ofSomalia. Images of sick, weak, and starving peo-pie had been forced into the consciousness ofeven the most casual observer of the news of theday. Television specials, photographs in maga-zines, newspaper articles, and even radio pro-grams all served to focus the attention of ournation to this devastated land on the Horn ofAfrica. That people were suffering and dying inthe thousands was obvious; that something need-ed to be done was unquestionable. But even thebest intentions are of no consequence withoutidentifiable goats and the means to implement arelevant plan. In August 1992, the United States,responding to a great human tragedy, was ready toact. The plan, originally quite simple, was the startof what would develop into one of the largesthumanitarian relief efforts in the history of theworld, Operation Restore Hope.

On 18 August 1992, President George H. W.Bush ordered the airlift of 145,000 tons of emer-

gency food supplies to Somalia. This initial effort,named Operation Provide Relief, was based inMombasa, Kenya, and was commanded byMarine Brigadier General Frank Libutti. Militaryand civilian aircraft were used to fly shipments offood to towns inside Somalia.' From there, thefood was to be distributed to needy refugees byhumanitarian relief organizations and nongovern-mental organizations such as the InternationalRed Cross and the World Food Program.Unfortunately, the accomplishment of thishumane task was often frustrated by the condi-tions on the ground in Somalia.

As is so often the case with crises that seem-ingly flash across the nation's television screensand magaziae covers, the situation that led to aunited intervention in Somalia had a long andcomplex history that was not immediately appar-ent. Of all of the world's areas, the Horn of Africaalways has been one of the most overlooked andleast understood. Yet, an appreciation of the histo-ry and culture of this region is necessary to under-stand what the United States-led coalition did, andwhat its accomplishments were.

DVIC DF-ST-98-04803

A Somali herds his flock of goats near the village of Belet Weyne. Unlike much of postcolonialAfrica, Somalia's bor-ders enclosed a single ethnic group, the Samaal, which has occupied the region since biblical times.

2 RaSTORING Hou IN SorvIAuk

Clans and Colonization

One of the most important aspects of Somalisociety, and perhaps the most difficult for Westernobservers to understand or appreciate, are the con-cepts of lineage and clan affiliation. For manyAmericans, the word "clan" conjures up images ofScottish or Irish ancestry. To a Somali, however,clan relationships define individual identity andrelationships to every person that he comes intocontact with. It is no exaggeration that Somalichildren are taught their lineages for several gen-erations back so that on meeting another person,each can recite his ancestry and thus understandhis obligations and responsibilities to the other.

Traditionally, all Somalis trace their ancestryback to one man, Abu Taalib, an uncle of theProphet Mohamed. His son, Aqiil, in turn had twosons, Sab and Samaal. It is from these two the six

clan-families descend andthrough which all ethnicSomalis trace their ancestry.On the Sab branch, theseclan-families are the Digiland Rahanweyne; fromSamaal are descended theDarod, Dir, Issaq andHawiye. Over generations,each of these clan-familieswas further subdivided intoclans, subclans and fami-lies.2 This fracturing of thepeople by lines of descentproduced a dichotomy notunusual in clan societies inwhich there is strengthagainst an external foe, butintemal national weakness.For example, while a threatto the overall structurecould bring about a unifiedeffort to combat it, the vari-ous entities could still befiercely antagonistic to oneanother. In an area in whichresources are scarce andcompetition for thoseresources is very great, suchhereditary divisiveness canassume tremendous impor-tance. In Somalia, thescarcity of water and arableland for both nomadic

herdsmen and for farmers has led to a tradition ofcompetition among the various families andclans.3

A unified Somali nation did not exist until the20th century. In earlier times, the country wasunder the control of various emirates, generallycentered along the coast. Cities carried on a tradebetween the peoples of the hinterland and theArabian Peninsula. By the late 19th century, how-ever, several other countries were colonizing oroccupying parts of the Horn of Africa that wouldbecome Somalia. The French occupied the north-ernmost sector, French Somaliland, today knownas Djibouti. The Italians, seeking an empire inAfrica, colonized the southern portion and calledItalian Somaliland. The British, with an eye to theprotection of the Suez Canal and their tradethrough the Red Sea, occupied an area on the Gulfof Aden known as British Somaliland. Even the

DESCENT INTO DESPAIR 3

Egyptians and Ethiopians claimed portions of theterritory inhabited by the Somalis.4 A legacy ofbitterness, particularly against the Egyptians, theCoptic Christian Ethiopians, and the Italians, wasformed at this time and was still apparent duringOperation Restore Hope.

Life was not always tranquil for the occupyingpowers, and they often fought among themselves.In 1896, the Italians invaded Ethiopia fromEritria, their colony on the Red Sea. The army ofthe Ethiopian emperor, Menelik II, stunninglydefeated them at the Battle of Adowa. ImamMohamed Ibn Abdullah Hassan raised an insur-rection in British Somaliland in 1899 in responseto perceived threats to the Islamic religion fromforeign influences. Known to history as the "MadMullah," Mohamed Abdullah waged an intermit-tent 22-year jihad against both the British and theEthiopians. This was a period in Somalia's histo-ry marked by chaos, destmction, and famine andduring which it is estimated that one-third of allmales in British Somaliland died, often at thehands of the Mullah and his followers. It is diffi-

cult not to see a reflection of these earlier eventsin those that would occur 80 years later.5

While Great Britain, Italy, and France wereallies during World War I, the rise of the Fascistdictator Benito Mussolini was to cause a divisionamong the colonial powers. The Italian invasionand conquest of Ethiopia in 1935 placed Italysquarely in confrontation with Great Britain.British opposition to this aggression movedMussolini to join Adolf Hitler, whose policies ofexpansion in Europe Mussolini had formerlyopposed.6 Thus, when World War II began, theHorn of Africa was occupied by belligerents andwas soon to become a battleground.

The Italian Fascist government recognized ithad the "chance of five thousand years" toincrease its African colonial holdings at theexpense of Great Britain.7 But Italy did notdeclare war on the British Empire until the fall ofFrance was imminent, in June 1940. Before theyear ended, however, the British were alreadyplanning to attack the Italian forces in Somalia, aspart of an overall strategy to clear the African con-

4 Rsioiur.jc HOPE IN SOMALIA

tinent of the enemy. Accordingly, in February1941, British Empire forces were on the offensiveto places that would become familiar to Americanservicemen 52 years later. On 14 February, theport city of Kismayo was captured, followed bythe town of Jilib on the Jubba River on 22February. The city of Mogadishu was attackednext. Although it is more than 200 miles fromKismayo and Jilib, British Empire troops enteredMogadishu only three days later, on 25 February.With the Italian forces retreating into the interior,British forces advanced quickly beyond the bor-ders of Italian Somaliland and into Ethiopia.8

As the war moved away from Somalia, theBritish assumed responsibility for the administra-tion of the entire area. During this period, theSomali people began to develop their first modempolitical organizations. The Somalia Youth Clubwas formed in 1943, including in its membershipnative civil servants and police officers. In 1947,the organization changed its name to the SomaliYouth League (SYL), with the announced aims ofthe unification of all Somali territory, a standard-ized written form of the language, and protectionof Somali interests. With branches in all Somali-occupied territories, including areas of Ethiopiaand Kenya, and with a membership from nearlyall clan-families, this party represented a truenational political organization. Other parties alsocame into being at this time, but these were invari-ably representative individual clan-families.9

A Trust Territory

British administration continued until the endof the war, when the Allies decided the Italiancolonies seized during the war would not bereturned. A commission composed of representa-tives of Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and theUnited States was formed to study the dispositionof these former colonies, including Somalia. TheSYL proposed that all Somali territories be uni-fied and requested a trusteeship by an intemation-al commission for 10 years to be followed bycomplete independence. While such a proposalwas agreeable to the commission, the AlliedCouncil of Foreign Ministers could not decide onthe proper method for preparing the country forindependence. Finally, in 1949, the GeneralAssembly of the United Nations assigned Italy thetrusteeship with the stipulation that Somalia mustbe entirely independent before the end of 1960.Although there were many Somalis, particularly

in the SYL, who did not want Italy to control anyof the country, they did acquiesce to the proposal.For the next 11 years, the country was preparedfor independence as a Trust Territory. Althoughthere was some antagonism toward the Italians inthe early years of this period, it began to wane asthe country's economy and political structuresdeveloped. The time was one of optimism asenthusiasm for the new democracy raised anational spirit without the traditional connectionsto the

During the 1950s, the SYL continued to be themost important and strongest of the political par-ties. By 1956, the SYL had received the majorityof the seats in the national assembly. It followed aprogram that was nationalist in outlook andsought to weaken the influence of the clans. Whendrafting the constitution for the new nation as itapproached independence, the SYL sought a uni-tary form of government. A federal form wasbelieved to be too susceptible to the divisivenessof clan interests, and even in the SYL itself therewere individuals who were more interested in thefurtherance of their particular clan than in a pure-ly national program.'

Unification and Independence

In 1956, Britain agreed to the eventual inde-pendence of British Somaliland and its incorpora-tion in the new nation. Accordingly, BritishSomaliland was granted independence on 26 June1960, and on 1 July it joined with the TrustTerritory to form the Somali Republic. During thisearly period of independence, the new nationalgovernment had to address the differencesbetween the two sections' political, economic, andsocial development. While clan allegiancesremained important, the development of a posi-tion with an appeal to the interests of both thenorthern and southern sections helped to bring thenation closer together.'2

The major issues facing the new country duringthe 1960s were the improvement of social condi-tions and the nation's physical infrastructure. Atthe same time, many of the nation's political lead-ers espoused the idea of "Pan-Somalism," a con-cept that called for the unification of all theSomali peoples into one nation. Whether thisunity was to be achieved by peaceful or aggres-sive means was an issue of some debate amongthe leaders, but the idea had a great appeal withthe people. Since many Somalis lived in the bor-

DESCENT INTO DESPAIR 5

der areas of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, thisgoal placed Somalia in confrontation with thosenations. There were several border clashes withEthiopia during this period, as well as guerillaraids into Kenya. While this expansionist programmay have alienated Somalia at times from itsneighbors, the general policy did provide a broadbasis for agreement among nearly all of the polit-ical leaders.'3

The 1960s also saw the increasing dominanceof the SYL in the government. Curiously, theparty's great success was becoming a weakness.As candidates in national elections began to rec-ognize the SYL was the winning ticket, the partydrew persons of all political views and beliefs intoits ranks. More importantly, the party became themeans through which nepotism and clan alle-giances were once again served. Ironically, theSYL thus came to represent the very factionalismit had originally opposed. In addition, the partyand government became corrupt as favors andpersonal gain took the place of public service. Bythe end of the decade, the nation was ripe for acoup d'etat.'4

A Failed State

An assassin, apparently motivated by a clangrievance, killed President Abdirashid AliShermarke on 15 October 1969. Although the actwas an isolated incident of violence, it served asthe catalyst for events that quickly followed. Theassassination was used as an excuse for the over-throw of the democratic government. On 21October, when Prime Minister Ibrahim Egal triedto arrange the selection of a new president, themilitary moved to take over the country. MajorGeneral Mohammed Siad Barre quickly assumedleadership of the new Supreme RevolutionaryCouncil. Members of the old government werearrested, political parties were outlawed, theNational Assembly was abolished, and the consti-tution was suspended. Under the new name of theSomali Democratic Republic, the countryembarked upon its own social experiment of sci-entific socialism. Specifically, the new regimewanted to end the influence of allegiance to clansand the corruption that had become endemic inthe government. Society was to be transformed inaccordance with a political philosophy based onboth the Quran and Marxism.'5

Among other projects begun by the new gov-ernment was an attempt to raise the literacy rate of

the nation. In this they were fairly successful,employing a program of sending those who werealready educated throughout the country to teachothers. Not as successful was the attempt of thegovernment to improve the economy of the coun-try. One of the poorest of all nations, Somalia'seconomy was defined by the pastoral nomadiclifestyle of the majority of its people. Foreignexports were limited mainly to cattle or otherfoodstuffs produced in the fertile river valleys.Most farming, however, was of a subsistencelevel. Such a fragile economy was susceptible tothe droughts that would regularly strike theregion, which left the country very dependentupon foreign assistance, particularly from theSoviet Union.16

In this period of the Cold War, there was somestrategic significance to the position of Somaliabased upon the approaches to the Red Sea and theSuez Canal. With many of its Army officers edu-cated in the Soviet Union, and with its commit-ment to a socialist form of government, Somalia

Photo courtesy of the author

MajGen Mohammed Siad Barre took power in late1969 in a bloodless coup following the assassination ofcountry's prime minister, Dr. Abdirashid Ali Shermarke.Barre's goal of removing the clan as the primary Somaliallegiance ultimately would lead to the destruction ofthe Somali state.

6 RESTORTNG HOPE IN SOMALIA

eagerly accepted Soviet military and economicaid. In return, the Soviets were allowed to buildairfield and port facilities at Berbera, on the northcoast. While the ties to the Soviet Union werenever truly strong, they were to be severed per-manently by the pursuit of Somali foreign poli-cy.'7

The concept of Pan-Somalism had continuedinto the Bare regime. In the early years of hisrule, this policy was pursued through peacefulnegotiations with neighboring countries.Especially in regard to the Ogaden region, con-trolled by Ethiopia, the Somali government dis-tanced itself from the insurgent movements thathad previously been supported there. Thischanged after the 1974 overthrow of EmperorHaile Selassie and the establishment of a Marxistgovernment in Addis Ababa. When attemptsfailed at negotiating a settlement of the Ogadenquestion, the Somali government recognized theWestern Somali Liberation Front, which wasfighting to break the Ogaden from Ethiopia. Aidwas given to the Ethiopian People's Revolu-tionary Army, which was fighting a guerilla waragainst the new Ethiopian government. Finally, inJuly 1977, the Somali Army invaded Ethiopianterritory in an attempt to gain the Ogaden. In thiscontest between two of its client states, the SovietUnion came to the aid of Ethiopia. With largeamounts of modern Soviet equipment and a rein-forcement of Cuban troops, the Ethiopians turnedthe tide of battle and drove the Somalis from theirterritory. In retaliation, Siad Bare ejected Sovietpersonnel from Somalia and turned to the West forsupport. In 1980, an agreement was reached withthe United States whereby use was given of theport and airfield facilities at Berbera in exchangefor military and economic aid.'8 Somalia stayedclose to the United States throughout the remain-der of the 1980s.

This decade was not to be an easy one for theBane regime, however. hi spite of its attempts torid the country of the influence of "tribalism," thegovernment was increasingly identified with theMarehan, Bane's own clan.'9 In addition, corrup-tion in the government created even more dissat-isfaction. By 1988, armed opposition to the Baneregime had begun with a rebellion in the north ofthe country.2° There were three main oppositiongroups forming in late 1990 around geographicaland clan affiliations: the Somali NationalMovement (SNM), which had begun in NorthernSomalia; the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM),

which was mainly recmited from the Ogaden andwas active in the southern region; and the UnitedSomali Congress (USC), composed mainly fromthe Hawiye clan and active in the central part ofthe country. By December these forces hadpushed the Somali Army back the outskirts of thecapital, Mogadishu. Violence and unrest began togrow within the city itself, creating a dangerousatmosphere for the foreign personnel and diplo-mats living there. Open fighting had begun in thecity by late in the month as the predominantlyMarehan-based army attempted to destroy USCelements in the Hawiye enclaves. The resultingbreakdown of all order unleashed even greaterlawlessness.2'

Operation Eastern Exit

On 5 December 1990, due to escalating vio-lence and chaos, American Ambassador James K.Bishop ordered the departure of non-essentialembassy personnel and dependents. By mid-month, several foreign countries had joined theUnited States in advising their citizens to leave.On 30 December, Ambassador Bishop brought allremaining official Americans into the embassycompound, where he initially thought they couldwait out the fighting in safety. By 1 January 1991,attacks on foreigners, including Americans, hadincreased and the embassy itself had been hit bysmall arms fire. Ambassador Bishop decided thesituation was too dangerous to permit embassypersonnel to remain any longer, and on NewYear's Day he requested permission from the U.S.State Department to evacuate the embassy.Permission was granted on 2 January.22

In a fine example of forward thinking, on 31December 1990, Vice Admiral Stanley R. Arthur,USN, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces CentralCommand, had already alerted his staff to be pre-pared to conduct a non-combatant evacuationoperation (NEO) in Mogadishu. Even thoughheavily involved in Operation Desert Shield andthe fmal preparations for Operation Desert Storm,Central Command in Saudi Arabia began plan-ning rapidly for the evacuation. After reviewingthe Central Command plan, the Joint Chiefs ofStaff issued an execute order for the evacuationoperation late on 2 January. By that time, forcesfor the operation were already being assembledfrom those available in the Persian Gulf.23

The operation was nanied Eastern Exit.Planners had created a variety of potential scenar-

DESCENT INTO DESPAIR 7

ios, each tailored for a specific situation. In apreparatory move, U.S. Air Force AC-130 Spectergunships and ground security elements deployedto Nairobi, Kenya, in case the preferred option, apeaceful evacuation through the Mogadishu air-port, could be accomplished. This plan was notpursued once Ambassador Bishop decided it wastoo dangerous for embassy personnel to make thenearly two-mile journey to the airport. Conditionsat the airport also had deteriorated to such anextent that an air operation would be too risky.These circumstances left an amphibious option.24

Admiral Arthur chose to create an amphibiousforce Composed of only two ships, the amphibioustransport dock USS Trenton (APD 14) and the hel-icopter assault ship USS Guam (LPD 9). Thecommanding general of 4th Marine ExpeditionaryBrigade (4th MEB), Major General Harry W.Jenkins, Jr., designated Colonel James J. Doyle,Jr., as the commander of the landing force. Hiscounterpart, the commander of the amphibioustask force, was Captain Alan B. Moser, USN.These two officers embarked their staffs and thetask force got under way from Masirah Island, offthe tip of Oman, by 2330 on 2 January. ColonelDoyle and Captain Moser had been informed theuse of the airport was not an option, nor was anacross-the-beach landing because of the distanceinland of the embassy from any potential landingsites. The plan with the greatest chance of successwas, therefore, to use shipborne Marine helicop-ters that could land directly in the embassy com-pound.25

By 3 and 4 January, the threat to the embassyand its personnel increased. The embassy guardsengaged in a firelight with looters, and small armsfire and even a rocket propelled grenade impactedinside the embassy grounds. At that point it wasdecided that a pair of Sikorsky CH-53 SuperStallion assault helicopters could be launchedwhen within 500 miles of Mogadishu. The time ofdeparture would be calculated to provide an earlymorning arrrval at the Somali coast. This long-dis-tance journey would require at least one aerialrefueling and cause crew fatigue, but it would getthe aircraft and security forces to the embassymuch sooner.26

*Planning for the imminent start of Operation Desert Stormwas paramount in the minds of planners at this time, and thechoice was to have as many ships available as possible in thePersian Gulf area. It was not possible to forecast either howlong Eastern Exit would take, or when ships committed to itwould be able to return.

The 60-man evacuation force was composed51 Marines and corpsmen from the 4th MEB, andnine U.S. Navy special warfare personnel fromSea, Air, Land (SEAL) Team 8F. The security ele-ments boarded the helicopters at 0330 on 5January. At 0345 they lifted off, with an expectedarrival time of 0620. With the in-flight refuelingsuccessfully completed, the helicopters crossedthe coast just at dawn. There was some initial dif-ficulty in identifying the embassy, but it wasclearly distinguished on the second attempt. Asthe helicopters came in for their landings, numer-ous armed looters were seen positioning laddersagainst one side of the compound wall. Uponlanding, the SEALs immediately established thesecurity of the chancery building while theMarines provided a perimeter defense for thecompound. Both helicopters were quickly filledwith evacuees and they returned to the Guam by1040.27

Back at Mogadishu, the evacuation force andthe embassy security force assisted in bringing inseveral citizens from other foreign countries. Byevening, the first of four waves of Boeing-VertolCFl-46E Sea Knight helicopters from the Guamarrived at the embassy landing zone. These fivehelicopters remained on the ground only 20 min-utes, departing with an additional 75 evacuees. Asthe first wave of helicopters returned to the Guam,the second wave set down at the embassy. Thiswave, also of five helicopters, departed after just18 minutes on the ground, leaving only theambassador, his staff, and the Marine SecurityGuard to be evacuated. The third wave departed at2210, and the fourth wave carried the ambassadorand the perimeter defense force. This final wavetook off even as looters clambered over the wallsand entered the compound. The last helicopterlanded back on the Guam at 2323, and 20 minuteslater the ambassador declared the operation com-pleted.28

Civil War and Anarchy

With the completion of this highly successfuloperation, the American presence in Somaliaended for nearly two years. Few in the UnitedStates noticed what was happening there becausethe attenti.on of Americans and most of the worldwas focused on the events in Southwest Asia. Bythe end of January 1991, Siad Bare was forced toflee Mogadishu, and the country fell deeper intoanarchy and chaos as the various armed factions

8 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

continued to battle the forces of the old nationalgovernment. Finally, by May 1992, Bane's forceswere defeated and he was forced to flee the coun-try altogether. This did not mean the end of fight-ing, however. Instead, the various factions andclans that had formerly opposed Bane now soughtto achieve dominance in the new government.When Barre was driven from Mogadishu, AliMahdi Mohamed of the USC was selected as thenew president. The USC was an instrument of theHawiye clan, however, and Au Mahdi neverreceived enough support to coalesce the rest of thecountry behind him. The fighting, which now pit-ted the clans against one another, also led to thecreation of new alliances and divisions. Forinstance, the USC itself split into two factions,one led by Ali Mahdi and the other by GeneralMohammed Farah Hassan Aideed.29 No singlegroup was strong enough to overcome the othersin this unending fight for power. Without a centralgovernment, anarchy, violence, and lawlessnessreigned.

To add to the suffering of the Somali people, asevere drought had devastated the region forabout three years. As farmers were unable to raisecrops, food itself became a weapon. To have itmade one's own group strong; to deprive one'srivals of it weakened them as it strengthened one-

self The threat of losing subsistence to armedbands of factional militias was now added to thethreat of being robbed by the increasing gangs ofbandits. With violence a reality of everyday life,everyone had to protect himself Individualsarmed themselves, formed local militias, or hiredothers for protection. Even private relief organiza-tions became the targets of threats and extortionand had to resort to the hiring of armed body-guards. It truly became a case of "every managainst every man."

By the early 1990s, the history of Somalia dis-closed certain disturbing patterns. First, it showedthat tribalism or clan loyalty was still a dominantfactor in society, despite earlier efforts to removeit. It was a force to be understood and reckonedwith. The passage of time made no change in thiscentral fact of life. What had changed was thegeneral lifestyle of the people. The reforms of theBarre regime had removed many of the old struc-tures by which Somali society had been able tokeep clan rivalries and violence in check, or atleast within acceptable limits. In fact, it could beargued that the Bane years actually made eachclan more jealous of the others and desirous ofachieving dominance, destroying the balance thathad existed before.3° In addition, the years duringwhich Somalia was a client state of the Soviet

DVIC DN-ST-93-03436

Village women gather near refugee huts outside Baidoa. The descending spiral of rape, murder, destruction of cropsand water supplies, and wholesale slaughter had led to mass starvation and forced thousands of Somalis to fleetheir former homes.

DESCENT INTO DESPAIR 9

DVIC DD-SD-00-O1 008

Members of the Aerial Port Squadron from Dyess Air Force Base, Abilene, Texas, and Dover Air Force Base, Dover,Delaware, unload medical supplies from the left side of a Boeing KC- 135 Stratotanker's cargo bay. Off loaded atMoi International Airport, Mombasa, Kenya, the supplies were transferred to U.S. Air Force C- 130s for deliveiy toSomalia as part of Operation Provide Relief.

Union and the United States saw the accumulationof a large amount of weapons, ranging from riflesto tanks and artillery. Somalia thus had an abun-dant supply of weapons for its factional armiesand bandits.

Operation Provide Relief, begun so hopefullyin August 1992, soon was confronted with thereality of the chaos and strife into which Somaliahad descended. The breaking of the famine couldonly be achieved by the safe delivery and distri-bution of the food.

In November, with deaths by starvation andrelated diseases numbering 350,000 and expectedto increase rapidly, the United States decided totake action. Acting on a United Nations mandate,President Bush announced the United Stateswould ensure the secure environment needed forthe safe and effective delivery of relief supplies.However, there was no assurance the food wouldultimately be given to those for whom it wasintended, the thousands of refugees who weredriven from their homes by the drought and fight-

ing and who now faced death by starvation.Aircraft deliveries of relief supplies could be sentinto the country, but there was no guarantee theaircraft would be allowed to land safely, or thattheir cargoes would not be subject to extortionatepayments. In the autumn of 1992, it had becomeobvious that merely providing the necessities oflife to these victims of anarchy would not suffice.

Operation Restore Hope was about to begin.

* An example of the amounts which the relief organizationshad to pay simply to accomplish their humanitarian goalswas told to the author by Lieutenant Colonel Carol J.Mathieu, commanding officer of the Canadian AirborneRegiment forces in Belet Weyne. The relief committee of theInternational Commission of the Red Cross was required toprovide each security guard at the airport with 85 kilograms(187 pounds) of food per month. The cost for each airplanelanding at the airport was 50,000 Somali shillings. Also, theywere forced to rent cars and trucks at the rate of $1,600 permonth.