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Clandestine cell system

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A clandestine cell structure is a method for organizing a group in such a way that it canmore effectively resist penetration  by an opposing organization. Depending on thegroup's philosophy, its operational area, the communications technologies available, andthe nature of the mission, it can range from a strict hierarchy to an extremely distributedorganization. It is also a method used by criminal organizations, undercover operatives,and unconventional warfare (UW) led by special forces.

Cell structures continue to evolve. Historically, clandestine organizations avoidedelectronic communications, because signals intelligence, SIGINT, is a strength of conventional militaries and counterintelligence organizations. New communicationstechniques, such as the Internet and strong encryption, may allow some inter-cellcommunications that were too dangerous in the past.

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In the context of tradecraft, covert and clandestine are not synonymous. The adversary isaware that a covert activity is happening, but does not know who is doing it, and certainlynot their sponsorship. Clandestine activities, however, if successful, are completelyunknown to the adversary, and their function, such as espionage, would be neutralized if there was any awareness of the activity. A covert cell structure is tantamount to a

contradiction in terms, because the point of the cell structure is that its details arecompletely hidden from the opposition.

A sleeper cell refers to a cell, or isolated grouping of sleeper agents that belong to anintelligence network or organization. The cell "sleeps" (lies dormant) inside a target population until it receives orders or decides to act. (See also Mole (espionage), Doubleagent, Sleeper agent.) A sleeper cell is a somewhat special case, if, for example, it isclandestine until activated, as with a sabotage or terror unit. Still, there can be cells (or singleton agents) who are both clandestine and sleeper.

Contents

[hide]

• 1 Historyo 1.1 Provisional Irish Republican Armyo 1.2 World War II French Resistanceo 1.3 National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam

• 2 Parallel organizations• 3 External support• 4 Models of insurgency and associated cell characteristics• 5 Classic models for cell system operations

o 5.1 Operations under official cover o 5.2 Clandestine presenceo 5.3 Fault-tolerant cellular structures

• 6 Non-traditional models, exemplified by al-Qaedao 6.1 Infrastructure cellso 6.2 Operational cellso 6.3 Indirect support networkso 6.4 A possible countermeasure

• 7 See also

• 8 References

[edit] History

[edit] Provisional Irish Republican Army

As opposed to the French Resistance, the modern Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) has a history going back to Irish revolutionary forces in the early 20th century,

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 but has little external control. Its doctrine and organization have changed over time, givenfactors such as the independence of Éire, the continued British control of NorthernIreland and the simple passage of time and changes in contemporary thinking andtechnology [1].

Officially, the PIRA is hierarchical, but, especially as British security forces becamemore effective, changed to a semiautonomous model for its operational and certain of itssupport cells (e.g., transportation, intelligence, cover and security) [2]. Its leadership seesitself as guiding and consensus-building. The lowest-level cells, typically of 2-5 people,tend to be built by people with an existing personal relationship. Britishcounterinsurgents could fairly easily understand the command structure, but not theworkings of the operational cells.

The IRA has an extensive network of inactive or sleeper cells, so new ad hoc

organizations may appear for any specific operation.

[edit] World War II French Resistance

In World War II, Operation Jedburgh teams parachuted into occupied France to leadunconventional warfare units [3][4]. They would be composed of two officers, oneAmerican or British, and the other French, the latter preferably from the area into whichthey landed. The third member of the team was a radio operator.

Especially through the French member, they would contact trusted individuals in the areaof operation, and ask them to recruit a team of trusted subordinates (i.e., a subcell). If theteam mission were sabotage, reconnaissance, or espionage, there was no need to meet inlarge units. If the team was to carry out direct action, often an unwise mission unless an

appreciable number of the locals had military experience, it would be necessary toassemble into units for combat. Even then, the hideouts of the leadership were knownonly to subcell leaders. The legitimacy of the Jedburgh team came from its knownaffiliation with Allied powers, and it was a structure more appropriate for UW than for truly clandestine operations.

[edit] National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam

Also known as the Viet Cong, this organization grew from earlier anticolonial groupsfighting the French, as well as anti-Japanese guerillas during World War II [5]. Itscommand, control, and communication techniques derived from the experiences of these

earlier insurgent groups. The group had extensive support from North Vietnam, and,indirectly, from the Soviet Union. It had parallel political and military structures, oftenoverlapping. See Viet Cong and PAVN strategy and tactics.

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A dual, but sometimes overlapping, Party and Military structure was top-down

The lowest level consisted of three-person cells who operated quite closely, and engagingin the sort of self-criticism common, as a bonding method, to Communist organizations.

[edit] Parallel organizations

It should be noted that the NLF and PIRA, as well as other movements, have chosen tohave parallel political and military organizations. In the case of the NLF, other than someindividuals with sanctuary in North Vietnam, the political organization could not be overtduring the Vietnam War . Of course, after the war ended, surviving NLF officials couldhold high office.

In the case of the PIRA, its political wing, Sinn Fein, became increasingly overt, and thena full participant in politics. Hamas and Hezbollah also have variants of overt political/social service and covert military wings.

The rationale for the overt political-covert military split is to avoid the inflexibility of completely secret organization. This practice can become counterproductive once anactive insurgency begins. Excessive secrecy can limit insurgent freedom of action, reduceor distort information about insurgent goals and ideals, and restrict communication withinthe insurgency [6]. By splitting, the public issues can be addressed overtly, while militaryactions remain covert and intelligence functions stay clandestine.

[edit] External support

Many cell systems still receive, with due attention to security, support from the outside.This can range from leaders, trainers and supplies (e.g., the Jedburgh assistance to the

French Resistance), or a safe haven for overt activities (e.g., NLF spokesmen in Hanoi).

External support need not be overt. Certain Shi'a groups in Iraq, for example, do receiveassistance from Iran[citation needed ], but this is not a public position of the government of Iran,and may even be limited to factions of that government. Early US support to the Afghan Northern Alliance against the Taliban used clandestine operators from both the CIA andUnited States Army Special Forces. As the latter conflict escalated, the US participation became overt.

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 Note that both unconventional warfare (UW) (i.e., guerilla operations) and foreigninternal defense (FID) (i.e., counterinsurgency) may be covert and use cellular organization.

In a covert FID mission, only selected host nation (HN) leaders are aware of the foreign

support organization. Under Operation White Star , US personnel gave covert FIDassistance to the Royal Lao Army starting in 1959, became overt in 1961, and ceasedoperations in 1962.

[edit] Models of insurgency and associated cell

characteristics

While different kinds of insurgency differ in where they place clandestine or covert cells,when certain types of insurgency grow in power, the cell system is deemphasized. Cellsstill may be used for leadership security, but, if overt violence by organized units

 becomes significant, cells are less important. In Mao's three-stage doctrine,[7]

cells arestill useful in Phase II to give cover to part-time guerillas, but, as the insurgency createsfull-time military units in Phase III, the main units are the focus, not the cells. The EighthRoute Army did not run on a cell model.

When considering where cells exist with respect to the existing government, the type of insurgency needs to be considered. One US Army reference was Field Manual 100-20,which has been superseded by FM3-07.[8] Drawing on this work, Nyberg (a United StatesMarine Corps officer) extended the ideas to describe four types of cell system, althoughhis descriptions also encompass types of insurgencies that the cell system supports.[9] At present, there is a new type associated with transnational terrorist insurgencies.

1. Traditional: the slowest to form, this reflects a principally indigenous insurgency,initially with limited goals. It is more secure than others, as it tends to grow from people with social, cultural or family ties. The insurgents resent a government thathas failed to recognize tribal, racial, religious or linguistic groups "who perceivethat the government has denied their rights and interests and work to establish or restore them. They seldom seek to overthrow the government or control the wholesociety; however, they frequently attempt to withdraw from government controlthrough autonomy or semiautonomy." The Mujahideen in Afghanistan, theLiberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, and the Kurdish revolt in Iraqillustrate the traditional pattern of insurgency. al-Qaeda generally operates in thismode, but if they become strong enough in a given area, they may change to themass-oriented form.

2. Subversive: Usually driven by an organization that contains at least some of thegoverning elite, some being sympathizers already in place, and others who penetrate the government. When they use violence, it has a specific purpose, suchas coercing voters, intimidating officials, and disrupting and discrediting thegovernment. Typically, there is a political arm (e.g., Sinn Fein or the NationalLiberation Front) that directs the military in planning carefully coordinated

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violence. "Employment of violence is designed to show the system to beincompetent and to provoke the government to an excessively violent responsewhich further undermines its legitimacy." The  Nazi rise to power, in the 1930s, isan example of subversion. Nazi members of parliament and street fighters werehardly clandestine, but the overall plan of the Nazi leadership to gain control of 

the nation was hidden. "A subversive insurgency is suited to a more permissive political environment which allows the insurgents to use both legal and illegalmethods to accomplish their goals. Effective government resistance may convertthis to a critical-cell model.

3. Critical-cell: Critical cell is useful when the political climate becomes less permissive than one that allowed shadow cells. While other cell types try to formintelligence cells within the government, this type sets up "shadow government"cells that can seize power once the system is destroyed both by external meansand the internal subversion. This model fits the classic coup d'etat,[10] and oftentries to minimize violence. Variants include the Sandinista takeover of an existinggovernment weakened by external popular revolution. "Insurgents also seek to

infiltrate the government's institutions, but their object is to destroy the systemfrom within." Clandestine cells form inside the government. "The use of violenceremains covert until the government is so weakened that the insurgency's superior organization seizes power, supported by the armed force. One variation of this pattern is when the insurgent leadership permits the popular revolution to destroythe existing government, then emerges to direct the formation of a newgovernment. Another variation is seen in the Cuban revolution [11] and is referredto as the foco (or Cuban model) insurgency. This model involves a single, armedcell which emerges in the midst of degenerating government legitimacy and becomes the nucleus around which mass popular support rallies. The insurgentsuse this support to establish control and erect new institutions."

4. Mass-oriented: where the subversive and covert-cell systems work from withinthe government, the mass-oriented builds a government completely outside theexisting one, with the intention of replacing it. Such "insurgents patientlyconstruct a base of passive and active political supporters, while simultaneously building a large armed element of guerrilla and regular forces. They plan a protracted campaign of increasing violence to destroy the government and itsinstitutions from the outside. They have a well-developed ideology and carefullydetermine their objectives. They are highly organized and effectively use propaganda and guerrilla action to mobilize forces for a direct political andmilitary challenge to the government." The revolution that produced the Peoples'Republic of China, the American Revolution, and the Shining Path insurgency inPeru are examples of the mass-oriented model. Once established, this type of insurgency is extremely difficult to defeat because of its great depth of organization.

[edit] Classic models for cell system operations

Different kinds of cell organizations have been used for different purposes. This sectionfocuses on clandestine cells, as would be used for espionage, sabotage, or the

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organization for unconventional warfare. When unconventional warfare starts using overtunits, the cell system tends to be used only for sensitive leadership and intelligence roles.[7] The examples here will use CIA cryptonyms as a naming convention used to identifymembers of the cell system. Cryptonyms begin with a two-letter country or subject name(e.g., AL), followed with an arbitrary word. It is considered elegant to have the code

merge with the other letters to form a pronounceable word.

[edit] Operations under official cover

Station BERRY operates, for country B, in target country BE. It has three case officersand several support officers. Espionage operation run by case officers under diplomaticcover, they would have to with the basic recruiting methods described in this article. Caseofficer BETTY runs the local agents BEN and BEATLE. Case officer BESSIE runsBENSON and BEAGLE.

Representative diplomatic-cover station and networks

Some recruits, due to the sensitivity of their position or their personalities not beingappropriate for cell leadership, might not enter cells but be run as singletons, perhaps byother than the recruiting case officer. Asset BARD is a different sort of highly sensitivesingleton, who is a joint asset of the country B, and the country identified by prefix AR.ARNOLD is a case officer from the country AR embassy, who knows only the caseofficer BERTRAM and the security officer BEST. ARNOLD does not know the stationchief of BERRY or any of its other personnel. Other than BELL and BEST, the Station personnel only know BERTRAM as someone authorized to be in the Station, and who isknown for his piano playing at embassy parties. He is covered as Cultural Attache, in acountry that has very few pianos. Only the personnel involved with BARD know thatARNOLD is other than another friendly diplomat.

In contrast, BESSIE and BETTY know one another, and procedures exist for their takingover each others' assets in the event one of the two is disabled.

Some recruits, however, would be qualified to recruit their own subcell, as BEATLE hasdone. BESSIE knows the identity of BEATLE-1 and BEATLE-2, since he had themchecked by headquarters counterintelligence before they were recruited. Note that acryptonym does not imply anything about its designee, such as gender.

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[edit] Clandestine presence

The diagram of "initial team presence" shows that two teams, ALAN and ALICE, havesuccessfully entered an area of operation, the country coded AL, but are only aware of a pool of potential recruits, and have not yet actually recruited anyone. They communicate

with one another only through headquarters, so compromise of one team will not affectthe other.

Initial team presence by 2 separate clandestine teams with no official cover 

Assume that in team ALAN, ALISTAIR is one of the officers with local contacts, mightrecruit two cell leaders, ALPINE and ALTITUDE. The other local officer in the team,ALBERT, recruits ALLOVER. When ALPINE recruited two subcell members, theywould be referred to as ALPINE-1 and ALPINE-2.

ALPINE and ALTITUDE only know how to reach ALISTAIR, but they are aware of atleast some of other team members' identity should ALISTAIR be unavailable, and they

would accept a message from ALBERT. Most often, the identity (and location) of theradio operator may not be shared. ALPINE and ALTITUDE, however, do not know oneanother. They do not know any of the members of team ALICE.

The legitimacy of the subcell structure came from the recruitment process, originally bythe case officer and then by the cell leaders. Sometimes, the cell leader would proposesubcell member names to the case officer, so the case officer could have a headquartersname check run before bringing the individual into the subcell. In principle, however, thesubcell members would know ALPINE, and sometimes the other members of theALPINE cell if they needed to work together; if ALPINE-1 and ALPINE-2 hadindependent assignments, they might not know each other. ALPINE-1 and ALPINE-2

certainly would not know ALISTAIR or anyone in the ALTITUDE or ALLOVER cells.

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Clandestine teams have built initial subcells

As the networks grow, a subcell leader might create his own cell, so ALPINE-2 might become the leader of the ALIMONY cell.

[edit] Fault-tolerant cellular structures

Modern communications theory has introduced methods to increase fault tolerance in cellorganizations. In the past, if cell members only knew the cell leader, and the leader wasneutralized, the cell was cut off from the rest of the organization. Game theory and graphtheory have been applied to the study of optimal covert network design (see Lindelauf,R.H.A. et al. 2009. The influence of secrecy on the communication structure of covertnetworks. Social Networks 31: 126-137).

If a traditional cell had independent communications with the foreign supportorganization, headquarters might be able to arrange its reconnection. Another method isto have impersonal communications "side links" between cells, such as a pair of dead

drops, one for Team ALAN to leave "lost contact" messages to be retrieved by TeamALICE, and another dead drop for Team ALICE to leave messages for Team ALAN.

These links, to be used only on losing contact, do not guarantee a contact. When a teamfinds a message in its emergency drop, it might do no more than send an alert message toheadquarters. Headquarters might determine, through SIGINT or other sources, that theenemy had captured the leadership and the entire team, and order the other team not toattempt contact. If headquarters can have reasonable confidence that there is acommunications failure or partial compromise, it might send a new contact to thesurvivors.

When the cut-off team has electronic communications, such as the Internet, it has a much better chance of eluding surveillance and getting emergency instructions than by using adead drop that can be under physical surveillance.

[edit] Non-traditional models, exemplified by al-Qaeda

Due to cultural differences, assuming the al-Qaeda Training Manual  [12] is authentic,Islamist cell structures may differ from the Western mode. "Al-Qaida's minimal core

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group, only accounting for the leadership, can also be viewed topologically as a ring or chain network, with each leader/node heading their own particular hierarchy.

"Such networks function by having their sub-networks provide information and other forms of support (the ‘many-to-one’ model), while the core group supplies ‘truth’ and

decisions/directions (the ‘one-to-many’ model). Trust and personal relationships are anessential part of the Al-Qaida network (a limiting factor, even while it provides enhancedsecurity). Even while cell members are trained as ‘replaceable’ units, ‘vetting’ of members occurs during the invited training period under the observation of the coregroup [13].

Cells of this structure are built outwards, from an internal leadership core. Superficially,this might be likened to a Western cell structure that emanates from a headquarters, butthe Western centrality is bureaucratic, while structures in other non-western cultures builds on close personal relationships, often built over years, perhaps involving family or other in-group linkages. Such in-groups are thus extremely hard to infiltrate; infiltration

has a serious chance only outside the in-group. Still, it may be possible for an in-group to be compromised through COMINT or, in rare cases, by compromising a member.

The core group is logically a ring, but is superimposed on an inner hub-and-spokestructure of ideological authority. Each member of the core forms another hub and spokesystem (see infrastructure cells, the spokes leading to infrastructure cells under thesupervision of the core group member, and possibly to operational groups which theheadquarters support. Note that in this organization, there is a point at which theoperational cell becomes autonomous of the core. Members surviving the operation mayrejoin at various points.

Core group, with contact ring and ideological hierarchy

Osama, in this model, has the main responsibility of commanding the organization and being the spokesman on propaganda video and audio messages distributed by the propaganda cell. The other members of the core each command one or moreinfrastructure cells.

While the tight coupling enhances security, it can limit flexibility and the ability to scalethe organization. This in-group, while sharing tight cultural and ideological values, is notcommitted to a bureaucratic process.

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"Members of the core group are under what could be termed ‘positive control’—longrelationships and similar mindsets make ‘control’ not so much of an issue, but there aredistinct roles, and position (structural, financial, spiritual in the sense of having the‘correct’ interpretation of Islam) determines authority, thus making the core group ahierarchy topologically.[13]

In the first example of the core, each member knows how to reach two other members,and also knows the member(s) he considers his ideological superior. Solid lines show basic communication, dotted red arrows show the first level of ideological respect, anddotted blue arrows show a second level of ideological respect.

If Osama, the most respected, died, the core would reconstitute itself. While differentmembers have an individual ideological guide, and these are not the same for allmembers, the core would reconstitute itself with Richard as most respected.

Assume there are no losses, and Osama can be reached directly only by members of the

core group. Members of outer cells and support systems might know him only as "theCommander", or, as in the actual case of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden's face isrecognizable worldwide, but only a very few people know where he is or even how tocontact it.

[edit] Infrastructure cells

Any clandestine or covert service, especially a non-national one, needs a variety of technical and administrative functions. Some of these services include: [13]

1. Forged documents and counterfeit currency

2. Apartments and hiding places3. Communication means4. Transportation means5. Information6. Arms and ammunition7. Transport

Other functions include psychological operations, training, and finance.

A national intelligence service [14] has a support organization to deal with services such asfinance, logistics, facilities (e.g., safehouses), information technology, communications,

training, weapons and explosives, medical services, etc. Transportation alone is a hugefunction, including the need to buy tickets without drawing suspicion, and, whereappropriate, using private vehicles. Finance includes the need to transfer money withoutcoming under the suspicion of financial security organizations.

Some of these functions, such as finance, are far harder to operate in remote areas such asthe FATA of Pakistan, than in cities with large numbers of official and unofficialfinancial institutions, and the communications to support them. If the financial office is

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distant from the remote headquarters, there is a need for  couriers, who must be trusted tosome extent, although they may not know the contents of their messages, or the actualidentity of sender and/or receiver. The couriers, depending on the balance among typeand size of message, security, and technology available, may memorize messages, carryaudio or video recordings, or hand-carry computer media.

Core group and infrastructure cells; military cells in training

"These cells are socially embedded (less so than the core group, however), structurallyembedded, functionally embedded (they are specialized into a domain), and knowledge base-specific (there does not seem to be a great deal of cross-training, or lateral mobilityin the organization). Such cells are probably subjected to a mixture of positive andnegative control ("do this, do these sorts of things, don’t do that")."[13]

Core Structure of Non-National GroupMember Infrastructure commanded

Richard FinanceAnton Military training/operations 1

Hassan Military training/operations 2David TransportationKim Communications and propaganda

The leaders of military cells are responsible for training them, and, when an operation isscheduled, selecting the operational commander, giving him the basic objective andarranging whatever support is needed, and then release him from tight control to executethe meeting. Depending on the specific case, the military leaders might have direct, possibly one-way, communications with their cells, or they might have to give Kim themessages to be transmitted, by means that Anton and Hassan have no need to know.

 Note that Anton does not have a direct connection to Kim. Under normal circumstances,he sacrifices efficiency for security, by passing communications requests through Anton.The security structure also means that Hassan does not know the members of Anton'scells, and Kim may only know ways to communicate with them, but not their identity.

Kim operates two systems of cells, one for secure communications and one for  propaganda. To send out a propaganda message, Osama must pass it to Kim. If Kim were

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compromised, the core group might have significant problems with any sort of outsidecommunications.

Terrorist networks do not match cleanly to other cell systems that regularly report to aheadquarters. The apparent al-Qaeda methodology of letting operational cells decide on

their final dates and means of attack exhibit an operational pattern, but not a periodicitythat could easily be used for an indications checklist appropriate for a warning center.Such lists depend on seeing a local pattern to give a specific warning. [15].

 Note that Hassan has two subordinates that have not yet established operational cells.These subordinates can be considered sleepers, but not necessarily with a sleeper cell.

[edit] Operational cells

For each mission are created one or more operational cells. If the al-Qaeda signature of multiple concurrent attacks is used, there may be an operational cell for each target

location. It will depend on the operation if they will need any support cells in theoperational area. For example, it may be more secure to have a local cell build bombs,which will be delivered by cells coming from outside the area.

"Operational cells are not created, but instead ‘seeded’ utilizing individuals spotted or that request assistance (both groups are ‘vetted’ by being trained under the observation of the core group, which dramatically restricts the opportunity for passing off walk-insunder false flag). Categorization of operational cells appears to be by capabilities, region,and then task/operation. Operational cells are composed of members whose worldviewhas been firmly tested—necessary to front-load, because such cells are dispersed back totheir own local control (or negative control—proscribed behavior—with positive control

only coming in the form of contact for synchronization or support)."[13]

If operational cells routinely are "released" curved dotted lines on link to military cells toselect their final operational parameters, they use a different paradigm than governmentalclandestine or covert operations. On a number of cases, US special operations forces hadto wait for Presidential authorization to make an attack, or even move to staging areas.Admittedly, a country would have to face the consequences of an inappropriate attack, soit may tend to be overcautious, where a terror network would merely shrug at the world being upset. Assuming that the al-Qaeda operational technique is not to use positivecontrol, their operations may be more random, but also more unpredictable for counterterror forces. If their cells truly need constant control, there are communications

links that might be detected by SIGINT, and if their command can be disrupted, the fieldunits could not function. Since there is fairly little downside for terrorists to attack out of synchronization with other activities, the lack of positive control becomes a strength of their approach to cell organization.

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Core group, with contact ring and ideological hierarchy

The operational cells need to have continuous internal communication; there is acommander, who may be in touch with infrastructure cells or, less likely from a securitystandpoint with the core group.

Al-Qaeda's approach, which even differs from that of earlier terrorist organizations, may be very viable for their goals:

• Cells are redundant and distributed, making them difficult to ‘rollup’• Cells are coordinated, not under "command & control"—thisautonomy and local control makes them flexible, and enhances security• Trust and comcon internally to the cell provide redundancy of  potential command (a failure of Palestinian operations in the past), andwell as a shared knowledgebase (which may mean, over time, that ‘crosstraining’ emerges inside a cell, providing redundancy of most criticalskills and knowledge).[13]

[edit] Indirect support networks

In the above graphic, note the indirect support network controlled by Richard's subcell.

"While Al-Qaida has elements of the organization designed to support the structure, butsuch elements are insufficient in meeting the needs of such an organization, and for security reasons there would be redundant and secondary-/tertiary-networks that areunaware of their connection to Al-Qaida. These networks, primarily related tofundraising and financial activities, as well as technology providers, are in a ‘use’relationship with Al-Qaida—managed through cut-outs or individuals that do not informthem of the nature of activities, and that may have a cover pretext sufficient to deflectquestions or inquiry."[13]

[edit] A possible countermeasure

In 2002, U.S. News & World Report said that American intelligence is beginning toacquire a sufficiently critical mass of intelligence on al-Qaida indicating "Once thoughtnearly impossible to penetrate, al Qaeda is proving no tougher a target than the KGB or 

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the Mafia--closed societies that took the U.S. government years to get inside. "We'regetting names, the different camps they trained at, the hierarchy, the infighting", says anintelligence official. "It's very promising." [16] The report also said that the collected datahas allowed the recruiting of informants.

Writing in the U.S. Army journal Military Review, David W. Pendall suggested that a"catch-and-release program for suspected operatives might create reluctance or distrust insuch suspects and prevent them from further acts or, perhaps more important, createdistrust in the cell leaders of these individuals in the future." The author noted the pressrelease describing Ramzi Binalshib's cooperation with the United States "are sure to prevent reentry into a terrorist cell as a trusted member and most likely limits the further trust and assignments of close cell associates still at large. The captor would determinewhen to name names and when to remain silent." [17] Indeed, once intelligence learns thename and characteristics of an at-large adversary, as well as some sensitive informationthat would plausibly be known to him, a news release could be issued to talk about hiscooperation. Such a method could not be used too often, but, used carefully, could disturb

the critical trust networks. The greatest uncertainty might be associated with throwingdoubt onto a key member of an operational cell that has gone autonomous.

[edit] See also

• Leaderless resistance• Lone wolf (terrorism)

[edit] References

1. ^ Leahy, Kevin C. (2005). "The Impact of Technology on the Command, Control,and Organizational Structure of Insurgent Groups" (PDF).http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll2&CISOPTR=386&filename=387.pdf . Retrieved 2007-12-04.

2. ^ Irish Republican Army. "The Green Book".http://uk.geocities.com/oglaigh_na_heireann32/THE_GREEN_BOOK.html.Retrieved 2007-12-04.

3. ^ Hall, Roger (1964). You're Stepping on my Cloak and Dagger . Bantam Books.4. ^ Hogan, David W. (1992). "Chapter 3: Special Operations in the European

Theater". U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II . Washington, D.C.:United States Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 70-42.http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/70-42/70-423.htm.

5. ^ Pike, Douglas (1970). Viet Cong: Organization and Technique of the National 

 Liberation Front of South Vietnam. MIT Press.6. ^ US Department of the Army (December 2006). "FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency" 

(PDF). http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf .7. ^ a b Mao, Zedong (1967). On Protracted War . Foreign Language Press, Beijing.

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8. ^ US Department of the Army (20 February 2003). "FM 3-07 (formerly FM 100-20): Stability Operations and Support Operations".https://atiam.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/altfmt/9630-1

9. ^ Nyberg, Eric N. (1991). Insurgency: The Unsolved Mystery. US Marine CorpsUniversity Command and Staff College.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1991/NEN.htm10. ^ Luttwak, Edward (1968). Coup d'etat: A Practical Handbook . HarvardUniversity Press.

11. ^ Guevara, Ernesto "Che" (1961). On Guerilla Warfare. Praeger.12. ^ "al-Qaeda training manual" (PDF). US Southern District Court, US New York 

City Attorney's Office, entered as evidence in Africa embassy bombings.http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/aqmanual.pdf .

13. ^ a b c d  e  f    g  Decision Support Systems, Inc. (2001-12-31). "Hunting the Sleepers:Tracking al-Qaida's Covert Operatives" (PDF).http://www.metatempo.com/huntingthesleepers.pdf . Retrieved 2007-11-17.

14. ^ US Central Intelligence Agency. "Support to Mission: Who We Are".

https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/mission-support/who-we-are.html. Retrieved2007-11-19.15. ^ Fellman, Philip Vos; Wright, Roxana. "Modeling Terrorist Networks - Complex 

Systems at the Mid-Range" (PDF).http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/complexity/Conference/FellmanWright.pdf . Retrieved2007-11-02.

16. ^ Kaplan, David E. (22 September 2002). "Run and Gun: Al Qaeda arrests andintelligence hauls bring new energy to the war on terrorism". U.S. News & World  Report .http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/020930/archive_022824.htm

17. ^ Pendall, David W. (January-February 2004). "Effects-Based Operations and theExercise of National Power". Military Review (United States Army CombinedArms Center ). http://calldp.leavenworth.army.mil

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Intelligence cycle management

Intelligence

collection

management

HUMINT/

Human Intelligence

Clandestine HUMINT (recruiting ·

operational techniques · Covert action ·

Direct action · Clandestine cell system)Special reconnaissance (organizations)Espionage (Agent handling · Black bagoperation · Concealment device ·

Cryptography · Cut-out · Dead drop ·

Eavesdropping · False flag operations ·

Honeypot ·  Non-official cover ·Interrogation ·  Numbers messaging ·

One-way voice link · Steganography ·

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SIGINT/

Signals Intelligence

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Traffic analysis

MASINT/

Measurement and

Signature Intelligence

Electro-optical ·  Nuclear · Geophysical ·

Radar · Radiofrequency · Materials ·

Casualty estimation

Others

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IMINT/Imagery Intelligence ·

GEOINT/Geospatial Intelligence ·

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TECHINT/Technical intelligence

Intelligence

analysis

management

Intelligence analysis · Cognitive traps for intelligence analysis ·

Words of Estimative Probability · Analysis of CompetingHypotheses · Intelligence cycle (target-centric approach)

Intelligence

dissemination

management

Intelligence cycle security · Counter-intelligence · Counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism organizations · List of counterintelligence organizations · Counterintelligence failures

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clandestine_cell_system"Categories: Counter-intelligence | Types of espionage | Intelligence analysis | Militaryintelligence | Military tactics | Secrecy | Terrorism tactics