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Clandestine HUMINT asset recruiting

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This article is a subset article under  Human Intelligence. For a completehierarchical list of articles, see the intelligence cycle management hierarchy.

Concepts here are also associated with counterintelligence. This article deals

with the recruiting of human agents. For more general descriptions of humanintelligence techniques, see the article on Clandestine HUMINT operational 

techniques.

This article contains instructions, advice, or how-to content. The purpose of Wikipedia is to present facts, not to train. Please help improve this article either  by rewriting the how-to content or by moving it to Wikiversity or Wikibooks.(September 2009)

This article is written like a personal reflection or essay and may require

cleanup. Please help improve it by rewriting it in an encyclopedic style. (May2008)

This article may be too long to read and navigate comfortably. Pleaseconsider splitting content into sub-articles and using this article for a summary of the key points of the subject. (September 2009)

This section deals with the recruiting of human agents who work for a foreigngovernment, or other targets of intelligence interest. For techniques of detecting and"doubling" host nation intelligence personnel who betray their oaths to work on behalf of a foreign intelligence agency, see counterintelligence.

The term spy refers to human agents that are recruited by intelligence officers of aforeign intelligence agency. The popular use of the term in the media is at variance withits use in a professional context. Spies are not intelligence officers. Spies are recruited by

intelligence officers to betray their country and to engage in espionage in favor of aforeign power. Intelligence officers who interact with spies are generally referred to ascase officers.

Contents

[hide]

• 1 Types of agents• 2 Planning for recruitment

o 2.1 Spotting

2.1.1 Persons with access to technology 2.1.2 Persons with access to knowledgeable people 2.1.3 Persons in allied intelligence agencies 2.1.4 Targeting recruits based on intelligence information

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o 2.2 Prioritizing potential recruitment

o 2.3 Assessing potential recruits

2.3.1 Assessing walk-ins 2.3.2 General assessment

• 3 Access agents and access techniques

o 3.1 Love, honeypots and recruitmento 3.2 Spotting through emotional attachment

• 4 Development: preparation for actual recruitmento 4.1 Choosing between "crash" and gradual approaches

o 4.2 Compromise during development

o 4.3 Recruitment through professional interests

o 4.4 Stopping before formal recruitment

• 5 Recruitmento 5.1 Recruiting through business relationships

o 5.2 Process of legalising illegal agents

• 6 Soviet case studies

o 6.1 Soviet case study 1: Potential agent, with financial motivation, successful outcome

o 6.2 Soviet case study 2: Potential agent, with financial motivation, failure

o 6.3 Soviet case study 3: Potential agent, with financial motivation, guarded

successo 6.4 Soviet case study 4: Potential agent, with financial motivation, guarded

success

• 7 References

[edit] Types of agentsAcquiring information may not involve collecting secret documents, but something assimple as observing the number and types of ships in a port. Even though suchinformation might be readily visible, the laws of many countries would consider reporting it to a foreign power espionage. Other asset roles include support functions suchas communications, forgery, disguise, etc.

According to Victor Suvorov, a former Soviet GRU (i.e., military intelligence) officer,his service had Soviet officers, under diplomatic or nonofficial cover, handling two kindsof agent: basic and supplementary.[1]

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Basic agents can be formed into groups with leaders, or report directly to the controller.Basic agents include information providers, perhaps through espionage or expertise aboutsome local subject. Also in the basic group are "executive agents", who will kill or commit sabotage, and recruiting agents. In US practice, recruiting agents are calledaccess agents.

Both operation leaders and the supplementary group must be clandestine in support rolesto basic agents. They may be clandestine officers of the FIS, such as Rudolf Abel,

recruited in the target country, or recruited in a third country. One of the supplementaryfunctions is communications, which includes clandestine radio transmission, dead drops,couriers, and finding places for secure radio transmissions. Other supplementaryfunctions include people who can "legalise" agents with cover jobs, and specialists thatcan forge documents or get illicit copies from the actual source. Safe houses, safe maildrops, and safe telephones are other supplementary functions.

[edit] Planning for recruitment

This article may require copy editing for grammar, style, cohesion, tone or

spelling. You can assist by editing it. (December 2009)

Recruiting typically begins with spotting - identifying targets. The preferred techniqueuses a period of development, in which the recruiter learns more about the potentialagent, and may, through a delicate process, entrap or otherwise convince the target tocooperate. In certain cases, a case officer has reason to risk a "cold" approach.

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Sometimes the recruiting officer receives an unsolicited offer. Many intelligence assetswere not painstakingly recruited but were walk-ins or write-ins: people who offeredinformation to foreign intelligence services. This can be a way for the "host country" toidentify the intelligence officers and procedures of an embassy in country. The walk-in,who arrives without warning, is far riskier than a write-in who can be checked without

any initial interaction.

[edit] Spotting

Spotting is identifying people who appear to have access to information, or are attractivefor some support role. There is research to identify any ties to counterintelligence, andthen selection of the most promising candidates and approach method.

Obvious candidates are staff officers under diplomatic cover, or officers under nonofficialcontact, have routine contact. Also possible contacts of access agents, existing agents, or through information that suggests they may be compromised.

Surveillance of targets (e.g., military or other establishments, open source or compromised reference documents) sometimes reveals people with potential access toinformation, but no clear means of approaching them. With this group, a secondarysurvey is in order. Headquarters may be able to suggest an approach, perhaps through athird country or through resources not known to the field station. [2]

Recruiting people that may have access to the activities of non-state groups will be muchharder, since these groups tend to be much more clandestine, and often operate on a cellsystem composed of relatives and people who have known one another for years. Accessagents may be especially important here, and it may be worth the effort to spot potential

access agents.

The deliberate spotting process complements more obvious candidates, but candidateswho are also more likely to be compromised by counterintelligence, such as walk-ins andwrite-ins.

According to Suvorov, the Soviet GRU was not always able to collect enough material, principally from open sources, to understand the candidate's motivations andvulnerabilities.[3] It was GRU doctrine, therefore, to use every meeting to continue toelicit this information. Other intelligence authorities also see eliciting information as acontinuing process.[4]

That continued meetings both provide substantive HUMINT, as well as knowledge aboutthe asset, are not incompatible with security. Agent handlers still observe all the rules of clandestinity while developing the agent relationship. Knowledge of meetings, andindeed knowledge of the existence of the asset, must be on a strict need-to-know basis.[3]

[edit] Persons with access to technology

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resources required, SIGINT can tap phone lines or intercept other communications thatwill give the recruiter more information about the target.

[edit] Prioritizing potential recruitment

This step differs from the next one, assessment of potential recruits, in that it is notfocused on the recruit himself or herself, the probability of recruitment, etc., but, whenthere is more than one possible recruit, and a finite amount of case officer time, thediscussion here gives criteria to select the most important targets.

One analysis, by a US clandestine service officer with good knowledge of the practices of European allies, has five descending priorities in the period between 1957 and 1962.[7] Hedeveloped these in the context of being stationed in Europe during the Cold War , with agoal of acquiring HUMINT recruits in the Soviet Union and its satellite nations. Hisoperations were focused on people with the general characteristics:

•

They were involved in an embassy, legation, consulate, trademission, and news bureau that constituted the "were instrumentalities for that economic penetration, political subversion, and espionage thatthreatened U.S. interests." That focus could be considered one of  counter-intelligence as well as espionage.• They were outside "their  iron curtains for extended periods of time,two to five years,", so recruitment could involve a wide range of US, and possibly allied, intelligence resources.

Among this group, the priorities were:

1. The most valuable recruit had regular access to "current politicaland economic intelligence from the installation in question." Ideally, theasset would be in the highest-priority country and have access to "theminutes of Politburo meetings" or equally critical military, scientific, or other data. In the case of countries that either dominate countries (e.g., thesatellites of the former Soviet Union) or client states of another power,officials of the client country, or of the patron country's representatives inthe client, may be easier to recruit than officials in the home country.2. Nearly as important is an agent who will continue the relationshiponce he returns to his home country, be that the Soviet Union or a satellite.Recruitment is harder to detect with the less intense counterintelligence

surveillance of an independent or satellite country. "Installation penetration thus becomes a means of establishing long-range assets in theSatellites by recruiting, testing, and training them while they are abroad".In other words, the priority is to recruit a defector in place, continuing toreport. "The Satellite diplomat, foreign trade official, journalist, or intelligence officer who has been useful to us abroad will be even morevaluable when he goes back home at the end of his tour, not just because

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he is then inside the target country, but because the intelligence to whichhe has access in a ministry headquarters has greater scope and depth.3. The third priority involves offensivecounterintelligence/counterespionage: by observation of intelligenceactivities operated from embassies of country X, a counterintelligence

service can deduce characteristic recruiting and agent handling practicesfor country X. Because these officers and techniques affect many hostiletargets in the country of operations, once this information is known, theforeign intelligence service (FIS) agents can be neutralized in a variety of ways, including police action, convincing the asset in the country of operations to stop cooperating with the FIS, or, ideally, "recruiting thehostile intelligence officer in place."4. The fourth and fifth priorities are considerably less urgent than thefirst three. The fourth priority is the "defection of senior diplomatic, trade,or intelligence personnel. Defection can obviously yield only those goldeneggs already in the nest; it cuts off the continuing intelligence that could

 be provided by an in-place asset. It may be worthwhile, however, simplyto deny a target country the services of an able and experienced officer,and it may produce, in addition to his store of positive intelligence, leadsto his former colleagues who are still in place."5. Last in priority is not direct recruitment, but the collection of information to support future recruitment. This begins with obtaining biographical information on "officials abroad who are likely in the futureto have other tours of foreign duty somewhere in the world. An officialmay not be developable for recruitment during his current tour, but sixmonths from now it might be a different story. Political turmoil beingwhat it is within the Satellites, the "ins" can rapidly become the "outs." If we can identify a man as a former "in" who is now "out" we may be ableto recruit him. But this kind of identification requires orderly and current biographic indexes of Satellite personnel who travel abroad."

[edit] Assessing potential recruits

In deciding whether to recruit a prospect, there needs to be a process to make sure that the person is actively working for the adversary's counterintelligence, is under surveillance by them, or presents other risks that may not make recruitment wise. The assessment process applies both to walk-ins and targeted recruits, but additional assessment needs toapply to the walk-in, who is most likely to be someone sent by a counterintelligence

service.

[edit] Assessing walk-ins

Major intelligence services are very cautious about walk-ins or write-ins, but some of themost important known assets were walk-ins, such as Oleg Penkovsky or write-ins (usingintelligence tradecraft) such as Robert Hanssen. Some US and Soviet practices will

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illustrate the issues of these assessments, as well as protecting the security of one's ownintelligence service. Most walk-ins are rejected.

The US Army defines three classes of people who may present themselves, andrecognizes that a person may belong to more than one category[8]:

1. Defectors2. Asylum seekers3. Walk-ins: A person who voluntarily contacts a U.S. Army personor facility in person in writing, by telephone, or through another person or agency in order to provide information of significant value to the UnitedStates; or a disaffected person (one who is discontent and resentful,especially against authority) who presents him- or herself to a U.S.installation in a foreign country and who appears willing to acceptrecruitment in place or requests asylum or assistance in escaping from thecontrol of his or her government.

A Soviet response, to someone simply visiting the embassy, was "This is a diplomaticrepresentation and not an espionage centre. Be so kind as to leave the building or we willcall the police." According to Suvorov, the police are usually not called but the embassystaff chase the would-be agent out quickly.[3]

Cautious handling of walk-ins was not exclusively a Soviet concern.[8] U.S. Army procedure is to have military intelligence (MI) personnel handle all aspects of walk-ins:

• Unit Contact. Units contacted by a walk-in will immediately callthe nearest MI detachment or military police (MP) station.•

Individual Contact. Individuals contacted by a walk-in will refer the walk-in to the nearest MI detachment or MP station.• Written Contact. Units and individuals contacted by a walk-inthrough notes, letters, or other written material will provide the material tothe nearest MI or MP representatives.• Entry-control-point contact. "Personnel controlling installationaccess (MP, contract guard, host-nation guard) who are contacted by awalk-in will notify the responsible MP desk and request assistance.....After performing a cursory search of the individual and his or her  belongings, the MP will transport the individual to the MP station." Under US Army Regulations, military police are not intended to dointerrogations, which are the responsibility of military intelligence personnel.[9] The individual will be held at the MP station until anappropriate interviewer can arrive.

While serious discussion with the contact will be done by counter-intelligence specialists,information about the walk-in must be restricted to people with a "need-to-know." "Theinformation the walk-in provides must be guarded and classified appropriately." Allelectronic communications about the contact must be secure.[8]

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• The agent's information has appeared in local open sources• The information is true, but is too old to be of operational value.This was one of the key techniques of the World War II British DoubleCross System• If there are inconsistencies in the agent's life story, which the case

officer can query periodically through social conversation, the truth isusually in the consistent aspects. It is easier to make a mistake in keepingup a lie, than in telling the truth, which is the reason criminal investigatorsask a suspect to repeat their statements.• If the agent makes predictions, be very sure to see if they becometrue• In the event that the recruiting officer's service uses technicalmeans of detecting evasion, such as polygraphy, voice stress analysis, interviews by psychologists and psychiatrists, and perhaps more in thefuture, brain imaging, make use of these within the agency policy. Beaware that penetrators may be trained to resist them.

[edit] Access agents and access techniques

An access agent does not have significant access to material of intelligence value, but hascontact with those who do. Such a person could be as simple as the barber outside amilitary base, or as complex as a think tank or academic expert (i.e., outside thegovernment) who deals regularly with government personnel with access to sensitivematerial[2].

Within private and public organizations that handle sensitive material, human resourceworkers, receptionists, and other seemingly low-level personnel know a great deal about

the people with sensitive access. Certain employees, such as guards and janitors, whohave no formal access, still may be able to gain access to secured rooms and containers;there is a blurry area between an access agent that might let your collector into an area,and a support employee who can collect information that he may or may not understand.

[edit] Love, honeypots and recruitment

If one paid attention only to the fictional James Bond, little besides love would beinvolved in recruitment. The reality is different, although the details will vary withcountries, cultures, legality of the physical contact, and other aspects of a specificsituation. US intelligence services, for example, are concerned when their own personnel

could be subject to sexual blackmail. This applied to any homosexual relationship untilthe mid-1990s, and also applied to heterosexual relationships with most foreign nationals.[11] See honeypots in espionage fiction for fictional examples. In some cases, especiallywhen the national was a citizen of a friendly nation, the relationship needed to bereported. Failure to do so, even with a friendly nation, could result in dismissal.

One former CIA officer said that while sexual entrapment wasn't generally a good tool torecruit a foreign official, it was sometimes employed successfully to solve short-term

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 problems. Seduction is a classic technique; "swallow" was the KGB tradecraft term for women, and "raven" the term for men, trained to seduce intelligence targets [12].

During the Cold War, the KGB (and allied services, including the East German Stasi under  Markus Wolf , and the Cuban Intelligence Directorate (formerly known as

Dirección General de Inteligencia or DGI)) frequently sought to entrap CIA officers. TheKGB believed that Americans were sex-obsessed materialists, and that U.S. spies couldeasily be entrapped by sexual lures. The best-known incident, however, was of ClaytonLonetree, a Marine guard supervisor at the Moscow embassy, who was seduced by a"swallow" who was a translator at the Embassy of the United States in Moscow. Once theseduction took place, she put him in touch with a KGB handler. The espionage continuedafter his transfer to Vienna, although he eventually turned himself in.

The Soviets used sex not only for direct recruitment, but as a contingency where anAmerican officer might need to be compromised in the future. The CIA itself madelimited use of sexual recruitment against foreign intelligence services. "Coercive

recruitment generally didn't work. We found that offers of money and freedom worked better."[11] If the Agency found a Soviet intelligence officer had a girlfriend, they wouldtry to recruit the girlfriend as an access agent . Once the CIA personnel had access to theSoviet officer, they might attempt to double him.

Examples of people trapped by sexual means include:

• Clayton J. Lonetree, a US Marine Sergeant embassy guard in Moscow, wasentrapped by a female Soviet officer in 1987. He was then blackmailed intohanding over documents when he was assigned to Vienna. Lonetree is the first USMarine to be convicted of spying against the United States.

•

Roy Rhodes, a US Army  NCO serving at the US embassy in Moscow, had a one-night stand (or was made to believe he had) with a Soviet agent while drunk. Hewas later told the agent was pregnant, and that unless he co-operated with theSoviet authorities, this would be revealed to his wife.

• Irvin Scarbeck , a US diplomat, was entrapped by a female Polish officer in 1961,and photographed in a compromising position. He was blackmailed into providingsecrets.

• Sharon Scranage, a CIA employee described by one source as a "shy, naive,country girl", was allegedly seduced by Ghanaian intelligence agent MichaelSoussoudis. She later gave him information on CIA operations in Ghana, whichwas later shared with Soviet-bloc countries.

• Mordechai Vanunu, who had disclosed Israeli nuclear secrets, began an affair with an American Mossad agent, Cheryl Bentov, operating under the name"Cindy" and masquerading as an American tourist, on September 30, 1986. She persuaded him to fly to Rome, Italy, with her on a holiday. Once in Rome,Mossad agents drugged him and smuggled him to Israel on a freighter.

• John Vassall, a British civil servant who was guided by the KGB into having sexwith multiple male partners while drunk. The KGB then used photographs of thisto blackmail Vassall into providing them with secret information.

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• Bernard Boursicot, a French diplomat, was entrapped by Shi Pei Pu, who wasworking for the Chinese government. Shi Pei Pu, a male Chinese opera singer,successfully masqueraded as a woman and told Boursicot he was carryingBoursicot's child. The situation was fictionalized into the play M. Butterfly.

• Katrina Leung, indicted as a double agent working for both China and the FBI,

seduced her FBI handler, James J. Smith, and was able to obtain FBI informationof use to China through him. She also had an affair with another FBI officer,William Cleveland.

• In 2006, the British Defence Attaché in Islamabad Pakistan, was recalled home,when it emerged that he had been involved in a relationship with a Pakistaniwoman, who was an intelligence agent. While the British Government deny thatsecrets were lost, others sources say that several Western operatives andoperations within Pakistan were compromised.[1]

• In May 2007 a female officer serving in Sweden's Kosovo force was suspected of having leaked classified information to her  Serbian lover who turned out to be aspy.[13]

•

Won Jeong-hwa, who was arrested by South Korea in 2008 and charged withspying for North Korea, is accused of using this method to obtain informationfrom an army officer.[14]

[edit] Spotting through emotional attachment

Yet other factors may apply. True friendship or romance may draw others to becomeinvolved with a current agent. John Anthony Walker , who spied for money, recruitedfriends and relatives. Rosario Ames, wife of Aldrich Ames, was brought into her husband's activities.

Katrina Leung is one of the more complex cases, who came to the US on a Taiwanese passport, became involved with a PRC activist, on whom she was recruited to report tothe FBI. She seduced her FBI case officer, and eventually was recruited by the FBI as a"dangle" to PRC targets, specifically in the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS).Her first reports were independently confirmed by the CIA. Later, however, she wasfound to be passing FBI documents to the MSS, while still reporting to the FBI. Whileshe was allowed, at first, to continue, on the belief that the information she provided tothe US was more important than that which she was giving to the PRC, she waseventually arrested and charged with a relatively low-level crime. Eventually, that wasdismissed for reasons of prosecutorial misconduct, although a subsequent US governmentappeal resulted in a plea bargain. Her true loyalty was never made public, but, at various

times, she appears to have been a dangled mole and a doubled agent, as well as possiblya PRC access agent to FBI personnel.

[edit] Development: preparation for actual recruitment

Actual recruiting involves a direct approach by a case officer who has some existingaccess to the potential recruit, an indirect approach through an access agent or 

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 proprietary, or has reason to risk a "cold" approach. Before the direct recruitment, theremay be a delicate period of development.

The case officer, possibly through an access agent, works on establishing a relationship.This phase, in which the potential agent is called a developmental, has not yet reached

the recruiting pitch. "After the cultivation stage, overt contact is established with thecandidate under the guise of an official meeting. After the acquaintanceship has ripenedand official meetings evolve into personal meetings, the developmental stage begins.[5]

[edit] Choosing between "crash" and gradual approaches

Suvorov describes the "crash approach" as the most demanding form of recruitment,which is to be done only if the local rezident , or chief of the GRU unit, convinces GRUheadquarters that the risk is worthwhile.[3] "Quite a few examples are known of recruitment at the first meeting, of course following the secret cultivation which has goneon for many months."

"The crash approach, or 'love at first sight' in GRU jargon, has a number of irrefutableadvantages. Contact with the future agent takes place only once, instead of at meetingsover many months, as is the case with the gradual approach. After the first contact thenewly recruited agent will himself take action on his own security. He will never talk tohis wife, or tell her that he has a charming friend in the Soviet military attaché who isalso very interested in stamp collecting."

[edit] Compromise during development

Telling one's wife or colleagues about a charming Soviet friend can compromise the

entire development.[3]

The US is also aware that the Soviet developmental process is, preferably, gradual. "The developmental stage cements the relationship and encouragesloyalty to it. The hostile intelligence officer may then, through friendly persuasion, ask for a very innocent and insignificant favor from the candidate and pay him generously for it., thus placing the candidate in a position of obligation. During this stage the futureagent becomes accustomed to being asked favors and fulfilling them accurately. Thefuture agent's ambitions, financial and work problems, hobbies, etc., are continuouslyassessed by an intelligence team to exacerbate weaknesses. The future agent's professional, social, and private personalities are soon stripped away.[5]

It is the goal of the case officer, with appropriate support from his organization, to learn

vulnerabilities, build trust, and solve problems for the developmental. These are all preparatory steps to asking, perhaps subtly, the developmental to betray his own side.

Information requests begin innocently, usually asking for public information, but to getthe development on the path to betrayal. At first, any requests for documents are for openones, which the case officer gives some pretext for not himself obtaining. A creative task officer may then ask for a technically restricted, but still fairly innocent document, suchas an unclassified telephone directory.

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The interaction becomes more sensitive, especially when the case officer asks for something technically classified, but with an explanation that lets the potential recruitrationalize that he is not really betraying any trust. During this time, the case officer is building psychological control. In some cases, it may be possible to get usefulinformation without ever asking the developmental to betray his country. These cases

may mean the role of the recruit is not to be as a direct agent, but perhaps as an access or a support agent. The recruit may not even be witting of his relationship to a FIS.

Finally, the relationship will move to clandestine to overt, when the foreign service hassignificant compromising information on the asset. If the asset had been motivated bymoney, he will find the tasks given him may become more challenging, but the paymentsreduce, because he is no longer in a position to negotiate.[5]

[edit] Recruitment through professional interests

The traditional openness of the scientific community can be exploited to obtain

information from an individual with access to commercially, scientifically, or militarilyvaluable material. [15] "There is another important source, peculiar to scientificintelligence. This is the body of experts in particular fields of science available in one'sown country for consultation. The phenomena of nature are independent of political boundaries, and the experts are in the position of agents spying on these phenomenainsofar as they throw light on the feasibility of a suspected enemy development."

A 1998 document describes typical foreign intelligence recruitment against citizens withaccess to sensitive technology.[5] "Hostile intelligence services begin the agentrecruitment process by scrupulously collecting information on persons who are connectedto industry, RDT&E laboratories, government institution staffs, military bases, and

design organizations." A candidate for recruitment usually fulfills the following criteria:

• They must be in a position to provide information of real use to thehostile intelligence service, either to steal or copy S&T information, tocommunicate secret information by word of mouth, or to recruit newagents.• There must exist motives by means of which an individual can berecruited:

• Financial Consideration/Greed (Transcends all other motives)• Revenge/Disaffection•

Blackmail/Hostage Situations (Used in USSR but veryinfrequently in U. S.)• Appeal to Emigres National Pride• Exploitation of an Emotional Involvement• False Flag Approaches• Exploitation of an American's Naivete• Sex

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• Ideology (Not the motivation it once was. The Soviet servicechanged its emphasis to concentrate on sympathy for "persecuted"elements of American, or other targeted, society)

[edit] Stopping before formal recruitment

"By degrees the tasks become more complicated, but the payment for them growsequally, In many cases the actual recruitment proposal is never made, as the candidategradually becomes an agent of the hostile intelligence service without fully realizing it.[5]

[edit] Recruitment

If the decision is made to make a formal recruitment, the case officer gets thedevelopmental accustomed to meeting in more obscure places and at more unusual times.These can have the function of  countersurveillance, during which additional officers may be watching the meeting, and the travel to it, for evidence of "country A"

counterintelligence interest. Without the developmental fully realizing it, he is beingdrawn into increasingly treasonous activity, which would be harder and harder to explainwere he caught. It is considered important for the case officer to offer money, perhapsdismissed as covering expenses, but really as a means of compromising thedevelopmental.

Eventually, especially if the recruit is ideologically sympathetic to Country B, the caseofficer makes the direct recruitment pitch. This may not work, and, in fact, may inducerage. The case officer has to be prepared for physical defense and escape if this becomesnecessary. If the case officer can produce compromising photographs, receipts, etc., evenan originally ideological subject now moves into the realm of compromise.

[edit] Recruiting through business relationships

Most commonly directed at the strategic level (i.e., Scientific & Technical Intelligence— ST&I) of Technical intelligence, key business personnel, or even a business itself, might be recruited by a FIS. Both the KGB and GRU of the Soviet Union carried out suchrecruitment. The KGB service for such recruitment was called Line X, which reported toDirectorate T of the KGB First Chief Directorate, the Soviet civilian foreign intelligenceservice.

According to Victor Suvorov, the GRU commonly ran such recruitments at industry trade

shows:

Before the opening of exhibitions of military electronics, armaments and militarytechnology, ship-building and engine-building conferences, air shows and so on,hundreds of which take place every year, a scientific delegation appears at the GRUresidency with a list of everything which is essential for the Soviet military and thearmaments industry. The experts of course know that at the exhibition there will bedemonstrations of models whose sale to the Soviet Union is categorically prohibited.

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 None the less, the delegation will carry suitcases crammed full of money, with full powers to spend it as they wish. All expenditure is approved and justified. Theexamination and construction of such samples as they have been able to obtain in theSoviet Union will occupy much more time and money.[3]

The delegation visits the exhibition and looks at the stands of the big corporations only todisguise its real object. At each of these stands these are several salesmen and guides, anyone or all of which may be from the security services. The delegation is only reallyinterested in the stands of small firms where the explanations are carried out by the owner or a director himself. The delegation gets into conversation with him and an officer of thelocal GRU residency acts the part of interpreter. The experts pass themselves off as anofficial Soviet delegation. At the same time they manage to let the operational officer know that they have arrived at just such a firm as could be of use to them and that theexhibit is not just a model, but an actual piece. The interpreter stays for a few seconds.'Could I not invite you to dinner this evening in the restaurant?' 'I don't know whether thatwould be all right. We hardly know each other.' And that is all. Recruitment is

accomplished. ...

Suvorov explains that this technique was extremely effective with small firms: "Theowner of a small firm, even a very successful one, is always at great risk, always keen tostrengthen his situation..... In any case, if he sells his product he can hide the fact fromthe authorities. It is equally easy for him to hide the money he has received." The businessman, however, may forget that while he might not report the cash transaction tohis own government, the GRU certainly has recorded the act of payment, and can use itfor subsequent blackmail.

Suvorov explained that while the most strategic information appears to be associated with

major firms, there are several reasons why an approach to a smaller company is the placeto begin.

1. In many products, the true breakthroughs are not the entire aircraftor tank, but some subcomponent. An example of such, admittedly made bya British government facility but still a good example of a key technology,is the Chobham armor used on the M1 Abrams tank.2. People recruited in small firms may become access agents for recruitments in large companies. "After he has been milked, the owner of a components manufacturing firm, now turned agent, must turn hisattention to the recruitment of other agents in the big firms to which hesupplies his parts.[3]

[edit] Process of legalising illegal agents

While the usual practice is to recruit residents of the country being targeted, therecertainly have been cases where the FIS brings illegal agents into that country. Whendoing so, common practice was to have them enter through a third country, and perhapsclaim to be immigrants from a fourth.

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There would also be cases where a resident of the target country needs to have somecover to carry out some operation. A Soviet executive agent about to carry out anassassination or an act of sabotage might need building passes, uniforms, etc., that wouldlet him or her get into range of the target. In addition to executive agents recruitedlocally, there would be times where an illegal specialist of the FIS might be brought in to

carry out some part of the operation. The Soviet KGB had a Department V, staffed withofficers qualified to kill or to carry out sabotage.[16]

Specialists of the FIS might also need legalisation to carry out clandestine intelligencecollection. The US has had a group of CIA and NSA specialists who would emplacetechnical sensors, ranging from telephone taps to specialized devices for measuringweapons tests, into the target country.

Obtaining the documentation and other resources is the role of legalising agents anddocumentalists. Candidate for this category of agents are sought among officials of the police and passport departments, consular clerks, customs and immigration officials, and

small employers of labour. Agent legalisers are subjected to especially thorough vetting, because the fate of illegals is entrusted to them. When a Soviet illegal arrives in a countrythe task of the legalising agent is to ensure the issue of documents by making thenecessary entries in the registration books and to ensure that the illegal is in possession of the necessary documentation.[1]

A common technique was to have a documentation specialist find birth records of someone known later to have died, preferably in a place where records of death wereknown to have been lost. Documentation agent functions are related to that of thelegalising agent, but complementary. Documentation agents never have contact withillegals. The value of a documentation agent is to obtain documentation, ideally blank 

forms from the proper office. Otherwise, they may work on obtaining forged or stolendocuments, or perhaps buying them from poor students and the like.

A similar role to that of the legalising agent is played by the documentation agents.[1]

[edit] Soviet case studies

These observations are from Ivan Serov, former director of the GRU, the Soviet militaryintelligence organization. [10].

[edit] Soviet case study 1: Potential agent, with financial motivation, successful outcome

Some sources want to minimize or eliminate personal contact with an agent handler, asdid Robert Hanssen. Even a write-in, however, potentially reveals information that can bechecked, with as little information as a callback telephone number that can be checked ina reverse telephone directory, or, if the technical resources are available, wiretapped tofind out about other contacts. Early in a recruitment, even with an ostensible "well-wisher", the intelligence service doing the recruiting cannot know if the potential sourceis actually a loyal foreign intelligence officer trying to penetrate the recruiting service.

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Serov became somewhat comfortable with the recruit only after the recruit's motivationswere understood and worthwhile material was provided by the recruit.

[edit] Soviet case study 2: Potential agent, with financial motivation, failure

Well-wishers who contact the recruiting service through non-public channels are apt to beintelligence officers, to have access to that information. It cannot be determined, at first,if the well-wisher is truly offering services or is a penetration, but such approaches arecritical to follow, due to the apparent affiliation of the contact. Even if the recruitingservice decides the well-wisher is a penetration agent, the interaction offers a potentialchannel for disinformation. Using the interaction in that manner is relatively low-risk, if the well-wisher already demonstrated some familiarity with the HUMINT officer. attachéwas not public, but if it was not, the contact immediately needed to be taken seriously.

As is correct tradecraft, the contact was reported to GRU Headquarters, to check thecontact against known foreign intelligence officers. Reporting to the center and itsextensive files is standard doctrine for all known services, which also is a reason whyAldrich Ames and Kim Philby, as headquarters personnel with access to new contactinformation, were so damaging. The initial response was that contact should becontinued, and the air attaché obtained a document of value. A second message fromheadquarters, however, told the GRU officer to drop the contact as risky. The reason theCenter warned the local residency to break contact was not strictly that the well-wisher was questionable, but because Center, through other methods, learned that localcounterintelligence was aware of the meeting. Better security about the meeting mighthave let the relationship continue.

[edit] Soviet case study 3: Potential agent, with financial motivation, guarded success

A walk-in said that he had documents to sell, and asked for a large sum. The GRU officer interviewing him arranged for a secure meeting, with a backup communications planusing a safe public telephone. The officer researched the contact, before the meeting. anddecided to check up on him more thoroughly. As a test, the meeting was cancelled, butother GRU assets kept the meeting place under clandestine surveillane, and confirmed:

• The contact arrived at the meeting site, carrying a bundle of documents• There was no indication of counterintelligence activity

These observations gave confidence to the GRU residency, and they used the agreed

telephone to set up a new meeting, at a Soviet building. The building was chosen to givecounterintelligence the least chance to stage a provocation, although that Serov later  pointed out that if the Soviet building were under counterintelligence surveillance, theagent might become known, and neutralized or doubled.

In this case, the well-wisher brought valuable information and was paid for it. Further meetings produced more material, for which the agent was paid and gave receipts. GRU,however, continued to study the agent through multiple methods, and learned that the

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well-wisher was an unstable gambler motivated by money. While he was unreliable inmeeting, his material was judged so valuable that the risks he presented were justified bythe value of the material. "But in working with such a personality the officers of theresidency should have been especially circumspect and careful to avoid the slightestmistake." In such a case, even though meeting at a Soviet location worked, it was bad

tradecraft.

[edit] Soviet case study 4: Potential agent, with financial motivation, guarded success

A US walk-in showed the cover of a TOP SECRET to an overt officer, and the officer said he wanted to see the document, not the cover. The walk-in then produced thedocument and asked for $50, a small sum that the officer paid.

At a second meeting, at the same office, the GRU decided he was legitimate, andarranged much more secure contact and information transfer mechanisms, which produced valuable documents. Serov said the second meeting should never have beenheld at the same place, nor did the residency put the man under countersurveillance todetect possible counterintelligence. Serov observed that counterintelligence might havesacrificed a document to gain credibility for the agent. Indeed, Serov does not mentionthe possibility that the document was indeed TOP SECRET, but of a highly technicalmatter that the US, in other documents, realized did not work, and could have caused theSoviets to waste much effort on a bad technique. While value was gained, risk wasincreased as well.

[edit] References

1. ^ a b c Suvorov, Victor (1984), "Chapter 3, Agents", Inside Soviet Military

 Intelligence, MacMillan Publishing Company,http://militera.lib.ru/research/suvorov8/16.html

2. ^ a b Thomas Patrick Carroll, Government 139 (Class Notes) Syllabus Section 1 — 

 Human Intelligence: From Sleepers to Walk-ins, California State UniversitySacramento, http://www.csus.edu/indiv/c/carrollt/Site/Welcome_files/Gov't%20139G%20class%20notes%20Fall%202006%20-%2024%20Oct.pdf 

3. ^ a b c d  e  f    g  Suvorov, Victor (1984), "Chapter 4, Agent Recruiting",  Inside Soviet Military Intelligence, MacMillan Publishing Company,http://militera.lib.ru/research/suvorov8/16.html

4. ^ Educing Information--Interrogation: Science and Art, Foundations for the

 Future, National Defense Intelligence College Press, December 2006,

http://www.dia.mil/college/3866.pdf , retrieved 2007-10-315. ^ a b c d  e  f  United States Department of Defense (November 1998),  DoD 5200.1

-PH-2 Hostile Intelligence Threat -- U.S. Technology,http://www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/intel/52001ph2.pdf 

6. ^ a b c Hulnick, Arthur S. (Winter/Spring 2004), "Espionage: Does It Have aFuture in the 21st Century?",  Brown Journal of World Affairs XI (1): 165,http://www.watsoninstitute.org/bjwa/archive/11.1/Espionage/Hulnik.pd

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7. ^ Steinmeyer, Walter, "Installation Penetration" ([dead link ] – Scholar search), Studies in Intelligence (Central Intelligence Agency), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/docs/v06i3a04p_0001.htm

8. ^ a b c US Army in Europe (22 May 2003), Regulation 381-22. Military

 Intelligence. Processing Walk-Ins, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/aer381-

22.pdf 9. ^ Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, United States Army (1 October 1997), AR 190–8/OPNAVINST 3461.6/AFJI 31–304/MCO 3461.1: Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees , http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/ar190-8.pdf 

10. ^ a b Serov, Ivan A., "Work with Walk-Ins", Studies in Intelligence,https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol8no1/html/v08i1a02p_0001.htm

11. ^ a b Silverstein, Ken (April 17, 2007), "love and the C.I.A.", Harpers Magazine,http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/04/sb-sex-and-the-cia

12. ^ Programs: Language of Espionage,

http://www.spymuseum.org/programs/educate/loe.php, retrieved 2007-11-1013. ^ Swedish soldier fed secrets to Serbian lover , The Local, 2007-05-14,http://www.thelocal.se/7306/, retrieved 2007-05-21

14. ^ Model defector Won Jeong Hwa faces trial over spying for North Korea , London: The Times, 2008-08-28,http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4619191.ece, retrieved2008-08-31

15. ^ Jones, R.V. (1993-09-22), "The Scientific Intelligencer" ([dead link ] – Scholar search),Studies in Intelligence, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/docs/v06i4a05p_0001.htm

16. ^ John Barron (1974), KGB: the secret work of Soviet secret agents, ReadersDigest Press