WILLIAM F. GEMPERLE,Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HELEN SCHENKER and PAUL SCHENKER, as her husband,Defendants-Appellees.

Gamboa & Gamboa, forPlaintiff-Appellant.

A. R. Narvasa forDefendants-Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. COURTS; JURISDICTION OVER A NON-RESIDENT DEFENDANT; SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON AN ATTORNEY-IN-FACT; EFFECT. Where a non-resident alien had constituted his wife as his attorney-in-fact had authorized her to sue, and the latter in fact had sued on his behalf, and as a result thereof a suit was brought against him and a service of summons addressed to him on the latter case was served personally on his wife, his attorney-in-fact; the court had acquired jurisdiction over his person, he having empowered her to sue, so that she was also in effect empowered to represent him in suits filed against him.

D E C I S I O N

CONCEPCION,C.J.:

Appeal, taken by plaintiff, William F. Gemperle, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing this case for lack of jurisdiction over the person of defendant Paul Schenker and for want of cause of action against his wife and co-defendant, Helen Schenker, said Paul Schenker "being in no position to be joined with her as party defendant, because he is beyond the reach of the magistracy of the Philippine courts."chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The record shows that sometime in 1952, Paul Schenker hereinafter referred to as Schenker acting through his wife and attorney-in-fact, Helen Schenker hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Schenker filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a complaint which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-2796 thereof against herein plaintiff William F. Gemperle, for the enforcement of Schenkers allegedly initial subscription to the shares of stock of the Philippine-Swiss Trading Co., Inc. and the exercise of his alleged pre-emptive rights to the then unissued original capital stock of said corporation and the increase thereof, as well as for an accounting and damages. Alleging that, in connection with said complaint, Mrs. Schenker had caused to be published some allegations thereof and other matters, which were impertinent, irrelevant and immaterial to said case No. Q-2796, aside from being false and derogatory to the reputation, good name and credit of Gemperle, "with the only purpose of attacking" his "honesty, integrity and reputation" and of bringing him "into public hatred, discredit, disrepute and contempt as a man and a businessman", Gemperle commenced the present action against the Schenkers for the recovery of P300,000 as damages, P30,000 as attorneys fees, and costs, in addition to praying for a judgment ordering Mrs. Schenker "to retract in writing the said defamatory expressions." In due course, thereafter, the lower court rendered the decision above referred to. A reconsideration thereof having been denied, Gemperle interposed the present appeal.

The first question for determination therein is whether or not the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over the person of Schenker. Admittedly, he, a Swiss citizen, residing in Zurich, Switzerland, has not been actually served with summons in the Philippines, although the summons addressed to him and Mrs. Schenker had been served personally upon her in the Philippines. It is urged by plaintiff that jurisdiction over the person of Schenker has been secured through voluntary appearance on his part, he not having made a special appearance to assail the jurisdiction over his person, and an answer having been filed in this case, stating that "the defendants, by counsel, answering the plaintiffs complaint, respectfully aver", which is allegedly a general appearance amounting to a submission to the jurisdiction of the court, confirmed, according to plaintiff, by a P225,000 counterclaim for damages set up in said answer; but, this counterclaim was set up by Mrs. Schenker alone, not including her husband. Moreover, said answer contained several affirmative defenses, one of which was lack of jurisdiction over the person of Schenker, thus negating the alleged waiver of this defense. Nevertheless, We hold that the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over said defendant, through service of the summons addressed to him upon Mrs. Schenker, it appearing from said answer that she is the representative and attorney-in-fact of her husband in the aforementioned Civil Case No. Q-2796, which apparently was filed at her behest, in her aforementioned representative capacity. In other words, Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually sued, on behalf of her husband, so that she was, also, empowered to represent him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case, like the one at bar, which is a consequence of the action brought by her on his behalf.

Inasmuch as the alleged absence of a cause of action against Mrs. Schenker is premised upon the alleged lack of jurisdiction over the person of Schenker, which cannot be sustained, it follows that the conclusion drawn therefrom is, likewise, untenable.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

Wherefore, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, reversed, and the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with the costs of this instance against defendants-appellees. It is so ordered.

IDONAH PERKINS vs. ROXAS ET AL.GRN 47517, June 27, 1941FACTS:July 5, 1938, respondent Eugene Perkins filed a complaint in the CFI- Manila against the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for the recovery of a sum consisting of dividends which have been declared and made payable on shares of stock registered in his name, payment of which was being withheld by the company, and for the recognition of his right to the control and disposal of said shares to the exclusion of all others. The company alleged, by way of defense that the withholding of plaintiffs right to the disposal and control of the shares was due to certain demands made with respect to said shares by the petitioner Idonah Perkins, and by one Engelhard.Eugene Perkins included in his modified complaint as parties defendants petitioner, Idonah Perkins, and Engelhard. Eugene Perkins prayed that petitioner Idonah Perkins and H. Engelhard be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock in question and excluded from any claim they assert thereon. Summons by publication were served upon the nonresident defendants Idonah Perkins and Engelhard. Engelhard filed his answer. Petitioner filed her answer with a crosscomplaint in which she sets up a judgment allegedly obtained by her against respondent Eugene Perkins, from the SC of the State of New York, wherein it is declared that she is the sole legal owner and entitled to the possession and control of the shares of stock in question with all the cash dividends declared thereon by the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company.Idonah Perkins filed a demurrer thereto on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action, because the alleged judgment of the SC of the State of New York is res judicata. Petitioners demurrer was overruled, thus this petition.ISSUE:WON in view of the alleged judgment entered in favor of the petitioner by the SC of New York and which is claimed by her to be res judicata on all questions raised by the respondent, Eugene Perkins, the local court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.RULING:By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought, and this is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court, and is to be sought for in general nature of its powers, or in authority specially conferred. In the present case, the amended complaint filed by the respondent, Eugene Perkins alleged calls for the adjudication of title to certain shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and the granting of affirmative reliefs, which fall within the general jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila. Similarly CFI- Manila is empowered to adjudicate the several demands contained in petitioners crosscomplaint.Idonah Perkins in her crosscomplaint brought suit against Eugene Perkins and the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company upon the alleged judgment of the SC of the State of New York and asked the court below to render judgment enforcing that New York judgment, and to issue execution thereon. This is a form of action recognized by section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court) and which falls within the general jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila, to adjudicate, settle and determine.The petitioner expresses the fear that the respondent judge may render judgment annulling the final, subsisting, valid judgment rendered and entered in this petitioners favor by the courts of the State of New York, which decision is res judicata on all the questions constituting the subject matter of civil case and argues on the assumption that the respondent judge is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause. Whether or not the respondent judge in the course of the proceedings will give validity and efficacy to the New York judgment set up by the petitioner in her cross-complaint is a question that goes to the merits of the controversy and relates to the rights of the parties as between each other, and not to the jurisdiction or power of the court. The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry, not whether its conclusion in the course of it is right or wrong. If its decision is erroneous, its judgment can be reversed on appeal; but its determination of the question, which the petitioner here anticipates and seeks to prevent, is the exercise by that court and the rightful exercise of its jurisdiction.Petition denied.

45 F.2d 426 (1930)HEINEv.NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.No. 10465.District Court, D. Oregon.December 1, 1930.C. T. Haas and E. B. Seabrook, both of Portland, Or., for plaintiff.Huntington, Wilson & Huntington and Clark & Clark, all of Portland, Or., for defendant.BEAN, District Judge.This is one of a series of cases pending in this court against the New York Life Insurance Company and the Guardian Insurance Company, each of which is a New York corporation, to recover on some two hundred and forty life insurance policies made and issued by the defendants in Germany, in favor of German citizens and subjects, and payable in German marks. The policies of the New York Life Insurance Company were issued prior to August 1, 1914, and those of the Guardian prior to May 1, 1918. As a condition to their right to do business in Germany, the insurance companies were required to and did submit to the supervision and control of the German insurance officials, to invest the reserves arising from German policies in German securities, and to establish, and they do now maintain, an office in that country with a resident representative or agent upon whom service of process can be made.The actions now pending are brought and prosecuted in the name of, or as assignee of the insured by, certain parties in the United States and Germany, under an irrevocable power of attorney, by which they are authorized and empowered to sue for, collect, receive, and receipt for all sums due or owing under the policies, or compromise the same in consideration of an assignment and transfer to them of the undivided 25 per cent. interest in the policies and all rights accruing thereunder.None of the parties to the litigation are residents or inhabitants of this district. The plaintiffs reside in, and are citizens of, the republic of Germany. The defendants are corporations organized and existing under the laws of New York, with their principal offices in that state, with statutory agents in Oregon, upon whom service can be made. None of the causes of action arose here, nor do any of the material witnesses reside in the district, nor are any of the records of the defendant companies pertaining to the policies in suit in the district, but such records are either at the home office in New York or at their offices in Germany. The courts of Germany and New York are open and functioning and competent to take jurisdiction of the controversies, and service can be made upon the defendants in either of such jurisdictions. To require the defendants to defend the actions in this district would impose upon them great and unnecessary inconvenience and expense, and probably compel them to produce here (three thousand miles from their home office) numerous records, books, and papers, all of which are in daily use by it in taking care of current business.In addition, it would no doubt consume months of the time of this court to try and dispose of these cases, thus necessarily disarranging the calendar, resulting in delay, inconvenience, and expense to other litigants who are entitled to invoke its jurisdiction.Under these circumstances, the defendants, while conceding that the court has jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter, urges that it should refuse, in its discretion, to exercise such jurisdiction.I unhesitatingly concur in this view, for, as said by Mr. Justice Holmes in Cuba Railroad Co. v. Crosby, 222 U. S. 473, 32 S. Ct. 132, 133, 56 L. Ed. 274, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 40: "It should be remembered that parties do not enter into civil relations in foreign jurisdictions in reliance upon our courts. They could not complain if our courts refused to meddle with their affairs, and remitted them to the place that established and would enforce their rights. * * * The only just ground for complaint would be if their rights and liabilities, when enforced by our courts, should be measured by a different rule from that under which the parties dealt."*427It is apparent that the plaintiffs are seeking by these actions to impose on the defendants a liability under a different rule than "that under which the parties dealt."The courts of Germany have ruled that any person seeking to recover on a civil contract made in Germany prior to August, 1924, and payable in marks, can only recover on the basis provided in the monetary law of 1924. Manifestly the plaintiffs are not proceeding on any such theory.It is argued by the plaintiffs that, because the court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties, it has no discretion, but should proceed with the case, regardless of where the cause of action arose, or the law by which it is controlled, or the residence or convenience of the parties and witnesses, or the difficulty the court would encounter in attempting to interpret and enforce a foreign contract, or the interference with the other business of the court. But that is a matter resting in its discretion. It may retain jurisdiction, or it may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, decline to do so, as the circumstances suggest. The courts have repeatedly refused, in their discretion, to entertain jurisdiction of causes of action arising in a foreign jurisdiction, where both parties are nonresidents of the forum. Gregonis v. Philadelphia & R. Coal & Iron Co., 235 N. Y. 152, 139 N. E. 223, 32 A. L. R. 1, and note; Pietraroia v. New Jersey & Hudson River Ry. & Ferry Co., 197 N. Y. 434, 91 N. E. 120; Gregonis v. P. & R. Coal & Iron Co., 235 N. Y. 152, 139 N. E. 223, 32 A. L. R. 1; Stewart v. Litchenberg, 148 La. 195, 86 So. 734; Smith v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 14 Allen (96 Mass.) 336-343; National Telephone Mfg. Co. v. Du Bois, 165 Mass. 117, 42 N. E. 510, 30 L. R. A. 628, 52 Am. St. Rep. 503; Collard v. Beach, 81 App. Div. 582, 81 N. Y. S. 619; Great Western Railway Co. v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305; Disconto Gesellschat v. Umbreit, 127 Wis. 651, 106 N. W. 821, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1045, 115 Am. St. Rep. 1063.As said by Mr. Justice Bradley in The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 355, 5 S. Ct. 860, 864, 29 L. Ed. 152: "Circumstances often exist which render it inexpedient for the court to take jurisdiction of controversies between foreigners in cases not arising in the country of the forum; as, where they are governed by the laws of the country to which the parties belong, and there is no difficulty in a resort to its courts; or where they have agreed to resort to no other tribunals * * * not on the ground that it has not jurisdiction, but that, from motives of convenience, or international comity, it will use its discretion whether to exercise jurisdiction or not."See, also, Charter Shipping Co. v. Bowring, 281 U. S. 515, 50 S. Ct. 400, 74 L. Ed. 1008.These, in my judgment, are cases of that kind. They are actions brought on causes of action arising in Germany. The contract of insurance was made and to be paid there and in German currency. It is to be construed and given effect according to the laws of the place where it was made. 22 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 1350. The courts of this country are established and maintained primarily to determine controversies between its own citizens and those having business there, and manifestly the court may protect itself against a flood of litigation over contracts made and to be performed in a foreign country, where the parties and witnesses are nonresidents of the forum, and no reason exists why the liability, if any, cannot be enforced in the courts of the country where the cause of action arose, or in the state where the defendant was organized and has its principal offices. True, the courts of New York have declined to exercise jurisdiction over actions brought on insurance policies similar to those in suit. Higgins v. N. Y. Ins. Co., 220 App. Div. 760, 222 N. Y. S. 819, and Von Nessen-Stone v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co.[1]But that affords no reason why this court should do so. It is to me unthinkable that residents and citizens of Germany may import bodily into this court numerous actions against a nonresident defendant, on contracts made and payable in Germany, and insist as a matter of right that, because it has obtained jurisdiction of the defendant by service of its statutory agent, the taxpayers, citizens, and residents of the district having business in the court should stand aside and wait the conclusion of the case, where, as here, the courts of Germany and of the home state of the defendant are open and functioning.Judge Tucker, in the state court of Multnomah county, in an able and well-considered opinion in a case brought on one of the German policies (Kahn v. New York), reached the same conclusion.Motion allowed

G.R. No. L-32636 March 17, 1930In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. A.W. FLUEMER, petitioner-appellant, vs.ANNIE COUSHING HIX, oppositor-appellee.MALCOLM, J.:FACTS: Fleumer, the special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appealed from a decision of Judge of First Instance Tuason denying the probate of the document alleged to by the last will and testament of the deceased. Appellee is not authorized to carry on this appeal. We think, however, that the appellant, who appears to have been the moving party in these proceedings, was a "person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of First Instance," and so should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of the will (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 781, as amended; Villanueva vs. De Leon [1925], 42 Phil., 780).It is theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Verginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., and as certified to by the Director of the National Library, should govern. ISSUE: Whether or not the laws of West Virginia should govern.RULING: The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. the courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts.(In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no was printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the sale of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.Note: In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it would then the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 633.)It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in West Virginia and not establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the CATHY will and the testimony of the petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedings originally in the Philippine Islands, the petitioner violated his own theory by attempting to have the principal administration in the Philippine Islands.While the appeal pending submission in this court, the attorney for the appellant presented an unverified petition asking the court to accept as part of the evidence the documents attached to the petition. One of these documents discloses that a paper writing purporting to be the was presented for probate on June 8, 1929, to the clerk of Randolph Country, State of West Virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven by the oaths of Dana Wamsley and Joseph L. MAdden, the subscribing witnesses thereto , and ordered to be recorded and filed. It was shown by another document that, in vacation, on June 8, 1929, the clerk of court of Randolph Country, West Virginia, appointed Claude W. Maxwell as administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. In this connection, it is to be noted that the application for the probate of the will in the Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929. These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make the Philippines the principal administration and West Virginia the ancillary administration. However this may be, no attempt has been made to comply with Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested. There is no showing that the deceased left any property at any place other than the Philippine Islands and no contention that he left any in West Virginia.Reference has been made by the parties to a divorce purported to have been awarded Edward Randolph Hix from Annie Cousins Hix on October 8, 1925, in the State of West specific pronouncements on the validity or validity of this alleged divorce.For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

PHILIPPINE TRUST CO. v. BOHANAN

Topic: Succession and AdministrationDate: January 30, 1960Labrador, J.

DOCTRINE:The validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator, provided that the law must be proved in courts.

QUICK FACTS:Decedent Bohanan was a US citizen. Nevada law allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will. His ex-wife and children oppose the project of partition filed by the executor-petitioner, saying they were deprived of their legitimes. According to them, Philippine law must prevail, requiring decedent to reserve the legitime for surviving spouse and children.

CONFLICT LAWS:Old CC Art. 10(2), now NCC Art. 16(2) Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in question.

Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925, Sec. 9905 Every person over the age of 18 years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his or her estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the testators debts.

FACTS:Testator Bohanan was born in Nebraska and was a US citizen. He has some properties in California. Despite his long residence in the Philippines, his stay was found by the CFI to be merely temporary, and he remained to be a US citizen. The CFI declared his will as fully in accordance with the laws of Nevada and admitted it to probate. The Philippine Trust Co. was named executor of the will.

A project of partition was filed by Phil Trust which distributed the residuary estate into 3: 1) to his grandson, 2) to his brother and sister, to be distributed equally, 3) legacies of P6,000 each to his son and daughter, and 4) legacies to other people.

Respondent Magdalena Bohanan, his ex-wife, questions the validity of the partition, claiming that she and her children were deprived of their legitimes. (It must be noted that Magdalena and decedent C.O. Bohanan were married in 1909 but he divorced her in 1922. She re-married in 1925 and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of decedent.)

ISSUE 1: W/N Magdalena is entitled to legitime as surviving spouse

HELD: NO.There is no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife in the State of Nevada. There is also no conjugal property between her and decedent.

Moreover, during the proceedings of the case, Magdalena filed a motion to withdraw P20,000 from the estate funds, chargeable against her share in the conjugal property. But the Court found that there is no community property.

ISSUE 2: W/N the children are entitled to their legitime

HELD: NO.1) The CFI has correctly held that the law to be applied is Nevada law, because the decedent was a US citizen.2) The children do not dispute the provision. 3) While Sec. 9905 was not introduced as evidence in the hearing of the project of partition, it was introduced during the hearing of the motion to withdraw filed by Magdalena. The Court took judicial notice of the law and deemed it unnecessary to prove the law at the hearing of the project of partition.

DISPOSITIVE:As in accordance with Art. 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.

GIBBS vs. GOVT. OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDSG.R. No. L-35694December 23, 1933

FACTS: Allison D. Gibbs and his wife Eva Johnson Gibbs are both citizens of California and domiciled therein since their marriage in July 1906. There was no antenuptial marriage contract between the parties and during the existence their marriage the spouses acquired lands in the Philippine Islands, as conjugal property. On November 28, 1929, Mrs. Gibbs died and that in accordance with the law of California, the community property of spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of the husband, belongs absolutely to the surviving husband without administration. In intestate proceedings, Allison D. Gibbs, on September 22, 1930, filed anex partepetition. The court granted said petition and entered a decree adjudicating the said Allison D. Gibbs to be the sole and absolute owner of said lands, applying section 1401 of the Civil Code of California. When this decree presented to the Register of Deeds of Manila and demanded for the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title, it declined to accept as binding said decree of court and refused to register the transfer of title of the said conjugal property to Allison D. Gibbs, on the ground that the corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid. Thereupon, Allison filed in the said court a petition for an order requiring the said register of deeds "to issue the corresponding titles" to the petitioner without requiring previous payment of any inheritance tax.ISSUE: Whether or not Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her death is the owner of a descendible interest in the Philippine lands.RULING: The second paragraph Article 10 of the Civil Code provides:Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.The second paragraph of article 10 applies only when a legal or testamentary succession has taken place in the Philippines and in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is consulted only in regard to the order of succession or the extent of the successional rights; in other words, the second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when the deceased was vested with a descendible interest in property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.In the case of Clarkevs. Clarke, the court said:It is principle firmly established that to the law of the state in which the land is situated we must look for the rules which govern its descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the effect and construction of wills and other conveyances.This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of article 10 of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal property is subject to the laws of the nation of the owner thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which it is situated.Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which vested in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the community lands here in question must be determined in accordance with thelex rei sitae. It is admitted that the Philippine lands here in question were acquired as community property of the conjugal partnership of the appellee and his wife. Under the law of the Philippine Islands, she was vested of a title equal to that of her husband. It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible interest, equal to that of her husband, in the Philippine lands covered by certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, from the date of their acquisition to the date of her death.The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly falls within the language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances. It is unnecessary in this proceeding to determine the "order of succession" or the "extent of the successional rights" (article 10, Civil Code,supra) which would be regulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code of California which was in effect at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.

BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1,767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL MUNDOvs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATIONS ADMINISTRATOR, NLRC, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATIONGRN 104776, December 5,1994.FACTS:This is a consolidation of 3 cases of SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court for Certiorari.On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other OCWs instituted a class suit by filing an Amended Complaint with the POEA for money claims arising from their recruitment by ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION (AIBC) and employment by BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC (BRI) which is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals.The amended complaint sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund; interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay; fringe benefits; reimbursement of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRIIOn October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the Motion to Strike Out of the Records filed by AIBC but required the claimants to correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed out.AIB and BRII kept on filing Motion for Extension of Time to file their answer. The POEA kept on granting such motions.On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII declared in default for failure to file their answers.On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers within ten days from receipt of the order.(at madami pang motions ang na-file, new complainants joined the case, ang daming inavail na remedies ng both parties)On June 19, 1987, AIBC finally submitted its answer to the complaint. At the same hearing, the parties were given a period of 15 days from said date within which to submit their respective position papers. On February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted position paper. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a Consolidated Reply, POEA Adminitartor rendered his decision which awarded the amount of $824, 652.44 in favor of only 324 complainants. Claimants submitted their Appeal Memorandum For Partial Appeal from the decision of the POEA. AIBC also filed its MR and/or appeal in addition to the Notice of Appeal filed earlier.NLRC promulgated its Resolution, modifying the decision of the POEA. The resolution removed some of the benefits awarded in favor of the claimants. NLRC denied all the MRs. Hence, these petitions filed by the claimants and by AlBC and BRII.The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by Bahrain where most of the complainants were deployed. His Majesty Ise Bin Selman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1176, otherwise known re the Labour Law for the Private Sector. Some of the provision of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the claims of the complainants-appellants are as follows:Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour equivalent to his wage entitlement increased by a minimum of twenty-rive per centurn thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a minimum off fifty per centurn thereof for hours worked during the night which shall be deemed to being from seven oclock in the evening until seven oclock in the morning .Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.If employee worked, 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him x x x.Art. 81; x x x When conditions of work require the worker to work on any official holiday, he shall be paid an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal wage.Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one years continuous service with his employer shall be entitled to Laos on full pay for a period of not less than 21 days for each year increased to a period not less than 28 days after five continuous years of service.A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in respect of the proportion of his service in that year.Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite duration may be terminated by either party thereto after giving the other party prior notice before such termination, in writing, in respect of monthly paid workers and fifteen days notice in respect of other workers. The party terminating a contract without the required notice shall pay to the other party compensation equivalent to the amount of wages payable to the worker for the period of such notice or the unexpired portion thereof.Art. Ill: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of his employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days wages for each year of the first three years of service and of one months wages for each year of service thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to payment of leaving indemnity upon a quantum meruit in proportion to the period of his service completed within a year.ISSUE:1. WON the foreign law should govern or the contract of the parties.(WON the complainants who have worked in Bahrain are entitled to the above-mentioned benefits provided by Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain).2. WON the Bahrain Law should apply in the case. (Assuming it is applicable WON complainants claim for the benefits provided therein have prescribed.)3. Whether or not the instant cases qualify as; a class suit (siningit ko nalang)(the rest of the issues in the full text of the case refer to Labor Law)RULING:1. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law and admitted in evidence a simple copy of the Bahrains Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the Private Sector).NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that where the laws of the host country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall form part of the overseas employment contract. It approved the observation of the POEA Administrator that in labor proceedings, all doubts in the implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became applicable to said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable than those stipulated therein. However there was a part of the employment contract which provides that the compensation of the employee may be adjusted downward so that the total computation plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation therein agree, another part of the same provision categorically states that total remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the host country regulation and custom.Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it. Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a prepared form containing the stipulations of the employment contract and the employees merely take it or leave it. The presumption is that there was an imposition by one party against the other and that the employees signed the contracts out of necessity that reduced their bargaining power.We read the overseas employment contracts in question as adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof. The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed. In such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a system to regulate the relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity to enter into the contract, the formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth. Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into their contract as a set of terms. By such reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the contract.A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties. Such party expectation is protected by giving effect to the parties own choice of the applicable law. The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship the parties or their transaction. There is no question that the contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain law because the services were rendered in that country.2. NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of the complainants was 3 years, as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, and not ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not actionable after the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of the Contract.As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum (local court), Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law. In Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir. [1955]), where the issue was the applicability of the Panama Labor Code in a case filed in the State of New York for claims arising from said Code, the claims would have prescribed under the Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of Limitations of New York. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Panamanian Law was procedural as it was not specifically intended to be substantive, hence, the prescriptive period provided in the law of the forum should apply. The Court observed: . . . we are dealing with a statute of limitations of a foreign country, and it is not clear on the face of the statute that its purpose was to limit the enforceability, outside as well as within the foreign country concerned, of the substantive rights to which the statute pertains. We think that as a yardstick for determining whether that was the purpose, this test is the most satisfactory one.The Court further noted: Applying that test here it appears to us that the libellant is entitled to succeed, for the respondents have failed to satisfy us that the Panamanian period of limitation in question was specifically aimed against the particular rights which the libellant seeks to enforce. The Panama Labor Code is a statute having broad objectives. The American court applied the statute of limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there was no showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum (local Court) on prescription of actions.However the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum (local Court) has a borrowing statute. Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A borrowing statute directs the state of the forum (local Court) to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are several kinds of borrowing statutes, one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute was not run against it.Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It provides: If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forums public policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution emphasized that:The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development (Sec. 10).The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare (Sec. 18).In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides:Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law.The next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of the claims is 3 years, as provided by the Labor Code or 10 years, as provided by the Civil Code of the Philippines.Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accross:(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgmentIn this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the written contracts between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period provided by Art. 1144(l) of the New Civil Code should govern.3. NO. A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court. When all the claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain law many of the claimants worked outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed in Indonesia under different terms and condition of employment.Inasmuch as the First requirement of a class suit is not present (common or general interest based on the Amiri Decree of the State of Bahrain), it is only logical that only those who worked in Bahrain shall be entitled to rile their claims in a class suit.While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of the claims is the same (for employees benefits), there is no common question of law or fact. While some claims are based on the Amiri Law of Bahrain, many of the claimants never worked in that country, but were deployed elsewhere. Thus, each claimant is interested only in his own demand and not in the claims of the other employees of defendants. A claimant has no concern in protecting the interests of the other claimants as shown by the fact, that hundreds of them have abandoned their co-claimants and have entered into separate compromise settlements of their respective claims. The claimants who worked in Bahrain can not be allowed to sue in a class suit in a judicial proceeding.WHEREFORE, all the three petitioners are DISMISSED.

7 SCRA 95 Civil Law Applicationof Laws Foreign Law Nationality Principle Internal and Conflict RuleApplicationof the Renvoi DoctrineEdward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Adolfo Aznar was the executor of the estate. Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California law.ISSUE:Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the successional rights of his heirs.HELD:The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to Californians domiciled in California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California. Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings the determination of the successional rights under Philippine law only.

Aznar vs. Garcia [7 SCRA 95]Post undercase digests,Civil LawatSaturday, February 25, 2012Posted bySchizophrenic MindFacts:Edward Christensens (citizen of theState ofCalifornia) will was executed in Manila where it provides that Helen ChristensenGarciareceive apayment ofP3,600 andproposedthat the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter Maria Lucy Christensen. Helen ChristensenGarciaopposed the project of partition of Edwards estate claiming thatshe wasdeprived of her legitime as acknowledged natural child under the Philippine law.

Issue:Whether or not theCalifornia lawor the Philippine law shouldapply inthe case at bar.

Held:Philippine law should be applied. TheState ofCalifornia prescribes two sets of laws for its citizens residing therein and a conflict of law rules for its citizens domiciled in other jurisdictions. Art. 946 of the California Civil Code states that If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile. Edward, a citizen of theState ofCalifornia, is considered to have his domicile in the Philippines. The court of domicile cannot and should not refer thecase backto the California, as such action would leave the issue incapable of determination, because the case would then be tossed back and forth between the states(doctrine of renvoi). The validity of the provisions of Edwards will depriving his acknowledged natural child of latters legacy, should be governed by the Philippine law.

The decision appealed from is reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instruction that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.

Facts:Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California where he resided and consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to 1913. He came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country, he had always considered himself as a citizen of California.In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied, the matter is returned back to the law of domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be increased in view of successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the other hand, counsel for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of theMew Civil Code, the national of the deceased must apply, our courts must apply internal law of California on the matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator should dispose any property possessed by him in absolute dominion.Issue:Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.Held:The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen Christensen Garcia said in effect that there be two rules in California on the matter.1.The conflict rule which should apply to Californians outside the California, and2.The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in califronia.The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code States that if there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the decree of its owner and is governed by the law of the domicile.Christensen being domiciled outside california, the law of his domicile, the Philippines is ought to be followed.Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to the lower court with instructions that partition be made as that of the Philippine law provides.

Bellis vs Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLES BANK & TRUST COMPANY,executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, VS.EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET. AL., heir-appelleesG.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

FACTS:Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had 5 legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children.

Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate should be divided in trust in the following order and manner:

a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.

Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in the Philippines. The Peoples Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein.

Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its Executors Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portionsfor the benefit of the testators 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.

Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children.

The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.

ISSUE:Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.

RULING:It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law.

Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and that under the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis