corpuz v people - comment - osg

8/12/2019 Corpuz v People - Comment - OSG

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Third Division SUPREMPOURT

THIR DlVISION

t___ S. :I.pL

Recehvd by: 77LITO CORPUZ

- versus -...

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Petitioner,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent..En ............... . ... .. x

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COMMENT

G.R. No. 180016

On the Petition for Review onCertioraridated November S 2007

Respondent People of the Philippines, by counsel, in compliance

with this Honorable Court s Resolution dated January 21, 2008, 1

respectfully states:

NATURE OF THE PETITION

This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals Decision dated

March 22, 2007, affirming with modification the Judgment dated July

30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City,

finding petitioner Lita Corpuz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

1 Copy received by the Office of the Solicitor General OSG) on February 29, 2008. On March 7,2007, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment praying that it be given anadditional period of sixty (60) days from March 10, 2008 or until May 9, 2008 within which to filethe required comment. Hence, this Comment is being filed within the period prayed for.

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LCOMMN T2

Lito Corpuz vs. People of the PhilippinesG.R. No. 180016x x

crime of estafa, as well as the Resolution dated September 5, 2007,

denying petitioner s Motion for Reconsideration.

RELEV NT NTECEDENTS

Sometime in 1990, Danilo Tangcoy met petitioner at the

Admiral Roya le Casino in Olongapo City. Both were employed ascollection agents of JBL Incorporated, a loan and financing company.

Aside from being an agent, Tangcoy was also engaged in the

business of buying and selling jewelry.

On May 2, 1991, petitioner inquired from Tangcoyif

he hadany jewelry for sale. At that time, Tangcoy had with him several

pieces of jewelry which he bought in Thailand: (1) an 18k diamond

men s ring worth P45,000.00; (2) a 2-baht 22k ladies bracelet worth

P12,000.00; (3) a 3-baht 22k men s bracelet worth P25,000.00; and

(4) a 2-baht 22k men s bracelet worth P16,000.00. The total value

of the jewelry was P98,000.00. 2

Petitioner told Tangcoy that he was interested to sell the

jewelry. They agreed that petitioner will sell the jewelry on

commission within sixty (60) days. Upon the lapse of such period,

2 TSN, December 17, 1992, pp. 5-6.

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T 30 MM N T

r Lito Corpuz vs. People of the PhilippinesG.R. No. 180016x--------------------------------------------------------x

petitioner shall remit the sale proceeds to Tangcoy or return the

jewelry, i f unsold. 3

On July 5, 1991, after the lapse of the 60-day period, Tangcoy

waited for petitioner to pay remit the sale proceeds or return the

jewelry, but petitioner failed to do so. 4

After constantly searching for petitioner, Tangcoy finally located

him after two (2) months. Petitioner promised to pay for the jewelry

but failed to do so. 5

Petitioner was then charged before the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 75, Olongapo City with the crime of estafa, in an Information

which reads:

That on or about the fifth 5th) day of July, 1991, in theCity of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of

this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after havingreceived from one Danilo Tangcoy, one men s diamond ring,18 k worth P45,000.00; one (1) three baht men s bracelet,22k worth P25,000.00; one two-baht men s necklace, 22kworth P16,000.00; and one (1) two-baht ladie s bracelet, 22 kworth P12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety EightThousand Pesos (98,000.00), Philippine Currency, under theexpress obligation on the part of said accused to remit theproceeds of the sale of the said items or to return the same, ifnot sold, but said accused, once in possession of the said

items, with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness andabuse of confidence, and far from complying with his afore-stated obligation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

3 Id. pp. 6-7.4 Id. pp. 9-10.5 Id. p 10.

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T 4C 0 M M E N TLita Corpuz vs. People of th PhilippinesG.R. No. 180016x--------------------------------------------------------x

feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own

personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries or theproceeds of sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, theaccused failed and refused to return the said items or to remitthe amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos P98,000.00)Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of saidDanilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned amount.

CONTRARYTO LAW.6

Upon arraignment, with assistance of counsel, petitioner

pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

On July 30, 2004, after trial on the merits, the trial court

rendered Judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of the crime charged, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of

imprisonment for four 4) years and two 2) months as minimum to

fourteen 14) years and eight 8) months as maximum.7

Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of

Appeals. On March 22, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a

Decision affirming with modification (as to the penalty) the trial

court s judgment. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the said

decision, but the motion was denied in a Resolution dated September

5 2007.

Hence, this appeal.

6 Judgment, July 30, 2001, p. 1.7 Id. p. 5.

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rLita Corpuz vs People o the PhilippinesG R No 180016x--------------------------------------------------------x

ISSUES

I

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALSCORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT SRULING THAT THE EXHIBITS WERE

ADMISSIBLE.

I I

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALSCORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT SRULING THAT THE INFORMATION WAS NOTFATALLY DEFECTIVE.

I I I

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALSCORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT SRULING THAT DEMAND TO REMIT THE SALEPROCEEDS OR RETURN THE JEWELRY WASSUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED.

V

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALSCORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT SRULING THAT PETITIONER S GUILT WASPROVEN BEYOND REASONABLEDOUBT.

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Lito Corpuz vs. People of the PhilippinesG.R. No. 180016x x

ARGUMENTS

The exhibits were properlyadmitted inasmuch spetitioner failed to object ttheir admissibility during trial

Petitioner contends that Exhibit A (receipt dated May 2 1991)

and its sub-markings were improperly admitted, as they consisted of

mere photocopies, the originals of which were never presented or the

reason for their loss or destruction explained. 8

As the Court of Appeals aptly explained:

xxx Such argument is untenable. An examination ofthe records discloses that [petitioner] did not object to theadmissibility of the said document at the time it was identifiedand marked in court as well as testified upon by the privatecomplainant. Neither did he raise such objection in hisComment to the prosecution s formal offer of evidence.Instead, [petitioner] admitted having signed the same. Assuch any objection to its admissibility is deemedwaived

It has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that

objections to the admissibility of evidence must be made at the

proper time, otherwise, i t be deemed waived. In the case of

documentary evidence, the proper time is when from the

8 Petition, November 5 2007, p. 7.9 Decision, March 22, 2007, p. 5. (citations omitted)

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. . .C OM M E NTLito Corpuz vs. People of the PhilippinesG.R. No. 180016x x

presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of the evidence may be

inferred. 10

The information was notdefective inasmuch s itsufficiently stated thedesignation of th offense andthe acts complained of

Petitioner contends that the Information was defective because

it did not specify the period within which petitioner was supposed to

remit the sale proceeds of the jewelry or return the same. He

theorizes that such period is material in determining if he is indeed

criminally liable for breaching his obligation to pay for or return the

jewelry. 11

Petitioner s contention has no merit.

An information is sufficient where it clearly states the

designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or omissions

complained of as constituting the offense. 12 Section 6 Rule 110 of

the Revised Rules of Court also provides that a complaint or

information is sufficient if it states: (1) the name of the accused; (2)

the designation of the offense by the statute; (3) the acts or

1 Abrenica vs. Gonda,upra note 6.

12 People vs. Rita, 247 SCRA 484 (1995).


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lCOMMENTLito Corpuz vs. People of the PhilippinesG.R. No. 180016x x

8

omissions complained of as constituting the offense; 4) the name of

the offended party; 5) the approximate time of the commission of

the offense; and 6) the place wherein the offense was committed.

That the information did not specify the period within which

petitioner was supposed to remit the sale proceeds of the jewelry or

return the same was immaterial. As the Court of Appeals correctly

pointed out:

xxx The gravamen of the crime of estafa underArticle 315, paragraph l b) of the Revised Penal CodeRPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or

property received to the prejudice of the [offendedparty]. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of thecommission thereof is not an essential element of thecrime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution tospecify the exact date does not render the Informationipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also nearthe due date within which [petitioner] should havedelivered the proceeds or returned the said jewelries astestified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient

compliance with the rules. [Petitioner], therefore, cannotnot be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprisedon the charges proffered against him. 3

he prosecution sufficientlyestablished all th elements ofthe crime charged

The third and fourth issues being interrelated, respondent begs

leave to discuss them jointly.

3 upra note 7, p. 7. citations omitted)

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C O M M E N T

Lito Corpuz vs. People o f the PhilippinesG.R. No. 180016x x

9

Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt

beyond reasonable doubt, 14 particularly since all the elements of

estafa were not sufficiently established. 15

Petitioner's contention has no merit.

The elements of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC are:

(1) That money, goods, or other personal property be

received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for

administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to

make delivery of, or to return, the same;

(2) That there be misappropriation or conversion of such

money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such

receipt;

(3) That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to

the prejudice of another; and

(4) That there is a demand made by the offended party to

the offender. 16

14 upra note 6, p. 11.is Id. p 916 2 Luis B. REYES THE REVISED PENAL CooE CRIMINAL LAw 742 (2006).

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sUPRltMPl COURT .,...,. llCBOF THECLERKOr CC:nJ '.n. El'l sANC

1itJ:CE1VEDINSTRUCTION

2 2 2D13.NSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGt:- ... NCING P 0 ESS

Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar,1 Appointed Amicus Curiae, Soft copy submitted August 16, 2013

Introductory remarks

._I want to start out with an insightful quotation from

reme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger who .said: c.-N

The methods by which we enforce our criminai . been c_alled the fl easure

qbur c vl zat on may nghtly be 1udged. (highlights

supplied)

r >

, I had made this quotation in protest against vigilante justiceulting in what has been euphemistically called "extra-legalcutionsldisappearances" that is even now still rampaging not only in

vao but also the rest of the country. The dubious claim of the police:a shoot-out in Atimonan, which the Court of Appeals concluded toa rub-out ; or the alleged attempted rescue of the Ozamis hold-upbery group, resulting in the killing of the two suspects while in police

stody, resulting in a criminal charge against the police escorts, make'1i'squotation relevant today. 2

. For this case, the question raised by the subject of this opinion is. ether that measure of civilization may be used to evaluate the( cial penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals based on legislatedtandards set in December 8, 1930, when the Revised Penal Code wasp proved as Act No. 3815, almost 83 years ago.

II. Constitutional rights of a criminal defendant.

In a survey that I had made several years ago, which I admit isss than exhaustive 3 , I found out that challenges to the constitutionalghts of those who get snared in the criminal process aregncentrated on those that violate their rights guaranteed by the Bill of,jghts. They all relate to the earlier stages of the criminal process,at is, crime investigation by the police, the issuance of an arrest, rrant, warrantless arrest and seizure, preliminary investigation by aagistrate or prosecuting officer, arraignment, and trial. These rights

he Notice of Resolution appointing Professor Tadiar as an amicus curiae was

PDl,July 17, 2013, front page captioned De Lima mad over slay of robbery gang'aders

Rights of the Accused, Proceedings of Symposia, Vol. 1, 1996, Institute of Humanights U.P. Law Center.

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are: right to due process 4 guarantee against unreasonable search andseizure, 5 privacy of communication 6 , freedom of speech 7 , freedom ofworship8 , liberty of abode 9 , right to be informed of right to remainsilent and to counsel 10 , right to bail 11 , presumption of innocence 12 ,speedy trial 13 , habeas corpus 14 , right against self-incrimination 15 , rightagainst double jeopardy 16 . All of these rights pertain to stages of thecriminal process up to conviction.

The challenges that may be raised at the last stage of theriminal process involve only the actual sentence imposed or the

barrying out of the sentence. The constitutional protection at this finalstage relate to the following provisions:

Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed

nor cruel degrading or inhuman punishment imposed

(2) The employment of physical psychological ordegrading punishment against any prisoner or detaineeor the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilitiesshall be dealt with by law. 17

The last sub-section does not raise any constitutional issuentil after a law has been passed. It is not therefore self-executoryntil after legislation has been enacted to give those rights.

II. The case at bar

Corpuz vs People o the Philippines 8 is unique in the senset hat petitioner does not challenge any stage of the criminal processhat led to his conviction of the crime of estafa by abuse ofponfidence under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code. Whath e poses a question on, that is, is the penalty imposed on him for theP98 000 00 worth of jewelry that were entrusted to him for sale on

ommission on May 2, 1991 which he failed to remit the proceeds ofny sale that he may have made or return the jewelry to the private

iSec. 1, Article III, Bill of Rights, Constitution:Sec. 2, ibidSec. 3, idsec. 4 id

:sec. 5, idSec. 6, id

.osec.12 1) to 4), id1Sec. 13, id

;2 Sec. 14, id13 i1 :

Sec. 15, id.ssec.17 id1 6 Sec. 21, idI,

]Article III, Bill of Rights, 1987 ConstitutionG.R. No. 180016


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mplainant, Danilo Tangcoy, valid in light o the drasticeterioration o the peso from the date when the legislature set the.,,enalty based on its value in 1930 to the date of its imposition by theourt of Appeals in 2012?

The Regional Trial Court RTC) of San Fernando Cityimposed upon Corpuz a sentence o an indeterminate

i,enalty of imprisonment from 4 years and 2 months of prisionqrreccional, medium period as minimum to 14 years and 8 months

freclusion temporal, as maximum.

0 Google search, Cruel and Unusual Punishment


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date it was approved by the Legislature on December8 1930?

3. May the incremental penalty imposed in 1930 by theRPC based on the excess of P22,000.00 be declaredunconstitutional for being disproportionate andexcessively harsh in relation to the present value of thepeso?

}Cl The power o judicial review

May the power of judicial review be exercisedto pass upon a constitutional issue that has notbeen squarely raised?

The power of judicial review was first established in theUnited States by the landmark case of Marbury v Madisondecided in 18 3 - more than 200 years ago - by Chief JusticeJohn Marshall. It is instructive to recall that this case wasoriginated by a petition filed by the Petitioner Justice o thePeace William Marbury against James Madison as Secretaryo State 31 for mandamus to compel the issuance of hiscommission in order to perform the duties of the position towhich he was appointed by President Adams.

The following disquisition of Justice Marshall is insightfulof the essence of the power of judicial review:

The very essence o f civil liberty certainlyconsists in the right o f every individual toclaim the protection o f the laws, wheneverhe receives an injury. One o f the first dutieso f government ls to afford that protection.The government o f the United States hasbeen emphatically termed a government o flaws, and not o f men. t wlll certainly ceaseto deserve this high appellation, l f the lawsfurnish no remedy for the violation o f avested legal underscores supplied

The constitution vests the whole judicialpower of the United States in one supremecourt, and such inferior courts as congress

shall, from time to time, ordain andestablish. This power ls expressly extendedto all cases arising under the laws o f theUnited States; and consequently, ln someform, may be exercised over the present

3 5 us 37 1803)


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case; because the right claimed is given bya Jaw of the United States.

So i f a law be in opposition to theconstitution; if both the Jaw and the

constitution apply to a particular case, sothat the court must either decide that caseconformably to the Jaw disregarding theconstitution; or conformab/y to theconstitution, disregarding the law; the courtmust determine which o f these conflictingrules governs the case. This is o f the veryessence o f judicial duty. Underscoressupplied)

If then the courts are to regard theconstitution; and the constitution issuperior to any ordinary act o f thelegislature; the constitution, and not suchordinary act, must govern the case to whichthey both apply.

Those then who controvert the principlethat the constitution is to be considered, incourt, as a paramount law, are reduced to

the necessity of maintaining that courtsmust close their eyes on the constitution,and see only the law.

This doctrine would subvert the veryfoundation of all written constitutions. twould declare that an act, which, accordingto the principles and theory o f ourgovernment, is entirely void; is yet, inpractice, completely obligatory. t would

declare, that i f the legislature shall do whatis expressly forbidden, such act,notwithstanding the express prohibition, isin reality effectual. t would be giving to thelegislature a practical and realomnipotence, with the same breath whichprofesses to restrict their powers withinnarrow limits. t is prescribing limits, anddeclaring that those limits may be passedat pleasure.

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Marbury then goes on to declare that Section 13 of the:; Judiciary Act is unconstitutional.


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A comment tor 32 observed, however, th t the power ofjudicial review was only judicially fashioned and not

mentioned in the u.s Constitution

An examination of the 1987 Constitution shows th t it gr nts

review power to the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari,irohibition mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus. Th is is

e only instance where the power of judicial review is expressly.entioned in the Philippine Constitution but restricted it to those xpressly mentioned therein. Thus, the observation made t theoutset by the American comment tor - th t this is a judici llyfashioned power th t is not expressly granted by the Constitution

continues to be valid tod y even for the Philippines outside ofthose expressly enumerated.

1

The power of judicial review has been adopted and practicedy the Philippine Supreme Court throughout its short existence. I t

seems th t no serious challenge has ever been raised against thexercise of this power, which is generally accepted. Nevertheless,

the case t bar, the power of judici l review is within the casesxpressly mentioned in the Constitution.

Under what circumstances may the power o fjudicial review be exercised by the Court?

From the following examples, such circumstances m y beeduced. The st tutory provision must have been cited by a p rtyo the case; or it is inextricably linked to the principal issue raised.

1. Constitutionality of Article 5 RPC

It is suggested by the opposition to reconsideration that the.remedy for excessive penalty, expressly provided for by Article 5 of

the RPC, be resorted to. Said provision states:

Art. 5. Second paragraph. the court shallsubmit to the Chief Executive through theDepartment of Justice such statement as may bedeemed proper, without suspending the executionof the sentence of the sentence, when a strictenforcement of the provisions of this Code wouldresult in the imposition of clearly excessive penalty,taking into consideration the degree of malice andinjury caused by the offense. (Bold type supplied)

i32 Warren Mickey Michelson, Google blog, April 2013


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. The antiquatedness o this provision, that is surprisingly soughtt be resurrected by the oppositors, is shown by the followingobservations:

I recall that as late as 1969 there was an Office o JudicialSupervisor n the Department o Justice then headed by JudgeEulalia , Tang Aliong , Pichay who lorded it, although benignly, overll judges in the Philippines who brought whatever problems, even

minor ones, they were confronted with.

It is not with a bit o irony that I also recall that in 1968, when Ithen applied for a study leave to pursue a scholarship for a mastersdegree in Harvard Law School without any cost to the government, it

as denied by Secretary of Justice Makasiar who curtly doused the

mbition o a lowly Justice of the Peace with the cutting phrase Whatll a P do with a Harvard education? I had to ask for a defermentofmy scholarship for a year.

Fortunately for me, when U. P. Law Dean Vicente Abad Santos,became Secretary o Justice, he readily granted my application as hisormer UP law student for a study leave o absence from my positionas a then judge o the provincial capital municipal court of SanFernando, La Union where I had been promoted.

No one ever raised any question pertaining to thatadministrative matter on the independence o the judiciary that hasbeen glaringly violated during that very lengthy period o more thanthirty (30) years between the restoration o Philippine Independence

hen the United States withdrew its sovereignty in 1946 up to 1987,.after the EDSA Revolution. It was only after that People Powerrevolution that the judiciary finally asserted its own independencefrom the executive branch o government.

. The Constitutions o 1935, 1973, 1986 Freedom Constitution,and 1987, established a democratic and republican state.

Section 5 o the Revised Penal Code clearly shows thesubservience o the judiciary to the Executive Branch and its lack

10f independence. It violates the bedrock principle o a democratic and::republican government that its three branches are co-equal andindependent of each other, as well as the principle of checks and

,:balances.

It is, therefore, my considered opinion that the foregoing:questionable statutory provision may outrightly be struck down as'unconstitutional in the present petition by the power o judicial review.


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.lorn the foregoing example, it may be deduced that the1ohable statute (Article 5, RPC) must have been cited by a party

. s:.ease, the opponents to a reconsideration) .

. Constitutionality o Article 39, RPC.

questionable statutory provision is the subsidiaryi .. set b Article 39 fixed at the rate o P2.50 for each da ,

''Cito rules providing outer limits to said additional penalty. Saidprovides that if the convict has no property with which to

liabilities (of reparation, indemnification and fine)allbe subject to a subsidiary personal liabil ity at the rate of one

''Peach P2. 50',,','

paragraph 1 clarifies the meaningo

subsidiary penalty by


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i.th the principal issue of the case, that is the disproportionatenessf:.fhe penalty imposed based on a devalued currency.

. Even more blatantly is the violation of Article 39 of the RPC ofequal protection clause. For while those who can afford it can

scape subsidiary imprisonment by paying off the imposed pecuniary0,bilities, it is only the poor who will bear the burden. t is a law thatiscriminates against the poor which constitutes a sizable ment of 27.9/o of the population of the Philippines. 34

Relatedly, in one reported case a country in the Westernemisphere passed a law that outlawed in vitro fertilization as beingolative of the right to life from conception. The Supreme Courtruck down that law as unconstitutional for contravening the equal

otection of law clause. For while the wealthy can afford to get IVFatment for infertility in places where it is legal, the poor are deniedat privilege of foreign travel.

Article 5 and Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code are bothQconstitutional and, therefore, poses the quandary envisaged by.hief Justice Marshall. The judge must make a choice of whether tophold the supremacy of the Constitution or enforce these statutory

'fovisions despite their being unconstitutional. The court mustetermine which o f these conflictin rules overns the case This

of the ve essence o udicial du . Thus, it is imperative fors Supreme Court to declare through its power of judicial reviewat these statutory provisions are unconstitutional.

XII Need to modify penalty

Is there a need to modify the penalty imposed onPetitioner Corpuz to adjust to present values fromthe date it was approved by the Legislature on

December B 1930?. The discussion of the first issue above, led to the consideredpinion that the power of judicial review may be exercised only in

where there is an incompatibility between the Constitutiona questioned statutory provision, eg., Articles 5 and 39 of the

evised Penal Code.

, Petitioner contends that the value of the Philippine Peso In.1957 as per the National Statistics Office is that the P1 .00 in 1930' ould be equivalent to P98.83 . It may be assumed from this that

H Findings of the National Statistical Coordination Board, cited by Columnist::.conrado e Quiroz, PDI Augus t 8, 2013.


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Pt DO in 1932 cannot have a v lue lower than P100.00 today. ,..Jsrefore, it is argued that the P98,000.00 value of what Corpuz had

frauded complainant Tangcoy in 1991 would be equivalent only toao oo Accordingly, such adjustment in value would necessarily\er the penalty meted out to the Petitioner only to a light penalty ofmonths and 1 day, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months asaximum. This would make the reduced penalty being asked for,obationable.

The opposite view, however, is that such adjustment foration amounts to judicial legislation 36

The key words used in the foregoing quotations areuivalent to , value , and inflation. Value relates to the

netary worth of something. Devalue is to reduce the official ue of a currency by economics. Inflation is a general increase inices and fall in purchasing value of money 37

Corpuz argues from a devalued peso in 1957 and 1991 at the. e of the transaction) when P100.00 is the equivalent of P1 .oo in930. Thus, P980.00 pesos valued in 1930 could purchase the

valued in 1991. This would seem to imply the decreased) rchasing power o the peso during those relevant periods.

The term inflation would imply consideration of therchasing power of the peso at its inflated rate and the rresponding increase in prices of goods.

The error of making such mathematical equivalence is/pparent. In 1930, P1 .oo could purchase goods worth P100.00 in

.957 and presumably also in 1991 when Tangcoy entrusted thewelry to Corpuz. Ergo, the P98,000.00 value would be P980.00.his equation however, does not consider the per capita income

fthe populations in 1930, 1991, or 2013.

In 1959, when I was appointed a Justice of the Peace byCarlos P. Garcia, a position that was part-time service with

ree law practice, I was given a monthly salary of P200.00, or annnual salary of P2,400. 00. Assuming that free law practice givese the equivalent of my salary, my income in 1959 would be

P400.00 a month, or an annual income of P4,800.00.1

NOTICE of Resolution dated July 16 2013 received on August 18 Secondparagraph page 2.}Ibid third paragraph.? Oxford dict ionary


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From the earlier table based on currency fluctuation of the peso::relation to the US dollar3 8, the P100.00 value in 1930 would be theuivalent of P2, 150.00 in 2013. In 2013, a gross income of P3illionfor higher middle class would not be unusual.

While concededly there may be a need to makearising from the depreciation of the peso or from

s inflationary value, i t is my considered opinion that the forumr making this adjustment should not be in the Supreme Court.he medium for making this adjustment should not be throughhe exercise by the Supreme Court of its power of judicialeview. This is not the situation envisaged by Chief Justice Marshallrere the penalty imposed in 1930 is unconstitutional in 1991 at the

1me of the transaction or 2012 at the time of penalty imposition by

h Court of Appeals.

The point of the opposition that this is a matter that is better left.the legislature to decide is persuasive. The Supreme Court does()t have the time or the resources that the Congress has to hold:ecessary public hearings on what prevailing monetary standardhould be used to set appropriate penalties of est f depending one amount defalcated.

A possibility may be for the legislature to use the dailyinimum wage at the time of defraudation, the average annual

.come or GDP per capita income 39 , or some such other flexibletandard. t the time of penalty imposition, this would require theLJ dge to take into consideration the different minimum wages set forbe National Capital Region (NCR), as well as the Regionalariations.

Utilizing any of such standards that are not set at a fixedonetary value, would certainly be beyond the power of judicial

::view, which is confined only to declaring unconstitutional theset by law based on the value of currency in 1930.

The foregoing is surely as persuasive a reason that may ber ued for den in the exercise of udicial review in this situation.

ee page 7 of this paper. . 1970 GDP per capita was 250.00; in 2010, US 2,215.00 cited by PDI ColumnistIelito F Habito, August 13, 2013. Multiplied by P43.00 the GDP per capita income

ould translate to Pl0,750.00.


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XIII. Constitutionality o f ncremental penalty

May the incremental penalty imposed in 1930by the Revised Penal Code RPG) based onthe excess of P22, 000. 00 be declaredunconstitutional for being disproportionateand excessively harsh in relation to thepresent value of the peso?

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' As earlier calculated 40 the incremental penalty based on themounts in excess of P22,000.00 is pegged at 1 year for eachdditional P10,000.00 would be seven (7) years [P98,000.00 -

76,000 divided by 1O].>

. As applied by the Court of Appeals, the incremental penaltyinposed on petitioner Corpuz is 7 years on top of the 8 years of'fincipal penalty of prision mayor as maximum.' 1

This additional penalty 7 years that the ourt of Appealsd imposed, would amount to 87.5 of the principal penalty of

l.1:years that it had modified the sentence imposed by theegional Trial ourt of San Fernando City (Pampanga). Thisalculation does not consider the devalued or inflated value of theeso at the time of the imposition. And there is no need to do so in'rder to determine the constitutionality of that increased penalty.

Adding a penalty of almost double that of the principalenalty is assuredly a disproportionate and unduly harsh punishmentom an assessment viewed from a more refined sense of decency

rising from an evolving standards of decency that mark therogress of a maturing society .

In the hierarchy of democratic values that we cherish, the,ights to life and liberty are in the topmost tier. The right toproperty occupies a lesser value. It is by reason of thesedistinctions in cultural values that for arbitration, the rules on

vidence are not as strictly enforced as those in judicial proceedings'':here life and liberty may be at risk of loss or deprivation. In contrast,or arbitration proceedings, only property may be lost. Property may

. ventually be earned or recovered.

. Should the sum defalcated have amounted to an additional fiftythousand pesos, or P150,000.00, the total incarceration would be 20ears, or reclusion temporal. That is the same penalty imposed by

, rticle 249 for Homicide. That would equate the value of propertyith that of life and liberty. That equation is shocking to our


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. ocratic hierarchy o values that we have developed over thers which would place the value of life and liberty above that oferty.

: To spend an additional seven years on top o the 8 yearsposed as principal penalty for failing to return jewelry that he was

to sell on commission is surely shocking to our moreped sensibilities arising from our progress as a maturi7 society.

ed

corpuz v people - comment - osg

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