ORIGINAL ^1IN THE SOPREME CODRT OF OHIO

State of Ohio

Plaintiff-Appellee . CASE NO.

V.

Vanny Loch

Defendant-Appellant

F

Court of AppealsCase No. 06AP-1142

Y"DRABIDUM IN SUPPORT OF JURISDICTION OFAPPELLAAPP VANNY LOCH

Vanny LochP.O. Box 7010Ross Correctional InstitutionChillicothe, Ohio 45601

Appellant Pro-se

Seth GilbertAssistant Prosecuting Attorney373 South High Street, 13th FloorColumbus, Ohio 43215

Counsel for Appellee

^

07^1765

On Appeal from the FranklinCounty Court of Appeals,Tenth Appellate District

DDsEP 1 a 20i'7

CLERK OF COURTSUPREME COURT OF OHIO

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents :..............................................................i

Explanation of why this case is a case of public interest of great generalinterest and involves a substantial constitutional question .....................1

Statement of the Case and of the Facts ..........................................2

Proposition of Law No. 1... ..................:...................................3

SECTION 2933.43(C) OF THE REVISED CODE PROVIDES FOR THE

RETURN OF PROPERTY WHEN CHARGES HAVE BEEN DISMISSED INTHE UNDERLYING CRIMINAL CASE.

Proposition of Law No. 2 .......................................:................5

AN INDIVIDUAL (SUCH AS APPELLANT) DOES NOT LOSE OWNERSHIP

OR POSSESSORY RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 2933.43(C) WHEN SUBJECT

PROPERTY WAS NOT FOUND TO HAVE BEEN USED IN THE COMMISSIONOF AN OFFENSE.

Proposition of Law No. 3 .......................................................11

WHEN A MOTION FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY IS IFLED AFTER CHARGES

RELATING TO THAT PROPERTY HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, DUE PROCESSREQUIRES A DETERMINATION OF OWNERSHIP BY THE "TRIER OF FACT".

Proposition of Law No. 4 ....................................................... 13

THE REFUSAL TO RETURN PROPERTY WHEN THERE WAS NO SPECIAL VERDICTB`!THE.JURY TO FORFEIT ANY OF THE 500-PLUS ITEMS IS A DENIAL OFDUE PROCCESS OF LAW.

_ ......, .. , ._ .,..Certificate of Service ..........................................................15

APPENDIX:

Journal Entry and Opinion of the Franklin County Cour of Appeals,Filed August 30, 2007

Case Information Sheet

(i)

EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE IS A CASE OF PUBLIC INTEREST OR GREAT GENERAL

INTEREST AND INVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION.

The substantial constitutional question involved in this case is whether the failure

to return property to its rightful owner after charges have been dismissed under

R.C. 2933.43 (C) violates the DueProcess.Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Con.stitution. The failure to follow this procedure denied Appellant

his right and opportunity to'a due process hearing to.firmly establish his right

to ownership to the property that did not forma basis fo conviction when the charges

on that property had been diemissed.

R.C. 2933.43 requires law enforcement officers to seize any property determined

to be contraband under R.C. 2933.43 (A) because of its relationship to an underlying

criminal offense. The one significant exception is that R.C. 2933.43 (C) mandates

the return of property to the defendant in the criminal action if charges are ulti-

mately dismissed and that property did not form a basis of the conviction.

.In its decision the Court of Appeals held that appellants motion for return of

property was barred by res judicata. (See Court of Appeals Opinion at 8). The appellant

argues that he could not have raised the property issue on direct appeal given that

no order was ever entered by the trial court in regards to any property issue. A

claim is not ripe for review unless a trial court has arrived at a definite position

on an issue. The Court of appeals' decision is especially erroneous because similar

to State v. Baumholtz (1990), 50 Ohio St. 3d 198, 553 N.E.2d 635, this Court held

that a forfeiture petition must be filed within a reasonable time after seizure of

the property, not at the close of the criminal proceeding. Because there was no

petition filed in the instant case, there was no..issue for appellant to challenge.

In,addition, the.Court of Appeals erroneously held that the appellant has neither

ownership or possessory rights in the seized property. While a guilty verdict in

the underlying criminal case is a requirement for forfeiture of stolen property,

(1)

the absence of such verdict and subsequent dismissal of charges statutorily entitles

the appellant to his right to the return of his property (500-plus items) under

procedural due process. The statute entitled the appellant to the return of hi.s property

when charges are dismissed. (R.C. 2933.43 (C)).

For the foregoins reasons, and for the reasons stated below, this case involves a

substantial constitutional question.

STA'rFMMn OF THE CASE AND FACTS

Appellant was indicted by the Franklin County grand jury on one count of receiving

stolen property, six counts of engaging in a pattern of corrput activity and one-

hundred-thrity-two counts of receiving stolen property. Appellant went.to trial by

jury and was convicted onone count of engaging in a pattern of currput activity and

thirty-two counts of receiving stolen property. Appellant was not convicted on any

other property seized in the underlying criminal case in regards to the 500-plus

items in addition to the 32 items of conviction. On September 19, 2002, the trial

court imposed sentence. Prior to the imposition of sentence the State did not file

a petition for forfeiture.

On September 20, 2006, appellant filed a motion for return of his 500-plus items

that did not form a basis of the conviction: The trial court denied appellants motion.

Appellant timely appealed to the Court of Appeals for.Franklin County, Ohio, Tenth

Appellate District. On August 30, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts

denial. (See Opinion of Court of Appeals, Appendix AO. Appellant now timely files

his Memorandum In Support of Jurisdiction.

(2)

PROPOSITION OF LAW NO. 1

SECTION 2933.43 (C) OF THE REVISED CODE PROVIDES. FOR THE

RETURN OF PROPERTY WHEN CHARGES HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

Appellantargues that Section 2933.43 (C) mandates a return of property when a

charge has been dismissed and those items seized do not form a basis of a conviction.

Section 2933.43 (C) provides in relevant part that:

Any property seized because of its relationship to an underlyingcriminal offense shall be returned to its owner if charges ofthat nature are filed and subsequently dismissed, or if chargesare filed and the person charged does not plead guilty to andis not convicted of the offense or does not admit and is notfound to have committed the violation.

There can be no question as to the application of this section to the appellant...

He was arrested in connection with a criminal offense (receiving stolen property)

after the Columbus Police Department seized nearly 600 items from his pawn shop.

These items were lawfully seized as evidence in connection with those offenses and

were in the custody of a law enforcement agency. At trial, appellant was convicted

of thrity-two (32) counts (items) of receiving stolen property. Therefore, under

R.C. 2933.43 (C), the appellant lost any right to the possession of those 32 items

he was convicted of. However, he did not lose any right to the 500-plus items that

did not form the basis of the conviction as those charges had been dismissed. The

property (500-plus items) was never found to have been used in the commission of

an offense. And the statute is precisely clear that a return of propery must issue

under R.C. 2933.43 (C) if charges were filed and subsequently dismissed. (R.C.

2933.43 (C)).

In the instant case, the appellant was convicted of only 32 counts involving

the 32 items allegedly stolen. A jury returned a guilty verdict on those counts.

However, the remaining counts were dismissed in regards to the 500-plus items.

Therefore, in accordance with this Court's holding in State v. Lilliock (1982),

70 Ohio St. 2d 23, 434 N.E.2d 723, the only items that appellant-lost his right

(3)

to ownership and possession were the 32 items he was convicted of. He did not lose

his right to the 500-plus items that did not form the basis of the conviction as

those charges were ultimately dismissed.

In order to lose his right to the 500-plus items, the property must have been

used in the commission of an offense. Notonly.:must tbe,property beused,in the

commission of an offense, it also must be:unlawful for the appellant to possess

the property, in light of its nature or the circumstances of the offender. In this

case the requirements were never fulfilled that the 500-plus items were ever used

in the commission of an offense as the charges relating to the 500-plus items were

dismissed against the appellant.

At trial, evidence was presented that appellant used the 32 items in the commision

of an offens'e. Therefore, he lost his right to those items. However, the loss of

his right to possession of the 500-plus items would unconstitutionally deprive his

of his right to due process of law. The loss of right cannot be exercised in an

arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner. Sensenbrenner v. Crosby (1974), 37

Ohio St. 2d 43,44, 306 N.E.2d 413. In this case, there is no reasonable relation

to the loss of appellants right to thQ 500-plus items and any legitimate state

interest for refusing to return his property that did not form the basis of a con-

viction. Such a loss of possession here would sub3ect numerous defendants to arbi-

trary confiscation and destruction of property that forms no basis of a conviction.

To permit the State of Ohio to withhold returning property that did not result

in a conviction when charges have been dismissed violates due process of law in

violation of Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution and Section I of the

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

(4)

PROPOSITION OF LAW N0. 2

AN INDIVIDUAL (SUCH AS APPELLANT) DOES NOT LOSE OWNERSHIP OR

POSSESSORY RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 2933.43 (C) WHEN SUBJECT PROPERTY

WAS NOT FOUND TO HAVE BEEN USED IN THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE.

Former R.C. 2933.41 provides in relevant part that:

(C) A person loses any right that the person may have to thepossession, or the possession and ownership, of property ifany of the following applies:

(1) The property was the subject, or was used in a conspiracyor attempt to commit, or in the commission, of an offense otherthan a traffic offense, and the person is a conspirator, accom-plice, or offender with respect to the offense.

(2) A court determines that the property should be forfeitedbecause, in light of the nature of the property or the circum-stances of the person, it is unlawful for the person to acquireor possess the property.

In its opinion the Court.of Appeals held that the appellant did not have ownership

or possessory rights to the property as he lost his right to the property under

section 2933.41 (C). This holding is erroneous and contrary to statutory law. In

order to be subject to the provision of 2933.41 (C) to lose ownership or possessory

rights of the 500-plus items the appellant must first be adjudicated in violation

of some criminal offense and those items used in connection with that offense.

State v. Lilliock (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 23, 434 N.E.2d 723; State v. Casalicchio

(1991), 58 Ohio St. 3d 178, 569 N.E.2d 916.

The appellant herein did not forfeit or lose his right to the possession of the

subject property (500-plus items) as he has never been adjudicated to have used

these items in the commission of an offense and in fact, the charges to those offenses

were dismissed and the appellant retained ownership and possessory rights to those

items.

(5)

(a) Appellant •.is` the ;ormer-ar ►d;has.possessory,rights:to_the500-plus items under R.C. 4727.11.

Appellant argues under Ohio law that pawnbrokers have possessory interest

under section 4727.11 which provides in part:

If the pledger fails to pay interest to a person licensed asa pawnbroker on a loan, the pledged property shall be forfeitedto the licensee. If the pledgor fails to redeem or pay all theinterest due, the licensee becomes the owner of the pledgedproperty.

It is evidenct that under-Ohio law that pawnbrokers have two different property -

interest in goods sold or pledged for a loan. First, the pawnbrokerhas a possessory

interest in the pawned goods by virtue of the bailment.relationship. Indeed, the

mere fact of possession of a chattel by a good faith purchaser for value raises

a presumption of ownership. Second, Ohio law recognizes that the baileee has a lein

interest in the bailed goods, especially pawnbrokers have lein interest in their

property.

Under section 4727.11, the pawnbroker has the power of disposal if the pawnee

makes no payment on the interest of fails to redeem the pledged property if the

seller has not re-purchased the property. Further, upon default, the licensee becomes

the owner of the pledged property.

In Wacksman v. Harrell (1963), 22 0.0. 2d 389, this Court held that it is well

established that one who purchases or acquires property from a thief in good faith

has a right to the possession thereof against everyone except the rightful owner.

As a licensed pawnbroker the appellant has a possessory right to the property, who

gave value for such property. Like a good-faith purchaser for value; appellants;

lack of title does not defeat the lawfulness of his possession, nor does it diminish

his rights against the rest of the world, including the State of Ohio.

(6)

In Fuentes v. Shevin (1983), 407 U.S. 67, the United States Supreme Court recog-

nized that mere possessory rights are protected property. The Court further noted

that as long as there was "some dispute" as to the right to continued possession,

a possessor is entitled to the due process. 407 U.S. at 87. Because there has no

adjudication or judicial determination of either the property's ownership nor the

right to possess the property due to the fact tnat no forfeitnre hearing was ever

conducted, appellants possession of the property was prima facie proof that he was

entitled to retain ownership and possessory rights to the 500-plus items confiscated

from the Columbus Police Department and clearly retained such possession as those

charges relating to the 500-plus items were ultimately dismissed against him.

In the instant case, these is no doubt that appellant retained ownership and

possessory rights to the 500-plus items by virtue of R.C. 47.27.11. only the 32 items

that formed the basis of his conviction did appellant lose his right to those items.

Those items were found to have been used in the commission of an offense and there-

fore appellant lost his right to those items. However, the charges in relation to

the 500-plus items were dismissed. There has been.no adjudication as to any of these

iteins being used in the commission of-an offense. Obviously the trial court did not

find it unlawful to possess the 500-plus items given that the charges in relation

to these items had been dismissed.

,.(b) procedural re^uiEQmer►t"s. were not sati•sf^ed in order forthe trial court to mBke a factual determination of vhether the500-plus items were stolen property.

Appellant argues that the procedural requirement of R.C. 2933.43 (C) were not

satisfied in the present case. The application of R.C. 2933.41 raises the factual

question (to be determined by the trial court) whether appellant has established

a right to possession or whether the 500-plus items that did not form the basis of

his conviction were stolen property.

(7)

R.C. 2933.41 (C) is a statute that "governs the disposition of property held by

a law enforcement agency." It i,g a statute that prevents certain individuals from

exercising a right to reclaim certain property under certain circumstances. In State

V. Lilliock, supra, the Ohio Supreme Court held that for the state to be successful

under R.C. 2933.41 (C), it must meet both parts of a two-part test. Lilliock at 26.

The Court held that the state must show that the offender used the property in the

commission of an offense, and that it is unlawful for the offender to possess the

property in light of its nature or the circumstances of the offender. Id.

After the Ohio Supreme Court decided Lilliock, R.C. 2933.41 (C) was amended and

not includes the phrase "if any of the following apply." This amendment removes

the two-part test described in Lilliock and substitutes it with two separate tests.

Now, the state must show either that the property was used in the commission of an

offense other than a traffic offense, or that it is unlawful for the offender to

possess the property in light of ITS NATURE OR THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENDER.

Therefore, if the state can successfully satify either of these tests, appellant

is unable to obtain possession of the 500-plus items.

Even though R.C. 2933.41 (C) does-not establish a particular procedure for the

disposition of property, it is a trial court that must order the property disposed

when that property has been found to have been used in the commission of an offense.

Lilliock, supra.

It is perfectly clear that the trial court did not apply R.C. 2933.41 (C) to the

present case and precisely clear that none of the procedural requirements were

afforded appellant in making a determination of whether the 500-plus items were

stolen property. What is clear is that none of the 500-plus items were ever found

to have been used in the commission of an offense and that the charges to those

items were dismissed.

(8)

(c) Appellants Motion For Return of Property was not barredby . the doctrine of res jtdicata.

The Court of Appeals held that appellants motion for return of property is barred

by res judicata. (See Court of Appeals Opinion at 8). Appellant argues that the

application of res judicata to the present case will extinguish a fundamental right

to a remedy as provided by Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution as the

appellant could not ahve raised the motion on direct appeal.

On August 20, 2001, subject property in question was seized froni appellants pawn

shop. As a result of this seizure appellant was indicted and went to trial by jury.

On July 24, 2002, appellant was convicted of 32 counts relating ot the 32 items. The

charges relating to the 500-plus items were dismissed. On September 19, 2002, the

trial court imposed sentence. Therefore, in order for res judicata to apply in this

case there were procedural safeguards that must be met by the state under R.C. 2933.43

(C). The state was required to file a petition for forfeiture within a reasonable

time after the seizure of the property, not at the close of criminal proceedings.

State v. Baumholtz (1990), 50 Ohio St. 3d 198, 553 N.E.2d 635.

Unless the state files a mandatory petition for forfeiture, and a determination

made by the trial court at a forfeiture hearing, there are no justifiable reasons

for appellant to even raise a property issue given that the state did not seek

forfeiture and the trial court made no findings as to the property in question.

The Court of appeals held that since appellant had filed a direct appeal and

failed to raise the issue regarding the return of property until filing the motion

for return of property four years after his sentencing and three years after his

convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal, he is now precluded from asserting

these additional issues which should have been raised in those proceedings. Id. at

8.

(9)

Appellant argues this holding is erroneous and contrary to law. First, a motion

for return of property contains no time limitation in which an individual must file

for the return of his property. This is especially true in light of the fact that

the State did not follow the mandatory requirements for timely filing a petition

for forfeiture within 45 days after appellant was convicted under R. C. 2933.43 (C).

Second, there was no judgment entry by the trial court as to any findings regarding

the forfeiture of appellants property and therefore, without a final appealable

order seeking forfeiture a court of appeals is without jurisdiction to hear an appeal

from such issue. (R.C. 2505.02).

In State v. Perry (1967), 10 Ohio St. 2d 175, paragraph nine of the syllabus,

this Court held that the doctrine of res judicata will bar any claim shich should

have.and could have been raised on direct appeal. However,.Perry is distinguishable

from the present case as appellant could not have raised the return of his property

on direct appeal as there was no final judgment rendered on the property issue.

And to apply res judicata to the present case will extinguish a fundamental right

to a remedy as provided by Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. Therefore,

given that no final appealable order or decree was rendered upon this issue by,the

trial court the appellant could not.have raised this issue on direct appeal.

In addition to the above, the State would have had 45 days after the appellant

was convicted in which to file a petition for forfeiture under R.C. 2933.43 (C).

This is well beyond the 30 day time limit for filing a notice of appeal and as such,

this time limit would have certainly precluded appellant from raising the property

issue on direct appeal.

Appellant would also point out that the State's argument before the Court of

Appeals (that the motion was barred res judicata) should have been barred by the

doctrine of reajudicata because the State failed to plead or otherwise respond to

the motion in the lower court.

(10)

k

In Johnson's Island, Inc. v. Danbury Twp. Bd. of trustees (1982), 69 Ohio St.

2d 241; 244, this Court held that the doctrine of res judicata also embrasis the

policy that a party must make good his cause of action or establish his defenses

by all proper means within his control, and if he fails inthat respect, purpose

or negligently, he will not afterward be permitted to deny the correctness of the

determination. And this Court has consistently held that it is well-settled law

that questions not raised or passed upon the lower court will not be ruled upon

by the Supreme Court. garono v. State (1988), 37 Ohio St. 3d 171, 175-76; Mills-

Jennings, Inc. v. Dept. of Ligour Control (1982), 70 Ohio St. 2d 95. Given the States

failure to plead against the motion for return of property in the lower court, the

State's argument of res judicata was improperly.considered by the Court of Appeals

especially given the fact that the lower court did not impose such a bar.

PROPOSITION OF LAW N0. 3

THE LOWER COURT VIOLATED APPELLANTS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS SaFLAW IN DENYING THE MOTION TO RETURN PROPERTY . WHEN A MOTION FOR

RETURNOF PROPERTY IS FILED:AFTER CHARGES RELATING TO THAT PROPERTYHAVE,BEEV'DISMISSED, DUE PROCESS REQUIRES A DETERMINATION OF OWNER-

SHIP BY THE "TRIER OF FACT".

In the instant case the lower court's holding that the appellant was not the

rightful owner of the subject property is clearly erroneous. Appellant argues that

the 500-plus items were never found to have been used in the commission of a crime

and therefore, when the charges were dismissed, appellant was, as continues to be

the rightful owner of the property. These items did not form a basis of the conviction

and unless and until a hearing isconducted under R.C. 2933.43 (C), appellants right

to due process of law will have continued to be violated as it is for the trier

of fact to determine the rightful owner of these items.

(11)

*

The record in this case is clear that appellant was a licensed pawnbroker who

purchased all said property. In evaluating appellants due process claim this court

must look to Ohio law to determine the nature and extent, if any, of his property

interest in this case. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Board of Regents v.

Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).

As previously stated, this Court has stated that it is well established that

one who purchases or acquires property from a thief in good faith has a right to

the possession thereof against everyone except the rightful owner. Wacksman v.

Harrell, supra. the Court of Appeals concluded that because the evidence showed

at trial that the property was stolen, the appellant therefore had no constitution-

ally protected property rights. This Court must disagree. Appellants lack of title

is irrelevant to the existence of his rights in the property against the State

of Ohio. Under Ohio law, one who possesses property without having a title to it

nonetheless has a recognized property interest. Wacksman, supra.

First, as a pawnbroker, appellant has a special interest in support of an action

in return of property. State v. Casalicchio (1991), 58 Ohio St. 3d 178; State v.

Lilliock (1982), 70 Ohio St. 2d 23. In sucn an action the question of ownership

and the right to possession is for the trier of fact. Henderson v. Lacy, 347 P.2d

1020,1021 (Okla. 1959). In addition, possession is prima facie proof of ownership.

A1's Auto Sales v. Moskowtiz, 203 Okl. 611, 224 P.2d588 (1950).

Because there has been no judicial determination of either the property's owner-

ship or the right to possess the property in which the counts were dismissed, the

,fact that appellant was not convicted on these counts is prima facie proof that

he is entitled to retain the 500-plus items confiscated from his pawn shop.

(12)

(a) When charges relating to the 500-plus items were dismissed,R.C. 2933.43(C) required a post-deprivation hearing at theconclusion of the criminal trial

Appellant argues that his right to due process was violated because he was not

afforded a post-deprivation hearing at the conclusion of his criminal case after

charges in relation to the 500-plus items had been dismissed. The right of an owner

to secure the return of his/her proerty exists if the owner is acquited (or charges

are dismissed) in the underlying criminal case; and consequently the hearing

opportunity for such owners cannot held until the conclusion of the underlying criminal

case. State v. Baumholtz(1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 198; State v. Cola (1992), 76 Ohio

App. 3d 840; State v. Golston (1990), 66 Ohio App.3d 423; State v. Niles (1989),

44 Ohio App 3d.133.

These four cases are directly analogous to the present case. Those were cases

in which the property owner was the defendant in the underlying criminal case. 'Ihe

appellant does not contest the State's right to seize the the property, but he does

contest the promtness of the post-seizure hearing opportnuity given that the charges

relating to the 500-plus items were dismissed.

A remand is necessary as it was never established at a hearing whether it was

unlawful for appellant(ohQ.:was only convicted on 32 items) to posess the 500-plus

items when charges in relation to those items were subsequently dismissed.

State v. Kennedy (1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 221, 683 N.E.2d 33.

PROPOSITION OF LAW NO. 4

THE REFUSAL T0 RETURN PROPERTY WHEN THERE WAS NO SPECIAL VERDICTFROM THE JURY Tn FORFEIT ANY OF THE 500-PLUS ITEMS IS A DENIALOF DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

Appellant argues that the refusal to return his property that did not form a

basis of the conviction is a denial of due process of law especially in light of

the fact that no special verdict was returned by the jury to forfeit any of the

500-plus items.

(13)

Revised Code 2923.32(B)(4)(b) provides:

(b) a special verdict shall be returned as to the extent ofof property, if any, subject to forfeiture. When the specialverdict is returned, a judgment of forfeiture shall be entered.

Under Ohio's version of Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization

(RICO) a special verdict is to be rendered as to the extent of any property subject

to forfeiture,and a judgment of forfeiture is to be entered when the verdict is

returned. Aronson v. City of Arkron, 116 F.3d 804(6th Cir.1998).

There is a strict compliance with the mandatory requirement that the State must

file a petition for forfeiture within forty-five days after the defedant is convicted.

It is necessary to ensure due process of law. A clear reading of the statute makes

it mandatory that the prosecuting attorney in the present case file a petition for

forfeiture and such petition be filed within a reasonable time. State v. Casalicchio

(1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 178,569 N.E. 2d 916; State v. Baumholtz (1990), 59 Ohio St.3d

198, 553 N.E. 2d 635.

In the instant case, the lower courts held that the appellant was not the rightful

owner of the property in question. However, the mandatory requirements were not

followed for such a determination. There was no special verdict returned by the jury

in this case. The State did not file petition for forfeiture nor was there any

judicial determination made by the court that the 500-plus items were found to

have been unsed in the comission of the offense.

Clearly, the State had a mandatory duty to file a timely petition for forfeiture

of the 500-plus items that were dismissed. There is nothing in the record to suggest

that the prosecuting attorney ever made an attempt to file a timely petition with

the trial court. Given that the State chose not to object to the return of the

500-plus items that did not form a basis of the conviction. Not only was the lower

courts' decisions an error of law, the decisions were prejudicial in light of the

fact that no request fro forfeiture was ever made by the prosecuting attorney.

(14)

r y

CONCLUSION

For the foregiong reasons, this Court should find: that this case involves a

substantial constitutional question, that jurisdiction of this appeal; and order

the case to be briefed on the merits.

Respectfully Submitted

Vanny LochAppellant pro-seP.O. Box 7010Ross Correctional Inst.Chillicothe, Ohio 45601

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on September 19 ,2007, I served a copy of the foregoing

Memorandum in Suuport of Jurisdiction of Appellant Vanny Loch upon Seth Gilbert,

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney at 373 South High Street, 13th Floor, Columbus,

Ohio 43215.

Vanny Loch

(15)

APPIINuIR

A. OPINION:AF FRANKLIN COUNTY COURT OF APPEALS DATED AUGUST 30,2007

B. JUDGMENT ENTRY

C. CASE INFORMATION STATIIIQVT

P0IcF^

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OsHtO

1:3TENTH APPELLATE DlSTRIC

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Stats of Ohio,

PIax^6lt-AppeNae,

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Vanny Loch,

No pBAP-1142ww

No OOAP-1172(C P C No 07CR-6917)

(k.'-GULAR CALENDI4R)

O P..I N1- 0 N

Randered o►August 30,2007

Ron O8nen, ProascuhnQ Attomey, and $e(h L GNfbtrt, forapPsqss

Chatf" R MeN, fcr appdbrN

iAPPEALS from the FrankNn County Court of Common Pleas

MdGiiATH,J

(Ti) Daiendant-appailant, Vanny Lodh, appeals the judy*.nent of the Franklin

County Court of Common P1qss, vA►ereun tha court drsmmsed apps{fant's petihon for post-

oonvN2ron mhsf and dsnied hm mobon for rehim ot pnoperiy

(^21 Appellant ownsd VIP Pawn Shop ("VIP") in Columbus, Ohio bapmninp in

18Q5 $tths v Lach, Frs,r+kiwr App No tY2AP-1065, 2003-Qttro.470t After an

ON COlNPwm fr

fVo 06AP-1142 ard QtiAP-117'2 2

investigation, a search warrant was obtaxted and Kems were seusd' AU the items were

plaoed in a warefouse and ntpretentatrv+as from Home Depot, Deka Marme, Cxawd City,

t3est Buy. H H Gragg, 8ig Bear snd Lowe's Ksnfted itnm thay balwved wero stolan

from thelr storea ki

113t On October 12, 2001, appaNan( was indwNad on one oount of engaging In a

pattem of cxtrrupt acbvity, one oount of recelving stolen property vnth a value in oxoess of

5100,000, and 113 counts of tecenring stolen proparty vWth a value in excess of $500 but

tess than S5,000 Id A jury lnal was heki, and the jury rsturnsd a verdict of gullty of one

count of engaging in a pattem of wrruptactivity, one count of receiving stolen praperty

vnth a vakte in excess of i104,000; 20 counts of reoetvfng stolen property wMh a vakN in

excess of $500. but iesa than $5,000, and 11 counts of reoeiving stolen proparty vnth a

value bss th:an'5500 Id The remalning counts were dalrmeaed-by ft state Id

AppeNant was o(dered to serve a total sentence of 15-yeara. unan,xraaltion and tb tnat

court.certtRed 54 days offad tx»e credit

(14) Appetfant appeakd hia senternoe and cvnvtcdart: and tfirs court atBmrsd tlat

same on September 4, 2003 cn Loah, supra In May. 2003.. appelaant fil4d a post-

oonvicbon petdton putsuant to R C 2953 21 and in November 2003, the tnot court

dusmissed the petrtwn finding that appeltant ramed atl of tha matten in his, 4irect appeal

No appeal was taken from this judgment In August 2006, appeifant flled,a seoond post-

' Cvlumhus PoOca t7eMadvw Clpde Schulxs no6csd that a urys numbar of appelranrs purchasss werebrand nsrr Awms sMl in aaaNd boxes DaMc6va tichulza discovered that 85-90% of ft itbms appNlaMhad ww tor sik on Iha E-txy Infa<nat aft vNn sbo naw in-8ox i0sms AfOu yurd%any dwns from anundenoovsr offlorr whc aas on ttN 'Ywt IaC'. dentdyinp hwo as an mdrodual mlh a onmaW backprqww Romwhom appallant was not parmiCW to buy qocds, uiC because of ft large number of n: Rema in boxes, asearch warrant was obtaned to recover nsw in-box property

2QJ?;'_':^^No Ot3AP-1142 and OQAP-1172 3

convictwn pWion aryump that h^s sentsnos was unconsbtuUonal under tha decrsion

rendsred by the Suprerm Court of Ohio m Stetr v Foah►r, 109 Ohio St 3d 1, 200E-Oha-

656 Later that montt►, appeftnt fileda pro fti nwbon for ft return of property sashw ►S

the ►eturn of property semed from hn pawn shop by ft Columbus Polas Department

The ttiai court darrussed ft post-arnvatlon reNef pet+bon end denied the motion for

nNum •-,f propoty AMr datandant Alsd two not+osa of appaat, tMa oourt tua sponte

consoAdated the carss for nwew

1131 On appsal. appelhiit aseerts ft foMovrxip saven assgnments of eFrw

APPELLANj'S FIRSTASSIGNM ENTOFERROR

The tnW coM erred by depmnnp tha AppeAant'of a UbsrtyInterostwllhout due prooess of taw

AP-MILS SE D ASRIGMIMT QF - I^^,ROR

The tntitCouit emed m eentenqnp the /1ppeNant in viofabon ofthe 0064 f:'qcto Cwusa;.

APPE[.LIANTS'[^RD ASStGNMENT OF ERROR

The tral Court comxmtled plem error in ssntqnanp theAppeitant

I►0PAiAN7'S FO11f2TH ASSIdNl^IEN7 OF ERROf3

Thb Tratal Court Errod ss a Matber of law to the substanbalprsfudmo;Qf tha Appslian[ m denying his nquest for retum ofpmparty when the indictment did not conta ►n a spea(icstion'for fodbduro of property

OF Et^ROR

The tW. aouR, engd as a nutttar. of kw to. the aubatanUatpropudies of ths Appelltinf et denymp his mqusst for rotum ofproperty when thom was no special verdict retumed by thelury for, forMiturs of ;rroperiy

. No U6AP-1142 and 06AP-1172

d- pPELLes!TS SLxTH ASSIGNMENT QEERROR

The tnal court emad as a mattar of law to the subetandalpnryudree of 1he Appellant rrr denyrtp ha requeat for rotum ofproperty when no forfeewro heannp waa conduebsd

APpELLANrS SEYENTH ASSIGNMENT QFf.RROR,

G►ven that the State faied to seek forfeiture of the Appel4nCsprcperty prior to s#ntencmy, todo Eo now wdl violate Wth theQhlD iAd Unlbd Statli ConslltutlOtK aptn6t OoUttlEJeopardy

{!s} _Bequse they aY t~ from the iarne {unadntwna!ftaw, appellanPs fkat

four assignments of emor wdl tte 1lddraased tripather

(17) ft C 2953 2t(Aj(2) prvvrcies that

Except as othermse provWed in section 2953.23 , of theRevnied Code, i pebtion under dnnswn (AK1) of this SectionahaA be fiNd no later than one hundred eighty days albr Ihedate on whrththe tnal transixpt isfNsd in the court OCaippaalsin the dwer:t appeal of the ludqmsnt e)f 0onvw6on orad{ud+catwn ''' If no appeal is taken, exoept as othenMSeprovidW in ssctwn 2953,33 of thrt Rdwted Codlt, the pbtitwnshall be flled no bder than one. hundred r+phty days afMr theexpiratron of thetmforfqinp the appeal

fyg) In thia case, appellant did flb a diroct appeal of hrs conviction and

sentencana, and it is undisputed that he did not flk his petitan for post-owivictieon relief

wdhur 180 days of the transcnpt being fikd in thecourt of appeals TI»mforb, appellant

must sabsfy the criteria set forth in R C 2953 23 to allow the late flhngof the post-

convwbwr peZrbort R C 2953 23(Ax1) prov+des riwrf a eou+i may not anteqain a petAon

for post-oonvw:Wn relief filed outs+de ihe 18U-day penod unbss both of the folkwnng

appb

No OBJ1P-1142 snd OOAP-1172

2005

(a) EAher the pa6boner ftwws thtat the petdioner wasm"xdably prOwnMd fiom dNCpvary o/ ft fiwYS upon whichthr pabbonw inust roy to ptesont fhioiarn for relNf, or.tuDMquont 10 1M ptrrwd prasCnbsd in diown -(A)(2), ofasdwn 2953 21 of tho FtevNod Code or to the NGnp of aneather ps66on, 1M tJnpbd StafN SuprsrtN Court nicxpvsda nw+n Old" ar stNr tp?tt that epphea reVouciwoly topertons ar Ihs patW>srK apaibm and the psmon a»erb adm ba+rsJ on lhat rqht

(b) The peb0oner shows by 'd"r antl convnxm0 evbenoethat, but for oonsbtutbnaF emor at. tnal, ra rsasonablsfaatlNKer would hovw found tM petifioner 9uiMy of the oManseof whr-h the peUbpn^r. Yvas wnva;ted or, rf ft clsans^aMonqsa a-sentiwlt►oe of d$*M that, but for oomtitutianateROr at (h! fefltNWk1Q heatRq,., no r4MOnabht.,NGtt111der..,woukf have faand ths petRaitsr ehpible for ths deNhsentence

{^!) Unbss these c,ntana are 34bafisd, a tnal court tac^ccs lunadfton to consider

any peLbon tilsd mors than 11i0 days atler the txne for fllutki Stete v Rw►es. FrankUn

App No t3SqP-107E, 2004-t7hw2524 Appellent's p.etAwn waa Rkd weU.rfter expin,bon

of ft trts: psrpd Qcrraq +knoh a{tpe:,'nnt wnts nqusW, 10 "M a darct ptpeat of tns

oanv►ctons and sentencaro Theretore, appeilqut was raquired to ahow Aa exwatartw of

the grounds taiBed in R C 2953 23(Ax1) e4ppellanYs petl0on dosa not rely on any neve:^

discovend tacls to support the ooaitent+on that he is entitbd to post-convictwn ro6ef:

Trius. in order to sstafy ti C 2953 23(Axt)(a), sppeftant must show that, subeqquent b

the tmm dunrp which apps0ant was requirsd to fike ha peLdon, the Suprems Court of

Ohio reoopn►ZW a new abte or foienW npht that appla9s retroactwely to persons in

appeNant's ahwtan

(110) The Suprome Court of Oha'a deasan in Foster was an appM:atan of the

decott)n rendered by the Unrted States Supreme Court in Blake/y v Washington (2004),

2+, .,.

., _ I I

No 06AP-1142 and 08AP-1172 6

542 U S 296, 124 S Ct 2531 By its expross tems, ft decision in FosMronly apphsd to

caaes that were pendxp on direct appaal at the tana the damion was issued We have

repeatedfy held that neithsr $faRely nor FosMr rooopnuod a naw state or fedsral npht that

would apply retroitxnrelystnle v Maitm, FrankNn App No 06AP-797. 2007-Ohio-1843,

State v Robmon: FrantcMn App No 06AP-388, 2006-Ohur6649 Thus, appellant's

petrGon was not filed Umely in accordonce with R C 2953 21; and did not aatabhsh

gmunds for un6msty ifAnp pursuant to R C 2953 23

(1111 Thetimelutass requirement of R C 2953 21 is lunsd+ckwn+ll and "a tnal court

has no aufhonty to ene'srbim an untmtsly post-Convrc6on rslbf patrtion untess the

p9btaner msets the requNerrwnts of R C 2953 23(A)(1) " State v INilAovr, Frankhn App

No Ot3AP-939; 2008-Ohio-2750, at 1116, ahnp State v Reaies, Frsnkhn Apn No 03AP-

1078; 2004-Ohn-2524, af'W12 See, sfso, Stete v Spns, Clemftnt App No CA2005-08-

077; 2006-0hio-3091 Therefors; the tnal oourt had no jumadichon to consider appellant's

petihon,' and daunrosal vwtliout rurther heanng weis approprmis

11121 FurUner, even if sippoNant's pehtwn had been tsnely filed, we tlnd no nient to

appellants claim that the tnal courCs imposed sentence violated his constitubonal rphts

A114er„F^a Otub axrrts have the dacretari+ to drrvoae arry serrler►cb, rnt9efdanQ

consecutlvt, withur the stattyiordyy authonzed sentencing nnge As for appellanCs

arqunmt ttiat ahe Fostsr court's decoon Nm. ppNCatron to those Cases on direct

appeal at.the tnneof ft announcenront acts as ex post facto law in vrolation of both the

United States and Ohio ConstAutans, and violates his rght to dus process, we have

prevqusiy reteoted these argurnsntt, tind" that ft Foster rsmedy does not v►olate the

M

No t)8AP-1112 snd OtfAP-1172 7

profubrtan spenst ax pcst fadb ktws and N not a vwlabon of the rpht to due prowss

3tiAr v (3ftan, Franktin App No OQJIP-sDO, 200tIOhw-Ae99, Slih v AArtaider,

frankhrrApp; No t>tFAP-301, 2006-ohw-0373

1i13} Ca*sqwnt►Y, wo ovwmlt tppallant's 1bs! tow ssspnnarnls o' rra

11141 AppNtanrs remsuanp asspnmants of srror chr.ilenys thw tnd court's denial

of sppeqsnfs mobon tor Fatum of proparty Sproflr,ak eppelkant contsnds the ststr

teded to confpy vnlh thp forffidursproosdures set forth in R C 2923 32(8), faded to

provide a.fortsdune heanng. and thst to do so now woukt valats both stsFe ind federal

corWA+tan protsanorn .neonst do" pop.rdy To the conhry. ft state oontands

appellants mobon for retum of property not only fsds on ft merRS. twt aleo that ssid

mobon wss not propeNy filed bafo:ns ft tnM court ; Aceoadrng to the state, eppsNanPs

four-yasr, post-senftnos mobon for r1Nut`n' of property was actue0y a replevin action

sp4inst the Columbus-polas DepsrEment, rnd as`auch, the .ppioprMti couna of acbon

ts ft eppe0snt to puntue.retlQf throuyh a Cwd stxfon ntinttny ttNspproptfata psftlbt; The

state submRa thatStete v Hsms(Msr 7, 20011), FrankUn App No 99AP-084, which

oonduded that the tnal court emsd in denymp a nwtan for rela ►f from )ud8ment on the

prounds thsl 1he underlying natan was not properly bsfore R, wxs swnply wmnply

dscided We nesd not decide, ho+Msver, the viabikly of Hams bscause appehanPs motion

for roUxn of property ulhi► aUly faYS on ft msntb sinoe appsNant is neither the owner of .

the prop" nor rs hs antMbd to po.ssstwn of d

(fIS} The bisis for oppsKsnTs moLon forreturn of property is that Ms "pbroonaf

property' must be retumed to him because the forfsdLre proosdures outbned in R C

^C.._. ^ .No U6AP-1442 and OBAP-11 T2 8

2923 32, et taq , w!ere not foNcwe v AppeManCs poubon a marRlaes tor. two reasons

Frst, appelant's darns are barred by the docMm of res tudaata' See Stite v Arrry

(1967), 10 Ohio St 2d 175, paragraph rnne of the syNabus .. Appellant flkd a tNieot appeet

and two post-convadtonpehUons, hoWawr, he. faftdto laa» the mue rsgrrdw ►g the

rNum of , prop" unb f Wp ihe rn.otan for,rNum of propstty. tour years attix hts

ssntenang sndahrw years atW tus convwtanlt and sentences were affirmed on appeal

Thus, he is now precktdsd kom saserUngthese addrqo" issuse whlcF ► should have been

raaed in those prror pnfosedatgs, parbcuqrty when the;subtect of.,ttns appeal does not :

involve any new evidWnoe, nar tny evidence that n► outside of thereoord S+bM v Fbicus

(taec t3, W), take App No ; 5NS-t- 1.79

(11161, Secondy. though appeilant assarts lhere is no onierforfeibng his "pecsonal

property," appellant hs4 nNther flwnershlp nor possessory n{thts in the mzed property he

now seeks to have returned in his direct appesl, appellant argued the state faded to

prove that the derns eeuxd [ronn VIP we►e0.stolsn This court tound; "[t)he arcurnatantial

evWerwe that the items were stotsn was^owWrhek ►iin9 " Coch, at 1134 In support of thts

finding, this court noted not Qnly wrtness tssbmony, which included testimony from thoao

who soki stokn rnerchandme to VIP, as w!eU as teatKnony from vanous store

reprosentabves that denbried the property as being stolen /rom the+'reapscbve pMmas of

business, but alsoihst the seu:ed dems wero m ttter sealsd boxss with onyinat shipping

tabeis trom ths rsZa;lera Add►LOreafly, thws court also ipund.ttaat "triera was also evxJe,nce

presenixd indicatuiy that appeliant knew or shoukt have:known the dom were stolen "

fil at ¶40

2002fr)y

No U9AP-1 142 end t18AP-t 172

{1117) FonnwR C 2633 41 proAdes

(A) (1) Any proparty. otbar than contraband Ihet Nout3act tothe provMwnm of sacbqr+"2013 34 or 2033 43 of ths RawredCoft, ottwr then pn7perty that o iub)aot to la^,̂ hon 3710 141[3718141) ofdw Ravind Cods: Whar than prt)paity that isfarhdod under pcbona 2923 44 to 2923 47 or 2923 41, to2923 45 d ri* Rat+aaif Cafi. ,•• srid olhar *tn propsifytAat INs 4faan ")eAMy soitad in noaton tb a vwlatiqn o/sacbon 2923 32 df ttw 1tevUeit Coda. that has been bst,abandonad, ifolan.

,"sau^J purauant 10 ^ ts^k wlirnnt. or

oUwnvm Iaw/uMy tau^ 4 IloriWted. and tli,lt is m thacustody of a law entorosmant agency ahnll be kbpt safelypendrnp tia twro d no Iwlyar a noodod as ewdenai and shaNbe cbspoMeQofpunarrnt to ft sec4on •"•• `

(8)A law "enforcN'nsnt agency 114 fis`s property m dapoaeaNan thaC a rpqumed to be duf►osed of punuant to thissotwn shaA rrfMce'M roasonable aHa.i to totatr the pars"'sntMlnd to possession of thr propsrly in 41 custady. to noLfytltsm of when rand whsre it n" ba c4^eried. rand tb +eturim the:propeKy to tham at tha eat4sat possiplM tw" In tna al"npof;av^ atant4ywlp'pancnt antit^W`to`pa+aasswn, rt "issuflkoWtt nobm b aawANa u1 • newspaper of g*reratptCUlrian in tha`•douniy; 6naUy desoinbxny 3fta'natun of thepropetqt m custody and mv" panons to vww and eshhLets

(C) A pentcin lo5eb any iqht Btat tha panwn rnay have tb ftposReasien, or the possmwn and ownenhip. of p ►cperty dany of;ths faloMnop appfibs

?) The prWsrty ►ws thb eubftct, or iv+Ira uNd in a coormeparrcyor atkmpt to abrnrrnd. or in the oommpsan, of an oNenaeothefthan a trafOc oflaoae, and ft pe+son is a conspirstow.acnompMce..or offbnder vnlh reapsad to the cffense

(2) A court dehfrmmss that the propeM1y should be forfeieedtaause, ai 4pfit of ths naturo of ttN pncperty or thsc^rcumsfanexa o( ft psrson, it is unlawful tor ft peraon toacqure or ponsass the p►oPer1Y

9

No OSAP-1142 and O5AP-1172

(D) Undoanwd or fortebd property in the custody of a lawenfonxrnant apsncy, otMrr ahan contraband tNst is subtect tothe proviswns of sectwn 2913.34 or 2933 43 of ft RevaadCorM, other,t#►an prppt♦rty torfiOod under s4cliorn 2923 44 to2023 47 or 2925 41 b 2025 45 or ft Ravalad Code, andop»r than proporty that hOS baMn lowfuNy aau'ed in reta4on toa vioia0qn of sw'bon 2013 32 9f pwr Rewsad CotN,, " bedaWwaad of on appiicobon 16 and adsr of any oourt of reoordthat has tierrKOn4f )unsdic64n, owr the poWjcN subdivaqn inwhich the k+Mt inlorq^nsnt agency has turadicbon to anQagein law en/orrsrtiant sci4vit" • "

10

{l1s) Thus, acoortfutgto the abovs, taw anfon4am*nR is roquwed to make

reasonable efforts to bcate the persons entdled to posaeason of the property "(INJhen

stolan property ts ntcovpred. the adupl propsrty be is returned tothe nphlfui ownw, not

to the convicted oRendet who posfiessed it at the Wne of the arrest" State v Hoover,

Wood App No W0-04-051, 2005-Oh+o-3882, at 1113

11191 Appellant does not issprt, he k, sty , owned or was enbUad to poasess the

property Further, a jury determined baaed on evidence present.sd at tnaf that the iEams

seized from VIP wdre sOolen propsrty On dwect appeaf, thes aouft a1Bmed appeHant s

convicUons nohng the ovenivheNmnQ evutence that the items setzed were stolen and that

appeNant knew or should have known fhby wero stolen Thsrsfore, the iterrro appellant

now seeks to have roturned to him were not personal propsrty, tpit rather were stolen

property Consequently, d is cle+ir that appeNant has no nghts to the stokn property in

this case, and thus the tnal couK did not ea in deny" hrs motwn for retum of prop"

See, id See, also, State v IUray (Aug 31, 1989), Cuyahoga App No 55823

11201 Accordingly, we overrule appeNant's fikh, sixlh, and seventh assignments of

ORor

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio,

V.

Vanny Loch,

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 06AP-1 142Yand

No. O6AP-1172(C.P.C. No. 01CR-5917)

(REGULAR CALENDAR)Defendant-Appel la nt.

JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court rendered herein on

August 30, 2007, appellant's seven assignments of error are overruled, and it is the

judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Franklin County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs shall be assessed against appellant.

McCsRPcTH1BRYANT and BRO)ISM, JJ.

,., Judqe Patrick M. McGrath

In The Supreme Court of Ohio

Case Information Statement_ ....

Case llianie:

! State v. VannY Loch06AP-1142

'--I. Has this case previously been decided or remanded by this Court? Yes q No Xq

If so, please provide the Case Name:Case No.:

Any Citation: ____z = ----- -_ -_ __ - -----------^^_------_- -- ---- ----II.Will the determination of this case involve the interpretation or application of any particular case

1 decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio or tlie Supreme Court of the United States? Yes Rq No qIf so, please provide the Case Name and Citation: 2933.41 (S) • 293 3 n^ (r) • 4727 i i

NVill the determination of this case involve the interpretation or application of any particularconstitutional provision, statute, or rule of court? Yes Q No q

If so, please provide the appropriate citation to the constitutional provision, statute, or court rule, as follows:

U.S. Constitution: Article, , Section Ohio Revised Code: R.C.Ohio Constitution: Article 1 , Section 16 Court Rule:United States Code: Title , Section Ohio Admin. Code: O.A.C. -_

:^__.. ---- -- - -_------

I' f III. Indicate up to three primary areas or topics of law involved in this proceeding (e.g., juryinstructions, Ub1/[JI117, search and seizure, etc.):

1) Due Process2)3)

IV. Are you aware of any case now pending or about to be brought before this Court that involves an

r

issue substantially the same as, similar to, or related to an issue in this case? Yes q NoIf so, please identify the Case Name:

q

Case No.:

Court where Currently Pending:

Issue:

f.... ^Contact information for a

PPellant or counsel:

!I

i

VannY LochName Atty.Reg. # Telephone # Fax #

P 0 Box 7010

4 Address Signature of appellant or counselRoss Correctional Inst.

Chillicothe, Ohio 45601Counsel for:

City State Zip Code

^ ^ ^;^ Case No..