from day to day and term to term until the further order of the court. (See Campbell v. State, 179 So. 137; Carnagio v. State, 143 So. 162 and Bronson v. State, 3 So. 2d 873; also see Moutos v. State, 49 So. 2d 841). The power to suspend the imposition of sentence is inherent, as witness the statement in Bronson v. State, supra., that:

"There is nothing in the statutes to limit or restrain the court's inherent powe?' to suspend pronouncement of sentence, once having entered a judgment of convic­tion...."

However, it is to be noted that in Coleman v. State ex reI. Lynde, 6 So. 2d 2, the Supreme Court of Florida said that it did not commend the exercise of the power to defer the imposition of sentence'in cases like that one, thereby in effect throwing out 'a warning against a too liberal exercise of the power.

AS TO QUESTION FOUR:

A person convicted of robbery under Ch. 28217 may be sen­tenced to imprisonment in the state prison for life and §948.01, F.S., withholds from the courts the power to place a defendant on probation if he has been convicted for "an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment". In State v. Taylor, 9 So. 2d 708, it was held that the trial court could not place on probation one convicted of second degree murder for which a term of life im­prisonment might be imposed, even though a lesser term of incar­ceration was allowable. However, in the later case of Parrish v. State, 14 So. 2cl 171, the Supreme Court announced that a ma­jority of the justices were not convinced that the former holding in State v. Taylor was correct, and served notice that upon the same queslion being presented in another case it might be that the Court would overrule the Taylor case and hold that probation could be allowed unless the only penalty provided for by statute should be death or life imprisonment. It therefore appears that no authoritative answer can be given to your Question Four, but it is my personal opinion that the question should be answered in the negative.

TRESPASS AND INJURY TO REALTY AND SIMILAR OFFENSES

October 15, 1954.-054-239. CRIMIN AL TRESPASS-P ARKING IN PRIVATE PARKING

LOT-DEFINITION OF §821.18, F.S.

QUESTION: Where a private parking lot is properly posted as such, does a person who parks on said lot without the permis­sion of the owner commit a criminal trespass?

To: Honorable K. C. Alvarez, Chief of Police, Ocala, Florida:

Your letter does not indicate that the parking lot in question is enclosed and r assume that it is in the City of Ocala and is not enclosed. Therefore, this opinion will not deal with trespass statutes affecting enclosed premises. Bearing this in mind, I find no applicable statu te except §821.18, F .S., providing as follows:

650 BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

"Other trespasses.-Every trespass upon the property of another, committed with a malicious and mischievous in­tent, the punishment of which is not specially provided for, shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding three months, or by fine not exceeding one hundred dollars."

It is a trespass to use the property of another without any authority or right whatsoever to do so. (Halifax Drainage District of Vol usia County v. Gleaton, 188 So. 374). Parking on a posted private parking lot is a use of the parking lot· and is therefore a trespass when done without the consent of the owner or his authorized agent and therefore without any right or authority 'Nhatsoever. Moreover the punishment for such a trespass "is not specially provided for".

The remaining question to be decided in determining whether said §821.18 applies to a person who parks in a posted private parking lot without the permission of the owner or his agent is as to whether such parking can be said to be done "with a ma­licious and mischievous intent".

"Malicious" means nothing more than that the wrongful act shall be done voluntarily, unlawfully, and without excuse or justi­fication. (Williams v. State, 109 So. 805). A person who parks in a posted private parking lot without permission may be pre­sumed to have done so voluntarily in the absence of a showing that it was done involuntarily. He acts unlawfully and in violation of the legal rights of the owner of the parking lot. I think that it would be possible for some extraordinary and unusual circum­stances to exist which would afford such person an excuse, or perhaps even a justification, for so parking, but there would be no excuse or justification in any ordinary case. So, a person who parks in a posted private parking lot without permission ordinarily does so maliciously within the contemplation of the statute but the final determination of whether the parking is done maliciousl)' would depend upon the peculiar facts of the case.

Does such a person act mischievously? One of the definitions of "mischievous" given in 58 C.J.S. 817 is "causing mischief" and on the same page "mischief" is defined as "Trouble or vexation caused by human agency or by some living being, intentionally or not." The same definitions of "mischief" and "mischievous" are found in Webster's New International Dictionary. A person who parks in a posted private parking lot without the consent of the owner or his agent causes trouble or vexation to the owner or his agent and commits a mischievous trespass if such parking comes to the attention of the owner or his agent. If neither the owner nor his agent finds out about it, no trouble or vexation is caused to either; what one is ignorant of doesn't trouble or vex him. So, whether the parking is done with a mischievous intent must be determined from the facts of the particular case.