“...[The situation] could [escalate] until janitors need PhD’s and babysitters are required

to hold advanced degrees in childcare,” (Weyrich 3).  So Randall Collins said of credential

inflation, one of the enduring trends of modern America.  Higher and higher education is

required to remain competitive in the job market.  More and more emphasis is placed needlessly

on degrees and schooling.  Jobs that once required high school diplomas now only admit those

holding bachelor’s or even graduate degrees.  The causes are multifarious, subtle and

interwoven, and often difficult to differentiate from effects, but lead to two overarching themes:

the desire of the elite to stay on top, and the ideals of democracy.  This situation, if allowed to

continue without regulation, has the deleterious potential to affect America’s intellectual culture,

economy, social mobility, and economic equality.

Nowadays, the prevailing consensus on what to do after high school is to attend college.

From 1997 to 2007 alone, enrollment in post-secondary education increased twenty-six percent,

(National Center for Educational Statistics, Fast Facts, Table).  College, many think, is a sure

thing, the best route to a decent paying job and financial security.  This view isn’t far from the

truth either.  The median annual pay of workers, ages twenty-five to thirty-four, holding a

bachelor’s degree in 1980 was $52,300.  High-school graduates of the same age only earned

$44,200.  An eight thousand dollar difference of this sort isn’t overtly condemning of the high-

school degree’s prospects, but looking twenty-eight years later, a marked and rather

disconcerting gap begins to form.  the bachelor’s degree median pay rises slightly under three

thousand dollars, which isn’t particularly noteworthy of itself, while the high school graduate’s

pay drops over twelve thousand (NCES, Fast Facts, Table).  Not only is this substantial

decrease alarming, as such a salary is hardly above the poverty line for families of five, but it is

also validates the credential inflation trend.  It is unlikely that the jobs held by high-school grads

remained in the same sector and universally decreased in pay by such a margin.  Rather, it is

much more probable that the jobs themselves shifted to a better educated employee base,

pushing high-school diploma-holders down to lower paying jobs.  

One of the surest indicators of credential inflation is the expansion of the education

system.  If higher degrees are required to receive the same jobs as previously, it follows that

more students would pursue further education.  Between 1970 and 2007, enrollment in

undergraduate institutions increased by over eight and a half million students, almost doubling.

For-profit schools, like the University of Phoenix, nearly tripled in number between 1997 and

2007, mushrooming from one-hundred seventy to four-hundred ninety schools, (NCES, Fast

Facts, Table).   Of course, some of this is due to population increase as a whole, but the

difference doesn’t fully account for the increase in the student body.  Resulting from the baby

boom, the population of college-aged U.S. residents was at a peak in the late ‘70s, and then

progressively declined until the mid-‘90s and didn’t surpass the peak again until recent years,

(U.S. Census Bureau).  Interestingly, even while the population of eighteen to twenty-five year-

old’s was decreasing, enrollment in post-secondary education still managed to increase

eighteen percent between 1985 and 1992.  Furthermore, fifty percent of high-school graduates

continued their education in 1972, whereas almost seventy percent did so in 2008, (NCES, Fast

Facts, Table).  These statistics in mind, population increase as a suspect for education

expansion holds a relatively minor position in comparison to credential inflation.

Some of the above statistics, one should note, regard post-secondary education in

general, community, technical and various other certification schools included.  In no way does

this reduce their efficacy in proving credential inflation, however, as an increased need for

licensing is occurring in almost all fields, still indicating credential inflation.  For more concrete

evidence regarding bachelor’s degrees specifically, consider Bellevue Community College in

Washington State.  Early 2009, it changed its name to Bellevue College and granted its first

bachelor’s degrees.  The college isn’t alone in this transition, either.  Ninety-five other

community colleges made the shift in 2008.  Reasoning behind this is clear: the demand for

bachelor’s degrees is increasing.  The impetus of credential inflation is pushing colleges like

Bellevue to offer higher degrees, (“More Community Colleges Now Offering Bachelor’s

Degrees” 1-3).

In further demonstrating the existence of credential inflation, an additional facet of the

trend should be examined:  higher credentials do not necessarily, if at all, correlate with better

job performance, nor does the need for credentials correlate with the demands of a more

advanced society.  Improvements in technology do not necessarily require a more educated

workforce.  That is the nature of credential inflation; more education is required to do the same

job as before.  This may seem opposed to logic.  With the IT sector expanding rapidly and

exportation of menial labor jobs to third world countries becoming commonplace, it seems

natural that jobs would shift to requiring more expertise and skilled workers, and in turn more

education.  Nonetheless, there is strong evidence to refute this, hinging on the fact that most

practical knowledge is learned on the job.  As Randall Collins claimed: “the skills of cutting-edge

industries are generally learned on the job or through experience rather than in high school or

college”, (“the Dirty Little Secret of Credential Inflation” 6).  

In “the Dirty Little Secret of Credential Inflation”, Collins further states that:

...a high-tech society does not mean that a high proportion of the labor force consists of

experts. A more likely pattern -- and the one we see emerging today -- is a bifurcation of

the labor force into an "expert" sector -- perhaps 20 percent -- and a much larger range

of those with routine or even menial service jobs. With continuing computerization and

automation, typical middle-class jobs may gradually disappear, leaving an even bigger

gap between a small elite of technical, managerial, and financial experts, and everyone

else (7).

With that, it is fairly clear that technology in no way increases need for expertise.  To

back this claim with actual evidence, rather than expert opinion, consider the study conducted

by Dr. Ivar Berg in the 1960-’70s.  The Federal Aviation Administration trained five-hundred

seven men, about half lacking post-high-school education.  Some years later, (unspecified), half

of the college grads had earned no awards from supervisors, while only one-third of the high-

school grads had done the same and forty-three percent had earned at least two.  Thus, Berg

surmised that “education proves not to be a factor in the daily performances of one of the most

demanding decision-making jobs in America”, (“Failing Grades” 3).

Another example of unnecessary credentials is evident in the resignation of MIT Dean of

Admissions, Marilee Jones, on April 26, 2007.  Some twenty-eight years earlier, she had

fabricated three degrees on her application to a lower level job in the Admissions office,

(Seward 1-2).  In reality, she had only graduated high-school.  When she was being considered

for the Dean’s position in ’98, she reportedly didn’t have the courage to correct her resume.  As

a Dean, Jones was a visionary in college admissions reform, trying to mitigate the stress of the

admissions process on students.  She also championed the change of emphasis on

extracurriculars.  Instead of focusing on a long, impressive list of activities, which leads

inevitably to shallow participation in all, she supported large contributions to a small number,

(Seward 8).  With this work, among other things, she was praised as a wonderful Dean of

Admissions, perhaps the best in recent MIT history.  Clearly, Marilee Jones was capable, even

successful, at her job.  But the interesting thing is she likely would have never received the

position, had she not made such a fabrication twenty-eight years earlier.  Such a heavy

emphasis on credentials, without thought of their actual worth, becomes absurd in this light.

They can hardly be held as an indicator for future success.  

To fully assert the existence of the trend of credential inflation, its longevity must be

discussed.  Tacit in many of the statistics, some ranging back to the ‘60s and ‘70s, is a clear

sense of duration.  Of itself, this evidence should be sufficient, but more discourse on the matter

is warranted.  Intermittent periods of trends of similar sorts have been manifest in societies

everywhere, as early as the Confucian system of education, in which gentry were often

educated until their thirties and forties.  Looking throughout history, at Spanish education in the

1500s and French in the 1700s, it becomes clear that credential inflation is the hallmark of an

advancing civilization; once a point is reached where formal education is prevalent, it becomes

a grinding competition to receive the highest credentialing offered.  It also becomes clear that

need for higher certification ebbs and flows.  Slowly credentials inflate more and more until the

population realizes the price outweighs the pay-out.  Disillusionment and abandonment of

formalized education follows and the cycle starts all over again.  In recent U.S. history alone,

one can clearly observe this characteristic.  Around the resolution of World War II, college

enrollment began to increase steadily until the 1971.  Then, enrollment rates dropped off by

almost ten percent and didn’t surpass the ’71 levels until 1981.  After this drop off, rates

increased almost without exception, totaling a seventeen percent increase from ’81 to date,

(NCES).  As for whether this trend is here to stay, experts agree that credential inflation will

continue for years to come.  Collins, in his “Credentials Inflation and the Future of Universities”,

even claims it could escalate until we have a socialistic system revolving around education.

The tenability of credential inflation as a trend can hardly be further questioned.  To

understand it more fully, however, its causes must be mentioned.  First, the causality of a trend

of such immense scope, spanning thousands of universities, millions of students, and hundreds

of billions of dollars of a GNP spent each year, is admittedly convoluted and indiscernible to the

average observer.  It almost requires a PhD in sociology to scratch the surface.  However, in

reducing it to a form understandable to any uninformed of the issue, two overriding causes

emerge: social classes and the idea of democratic equality.  

In discussing the former, I must defer to Max Weber, whose credentialing theory has

largely been acknowledged as the best explanation for the phenomenon.  His ideas depart from

the standard view that universities are “merely meritocratic institutions that sort individuals and

certify their objective technical skills,” (Brown 2).  Rather, he claims credentials are more than

anything “exclusionary cultural entry barriers to positions,” (Brown 2).  The essence of his

argument comes down to an underlying desire of the elite to stay on top.  The rich, he claims,

want to secure positions for themselves and their progeny in the upper tier.  Of course, they

aren’t conspiring to do such.  It isn’t as if all the elite in America collectively decided to drive up

the need for credentials.  No, the driving force is the instinct of self-preservation.  Wealth and

success is tenuous.  Obviously, no guarantee exists that one will always be rich, or that one’s

children will succeed of their own merit.  But with the establishment of an institution, education,

which financial success hinges upon, the affluent can easily take advantage.  Even further, if

that institution requires a particularly weighty financial burden, there will be a natural predilection

to the wealthy.  With the expansion of that very institution, soon lower classes will no longer be

afforded the opportunity to move upwards, thus cementing social stratification.  In other words,

credential inflation is a mechanism the wealthy use to stay wealthy (Brown 3).

Clearly, a motive is present for the elite to push the spiral of credentialism upwards.

Their methods of succeeding in this without coordination are unclear, however.  Even Weber,

the author of this theory, provides little explanation.  To conjecture, the method is likely rooted in

the fact that the elite are in positions of power and management.  They often have control over

hiring policies.  As Randall Collins said in his “Credential Inflation and the Future of

Universities”, the elite then use this power to “redefine their jobs and to eliminate

noncredentialed <sic> jobs around them” (13). Thus, the demand for credentials increases,

education, a credential-granting institution, expands, and the elite monopolize the education

system, effectively securing their position at the top of society.

Most modern sociologists agree that this theory provides perhaps the best explanation of

credential inflation. As previously mentioned, however, the minutiae and causation of an

occurrence of this scope can hardly be summed up by one definitive hypothesis. Other ideas

exist within the realm of plausibility. Human capitalist theorists, for instance, posit that

education is both a means for skilling workers and for workers to “signal their competence to

employers, particularly when recruitment entailed uncertainties about adequate technical

performance” (Brown 4). They then proceed to claim education expands as a result of

increased competition for this signaling. Parts of their theory may seem valid, but under closer

scrutiny become inadequate. In reality, education is a poor means of skilling workers, as has

been heavily discussed. Furthermore, employers do not typically use degrees as signals of

competence, but rather as a filter of sorts, cutting down large numbers of applicants to a

manageable selection pool (Brown 4). Degrees are often also used to ensure cultural

homogeneity. Weber’s idea is that “educational credentials [are] essentially cultural-political

constructions of…organizational loyalty that [bear] little relationship to the technical demands of

modern work” (Brown 3). He goes on to say education is a means of “[encapsulating] workers

in capitalist ideology, and credentials are meaningless to workers’ own interests” (Brown 3).

Essentially, Weber claims employers use credentials and education to improve efficiency by

reducing conflict from differences. Another inadequacy of the signaling-human capitalist theory

regards a plausible explanation for the inflation of credentialed jobs. The theory only explains a

need for credentials, not an expansion thereof (Brown 5).

It is, of course, difficult to fully assert the validity of Weber’s theory, as it is by no means

definitive, and certainly involves conjecture. With an American workforce of perhaps one

hundred million workers, the dynamics of the need for credentials cannot possibly be reduced to

one theory. In the case of Weber’s ideas, some of them have become a bit archaic, having

been formulated in the first half of the twentieth century. His claim that the elite drive credential

inflation still holds weight, though in recent years I would expect the elite’s monopoly has

become diminished, especially considering increases in financial aid aimed at lower social

classes. Perhaps a better potential cause is democracy.

At the turn of the twentieth century, less than ten percent of the population had

graduated from high school. The diploma was, as Collins said, “the badge of middle-class

respectability” (“The Dirty Little Secret of Credential Inflation” 2). All the way up until World War

II, one could get a perfectly well-paying job without so much as a G.E.D. Indeed, almost eighty-

percent of CEOs in the 1940s hadn’t even attended college (Weyrich 2). Something obviously

changed, however, as now only ten percent of the population does not graduate from high

school. The diploma has become “little more than a ticket to a lottery in which one can buy a

chance at a college degree -- which itself is becoming a ticket to a yet higher-stakes lottery”

(“The Dirty Little Secret of Credential Inflation” 2). The impetus for this change is clear: the

aforementioned ideals of democracy. For some time, the government has been stressing high-

school completion, with don’t-drop-out campaigns and legislation promoting equality of

achievement. A recent manifestation presented itself in the Bush-era No Child Left Behind Act.

Resulting from the women suffrage movement in the 1910s and the civil rights movement in the

1960s, affirmative action legislation has likewise pushed achievement, accenting minority

success. As Collins said in “Credential Inflation and the Future of Universities”, “education is…

legitimated as democratic equality of opportunity (29).  

To better understand the effect of democracy, let us first begin with a rudimentary

discussion of the dynamics of credential inflation, nothing complex but merely a near reiteration

of common sense. As the amount of people who earn each successive degree or level of

education increases, the intrinsic value of that degree proportionally decreases. We cannot

expect every person who earns a given certification to receive the same level of job as the next

person. For instance, if there are one thousand jobs requiring a bachelor’s in chemical

engineering, then clearly only one thousand people will receive a job. Even if one thousand and

fifty people receive the chemical engineering degree, only one thousand of them will get the job.

It then follows that competition will exist, and in some way applicants are going to have to put

themselves in front of the others. To succeed in this, many will continue their education, until

they are conferred Master’s in Chemical Engineering. Newly bestowed with this credential, they

will then be able to apply with a substantial advantage over the other applicants. Slowly, more

of the jobs will be obtained by Master’s degree holders, as the displaced fifty try to pry their way

back in by receiving their own Master’s degrees. Following this logic, the job will eventually

require a Master’s degree, as no reason will exist to hire bachelor’s holders if a surplus of

Master’s holders is present. Thus, credential inflation occurs.

Democracy tells us that everyone is equal. To quote the Declaration of Independence:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are

endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,

Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are

instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

With this, the idea is had that we should strive to give everyone equal opportunity.

Education is an obvious extension of this. Apart from menial labor and positions behind the

cash register and under the golden arches, nearly every job requires education to some extent.

If we offer everyone education, the theory goes, these ideals of democracy will approach

realization. Of course, this is far from the truth. Along this line, Randall Collins said, “Imagine if

we said we want every school in the country to have a championship football team, that every

team should win 90 percent of its games. People would recognize the flaw in that thinking. But

we say that about education all the time” (Weyrich 2). Pushing education for all has a sort of

“dog-chasing-its-tail quality to it”; clearly we cannot expect everyone to be wealthy and

successful (Weyrich 2). All this does is up the number of credentialed workers without upping

the number of credentialed jobs. No one’s income will actually increase. And so democracy

drives credential inflation: it pushes more into successively higher levels of education, thus

devaluing each successive level, in turn forcing jobs to require higher and higher certification.

The only noteworthy counter-causal argument, in regard to democracy as a drive of

credential inflation, has already been easily refuted: the idea that a more technological society

requires more education. Aside from this, no one in the sociological community really opposes

this idea. Other theories exist, of course. Some posit, for example, that credential inflation has

developed naturally as a macroeconomic counterbalance to unemployment and

underemployment, allowing for a ten percent reduction of the workforce. This theory and

countless other minute suggestions of potential causes are all valid in their own, but it would

hardly be practical to mention all of them. Instead, the two most prominent, and most widely

accepted, hypotheses have been presented.

    The proof and causes of credential inflation now stand on fairly strong grounds, or at least as

strong of grounds on which an uninformed, high school senior can place them.  However, the

importance of this phenomenon has yet to be discussed.  Credential inflation, one finds with a

little research, has startling implications for society.  Collins claims “most problems of

contemporary universities are connected to credential inflation” (“The Dirty Little Secret of

Credential Inflation” 1).  If this statement is true, we have an obligation to stop credential

inflation where it stands.  To do so, solutions must be formulated, but before solutions can be

made the exact impacts of credential inflation must be known.  

    David Labaree said “the relentless urge to get ahead has undermined the opportunity to get

an education” (Weyrich 4).  Both Randall Collins and Dr. Ivar Berg attribute credential inflation to

this same urge, a utilitarian student mentality that getting degrees from distinguished institutions

is the best way to get a good job.  Along the way, students neglect actual learning, the

opportunity to improve themselves.  Thus, universities have been transformed into tollbooths of

sorts on the highway to future success, a mere stopping point requiring one to dump out his

pockets so he can continue on to prosperity.  Intellectualism has dwindled as a result.

“Humanistic culture has become very nearly the exclusive province of professional teachers of

the humanities,” Collins said in his “The Late Twentieth-Century Crisis” (25).  It has come to the

point that very few students go to college to experience what college should be, a chance to

improve themselves, to cultivate their minds, to broaden their perspectives.  Rather, they grind

through as quickly as possible, taking courses that will give them an easy A. So, in a sense,

credential inflation is undermining culture.

This “relentless urge to get ahead” has further ramifications. Achievement levels and

“high school…test scores have fallen precipitously”, as students focus on the immediate quarter

and semester grade, not the long-term retention and understanding (“The Late Twentieth-

Century Credential Crisis” 25). Resultantly, the true purpose of education is neglected in place

of an impressive transcript. Grade inflation has also ensued. As Collins explains, “the

prevailing ethos is for faculty members to treat students sympathetically to try to get them

through what the professors recognize as a competitive grind” (“The Dirty Little Secret…” 11).

Professors are generally aware that in other classes and other universities students are

receiving higher grades than they deserve and if, as a professor, one doesn’t do the same, his

or her students will be disadvantaged in the job market.

In the job market itself, efficiency has declined and knowledge applicable to jobs has

been replaced with airy, insubstantial degrees. A study published by the American Bar

Association showed findings that many new lawyers are unfamiliar with daily procedures such

as drafting contracts and court-required forms (Weyrich 3). This has been discussed heavily;

college provides little or no real, useful knowledge for jobs. The reason for this cause is much

the same as the dwindling of intellectual culture: students are largely becoming more focused

on receiving the degree, not the information. Furthermore, the education system is seeking

ways to confer credentials to larger amounts of people with less money and in the process is

missing some of the important information.

Educational expansion, an effect already extensively discussed, is worth mentioning

briefly. As has already been established, credential inflation requires more education and the

system expands resultantly. However, one object previously unnoted is the cause-sustaining

nature of education expansion. While started by the need for credentials in the first place,

education expansion now serves as push for further inflation. With more universities, more

propaganda and advertisements pushing people continue with education are present. Hence, it

fuels itself, pushing more people into the credential competition.

Elsewhere, many students are now amassing large amounts of debt, often owing

upwards of one hundred thousand dollars. From this, numerous other society-plaguing trends

have stemmed. To provide a seemingly unrelated example, the frequency of birth defects has

risen. Mentioning this in relation to higher student debt may seem in all respects absurd, but

with some analysis, the link becomes clear. With higher debt, many are reluctant to start a

family, knowing the financial burden children can be and worrying they may not be able to fully

provide. Families, then, start later, and people have kids in their thirties and forties, rather than

their twenties. Studies have shown that the later in life one reproduces, the greater the chance

for various genetic problems and birth defects, such as Down syndrome and cleft palates.

Considering all of this, it becomes alarmingly apparent that credential inflation’s dark fingers

have reached even the furthest niches of society.

One other primary effect remains, (many others exist but are inconsequential to this

paper’s topic), one that has already been heavily discussed not in relation to the consequences

of credential inflation but the causes: social stratification. The more credentials and education

required, the less likely the poor are to move upwards out of stagnation. If this continues,

classes will soon be cemented into permanence, no hope for upward mobility and no fear for the

opposite. And a society without social mobility is a society without democracy, without equality,

without freedom, and without the cherished American Dream. In this respect, credential inflation

is destroying the ideals America was founded on, the thought that anyone can succeed, anyone

can go from rags to riches. With this debasement, we are risking all America stands for. For

this reason, it is so important that we stop credential inflation and find solutions to these

problems.

Randall Collins himself is quoted as having said “I make no claim to solve [this]

ideological problem.”  He is the leading expert in the field, having devoted most of his life to the

topic.  How then, can I, a high-school senior who has studied the topic for two weeks without

any of my own research, hope to provide any helpful insight?  The truth is, this topic is so

complex and vast that any solution I deign to present will likely be so shallow and naive in scope

that if actually enacted, would only worsen the situation.  This limitation in mind, I will discuss

several possible courses of action, ranging from extreme to mild, and their implications.

The first view at hand is credential capitalism, with the belief that individuals should

endeavor to attain credentials in order to remain competitive. This view provides no solution,

ignoring that such behavior further induces inflation, and even suggests that credentials are a

necessary part of competition in a free market system. Obviously, this will not work (“The Late

Twentieth-Century Credential Crisis” 15).

On the opposite side is credential socialism, holding that government should intervene to

more evenly distribute education. This is an effort to shore up social stratification and

inequalities in the system by pushing for more education for minorities, thus minimizing the

negative effects of credential inflation. However, it really only results in further credential

inflation in which the rich still end up on top. To provide an example, initiatives of this sort, such

as federal student aid and Pell grants, only go so far and the elite remain the only one’s capable

of paying for the needed education (Collins 17).

Still on the left is credential radicalism, advocating so-called free-schools and de-

schooling. Community and hands-on schools like Montessori are a manifestation of this. At a

lower level, this method may prove useful. Many notable success stories with alternative

learning are a testament to this. In preparing for jobs, however, the best method is still on-the-

job training. Perhaps if universally instituted, this proposal could work, but the transition would

be economically infeasible. If partially instituted, the transition would work financially, but the

external system of credentials would reject any of the students that had gone through free-

schools. Collins largely finds this proposal inadequate (Collins 19).

These previous views on credential inflation have all been inadequate or unreasonable.

Randall Collins only considers two views sufficient, the first being credential Keynesianism.

Keynesianism realizes the negative implications of credential inflation, but nevertheless

attempts to continue the system. Proponents of this school of thought argue the risk of future

inflation is acceptable in order to maintain the economy. If credentials were suddenly ended,

millions of previously occupied workers would suddenly flood the market, thereby worsening

unemployment and throwing the economy into a recession (Collins 20). Collins finds this view

perhaps the most reasonable view, but not the best. Credential abolitionism

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