CRIMPRO DIGESTS FOR June 24, 2013

CUYCO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN(2000)

FACTS:

Graft Investigation Officer Ma. Lourdes M. Vilaria-Yap found probable cause for the indictment of Ramon G. Cuyco (petitioner), Generoso P. Germino and Melcy V. Wee for violation of Section 3(a)- (a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense., R.A.3019, and Cuyco with Rolando R. Madarang for violation of Section 3(e)- (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. of the same Act.

She recommended the filing of two informations against Cuyco.

The Ombudsman approved the recommendation, and the prosecution filed with the Sandiganbayan two informations against Cuyco for both offenses.

Cuyco filed a motion to quash the information for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the cases.

The Sandiganbayan issued resolutions denying the motion to quash and ordering the preventive suspension of Cuyco and his co-accused for ninety (90) days.

Cuyco filed a motion for reconsideration seeking to set aside the resolutions in question and to dismiss the criminal cases for want of jurisdiction. This was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the cases against petitioner for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e), R.A.3019, as amended.

HELD:

No. The Sandiganbayan did not have jurisdiction.

RATIO:The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses and felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, where the accused holds a position with salary grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.At the time of the commission of the offense in 1992, he was occupying the position of Director II, Salary Grade 26, hence, jurisdiction over the cases falls with the Regional Trial Court.

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), R.A., as amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of regional director and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. 6758) in relation to their office.

MORALES V. CA

GR No.: 126623

Date: December 12, 1997

Petitioner: Ernesto Morales

Respondents: Court of Appeals, Hon. Alfredo Gustilo, as presiding judge of RTC, and People of the Philippines

Facts

Petitioner was charged for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 in an information filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He then filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground the penalty for the offense charged should not exceed prision correccional or six years worth of imprisonment and that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court that has jurisdiction over the case.

In denying this motion, the RTC reasons out that, while MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over cases with penalties of not more than six years of imprisonment, an exception is provided in the said Act. It provides the Court of First Instance (currently, the RTC) shall have concurrent original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable under the Act.

Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction over the case.

Hence, this petition

In raising the same to SC, petitioner furthers that, since only about 0.5 gram of shabu was involved, the imposable penalty would not exceed prision correccional. Therefore, RTC doesnt have jurisdiction over his case.

Issue

Whether RTC has jurisdiction to try petitioners alleged violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act

Held

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, but only insofar as the issue of jurisdiction of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670 is concerned. The Resolutions of 8 August and 13 September 1996 of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE, while the challenged orders in Criminal Case No. 96-8443 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 116, are AFFIRMED. The trial court is hereby DIRECTED to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. 96-8443 with all reasonable dispatch.

Ratio

Whether RTC has jurisdiction to try petitioners alleged violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act

YES. Section 32 of RA 7691 reads:

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offender or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.

It must be noted, however, that the exclusive jurisdiction of these courts does not cover those cases which, by law, fall within the RTCs and Sandiganbayans exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the prescribed penalty. In the case at bar, the Dangerous Drugs Act specifically confers upon the RTC the jurisdiction over cases such as this.

PEOPLE VS MAGALLANES

Facts:

Two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder (of Gargar and Lumangyao) were filed with the RTC of Bacolod City against 14 persons, 5 whom are members of the PNP

Each of the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment

Prosecution rested its case and the trial court started to receive the evidence for the accused

Private prosecutors moved for the transmittal of the records of the cases to the Sandiganbayan (SB) on the ground that, pursuant to our decision of 11 March 1994 inRepublic of the Philippines vs. Asuncion,the RTC has no jurisdiction over the cases because the offenses charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers

RTC issued an order denying the motion

The prosecution, represented by the OSG, prayed for a TRO challenging the refusal of the respondent Judge Magallanes to transfer the cases to the SB

Issue:

w/n RTC of Bacolod City has jurisdiction over the case instead of the SB - YES

Ruling:

At the time the informations in the said cases were filed, the law governing the jurisdiction of the SB was Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606

Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information,and not by the result of evidence after trial.

For lack of an allegation in the informations that the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers or were intimately connected with the discharge of the functions of the accused, the subject cases come within the jurisdiction of the RTC and not of the SB

The allegation of "taking advantage of his position" or "taking advantage of their respective positions" incorporated in the informations is not sufficient to bring the offenses within the definition of "offenses committed in relation to public office."

The SB partly lost itsexclusive original jurisdictionin cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corruption), it retains only cases where the accused are those enumerated in subsectiona, Section 4 (R.A. 7975) and officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6758)

Also, upon express provision of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, all criminal cases in which trial has not yet begun in the SB shall be referred to the proper courts. Hence, cases which were previously cognizable by the SB under P.D. No. 1606, as amended, but are already under the jurisdiction of the courts by virtue of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7975, shall be referred to the latter courts if hearing thereon has not yet been commenced in the SB

CONCURRING and DISSENTING OPINION:

Padilla: the act of Torres was undoubtly connected with his position as station commander of PNP; others were performing as law enforcers such that the case must be prosecuted in the SB. The informations must have been filed with the SB.

Kapunan: in favor of granting bail

SANCHEZ VS. DEMETRIOU

227 SCRA 627 09 NOVEMBER 1993

Facts: The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of

appropriated charges against several persons including Mayor Antonio

Sanchez of Calauan, Lagauna, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen

Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. Acting on this request, the Panel of

State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary

investigation. Subsequently, the prosecutors filed with the RTC of Calamba 7

info against Sanchez and the other persons accused. However, to avoid

miscarriage of justice the venue of the seven cases was transferred to Pasig,

where they were raffled to Judge Harriet Demetriou.

Sachez now contends that the proceedings conducted by the DOJ are null and

void for want of jurisdiction, as such is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman

to conduct the investigation of all cases involving Public Officers. The Court,

however, held that as in the case of Aguinaldo v. Dumagas, this authority is

not exclusive but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the

offense charged. In fact, other investigatory agencies of the government such

as the DOJ may conduct the investigation.

Sanchez also contends that the case should come under the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan as most of the accused are public officials.

Decision: The court held that the crime of rape with homicide does not fall

under paragraph 1 of PD1606 as amended by PD1861, which deals with the

jurisdiction of the Sandigan in graft and corruption cases. Neither does it fall

under paragraph 2 because it is not an offense committed in relation to the

office of the petitioner. There is no direct relation between the commission of

the crime of rape with homicide and the petitioners office as municipal mayor

because public office is not an essential element of the crime charged. The

offense can stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged

in the info that the commission of the crime charged was intimately connected

with the performance of the petitioners official function. Thus, the case is

triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.

Prior to the amendment of RA 7975, jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for

felonies other than violation of R.A. No 3019 as amended, otherwise known as

the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, RA 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2,

Title VII of the RPC, embrace all other offenses provided, the offense was

committed in relation to public office and the prescribed penalty is more than

six year

UY VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 105965-70 09 August 1999

Facts: Petitioner George Uy was the deputy comptroller of the Philippine Navy

designated to act on behalf of Captain Fernandez, the latters supervisor, on

matters relating the activities of the Fiscal Control Branch. Six informations for

Estafa through falsification of official documents and one information for

violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 (anti-graft and corrupt practices act) were

filed with the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner and 19 other accused for

alleged. The petitioner was said to have signed a P.O. stating that the unit

received 1,000 pieces of seal rings when in fact, only 100 were ordered. The

Sandiganbayan recommended that the infomations be withdrawn against some

of the accused after a comprehensive investigation.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash contending that it is the Court Martial and

not the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the offense charged or the

person of the accused. Petitioner further contends that RA 1850 which

provides for the jurisdiction of court martial should govern in this case.

Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases

or the person of the petitioner

Decision: The fundamental rule is that the jurisdiction of a court is determined

by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Thus,

Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the petitioner at the time of the filing

of the informations and as now prescribed by law. RA 8249, the latest

amendment of PD 1606 creating the Sandiganbayan provides that such will

have jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019 of members of the Philippines

Army and air force colonels, naval captains and all officers of higher rank.

In the case at bar, while the petitioner is charged with violation of RA 3018, his

position as Lieutenant Commander of the Philippine Navy is a rank lower than

naval captains and all officers of higher rank. It must be noted that both the

NATURE of the OFFENSE and the POSITION OCCUPIED BY THE ACCUSED are

conditions SINE QUA NON before Sandiganbayan can validly take cognizance of

the case. Thus, regular courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the person

of the accused as provided by the Sandiganbayan Law which states that in

case where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the

proper RTC, MTC, MCTC or METC pursuant to BP Blg. 129.

Consequently, it is the RTC which has jurisdiction over the offense charged

since under Section 9 of RA 3019, the commission of any violation of said law

shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than Six years and One

month to FIFTEEN years. The indictment of the petitioner therefore cannot fall

within the jurisdiction of the MTC, METC or MCTC.

M. Jurisdiction determined by the position

PEOPLE VS. BARTOLOME

142 SCRA 464

Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted Rolando Bartolome y Perez, Senior Labor

Regulation Officer and Chief of the Labor Regulations Section of the Ministry of

Labor, and Elino Coronel y Santos, Labor Regulation Officer of the Ministry of

Labor, of the crime of Falsification of Official Document where they made it

appear in the Civil Service Personal Data Sheet of Bartolome that he had taken

and passed the Career Service with a rating of 73.5% in Manila and that he

was a 4th year AB student at FEU, when in truth, as both accused knew,

Bartolome had not taken the said exam nor was he a 4th year AB student in

FEU.

Decision: The office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in

the statute. The test is whether the offense cannot exist without the office.

Falsification of an official document is not within the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan unless committed in relation the public office of the public

officer.

The information does not allege that there was an intimate connection between

the discharge of official duties and the offense, thus, it cannot be brought

under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Note: When is an offense said to have been committed in relation to

office:

General Rule: offense may be considered as committed in relation to accuseds

office if the offense cannot exist without the office such that the office is a

constituent element of the crime as defined and punished in RPC (People vs.

Montilla).

Exception: Where the offense charged in the information is intimately

connected with the respective offices of the accused and was perpetuated while

they were in the performance, through irregular or improper, of their official

functions and had no personal motive to commit the crime and would not have

committed it had they not held their public office and merely obeyed the

instruction of their superior office, the offense may be said to have been

committed in relation to their office (the victim in this case was killed whiled

under custodial investigation in a police substation, murder was charged)

(People vs. Montejo)

FERDINAND CUNANAN vs. HON. HERMIN E. ARCEO

Facts:

1991- Petitioner had shot and killed Efren Bass in the course of trying to restore local public order which had been breached by a fistfight between the victim and two other individuals. An information for Murder was filed against Ferdinand Cunanan before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga. The Information alleged that petitioner was a member of the Philippine National Police; it contained no averment that he had committed the offense charged in relation to his public office.

1994, the Supreme Court promulgated its En Banc Decision in Republic v. Hon. Asuncion, which laid down the rule that the Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction to take cognizance of offenses 1. committed by public officers in relation to their office, 2. where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six (6) years or more or a fine of P6,000.00. (2 requisites)

The Supreme Court further held that in the event Information failed to allege that the accused-public officer had committed the offense charged in relation to his office, the RTC hearing the criminal case, pending at the time of the promulgation of the Asuncion rule, shall conduct a preliminary hearing to determine the existence or absence of this material fact. If this material fact is found to be present, the RTC shall order the transfer of the case to the Sandiganbayan and the latter shall proceed to hear the case as if the same had been originally instituted with it. If it be determined that that fact is absent, the RTC seized with the case shall proceed with the trial and render judgment on the case.

Judge Arceo held that the RTC had no jurisdiction to try the case and forwarded it to the Sandiganbayan and the complete records of the same transmitted therewith as if it was originally filed with the said Court.

The case is now in the Supreme Court on certiorari, seeking annulment of the orders of the public respondents calling for the transfer of Criminal Case and transmittal of records to the Sandiganbayan as products of alleged grave abuse of discretion.

Issue: The principal issue posed in this case is whether the public respondent RTC judges had correctly applied the doctrine laid down in Asuncion to this case, considering that here the absence of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC became apparent to the RTC after completion of the trial and submission of the case for decision.

Held: The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

Under Section 4 (a-2) of P.D. No. 1602 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, whenever the following 2 requisites concur, the offenses mentioned thereunder fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It is firmly settled that jurisdiction over the offense charged is a matter that is conferred by lawThe absence in the old information filed before the RTC of an allegation that petitioner Cunanan had committed the offense charged in relation to his office, is immaterial insofar as determination of the locus of jurisdiction is concerned.

Respondent RTC judges had forwarded petitioner's case to the Sandiganbayan, and the complete records transmitted thereto in accordance with the directions of this Court set out in the Asuncion case: ". . . As if it was originally filed with [the Sandiganbayan]." That information maybe amended at any time before arraignment before the Sandiganbayan, and indeed, by leave of court at any time before judgment is rendered by the Sandiganbayan, considering that such an amendment would not affect the juridical nature of the offense charged (i.e., murder), the qualifying circumstances alleged in the information, or the defenses that petitioner may assert before the Sandiganbayan. In other words, the amendment may be made before the Sandiganbayan without surprising the petitioner or prejudicing his substantive rights.

On double jeopardy: Petitioner had not been exposed at all to legal jeopardy by the commencement and trial of Criminal Case No. 5708 because the RTC was not a court of competent jurisdiction to try the case in the first place. Consequently, upon the commencement of this case before the Sandiganbayan petitioner will for the first time be placed in jeopardy of punishment for the offense of murder. By the same token, the dismissal of the Information by the RTC was not equivalent to, and did not operate as an acquittal of petitioner of that offense. The "dismissal" (later deleted by the RTC) had simply reflected the fact that the proceedings before the RTC were terminated, the RTC having ascertained that it had no jurisdiction to try the case at all.

LACSON v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Petitioner: PANFILO M. LACSON

Respondent: THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation.

However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murders against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.

All of the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended information, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975. 7

Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.

However, the special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.

During the pendency of the case, Congress passed a bill expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.

Said bill was approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 13 by the President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.

Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Sandigangbayan was now in favor of granting, the Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.

xxx xxx xxx

Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases in fact, no order of arrest has been issued this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.

Issue:

W/N the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

Held:

No. the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over the case.

Rationale:

Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

Article XI, Section 4 (1987) Constitution:

Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:

Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher

(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional offense is paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their office. "The phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

W/N the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction of the case.

The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.

As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by the public officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to their office as may be determined by law." This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of the accussed PNP officers.

As to how the offense charged be stated in the information, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:

Sec. 9 Cause of accusation The acts or omissions complied of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense , but in such from as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment . (Emphasis supplied)

As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts." The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.

It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as "he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense."

Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended information for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders.

The allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intevenors as among the accessories after-the-facts, the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories concelead "the crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused" surprises the reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in the two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the amended information that the said accessories committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP)," we, however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

PEOPLE VS CAWALING

Facts:Before us is an appeal from the 34-page Decision[2]dated October 21, 1994, promulgated by the Regional Trial Court of Romblon in Criminal Case No. OD-269.Convicted of murderwere former Mayor Ulysses M. Cawaling and Policemen Ernesto Tumbagahan,[3]Ricardo De los Santos and Hilario Cajilo.

Prior to the institution of the criminal case against all the appellants, an administrative case[4]had been filed before the National Police Commission, in which Policemen Ernesto Tumbagahan, Ricardo De los Santos, Hilario Cajilo (three of herein appellants) and Andres Fontamillas were charged by Nelson Ilisan[5]with the killing of his brother Ronie[6]Ilisan. On April 6, 1986, Adjudication Board No. 14[7]rendered its Decision which found Tumbagahan, De los Santos, Cajilo and Fontamillas guilty of grave misconduct and ordered their dismissal from the service with prejudice.[8]On June 26, 1986, the Board issued a resolution,[9]dismissing the respondents motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal Alexander Mortel filed, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan, Romblon,[10]an Information for murder[11]against the appellants and Andres Fontamillas.The accusatory portion reads:

That on or about the 4th day of December 1982, at around 9:00 oclock in the evening, in the Poblacion, [M]unicipality of San Jose, [P]rovince of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strenght [sic] willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot RONIE ILISAN, with the use of firearms, inflicting upon the latter multiple mortal injuries in different parts of his body which were the direct and immediate cause of his death.

Finding the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies credible, the courta quoconvicted the appellants.The killing was qualified to murder because of the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and treachery.The trial court ruled that there was a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and his assailants, as the latter were greater in number and armed with guns.It further ruled that abuse of superior strength absorbed treachery, as it ratiocinated:TRIAL COURT CONVICTED.

Issue:(1) Jurisdiction of the trial court;(2)Double Jeopardy

Held:Affirmed the RTCs ruling.

Answer issue no.1: Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo argue that the trial court erred when it assumed jurisdiction over the criminal case.They insist that the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, had jurisdiction to try and hear the case against the appellants, as they were public officers at the time of the killing which was allegedly committed by reason of or in relation to their office.

We do not agree.

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the case by any subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing such proceedings under the jurisdiction of another tribunal.The only recognized exceptions to the rule, which find no application in the case at bar, arise when:(1) there is an express provision in the statute, or (2) the statute is clearly intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment.

Public office is not the essence of murder.The taking of human life is either murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary, took advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is increased.

But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime.

Furthermore, the Information filed against the appellants contains no allegation that appellants were public officers who committed the crime in relation to their office.The charge was for murder, a felony punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.As clarified inAguinaldo, et al. vs. Domagas, et al.,[36][I]n the absence of such essential allegation, and since the present case does not involve charges of violation of R.A. No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft etc. Act), the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the present case. (Bartolome vs. People, 142 SCRA 459 [1986]Even before considering the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged, it is thus essential to determine whether that offense was committed or alleged to have been committed by the public officers and employees in relation to their offices.

Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.[37]In the absence of any allegation that the offense was committed in relation to the office of appellants or was necessarily connected with the discharge of their functions, the regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.[38]

Answer on Issue no. 2: In seeking their acquittal, Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo also invoke their right against double jeopardy.They argue that the first jeopardy attached when a criminal case for murder was filed before the Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO), which was allegedly dismissed after several hearings had been conducted.[39]We are not persuaded.

There is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present:(1) a first jeopardy has attached prior to the second;(2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and, (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as that in the first.And the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent

In the present case, the appellants have presented no sufficient and conclusive evidence to show that they were charged, arraigned and acquitted in a military commission, or that the case was dismissed therein without their consent.The defense merely offered as evidence certain disposition forms[47]and a letter,[48]dated March 8, 1983, recommending that the case against Appellants Tumbagahan, Cajilo and De los Santos be dropped and considered closed.[49]No charge sheet and record of arraignment and trial were presented to establish the first jeopardy.

As pointed out by the solicitor general, appellants were never arraigned, they never pleaded before the Judge Advocate Generals Office, there was no trial, and no judgment on the merits had been rendered.

Aguinaldo vs Domangas (MISSING)

Natividad v. Felix

February 4, 1994

Facts:

PNP requested Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor to investigate Mayor Natividads involvement in the death of Lourdes Aquinos husband, Severino Aquino, at the Ramos Police Station.

During the investigation, PNP filed another complaint with the Tarlac Municipal Circuit Court, which directed Mayor Natividads arrest with bail. He posted bail with the Manila RTC, which later issued an order recalling warrant.

After conducting the preliminary investigation, MCTC determined that there was probable cause to hold Natividad for murder with bail. The Provincial Prosecutor approved the filing of information against Natividad and Llerina in the Tarlac RTC (where Hon. Felix was the judge). Warrant of arrest was issued.

Upon seeing that the MCTC judge failed to conduct the second staged in the preliminary investigation, RTC recalled the warrant and remanded the case for further preliminary investigation. A panel of prosecutors later held that probable cause exists. The information was amended, additionally charging Cabaong, Llerina and Millado. An arrest warrant was issued without bail.

Mayor Nativadad alleged that there was no preliminary investigation, and that Hon. Felix had no jurisdiction because it was the Ombudmans, not the provincial prosecutor, who had jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation and that the proper court was the Sandiganbayan. Hon. Felix denied Mayor Natividads motion, and committed the latter to Tarlac Penal Colony.

Issue:

Whether or not Hon. Felex committed grave abuse off discretion in admitting the amended information filed by the provincial fiscal and in directing Natividads arrest

Held:

No.

Ratio:

The latest law on Sandiganbayan (PD 1606) states that there are 2 requirements for an offense to fall under the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction: 1) offense committed by a public officer must be in relation to his office, and 2) that the penalty be higher that prision correccional or imprisonment for 6 years or a fine of P6,000.

The 2nd requirement was met, but the 1st requirement wasnt because the offense charged wass murder. The offense could not have been committed in the performance of the mayors responsibility to maintain peace and order. The alleged act doesnt fall under any of the functions of the municipal mayor in the Local Government Code.

Assuming arguendo that the 1st requirement was satisfied, Ombudsman has only primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, not exclusive original jurisdiction. The Ombudsman is not an exclusive authority but a concurrent authority with similarly authorized agencies. He may take over the investigation at any stage from any investigative government agency. His investigatory powers are but directory in nature.

(Also, Natividad wasnt denied due process as he has been afforded every opportunity to present his counter-affidavit. He was notified, but it was he who did not appear.)