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THE MISSION AND ROLE OrJH "'TI9 AND BEYOND.

: .Y _ _

Lieutenant Colonel*Rola Ind A. AegaUnited States Army D I

- S ELECTE~JU a0 8 i992

A X~Af)]D for'b e4e

USAWC CLASS OF 1992

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARUSLE BARRACS, PA 17013-5050

92-14976

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11. TITLE (&CFO* SeCUrfty ClAul~fication)The Mission and Role of the Finance Corps--1995 and Beyond, Will There Be One?

12. PERSONAL. AUThOR(S)LTC Roan A. Arte a

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19. Abstract

During the Program Budget Decision cycle of October toDecember 1991, an adjustment to Defense Management Review DecisionNo. 910, dated January 1991, was issued and approved by theDepartment of Defense. In essence, the decision directed theDefense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) to assume fullcontrol, and consolidate and capitalize all finance and accountingfunctions of the DOD components. Additionally, the mandatedictated that the implementing group conduct a study to determinethe "disposition of the tactical finance and accounting function."This edict has caused much consternation and concern among theFinance Corps, and begged the question of survivability. Thepurpose of this paper is to shed some light on the issue, andascertain whether the United States Army Finance Corps has had andcontinues to have a vital role in our Army; and if so, to examinethe changes necessary to ensure its place in tomorrow's tailoredfor(. .a.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

The viers expressed in this paper are those of theauthor and do not necessarily reflect the views ofthe Department of Defense or any of its agencies.This doc"-ent may not be released for open publicationuntil it has been cleared by the appropriate militarvservice or government agency.

THE MISSION AND ROLE OF THE FINANCE CORPS -- 1995 AND BEYOND,

WILL THERE BE ONE?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Roland A. Arteaga OWUnited States Army

Colonel Roger W. ScearceProject Advisor

Accesion For

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A Approved for public NTIS CRA&Irelease; distribution is unlimited LTIC TAB []

Unia;)ounced ElJustificatio.l

U.S. Army War College By.Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013 D-t ibutio

Availability Codes

Avail an'd IorDist Special

AUTHOR: Roland A. Arteaga, LTC, FC, USA

TITLE: The Mission and Role of the Finance Corps -- 1995 andBeyond: Will There Be One?

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 15 April 1992 PAGES: xx CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

During the Program Budget Decision cycle of October toDecember 1991, an adjustment to Defense Management Review DecisionNo. 910, dated January 1991, was issued and approved by theDepartment of Defense. In essence, the decision directed theDefense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) to assume fullcontrol, and consolidate and capitalize all finance and accountingfunctions of the DOD components. Additionally, the mandatedictated that the implementing group conduct a study to determinethe "disposition of the tactical finance and accounting function."This edict has caused much consternation and concern among theFinance Corps, and begged the question of survivability. Thepurpose of this paper is to shed some light on the issue, andascertain whether the United States Army Finance Corps has had andcontinues to have a vital role in our Army; and if so, to examinethe changes necessary to ensure its place in tomorrow's tailoredforce.

ii

THE MISSION AND ROLE OF THE FINANCE CORPS -- 1995 AND BEYOND:WILL THERE BE ONE?

INTRODUCTION

"In order to realize additional economies, the DefenseFinance and Accounting Service could assume managementresponsibility for the finance and accounting functionsof the DOD Components and consolidate those functionsinto a limited number of locations...Accordingly, it isdirected that an implementation group be formed todevelop a plan for capitalizing and consolidatingapplicable functions...The study should include arecommendation for the disposition of the tacticalfinance and accounting operations."

Not exactly music to my ears nor the ears of approximately 850

Officers and 6300 Non-Commissioned Officers and junior enlisted

personnel faithfully serving in the United States Army Finance

Corps.2 The above passage is an edict from the Department of

Defense (DOD), in the form of Program Budget Decision (PBD) No.

910, to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) to

consolidate finance and accounting functions -- across DOD

Components -- and to assess the viability and need of a TOE (Table

of Organization and Equipment) Finance Corps. Although this is not

the first such challenge in our long and illustrious history, it

is, in my opinion, the most formidable to date.

The elimination of the Finance Corps is one of the hottest

issues within the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial

Management (ASA(FM)) community. Rarely a day goes by that either

message traffic, phone conversations, or personal discussions do

not take place concerning the implications of PBD 910 and the

future of "the Corps." Typical questions include: "Will there be

a Finance Corps in the outyears?" "Are we being merged?" "Should I

branch transfer?" "Is the Corps being civilianized?" "What advice

do I give junior officers and enlisted personnel; should they stay

in or get out?" Unfortunately, answers are vague at best, a "tap

dance" of sorts, since no one (whom I have met) can give an

emphatic yea or nay. Patience is wearing thin among the Corps'

future leaders, and our finance soldiers and civilians are getting

tired of being put "on hold."

What events led to this uncertainty; and what of the Finance

Corps -- does it have a future? Is there a place for the Finance

Corps in tomorrow's Army? The purpose of this study is to provide

some background to this current dilemma, to elaborate on the

Finance Corps' role, and to ascertain whether such a role remains

vital to our future Army. Methodology employed will briefly touch

on our history and contributions over time, draw on our most recent

experience in the Gulf war (our role, and whether or not we were a

combat multiplier), and if appropriate, propose alternatives to

peacetime doctrine and current force structure that will enable us

to retain a tactical finance and accounting organization.'

B&CIGROUND

With the demise of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet

2

Union, a change in venue has occurred within our government.

Domestic issues, such as the economy, health care, and drugs are

now in the forefront of our daily lives, and once again, the

defense budget is atop every politician's decrement list. As the

President's FY 92/93 Budget so vividly points out, Defense and Army

outlays are steadily declining, manpower cuts are occurring daily,

and now, an additional cut of $50 billion (announced by the

President in his State of the Union of January 1992) has been

directed.4 This is merely the beginning, however, for the House has

recently proposed an additional $7.5 billion reduction in defense

spending for FY 93.5 Without a doubt, the Department of Defense is

further streamlining, and DOD resources are likely to continue

shifting from defense to other national priorities. As this

occurs, however, we must ensure decisions are neither made in haste

nor in a vacuum. The Program and Budget Decision (PBD) cycle of

DOD's Planning Program Budget System (PPBS) is intended to do just

that. PBD 910, the Consolidation of DOD Accounting/Finance, is but

one product of this year's budget drill, and the culmination of a

two year effort.

In February of 1989 President Bush commissioned the Secretary

of Defense, Mr. Cheney, to perform a "self-appraisal" of the

Department of Defense -- an assessment, if you will, of the DOD.'

After several months of examination, this assessment (the Defense

Management Review (DMR)) concluded that significant savings --

approximately $150 million per year -- could be achieved, if

finance and accounting functions improved, and they were

3

consolidated at DOD level.7 Hence, on 20 January 1991 the Defense

Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) was formed and chartered "to

control, direct, and standardize policies, standards, systems, and

operations of DOD finance and accounting functions."8

In essence, this newly formed Defense Agency transferred the

United States Army Finance and Accounting Center (USAFAC) (along

with all other uniformed services finance centers) from Army to DOD

control. The immediate shift in DFAS-Indianapolis' (aka USAFAC)

workforce and leadership, to include the mix of military and

civilian, generated enormous concern within the Finance Corps.

Military positions were reduced by approximately 50% and

civilianization became the byword.9 More importantly, the lone

Finance Corps' General Officer billet in the DFAS-Indianapolis

(DFAS-I) structure was transferred (eliminated?) from the "Finance

Center" of old to DFAS headquarters in Washington.

These actions were disconcerting to the Finance Corps' young,

and concerned the Corps' senior leadership. Many of the same

rumors of the mid-eighties began resurfacing: "the Finance Corps is

past history!" and "the Finance Office is to be completely

civilianized." °0 Quite frankly, we (the Finance Corps) have over-

reacted. After all, it seems logical that DFAS-I should be manned

primarily by civilians, since they are responsible for DFAS-I's

peacetime and wartime missions. Hence, it should follow that

civilian vice military leadership be in-place to oversee

operations. So long as the Finance Corps' senior military

leadership is kept abreast of policy and procedural changes

4

regarding finance and accounting operations and the Army Finance

Corps, control of DFAS-I, military/civilian mix, and displacement

of the General officer position to Washington D.C. becomes

ancillary. We need to focus more on reality and support economy

and efficiency! Program Budget Decision No. 910, which approves

the implementation of Defense Management Review Decision (DMRD)

910, does just that. It generates additional savings by

standardizing, consolidating, and further improving finance and

accounting, and provides the basis for a more efficient and

effective finance operation."1 With DFAS assuming full

responsibility for the service components' finance and accounting

f, to include consolidation (vice regionalization) another

$295 million in savings could be gained by FY 97. 12 Prior to PBD

910, travel and other finance and accounting functions were to be

rjonaize at various service centers throughout the Continental

United States (CONUS) and Overseas (OCONUS). However, under

consolidation, for example, travel vouchers for all CONUS-based DOD

components would be centralized at one site. Whether assigned to

Ft. Hood, Texas, or Norfolk Naval Base, Virginia, or Macdill Air

Force Base, Florida, travel vouchers would Le submitted to one

site. Savings? Absolutely!! For, as opposed to several sites,

there is now (or will be) only one installation or post responsible

for processing DOD travel. First "streamlining," then

regionalization and capitalization, and now consolidation. Some

could say there is a hidden agenda in DOD's proposal; that PBD 910

and the study undertaken to determine "the disposition of tactical

5

finance and accounting operations," all but spells-out the

elimination of the Finance Corps.13 Thus, the real issue perceived

by many is not savings, but rather the future of the Finance Corps.

Nothing new; we have been down this road before, and as our history

will attest, there remains a vital and most demanding need for

finance on the battlefield. The remainder of this study will

support such a conclusion by briefly drawing on our roles in

history, and reflecting on our wartime contributions during

Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

HISTORICAL P3RVPIZ.1V!

"That there be one Paymaster General and a Deputy underhim, for the Army, in a separate department; that thepay for the Paymaster General himself be one hundreddollars per month, and for the Deputy Paymaster underhim, fifty dollars per month.

" 14

Such was the resolve of the Continental Congress during its

session in Philadelphia on the 16th of June 1775, and so were the

beginnings of the United States Army Finance Corps. 5 Our

charter:

"That it shall be the duty of the said paymaster, toreceive from the treasurer, all the monies which shallbe intrusted to him for the purpose of paying the pay,the arrears of pay, subsistence, or forage, due to thetroops of the United States." 16

More than two hundred and sixteen years ago, our forefathers

recognized that soldiers required some form of payment for their

duty and service, and that some organization, some agency had to be

6

charged with the responsibility of paying soldiers. As such, the

Paymaster Corps of 200+ years was structured with one Paymaster

General, two deputies, and a number of line officers detailed to

perform the pay function.7

As time evolved, however, the Continental Congress recognized

the need for specialization and abolished the Paymaster Corps in

1821, establishing in its place a separate department to administer

and discharge the financial needs of the Army -- the Pay

Department.18 Since then, depending on the whims of Congress and

the Unions' state of affairs, the department has either grown or

been reduced. The mission, however, has rarely fluctuated; to the

contrary, it has steadily grown and become a critical support

ingredient on the battlefield.

During World War II, for example, the Corps' mission ran the

gamut of service support. They not only paid ten million soldiers,

civilians, and dependents (at home and abroad), but also paid

commercial vendors, native laborers, prisoners of war, and

performed the central funding and currency exchange roles for our

Army.19 Furthermore, during the initial stages of the war, the

Chief of Finance was also "charged with the additional

responsibility of assisting the Government's effort to finance the

war and of reducing spending on the part of the soldiers by the

sale of war bonds."1

During the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, the mission and tasks

of the present-day Finance Corps (designated as such on 20 July

1950) were equally as intense. Partial payments, coupled with the

7

high volume of commercial accounts payments for local procurement,

were a significant part of the Finance Corps' wartime mission.

Additionally, central funding, agent funding, foreign currency

exchange, maintenance and control of Military Payment Certificates

(MPC), regular military pay service, and "front-line" pay inquiries

were also significant.21 Notwithstanding the shortage of personnel

at the onset of hostilities, however, finance support during the

Korean and Vietnam wars was crucial, and contributed in large part

to the overall success of each campaign. Once again the Finance

Corps was on the leading edge on of the battlefield. Pay missions

were accomplished, currency control was established, and vendor

services/local procurement were in-place.

In between the Vietnam Conflict and the Gulf War, the Finance

Corps was involved in other major operations. In my opinion, the

most significant was Operation Urgent Fury -- the invasion of

Grenada. For me, it was the pivotal point of our doctrine, for it

reaffirmed the sustaining role of the TOE Finance Corps, reinforced

the need for finance soldiers in war/combat operations, and

provided the foundation for future (now current) operations. As

such, the Finance Corps' sustainment mission (essentially its

tactical service/support role) is now clearly defined in United

States Army Field Manual (FM) 14-7, Finance Operations:

"The Finance Corps' mission on the Airland Battlefieldis to sustain [emphasis added] Army, joint, andcombined operationL by providing timely commercialvendor and contractual payments, various pay anddisbursing services, and limited accounting on an areabasis. Finance units also have the implied mission to

8

protect and defend themselves to continue sustainmentof the force and maintain battle freedom for combatunits to engage the enemy."

SUSTAINING TEN FORCE

The issue of sustainment has never been more crucial than it is

today. As another United States Army War College (USAWC) student

noted in his individual study project of two years past:

"LIC planners (especially those concerned with so-called Third World countries in Central/South America andSouthwest Asia) are finding that sustaining the deployedforce is perhaps the most critical and worrisome issuefacing some of our Unified Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs)."3

Such was the case during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm;

however, not to the extent of past conflicts. Finance TOE elements

were included early-on in the deployment phase and established

operations, executing the Principles of Support outlined in FM 14-

7 with precision and timeliness. From providing procurement

support, banking and currency support, and currency control, to

providing essential personal finance services (military and

civilian pay support), non-US pay support (to enemy prisoners of

war), and finance advice/guidance to commanders, these principles

guided finance units and bridged the sustainment gap from start to

finish.2 More importantly, they confirmed an unprecedented need

for the U.S. Army Finance Corps on the battlefield.

The principle of "support of the procurement process" was

crucial during the initial stages of the Gulf War, since supplies

9

and equipment were not available early-on in the campaign.

Anticipating such, the 18th Airborne Corps deployed a Finance Team

and Contracting Officer at the very onset. The Finance Team "hit

the ground running" on the 8th of August 1990, successfully

performing its mission with the 82nd Airborne Division, and laying

the groundwork for the following brigades.U It was, however, the

long term operation established by the 18th Corps Finance Group

(Airborne) (18th CFG) that contributed the most towards sustaining

the CINC's deployed force. The 18th CFG alone disbursed over $475

million in commercial operations, $74 million of which was for

small/local purchases of equipment and supplies.2' Class A Agents

and Ordering Officers were seen throughout the theater and were

constantly purchasing needed supplies and equipment, and obtaining

contract services for required and essential services. As a

result, the CINC's ground force was well-equipped and supplied to

launch what has been described as the most overwhelming offensive

operation in the annals of military history. Such support of

combat forces clearly demonstrates the Finance Corps' ability to

enhance combat operations, to make a difference and to become a

force multiplier. Lieutenant General, then Major General, William

G. Pagonis best described the Finance Corps' performance in Saudi

Arabia in a message to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations,

Headquarters Department of the Army by saying:

" Having been here from the start, I can attest thatthe rapid build-up just could not have beenaccomplished without the contribution of the FinanceCorps, particularly in supporting procurementoperations. Finance placed purchasing power in the

10

commander's hands by allowing ordering officers toimmediately procure goods and services from the localeconomy to sustain our forces. This has becomeespecially important, given our very extended supplylines. ...They serve as true combat multipliers byenabling the log base to be established as commandersobtain what they need locally."2

In addition to critical procurement support, the 18th CFG also

established a central funding site, which supported the principle

of "banking and currency support." Close coordination with the

U.S. Embassy and the Federal Reserve, coupled with frequent liaison

with the Saudi Arabian banking system and USAREUR, resulted in a

full-fledged wartime theater "military banking operation." Cash

collecting and funding services were provided to the Army and Air

Force Exchange and the U.S. Postal systems, cash exchange and bill-

paying service was provided to our soldiers (a "money order"

capability); and adequate currency was available to satisfy all in-

country financial obligations. The 18th CFG's "banking and

currency" role not only mirrored that of FM 14-7 ("supplying U.S.

currency, foreign currencies, U.S. Treasury checks, ...to U.S.

Forces and allies in the theater"), but also exceeded the standards

of service contained therein.n Positive feedback from Battalion

and Brigade Commanders, and the AAFES in-country hierarchy,

regarding our "bill-paying" and funding support -- especially of

the Tactical Field Exchanges (TFE's) -- firmly attests to the

latter, and equally supports the critical need for military banking

in a combat theater/wartime environment.

A third principle, "controlling currency on the battlefield,"

was also exercised successfully durizig Operations Desert

11

Shield/Desert Storm. From securing captured funds, to retrieving

monies from KIA or MIA, to establishing policies governing "combat

payments," personal check cashing, and use of MPC and foreign

currency, the 18th CFG met every challenge. Early-on in the

campaign, policies limiting casual payments, restricting the use of

U.S. dollars, and destroying currency (under emergency conditions)

were established and incorporated into OPLANS and contingency

plans. In so doing, potential economic disasters caused by black

market operations and currency inflation were averted.

Of the many principles supported, however, the most apparent

and visible to the soldiers and civilians in theater was that of

providing financial services -- military, civilian, and travel pay.

18th CFG finance units worked around the clock, 7 days a week,

accommodating commanders, soldiers, airmen, sailors, marines, DA

civilians, NAF employees, and DA contract personnel. Whether it

was currency conversion, casual pays, or travel pay; check-

cashing/bill-paying; pay inquiry, or pay change processing;

distributing Leave and Earning Statements, processing claims; or

fielding (and responding) to civilian and military pay issues,

every single finance soldier had but one thought in mind -- "to

support and serve." The 18th CFGs' statistics bear this out: $27.4

million in casual pays, $18.4 million in check cashing, almost $1

million in travel pay, and $7.1 million in currency conversion.

When combined with procurement disbursements of $530 million, the

incalculable number of pay transactions and inquiries processed,

and the hundreds of pay issues resolved, there is no doubt that the

12

Finance Corps' role during Desert Shield/Desert Storm was equally

important as that of any other combat support and combat service

support unit.29

The principles of support outlined in FM 14-7, however, extend

beyond the CINC's forces. They also encompass the pay support of

enemy prisoners of war (EPW) and civilian internees. It was in

this regard that much preparation and coordination was effected

with the 800th Military Police Brigade (the major subordinate

command responsible for the Gulf War EPW mission) to ensure finance

procedures and assets were established and identified to support

EPW operations both at Corps and Theater levels. Although the

800th MP Brigade had a small number of finance personnel assigned,

the majority of finance support came initially from the 18th CFG."

Hence, provisional EPW teams were identified within the 18th CFG

structure, and subordinate Finance units were given a "be

prepared/augment" mission. The Group was prepared to process 2,500

enemy prisoners of war a day, and dedicate between 60-180 soldiers

(based on estimates of 100,000 to 300,000 EPWs) to the EPW

effort.t Had the Saudi Arabian government not been as quick to

take custody of Iraqi soldiers as they were, the 18th CFG would

have been further absorbed by the EPW finance support mission.

Clearly, the tactical finance structure made a vast difference

during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. It provided the

wherewithal to sustain forces early-on, and established the

infrastructure to support the Commander (logistically and

financially) during all phases of combat operations. Simply

13

stated, the Finance Corps accomplished its mission.

Notwithstanding the field and combat conditions, inadequate

communication links, frequent moves (in support of offensive

operations), the desert environment, limited infrastructure, and

poor lines of communication (LOC's), the TOE Finance Corps never

faltered. Tactical finance units supported the procurement

process, provided banking and currency support, controlled currency

on the battlefield, provided essential finance service support,

essential military pay support, travel pay support, civilian pay

support, non-U.S. pay support, appropriated and non-appropriated

accounting support, and provided financial advice and guidance to

commanders at all levels, regardless of hour, regardless of day.

During the "acid test" of combat, the Finance Corps, once again,

proved its value and worth with respect to sustaining our forces,

and accomplishing the Army's mission.

THE ISSUB

Having demonstrated our resolve and relevance from early

times, why question the viability of the Finance Corps? Have our

past achievements not adequately supported our importance on the

battlefield? Why study "the disposition of the tactical finance

and accounting organization?" The obvious answers relate to the

"new world order," to issues such as a decreasing budget,

downsizing, restructuring, and a reshaping of the force.

As noted in my introduction and background, the Department of

14

Defense has already tapped the finance community as a billpayer,

and directed DFAS to consolidate and capitalize DOD's finance and

accounting functions. In so doing, however, they have basically

stripped the finance function from Army and the other services, and

(inadvertently or advertently) left the tactical slice of each

component holding the proverbial "bag." Bottom line: given current

guidance in PBD 910/DMRD 910, there appears to be no place for the

"green suit" TOE finance structure in the outyears. More savings?

Absolutely!! (But at what cost?) Although PBD 910 does not

specifically state it, the review of the tactical finance

structure must conclude with a recommendation concerning its

future. While history has certainly proven the need for finance

support on the battlefield, the Department of Defense is strongly

committed to further savings. How do we resolve this dilemma?

More importantly, how do we remain a viable and contending force in

the future, and simultaneously provide resource savings to DOD?

OPTIONS

As I see it, there are three options we could pursue: a)

consolidate the Finance Corps into another branch, logically the

Quartermaster Corps; b) civilianize the Finance Corps and increase

the Finance Reserve Component (RC) structure; or c) eliminate the

bulk of the TDA Finance Corps, simultaneously reducing the number

of TOE unit flags -- get smaller quicker -- and reorienting our

peacetime functions/training.

15

First, I will address the consolidation of the Finance Corps

into the Quartermaster Corps. While my professional background

dictates a great demand for finance service to soldiers and family,

my Desert Shield/Desert Storm experience dictates an even greater

demand to support the commander's wartime efforts, to accommodate

his wants and needs, and to supplement supply/procurement systems.

On the surface, the idea of being absorbed by the Quartermaster

Corps makes sense, since there is some commonality between the two

branches -- both are primarily involved with sustaining the battle

-- and a manpower and dollar savings could probably be realized.

There is, however, one significant flaw. Finance expertise would

quickly erode, and the administrative and support problems

encountered during the demobilization effort of World War I would

again prevail. As discussed below, we have been through this

"melting" process before -- and on more than one occasion.

In the late 1870's, just as today, Congress was pursuing

economy within the federal government. Though a number of

proposals were entertained, Congress was convinced that the War

Department could become more efficient, if the quartermaster,

subsistence, and pay departments were merged into one agency.32

However, unlike today, the idea was immediately dismissed by

Congress after General Meade informed Congress that the War

Department was operating at peak efficiency and that any revamping

of structure would generate inefficiency and introduce

complexity.33 It was not until the Spanish-American War that the

issue of consolidation once again resurfaced. The logistical

16

problems experienced during the early stages of the war were

pervasive -- inadequacies of supplies, clothing, and equipment;

shortages of subsistence; transportation and distribution problems;

and poor management and administration. This brought a strong

recommendation by the McKinley Commission, chartered by President

McKinley to review the administrative debacle of the Spanish-

American War, to consolidate the quartermaster, subsistence, and

pay departments under one head. Again, however, no immediate

reforms were enacted because the Army convinced Congress that the

ills of the Spanish-American War were due in great part to "general

unpreparedness" and personnel shortfalls, not the "supply"

departments.m In the early 1900's, however, a twist of events

occurred. Then Secretary of War Elihu Root, not Congress, lobbied

for the merger. The Secretary opined that the supply departments'

independent operations were, in fact, responsible for the

logistical catastrophes of the Spanish-American War." By merging

the three departments, Secretary Root thought he would not only fix

responsibility, but also produce a much needed savings within the

Department. As history would have it, the Secretary's proposal

fell on deaf ears, and required legislation failed to pass. It was

not until 24 August 1912 that Congress opted for economy and

savings, and passed legislation to merge the quartermaster,

subsistence, and pay departments.-3 That mandate survived only

eight years. Demobilization problems during World War I caused the

Secretary of War to submit a bill to Congress in 1919 to reorganize

the War Department. His justification was quite simple and

17

pointed: inadequate force structure and the loss of expertise in

the "supply" departments during the post war years. Congress

passed the National Defense Act on 4 June 1920, which vested the

authority in the President to make distribution of functions and to

retain a separate agency to handle the finance function."

Accordingly, the Finance Department was again the sole proprietor

of the War Department's financial activities.

As previously noted, a merger with the Quartermaster Corps

appears superficially sound. It not only meets the monetary and

personnel savings test, but also retains the tactical finance

function in the force structure. One major flaw, however, prevails

-- the loss of expertise and specialization. A merger with the

Quartermaster Corps (or any other branch) would cause those special

and critical military financial skills (crucial and necessary

throughout history) to perish over time, and would ultimately

create a void on the battlefield which would be most difficult to

fill. Given the austere fiscal environment of present and future,

we cannot afford such a situation to develop. The likelihood of

adding force structure -- let alone finance force structure -- in

the future is quite remote. Conversely, the likelihood of losing

finance expertise (on and off the battlefield) is extremely high,

with the consequences irreparable.

Under the second alternative, civilianizing the Finance

Corps and increasing the U.S. Army Reserve force structure, the

active duty Finance Corps would basically disappear, except for a

small cadre of active duty officers and senior non-commissioned

18

officers at the Finance School, Major Commands (MACOMs), and DFAS-

I. Responsibilities for the active duty contingent would vary but

be limited, running the gamut of peacetime leadership at the U.S.

Army Finance School to providing technical expertise/liaison at

MACOMs and DFAS-I. Responsibilities for wartime and peacetime

functions would rest solely with the United States Army Reserves

and Department of the Army civilians. Using the Gulf War as an

example, Reserve Component finance units would have been activated

and deployed to Saudi Arabia at the outset, and civilians would

have provided most, if not all, of the CONUS-based finance support.

Although this option meets the savings test (since a significant

economy of scale would be realized) and retains the tactical

finance function -- albeit in the Reserve Components -- it would be

most challenging. Doable, yes; risky, undoubtedly. The down-side

of this option is the turbulence created on the battlefield,

especially early-on in the campaign. Although RC finance personnel

did a superb job supporting CONUS-based operations during

Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, a large factor contributing

to their success was the outstanding civilian and active duty

military finance personnel available. The reserve finance soldier

trains but one weekend a month, and in more cases than not, spends

only two weeks in a finance office during annual training. As was

the case during the Gulf war, some train-up time would be required,

and supervision/leadership a must. Even though military cashiering

functions and some disbursing and acccunting functions are

basically similar to those in the private sector, the majority of

19

tactical finance functions require additional training. A case in

point is the Reserve finance unit that deployed to Saudi Arabia.

Though this unit was committed, enthusiastic, and willing to

perform, it took 60-90 days to train them to standard on basic

finance functions. Our Army needs a Finance Corps that is ready,

trained, and able to deploy at a moment's notice and provide

I)DZDIATE support to commanders at all levels, as was done in

Grenada, Panama, and Saudi Arabia. To rely solely on the Reserve

Components would be taking a significant and unnecessary risk.

The third option proposes the elimination of the TDA Finance

Corps (except for a few positions at the Finance School and

MACOMs), while simultaneously reducing TOE flags and reorienting

peacetime efforts. Quite frankly, this alternative may best suit

the needs of the DOD and our Army. Savings can be generated, and

a slice of current TOE finance structure will remain to support the

tactical financial needs of the CINC.

It is my view that total civilianization of installation TDA

finance and accounting offices would provide a stable finance force

to support any future contingencies. As was the case at Fort Sill,

Oklahoma, during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the

civilian finance and accounting workforce did a magnificent job.

They conducted the POM (Processing for Overseas Movement) board,

while the soldiers of the 230th Finance Support Unit (FSU) trained

and prepared to deploy, and they provided the support processing

base for the forward element of the 230th FSU during combat

operations." Additionally, with the current drawdown of military

20

forces both here and abroad, a 33% reductio of the current TOE

Finance Command structure is conceivable, especially in light of

the one Corps scenario proposed in Europe. Presently, there are

three Colonel-level finance commands in the United States Army

Europe (USAREUR). Given the one Corps concept, I submit that one

Colonel-level Command is sufficient to support the TOE Army in

Europe. The 9th Finance Group and the 5th Finance Group should be

inactivated, leaving the 266th Theater Finance Command (TFC), with

its civilian augmentation, as the sole Finance Colonel Command in

USAREUR. In so doing, a Theater-level command will be retained in

Europe (similar to that of Korea) to provide the requisite command

and control and to oversee the drawdown of TOE finance assets in

USAREUR. Not only do we reduce the current Colonel-level Finance

Commands from six to four (two CFGs to support two Corps in CONUS

and two TFCs to support two theaters OCONUS -- one east, Korea, and

one west, Europe), but also position ourselves to take a

proportionate cut in finance battalion-level commands. Seems

logical; is doable; and most importantly, aligns finance TOE force

structure with current Army thinking of theater level support to

the warfighting CINCs.

It is the third part of the option -- refocusing of peacetime

efforts -- that commands immediate attention. During a recent

conversation with a senior Finance Corps' officer, it was suggested

that we relook the Finance Corps' training philosophy and

priorities, and concentrate more on performing and polishing

wartime functions, (such as central funding, enemy prisoner of war,

21

and commercial vendor services) vice accomplishing traditional

military pay functions." Makes sense, especially in light of DOD

finance consolidation, for with the various finance and accounting

functions now being consolidated, I believe the TOE Finance Corps

will soon be reduced to a mere customer service cell. Accordingly,

we must now begin further integrating our wartime functions into

peacetime scenarios. With our recent experience in the Gulf, it is

certainly feasible. The following are but three examples of

changes that could be implemented immediately.

First, we become active players in the installation

contracting process/function. We not only train our soldiers in

procurement, but also train those we support. During the onset of

hostilities in the Gulf, only a hand-full of commanders realized

the importance and significance of local procurement and

contracting. Consequently, few if any officers were on orders

either as ordering officers or Class A Agents. The net result of

this oversight generated increased administration in the unit, and

required the immediate training of officers on local procurement

procedures. Had we not had the luxury of time, many purchases of

supplies and equipment in preparation for the war would not have

occurred. Show-stopper? Not sure. A slowed operation? Most

assuredly. In essence, commanders need to be better prepared, need

to "learn to do by doing." Unit personnel must employ local

procurement procedures during field exercises and at the National

Training Center (NTC) so they are comfortable and prepared to

execute similar procedures during times of hostilities. Commanders

22

must be given limited authority to make local purchases, whether it

be for repair parts or subsistence, and actually walk through the

process whenever they depart their garrison areas and train.

Finance soldiers in-turn need to be with them, advancing cash to

their Class A Agents, taking their returns, and processing local

purchase vouchers.

Second, the supporting Finance Commander needs to be given the

latitude to perform military banking on the installation, whether

CONUS or OCONUS. Personal checks should be cashed, limited bill

paying (such as local utility bills, phone bills, etc.) should be

allowed, exchanging U.S. Treasury checks for cash should be

permitted, and limited currency conversion (for PCS personnel)

should be performed.4 Risks? Definitely! Critical functions?

Even more so! Problems with the chartered installation Military

Banking Facility (MBF)? Not if we tailor our services, such as

"banking hours," to preclude any semblance of competition. The

real challenge is making it happen; making it the rule rather than

the exception.

Third, continue to field Finance Support Teams. Whether in

garrison or in the field, collocate (if at all possible) with the

supported unit. A number, if not all, TOE finance units are

currently engaged in such practice; however, we need to do more and

be innovative. Make certain that field commanders know finance

unit capabilities. Some ideas: process inquiries, pay changes,

etc, in a field environment; work hand-in-hand with the Personnel

Action Center (PAC); put a 73C (finance specialist) in the PAC --

23

be a part of the team.41 Be tactical and become an integral part

of exercise play; train as soldiers/with soldiers; force the

issues, and do not settle for "traditional" finance officer roles.

Bottom line: contribute to the warriors' mission and be a force

multiplier.

Our mission is clear. In brief, we need to do other than

finance and accounting functions in a peacetime mode. We need to

prepare for war and the finance functions performed in war. We

need to use our experience from the Gulf War and capitalize on

lessons learned. We need to pursue modernization, and develop and

export communication/software packages and pay systems that enhance

the aforementioned peacetime training efforts, and ultimately

heighten our wartime readiness posture.

CQNCLBIZQM

Is there a continuing and future role for tactical finance and

accounting organizations and functions? As demonstrated from the

beginnings of our Army to present, the answer is a resounding yes!!

The Finance Corps has a most important and critical mission to

perform during combat-- sustaining combat operations whether joint,

combined, or otherwise. As best said by Lieutenant General

Pagonis, then Commander 22nd SUPCOM, to HQDA, "... there is

definitely a need for a TOE Finance Corps structure in our Army. It

works and should not be civilianized nor combined with any other

branch."42

24

The challenge, however, is how to articulate this to DOD. How

best to convince DOD and DFAS that there is a place for the

tactical finance and accounting organization in tomorrows' smaller,

but more versatile, powerful, and CONUS-based Army? Throughout

history we have demonstrated our viability and capability through

performance. From the American Revolution to the Persian Gulf War,

the Finance Corps has successfully accomplished every mission,

every task, regardless of obstacle or challenge, and contributed

immensely to the many battle campaigns of the United States Army.

Hence, the most obvious and best way to promote the Finance Corps

is to continue doing our jobs professionally, and accomplish the

spectrum of current missions with excellence. Second, we need to

communicate this to DOD and DFAS, and to lobby, both within and

outside the Army, for the Finance Corps. The first challenge is

the responsibility of our "field" leadership, the second, however,

lies in the charge of our senior leadership. It is in that regard

that the Commandant, United States Army Finance School and Chief of

the Finance Regiment established a Finance Board in 1991.

Consisting of the Corps' most senior leaders, the board's charter

is to stay abreast of all issues affecting the Finance Corps, to

assist in the resolution of major issues, and most importantly, to

"chart the Corps' path for the future." 3 In my opinion, the

Finance Board has done an adequate job to date. They have

responded to every regionalization/consolidation challenge put

forth by DFAS, and kept pace with the dynamics of PBD 910 and DMRD

910.

25

Will there be a Finance Corps in the future? Absolutely!! It

will be a smaller and more tactically oriented Corps, but it will

continue to serve the needs of the Army, both in peace and war.

The future Finance Corps will be mobile, reactive, and equally

versatile; be better trained, better equipped, and better postured

to support any CINC, anywhere, and anytime.

What advice should be given to junior officers and enlisted

personnel, regarding their future in the Finance Corps? First,

assure them that there will be a TO&E Finance Corps 1995 and

beyond, and second, tell them that their future is contingent on

their present. They must focus on doing their jobs, doing what

they do best -- soldier! Let them know that the Finance Corps'

future will be in the hands of those who embrace the basic

principles of leadership outlined in U.S. Army Field Manual 22-100,

Military Leadership; to those who know themselves and seek self-

improvement; who are technically and tactically proficient, seek

responsibility and develop their subordinates; to those who lead

and accomplish the mission. Finally, inform them that the sky is

not falling; cloudy and turbulent maybe, but not falling. Just as

we have in the past, the Finance Corps will once again weather the

storm. We will emerge through this DMRD study process with a

tactical Finance Corps -- trained, equipped, and ready to provide

and maintain "the sustaining edge" for commanders at all levels.

26

1. Defense Management Report Decision No. 910, sj: Consolidationof DOD Accounting and Finance Operations, undated, 1/7.

2. Personal phone conversation with LTC Teddy A. Stout, TAPC-OPC,PERSCOM, 21 February 1992, sj: Current Finance Strength, Officersand Enlisted.

3. The purpose of this study is not to capture the Finance Corps'history from start to present; however, such can be found in theFinance Advance Course study of 1986 and Major Jeffery Eskridge'sMaster Thesis of 1989, Command and General Staff College.

4. Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management, "TheArmy Budget -- FY92/93 President's Budget," April 1991, reflectsdefense and Army outlays (as a percentage of the Federal Budget)decreasing from 26.5% and 7.0% in FY 1989 to 20.1% and 4.8% in FY1993, respectively.

5. Rick Maze, "Pentagon: House Budget Would Cut 400,000," ATimes, No.34, March 23, 1992, : 8.

6. Jim Tiry, "Overview of DOD Consolidation of Finance andAccounting Functions," All Points Bulletin, 28, (Nov 90) : 2.

7. Arnold R. Weiss, "The Defense Finance and Accounting Service,"

All Points Bulletin 29, (Mar91) : 4.

8. Ibid., 3.

9. Interoffice Memorandum, Finance School Commandant, sj: 1991Year-End Message to the Finance Board, dated 2 Jan 92, : 2.

10. Russell H. Dowden Jr., "Finance Doctrine: The EvolutionContinues," Resource Management, (Jun 86) : 8.

11. Defense Management Review Decision No 910, 1.

12. Ibid., 6/7.

13. Ibid., 7.

14. A.B. Carey, A Sketch of the Organization of the PayDepartment. U.S. Army 1775-1876, (Washington D.C., PaymasterDepartment, 1876) : 1.

15. Ibid.

27

16. Ibid., 11.

17. Ibid, 1.

18. History of the War Deoartment, "The Pay Department,"(Washington D.C., 1879 ed) : 261; and Finance Corys 1775-1985, "AHistory of the U.S. Army Finance Corps 1775-1985," (U.S. ArmySoldier Support Institute, Ft Benjamin Harrison, In, 1985) : 3.

19. Walter Rundell Jr, Military Money. A Fiscal History of theU.S. Army Overseas in World War II, (College Station, Texas A&M,1980) : 157, and The Army Almanac. a Book of Facts Concerning theUnited States Army, (1950 ed) : 44.

20. The Army Almanac. a Book of Facts Concernina the United StatesArmy, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950 ed) : 85.

21. Finance Officer Advance Course, "A History of the U.S. ArmyFinance Corps 1775-1985," Group Study Project. U.S. Army FinanceSchool, (Ft. Benjamin Harrison, IN, 1985) : 19-27.

22. United States Army Field Manual 14-7, Finance Operations,(HQDA: 9 Oct 89) : 1-1.

23. Roger W. Scearce, "Finance Support During Low IntensityConflict: Providing the Sustainment Edge!," Individual StudyProiect. U.S. Army War Colleae, (USAWC, Carlisle Barracks, PA,1990) : 2.

24. Field Manual 14-7, 2-1 thru 2-5.

25. Briefing Charts 18th Corps Finance Group (CFG) (Airborne),Operation Desert Shield, operation Desert Storm, undated.

26. Ibid.

27. 18th Corps Finance Group Briefing Charts, reflect passages ofMajor General Pagonis' message to the Deputy Chief of Staff forOperations, Headquarters, Department of the Army.

28. Field Manual 14-7, 2-1.

29. Briefing Charts, 18th Corps Finance Group, undated.

30. The 7th Corps Finance Group arrived in theater in lateDecember and early January and were also tasked with providing EPWsupport.

31. 18th Corps Finance Group Briefing Charts, undated.

28

32. Erna Risch, Quartermaster SuDoort of the Army. a History ofthe Corps 1775-1939, (Washington D.C., U.S. Printing Office, 1989): 512.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., 515-556.

35. Ibid., 562.

36. Ibid., 562-565.

37. Ibid., 701-3.

38. Soldiers of the 230th FSU augmented the Preparation forOverseas Movement (POM) when they were not preparing for deploymentor training, and were primarily responsible for the finance POMfunction after duty hours. Additionally, during the first week ofPOM operations, a Reserve Finance unit was at Ft Sill conductingits second week of Annual Training. They also were employedextensively at the POM site and finance office. In January 1991,a National Guard Finance unit augmented the Ft Sill FAO and the230th FSU Rear Detachment, and provided additional manpower.

39. Personal Conversation with Colonel Roger W. Scearce, U.S. ArmyWar College, 11 February 1992, sj: The Future Role of the FinanceCorps.

40. During the Persian Gulf War many soldiers deployed home-station without paying utility bills and other debts. Since anumber of soldiers had their mid-month and end-of-month pay goingto a savings vice checking account, in-country Finance SupportUnits were called upon to help liquidate these debts. After muchcoordination, U.S. Treasury checks were issued to the appropriateagencies/organizations, and the soldiers' pay account were assessedaccordingly.

41. The idea of assigning a finance clerk to the Personnel ActionCenter was conceived by Colonel, then Lieutenant Colonel RichardTeters.

42. Briefing Charts 18th CFG, undated, reflecting context of MGPagonis' message to HQDA.

43. Enclosures 1-4 of the Minutes of the Finance Board Meeting 3-4May 91, undated.

29

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b