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Democratic Republic of Congo:

Evaluation of the Bank’s Country Strategy and Program

2004–2015Summary Report

March 2017

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An IDEV Country Strategy EvaluationDem

ocratic Republic of Congo: Evaluation of the Bank’s Country Strategy and Program 2004–2015

Summ

ary ReportIndependent Developm

ent Evaluation

IDEV conducts different types of evaluations to achieve its

strategic objectives

Thematic Evaluations Project Cluster Evaluations

Regional Integration Stra

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Evaluations

Project Perfo

rmance Evaluations

(Public Secto

r)Impact Evaluations

Project Performance Evaluations

(Private Sector)

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Evaluation Syntheses

Corporate Evaluations

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Eva

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Democratic Republic of Congo:

Evaluation of the Bank’s Country Strategy and Program

2004–2015Summary Report

March 2017

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Summ


ent Evaluation

Task managers Herimandimby Razafindramanana, Chief Evaluation Officer, IDEV, Overall task manager for CSPEs of Transition States: Burundi, DRC, and Togo; Mabarakissa Diomandé, Evaluation Officer, IDEV, Task manager for the DRC CSPE

Team Members Clément Bansé, Evaluation Officer, IDEV; Eglantine Marcelin, Junior Consultant, IDEV.

Consultants Aide à la Décision Economique (ADE) with Jérôme Coste as ADE Team Leader.

Internal peer reviewer Oswald Mirianaud Agbadome, Senior Evaluation Officer, IDEV

External peer reviewer Claudine Voyadzis, Senior Consultant

Internal Bank Reference group Bruno Boedts, Chief Operations Implementation Officer, Eastern Africa regional development and business deliv-ery office (RDGE); Gérard Bizimana, Principal Country Economist, Regional Directorate General-Central (RDGC); Frederik Teufel, Senior Political Risk and Private Sector Development Analyst, Transition States Coordination Office (RDTS); Abdourahmane Diaw, Chief Country Program Officer, RDGE; Jean Marie Dabiré, Senior Country Econ-omist, Democratic Republic of Congo Field Office (COCD); Anatole Désiré Bizongo, Infrastructure Expert, COCD; Stanny Kolokota, Principal Social Development Expert, COCD; Jean Paterne March Ekoga, Senior Transport Economist, Transport and ICT Department (OITC); Mafouta Vurce-Arsène Lossombot, Principal Financial Manage-ment Expert, COCD.

Knowledge management officers Jacqueline Nyagahima, Consultant, IDEV, Najade Lindsay, Junior Consultant, IDEV.

Other assistance Myrtha Diop, Administrative Assistant, IDEV; Ruby Adzobu-Agyare, and Henda Ayari, Assistants, IDEV.

Special thanks to Sylvain Maliko, Resident Representative and the entire team of the AfDB field office in DRC (COCD)

Division manager Samer Hachem

Evaluator-General Rakesh Nangia

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

© 2017 African Development Bank Group All rights reserved – March 2017

Democratic Republic of Congo: Evaluation of the Bank’s Country Strategy and Program 2004–2015 – Summary Report

An IDEV Country Strategy Evaluation, March 2017

DisclaimerUnless expressly stated otherwise, the findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this publication are those of the various authors of the publication and are not necessarily those of the Management of the African Development Bank (the “Bank”) and the African Development Fund (the “Fund”), Boards of Directors, Boards of Governors or the countries they represent.

Use of this publication is at the reader’s sole risk. The content of this publication is provided without warranty of any kind, either express or implied, including without limitation warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, and non-infringement of third-party rights. The Bank specifically does not make any warranties or representations as to the accuracy, completeness, reliability or current validity of any information contained in the publication. Under no circumstances including, but not limited to, negligence, shall the Bank be liable for any loss, damage, liability or expense incurred or suffered which is claimed to result directly or indirectly from use of this publication or reliance on its content.

This publication may contain advice, opinions, and statements of various information and content providers. The Bank does not represent or endorse the accuracy, completeness, reliability or current validity of any advice, opinion, statement or other information provided by any information or content provider or other person or entity. Reliance upon any such opinion, advice, statement, or other information shall also be at the reader’s own risk.

About the AfDBThe overarching objective of the African Development Bank Group is to spur sustainable economic development and social progress in its regional member countries (RMCs), thus contributing to poverty reduction. The Bank Group achieves this objective by mobilizing and allocating resources for investment in RMCs and providing policy advice and technical assistance to support development efforts.

About Independent Development Evaluation (IDEV)The mission of Independent Development Evaluation at the AfDB is to enhance the development effectiveness of the institution in its regional member countries through independent and instrumental evaluations and partnerships for sharing knowledge.

Independent Development Evaluation (IDEV)African Development Bank GroupAvenue Joseph Anoma, 01 BP 1387, Abidjan 01, Côte d’Ivoire Phone: +225 20 26 20 41 E-mail: [email protected] idev.afdb.org

Layout & production: Visual Identity – www.visualidentity.co.uk Original language: French – Translation: AfDB Language Services Department

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Acknowledgments iAcronyms and Abbreviations vExecutive Summary 1Management Response 7

Introduction 19Evaluation Purpose and Objectives 19Methodological Approach 19Limitations of the Evaluation 20

Country Context 21Main Development Challenges of DRC 21National Development Strategy 23

Bank Assistance Strategies and Program 25Strategic orientations, Theory of Change, and Dialogue 25Bank Portfolio in DRC 28

Results of the Evaluation of Bank Interventions 31Relevance 31Effectiveness 32Sustainability 37Efficiency 39Knowledge and Advisory Services 40Summary:DidtheBankMakeaDifferenceinDRC? 40

Performance and Results-Based Management 43Quality of CSPs and Selectivity 43Managing for Development Results (MfDR) 44 Application of the Paris Declaration and the Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States 45Complementarity and Synergies 46LeverageEffectMobilizingOtherResources 46

Country Performance 47

Conclusions and Recommendations 49Main conclusions 49Recommendations 49

Table of contents

Table of contents

Annexes 53Methodological approach 54Rating of Projects Subject to a PRA 65Map of DRC and Mapping of AfDB Operations 66TotalandMultilateralOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA)receivedbyDRC 68ChronologyofSignificantPoliticalEventsinDRCandTFPCommitments 70Some Comparative Socio-economic Indicators of the DRC 72Factors and/or Manifestations of Fragility in Country Strategy Papers 75

Endnotes 76

List of figures Figure 1: Milestones of the Methodological Approach 20Figure 2: Trends of DRC’s Main Fragility Factors between 2004 and 2015 22Figure 3: Theory of Change 26Figure 4: Sector Breakdown of Bank Operations in DRC 29

List of tablesTable 1: Strategic Guidelines and Dialogue Areas of the AfDB in DRC 25Table 2: Relevance Ratings 31Table3:EffectivenessRating 32Table 4: Public Finance Management Scores in DRC 35Table 5: Real GDP Growth Rate Trends in DRC (in %) 36Table 6: Assessment of the Bank’s level of Contribution to Factors of Fragility 37Table 7: Sustainability Rating 37Table8:EfficiencyRating 39Table 9: Rating of Performance and Results-Based Management 43Table 10: Selection Criteria and Stages in the Analysis of Projects Eligible to PRA 55

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vAcronyms and abbreviations

Acronyms and abbreviations

ADF African Development Fund

AfDB African Development Bank

AsDB Asian Development Bank

CAADP Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program

CBFF Congo Basin Forest Fund

CEDR Comprehensive Evaluation of Development Results

CODE Committee on Operations and Development Effectiveness (AfDB)

CPIA Country Policy and Institutional Assessment

CSP Country Strategy Paper

DFID Department for International Development (UK)

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

FSF Fragile States Facility

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GHG Greenhouse Gas

GPRSP Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

HDI Human Development Index

HED Higher Education

HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Country

IDEV Independent Development Evaluation

IMF International Monetary Fund

M23 March 23 Movement

MAS Ministry of Social Affairs

MDG Millennium Development Goal

MEPSP Ministry of Primary, Secondary and Vocational Education

MESU Ministry of Higher Education

MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

PAM-FP Public Finance Modernization Support Project

PAPDDS Health Development Master Plan Support Project for Orientale Province

PARSAR Agricultural and Rural Sector Rehabilitation Support Project in Bas-Congo and Bandundu Provinces

PARSEC Socio-economic Reintegration Support Project for Ex-combatants

PASE Education Sector Support Project

PEASU Semi-Urban Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Project

vi Democratic Republic of Congo: Evaluation of the Bank’s Country Strategy and Program 2004–2015 – Summary Report

PEPUR Rural and Semi-Urban Electrification Project

PMEDE Project for Development of Electricity Market for Domestic Consumption and Export

PMPTR Minimum Partnership for Transition and Recovery Program

PMURR Emergency Multi-Sectoral Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program

PNDS National Health Development Plan

PNIA National Agricultural Investment Plan

PRA Project Results assessment

PRECI Institutional Capacity-Building Project on Reform Implementation

PRESAR Agricultural and Rural Sector Rehabilitation Project

PRISE Socio-economic Infrastructure Reinforcement Project in Central Zone of DRC (West Kasaï and East Kasaï)

PRODAP Lake Tanganyika Development Program

PRSP-I Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

PSVE Primary, Secondary and Vocational Education

PUAICF Financial Crisis Impact Mitigation Emergency Program

RBCSP Results-Based Country Strategy Paper

SRSS Health System Strengthening Strategy

SSADR Agriculture and Rural Development Sector Strategy

TFP Technical and Financial Partner

UA Unit of Account

USD US Dollar

WB World Bank

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1Executive Summary

Executive Summary

Evaluation Goal and Methodology

This evaluation, initiated and conducted by the Inde-pendent Development Evaluation (IDEV), is part of a comprehensive evaluation of the development results (CEDR) of the Bank. Its goal is to review the specificity of the Bank’s actions in a transition economy like DRC, and make recommendations that could help improve the effectiveness of Bank assis-tance while supporting the preparation and opera-tionalization of its future strategies in DRC over the 2017–2021 period.

The evaluation covers Bank strategies, operations and policy dialogue activities implemented through various financing mechanisms in DRC over the 2004–2015 period.¹ The evaluation method is based on two major themes, namely: obtaining develop-ment results and performance-based manage-ment of Bank interventions. It is structured around 20 evaluation questions (Annex 1.b) which mainly focus on aspects of fragility and is based on a docu-mentary review, discussions with experts and quick surveys on the intervention sites that included indivi-dual and group discussions, consultation workshops and direct observations.

Development Context and Challenges of DRC 2

Situated in Central Africa and lying astride the equa-tor, DRC is one of the largest countries in Africa with a surface area of 2.3 million km¹. Between 2004 and 2015, the country’s population increased by 25 million, rising from 52.5 million to 77.27 million inhabitants. It is a youthful population (55% are under the age of 25 years) that lives predominantly in rural areas (63% in 2004 and 60% in 2015).

Since the mid-1990s, the country has experienced a series of political crises (flight and assassination of presidents, and challenge of election results), followed by relative calm in 2013. The current period is charac-terized by a new territorial redistricting and political tensions due to the postponement of presidential and legislative elections initially scheduled to be held in November 2016.

According to the latest estimates, the economic growth rate has fluctuated between 2004 and 2015, rising from 6.7% in 2004 to 8.5% in 2013, before falling back to 6.9% in 2015 following a slowdown, to 2.8% in 2009 due to the global financial crisis. This economic performance, which exceeds the African average (4.8%), is essentially driven by: (i) manufac-turing industries (33% of GDP in 2014), and (ii) agri-culture (21% of GDP in 2014).

Over the 2005–2015 period, DRC was classified among fragile States on the harmonized lists of most international organizations. Despite positive trends, particularly in economic growth, State capacity and legitimacy, regional conflicts and armed violence, the country is still dogged by enormous challenges, namely: the fragile legitimacy of State institutions; a high poverty rate; difficult access to basic social services; economic, political and institutional instability; a poor business environment; and threats to biodiversity.

Bank Assistance Strategy and Program in DRC

Between 2004 and 2015, the Bank engaged in policy dialogue with the Government, directly and through its contribution to sector policy formulation. The four (4) Country Strategy Papers (CSP) for 2003–2004, 2005–2007, 2008–2012 and 2013–2017 were prepared based on growth and poverty reduction strategy papers (GPRSP I and II), priority action programs (PAP I and

2 Democratic Republic of Congo: Evaluation of the Bank’s Country Strategy and Program 2004–2015 – Summary Report

II) and mainly sector strategies in agriculture (SSADR, PDDAA, PNIA) and health (SRSS, PNDS). The Bank intervened in DRC through 63 projects worth a total of approximately UA 1.2 billion. Economic and social infrastructure accounts for nearly 80% of the total amount invested in this portfolio.

Results of Evaluation of Bank Strategies and Programs

Relevance

Relevance is assessed as moderately satisfactory. The Bank’s CSPs during the review period reflect the fragile state of DRC, but do not provide an integrated analysis of the factors of fragility. Through its succes-sive strategies, the Bank has supported the country through its evolution from a “post-conflict” situation at the beginning of the period to a “development” situa-tion thereafter. The Bank’s strategies and operations in DRC are globally aligned with its general orienta-tions. The use of the Fragile States Facility (FSF) was relevant. However, considering the country’s situa-tion, the amounts for the 3rd pillar were small relative to the needs, and there was a focus on Government services to the detriment of further strengthening of private sector stakeholders and civil society organiza-tions. Although gender inequality, youth employment, regional disparities and green growth are identified as key issues in the CSPs, the Bank’s strategies and operations in DRC have remained poorly inclusive.

Effectiveness

Effectiveness is assessed as moderately satis-factory. As regards economic and social infrastruc-ture, the attainment of results is satisfactory in terms of outputs and moderately satisfactory in terms of outco-mes. While operations in the transport and social deve-lopment sectors are most effective overall, the results are less satisfactory in the agricultural and rural deve-lopment sectors. In the energy sector, the operations

are not advanced enough for their effectiveness to be determined. With respect to economic and financial governance, only one of the four projects funded by the Bank, namely the Emergency Program to Mitigate the Impact of the Financial Crisis (PUAICF) was evaluated, since the others were not yet fully advanced in their implementation. This program attained its objectives by helping to restore macroeconomic balance in DRC and achieve the completion point of the HIPC Initiative (as of July 2010). It created favorable conditions for imple-mentation of the Bank’s subsequent support in public finance management area.

Effects on Factors of Fragility

A correlation can be established between the Bank’s operations and the positive or neutral trends in factors of fragility. The positive trends relate to institutional capacity in economic governance and economic growth, while the neutral trends concern diversification of the economy and living conditions in the critical provinces.

Sustainability

The sustainability of Bank operations is assessed as moderately unlikely. Overall, the technical soundness of achievements is moderately unlikely. Economic and financial viability and the political and governance environment are the criteria with the poorest performance. This stems essentially from road maintenance policy shortcomings, especially for rural roads, and failure by the State (or provinces) to provide the operating budgets of facilities established through Bank operations.

Institutional sustainability and capacity building, ownership and sustainability of partnerships, as well as environmental sustainability, are considered to be moderately unlikely.

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3Executive Summary

Efficiency

The Bank’s efficiency in DRC is assessed as mode-rately unsatisfactory. Project implementation delays are the main problem. The delays are due to three factors, namely: (i) country context; (ii) Government responsibility; and (iii) Bank responsibility.

Knowledge and advisory support for policy formulation

There is a wide gap between the Bank’s professed intentions in DRC in terms of policy dialogue and its results. As regards economic governance, the Bank significantly engaged in policy dialogue to help DRC reach the completion point of the HIPC Initiative. In other sectors, the Bank’s involvement in dialogue on sector policy implementation was limited to the production of studies that were insufficiently promoted. Furthermore, the Bank’s involvement in dialogue with civil society stakeholders and the private sector remains weak. The Bank’s analytical studies over the review period were neither program-med nor given any follow-up. They are few in number and their linkages to policy dialogue are not obvious.

Findings: Performance-based Management

Quality of CSPs and Selectivity

Overall, the quality and selectivity of CSPs have not been satisfactory despite an improvement over the review period. Bank strategies lack of consistency in the choice of pillars that change with each CSP, without any real common denominator, and by the sheer diversity of intervention areas. This situation is not conducive to consolidating experience and weakens the effectiveness of resources raised to monitor operations.

Managing for Development Results

Managing for results was increasingly factored into the Bank’s strategies in DRC during the review period. However, owing to weak statistical and national moni-toring/evaluation systems and a failure to implement recommendations, the Bank’s monitoring and supervi-sion mechanisms neither functioned well nor enhanced the effectiveness of strategies and programs.

Implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States

Implementation of the Principles of Good Internatio-nal Engagement in Fragile States ³ is unsatisfactory. This finding is partly due to the difficult context in DRC (weakness of the State and magnitude of needs). The Bank contributed to the implementation of principles aimed at improving aid effectiveness in DRC under the Paris Declaration (2005).

Complementarity and Synergies

Synergies between Bank operations in DRC are not optimal and differ from sector to sector. The potential for synergy between road, agricultural and environ-mental projects was not exploited. Furthermore, there was no capacity building strategy that cuts across the various areas of intervention.

Leverage

Leverage effects are evident in various forms, with the outcomes varying from sector to sector. The most emblematic is the Bank’s involvement in the deve-lopment and promotion of the INGA 3 project which should allow for considerable investment by public and private partners. Leverage effects can also be observed in the social and transport sectors.


Country Performance

DRC performance in its cooperation with AfDB impro-ved during the review period, mainly with develop-ment of the capacity to define and manage sector reforms. However, several shortcomings remain, in particular: weaknesses in the statistical apparatus; deficiencies in budget execution; inadequate mobi-lization of counterpart funds; precipitous implemen-tation of decentralization; shortcomings in assistance coordination; and very limited involvement of line Ministries in project monitoring.

Recommendations

The evaluation proposes four recommendations as follows:

1. Better focus the Bank’s intervention strategy in DRC on areas of comparative advantage with potential for catalytic effect on factors of fragility;

2. Improve quality at entry for Bank operations in DRC;

3. Improve the sustainability of operations through coordinated efforts at various levels, strategy formulation, preparation of interventions, and policy dialogue; and

4. Improve the monitoring/evaluation mecha-nisms of the Bank’s strategies and interven-tions in DRC.

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7Management Response

Management Response

Introduction

The evaluation approach was based on two main themes: the achievement of development outcomes and the performance-based management of Bank interventions. The evaluation examined relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, knowledge and advice on policy formulation, whilst taking into account results-based management as well as country performance and fragility. During the evalua-tion period, four Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) covering the periods 2003–2004, 2005–2007, 2008–2012 and 2013–2017 were implemented by the Bank through 63 projects with a total funding of approximately UA 1.2 billion. Economic and social infrastructure accounts for almost 80% of the total amount committed under this portfolio.

Management welcomes the recommendations of this evaluation, which will help improve the effectiveness of the Bank's assistance and the quality of its future cooperation strategy in the DRC.

Management welcomes the outcome of the evaluation conducted by the Independent Development Evalua-tion Department on the strategies and programmes implemented by the Bank in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) over the 2004–2015 period. The evaluation specifically covers the strategies, operations and policy dialogue implemented through various funding instruments in the DRC during the period. As part of the Bank's comprehensive evaluation of development results (CEDR), it seeks to examine the specific nature of the Bank's actions in the DRC, a transition state, identify recommendations to improve the Bank's assistance and inform the preparation and operationalisation of future strategies in the country. Overall, Management agrees with the conclusions of the evaluation, which highlight the need to (i) focus the Bank's intervention strategy in the DRC on the areas where it has a comparative advantage, to better address the fragility factors; (ii) enhance the quality at entry of Bank operations in the DRC; (iii) improve their sustaina-bility; and (iv) improve the monitoring and evaluation of cooperation and intervention strategies.

Relevance

Management welcomes the following findings of the evaluation:

❙ The Bank's CSPs during the period under review reflect the fragility of the DRC and have accompanied the country in its transition from a “post-conflict” country to a country faced with

“development” issues;

❙ The three pillars of intervention specific to fragile states, which make up the Fragile States Facility (FSF), proved relevant in the DRC; and

❙ Strategies and interventions in the DRC are broadly aligned with the country's various strategies and the Bank's overall orientation.

Management recognises, however, that the Bank should make efforts to strengthen inclusiveness in the next country strategy, with a view to (i) better


addressing gender inequalities, youth employment, regional disparities and green growth; and (ii) obtai-ning an integrated analysis of the fragility factors of the country. It wishes to underscore that the fragility lens recently developed by the Bank should facilitate this analysis.

Efficiency

Management notes that the effectiveness of the Bank's assistance in the DRC was rated as “mode-rately satisfactory” by the evaluation. It welcomes the fact that the evaluation highlighted the effectiveness of Bank-financed projects in the transport and social development sectors. The Nsele-Lufimi and Kwan-go-Kenge road rehabilitation project made it possible to link the City-Province of Kinshasa with the Province of Bandundu, one of the DRC’s breadbaskets, and to reduce travel times between the two regional capitals from over two weeks to just four hours, thus making it much easier to transport commonly consumed agri-cultural produce to Kinshasa. The project enabled nearly 200,000 additional households to engage in agricultural activities. The Eastern Province Health Care Development Master Plan Support Project (PAPDDS) has positively affected the quality of health care provision in part of the former Eastern Province by rehabilitating, building and fitting out infrastruc-ture, and providing staff training. Finally, after the completion of the Project in Support of Post-Conflict Socio-Economic Reintegration of ex-combatants (PARSEC), pilot farms have remained active and they ensure food supply to the ex-combatant beneficiaries. These farms annually supply the local markets with around 222,000 kg of agricultural produce, 286.2 kg of livestock products and 5,040 kg of fish products. Management notes the difficulties of implementing projects in the social sector; the lessons learned will help to better prepare and implement future opera-tions in this sector.

In terms of economic and financial governance, the evaluation highlights the positive outcomes achieved by the Emergency Programme to Mitigate the Impacts of the Financial Crisis (PUAICF). This programme

contributed measurably to restoring the macroeco-nomic equilibrium of the DRC and to the country’s reaching the completion point of the HIPC Initiative in July 2010. The Bank also contributed to boos-ting human-resource-development capacity (public administration, public finance and statistics) through a number of projects that were not sufficiently imple-mented to be included in the evaluation.

Management notes that it is not possible to assess the performance of Bank-financed projects in the energy and industry (mining and quarrying) sectors because of their low implementation rate. In fact, the project in the industry sector was only recently approved.

For the energy sector, the low level of execution can be explained by delays in the reform of the sector, parti-cularly the reform of the National Electricity Company (SNEL), the main executing agency for the sector's projects; the complexity of operations (cross-disbur-sement conditions between several partners, rehabi-litation operations, multiple simultaneous operations); the operational problems of the execution units; and the lack of expertise in this field within the Bank's Office in the DRC (COCD). The design of the latest energy sector operations, in particular the PAGASE Project approved in December 2016, takes into account lessons learned by:

❙ Paying attention to quality at entry (technical prerequisites, coordination).

❙ Ensuring that the execution unit is appropriately positioned and operates on the basis of collabo-ration with specialised national entities for the execution of certain activities and the use of inter-national expertise for the transfer of know-how.

❙ Involving a monitoring and evaluation expert.

❙ Keeping the need for mobilising counterpart funds as low as possible. In addition, improving the governance of the energy sector through support to the undertaken reforms, is at the heart of the PAGASE project, approved by the the Bank in December 2016.

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In 2016, a recruitment process to provide COCD with expertise in energy was not successful. The issue will be revisited in the new model of development and service delivery so that an appropriate solution is defi-nitively found.

Management takes note of the concerns raised by the evaluation in the agriculture and rural develop-ment sector, where results have been less conclusive, notably because of various weaknesses in project implementation:

❙ Certain equipment acquired under the projects and supplied to the producer organisations was not used, because the farmers did not receive adequate training (e.g., in the Agricultural and Rural Sector Rehabilitation Support Project (PARSAR) in the Bas-Congo and Bandundu provinces.

❙ Infrastructure—such as farm feeder-roads and market infrastructure—has not been maintained.

❙ The Government’s counterpart contribution has not been paid, negatively affecting project outcomes in this sector.

To temporarily minimise difficulties related to the non-payment, the Bank's Management authorised the financing of all the resources earmarked for certain operations in this sector—for example, for the Project for the Reinforcement of Socio-economic Infrastruc-ture in the Central Region (PRISE) and road projects in which the Government's counterpart contribution consists only of the provision of buildings (offices) and staff to manage the project. Management will pursue dialogue with Government authorities to ensure the Government’s effective contribution to the implementa-tion of the projects. It should be noted that non-payment or partial payment of counterpart resources reflects a low degree of country ownership of the projects and is mainly due to budgetary constraints and the lack of political will. For new projects, the Bank will ensure that: (a) the country complies as far as possible with the provisions of the Bank's Expenditure Policy (10%): in the case of a project to consolidate the economic

fabric currently under preparation and whose approval is expected before the end of March 2017, the amount of the national counterpart is 10% of the total cost of the project; and (b) adequate budgetary allocations are provided for in the annual budget acts for each project. The Bank will then agree with the Ministry of Finance and the sectoral Ministry on a timetable for disburse-ment of these resources in accordance with the time-table for project implementation.

Issues related to the maintenance of infrastructure (including rural roads) are discussed in the paragraph on sustainability.

Effects on Fragility Factors

The Bank is a highly committed partner in the fight against fragility in the DRC. The evaluation notes that the Bank has focused on three types of fragility factors, in line with its mandate: (i) growth factors that are heavily dependent on natural resources at both national and local levels; (ii) factors related to livelihoods or the fight for survival; and (iii) factors related to the capacity and legitimacy of state institutions. Management is pleased that the Bank's assistance has yielded positive outco-mes in institutional capacity, economic governance and economic growth. However, it recognises that there was little progress in diversifying the economy and improving living conditions in the critical provinces. The evaluation notes that the Bank's support did not allow the country's economic structure, still highly dependent on the interna-tional prices of its primary export ores, especially copper, to truly diversify. Concentration on state structures to the exclusion of the private sector and civil society is also viewed as a hindrance in certain programmes. Mana-gement is aware of these inadequacies and has already applied corrective measures, including

❙ Better management to ensure economic diversi-fication by optimising support to the agriculture sector (agro industrial parks, youth entrepre-neurship in agriculture and agro industries);

❙ The continuation of energy projects to remove the sector constraints;


❙ Support for national structures seeking to improve the investment climate; and

❙ The Bank's commitment to support the prepara-tion of the National Strategy for Export Diversifi-cation.

In addition, the Bank has involved civil society and local nongovernmental organisations more closely by recruiting local implementation agencies to imple-ment several operations, including the Project to Strengthen the Socio-economic Infrastructure in the Central Region, the Rural Infrastructure Development Project (PADIR) and the Integrated REDD + Project in the Mbuji-Mayi Kananga (PIREDD-MBKIS) Basins, approved respectively on 10 November 2011 and 11 September 2013.The experience proved to be gene-rally positive. The Bank will evaluate this practice at the end of these operations with a view to extending it to future rural infrastructure operations.

Sustainability

The evaluation of the sustainability of Bank operations in the DRC revealed many shortcomings that require Management's full attention:

❙ The limited technical soundness of certain projects: work at all stages of the process must meet international quality standards—including feasibility and design studies, the procurement process and the services of supervisory and supervisory offices, technical audit, and execu-tion of the works.

❙ Low economic and financial viability, due to weaknesses in policies governing road maintenance and, above all, to the failure of the national (or subna-tional) government to cover the equipment-operating budgets established in Bank operations.

❙ Low institutional sustainability: in general, DRC's systems and capacities are not yet sufficiently developed to ensure that the project's positive outcomes last after its completion.

❙ Gaps in the environmental and ecological sustai-nability of infrastructure developed in various sectors (transport, agriculture and, to a lesser extent, health). Emphasis should be placed on the design and construction of infrastructures that consume a minimum of non-renewable natural resources and incorporate the new climate change implications. This implies that specialists must have a good grasp of the envi-ronmental impacts of infrastructure and must share their knowledge and experience to stren-gthen their technical capacities.

Management is aware of the need for substantial progress in ensuring the sustainability of operations. This year it will, jointly with the DRC, initiate a strategic reflection on the issue, based on the findings of this evaluation. It nevertheless wishes to highlight several initiatives the Bank has already taken in agreement with national authorities to strengthen the sustaina-bility of its operations in the country—initiatives that it will reinforce:

❙ Taking maintenance aspects into account from the design stage of new operations, particularly in energy, as in PAGASE and the Peri-Urban and Rural Electrification Project (PEPUR).

❙ Systematically conducting feasibility studies to prepare infrastructure projects and improve their quality at entry (recent feasibility studies are described in Recommendation 2).

❙ Supporting the reform of public sector compa-nies in the fields of transport and energy—that is, improving their operational performance and finan-cial stability—to ensure that investments remain sustainable. For example, PAGASE supports the reform of the National Electricity Company, and the Priority Air Safety Project supported the reform of the Régie des Voies Aériennes.

❙ Tethering project implementation units to perma-nent administrative structures; working colla-boratively with national entities that specialise in certain activities; and looking to international

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expertise to transfer skills and knowledge, as in the PRISM, PADIR and PAGASE projects.

In transport infrastructure, the second-generation National Road Maintenance Fund (FONER) owes its existence to the recommendations of the technical and financial partners of the DRC. FONER represents a major step forward in comparison with the traditio-nal road fund, whose resources were used to finance investment work (new works, disaster response, main-tenance work, capacities, etc.). The resources raised under the second-generation FONER are paid into a single account for road maintenance work, reflecting the country's willingness to finance the maintenance of road infrastructure. As lead partner of the Infrastruc-ture Thematic Group, the Bank is very much engaged in dialogue with the Government and other partners on this issue. In new road projects, the Bank intends to finance maintenance over the two years following the final acceptance of a road; during that time, the country can set up the mechanism that will enable it to take over subsequently. Contracts for maintenance of part of the RN1 (financed by the Bank and the European Union) supported by the FONER have been awarded, and work is expected to start shortly.

As for rural road maintenance, in collaboration with the financial partners the country has established a system that has been deemed effective thus far. Structures on the rural roads to be rehabilitated are now made of durable materials. Local Road Maintenance Committees (CLERs), comprising residents of the villages crossed by rural roads, have been set up. The CLERs are trained by the Farm Roads Department to maintain rural feeder roads, and they can obtain an annual subsidy from the FONER for the maintenance of rural roads. This system is already used for all new rural feeder roads financed by the Bank to ensure their sustainability. The rehabilita-tion works on the Kayala-Kitangua-Katanga and Kitan-gua-Shaytengo (80 km) roads financed by the Bank in connection with the development of the Loange-Pont Lovua road are virtually complete. The installation of the CLERs for the maintenance of these roads took place during the one-year warranty period, and as soon as the final reception of the works is pronounced, the CLERs will take over the maintenance.

Efficiency

The evaluation notes that the Bank's overall effi-ciency is not satisfactory, as most operations have experienced delays. These delays are caused by three types of factors: (i) those related to the country context, (ii) those attributable to the Government, and (iii) those attributable to the Bank. The first two factors are largely beyond the Bank's control; however, the DRC Country Office maintains an ongoing dialogue with the Government, which has resulted in recent progress in the ratification of two loan agreements by Parliament and fulfilment of the conditions precedent to the first disbursement. In newly approved projects in the agriculture and energy sectors, the Bank will pursue efforts to build on progress made in loan rati-fications and to tackle the delicate question of regular and timely payment of counterpart funds.

The evaluation appropriately notes that the disbur-sement rate under the portfolio improved when the Bank's Country Office opened in 2007, rising from 19.3% in January 2008 to 31.9% in February 2012 and then to 38.96% by the end of 2016. In addition, the overall performance of the portfolio has improved over time. The portfolio performance review conduc-ted in December 2015 rated the overall performance satisfactory, with a rating of 2.5 on a scale of 3, up from 2.4 in 2014 and 2013 and 2.1 in 2011. COCD achieves these results through proximity monitoring involving the following:

❙ Quarterly meetings with the implementing agen-cies to review the implementation of the projects, particularly any difficulties encountered and the solutions to remedy them;

❙ Work sessions organised within the projects to discuss specific concerns;

❙ Regular exchanges between COCD disbursement and procurement officers and the project trust experts, to permanently strengthen their capaci-ties and improve the quality of the files received;


❙ Supporting project implementation units in the use of national procedures in national tenders; the Bank is ahead of the World Bank in capitalising on its experience in this area;

❙ Support to the supervisory bodies (General Direc-torate of Public Contracts and Public Procurement Regulatory Authority) with a view to the full use of the country system in operations financed by the Bank.

Management is aware that in the energy and gover-nance sectors, which account for 17% and 10%, respectively, of the Bank’s ongoing national-le-vel commitments, the dearth of sector specialists constitutes a major obstacle and explains certain delays in file processing. It proposes to examine this issue as part of the implementation of the Bank's new development and service delivery model.

Knowledge and advice on policymaking

Management notes with satisfaction the evaluation’s finding that the Bank is perceived to be an impor-tant partner of the country, particularly in the water, sanitation, transport and energy sectors. In terms of economic governance, the evaluation highlights the Bank's commitment to engaging in dialogue with the DRC authorities, notably in supporting the country’s efforts to reach the decision point (2003) and subse-quently the completion point (2010) of the HIPC initiative, by clearing arrears. It should be noted that, given the current difficult economic situation in the DRC, the Bank plays a leading role in the dialogue with the national authorities and other development partners to ensure that the assistance provided is adapted to the needs and challenges at hand.

The evaluation also noted weaknesses in other areas:

❙ Analytical work carried out by the Bank during the review period, which was too limited to adequately support the political dialogue; and

❙ The Bank's involvement in dialogue with civil society and private sector stakeholders, inclu-ding through direct support to these stakehol-ders.

Management has noted these weaknesses, which it will address by issuing analytical and sector-spe-cific notes to inform the Bank's future assistance strategy in the DRC. However, it wishes to empha-sise that, in 2016, the Bank supported the prepa-ration of the forward-looking studies that informed the preparation of the National Strategic Develop-ment Plan (NSDP), in particular the Vision Paper for 2050. In addition, Management will evaluate actions already taken to involve civil society and the private sector in the execution of current projects (through the local implementation agencies), with a view to replicating them in future operations.

Results-based management

The evaluation highlighted weaknesses in the quality and selectivity of the Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) and the implementation of results-based management principles.

Although there was improvement over the evalua-tion period, Management is aware that the quality of CSPs in the DRC still needs to be improved through:

❙ An integrated analysis of the country's fragi-lity factors, as mentioned earlier, and a demons-tration of how interventions at different levels will influence these factors and strengthen the country's resilience;

❙ Greater emphasis on cross-cutting themes (in particular gender and environment);

❙ Emphasis on complementary analytical work needed to deepen the analysis; and

❙ Stronger links between the different pillars of the CSP. Management nevertheless wishes to

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emphasise that the change over time in the Bank's areas of intervention should not be perceived as inconsistency, as noted by the evaluation, but rather as evidence of the Bank's flexibility in adap-ting to the country's needs and priorities.

Management is also aware of the need to increase strategy and portfolio selectivity. As the evaluation noted, the pillars of the different CSPs cover broad thematic clusters (economic and financial gover-nance, economic and social infrastructure), which in fact cover a wide variety of sectors of intervention. As a result, despite the Bank's commitment to grea-ter project selectivity, the areas covered by the port-folio remained too broad. To achieve greater impact on the ground, therefore, it is necessary to narrow the areas of intervention in future strategies and take into account the comparative advantages of the Bank. The examples below for the agriculture and energy sectors illustrate this point.

The Bank is one of the principal partners in the agri-culture sector in the DRC. Its previous interventions in the sector have focused mainly on the develop-ment of rural infrastructure, the revival of agricultural production and the management of natural resources, especially in the five southern provinces of the country. It has also funded the Agricultural Sector Study and the National Agricultural Investment Program, which are currently guiding the interventions of all stakehol-ders (e.g., World Bank and IFAD) in this sector. Finally, the Bank is very much involved in the transformation of the agriculture sector, in line with the objective of economic diversification. It supports agribusiness and the youth entrepreneurship project in the sector and finances feasibility studies for the development of agro-industrial parks. Its many previous interventions, as well as those now under preparation (feasibility studies), give the Bank a clear comparative advan-tage in the agriculture and rural development sector in the DRC. The Bank expects to capitalise on its expe-rience in this area and to correct in future operations the weaknesses highlighted by the evaluation.

The Bank is also one of the most active partners in the energy sector in the DRC; for nearly a decade it has been assisting the country in developing its energy sector. Its interventions in this sector, which repre-sent about 17% of its current commitments in the country, focus mainly on electricity infrastructure. A recently approved project addresses the governance of the sector, notably by setting up key institutions to guarantee the success of reforms (in particular, reforms of the structures responsible for regulation and rural electrification). The Bank is also financing studies for the development of the Inga 3 project and has provided resources for studies on the develop-ment of renewable energies. Current interventions, as well as those under preparation (feasibility studies), give the Bank a comparative advantage in this sector in the DRC. Indeed, they constitute a bank of well-de-fined projects whose realisation will be essential to the development of the energy sector. The Bank will capi-talise on its experience in this sector, which is essen-tial to support the country's economic diversification and transformation.

In terms of development-results-based manage-ment, the evaluation notes that the Bank paid greater attention to monitoring the results of its interven-tions during the period under review. However, these efforts have encountered varying difficulties at both the strategic and project levels:

❙ An inadequate national statistical system and a poor monitoring and evaluation system in the Ministry of Planning and line ministries,

❙ Inadequate indicator quality and poor coordination within the results chain, and

❙ Weak correlation between the CSP and project results frameworks.

Management is already working on some of these factors; in particular, it aims to strengthen the national statistical system by implementing the Statistics and


Public Finance Institutional Support Project (PAI-STAT-FIN), an ongoing monitoring and evaluation system for projects and programmes within the Project and Programme Monitoring Unit of the Ministry of Finance. In future, the Bank will give greater attention to the quality of logical framework indicators in CSPs and to their correlation with project indicators, in accor-dance with the relevant Directives. The Bank is also revising the logical framework and format of the CSPs to further enhance their quality.

The Bank, through its Country Office, is highly committed to coordinating aid in the DRC. The Bank is currently the lead partner for the Infrastructure and Statistics thematic and sector groups. The Country

Office actively participates in the monthly Partnership Coordination Group meetings and other sector-spe-cific framework meetings, including in the areas of economic and financial governance, agriculture, and water and sanitation. In this respect, Management is pleased that the evaluation has highlighted the Bank's positive contribution to implementing the five Paris Declaration principles, thereby contributing to improved aid effectiveness in the DRC. Management will pursue its work to strengthen complementari-ties, seek to establish synergies between the Bank's interventions and those of other partners operating in the country and optimise the leveraging impact of its interventions in various sectors.

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Management Action Record

Recommendation Management Response

Management concurs with the main lessons and recommendations of the evaluation, which will inform the design of future strategies and operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

RECOMMENDATION 1: Focus on the Bank's operations strategy in the DRC on areas of comparative advantage in order to act catalytically on fragility factors.

The Bank's next DRC strategy should be more selective and based on an integrated analysis of fragility factors, while prioritising sectors with a comparative advantage (e.g. agriculture and rural development, or energy). Given fragility-re-lated challenges in the DRC (lack of infrastruc-ture, rural poverty, weak sustainable development objectives and capacity, environmental challen-ges, etc.) and the Bank's limited resources, a potential way forward is to prioritise a strategy focusing on structural investments that promote green growth. The areas for catalytic investment could include (i) agricultural infrastructure (farm feeder roads, structures), and/or (ii) the promo-tion of environmentally friendly agriculture (inclu-ding agroforestry) that creates jobs (family and small processing enterprises), and / or (iii) energy production from renewable resources, including the development of the country's hydroelectric resources. Moreover, in view of the critical impor-tance of improving economic governance (at all levels) as a key to sustainable development in the DRC, strengthening economic governance, with a capacity-building component whose impact is both significant and government-wide (central and decentralised services of the national admi-nistration and provincial administrative services) could constitute a complementary strategic component.

AGREED. In line with the recommendations of the evalua-tion, Management will ensure that more rigorous selectivity is applied to the sectors of intervention under the future CSP. The preparation of this strategy will benefit from:

The outcome of the updated study on DRC's fragility factors, conducted by RDTS in 2016, and application of the fragi-lity lens, to reinforce the analysis of fragility factors in the strategy. (The mid-term review of the 2013–2017 CSP, approved by CODE in June 2016, has already yielded an integrated analysis of fragility factors).

The upstream preparation of analytical and sector-spe-cific notes.

The emphases proposed by the evaluation (agriculture, energy and economic governance) will inform the design of the CSP, as will close attention to green growth investments. The CSP focus areas will be selected on the basis of their alignment with four main criteria:

The country's priorities, as reflected in the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP);

The Bank's long-term strategy orientations and five key priorities;

The interventions of other development partners in the DRC; and

The comparative advantages of the Bank highlighted in the paragraph on managing for results.


RECOMMENDATION 2: Improve the quality at entry of the Bank's interventions in the DRC, in particular to take into account the country's constraints.

Given the limited quality at entry of the Bank's interventions in the DRC, it is necessary to improve preliminary studies, in terms of quality and resources allocated, prior to implemen-ting operations. More specifically, these studies should provide a more precise definition (compared to past approaches) of the strategy for taking into account the various constraints affecting project implementation, namely (i) secu-rity and fiduciary risks, (ii) institutional challen-ges linked to the absence of governance in public policy (both at the centralised and at the decentralised levels) and (Iii) logistical problems generated by the immensity of the country’s terri-tory, coupled with generally poor infrastructure (transport, energy, etc). Therefore, future inter-ventions should be given special attention and be presented for funding only when their quality has been deemed satisfactory.

AGREED. Management has already taken several actions to improve the quality at entry of the Bank's operations in the DRC. These measures will be further strengthened in the coming years, taking into account the constraints identified by the evaluation.

Studies were undertaken before implementing a number of important projects: (i) in 2016 a Project Preparation Facility of UA 0.8 million was approved to finance feasi-bility studies for the Youth Entrepreneurship in Agricul-ture and Agri-Business Project; (ii) in September 2016 a grant of UA 1.53 million was approved to finance feasibi-lity studies for the development of agro-industrial parks in Ngandajika, Kaniama Kasese and Mweka (ED-PAI); once the studies are completed, the project could be eligible for Bank financing over the next CSP cycle; (iii) the feasibility study financed by the Bank for the project to build the Braz-zaville-Kinshasa Road-Rail Bridge, scheduled in the 2017 lending programme; and (iv) studies on the development of the Inga 3 Project, which will be jointly financed by the Bank and other technical and financial partners and for which over US$50 million has already been mobilised.

With respect to institutional constraints, to minimise fidu-ciary risk and enhance project implementation, new projects will systematically include a “support and capacity-building” component.

Because of the size of the DRC, as of the 2013–2017 CSP, the Bank has limited its operations to the Central Region. During project preparation, this allows the Bank to focus on a target population with well-defined concerns and incorpo-rate area-specific and well adapted solutions.

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RECOMMENDATION 3: Improve operations’ sustainability through coordinated strategy development, operations preparation and policy dialogue.

Implementing the first two recommendations should have a positive effect on the sustainabi-lity of operations outcomes. A better and more harmonised strategy that integrates the specifici-ties of the DRC and ensures enhanced operations quality, should improve sustainability. In addition, the issue of sustainability should be at the core of policy dialogue and subject to rigorous analysis in the design and implementation of Bank opera-tions. Areas of particular concern are: paved and feeder road maintenance; human resource mana-gement in public administrations to improve the sustainability of capacity-building activities; the management of public finances to ensure that the administrations supported within the framework of a project actually receive, after the end of the project, the operating and capital budgets ente-red in the annual budget laws. Throughout the analytical process, it should be ensured that the said budgets will be effectively used to prepare and implement Bank operations.

AGREED. Management will closely monitor the issue of sustai-nability in ongoing and future operations. To this effect, the Bank will undertake the following actions:

Organising in 2017 a brainstorming workshop with the Government to identify a roadmap on the sustainability of the outcomes of Bank-financed projects in the DRC, based on the findings of this evaluation. The workshop will also discuss issues related to recurring post-completion costs to be borne by the State and local authorities with respect to infrastructure maintenance (particularly transport infrastruc-ture) and staff trained under the projects.

Defining an exit strategy (the Bank's disengagement) for each project to be completed, starting from 2017.

Consistently using durable materials for feeder road construction, and relying on Local Road Maintenance Committees (CLERs) for periodic maintenance.

Pursuing dialogue with the Government and other partners on the reform of the Road Maintenance Fund to enable it to play its role more effectively.

RECOMMENDATION 4: Improve the monitoring and evaluation of cooperation and intervention strategies.

In order to apply results-based management principles more thoroughly, project monitoring and evaluation systems should be enhanced by adopting a precise and rigorous project approach and strengthening the monitoring of impact indi-cators, particularly in areas most affected by lack of data, such as: (i) capacity-building at the level of individuals and organisations (public admi-nistrations, socio-professional entities, private companies etc.); (ii) youth employment; and (iii) the socio-economic status of beneficiaries, inclu-ding women. This would also inform each CSP's completion report and the development of the next CSP. Capacity enhancement of the country office should also be borne in mind, especially in the context of the ongoing decentralisation, to facilitate efficient programme implementation.

AGREED. Management will:

Improve the logical frameworks for future strategies and projects, in line with existing practices.

Step up its assistance to the National Statistical System (NSS) by comprehensively enhancing its technical and human capacities. The Directorate will also consider, within the framework of the future country strategy, the possibility of supporting the establishment of an effective NSDP moni-toring and evaluation mechanism.

Strengthen COCD's workforce, particularly in the energy and governance sectors, by mapping staff to the Country Office under the implementation of the Bank's new Business Deve-lopment and Delivery Model.

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19Introduction

Introduction

The Bank’s strategies, operations and policy dialogue activities, implemented through various funding instruments in DRC, are channels for achieving the development goals agreed upon by the Bank and DRC in the CSPs (2004–2015). Under that agreement, this evaluation, which is also a building block of the comprehensive evaluation of the development results (CEDR) of the Bank, presents the results obtained and the attendant factors of success or failure, and also appraises performance in the management of Bank operations. Its recommendations will be useful to stakeholders, including the Bank, the Government and civil society, and will guide the preparation and implementation of the Bank’s Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for 2017–2021 in DRC.

Part I of this report presents the evaluation framework (purpose, objectives, methodology, and limitations) and the context of DRC, its main challenges and national development strategy. Part II is devoted to the Bank’s assistance strategies in DRC from 2004 to 2015 and the evaluation results. Lastly, the report presents its conclusions and makes recommenda-tions to the Bank.

Evaluation Purpose and Objectives

The evaluation was conducted to increase the effec-tiveness of the Bank’s development actions in a transition country like DRC. It seeks to: (i) measure the results (relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, efficiency, knowledge and advisory services) of the Bank in achieving the objectives defined in the CSPs from 2004 to 2015; (ii) analyze performance in the management of Bank interventions (quality of design, partnership and leverage, results-based management, complementarity and synergy); and (iii) make recom-mendations to improve the Bank’s future operations and strategies.

Methodological Approach 4

Overall, the evaluation approach is broken down into two levels of analysis, namely: the strategic level based on: (i) analysis of the contribution by Bank assistance to results expected from broader frameworks of action; (ii) a focus on immediate and intermediate results levels; (iii) country and sector analyses; and the operational level based on a syste-matic and thorough analysis of the results of a sample of projects (PRA).

The evaluation was based on the theories of change reconstituted from Bank assistance (Figure 3) and various projects. It focused on 63 projects from 9 sectors in which the Bank operated between 2004 and 2015 (Figure 4). The exercise was conducted through 20 evaluation questions (Annex 1 b), which specifically include aspects of fragility and were designed to meet the expectations of CEDR and the internal practices of IDEV pertaining to the evaluation of country strategies and programs. Based on these questions grouped by evaluation criterion, indicators were defined to measure the results obtained at each analysis level. A six-point rating scale per criterion 5

was used.

For triangulation purposes, these indicators were determined based on quantitative and qualitative data from several sources (country team, govern-ment, local elected officials, civil society, private sector, project beneficiaries, and development partners) and following various methods, namely: documen-tary review, quick survey with questionnaire and semi-structured interviews, and direct observation. The sites visited and the respondents were selected based on geographical representation (Map of the country in Annex 3), level of project implementation with preference given to projects that had matured enough to warrant an evaluation of their results, and accessibility. Hence, 8 project results assessment


(PRA) reports were produced (representing 18% of the total portfolio and 4 of the Bank’s 9 interven-tion sectors in DRC), as well as a “country analysis framework’’, and strategic and sector analyses at country level. This report was prepared based on these various products.

Furthermore, a stakeholders’ consultation workshop helped to verify the validity of the data collected and encourage ownership of the results. Quality control was ensured through internal and external peer review.

Limitations of the Evaluation

This evaluation faced some constraints, namely: (i) logistical arrangements to visit a sufficiently

representative sample of sites due to the very large size of the country; (ii) a low project implementa-tion rate in the energy, environment, industry/mines/quarries and public finance sectors which limited evaluation of the effectiveness of Bank action in these sectors; (iii) the lack of data on the beginning of the review period and on the impact of Bank interven-tions due to a weak monitoring/evaluation system; and (iv) only 8 out of 63 projects (representing 18% of the total portfolio and 4 of the Bank's 9 intervention areas in DRC) were subjected to in-depth evaluation through a PRA (project results assessment). Howe-ver, in addition to the PRA, the team relied on sector and strategic analyses, as well as a “country analysis framework” to prepare this report. Similarly, it tried to inform the evaluation criteria by triangulating data collection sources and methods.

Figure 1: Milestones of the Methodological Approach

Note: Author, IDEV.

1.1 Formulation of sub-questions/criteria targeting evaluation questions and indicators or collection and analysis of information

4.1 Documents, individual/collective interviews with stakeholders, site visits, meeting of beneficiaries

3.1 Preliminary filling of PRA template based on documentary review

5.1 Conclusions

3.2 Preliminary responses to evaluation questions and identification of information needs to be covered during the mission

5.2 Recommendations

2.1 Analysis of strategic documentation

2.2 Analysis of interventions of the country/regional portfolio

2.3 Sampling of projects PRA

1. Structuring of evaluative questioning

4. Collect and information analysis on the ground

3. Pre-filling evaluation tools and formulating initial responses to evaluative questioning

5. Responses to the evaluation questions

6. Technical and synthesis reports

2. Analysis of strategies and interventions

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21Country context

Country context

Main Development Challenges of DRC

Geographical and Political Context

The DRC is the second largest country in Africa after Algeria, with a surface area of 2.3 million km 2. It is located in Central Africa and straddles the equator. Between 2004 and 2015, its population grew from 52.5 to 77.27 million inhabitants. It has a youthful population (55% under 25 years old; only 5.2% are above the age of 55 years) living mostly in rural areas (63% in 2004 and 60% in 2015).6 The population density on the national territory is very diverse: 14 inhab. /km 2 in Equateur Province compared to 60 inhab. /km 2 in South Kivu. The city of Kinshasa had over 8 million inhabitants in 2012, and its population is expected to reach 12.7 million in 2020.

Since the mid-1990s, DRC has experienced a series of conflicts, some of which have been large-scale. The key events that have marked the political life of the country over the past 15 years can be summarized as follows: (i) 1997: flight of President Mobutu, who had been in power since 1965, and the coming to power of Laurent-Désiré Kabila; (ii) May 1998 to late 2002: Second Congo War, which claimed many civilian lives; 7 (iii) January 200: assassination of Laurent-Dé-siré Kabila, replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila; (iv) May 2006: election of Joseph Kabila as President of the Republic (elections recognized as fair), followed by re-election in November 2011 (results challenged by the Opposition and criticized by the international community); (v) 2009 to 2013: resurgence of conflict in Eastern DRC followed by relative stabilization after the military defeat of the M23 movement in November 2013; (vi) the current period is marked by political tensions ahead of the scheduled 2016 elections, thus creating an uncertain political and security situation. The new territorial redistricting has been effective since 30 June 2015, with the country's administrative

units increased from 11 to 26 provinces. The miles-tones of political life, as well as commitments by the AfDB and other technical and financial partners, are outlined in Annex 5.

Economic Performance 8

According to estimates, the economic growth rate fluctuated, rising from 6.7% in 2004 to 8.5% in 2013, before falling back to 6.9% in 2015 following a slowdown, and after having plunged to 2.8% in 2009 due to the global financial crisis. Such econo-mic performance, which exceeds the African average (4.8%), remains dependent on agriculture (21% of GDP in 2014) which employs 70% of the population and is characterized by low productivity leading to food insecurity and a nutritional deficit (43% of under-five children suffer from stunted growth), as well as on manufacturing industries (33% of GDP in 2014) which are hamstrung by obsolete production machinery, a limited capacity to use new technologies, the impacts of foreign competition, and energy sector shortcomings.9 Extractive industries (including mining) represented 8.5% of GDP in 2011. Public revenue from mining is insignificant relative to the country's potential. Accor-ding to the World Bank,10 the mining sector tax revenue potential is 15–20% of GDP, or over 7 times its current contribution to Central Government revenue.

Despite the several factors that fuel growth, the DRC economy is still affected by world prices of minerals; economic, political and institutional instability evident in the military spending pressure on public finances; and the security situation in East DRC. This back-ground, coupled with energy sector weaknesses, and a poor business environment erodes confidence of the business community and undermines macroeco-nomic stability.


Figure 2: Trends of DRC’s Main Fragility Factors between 2004 and 2015

Regional factors

Regional conflicts and convergence of transbor-der interests

Weak State capacity and legitimacy / limited State presence, weak institutions, no rule of law

Growth but high depend-ence on natural resources

Growth but high depend-ence on natural resources

«Ethnic entrepreneurs»; i.e. relying on mobilization based on identity

Deep social divisions (ethnic/clan/province) and clientelism

«Uncontrolled» and «pred-atory» security services

Identity antagonisms

Livelihoods/struggle for survival

Displaced persons and land conflicts

«Uncontrolled» and «pred-atory» security services

National factors Local factors Micro-local factors

Note: The colours correspond to the trend (positive=green; negative=red) and not to the situation (satisfactory or not) of each factor.

Source: Author, IDEV.

Status of DRC’s Fragility, Challenges and Development Opportunities

During the period under review, DRC was ranked among fragile States on the harmonized lists of most international organizations, particularly the AfDB, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, OECD and DFID. Its score based on country policy and institutional assess-ment (CPIA) criteria changed very slightly between 2006 and 2013. On a scale of 6, its overall score inched up from 2.61 to 2.65 before rising to 3.0 in 2014. The country's fragility stems from the interaction of various factors at regional and national levels, as well as at local and micro-local levels. Figure 2 below presents the main factors and their trends between 2004 and 2015. Although the DRC has recorded some positive trends, especially in economic growth, State capacity, and regional conflicts/armed violence, it continues to face significant challenges in several areas, such as:

❙ The fragile legitimacy of State institutions, as was demonstrated in the January 2015 violence spar-ked by a possible third term for President Joseph Kabila.

❙ No access to basic social services (education, health, water and sanitation). In the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI), DRC was ranked 186th (out of 186 countries) in 2012 and 176th (out of 188 countries) in 2015.11 Only 47% of households use an improved drinking water source and 14% use improved sanitation facilities.12

❙ Although poverty declined significantly between 2004 and 2015, it still affects the vast majo-rity of the population: the gross national income, which stood at USD 380 per capita in 2014 (Atlas method), is one of the lowest in the world.13

Currently, 87.7% of the population reported lives

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23Country context

on less than USD 1.25 per day.14 With regard to inequalities, the Gini index which was 39% in 2005 rose to 41% in 2012, reflecting an increase in inequality15 over this period.

❙ The threat to forest biodiversity (112 million hectares), mainly due to the excessive exploitation of forest resources, and illegal occupancy of some national parks. This is compounded by the effects of climate change on agriculture, forests and the water resources network.

However, the DRC has a lot of potential for its deve-lopment, namely: its territory which is exceptionally rich in mineral and forest resources; the abundance of hydroelectric resources of which only a small portion is developed; its agricultural development potential due to the sheer extent of available farmland and the diversity of ecosystems and, finally, its central regional position which transforms the country into a junction between Central Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa.

National Development Strategy

To address the above challenges, the Government prepared successive programs presented in the I-PRSP (2002–2005), PMPTR (2004–2007), GPRSP-I (2007–2011), and GPRSP-II (2011–2015).

Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP 2002–2005): This strategy was intended to rehabili-tate basic infrastructure so as provide minimum public services and support the economic recovery which began in 2002 after the war, through: (i) reconstruction

of basic infrastructure in the agricultural and social sectors; (ii) capacity-building in planning and macroe-conomic management; and (iii) reform support.

Minimum Partnership Program for Transition and Recovery (PMPTR 2004–2007): This is the partnership framework between the Government and donors to support transition and economic recovery pending adoption by the Government of a medium-term development strategy resulting from the I-PRSP. It seeks to: (i) ensure political stability and security; (ii) accelerate economic growth on an equitable basis; (iii) improve governance and strengthen institutions; and (iv) mitigate and address the social crisis.

Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP-I 2007–2011): To reduce poverty, the main objectives pursued are broken down into five pillars, namely: (i) promotion of good governance and peace-building; (ii) consolidation of macroeconomic stability and macroeconomic growth; (iii) improved access to social services and reduction of vulnerabi-lity; (iv) HIV/AIDS control; and (v) promotion of commu-nity dynamism.

Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP-II 2011–2015): This strategy seeks to improve the living conditions of the people by laying a foundation conducive to economic diversifica-tion through: (i) consolidation of governance and peace-building; (ii) diversification of the economy, acceleration of growth, and promotion of employment; (iii) improvement of access to basic social services and development of human capital; and (iv) environ-mental protection and climate change control.

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25Bank Assistance Strategies and Program

Bank Assistance Strategies and Program

Strategic orientations, Theory of Change, and Dialogue

Over the 2004–2015 period, four country strategy papers (CSP) guided the Bank's cooperation with DRC. There is no dialogue note for the DRC. However, each CSP sets out the themes that need to be addressed through policy dialogue. The main pillars and areas of dialogue per CSP can be summarized as follows:

Between 2004 and 2015, the Bank’s overall objective was to ensure equitable and sustainable economic growth so as to fight against poverty and build peace. Figure 3 above presents the causal

relationship between this general objective and Bank operations in DRC. Indeed, the Bank has gradually invested in several sectors in DRC through two pillars, namely: (i) economic and social infrastruc-ture, including in the transport, energy, agricul-ture, environment, water and sanitation, and social sectors; and (ii) economic and financial governance.

The arrangements made by the Bank to achieve policy dialogue objectives are very succinctly descri-bed in the CSP. They mainly relate to: (i) participation in and contribution to formal mechanisms for aid coordination with the Government; (ii) strengthe-ning of the Government's capacity to coordinate the

CSP Pillar 1 Pillar 2 Areas of dialogue

DSP 2003–2004 Rural development Social sectors ❙ Portfolio management; ❙ Preparation and implementation of

the PRSP and access to the HIPC initiative;

❙ Governance and pursuit of reforms.

CSP 2005–2007 Economic and social conditions of poor communities in rural and semi-urban areas

Good economic and financial govern-ance in the public sector

❙ Good governance in public resource management;

❙ Social equity; ❙ Portfolio performance.

CSP 2008–2012 Support for good governance Promotion of pro-poor growth ❙ Implementation of emergency structural reforms on improving public finance and the business environment;

❙ Gender and the environment.

CSP 2013–2017 Development of infrastructure that supports private investment and regional integration

State capacity-building with a view to increasing public revenue and establish-ing an attractive framework for private investment.

❙ Economic and financial governance; ❙ sector governance; ❙ improvement of portfolio performance; ❙ Strengthening of dialogue with civil

society

Table 1: Strategic Guidelines and Dialogue Areas of the AfDB in DRC


IMPACTEnsure balanced and sustainable economic growth to combat poverty and build peace

Infrastructure is utilized (access and usage). Agricultural competitiveness and sustainability are consolidated. Long-term environmental effects are contained.

Infrastructure is properly sized and designed (integration and coherence). Agricultural development outputs are adapted to rural needs and conditions. Environmental outputs are integrated geographically and within the sub-regional institutional framework.

Infrastructure is constructed (mobilising labour), utilized and maintained. The necessary adapted inputs are provided for rural development and forest protection. The implementation capacity of programmes is improved.

Assumptions P1

❙ Improvement of access to infrastructure and services;

❙ Consolidation of regional integration;

❙ Increased diversification of economic sectors.

❙ Reduction of green house gas emissions

❙ Improvement of the transport logistical chain;

❙ Improvement of air safety;

❙ Increase in airport revenue;

❙ Strengthening of the structures in charge of the sector.

Land and air transport projects.

Energy and industry / mining / quarrying

projects

Agriculture and environment projects.

❙ Increased supply/reliability of electricity;

❙ Increased energy exchange between countries;

❙ Reduced energy cost; Reduced cost of cement; Increased production of cement;

❙ Increased volume of investments in the electricity sector/Currency savings;

❙ Direct and temporary and permanent job creation;

❙ Capacity-building for SNEL

❙ Increased food crop production;

❙ Infrastructure rehabilitation;

❙ Local development;

❙ Reduction of deforestation and increased carbon sequestration;

❙ Institutional capacity building.

Long-term effect

Immediate effect

Products: Goods, Equipment or Services as a Result of Projects

Financial and non-financial inputs (Dialogue, Expertise, etc…)

Source: Author, IDEV.

Figure 3: Theory of Change

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IMPACTEnsure balanced and sustainable economic growth to combat poverty and build peace

Political and social stability, improvement of the food security situation. Favourable international and regional economic context.

Efficient economic and institutional framework that properly manages budget resources.

Constructive dialogue and transparent interactions between the economic and social sectors and the Government.

Pursuit of anti-corruption efforts.

Government commitment to reforms.

❙ Improvement of food security;

❙ Improvement of social conditions (schooling, peacebuilding);

❙ Improvement of health conditions (coverage, reduction of morbidity/mortality, including for children).

❙ Maintenance of economic and social stability;

❙ Strengthening of social inclusion and equity;

❙ Improvement of domestic resource mobilization.

Water and sanitation projects.

Social projectsMulti-sector projects

(Economic and financial governance).

❙ Improved access to water and sanitation;

❙ Strengthening of the institutional framework and the capacity of stakeholders to ensure sustainable management of the Congo basin.

❙ Reconversion of ex-combattants;

❙ Strengthening of community participation and the capacities of decentralized health services;

❙ Education sector reform.

❙ Modernization of public finance;

❙ Capacity-building (PF, statistics, education);

❙ Public service reform;

❙ Facilitation of the payment of urgent public expenditure.

Long-term effect

Immediate effect

Products: Goods, Equipment or Services as a Result of Projects

Financial and non-financial inputs (Dialogue, Expertise, etc…)

Assumptions P2

Figure 3: Theory of Change


interventions of development partners; (iii) search for joint project implementation mechanisms; and (iv) joint portfolio reviews with some TFPs. The docu-mentation consulted and the interviews conducted (November 2015) do not give a clear idea of the financial and human resources, specifically allo-cated by the Bank to these activities.

The studies conducted during the period under review include two economic sector works (ESW), namely: a study on regional economic development in Bas-Congo for decentralization in DRC;16 and a study on the investment environment in DRC.17 However, no other analytical study could be identi-fied and analyzed.

Bank Portfolio in DRC

Over the 2004–2015 period, the Bank intervened in DRC through 63 projects worth a total of UA 1.2 billion. The average project budget was approxima-tely UA 18.7 million. Among these 63 projects, 55 are country-specific and 8 are multinational projects having a DRC component. As concerns the mecha-nisms used, the ADF is heavy predominant with 91.7% of the budget committed over the period, followed by the Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF) with 3.16%, the ADB with 2.68%, the Fragile State Facility (FSF) with 1.28% and other financial instruments, each repre-senting less than 1% of the total budget. With regard to the sector distribution of Bank operations in DRC (see Figure 4 above), economic and social infrastruc-ture largely dominates as it accounts for nearly 80% of the budget committed during the review period.

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Figure 4: Sector Distribution of Bank Operations in DRC

Transport 33.30%

Social 3.80%

Multisector 15%

Fina

nce

0.01

%Energ

y 16

.70%

Water supply & sanitation 15.10%

Agriculture 10.30%

Environment 3.20%

Ind/Min/Quar 2.60%

Source: Statistics, AfDB 2016.

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31Results of the Evaluation of Bank Interventions

Results of the Evaluation of Bank Interventions

The results are presented per evaluation criterion.

Relevance

Relevance is moderately satisfactory. The Bank's strategies in DRC are aligned on its general strategies and have supported the country through its evolution from a

“post-conflict” situation to a “development” situation. However, they do not sufficiently deal with all the country's factors of fragility, thus weakening the overall relevance of the portfolio of operations.

Table 2: Relevance Ratings

Aspects of Relevance Rating

AfDB strategy and analysis of the fragility context

Moderately satisfactory

Adaptation of assistance to changes in factors of fragility

Satisfactory

Intervention on the factors of fragility and strengthening of resilience


Alignment of operations on the Bank’s general priorities

Satisfactory

Adaptation of instruments and arrangements for better response to needs


Integration of the new prio-rity objectives and cross-cut-ting concerns into strategies and operations (gender, youth employment, regional disparities, green growth, inclusive growth)

Moderately unsatisfactory

Overall rating of relevance Moderately satisfactory

During the period under review, the Bank's strategies analyzed the causes of fragility and took into account the continuously fragile state of DRC (Annex 7). However, the quality, particularly the comprehensive

character of the fragility profile described by the CSPs, varies from one CSP to another. None of the strategies proposes an integrated analysis of these factors (dispersal of the analysis within the text of the CSPs) or indicates how the targeted objec-tives/expected results at various levels will make it possible to act on the factors of fragility and thus help to build the country’s resilience.

The linkage between Bank strategies and the overall national policy framework is strong. The CSPs are aligned successively on the Interim Poverty Reduc-tion Strategy Paper (I-PRSP, 2002–2005), the Mini-mum Partnership Program for Transition and Recovery (PMPTR) (2004–2007), GPRSP 1 (2006–2010) and GPRSP 2 (2011–2015). Hence, throughout the period under review, the Bank’s intent was to support DRC in its transition from a “post-conflict” situation to a

“development” situation. Indeed, after supporting a management phase of the emergency and the poli-tical transition (2002–2006) mainly by backing the emergency program for rehabilitation and recons-truction of socio-economic infrastructure (PMURR and then PMPTR) and strengthening of national capacity in key areas of planning and macroeconomic manage-ment, the Bank considered that support to: (i) 'smart' infrastructure that promotes private sector develop-ment, social cohesion and regional integration, and (ii) agricultural projects, combined with support to gover-nance reforms and development of the government's economic capacity would yield strong and inclusive growth. Thus, Bank assistance, as proposed in succes-sive CSPs, has essentially sought to address the factors of fragility (Figure 2) such as: robust growth dependent on natural resources at national and local levels and the struggle for survival (livelihoods) at the micro level. However, Bank assistance focused less on crisis prevention, social aspects and human development: PASE (Education Sector Support Project) and PAPDDS (Health Development Master Plan Support Project in


Orientale Province) were approved in 2004. Subse-quently, the Bank did not approve any more projects in these areas, whereas access to education and health are among the factors of fragility and major challen-ges in DRC. Similarly, for crisis prevention, only PARSEC (Support Project for Socio-economic Reintegration of Ex-combatants) and PUAICF (Emergency Program to Mitigate the Impact of the Financial Crisis) were sche-duled, the latter being a very cyclical support.

The Bank’s strategies and operations in DRC are globally aligned on its priorities and general strate-gies. Infrastructure operations were conducted in 5 sectors, 4 of which are central to the Bank's opera-tional priorities during the period, namely: agricul-ture and rural development, transport, energy, water and sanitation. Environmental interventions are among the priority objectives pertaining to climate change. Social operations are not directly aligned on the Bank’s priorities and are justified more by the need to address urgent needs.

The three intervention pillars specific to fragile States, which make up the FSF, proved to be relevant to the DRC. The first pillar made it possible to raise additional funding for major projects in water and sanitation, as well as energy sectors. The second pillar contributed to attainment of the completion point of the HIPC Initiative (July 2010). The third pillar was used in five projects to build the capa-city of State structures. Although these projects are highly relevant, their amounts are very low (1.28% of the Bank's total portfolio in DRC over the review period) relative to needs. Moreover, resources were concentrated on State structures to the detriment of the private sector and civil society.

During the evaluation period, the Bank’s strategies and operations in DRC were not sufficiently inclusive. The CSPs identify gender inequality as a key issue, but make no provision for any concrete action in this area. The same applies to regional disparities and youth employment, except in CSP 2013–2017 which indi-cates a willingness to consider these issues. In gene-ral, the CSPs do not target the environment through a specific environmental objective. Only the issues and

challenges, particularly the abundance and diver-sity of natural resources, are generally well identified in the various CSPs. With the establishment of the Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF) in 2008, the Bank and its partners had the means to intervene directly in the DRC environmental sector, but the CSPs did not serve as a framework for targeting the resources raised through this Fund. Consideration of the envi-ronment was essentially guaranteed through the categorization of projects, environmental and social studies and the mitigation measures adopted. Howe-ver, the implementation and monitoring of measures and/or expected outcomes to ensure sustainable management of projects is not systematic. The CSP 2008–2012 completion report states that analyses of the results obtained through country strategies did not consider environmental effects.

Effectiveness 18

Effectiveness is moderately satisfactory. As regards support for economic and social infrastructure, the results are satisfactory in terms of achievement of outputs and moderately satisfactory as regards the outcomes. Operations in the transport and social development sectors are the most effective. However, the results are less convincing in the agricultural and rural development sectors. Operations in the energy, environment and industry/mines/quarries sectors are not sufficiently advanced to assess their effectiveness.

Table 3: Effectiveness Rating

Sector Rating

Agriculture and rural develop-ment 19


Transport 20 Moderately satisfactory

Social development 21 Moderately satisfactory

Economic and financial govern-ance 22

Satisfactory

Overall Effectiveness Rating


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Agriculture and Rural Development Sector

Projects in this sector (Agricultural and Rural Sector Rehabilitation Support Project in Bas-Congo and Bandundu Provinces (PARSAR), Agricultural and Rural Sector Rehabilitation Project (PRESAR) and the Lake Tanganyika Development Program (PRODAP)) are moderately unsatisfactory in terms of overall effectiveness. Indeed, although the expected outputs were achieved satisfactorily with an implementation rate exceeding 75%, this has not been the case with the achievement of outcomes, which records an average implementation of less than 49%. Analysis of the field mission documents (2015) shows that, in general, basic socio-economic infrastructure was constructed and outputs relating to production deve-lopment, institutional support and capacity-building were achieved. For example, according to the PCR validated by the PRA, PRESAR helped to build the capacity of agricultural structures, through the trai-ning of 614 MINAGRI employees (target: 550), 280 MFI employees (target: 300), and 125 veterinarians (target: 125); the procurement of 188 pairs of oxen; the dissemination of 23,373 tonnes of food crop seeds (target: 22,800 tonnes); and the rehabilitation of 582 km of rural roads (target:) 837 km). However, with regard to impacts, it was noted in 2015 (field mission) that the farm-to-market roads rehabilitated by PARSAR, as well as market infrastructures had suffered degradation due to lack of maintenance. Moreover, the equipment given to farmer organiza-tions (sorting machines, polishing machines, etc.) under the project were neither installed nor used in 2015, because farmers were not trained to use them. All this undermines achievement of the expected project outcomes such as facilitation of the supply of inputs and sale of agricultural produce which closely relate to the increase in farm income. In addition, PARSAR carried out training and sensitization activi-ties among village seed organizations (VSO). Howe-ver, it is estimated that by 2015, 80% of these VSOs were no longer operational.

Furthermore, non-payment of counterpart contri-butions by DRC negatively affected the results of

projects in the sector. Indeed, this created a huge debt (owed to companies and NGOs that worked under PARSAR23) that has weakened the local economic fabric and neutralized the job-creation outcomes expected from the project. It also led to the non-execution (construction of piers and docks) or partial execution (construction of fishing moni-toring buildings and crossing structures, rehabili-tation of rural roads, construction of latrines and water points) of some major activities of PRODAP and PRESAR.

Transport Sector

Road projects financed by the Bank are concentrated on National Highway No. 1 (RN1), in accordance with national priorities to rehabilitate the major highways. According to the report entitled “Socio-Economic Impact Assessment by Beneficiaries, 2012”, vali-dated by PRA, the Nsélé-Lufimi and Kwango-Kengé Road Project led to the rehabilitation of 164 km of paved roads and the construction of many related facilities, including 140 km of rural roads, as initially planned.24

It emerged from the 2015 field mission that effective-ness in the achievement of outcomes is satisfactory for the main structure (the road). However, it is neces-sary to execute some ancillary works (drainage of water, cleaning of gutters), protect the slope in some localities and drain the runoff water around Nsele bridge. On the other hand, the field mission (2015) noted that effectiveness was lower for related works, particularly degraded rural roads, as well as market sheds and school fences that are of poor quality.

With regard to outcomes, it was noted that impro-vement of the state of the road resulted in a sharp increase in the flow of staple agricultural consumer products to Kinshasa: according to the PCR vali-dated by the 2015 field mission, the average traffic volume increased from 446 to 981 vehicles per day between 2005 and 2011. Furthermore, it is estimated that, in the project area, about 200,000 additional


households would take up agricultural activities and that agricultural production would increase by 60%. The travel time on the Nsélé-Lufimi road section reduced from 9 hours in 2005 to 2 hours in 2015.

Energy, Industry/Mines/Quarries, and Environmental Sectors

Operations in these various sectors have a low imple-mentation rate. This is why their effectiveness was not assessed. Besides, an evaluation of the Congo Basin Forest Fund is underway at IDEV.

Social Development Sector

Projects in this sector (Education Sector Support Project (PASE), Health Development Master Plan Support Project for Orientale Province (PAPDDS) and the Support Project for Socio-economic Reinte-gration of Ex-combatants (PARSEC)) present mode-rately satisfactory overall effectiveness. Indeed, in the education sector, PASE achieved satisfactory results for having: (i) supported the regular produc-tion of statistics on education through the esta-blishment of a functional system for managing education system information (SIGE); (ii) strengthe-ned the institutional and human capacities of plan-ning structures (in 2015, the evaluation mission was able to meet several trained persons who are still in service and are responsible for statis-tical analysis, the definition of sector strategies, and project formulation; and (iii) allowed for the conduct of studies to formulate sub-sector strate-gies (five thematic studies produced by interna-tional firms for the benefit of the three Ministries involved in the project (MEPSP, MAS, MESU) were used by the Government and donors, including the World Bank, as basis for the development of sub-sector strategies (EPSP, ESU, MAS) that help to revitalize the educational system). However, difficulties were encountered in the use of skills acquired abroad. For example, of the six senior offi-cers sent out for long-term (9 months) training in Europe (in education planning and management),

five have not returned. This high rate of staff losses undermines the objective of providing the Minis-tries with high-level officers.

As regards health, PAPDDS did not achieve all the initially planned outcomes, mainly due to: (i) failure to provide the national counterpart contribution (non-construction of the office of the Provincial Directorate for Health, and non-rehabilitation of three offices of the health districts), and (ii) underes-timation of certain costs (e.g. rehabilitation of two general hospitals in Buta and Bili).

Overall, PAPDDS had positive impacts on the quality of health care in part of the former Orientale Province, through the rehabilitation, construction and equipment of infrastructure;25 staff training; and, albeit belated, supply of medicines (422 health facilities supplied). This late supply some-times leads to expiry of medicines and reagents upon delivery. According to the PCR, the curative care utilization rate in the project area surged from 10% in 2007 to 26% in 2014 (target: 30%; the proportion of post-operative infections declined from 7% in 2007 to 3.3% in 2014 (target: 2%) and the proportion of births assisted by qualified health personnel spiraled from 10% in 2007 to 78.4% in 2014 (target: 80 %).

Similarly, visits to some sites in November 2015 (Isangi Referral General Hospital (HGR) and the Health Centres (HCs) of Yalokombe, Yalolia and Lilanda) confirmed an increase in attendance of health facilities following PAPDDS operations. For example, at Yalokombe health centre, the number of births increased from 10 to 15 per month after the project, compared to 5 or 6 before the project. At Yalokombe and Lilanda, health centre officials indicate that the intake capacity is now insufficient.

With regard to the reintegration of ex-combatants, the PARSEC project was aimed at facilitating the conversion of these combatants through vocatio-nal training and self-employment in agricultural activities (reintegration farms) in the five eastern provinces. Available documentation does not allow

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(lack of benchmark and target values) for determi-nation of the overall project implementation rate, particularly the number of persons demobilized and reintegrated. On-site comments (2015 field missions) show that reintegration farms are active and ensure food security for ex-combatants who have settled down to peaceful relations with host communities. However, several facilities provided by the project for processing agricultural produce are not operational due to lack of resources. Certain water management structures have not been completed, even though the project period has been extended four times.

Support for Economic and Financial Governance

During the period under review, the Bank funded four (4) projects to improve the macroeconomic situation and public finance management. However, only the effectiveness of the Emergency Program to Mitigate the Impact of the Financial Crisis (PUAICF) could be evaluated, since implementation of the other projects is not sufficiently advanced.

PUAICF was designed to support balance of payments so that, after the financial crisis, the DRC can continue to finance its imports of basic products and emergency public spending. It achieved this goal by transferring UA 65 million to the Central Bank of Congo, thus helping to restore macroeco-nomic balance and facilitate attainment of the HIPC Initiative completion point in July 2010. Furthermore,

this project created favorable conditions for imple-menting the Bank’s subsequent support for public finance management. Since 2010, the country has embarked on a prudent debt policy by closely moni-toring new commitments and resorting mainly to concessional lending. According to the IMF, DRC moved from a high to a low debt risk in 2014. This positive assessment of PUAICF should, however, not eclipse the persistent weakness of the country in public finance management which, despite some progress, remains low, judging from CPIA (Country Performance and Institutional Assessment, Table 4 below) indicator trends.26

Effect of Bank interventions on Factors of Fragility

A correlation can be established between the Bank's operations and the positive or neutral trends in factors of fragility. The Bank did not act on all DRC’s factors of fragility presented above in Figure 2 and does not intend to do so. Indeed, its mandate (“Contribute to the sustainable economic develop-ment and social progress of the Regional Member Countries, individually and collectively”) does not, for example, include direct involvement in political or security issues. However, it intervened essentially in areas relating to: (i) growth that is heavily dependent on natural resources at national and local levels; (ii) livelihoods or the struggle for survival; and (iii) fragi-lity factors pertaining to the capacity and legitimacy of State institutions, by acting:

Criteria 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Debt management 3.5 3.5 3 2.5 2.5 3 3.5 3.5 3 3

Economic Management 3.17 2.83 2.5 2.67 2.83 3 3.33 3.67 3.83 3.67

Quality of public adminis-tration

2 2.5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2.25 3.38

Source: AfDB 27 – Score on a scale of 1 to 6 (1=Low; 6=High).

Table 4: Public Finance Management Scores in DRC


❙ Directly on institutional capacities in the economic sector (positive trend). Indeed, according to IDEV Evaluation of Assistance to Fragile States (1999–2011) and the current evaluation, the AfDB has contributed positively to reforms in public finance management and clearance of arrears to facilitate progress towards attainment of the HIPC Initiative completion point. However, capacity development results are limited by the fragmented approach adopted by the Bank and the Government, mainly due to the paltry amounts allocated to projects in this sector, and a focus on State structures to the detriment of the private sector and civil society (See «Relevance», «Sustainability» and «Did the Bank Make a Difference in DRC» sections).

❙ Directly on structural transformation (neutral trend): The Bank contributed to infrastructure development, especially in the water and sani-tation and road sectors, although the projects have experienced delays and implementation difficulties.28 However, its support operations did not lead to real diversification of the natio-nal economy, which remains highly dependent on the international prices of major mineral exports, especially copper.29 This has negatively affec-ted the development of other sectors and gover-nance in the country.

❙ Indirectly on sustainable and inclusive growth (positive trend): Throughout the evaluation period, the DRC economy grew steadily, except in 2009

when it plummeted on account of the internatio-nal financial and economic crisis. In the areas concerned, the operations implemented during the review period boosted agricultural production and facilitated trade. The effective support provi-ded by the Bank to stabilize the macroecono-mic framework (attainment of the HIPC Initiative completion point) has indirectly had a positive effect on growth by improving the country's attractiveness to investors. However, Bank’s operations alone did not lead to real diversifi-cation of the national economy, which remains highly dependent on the international prices of major mineral exports, especially copper. Moreover, available data from the INS 1-2-3 survey (2014) on social and economic inequality between households show that economic growth is not inclusive.

❙ Indirectly on livelihoods in critical provinces and territories in terms of stability (neutral trend): Over the review period, the Bank did not inter-vene in critical areas to ensure stability, espe-cially in the eastern provinces.30 It was thanks to its overall support for the economic governance of the country that the Bank indirectly played a role in the development of these areas.

Based on the IDEV Evaluation of Assistance to Fragile States (1999–2011) and the findings of this evaluation, the table below presents a brief evalua-tion of the Bank's contribution to sustainable stren-gthening of DRC resilience.

Source: World Bank, Data Bank.

Table 5: Real GDP Growth Rate Trends in DRC (in %)

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

6.7 6.1 5.3 6.3 6.2 2.9 7.1 6.9 7.2 8.5 8.9 6.9

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Sustainability

The sustainability of operations is moderately unlikely. The economic and financial viability of the achievements funded by the Bank is particularly low, mainly because of dysfunctions in the sector policies concerned and the absence of “post-project” support strategies.

Table 7: Sustainability Rating

Sustainability of Projects 31 Rating

Technical soundness Moderately unlikely

Economic and financial viability Unlikely

Institutional sustainability and capacity-building

Moderately unlikely

Political environment and govern-ance

Improbable

Ownership and sustainability of partnerships

Moderately unlikely

Environmental and social sustain-ability

Moderately unlikely

Overall Rating Moderately unlikely

Overall, the technical soundness of achieve-ments is moderately unlikely. Indeed, even though in most projects, the works (buildings, roads, etc.) were executed according to applicable standards and compliant with the prescriptions of the bidding documents, the fact remains that the materials supplied in some projects were of poor quality. For instance, under the health project (PAPDDS), visits made (November 2015) to the four (4) health faci-lities revealed: (i) the weakness and rapid deterio-ration of delivery beds and metal cabinets; (ii) an ill-adapted power supply system based on photo-voltaic panels, which did not guarantee proper conservation of vaccines. In the agricultural project (PRESAR), one of the main activities is the large-scale production of improved seeds by INERA, which is not equipped for such activity.

Economic and financial viability is the criterion with the weakest performance. This is mainly due to inadequacies in the maintenance policy for highways and especially rural roads. Another cause is failure by the State (or provinces) to bear the operating costs of equipment and infrastructure provided through Bank operations. In several cases

Source: IDEV, 2015, based on the evaluation of assistance to fragile States (1999–2011), 2011 DRC country report.

Table 6: Assessment of the Bank’s level of Contribution to Factors of Fragility

Outcomes Level of Contribution Identifiable Contribution

Functional basic infrastructure in rural and semi-urban areas

Medium ❙ PEASU ❙ Pinch ❙ PAPDDS ❙ Rural development projects

(PARSAR, PRESAR, PRODAP) ❙ Nsélé-Lufimi and Kwango-Kengo road.

Macroeconomic stabilization and institutional capacity Medium ❙ PUAICF ❙ PAM-FP ❙ PRECI

Improved livelihoods in rural areas Limited ❙ Rural development projects (PARSAR, PRESAR, PRODAP)

Private Sector Development Limited ❙ Creation of Advans Bank Congo, which supports access to microcredit


(PRODAP, PARSAR, PARSEC, PAPDDS), economic and financial viability was reduced by the fact that projects failed to define strategies for defraying recurrent expenses or for attendant “post-project” management of equipment and infrastructure by the public administration or final beneficiaries.

Institutional sustainability and capacity building are generally deemed to be moderately unlikely. Indeed, most of the projects reviewed contributed to institutional capacity building, especially the road project thanks to which the infrastructure unit of the Ministry of Public Works (MTPI) now controls the design, implementation and monitoring of invest-ments, having received advisory support from inter-national technical assistance, computer and office automation equipment, and training. However, the country's systems and capacities are still insufficient to ensure continuous flow of project benefits after completion. For example, under PRODAP, a co-ma-nagement committee including State services, the naval police, civil society institutions, and associa-tions of fishermen and fishmongers was established to ensure greater sustainability of project achieve-ments, but it is not functioning efficiently due to lack of funding. Similarly, under PARSAR, the field mission to Bas-Congo took note of the disorganization of admi-nistrative services, absenteeism, lack of a work plan, and shortage of equipment and human resources in the institutions, especially in provincial offices.

The policy and governance environment is unli-kely. For agricultural projects and especially public finance projects, some achievements have been greatly weakened by the new administra-tive and political redistricting of the country (30 June 2015) and the postponement of provincial elections (September 2015). These hastily imple-mented decisions create a lot of confusion about the prerogatives of the different entities (decentra-lized services of the State, provincial governments, assemblies and administrations, etc.). As regards operations relating to rural roads, highways and health, dysfunctions in the sector policies concerned hamper sustainability of actions taken.

Ownership and sustainability of partnerships show highly variable performance from sector to sector. Overall, this criterion is deemed to be mode-rately unlikely. In the rural development sector, the effectiveness of ownership is limited by the lack of operational means for structures (farmer organiza-tions, the Ministry of Agriculture) supported by the Bank. In the road sector, ownership of reforms is limited (road maintenance, road safety), apart from missions of the Infrastructure Unit. In economic gover-nance, there is relative ownership of public finance reforms by the administrative entities, but such ownership would be complete if the Bank’s reform support was provided through intense and regu-lar policy dialogue. Owing to vacancy of the “public finance” position in the Kinshasa office from 2013, the AfDB has not been able to maintain such dialogue with the intensity commensurate with the magnitude of its support for public finance reform. In the social development sector, activities under the Socio-eco-nomic Reintegration Support Project for Ex-comba-tants (PARSEC) and the Education Sector Support Project (PASE) are marked by significant ownership of their outcomes by beneficiaries. Indeed, following the documentary review and interviews in the field (November 2015), the ownership of PARSEC by beneficiaries (both men and women) is strong, as evidenced by the clearing and stumping of sites and related access roads, as well as the non-re-enlist-ment of demobilized combatants by armed groups. This is due to the successful partnerships established by the Implementation Unit of the National Disarma-ment, Demobilization and Reintegration Program –UEPNDDR (supported by PARSEC) with civil society organizations and donors. However, partnerships with central or provincial Ministries and with the private sector are still too limited and hamper project sustai-nability. Regarding PASE, the strong ownership is justi-fied by the integrated sector approach between the various Ministries of the sector, including participation in the project by all central directorates of education. The monitoring-evaluation mechanism was establi-shed with the Steering Committee and the focal points of the three Ministries of education, working closely with the implementation unit. The regular exchange of information on the project through the Donors

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Consultative Committee and the Education Thema-tic Group strengthened commitments. It is within this framework that the sub-sector strategies of TFPs, including the World Bank (with its Education Sector Recovery Support Project – PARSE) were developed based on thematic studies funded by PASE.

Environmental sustainability is moderately unlikely. Gaps exist in the environmental sustainability of the infrastructure constructed in various sectors (trans-port, agriculture and, to a lesser extent, health). The implementation and monitoring of measures and/or expected outcomes to ensure sustainable mana-gement of projects is not systematic, sufficient or completely successful. Moreover, outcomes preju-dicial to the sustainable management of forest resources, not foreseen by the preliminary envi-ronmental analysis and not covered by mitigation measures, undermine the expected medium and long-term socio-economic benefits.

Efficiency

The Bank’s efficiency is moderately unsatisfactory. Project implementation delays are a major problem. However, the opening of the Bank’s local office in 2007 helped to improve the portfolio disbursement rate.

Table 8: Efficiency Rating

Efficiency of Projects 32 Appreciation

Cost-benefit analysis –

Cost-efficiency analysis Moderately satisfactory

Timeliness Unsatisfactory

Implementation status Moderately unsatisfactory

Overall efficiency Moderately unsatisfactory

Project implementation delays are the main problem. For the eight projects eligible for project results assess-ment (PRA), the average time overrun rate is 56%.33 Other projects also face significant implementation delays, especially in the energy sector (PEPUR and

PMEDE). For some projects, the initially scheduled duration was unrealistic in light of the set objectives and the DRC context. For example, the “Nsélé-Lufimi and Kwango-Kenge Road” project, PARSEC and PARSAR. Apart from the above, there are three (3) types of delay factors common to most of the operations, namely:

❙ Factors relating to the context: insecurity; incom-petence of audit firms and consulting firms responsible for works control and supervision; and insufficient cash flow for works companies.

❙ Factors relating to the Congolese Government: delays in: (i) the ratification of loan agreements by Parliament; (ii) the recruitment of staff deployed to project implementation units; (iii) the fulfilment of conditions precedent to first disbursement; (iv) the provision of Government counterpart funds; weak administrative and financial management capaci-ties; and insufficient involvement of Ministries in project monitoring.

❙ Factors relating to the Bank: cumbersome and complex internal procedures for procurements and disbursements;34 insufficient delegation of authority to the Country Office which is unders-taffed relative to the size of the portfolio (lack of energy and governance experts at the end of period); irrelevant choices in some procurement processes as in the Health Development Master Plan Support Project (PAPDDS) in Orientale Province where many medicines were not used by beneficiaries due to late delivery, very close to the expiry date.35

The opening of a Bank Office in Kinshasa (December 2006) has had a positive effect on port-folio efficiency. This decentralized entity has affected the quality of dialogue with the Government and the monitoring of project preparation and implementation, although much decision-making remains centralized at Bank headquarters particularly formal approvals at project implementation stage. Furthermore, although linkage with the opening of the Office is not automa-tic,36 there has been an improvement in the portfolio


disbursement rate, from 19.3% in January 200837 to 31.9% in February 2012.38

The cost-benefit ratio of operations was calculated for two of the eight projects eligible for PRA for which data was available, namely PRESAR (agriculture sector) and the Nsélé-Lufimi and Kwango-Kenge road (transport sector) project. In both cases, the criterion is rated as “satisfactory” or “very satisfac-tory”. This rating is based on a calculation of the economic rate of return (ERR) estimated at 17% for PRESAR and 24.4% for the road, while the opportu-nity cost of capital (at time of calculation of ERR) is estimated at 12%.39

Regarding the cost-efficiency ratio, projects eligible for PRA show relatively efficient management of resources, with the exception of PRODAP (Lake Tanganyika fisheries management) for which certain equipment cannot be used without additional equip-ment or resources

Knowledge and Advisory Services

Apart from economic governance, the Bank's involvement in policy dialogue has remained insufficient. Analytical studies are few and have no clear linkages to policy dialogue.

There is a big gap between the professed intent of the Bank in terms of policy dialogue in DRC and the results obtained. During the review period, there was an impro-vement in the Bank's efforts in aid coordination with the Government and other TFPs, especially with the opening of a regional office of the Bank in Kinshasa which strengthened its presence and facilitated its participation in aid coordination mechanisms. In finan-cial terms, the AfDB was ranked 8th,40 in 2012 and 2013, among the (bilateral or multilateral) institutions providing development aid to DRC.41 The documen-tary review and interviews reveal that the AfDB is reco-gnized as a key partner of the country, overall, and in the water and sanitation, transport, and energy sectors. As regards economic governance, the Bank has made a lot of efforts in dialogue with the country’s authorities,

including supporting DRC to reach the decision point (2003) and, subsequently, the completion point (2010) of the HIPC initiative. In other areas, the Bank's commit-ment as facilitator of dialogue, supporting the country in the implementation of its sector policies has often turned out to be weak, as it is limited to the production of studies that are not sufficiently promoted.42

Apart from the dialogue with the Government and other development partners, the Bank's involvement in dialogue with civil society stakeholders and the private sector remains weak. The preparation and the mid-term review of the latest CSP (2013–2017) has been the subject of broad-based consultations, invol-ving the private sector and civil society representa-tives. Civil society organizations positively appreciate this overture of the Bank in their regard. However, they would like the Bank to be more committed to them and give them direct support (currently, only the CBFF provi-des such support).

The Bank's analytical studies over the review period were neither programmed nor given any special follow-up. They are few in number43 and their linkages to policy dialogue are not obvious. Indeed, no information filtered out on the use of these analy-tical studies, including their possible contribution to discussions held as part of the Bank's policy dialogue with DRC authorities.

Summary: Did the Bank Make a Difference in DRC?

The Bank's contribution to improvement of deve-lopment factors in DRC is mixed.

Indeed, the Bank was one of the key partners who ensured the resumption of international aid in DRC, through its operations and contribution to dialogue with the Authorities. After more than ten years of suspension of operations in DRC (suspension of disbursements following cancellation of the portfolio in 1996), coope-ration resumed in 2001 through a post-conflict recons-truction strategy. In June 2002, the Bank approved the arrears clearance mechanism of DRC, thus normalizing

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its relations with the country. In 2003, it continued its dialogue with national authorities and other TFPs to prepare the conditions for DRC's attainment of the decision point of the HIPC Initiative.44

The Bank’s specific intervention pillars for fragile States, evidenced by the FSF, were relevant. The first pillar helped to mobilize additional funding for major projects in the water and sanitation, and energy sectors (a grant of UA 5 million for the INGA site development support project and access to electricity (PASEL – energy)). The second pillar was effective as regards operations that support public finance management structural reforms (PAM – FP and PRECI), and cyclical support (PUAICF) through: (i) its contribution to attainment of the HIPC Initia-tive completion point in 2010; (ii) restoration of macroeconomic balances; (iii) creation of condi-tions conducive to other Bank support for public finance management; and its contribution to growth by improving the country’s attractiveness to investors.

However, the Bank has indeed made a lot of efforts in dialogue with the Authorities on economic gover-nance, but has not done same for the other sectors. The Bank’s analytical studies during the period under review are insufficient, and their linkages to policy dialogue are also insufficient. Furthermore, apart from the dialogue with the Government, the Bank's involvement in dialogue with civil society stakeholders and the private sector remains weak (cf. Section 4.5). The third pillar was used for (material and human) capacity building of State structures through the construction/rehabilitation of buildings, and the provision of office equipment and supplies, vehicles, communications equipment,

and staff training. This option was relevant, in light of the extremely degraded situation of public services and the magnitude of needs during the post-conflict period, which required simultaneous support to all national recovery policies in seve-ral areas (health, education, water, etc.) and the strengthening of national cohesion. However, the amounts mobilized were paltry relative to needs (less than USD 3 million). Similarly, the focus was on Government services to the detriment of real consolidation of the activities of private sector stakeholders and civil society organizations. In several areas (agriculture and rural development, for example), this undermines the effectiveness and sustainability of operations given the success of Bank-supported actions that is based largely on the actual managerial and operational capacities of the management committees (e.g. for markets, warehouses or latrines), socio-professional orga-nizations (e.g. seed producers’ unions) or private companies (e.g. microfinance institutions, input marketing firms or NGOs providing technical support to farmers).

Over the 2004–2014 period, the Bank's share in total official development assistance (ODA) was 4%, and 11% for multilateral ODA received by DRC over the 2004–2013 period (Annex 4). In some sectors such as energy, transport, and public finance, the Bank's contribution is much higher than this average. This notwithstanding, the Bank did not enjoy the policy relevance to which it should be entitled by virtue of its status (African multilateral institution) and aid volume, during the review period. This discrepancy stems from the thematic dispersal of the portfolio and the Bank’s irregular involvement in policy dialogue and aid coor-dination mechanisms.

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43Performance and Results-Based Management

Performance and Results-Based Management

The orientation of Bank actions towards performance was moderately unsatisfactory in DRC. The shortcomings mainly relate to the quality and selectivity of CSPs, as well as implementation of the principles of results-based management.

Table 9: Rating of Performance and Results-Based Management


Rating

Quality of CSPs and selectivity Unsatisfactory

Performance management strategy

Unsatisfactory

Implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States


Complementarity and Synergies Moderately unsatisfactory

Leverage effect mobilizing other resources




Quality of CSPs and Selectivity

Overall, despite an improvement during the review period, the quality of CSPs in DRC is unsatisfactory.

While the four CSPs of the period include relatively detailed contextual and needs analyses, as well as intervention logics based on these analyses, they lack an integrated approach to the factors of fragility. Indeed, as detailed above in section 4.1, the CSPs present an analysis of the causes of fragility and mention the persistent fragility of DRC. However, the quality and comprehensive character of the fragility profile described in the CSPs vary from one CSP to

another. None of the CSPs proposes an integrated analysis of these factors (dispersal of such analysis in the text of the CSPs) or indicates how operations at various levels will influence the factors of fragi-lity to build the resilience of the country. Moreover, the consideration of cross-cutting issues (including gender and the environment) remains unclear. During the evaluation period, there was an improvement in the quality of CSP analysis, except for the 2008–2012 CSP whose quality is unsatisfactory. According to the independent evaluation report on the quality at entry of ADF 2005–2008 operations and strategies, the quality of CSPs at start-up in DRC in 2005 was deemed unsatisfactory in 2008. Thus, even though the Bank opened its office in DRC in 2006, its expec-ted commitment to the country did not translate into an improvement of strategy during this period. However, the evaluation report on quality at start-up for CSP 2013–2017 awards a score of 5 out of 6 to the Bank’s contextual analysis and strategy design, reflecting a significant improvement in the quality of CSPs. Country strategies present analyses in terms of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. However, these analyses do not show how the strengths and opportunities of the country will be used to respond to identified challenges and address the weaknesses of the country. Lastly, the strategies do not refer to additional analytical studies that make it possible to deepen the proposed analyses. Besides, they do not refer to the Fragility Assessment Report of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Octo-ber 2012). Following review of the various CSPs and their theory of change, the lack of consistency in the selected intervention areas and the diversity of the portfolio are striking. Each CSP suggested different pillars without any real substantive common denomi-nator. This is not conducive to building experience and weakens the efficiency of the resources mobilized to monitor interventions.


The evaluation of selectivity at the strategic and portfolio levels is not satisfactory. The selectivity of the various CSPs is not strong at the strategic and global levels (the pillars cover broad thematic concepts such as “economic and financial governance” and

“economic and social infrastructure”), and at the sector level. Despite the project’s commitments to greater project selectivity, the portfolio remained too broad in terms of the areas covered throughout the period. Between 2003 and 2007, the Bank intervened in a large number of sectors and its portfolio showed no clear choices. This stems more from the fact that CSP 2003–2004 and CSP 2005–2007 rather focused more on relevance to the needs of post-conflict country reconstruction (alignment on the Government’s PMURR an PMPTR priorities45) and the multidimensional nature of the economic and social crisis in DRC, than on the selectivity of the Bank's portfolio. Subsequently, struc-turing of the portfolio into two pillars, covering broad thematic concepts (“economic and social infrastruc-ture” pillar and the “economic and financial governance” pillar), gave the impression that there was focus on two areas identified as priorities. However, within these two pillars, the Bank's intervention was divided into a wide variety of sectors and the program of opera-tions remained too extensive. The “economic and social infrastructure” pillar, actually covered six different sectors, namely: transport, energy, water and sanita-tion, agriculture and rural development, social develop-ment and the environment. Furthermore, in some areas, Bank support is significant, but is not clearly identified since the amount is diluted in projects with multiple components. This is the case with the education sector, which is similar to the situation of several projects in various sectors (PASE, PMURIS, PARER, PUAICF, PMR – HR, PAI-STATFIN, rural development and infrastruc-ture projects). This dispersal among several projects of a given sector makes it difficult to construct the intervention logic and assess the effects and impacts in the sector concerned. Furthermore, it undermines the Bank’s visibility as well as coordination with other stakeholders in the sector. Indeed, several strategy papers and the successive completion reports call for improved selectivity of the Bank’s portfolio (CSP 2008–2012; CSP 2013–2017; Report on quality at entry for CSP 2013–2017). Besides, the comparative advantage

of the Bank relative to other donors in the specialization areas retained in DRC is not clearly shown in succes-sive CSPs. They present a mapping of the interventions of other TFPs without a detailed analysis of the Bank's comparative advantage relative to the operations of these TFPs in each sector.

Managing for Development Results (MfDR)

MfDR was increasingly factored into the Bank's strategies in DRC during the 2004–2015 period. Indeed, the Bank paid increasingly more attention to monitoring of the outcomes of its operations, seeking to go beyond simple monitoring of the achievement of outcomes to gauging the degree of attainment of effects and impacts. Several elements attest to this, in particular:46 (i) the systematic implementation of a

“results-based logical framework (RBLF)” integrated into CSPs and projects; (ii) use of the results of natio-nal socio-economic surveys (demographic survey and health (EDS); National 1-2-3 Survey on Employment, the Informal Sector and Household Living Conditions; etc.) and national information systems to achieve an annual follow-up of the results referred to in the CSP; (iii) assistance to the statistical services of Ministries, including the training of project managers; and (iv) implementation of an action plan to improve port-folio performance (studies, reports, annual portfolio reviews, supervision mission, etc.). However, efforts made by the Bank to improve the quality of the performance management system encountered different kinds of difficulties at the strategic and project levels, namely: (i) significant gaps in the national statistical system and the lack of a monito-ring/evaluation system at the Ministry of Planning and in the line Ministries of projects financed by the Bank (except the Ministry of Finance47) with the lack of a unified institutional framework describing the division of labor and the principles of information flow between the various bodies responsible for the production and analysis of data on the outputs, effects and impacts of public action; (ii) shortcomings related to the quality of indicators and articulation of the results chain, parti-cularly for CSP 2005–2007 and 2008–2012; the

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45Performance and Results-Based Management

targeting and selection of performance indicators is not always relevant and measurable; delays in esta-blishing the Poverty Observatory as part of GPRSP monitoring did not make it possible to provide reliable recent data for measuring poverty indicators;48 (iii) linkages between the results frameworks of CSPs and those of projects are not always sufficiently explicit and precise; (iv) the results framework focuses more on outputs and less on outcomes and impacts; for instance, under the PARSAR, the logical framework of the project lays emphasis mainly on outputs and does not provide any details on the results chain that make it possible to move from these outputs to outcomes and impacts. A single intermediate effect (“increase in agricultural production”) features in this logical framework while the description of activities shows that other effects were sought, including “the increase of farmers’ incomes” or “improvement of living condi-tions”; (v) baseline values are missing and the target values are either too optimistic or absent. For example, in the case of PRISE, since the study to determine the baseline situation could not be conducted at project start-up (due to the lack of funds at project start-up), the outcomes and impacts in the initial logical framework were formulated only on a documentary basis.49 For PARSEC, the outcomes and impacts have neither indicators nor target values. Consequently, it is difficult to know whether ex-combatants practise sustainable farming, live in peace with host commu-nities, and no longer constitute a risk group (expected effect 1) or whether there is a “revival of agricultu-ral economic activities in the areas covered by the project” (effect 2); (vi) insufficient attention is paid to the establishment of M&E features of projects, and major shortcomings are noted in the M&E systems of projects, mainly due to failure to budget this acti-vity (e.g. PRISE, PMR-RH), and insufficient training of teams.50 According to a project coordinator, projects approved during the 2004–2008 period had no M&E mechanisms. It was not until 2013 that the AfDB organized M&E training for project teams.51 These project design shortcomings adversely affected their management, as well as the performance of monito-ring/evaluation mechanisms. Moreover, the lessons learned from previous strategies and the improve-ment recommendations are explicitly outlined in

the CSPs, but the implementation and monitoring of corrective measures to address the challenges of the country remain very illegible (absence of mecha-nisms for monitoring implementation of the corrective measures proposed).

Despite the efforts made by the Bank, MfDR has remained at the embryonic stage and mainly focused on the production of outputs. It is difficult to assess the real extent of the outcomes occasionally obser-ved. Overall, the Bank's monitoring and supervi-sion mechanisms did not function well in DRC and failed to ensure effective implementation of strate-gies and programs. Apart from these shortcomings, there is the poor quality at entry of many projects. Several factors account for this situation. Some stem from the Bank's responsibility, namely weak prepa-ratory studies on the context, technique, knowledge of project areas, or the absence or poor appraisal of risk. Other factors such as the inappropriate institu-tional basis of project implementation units, as well as delays and irregularities in the provision of national counterpart contributions are essentially the responsi-bility of the Government.

Application of the Paris Declaration and the Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States

The Bank's strategy in favor of fragile States (2007) is based on the ten “Principles of Good Internatio-nal Engagement in Fragile States” adopted under the aegis of OECD in 2007. A review of the imple-mentation status of these principles by the Bank in DRC shows unsatisfactory performance overall, even if this can be partly explained by the particularly diffi-cult context in the country (weakness of the Govern-ment, weakness of national strategies, and magnitude of needs). The main negative points are: inadequate consideration of the factors of fragility in operations; failure to target operations at vulnerable groups or the lack of linkages between security or development policies. On the other hand, several positive points need to be underscored, especially reliability of the


Bank's financial commitment throughout the period and its participation in aid coordination mechanisms.

As concerns the Paris Declaration of 2005, the Bank contributed positively to the implementa-tion of the five principles for improving aid effec-tiveness in the specific context of DRC as follows: (i) with the other TFPs, the Bank sought to provide the Government with resources to play a leading role in the design of development policies (ownership); (ii) the Bank's strategies are aligned on national strate-gies, although the use of national systems remains limited since such systems are not fully reliable; (iii) although it has to make more efforts to demonstrate its comparative advantage over the other donors in the CSP, the Bank considered the operations of other partners when defining its operational priori-ties in DRC. In some areas (energy, roads), the opera-tions were designed in close collaboration with the other TFPs present in the country to achieve greater complementarity; (iv) the principle of results-based management was factored into the CSP, but was undermined by very weak national systems and the non-inclusion of the mechanisms in Bank operations; and (v) the principle of mutual responsibility is taken into account through the coordination mechanisms in which the Bank participates and the dialogue establi-shed with national authorities.

Complementarity and Synergies

Complementarity and synergies between Bank operations in DRC are suboptimal and differ from sector to sector. On the one hand, some operations

did not exploit the potential for synergy (e.g. between road, agricultural and environmental projects) and, on the other hand, there is the energy sector where the PEPUR and PMEDE projects demonstrate a certain degree of complementarity. As regards economic governance, the Bank's operations are relatively complementary in terms of their formulation, but there is no internal coordination at the Bank. Moreover, the Bank has allocated a significant portion of its funds to (material and human) capacity building for Govern-ment services in all its portfolio operations. However, there was no cross-cutting capacity building strategy applicable to the various operations.

Leverage Effect Mobilizing Other Resources

Within the operations, leverage effects can be observed in various forms, with the outcomes varying from sector to sector. The most emblema-tic is the Bank’s involvement in the development and promotion of the major INGA 3 project which should lead to considerable investment by public and private partners. In the education sector, the education system support project (PASE) laid the foundation for preparation of the sector’s sub-sec-tor strategies that have enabled other TFPs to engage in the sector. In the transport infrastruc-ture sector, studies underway (Kinshasa-Brazzaville bridge, Kinshasa-Ilebo railway) will yield technical and financial analyses that would equip the DRC Government with the right arguments to convince potential (public and private) funding bodies to back these investments.

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47Country Performance

Country Performance

DRC performance in its cooperation with the AfDB improved during the review period, mainly with development of capacity to define and manage sector reforms. However, several shortcomings remain, in particular: (i) weaknesses of the natio-nal statistical system and absence of a monitoring/evaluation system in the Ministries (See Section «Managing for Development Results»); (ii) inappro-priate institutional basis of project implementation units, major delays (See Section «Relevance») and irregularities in the fulfilment of conditions prece-dent to first disbursement and in the provision of national counterpart contributions (agricultural projects, Nsélé-Lufimi and Kwango-Kenge road); (iii) budget execution deficiencies (in Bas-Congo and Bandundu Provinces, the service of the Directorate for Farm-to-Market Roads (DVDA) has no resources in terms of equipment and staff); the funds earmar-ked for road maintenance are disbursed irregularly and in limited amounts, and the local road mainte-nance committees (LRMCs) are not able to perform

the maintenance work;52 (iv) the precipitous imple-mentation of decentralization, which has affected institutional sustainability and capacity building (See Section «Sustainability»); (v) dysfunctions in aid coor-dination: The Government adopted a new “operatio-nal framework” for Sector Working Group (SWG) to increase their effectiveness mainly by strengthening Government leadership and ensuring greater invol-vement of civil society and the private sector. Each SWG is co-chaired by two leading entities: a Ministry and a TFP. Despite the renovation of their operational framework and the significant investments of many TFPs, the SWG find it difficult to play their role of implementing sector policies, and the meetings are described by some partners as being, more or less, a formality. This is due to the fact that most areas of public action suffer from lack of strategies and operational policies that are relevant and credible. Furthermore, the DRC Government has also failed to facilitate strong aid coordination by entrusting four different Ministries 53 with responsibilities in aid mobilization and programming.54

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49Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions and Recommendations

Main conclusions

The evaluation of Bank strategies and programs in DRC for the 2004–2015 period has yielded several findings that constitute challenges which should be considered in the definition of the future cooperation strategy for both partners.

The relevance of the Bank’s strategies in DRC is moderately satisfactory. They were aligned on the general guidelines of the Bank, including those related to fragile States. These strategies have supported its transition from an essentially “post-conflict” situa-tion at the beginning of the period to a “development” situation thereafter. However, these strategies did not clearly address all the country’s factors of fragi-lity (pressure on the environment, regional disparities, gender inequalities, tensions over access to resources, structural dysfunction of Government services, etc.). Accordingly, the Bank's strategies throughout the evaluation period were marked by the absence of a real common denominator and a wide range of inter-vention areas, with no focus on inter-sector synergies and complementarities.

Overall, the effectiveness of interventions is modera-tely satisfactory. Indeed, it is moderately satisfactory in the transport and social development sectors, and less convincing in the agricultural and rural develop-ment sectors. Most of the operations in the energy, environment and industry/mines/quarries sectors and in economic and financial governance are not sufficiently advanced in their implementation for their effectiveness to be determined. With the Emergency Program to Mitigate the Impact of the Financial Crisis (PUAICF), the Bank made a significant contribution

to the stabilization of the country’s macroeconomic framework, thus having an indirect positive effect on growth. However, the Bank's operations have so far contributed little to diversification of the national economic fabric, which remains heavily dependent on mineral exports.

The sustainability of operations recorded poor perfor-mance, particularly in economic and financial viability. This situation stems from dysfunctions in the conduct of Government action (shortcomings in the implemen-tation of the road maintenance policy; underfunding of decentralized technical services, etc.), as well as little consideration given to the “post-project” phase during the design and implementation of operations.

As regards policy dialogue, there is a significant gap between the Bank's plans and the results achie-ved in DRC, except in economic and financial gover-nance. Dialogue with civil society stakeholders and the private sector, which developed at the end of the period, is not enough to address the challenges. Lastly, the linkages between the few analytical studies and policy dialogue are not evident.

The efficiency of Bank operations is moderately unsa-tisfactory. The main problem resides in project imple-mentation delays, stemming from a combination of factors related to the national context, Government responsibility, and the Bank's organizational system.

Despite positive developments, management for development results remains embryonic and focused on the achievement of outputs.


Recommendations

Focus on the Bank’s intervention strategy in DRC on areas of comparative advantage with a potential for catalytic effect on factors of fragility

The next strategy of the Bank in DRC should be more selective and based on an integrated analysis of the factors of fragility, while giving priority to sectors of comparative advantage (e.g. agriculture and rural deve-lopment, or energy). Given the challenges of fragility in DRC (lack of infrastructure, rural poverty, environmental challenges, etc.) and in light of the Bank's limited means, a strategy of transformative investments that promote green growth is one option to be explored. Possible areas of catalytic investments could include: (i) agricul-tural infrastructure (roads, facilities), and/or (ii) promotion of agriculture that is environmentally-friendly (inclu-ding agroforestry) and job-creating (family businesses, small processing companies), and/or (iii) the promotion of green energy production, based on development of the country's hydroelectricity resources. Furthermore, in view of the critical importance of improving economic governance (at all levels) as a key to sustainable deve-lopment of DRC, the strengthening of economic gover-nance, with a significant capacity building component at all levels of the State (central and decentralized services of the national administration, provincial government services) could constitute a complementary strategy.

Improve the quality at entry of the Bank’s interventions in DRC, especially as regards consideration of national constraints

Given the poor quality at entry of Bank interventions in DRC, there is need to increase the quality of and resources allocated to studies precedent to the imple-mentation of operations. Such studies should especially help to define precisely (contrary to past practice) the strategy for addressing various types of constraints affecting project implementation, namely: (i) security and fiduciary risks; (ii) institutional difficulties related to lack of governance in public action (from the central to the decentralized levels); and (iii) logistical problems generated by the immense size of the territory and the substantial infrastructural shortage (transport, energy,

etc.). Hence, future interventions should be carefully designed and submitted for funding only when their quality is deemed to be satisfactory.

Improve the sustainability through coordinated efforts at various levels, strategy elaboration, preparation of interventions, and policy dialogue

Implementation of the first two recommendations should have a positive impact on the sustainability of operational outcomes. Indeed, a better and more coherent strategy that fully accommodates the specificities of DRC, as well as better quality of interventions should improve sustai-nability. Furthermore, sustainability should be the focus of policy dialogue and the subject of rigorous analysis during the design and implementation of Bank operations. The areas particularly concerned are: road maintenance, especially rural roads; human resource management in Government services to improve the sustainability of capacity building activities; public finance management to ensure that the services supported under a project effectively receive, at project completion, the opera-ting and investment budgets earmarked for them in the annual finance laws. Throughout the conduct of these analytical studies, care should be taken to ensure that they are effectively utilized in the preparation and imple-mentation of Bank interventions.55

Improve the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms of strategies and interventions

To ensure more exhaustive application of the principles of results-based management, there is need to improve the project monitoring/evaluation mechanisms by deve-loping more precise and rigorous intervention approaches and by strengthening the monitoring of outcomes indica-tors, especially in areas most affected by the lack of data, such as: (i) capacity building for individuals and organiza-tions (Government services, socio-professional structures, private companies, etc.); (ii) youth employment; and (iii) the socio-economic situation of the beneficiaries, inclu-ding women. This would also enrich the completion report of each CSP and the design of the next CSP. The capacity of the Country Office is also another element that must be taken into consideration in the current decentralization drive to ensure efficient implementation of the program.

Annexes


Annex 1: Methodological Approach

Overall, the evaluation approach is broken down into the two main levels of analysis, namely: the strategic level (global) and operational level (operations).

Global Level (Country Strategies)

Contribution Analysis

The analytical approach adopted for this evaluation is that of contribution analysis. Its starting point is the (re)construction of the theory of change as regards the Bank's assistance in DRC during the period under review. The theory of change has strong heuristic potential in that it summarily and systematically highlights the logical causal links between the various intervention levels and outcomes (output, effect, impact). The essential goal of the analysis is to verify the extent to which Bank assistance contributes to the achievement of expected results through more general frameworks of action which are the specific priorities of the Bank, on the one hand, and national development priorities and policies, on the other hand.

Focus of the Evaluation on Immediate and Intermediate Outcome Levels

During this results-based evaluation, emphasis was laid mainly on the analysis of results at the level of outputs and of immediate and intermediate outcomes. Higher level results (impact) could be captured only with much difficulty, and only when robust data sources exist.

Country and Sector Analyses Templates

The main tool for collecting relevant data and for analyzing strategic outcomes is the special template (Country Template), created by IDEV. It also facilitates the comprehensive evaluation of development results (CEDR) of the Bank.

Moreover, the evaluation team used an internal work tool to conduct an analysis of the key national sectors in which the Bank focuses its operations. This analysis was conducted based on documents and interviews with resource persons involved in the implementation of national sector policies and site visits.

Level of Operations (Assessment of Project Outcomes)

Project Selection Approach

Project selection was done during the study start-up phase, by applying the criteria presented in table 4 below to determine projects eligible to project results assessment (PRA).

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Table 10: Selection Criteria and Stages in the Analysis of Projects Eligible for PRA

Stages Criteria and approach

1. Select projects ❙ Approval date between 2004 and 2013; ❙ Status closed (Clsd) or completed (Comp) as of 31 December 2014; ❙ Total amount above UA 1 million; ❙ Specific criterion for multi-sector projects: In addition to the first 3 criteria, the project must fall

under the Governance, Economic and Financial Management Department (OSGE); ❙ For multinational projects, the national component must be clearly identified and be worth over

UA 1 million.N.B: Studies and other analytical work are not eligible for PRA.

2. Analyze projects ❙ Conduct of a thorough documentary review (available docu-ments and collection of other documents);

❙ Review of the project intervention approach; ❙ Conduct of individual and/or group interviews with stakeholders (including beneficiaries); ❙ Site visits and observation; ❙ Filling out of the project results assessment form.

Projects eligible for PRA are marked by the following elements:

❙ They represent approximately 18% (UA 212.3 million) of the total budget of operations in DRC, approved between 2004 and 2015.

❙ They cover 4 of the Bank’s 9 sectors of intervention in DRC during the 2004–2015 period: transport, multi-sector, agriculture and social. The “energy”, “water and sanitation”, “environment”, “finance” and “industry/mines/quarries” sectors are therefore not covered by the sample.

❙ As regards intervention mechanisms, the projects eligible for PRA rely exclusively on the ADF, which reflects the relevance of this instrument to the overall AfDB portfolio in DRC. Other instruments used during the period were analyzed from the standpoint of coherence and complementarity.

Projects excluded from PRA analysis on account of their low disbursement rate or their small size were captured under the sector analysis presented above, using available documents and from the standpoint of their rele-vance, implementation and expected contribution to development results.


1. a. Evaluation Process

Reporting phaseData Collection and

Analysis PhaseStart-up Phase

Response to evaluation questions-findings and conclusions

Data collection and assumptions

Additional information

Structuring into sub-questions

Evaluation questions

Indicators

Overview and recommendationsResponse elements

Comparison and verification

1. Inventory of available information and review of documentation

2. Context analysis and reconstruction of the theory of change

3. Structuring of evaluation questions and preparation of the evaluation framework

4. Detailed inventory of operations and sampling

5. Preparatory mission to Burundi, DRC

6. Preparation and testing of collection tools

1. Analysis of relevant documents and literature

2. Field mission:

(a) Discussions with the main stakeholders

(b) Case studies, results presentation workshop in Burundi, DRC

(c) Administration of surveys

1. Integration of results-information summary per indicator, analysis per subquestion, preliminary response

2. Triangulation of information and verification of validity

3. Conclusions and Recommendations

❙ Summary note on documentary review

❙ Benchmark "Theory of change" framework

❙ Data collection and analysis template

❙ Commencement report

❙ Systematic and targeted filling out of the evaluation template-preliminary responses and assumptions to be verified

❙ Comparison of the information to the reality on the ground-reports

❙ Provisional technical report

❙ Final summary report

Information and discussion sessions with stakeholders of the Bank (including preparatory missions)

Presentation of the approach to the AfDB at the beginning of the mission, discussions with stakeholdes, in situ visits and end-of-mission workshop

Discussion session for the draft technical report

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1.b. Evaluation Questions

Issues Criteria

QE1 – Relevance of assistance within a context of fragility and transi-tion towards greater resilience

❙ AfDB strategy and analysis of the fragility context ❙ Adaptation of assistance to changes in factors of fragility ❙ Intervention on the factors of fragility and strengthening of resilience

QE2 – Portfolio alignment on Bank strat-egy and innovative practices

❙ Alignment of operations on the general priorities of the Bank ❙ Consideration of new priority objectives: inclusive green growth ❙ Adaptation of instruments and arrangements for a better response to the needs

QE3 – Inclusiveness of Bank operations Inclusion of cross-cutting concerns into the strategies and operations in the following areas: ❙ Gender equality ❙ Youth employment ❙ Regional disparities

QE4 – Economic and social infrastruc-ture and growth stimulation

❙ Defined objectives and achievements made in the field of economic infrastructure ❙ Economic infrastructure results attained ❙ Impact on economic growth

QE5 – Strengthening of governance ❙ Objectives defined and results achieved in economic governance ❙ Impact on economic governance, PFM and business climate

QE6 – Sustainability of results Sustainability of the results obtained in the field of: ❙ Economic infrastructure ❙ Economic governance

QE8 – Beneficiaries/target groups ❙ Definition of target groups ❙ Perceived influence exerted through the interventions of target groups

QE9 – Environmental sustainability and transition towards green growth

❙ Integration of environmental concerns and transition towards green growth at the level of: › strategy › operations

❙ Major achievements of measures to integrate environmental concerns

QE10 – Efficiency of operations ❙ Assessment of portfolio efficiency ❙ Adaptation of financial instruments to the specific needs of fragile States ❙ Effect of the opening of the Bank office on portfolio efficiency

QE11 – Respect of timing and oper-ational standards

❙ Duration of operations and consistency with objectives ❙ Degree of efficiency of the decision circuit

QE12 – Quality of CSPs ❙ Needs analysis and strategic alignment ❙ Strategic position and comparative advantage of the Bank ❙ Monitoring/evaluation, consideration of risks and mitigation measures

QE13 – Selectivity ❙ Origin and content of the principle of selectivity ❙ Strategic selectivity ❙ Operational selectivity

QE14 – Coordination and synergies Complementarity and synergy of operations in the areas of: ❙ Capacity building ❙ Public finance management ❙ Infrastructure ❙ Analytical work with other Bank operations

QE15 – Policy dialogue ❙ Involvement in policy dialogue with the Government and other partners ❙ Mechanisms for dialogue with national and international stakeholders ❙ Evolution and achievement of policy dialogue with national and international stakeholders

QE16 – Analytical work ❙ Rationale and results of analytical work planned ❙ Rationale and results of unplanned analytical work ❙ Impacts of analytical work on the image of the Bank as perceived

by stakeholders and on policy dialogue with them


QE17 – Implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Principles of Good International Engage-ment in Fragile States

❙ Respect for the Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States ❙ Bank contribution to implementation of the Paris Declaration.

QE18 – Leverage effect mobiliz-ing other resources

❙ Decisive nature of Bank interventions for the resumption of cooperation ❙ Leverage effect on other resources generated by Bank operations in the areas of:

› economic governance › infrastructure

QE19 – Performance management strategy ❙ Inclusion of the performance requirement at the level of: › strategies › operations

QE20 – Project design and implementation ❙ Design and implementation of projects in terms of: › results targeted by CSPs › constraints on the achievement of CSP results

N° Item

1 French Development Agency

2 Embassy of Belgium

3 African Development Bank

4 World Bank

5 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

6 Caritas

7 Public Finance Reform Guidance Committee

8 National Action Committee for Water and Sanitation

9 Delegation of the European Union

10 Department for International Development (UK)

11 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)

12 International Monetary Fund

13 Human Dignity in the world

14 National Institute of Studies and Agronomic Research

15 Ministry of Agriculture

16 Ministry of National Education, Teachers’ Salary Control Service (SECOPE)

17 Ministry of National Education, Education Management Information System

18 Ministry of the Environment

19 Ministry of Women’s, Family and Children’s Affairs

20 Department of Health, Office of the Minister

21 Ministry of Health, Tshopo Provincial Directorate for Health

1.b. Evaluation Questions (Continued )

1. c. List of Structures Met

Issues Criteria

59Annexes

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1. c. List of Structures Met (Continued )

22 Ministry of Social Affairs

23 Ministry of Social Affairs

24 Ministry of Finance, Projects and Programs Monitoring Unit (CSPP)

25 Ministry of Finance, Tshopo Provincial Directorate for Taxation

26 Ministry of Infrastructure and Public Works, Infrastructure Unit

27 Ministry of Rural Development, Directorate for Farm-to-Market Roads

28 Ministry of Rural Development, Secretariat General

29 Ministry of Rural Development, National Rural Water Supply Service

30 Ministry of Planning, Directorate for Infrastructure

31 United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC

32 Highways Authority

33 NGO OCEAN

34 Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)

35 National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program (PNDDR)

36 Lake Tanganyika Development Program (PRODAP)

37 Public Finance Modernization Support Project (PAM-FP)

38 Rural Infrastructure Development Support Project

39 Public Administration Human Resource Mobilization and Revitalization Project (PMR-HR)

40 Project for the Rehabilitation and Consolidation of the Inga Hydro-Electric-ity Power Stations and the Kinshasa Power Distribution Grid (PMEDE)

41 Tshopo Province, General Directorate for Revenue

42 Airways authority

43 National Electricity Corporation (SNEL)

N° Item


1.d.

Lis

t of O

pera

tions

Con

side

red

in th

e Ev

alua

tion

Proj

ect T

itle

Stat

usAp

prov

al D

ate

Com

mitm

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ate

Effe

ctiv

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Plan

ned

Com

ple-

tion

Date

Fore

ign

Exch

ange

Net L

oan

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ntDi

sbur

sem

ent R

ate

Agric

ultu

re a

nd R

ural

Dev

elop

men

t

Agric

ultu

ral S

ecto

r Reh

abilit

atio

n Pr

ojec

tCO

MP

19/0

5/20

0425

/05/

2004

04/0

2/20

0530

/03/

2013

UAC

1777

8560

.24

100.

00

Agric

ultu

ral S

ecto

r Reh

abilit

atio

n Pr

ojec

tCO

MP

19/0

5/20

0425

/05/

2004

04/0

2/20

0530

/03/

2013

UAC

7000

000.

0010

0.00

Lake

Tan

gany

ika

Deve

lopm

ent P

rogr

am (D

rc)

COM

P17

/11/

2004

01/0

2/20

0524

/11/

2006

31/1

2/20

14UA

C67

9000

0.00

96.3

5

Lake

Tan

gany

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Deve

lopm

ent P

rogr

am (D

rc)

COM

P17

/11/

2004

01/0

2/20

0501

/02/

2005

31/1

2/20

14UA

C49

6000

0.00

82.5

7

Reha

bilit

atio

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Agr

i & R

ural

Sec

tor P

rov

3KCO

MP

12/1

2/20

0502

/02/

2006

02/0

2/20

0631

/05/

2013

UAC

3475

8317

.88

100.

00

Agric

ultu

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ecto

r Stu

dy (F

ishi

ng, F

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t,CO

MP

28/0

6/20

0611

/10/

2006

11/1

0/20

0630

/06/

2011

UAC

1686

528.

2010

0.00

Rura

l Inf

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ure

Deve

lop-

men

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port

Proj

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OnGo

10/1

1/20

1120

/01/

2012

20/0

1/20

1231

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2017

UAC

4946

0000

.00

16.5

3

Fore

stry

Inve

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lan

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P19

/06/

2012

06/1

0/20

1206

/10/

2012

31/1

2/20

14UA

C56

6833

.17

81.7

1

Redd

+ In

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Pro

ject

in th

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of

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anan

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VD11

/09/

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15/0

8/20

1415

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30/0

6/20

19UA

C15

2336

41.5

50.

00

Emer

genc

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to D

ispl

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Pe

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Terri

tory

of M

alem

ba

Nkul

u (P

rovin

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f Kat

anga

)

COM

P20

/02/

2014

20/0

8/20

1420

/08/

2014

30/0

6/20

15UA

C47

2733

.173

0.00

Emer

genc

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sist

ance

to C

omm

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ties

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atan

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VD20

/02/

2014

20/0

8/20

1420

/08/

2014

30/0

6/20

15UA

C70

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Envi

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De

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a)On

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12/0

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1212

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31/1

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15UA

C50

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Wor

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VD28

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30/0

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SD04

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20/1

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0920

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31/1

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13UA

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9780

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Cbff

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CLSD

11/1

1/20

0920

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27/1

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0931

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UAC

9380

74.3

210

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Cbff-

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UAC

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61Annexes

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1.d.

Lis

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side

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Geog

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16UA

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2489

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0328

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31/1

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UAC

3000

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Stat

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1475

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99.8

9

Emer

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63Annexes

An ID

EV C

ount

ry S

trat

egy

Eval

uatio

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Inga

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65Annexes

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Annex 2: Rating of Projects Subject to a PRA

Agriculture and Rural Development Transport Social development Govern-ance

PRA ratings PARSAR PRESAR PRODAP Nsélé-Lu-fimi road

PASE PAPDDS PARSEC PUAICF

Relevance of project objectives 4 5 5 5 6 6 5 5

Relevance of project design 2 2 2 4 3 2 2 5

Total-Relevance 3 3 3 5 4 4 3 5

Effectiveness in the achieve-ment of outcomes

4 4 3 5 5 4 3 6

Effectiveness in the achieve-ment of outcomes

2 4 4 4 5 4 5 5

Total-Effectiveness 3 4 4 4 5 4 4 5

Cost-benefit analysis NA 5 6 5 5 NA 4 NA

Cost-efficiency analysis NA 4 2 5 5 2 3 NA

Timeliness 1 4 1 1 4 1 1 2

Implementation status 4 4 2 NA NA 2 3 NA

Total-Efficiency 3 4 3 3 4 2 2 3

Technical soundness 3 3 3 4 5 3 4 NA

Economic and financial viability 1 3 2 3 1 2 3 2

Institutional sustainabil-ity and capacity-building

2 4 3 5 4 3 4 NA

Political environment and governance 1 2 2 3 3 2 4 2

Ownership and sustaina-bility of partnerships

3 4 2 3 5 2 3 5

Environmental and social sustainability 4 4 3 3 NA 3 5 NA

Resilience to exogenous factors and risk management

NA NA 2 NA NA NA 2 3

Total-sustainability 2 3 2 3 4 2 4 3


Annex 3: Map of DRC and Mapping of AfDB Operations

Source: AfDB, 2014.

Kinshasa

ANGOLA

CONGO

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

GABON

ZAMBIA

TANZANIA

BURUNDI

RWANDA

UGANDA

SUDAN

Map of DRC

67Annexes

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Kinshasa

Central zone

CONGO

GABON

PAPDDS

PARSEC

PRODAP

PARSAR

RN1Inga

Mapping of AfDB operations

RUZIZI

Source: IDEV, 2015.

Demarcation of the AfDB intervention zone- CSP 2013-2017 Road Projects

Water and sanitation projects Energy projects

Agricultural projects Social projects


Annex 4: Total and Multilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) received by DRC

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total

Total ODA (net) 2.309 2.184 2.520 1.441 1.787 2.482 3.642 5.481 2.910 2.528 27.284

Multilateral ODA 919 1.060 808 605 781 1.310 1.136 1.263 1.209 1.392 10.483

African Development Bank 113 127 135 124 123 138 108 103 102 132 1.205

AfDB share in total ODA 5% 6% 5% 9% 7% 6% 3% 2% 4% 5% 4%

AfDB share in multilat-eral ODA

12% 12% 17% 20% 16% 11% 10% 8% 8% 9% 11%

Official development assistance allocated to DRC, 2004–2013 (in constant USD million, 2013)

Source: CAD/OCDE.

69Annexes

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Support from multilateral and bilateral partners (in %), 2001–2014

Source: Aid and Investment Management Platform (PGAI).

10

20

30

40

50

60

Mul

tilat

éral

Wor

ld B

ank

Euro

pean

Uni

on

Unite

d Na

tions

AfDB IM

F

Glob

al F

und

Bila

tera

l

Unite

d Ki

ngdo

m

Unite

d St

ates

Belg

ium

Neth

erla

nds

Chin

a

52

35

13 12

41

3

48

23

18 17

8 7


Annex 5. Chronology of Significant Political Events in DRC and TFP Commitments

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

May 1997End of the first Congo WarL.D Kabila declares himself as President

2000Resumption of cooperation with the AfdB

DSP 2003–2004Post-conflict situation.Targeted operations on rural development and social sectors

2001Resumption of cooperation with the WB

2002Resumption of cooperation with the EU

July 2003Eligible to the HIPC Initiative

1998Beginning of the Second Congo War (Rwanda and Uganda)

January 2001Assasination of L.D.Kabila J.Kabila succeeds him

July 2002Pretoria Accord End of Second Congo War

2003Beginning of democratic transition

2005Constitutional referendum

2004–2015Evaluation period

Events in DRC

International commitments

Involvement of the AfDB

PARSAR

Agriculture

Water and sanitation

PASESocial

Environment

PRODAP

Energy

NSELE-LUFIMI & KWANGO-KENGE

Transport

AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL SECTOR STUDY

PAPDDS

REGIONAL STATISTICAL CAPACITY

Multi-sector

Finance

Source: ADE See Annex 1 for the meaning of project acronyms, implementation dates and budgets.

71Annexes

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Annex 5. Chronology of Significant Political Events in DRC and TFP Commitments

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

2015…

CSP 2005–2007Targeted interventions on rural living conditions and the promotion of public sector good governance

CSP 2008–2012Support operations on good governance and the promotion of pro-poor growth CSP 2013–2017

Targeted operations on private investment support infrastructure, regional integration and state capacity-building

July 2010Attainment of the HIPC completion point

May 2006Free presidential elections: Election of J.Kabila

2009Instability: Rebel movements in the East 2013

Ceasefire with M23 rebels

November 2011 Re-election of J.Kabila Election results challenged by the opposition and the international community

2004–2015Evaluation period

PARSAR

NAT. STATISTIC DEVT STRATEGY

CBFF – GEDIRF

PEPUR

PIF

FIN STAT

CBFF – NAT RES MGT TRAINING

PARSEC

PAS GIRE

PRESAR

PUBLIC FINANCE

CBFF – BONOBO

PASE

CBFF – AGROFORESTRY

INGA DEVELOP STUDY

CBFF – MNV

KINSHASA-BRAZZA BRIDGE STUDY

PRISE

PRODAP

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION

CBFF – SANKURU

APPUI DEV INGA 3

REDD+

PMEDE

CBFF – VAMPEEM

NSELE-LUFIMI & KWANGO-KENGE

PEASU

AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL SECTOR STUDY PADIR

PRECI

CBFF – 6 REDO PROJECTS

PAPDDS

BATSHAMBA-TSHIKAPA

CBFF – BIOCHAR

NELSAP

REGIONAL STATISTICAL CAPACITY PUAICF MOBILISATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES

PPSA

ADVANS

NB: Projects with zero disbursement rates are not included


Year Congo, Dem. Republic

Africa Developing Countries

Developed Countries

Basic Indicators

Area ('000 Km²) 2016 2,345 30,067 94,638 36,907

Total Population (millions) 2016 79.7 1,214.4 3,010.9 1,407.8

Urban Population (% of Total) 2016 39.5 40.1 41.6 80.6

Population Density (per Km²) 2016 35.2 41.3 67.7 25.6

GNI per Capita (US $) 2014 380 2 045 4 226 38 317

Labor Force Participation * – Total (%) 2016 71.1 65.6 63.9 60.3

Labor Force Participation ** – Female (%) 2016 70.5 55.6 49.9 52.1

Gender-Related Development Index Value 2007–2013 0.822 0.801 0.506 0.792

Human Develop. Index (Rank among 187 countries)

2014 176 ... ... ...

Popul. Living Below $ 1.90 a Day (% of Population)

2008–2013 77.2 42.7 14.9 ...

Demographic Indicators

Population Growth Rate – Total (%) 2016 3.2 2.5 1.9 0.4

Population Growth Rate – Urban (%) 2016 4.0 3.6 2.9 0.8

Population < 15 years (%) 2016 45.9 40.9 28.0 17.2

Population >= 65 years (%) 2016 3.0 3.5 6.6 16.6

Dependency Ratio (%) 2016 95.5 79.9 52.9 51.2

Sex Ratio (per 100 female) 2016 99.5 100.2 103.0 97.6

Female Population 15 – 49 years (% of total population)

2016 22.5 24.0 25.7 22.8

Life Expectancy at Birth – Total (years) 2016 59.4 61.5 66.2 79.4

Life Expectancy at Birth – Female (years) 2016 60.9 63.0 68.0 82.4

Crude Birth Rate (per 1,000) 2016 41.1 34.4 27.0 11.6

Crude Death Rate (per 1,000) 2016 9.9 9.1 7.9 9.1

Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000) 2015 74.5 52.2 35.2 5.8

Child Mortality Rate (per 1,000) 2015 98.3 75.5 47.3 6.8

Total Fertility Rate (per woman) 2016 5.8 4.5 3.5 1.8

Maternal Mortality Rate (per 100,000) 2015 693.0 495.0 238.0 10.0

Women Using Contraception (%) 2016 23.3 31.0 ... ...

Health & Nutrition Indicators

Physicians (per 100,000 people) 2004–2013 10.7 47.9 123.8 292.3

Nurses and midwives (per 100,000 people) 2004–2013 52.9 135.4 220.0 859.8

Births attended by Trained Health Personnel (%) 2010–2015 80.1 53.2 68.5 ...

Annex 6. Some Comparative Socio-economic Indicators of the DRC

73Annexes

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Access to Safe Water (% of Population) 2015 52.4 71.6 89.3 99.5

Healthy life expectancy at birth (years) 2013 51.8 54.0 57 68.0

Access to Sanitation (% of Population) 2015 28.7 39.4 61.2 99.4

Percent. of Adults (aged 15–49) Living with HIV/AIDS

2014 1.0 3.8 ... ...

Incidence of Tuberculosis (per 100,000) 2014 325.0 245.9 160.0 21.0

Child Immunization Against Tuberculosis (%) 2014 90.0 84.1 90.0 ...

Child Immunization Against Measles (%) 2014 77.0 76.0 83.5 93.7

Underweight Children (% of child-ren under 5 years)

2010–2014 23.4 18.1 16.2 1.1

Daily Calorie Supply per Capita 2011 ... 2 621 2 335 3 503

Public Expenditure on Health (as % of GDP) 2013 1.6 2.6 3.0 7.7

Education Indicators

Gross Enrolment Ratio (%)

Primary School – Total 2010–2015 107.0 100.5 104.7 102.4

Primary School – Female 2010–2015 101.8 97.1 102.9 102.2

Secondary School – Total 2010–2015 43.5 50.9 57.8 105.3

Secondary School – Female 2010–2015 33.3 48.5 55.7 105.3

Primary School Female Teaching Staff (% of Total)

2010–2015 28.3 47.6 50.6 82.2

Adult literacy Rate – Total (%) 2010–2015 77.2 66.8 70.5 98.6

Adult literacy Rate – Male (%) 2010–2015 88.8 74.3 77.3 98.9

Adult literacy Rate – Female (%) 2010–2015 65.9 59.4 64.0 98.4

Percentage of GDP Spent on Education 2010–2014 2.2 5.0 4.2 4.8

Environmental Indicators

Land Use (Arable Land as % of Total Land Area) 2013 3.1 8.6 11.9 9.4

Agricultural Land (as % of land area) 2013 11.6 43.2 43.4 30.0

Forest (As % of Land Area) 2013 67.6 23.3 28.0 34.5

Per Capita CO2 Emissions (metric tons) 2012 0.0 1.1 3.0 11.6

Sources: AfDB Statistics Department Databases; World Bank: World Development Indicators; UNAIDS; UNSD; WHO, UNICEF, UNDP; Country Reports.

Note: n.a.: Not Applicable ; … : Data Not Available. * Labor force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15+) ** Labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+) .


GNI Per Capita US $

Infant Mortality Rate (Per 1000)

Population Growth Rate (%)20

00

2005

2008

2009

2010

2011

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2013

2014

Africa Democratic Republic of Congo

00

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

Africa Democratic Republic of Congo

2000

2005

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

0

20

40

60

80

100

2000

2005

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Democratic Republic of Congo

Life Expectancy at Birth (years)

40

50

60

70

80

Democratic Republic of Congo

Africa

2000

2005

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Africa

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Annex 7: Factors and/or Manifestations of Fragility in Country Strategy Papers

CSP 2003–2004 CSP 2005–2007 CSP 2008–2012 CSP 2013–2017 For reference: DRC Fragility Evaluation Report (2012)

Political Factors Lack of State authority in certain areas of the national territory.Moribund and ineffi-cient administration.

Uncertainties related to the political transi-tion process.Difficulties in normal-izing the situation in the East.Moribund and ineffi-cient administration.

Difficulties in building a local governance system due to weak administrative and financial capacity at the decentralized level.

Limited legitimacy of State institutions, due to an incomplete elec-toral process.Weak State authority (rebellions in the East).Weak capacity of the administration.

Fragility of the demo-cratic transition and State institutionsdeficient State authorityinefficiency of the administration. Necessary but deferred decentral-ization. Legal uncertainty and corruption. Conflict minerals.

Economic factors Low national savingsWeight of the public debt burden.Low public investment in priority areas.Highly degraded production apparatus and socio-economic infrastructure.

Idem CSP 2003–2004.

Highly degraded production apparatus and socio-economic infrastructure.Regulatory, fiscal and legal environ-ment unfavourable to private sector devel-opment.

Unfavourable business environment Limited supply of infrastructure services (roads, elec-tricity, water, etc.) and access to such services.

Steady weakening of the economyInfrastructure defi-cit: overwhelmed networks and dilap-idated equipment.Energy: A huge untapped potential.Low tax revenue collection capacity. Fragility accelerators: informalization and de-industrialisation of the economy.

Social sectors – Shortage of human resources.Fragile social situation.

Limited domes-tic ownership of reforms due to weak human, institutional and administrative capacity.Limited community access to basic social services.

– Weak socio-economic conditions and human development.Accelerators of fragil-ity: demographics, disorderly urban-ization; displaced persons and refugees; gender inequalities; rights of minorities.


Endnotes

1. The initial assessment period was 2004–2013. An update (2004–015) was made after the field mission (November 2015).

2. The information presented in this section comes from “World Data Bank”.

3. Principles adopted under the aegis of the OECD in 2007.

4. Detailed description in Annex 1.

5. For the criteria of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency, the scale is as follows: 1 = very unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = very satisfactory.

6. Source: World Data Bank.

7. According to the International Rescue Committee, 5.4 million people died between 1998 and 2007, most of them from war-related disease and malnutrition.

8. The data presented in this section comes from World Bank Data.

9. OCDE, “African Economic Outlook”, 2013.

10. World Bank, 2010, Democratic Republic of Congo: Growth with Governance in the Mineral Sector Technical Assistance Project.

11. UNDP, Human Development Report 2011–2016.

12. Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey conducted in 2010 by UNICEF.

13. http://www.banquemondiale.org/fr/country/drc/overview#1, last update: 19 Apr. 2016.

14. www.undp.org (Country profile).

15. MDG Progress Report 2000–2015, assessment of the progress achieved by the DRC.

16. AfDB, Economic Sector Work: Regional Economic Development in Bas-Congo for Decentralization in DRC, October 2009.

17. AfDB, Economic Sector Work: Private Investment Environment in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2012.

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18. Effectiveness was assessed only for the sectors in which projects were eligible to Project Results Assessments (i.e. completed/closed as of 31 December 2015) or had a sufficient level of maturity to warrant an assessment of results. Annex 1 presents PRA eligibility criteria.

19. Three projects eligible for PRA: PARSAR, PRESAR and PRODAP.

20. One project eligible for PRA: Nsélé-Lufimi and Kwango-Kenge road.

21. Three projects eligible for PRA: PASE (education), PAPDDS (health) and PARSEC (reintegration of ex-combatants).

22. One project eligible for PRA: PUAICF.

23. This debt amounts to USD 2.4 million. Three years after project completion, it was still not yet settled. Other Operational Activities: 7 drinking water points; 7 rural markets; fencing of 6 schools; reconstruction of 30 shops, stalls and sheds; planting of trees in 36 roadside villages, outreach activities.

24. Other related activities: 7 drinking water points, 7 rural markets, 6 fences around schools, reconstruction of 30 roadside mini-shops, stalls and warehouses, tree-planting in 36 surrounding villages, awareness activities.

25. 10 referral general hospitals, 26 central offices of health zones, 3 offices of health districts, 31 health centres.

26. Recent AfDB data.

27. http://www.afdb.org/fr/documents/document/2004-2013-country-policy-and-institutional-assessment-cpia-47411/

28. Assessment of Assistance to Fragile States, IDEV (1999–2011).

29. Minerals represented 70% of the country's goods exports in 2005 and 78% in 2010.

30. Except PRODAP on the banks of Lake Tanganyika.

31. This rating concerns eight projects eligible to in-depth project results assessment (PRA).

32. This rating concerns eight projects eligible for in-depth project results assessment (PRA).

33. This average covers wide disparities: the overrun rate varies from 5% to 193% for projects eligible for PRA.

34. This factor is mentioned in most of the field interviews (November 2015).

35. Site visit interviews (assessment mission, November 2015).


36. Disbursement rate trends depend on several factors: Thus, a rejuvenation of the portfolio (with the approval of new projects and the closing of old ones) translates into a reduction in the disbursement rate, regardless of the efforts made by the Country Office to speed up the implementation of operations.

37. Source: Democratic Republic of Congo: Completion report of the 2005–2007 results-based country strategy. AfDB, January 2008.

38. Source: Combined Completion Report of the 2008–2012 Country Strategy Paper and the 2012 Country Portfolio Performance Review. AfDB, June 2012.

39. Source: Completion reports and reports on monitoring-evaluation of the socio-economic impacts of the two projects concerned.

40. This ranking does not include resources provided by the African Development Fund. If such resources are included, the AfDB Group would rank as 6th.

41. Source: DAC/OECD; Average for the two years 2012 and 2013.

42. For example: Study on formulation of the national programme on access to drinking water and sanitation, conducted under PEASU; Study on the agricultural and rural sector.

43. Two economic sector works were conducted during the period under review: (1) Regional Economic Development in Bas-Congo in the Context of Decentralization in DRC, October 2009. (2) Development of Private Investment in DRC, 2012.

44. Source: AfDB, DRC: Paper prepared for approval of the contribution under the HIPC Initiative – decision point of the enhanced HIPC, June 2004. Discussions during the mission of November 2015.

45. Programmes prepared with the support of the World Bank, UNDP and MONUC.

46. CSP 2003–2004, 2005–2007, 2008–2012, and 2013–2017 as well as progress and completion reports for these same strategies.

47. However, the mechanism for integrated monitoring of projects by the CSPP of the Ministry of Finance is not yet operational.

48. Completion Report of RBCSP 2005–2007.

49. Interview, PRISE Coordination Unit, November 2015.

50. Interview, PEASU Coordination Unit, November 2015.

51. Interview, Project Coordination Unit, November 2015.

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52. At national level, the annual budget of LRMCs is estimated at USD 80 million (USD 3.5 x 22 days per month x 12 months / year x 87,000 km of road). The operating costs of DVDA should also be included. This budget is relatively modest, considering the effects in terms of improving community living conditions, boosting the agricultural economy, and creating jobs (87,000 road maintenance jobs).

53. Pursuant to Presidential Orders No. 12/007 of 11 June 2012 and No. 12/008 of 11 June 2012 defining the responsibilities of Ministries, aid mobilization and programming are activities shared among several Ministries, namely: the Ministry of Planning and Monitoring of the Implementation of the Modernity Revolution, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and international Co-operation, and the Ministry of Finance and the Budget. However, the coordination of external resources within the Government is marked by a plethora of structures with overlapping missions.

54. AfDB, Evaluation of the fragility of the Democratic Republic of Congo, October 2012.

55. This approach was not fully applied during the review period.

African Development Bank GroupAvenue Joseph Anoma, 01 BP 1387, Abidjan 01, Côte d’IvoirePhone: +225 20 26 20 41E-mail: [email protected]

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About this Evaluation

This evaluation examines the African Development Bank’s assistance to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) over the 2004–2015 period; a period in which DRC was classified among fragile States on the harmonized lists of most international organizations. The evaluation aims to draw lessons from past performance to increase the effectiveness of the Bank’s development actions in transition countries. Between 2004 and 2015, the Bank financed 63 projects in the country worth about USD 1.62 billion.

Four successive Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) guided the Bank’s cooperation with the DRC over the period in review. The evaluation is based on data and information gathered from different sources including document reviews, key informant interviews and site visits. All areas of the Bank’s interventions in the country were covered by the evaluation. However, due to various limitations (country size, level of project implementation, data), only 18% of the Bank’s total portfolio and 4 out of the 9 sectors of the Bank’s interventions were examined in depth. The sectors are agriculture and rural development, transport, energy, and water and sanitation sectors.

Overall, this evaluation finds that the Bank strategies supported the country through its evolution from a “post-conflict” situation to a “development” situation. However, they did not sufficiently deal with all the country's factors of fragility. The Bank’s interventions were most effective in the transport and social development sectors; while its involvement in policy dialogue was weak. The evaluation recommends that the Bank should focus on addressing factors of fragility in the country and improving the quality at entry, the sustainability, and the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms of its operations in the DRC.

An IDEV Country Strategy Evaluation



Summ


ent Evaluation

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