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Problems of Involvement and DetachmentAuthor(s): Norbert EliasReviewed work(s):Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Sep., 1956), pp. 226-252Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/587994.
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etachment
NORBERT
ELIAS
Old Lady:
Are you not prejudiced
Author:
Madame,arelywill
you meeta moreprejudiced
an
norone who {ells
himselfhe keeps
his mind
moreopen. But cannot
hat be because ne
part
of ourmind, hat
svhich
we act with,becomes rejudiced
hrough xperience,
andstillwe keep
another artcompletely
pen o
observe nd udgewith
?
Old Lady:
Sir, I
do not know.
A thor: Madame,
eitherdo
I and it may well be
that we aretalkingnonsense.
Old Lady: That is
an odd term
and oneI did not
encountern my youth.
A thor:
Madame,we apply
the term now
to describe nsoundness
n abstract
conversation,
r, indeed,any overmetaphysical
endency n speech.
Old Lady:
I must
learnto use these terms
correctly.
E. Hemingway,
eathin the afternoon.
NE
cannotsay ol a
man's outlook
in any absolute
sense that it is
{ Xdetached
or involved(or, if one
prefers,
rational or irrational
,
^ objective
or subjective
). Only small
babies,and among
adults
perhaps
only insanepeople,
becomeinvolved in
whatever
they experience
with complete
abandon o
their feelingshere and
now; and
again only the
insanecan remain
otally unmovedby
what goes
on around hem. Normally
adultbehaviour ies on a scalesomewhere etweenthese two extremes.
In
some
groups,and in some
individuals
of these groups, t
may come nearer
to one of them than
in others; it may
shift hither
and thither as social
and
mental
pressures lse and fall.
But sociallife as
we knowit would come
to
an end
if standards
of adult behaviour
went too far in either
direction. As
far as
one can see,
the very existence
of orderedgroup ife
depends
on the
interplay
n men's thoughts
and actionsof impulses
n both directions,
hose
that involve
and those that
detach keeping
each other in check.
Theymay
clash and struggle
for dominance
or compromise
nd form alloys of
many
differentshades
and kinds however
varied, it
is the relation between
the
two whichsets people'scourse. In usingthese terms,1onerefers n shortto
1 It
is still the prevalent practice
to speak of psychological
characteristics
and of social
characteristicsof people
not only as different, but
as separable and in the last
resort independent
226
roblems
o Involvement
n d
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NORBERT ELIAS
227
changing qiilibriabetween ets of mental activitieswhich n man's relations
with men, with non-humanobjects and with himself (whatever heir other
functionsmay be) have the function to involve and to detach.
As tools of thinking, therefore, involvement and detachment
wouldremainhighly ineffectual f they wereunderstood o adumbrate sharp
division betweentwo independent ets of phenomena. They do not refer to
two separateclassesof objects; used as universals hey are, at best, marginal
concepts. In the main, what we observeare people and people'smanifesta-
tions, such as patternsof speech or of thought, and of other activities, some
of which bear the stamp of higher, others of lesser detachmentor involve-
ment. It is the continuum hat lies between hese marginal olesthat presents
the principalproblem. Canone determinewith greateraccuracy he position
of specificattitudes or productsof men within this continuum One might,
impressionistically,ay for examplethat in societies ike ours people tend to
be more detached n their approaches o naturalthan to social events. Can
one trace, at least summarily,criteria for differentdegrees of detachment
and involvement? What in fact is meant,what does it imply f one says that
in societiessuch as ours with a relativelyhigh degreeof industrialization nd
of control over non-human orcesof nature,approaches o nature are on the
whole more detached than those to society ? The degree of detachment
shown by different ndividuals n similarsituationsmay differgreatly. Can
one, nevertheless, peak, in this respect, of differentdegreesof detachment
and involvementregardlessof these individualvariations?
II
The way in which individualmembersof a group experiencewhatever
affects heirsenses, he meaningwhich t has for them,depends n the standard
formsof dealingwith, and of thinkingand speakingabout, these phenomena
graduallyevolved in their society. Thus, although he degreeof detachment
sets of properties. And if this is the assumption underlying one's form of discourse, terms like
involved and detached , as they are used here, must appear as equivocal and vague.
They have been chosen in preference to other perhaps more familiar terms precisely because
they do not fall in line with linguistic usages which are based on the tacit assumption of the
ultimate independence of psychological and social properties of men. They do not suggest as
some current scientific concepts do that there are two separate sets of human functions or attri-
butes, one psychological and one social in character, which communicate with each other only
occasionally during a limited span of time with a definite beginning and a definite end by means
of those one-way connections which we call causes-and-effects and then withdraw from each
other until a new causal connection is established again with a definite beginning and a
definite end.
Both these terms express quite clearly that changes in a person's relation with others and
psychological changes are distinct but inseparable phenomena. The same holds good of their
use as expressions referring to men's relation to objects in general. They seem preferable
to others which like subjective and objective suggest a static and unbridgeable divide
between two entities subject and object . To give a brief and all too simple example of
their meaning in this context: A philosopheronce said, If Paul speaks of Peter he teUs us more
about Paul than about Peter. One can say, by way of comment, that in speaking of Peter
he is always telling us something about himself as well as about Peter. One would call his
approach involved as long as his own characteristics, the characteristics of the perceiver
overshadow those of the perceived. If Paul's propositions begin to tell more about Peter than
about himself the balance begins to turn in favour of detachment.
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228 PROBLEMS
OF INVOLVEMENT
AND DETACHMENT
shown in one's encounterwith
natural forces may vary from indindual
to
indisridual nd
from situation to situation, the concepts
themselveswhich,
in societies like
ours, all individualsuse in thinking,
speakingand
acting,
concepts ike lightning , tree or wolf not less than electricity ,
organism ,
cause-and-effect or nature , in
the sense in whichthey
are used to-day,
representa relatively
high degree of detachment;
so does
the socially nduced
xperience f natureas a landscape
or as beautiful
.
The range of
individualvariations n detachment,
n other words, s limited
by the public
standardsof detachmentembodied
n modes of thinkingand
speakingaboutnatureand in the
widely nstitutionalized
se of natural orces
for humanends.
Compared sthpreviousages control
of emotions n experi-
encingnature,
as that of nature
tself, has grown. Involvementhas
lessened,
but it has not disappeared. Even
scientific approacheso nature
do not
require he extinctionof other more nvolvedandemotiveformsof approach.
What distinguishes hese from other
less detachedapproachess the
manner
in which tendenciestowards detachment
and towards
nvolvementbalance
each other and
blend.
Like otherpeople,scientists
engaged n the study
of natureare, to some
extent, prompted
n the pursuitof their task by personal
wishesand wants;
they are often
enough nfluenced y specificneeds
of the community
o which
they belong. They may wish to
foster their own career. They may
hope
that the results
of their inqulrieswill be in line with
theories hey haveenun-
ciated beforeor with the requirementsnd idealsof groupswith whichthey
identify themselves. But these
involvements, n the
naturalsciences,deter-
mine as a rule
nothingmorethan the generaldirection
of inquiries; they are,
in most cases,
counter-balanced
nd checkedby institutionalized rocedures
which compel scientists, more
or less, to detach themselves,for the
time
being, from the
urgent issues at hand. The immediate
problems,personal
or communal,
nduce problems
of a differentkind, scientificproblems
which
are no longer
directlyrelated o specificpersonsor
groups. The former,more
narrowly ime-bound,
often serve
merely as a motive force; the latter,
the
seientificproblemswhich they
may have induced,owe their forrnand
their
meaning o the widerand less time-bound ontinuum f theoriesandobserva-
tions evolved
in this or that problem-area y generations
of specialists.
Like other human activities
scientific nquiriesnto nature embody
sets
of values. To
say that natural sciences are non-evaluating
or value-
free is a misuse
of terms. But the sets of values,
the types of evaluations
which play a
part in scientifie nquiriesof this type
differfrom those
which
have as theirframe of reference
he interests,the well-beingor suffering
of
oneself or of social
units to which
one belongs. The aim of these
inqwries
is to find the inherent
orderof eventsas it is, independently
ot of
any, but
of any particularobserver,and
the importance, he relevanee, he
value of
what one observes s assessed n accordancewith the place and function t
appearsto have
withln this orderitself.
In the explorationof nature,
in short, scientists
have learned hat any
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NORBERT ELIAS
229
direct encroachmentupon their work by short-term nterests or needs of
specific personsor groups is liable to jeopardize he usefulnesswhich their
workmay have in the end forthemselves r fortheirowngroup. Theproblems
which they formulateand, by means of their theories, ry to solve, have in
relation o personalor socialproblems f the day a high degreeof autonomy;
so have the sets of values which they use; their work is not value-free ,
but it is, in contrast to that of many social scientists, protectedby firmly
establishedprofessional tandardsand other institutionalsafeguardsagalnst
the intrusionof heteronomous valuations.l Here, the primary endencyof
man to take the short route from a strongly felt need to a precept or its
satisfactionhas becomemore or less subordinate o preceptsand procedures
whichrequire longer oute. Natural cientists eek to findways of satisfying
human needs by means of a detour the detour via detachment. They set
out to find solutionsfor problemspotentiallyrelevant for all human beings
and all human groups. The question characteristic f men's involvement:
What does it mean for me or for us ? has become ubordinateo questions
like What is it ? or How are these events connectedwith others? In
this form, the level of detachmentrepresentedby the scientist's work has
becomemoreor less institutionalized s part of a scientific radition eproduced
by means of a highly specialized raining,maintainedby various forms of
social control and socially induced emotional restraints; it has become
embodied n the conceptualtools, the basic assumptionsf he methods of
speakingand thinking which scientists use.
Moreover,onceptsand methodsof this type have spread,and are spread-
ing agasn and again, from the workshopsof the specialiststo the general
public. In most industrial societies, impersonal ypes of explanationsof
natural events and other conceptsbased on the idea of a relativelyautono-
mous order,of a courseof events independent f any specificgroupof human
observers,are used by people almost as a matter of course though most of
them are probablyunawareof the long struggle nvolved in the elaboration
and diffusionof these forms of thinking.
Yet, here too, in society at large, these more detached ormsof thinking
represent only orle layer in people's approaches o nature. Other more
involved and emotive forms of thinking about nature have by no means
disappeared.
1 This concept has been introduced here in preference to the distinction between scientific
procedures which are value-free and others which are not. It rather confuses the issue if
the term value , in its application to sciences, is reserved to those values which intrude
upon scientific theories and procedures, as it were, from outside. Not oniy has this narrow
use of the word led to the odd conclusion that it is possible to sever the connection between
the activity of evaluating and the values which serve as its guide, it has also tended to
limit the use of terms like value or evaluating in such a way that they seem applicable
only in cases of what is otherwise known as bias or prejudice ''. Yet, even the aim of
finding out the relatednessof data, their inherent orderor, as it is sometimes expressed, at approxi-
mating to the truth , implies that one regards the discovery of this relatedness or of the
truth as a value . In that sense, every scientific endeavour has moral implications.Instead of distinguishing between two types of sciences, one of which is value-free while the
other is not, one may find it both simpler and more apposite to distinguish n scientific pronounce-
ments betsveen two types of evaluations, one autonomous, the other heteronomous, of which
one or the other may be dominant.
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230
PROBLEMS OF
INVOLVEMENT AND
DETACHMENT
Thus in
falling ll one may
find one's thoughts
stray
again and again to
the question:
Who is to blame
for this ?
'> The childhood
experienceof
pain as
the outcomeof an
attackand
perhapsa certainurge
to retaliate
may
assertthemselves venthoughunder he pressure f an overgrown onscience
the attack may
appearas deserved}
o that one may
come to
feel, rightly or
wrongly,
one has only
oneself to blame for
it. And
yet one may
accept at
the same time
the doctor'smore
detached
dictumthat this
illness followed
primarily rom a
completelyblind biological
course
of events and not
from
anybody's ntentions,not
from
consciousor
unconsciousmotives of any
kind.
More
nvolved formsof
thinking, n short,
continueto
form an integral
part of our
experienceof nature.
But in this area
of our
experience hey
have
become ncreasingly
verlaidand
counterbalancedy otherswhich
make
higherdemands
on men's faculty
of looking
at themselvesas
it were from
outsideand of viewingwhat they call mine or ours as partsystemsof
a larger ystem.
In their
experience f
naturemenhave been
able, in course
of time,
to fotmand to face
a pictureof the
physicaluniverse
which s
emotion-
ally far from
satisfactory,which, n
fact,
seems to become ess
and less so as
science
advances,but which
at thesametime
agreesbetterwith
the
cumulative
resultsof
systematic
observations. They
have learned
o imposeupon
them-
selvesgreater
restraint n their
approacheso natural
events
and in exchange
for the
short-term
atisfactionswhich they
had to
give up they have
gained
greaterpower o
controland to
manipulatenatural
orces or
their ownends,
and with it, in this sphere, greater security and other new long-term
satisfactions.
III
Thusin their
publicapproaches
o nature,men
have
travelleda longway
(and
have to
travel it again and
again as they grow
up) from the
primary,
the
childhoodpatternsof
thinking.
The road they
have travelled s
still far
fromclear. But
one can
see in broadoutline
omeof its
characteristic atterns
and
mechanisms.
When men, instead of using stones as they found them againsthuman
enemies
or
beasts, with greater
restraint of their
momentaryimpulses,
gradually
changedtowards
fashioning
stones in advance for
their
use as
weaponsor tools
(as we
may assume hey did
at some time),
when,
ncreasing
their
foresight, hey
gradually
hanged romgathering
niits androots
towards
gro+ring
lants deliberately
or their
own use, it
implied hat they
themselves
as well as their
social life
and theirnatural
surroundings,hat
their outlook
as well as their
actions
changed. The same
can be said of
those later stages
in which
changes n men's
thinking
aboutnature
becamemore and more
the
task of scientific
specialists. Throughout
hese developments
he mastery
of menoverthemselvesas expressedn theirmentalattitudestowardsnature
and their
masteryover
natural orces
by handling
hem, havegrown
ogether.
The level
and patterns of
detachmentrepresented
by public
standardsof
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NORBERT
ELIAS
23I
thinkingabout
naturalevents were
n the past and still
are
dependenton the
level
andthemanner f
control epresented y
public tandards f
manipulating
them and vlce versa.
For a verylong time,therefore,men, n theirstrugglewith thenon-human
forcesof nature,must
have moved
n whatappears n
retrospectas a vicious
circle. They had little
controlover
natural orceson
which heyweredepend-
dent
for theirsurvival.
Whollydependenton
phenomenawhose
course hey
could neither
foreseenor influence
o any considerable
xtent,
they lived in
extreme
nsecurity,and, being
most
vulnerableand insecure, hey
could not
help feeling
strongly
about everyoccurrence
hey thought might
affect their
lives; they were too
deeply involved to
look at natural
phenomena, ike
distant
observers, almly. Thus,
on the one hand, they
had little
chanceof
controlling
heir ovvnstrong
feelings in relation to
nature and of forming
more detachedconceptsof naturalevents as long as they had little control
over them;
and they
had, on the other hand,
little chanceof
extending heir
control over
their non-human
urroundings s long as
they
could not gain
greatermasteryover
their own
strong eelingsn relation
o them and increase
their controlover
themselves.
The change towards
greater
control over natural
phenomenaappears
to
have followedwhat in
ourtraditional
anguagemight be called
the prin-
ciple of increasing
acilitation . It must
have been extremely
difficult or
men
to gain greater
controlover
natureas long as they
had little controlover
it; and the
morecontrol
hey gained, he
easierwas it for them to
extend it.
Nothing
n ourexperience
uggeststhat
part-processes f this
kind must
always work in the same
direction.
Some of the phases
n which they went
into
reversegear are
known fromthe past.
Increasing ocial
tensions and
strife may go
hand in
hand with both a
decreaseof men's ability
to control,
andan
increase n the
phantasy-content f
men's deasabout,
naturalas well
as social
phenomena. Whether
eed-back
mechanisms f this
kind work in
one or in the
otherdirection
depends, n short, on the
total
situationof the
social units
concerned.
IV
Paradoxically
nough, the
steadyincrease n the
capacity of men, both
for
a moredetached
approach o natural
orcesand for
controllinghem, and
the gradual
acceleration f this
process,have
helped o increase he
difficulties
which men have in
extending
their controlover
processesof social change
and
over their own
feelings in
thinkingabout them.
Dangers
threateningmen
from non-human
forces have
been slowly
decreasing.
Not the
least importanteffect
of a more detached
approach n
this
field has been that
of limiting
fears, of preventing
hem, that is, from
irradiatingwidelybeyondwhat canbe realistically ssessedas a threat. The
formerhelplessnessn the
face of
incomprehensiblend
unmanageable atural
forces has
slowly given way to a
feeling of
confidence,he
concomitant,one
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232 PROBLEMS OF INVOLVEMENT AND
DETACHMENT
might say, of
increasing acilitation,of men's powerto
raise, in this sphere,
the general evel of
well-being nd to enlarge he area of security hrough he
applicationof
patient and systematicresearch.
But the growthof men's comprehensionf natural orcesand of the use
made of them for
human ends is associatedunth specificchanges n human
relationships; it goes hand in hand with the growing
nterdependence f
growingnumbersof
people. The gradualaccelerationn the incrementof
knowledgeand use
of non-human orces, bound up with specificchanges n
humanrelationsas it iSs has helped, n turn,to accelerate
he processof change
in the latter. The
networkof humanactivitiestends to become ncreasingly
complex,far-flung
and dosely knit. Moreand moregroups,and with them
more and more ndividuals, end to besomedependent n
each otherfor their
secunty and the
satisfactionof their needs in ways
which, for the greater
part, surpass he comprehensionf those involved. It is as if first thousands,
then millions, hen more and more millionswalked
through his world their
hands and feet
chained ogetherby invisible les. No
one is in charge. No
one stands outside.
Somewant to go this, othersthat
way. They fall upon
each other and,vanquishing r defeated,still remain
chained o each other.
No one can regulate
he movementsof the whole unless
a great part of them
are able to
understand, o see, as it were, from outside,the whole patterns
they fortn together. And they are not able to visualize
themselvesas part
of these largerpatterns because, being hemmed in and
moved uncompre-
hendinglyhitherandthither n wayswhichnoneof them ntended, hey cannot
help being
preoccupied ith the urgent,narrowandparochialproblemswhich
each of them has to
face. They can only look at
whateverhappens o them
from their narrow
ocationwithin the system. They aretoo deeply nvolved
to look at themselves rom without. Thus what is
formedof nothing but
human beings acts
upon each of them, and is
experiencedby many as ar
alien external force
not unlike the forces of nature.
The same
processwhichhas made men less
dependent n the vagariesof
nature has made
them more dependenton each other. Ishe changeswhich,
with regard o non-humanorces,have given men greater
powerand security,
have increasingly roughtupon them different ormsof insecurity. In their
reiationswith each
other men are again and againconfronted, s they were
in the past in theirdeaSingswith non-human orces,
with phenomena,with
problemswhich,
given their presentapproaches, re still beyond heir control.
They are incessantly aced with the task of adjusting
hemselves o changes
whichthough
perhapsof their own makingwerenot intendedby them. And
as these changes requentlybring n their wake unforeseen
ains for some atld
losses for others,
they tend to go hand in hand with tensions and frictions
between groups
which, at the same time, are
inescapablychained to each
other. Tests of strengthand the use of organized orce
serve often as costly
means of adjustmento changeswithin this tangle of interdependencies; n
manr of its levels no other means of adiustmentexist.
Thus vulnerable
and insecureas men are under
these conditions, hey
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NORBERT
ELIAS
233
cannot
stand back and
look
at the
courseof
events calmly
ike
more
detached
observers.
Again, t
is, on the
other hand,
difficult or
men in that
situation
to
control
more
fully their
own
strong feelings
with
regard o
events
which,
they feel,
may deeply
affecttheir
lives, and to
approach
hem with greaterdetachment,as
long as
their
ability to
controlthe
course
of events is
small;
and it is, on
the
other
hand, difficult
or
them to
extendtheir
understanding
and control
of
theseevents
as long as
they cannot
approachhem
with
greater
detachment
andgain
greater
control
over
themselves.
Thus a circular
move-
ment
between
nner
and outer
controls,a
feedback
mechanismof a
kind, is
at
work not
only
in men's
relations
with the
non-human
orces of
nature,
but also in
their
relationswith
each
other. But
it operates
at
present n
these
two
spheres on
very
different
evels.
While in
men's
relations
with non-
human
forces the
standard
of both
the control
of
self and that
of
external
events is relativelyhigh, in relationsof men with men the sociallyrequired
and socially
bred
standard
of both is
considerably
ower.
The
similarities
between this
situation
and
that which
men had
to face
in past
ages in
their
relations
with the
forces of
nature,
are often
obscured
by the
more
obnous
differences.
We do
already
know that
men can
attain
a
considerable egree
of control
over
natural
phenomena
mpingingupon
their
lives
and a
fairlyhigh
degreeof
detachment
n
manipulating,nd in
thinking
of,
them. We do
not
know, and
we can
hardly
imagine,how a
comparable
degree of
detachmentand
control
may be
attained
with
regard to
social
phenomena.
Yet, for
thousandsof
years it was
equally
mpossible or
those
who struggledbeforeus to imagine hat one couldapproachand manipulate
natural
orcesas we do.
The
comparisonhrows
some light
on
their
situation
as
well as
on
ours.
V
It
also
throws
some light on
the
differences
hat
exist to-day
between
the
standardsof
certainty
and
achievementof the
naturaland the
social
sciences. It
is
oftenimplied,
f it is
not stated
explicitly, hat
the objects
of
the
former,by their
very
nature,
end
themselvesbetter
than
thoseof
the
latter to an exploration y meansof scientificmethodsensunnga highdegree
of
certainty.
However,
there is no
reason
to assume
that
social data,
that
the
relationsof
personsare
less
accessible
o man's
comprehension
han the
relationsof
non-human
henomena, r
that man's
ntellectual
powersas
such
are
incommensurateo
the task
of
evolving theones
and
methods
for the
study
of social
data to a
level of
fitness,
comparable
o that
reached
n the
study of
physicaldata.
What is
sigiificantly
different n
these
two fields
is
the
situationof
the
investigators
nd, as part
of it,
their
attitudeswith
regard
to
their
objects ;
it is, to
put it
in a
nutshell,the
relationship
etween
sxbjects and obyects. If this relationship,f situationandattitudesare
taken into
acJcounthe
problemsand
the
difficulties f an
equal
advance
n
the
social sciences
stand
out
moreclearly.
Q
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234 PROBLEMS OF
INVOLVEMENT AND
DETACHMENT
The
generalaim of scientificpursuitss the same n both fields;
stripped
of a good
many philosophical
ncrustationst is to find out in whatway per-
ceiveddataare connectedwith each
other. But socialas distinct romnatural
sciences are concernedwith conjunctions f persons. Here, in one form or
the other,
men face themselves;1 the objects are also
subjects . The
task of socialscientists s to explore,and
to makemenunderstand,
he patterns
they form
together, the nature and the changingconfiguration f
all that
binds them
to each other. The investigators hemselves orm part
of these
patterns.
They cannot help
expenencing hem, directlyor by identification,
as immediate
articipantsromwithin;
and the greater he strainsandstresses
to which they or their groupsare
exposed, he moredifficult s it for them to
perfotm he mental operation,
underlying ll scientificpursiits, of detaching
themselvesfrom their role as immediate
participantsand from the limited
vista it offers.
There is no lack of attempts in the
social sciencesat detachingoneself
from one's
positionas an involvedexponentof social events, and at
working
out a wider
conceptual rameworkwithinwhich the problems f the
day can
find theirplace and their meaning.
Perhaps he most persistent ffort n that
directionhasbeen madeby the great
pioneering ociologists f the nineteenth
and early
twentiethcenturies. But theirworkalso showsmost
conspicuously
the difficulties
which, underpresent
conditions, tand in the way of such an
attempt. On
the one hand, they all attemptedto discover, rom
one angle
or the other, the inherent order of the
social developmentof
mankind, ts
laws as some of them called t. They tried to work out a comprehensive
and
universallyvalid theoretical rameworkwithin which the
problemsof
their own age
appearedas specificproblemsof detail and no
longer as the
centralproblem rom which those of
other ages received heir
relevanceand
their meaning. And yet, on the other
hand, they were so deeply nvolved in
the problems
of their own society that they often viewed in fact
the whole
development
f men's relationswith eachother in the light of the
hopes and
1 The
problem of facing oneself is no doubt far more complex than can be
shown here.
It plays its part in explorations of nature as well as
in those of society. For man forms part of
both. Every major change in men's conception of nature, therefore, goes hand in hand with
a change of the
picture they have of themselves.
So does any change in their conception of the
social universe.
Success and failure of any attempt to chatlge from a more involved
to a more
detached view of social phenomena is bound up
with the capacity of men to revise the picture
they have of
themselves in accordance with the results of more methodical studies,
and often
enough in a way
vYhich uns counter to deeply felt beliefs and ideals. In that respect
the problem
of increasing detachment i the social sciences is
hardly diSerent from that which plays its part
in the development of the natural sciences.
However, it
must still be regarded as an open problem how far men are capable
of facing
themselves , of
seeing themselves as they are
without the shining armour of fantasies shielding
them from
sufleringpast, present and future. It is fairly safe to say that their
capacity to do so
grows and declines with the degree of security
which they enjoyed and enjoy. But
it probably
has its limits.
However that may be, at present such
problems can be discussed only in societies which
demand and produce a high degree of
individualization and in which men are being brought up
to experiencethemselves, more perhaps than ever before, as beings set apart from each other by
very strong walls. There can be little doubt that
the picture of self which is thus built up in
the growiIlg
person makes it rather difficult to envisage oneself in a more detached
manner as
forming patterns with others and to study the
nature and structure of these patterns as such.
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NORBERT ELIAS
235
fears,
the enmities
and
beliefs resulting
romtheir role
as
immediate
partici-
pants in the
struggles
and
conflictsof
their own
time.
These two
forms
of
approach-one
more
involved which
made
them
see the
development
of
humansociety as a whole in the light of the pressingproblemsof theirown
time,
the other
more
detached
whichenabled
hem to
visualize
he
short-term
problemsof their
own time
in
the light
of the
long-term
developmentof
society-were so
inextricably
nterwoven n
theirwork
that, in
retrospect,
t
is
difficult o sift
onefrom
the other
and to
sort out
their
contributiono
the
development
of a
more
universally
valid
system of
theories about
men
in
society
from
ideas
relevantonly
as an
expressionof their
own
ideals and
idiosyncrasiesn the
strugglesof a
particular
historical
period.
Since then, a
good
deal
more factual
materialabout
social
phenomena
has
been
broughtto
light. The
elaborationof
a more
impersonal
body of
theoriesand theiradjustment o a wldeningrange of observed acts brought
to light
under heir
guidance, as
considerably
dvancedn
somesocial
sciences,
and
advanced n
some
morethan
in
others.l To a
greater
or lesser
extent,
research n
all human
sciencesstill
tends to
oscillate
between
two levels
of
consciousness
nd two
forms
of
approach,he
one more
akin,
one might
say,
to a
simple
geocentric,
he other
more to a
heliocentric
pproach.
And
the
constant
upsurgeof
the former
n
connection
with acute
social and
political
tensions
effectively
bars in
most
social
sciences the
steady
continuity
of
research
whichhas
become o
markeda
characteristic f
many natural
ciences.
1
The evident
differences in
the
levels of development of different social sciences have
perhaps
not found
quite the
attention they
deserve as a
subject of
research. Like
the
differences
in
the
development of
natural and social
sciences generally,
they are
relevant to
any theory
of
knowledge and of
sciences.
To
set out here
more
comprehensively the
problems raised by
such differences
would
require
an
exposition
of the wider
theory of
knowledge implied in
these
observwations
on
detachment
and
involvement- it would
require
fuller
elaboration of the
general
conceptual
framework
that
has been used
here and
within which,
as one
has seen, the
development
of
scientific
thinking
as
of
thinking in
general, and that
of
changes in the
situation of
those who
thiIlk,
instead of
being allotted
to largely
independent fields of
studiesJ are
linked to each
other
as different,
but
inseparable and
interdependent facets of
the
same process.
Only with the
help of such
an
inte-
grating
framework is it
possible to
determine
with greater
precision different
stages and
levels
of
thinking and
knowing
whether or
not one
adopts concepts
like level of
detachment ,
level
of
Stness , level of
control and
others which
have been used
here.
On
these lines,
one might say,
for example,
that,
under present
conditions,
anthropologists
have a better chance of developing theories on human relations to a higher level of fitness than
say, those
engaged in the
study of highly
differentiated
societies to which
they
themselves
belong
or
which are
antagonists or partners
of societies
to which
they
belong; they have a
better
chance
not only
because it is
easier
to survey,
and to form
relatively fitting
theories about,
social units
which are small
and not too
complex in
structure, but also
because the
investigators
themselves
are, as a
rule, less
directly involved
in the
problems
they study.
Anthropologists, in
most cases
study
societies
to which
they do not
belong, other
sociologists mostly
societies of
which they
are
members.
But
in
saying this, one
refers only
to one
facet of the
relationship
between the
mode
of
thirlking
and the
situation of those
who think.
To
complete the
nexus one
would have to
add
that the
more
detached
theoretical tools
of thinking
which
anthropologists have a
chance
to
build up
in
accordance with
their specific
situation,
can
themselves act,
within
certain limits
as
a shield
against the
encroachment
upon their
scientific work,
and
perhaps even
on their
personai
outlook,
of more
involved, more
emotive forms
of
thinking, even
if tensions
mount
between
social
units to which
they
belong as
participant
members and
others in
relation to
which they
play mainly the part of investigators.
Here, too, in
comparative studies on
the
development of
social
sciences it may
be more
appropriate and more
profitable to
focus on the
relations of observers
and observed
than on
either
of
them or on
methods alone.
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236 PROBLEMS OF
INVOLVEMENT AND DETACHMENT
The pressureof short-termproblemswhich
can no longer be solved in tra-
ditional ways,
of social problemswhichappearto require or their
solution
procedures
evolved and employed by scientific specialists, has
increased
together with the complexityof humanrelations tself. Fragmentation f
social research
has grown apace. Even as an aim of research he idea
of
a
wider heoreticalramework onnecting nd
unifying he problems nd results
of more limited
inquirieshas become more remote; to many it
appears
unattainable, o
others, in addition,undesirable. For the immediate
diffi-
culties of menspringingup in their own
midst fromthe unmanageableorces
of socialchange, romconflictsand frictions
among hemselves,have
remained
exceedinglygreat. The strength of
involvements,within the socialcontext
of men's lives,
if it has not actually ncreasedJ as hardly essened.
- Hence,whateverelse may have changed
ince the days of the
pioneering
sociologists, ertainbasic characteristics f the social scienceshave not. For
the time being,
social scientistsare liable to be caught in a dilemma.
They
workand live in a world n whichalmost
everywhere roups, mall and
great,
including heir
own groups,are engaged n
a struggle or positionand often
enough or
survival,some trying to rise and to better themselves n the
teeth
of strong
opposition, ome who have risenbefore trying to hold what
they
have and some going down.
Under
these conditionsthe membersof such groups can hardly
help
being deeply
affected n their thinkingabout social events by the
constant
threats arisingfrom these tensionsto theirway of life or to their standards
of life and
perhaps o their ife. As members f such groups cientific
pecial-
ists engaged in the study of society share
with others these vicissitudes.
Theirexperience
f themselvesas upholders f a particular ocialand
political
creedwhich is
threatened,as representativesf a specificway of life in
need
of defence, ike
the experience f their fellows,
can hardly ail to have astrong
emotionalundertone. Group-images,hose,
for instance, of classes or of
nations, self-justifications,he cases which
groupsmake out for
themselves,
represent,as a rule, an amalgamof realistic
observations nd collectivefan-
tasies (which
like the myths of simpler
people are real enough as motive
forces of action). To sift out the former rom the latter, to hold up before
these groupsa mirror n whichthey can see
themselves s they might be
seen,
not by an
involvedcritic romanother ontemporaryroup,but by an
inquirer
trying to see in
perspective he structureandfunctioning f their
relationship
with eachother, s not only difficult n itself
for anyonewhosegroup s involved
in such a stzggle; expressed n public, it
may also weaken the cohesion
and solidarity eelingof his groupand, with
it, its capacity o survive.
There
is, in fact, in all these groupsa point beyond
which none of its members an
go in his detachmentwithout appearing nd,
so far as his group s
concerned,
without becominga dangerousheretic,
howeverconsistenthis ideas or
his
theoriesmay be in themselvesand with observed acts, howevermuch thet
may approximate o what we call the
truth .
And yet, if
social scientists althoughusing more specialized
procedures
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NORBERT
ELIAS
237
and a
more
technical
anguageare
in the
last resort
not much
ess
affected n
their
approach o the
problems
of
societyby
preconceived
deas and
ideals,
by
passions
and
partisanviews
than the
man in
the
street, are they
really
justified in calling themselves scientists ? Does any statement, any
hypothesisor
theorydeserve
he
epithet
scientific ,
if it is
ultimately
based
on
dogmatic
beliefs, on a priori
assumptions, n ideas
and
evaluations
which
are
impervious o
arguments
based on
a more
systematic
and
dispassionate
examination
of the
available
evidence? Can
social
scientists
make
any
specific
contribution o
the
solution of
major
problems
even of
their own
groups,
of their
owncountry,
class,
profession r
whatever t is, if
they
accept
as
the
self-endent
foundationof their
theories
some
of the
religiously
held
creedsand
normsof
one or the
other
of these
groupsso
that the
results
of
their
studiesare
destined
rom
the start to
agree,or
at
least not to
disagree,
with the basic tenets of these communalbeliefs? Withoutgreaterdetach-
ment and
autonomyof
thinking,can
they hope
to put in
the
handsof
their
fellow-men
more
fitting
tools of
thinking and
more
adequate
blueprints
or
the handling
of social
and
political
problems-more
adequate
blueprints
han
those
handed on
unreflectingly
rom
generation
to
generationor
evolved
haphazardly
n the heat
of the
battle ?
And
even if they
do not
acceptsuch
beliefs
unquestioningly,re
they not
often
impelled o
use them as
the
general
frame
of
reference or
their
studies simply
by
sentiments
of
solidarity, of
loyalty
or
perhapsof
fear ? Are
they not
sometimes
only too
justified
n
thinking hat it
might
weakena cause
which
they
regardas their
own if
they
were to subjectsystematically he religiously
held social
creedsand
ideals of
one of
their
own
groupsto a
more
dispassionate
cientific
examination, hat
it
might put
weapons n
the
hand of
opponentsor
that,
as a
result, they
themselves
might be
exposed to
ostracism
f to
nothing
worse?
The
dilemma
underlying
many of
thepresent
uncertainties f
the
sciences
of
men is,
as one can
see, not
simply
a
dilemmaof this
or that
historian,
economist,
political
scientistor
sociologist
to
nameonly
some of the
present
divisions); it is
not the
perplexity of
individual
social
scientists,
but that
of
social
scientists
as a
professional
roup. As
things
stand,
theirsocial
task
as scientistsandthe requirementsf theirpositionas members f othergroups
often
disagree;
and
the latter
are apt to
prevail as
long
as the
pressureof
group
tensions and
passions
remains
as high as
it is.
Theproblem
onfronting
hem is not
simply to
discard
he latter
rolein
favourof the
former.
They
cannot
cease to take
partin,
and to be
affected
by, the social
and
political
affairsof
theirgroups
and their
time.
Their
own
participation
and
involvement,
moreover, s
itself one
of the
conditions
or
comprehending
he problems
hey try
to
solve as
scientists.
For while
one
need not
know,in
order to
understand he
structureof
molecules,what
it
feels like to
be one of
its
atoms, in
orderto
understandhe
functioning
of
humangroupsone needs to know,as it were,from nsidehowhumanbeings
expenence
their
own and
other groups,
and
one
cannotknow
without
active
participationand
involvement.
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238 PROBLEMS
OF
INVOLVEMENT
AND
DETACHMENT
The problem
confronting
hose
who study
one or
the
other aspects
of
human
groups
s how to
keep their two
rolesas
participant
and
as inquirer
clearly
and consistently
apart
and, as a
professional
roup,to establish
n
their workthe undisputeddominanceof the latter.
This is so
difficult
a task
that many
representatives
f
social sciences,
at
present,
appear
o regard he
determination
f their inquiries
by precon-
ceived
andreligiously
eld social
andpolitical
dealsas inevitable.
They
often
seem
to
consider hese
heteronomous
oundations
f their pronouncements
s
characteristic,
ot of
a specific
ituation
and, within
t, of a
specific
dilemma,
but
of their
subject-matter
s
such. The
latitude
they allow
each other
in
their use
of dogmatic
deals and
evaluations
as
a basis for
the
setting of
problems,
he
selectionof
material
and the
construction
f theories
s
very
wide;
and is
apt to
becomewider
still whenever
he pressure
f tensions
and
passionsmountsin society at large.
VI
The
chancewhich
social
scientists
have to
face and to
cope with
this
dilemma
might be
greater f it
werenot
for another
characteristic
f
their
situation
which
tends to
obscure he
natureof these
difficulties.
That is the
ascendancy
gained,
over
the
centuries, by
a manner
or style
of thinking
which
has proved
highly adequate
and successful
n men's
dealings
with
physical
events,
but which
is not always
equally
appropriate
f used
in
their
dealingswith others. Oneof the majorreasons orthe difficultieswithwhich
men have
to contend
n theirendeavour
o gain
morereliable
knowledge
bout
themselves
is
the
uncritical and
often dogmatic
application
of categories
and concepts
highly
adequate
n relation
o problems
on the
level
of matter
and energy
to
other levels
of experience
and among
them to that
of social
phenomena.
Not only specific
expectations
as
to how
perceived
data are
connected
with
each other,
specific
concepts
of causation
or of
explanation
formed
n this manner
are
generalized
ndused
almostas a
matter
of course
in
inquiries
about relations
of men;
this
mechanical
diffusion
of models
expressestself, too, for example, n the widespreaddentification f ration-
ality
with the use
of categories
developed
mainly
n
connection
with experi-
ences
of physical
events,
and in
the assumption
hat
the use of
other forms
of
thinking
must
necessarily
ndicate a
leaning
towards
metaphysics
and
irTationality.
The same
tendency
towards
over-generalization
hows itself
in
many
current
deas of what
is and what
is not scientific.
By and
large,theories
of
science
still
use as their
principalmodel
the
physical
sciencesften
not in
theircontemporary,
ut
in theirclassical
orm. Aspects
of their
procedures
are
widely
regarded
as the most
potent
and decisive
factor
responsible
or
their achievementsand ars he essentialcharacteristic f sciencesgenerally.
By
abstracting
uch aspects
from
the actual
procedures
nd
techniques
of
the physical
sciences,one
amves at
a general
model
of scientific
procedure
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NORBERT
ELIAS
239
which
is
knownas '
the
scientific
method . In
name, t
represents
he
dis-
tinguishing
characteristics
ommonto all
scientific,
as
distinct
from non-
scientific, orms
of solving
problems. In
fact, it
often
constitutesa
curious
compoundof featureswhichmay be universalwith otherscharacteristic f
the
physical
sciences
only and
bound up with
the
specific nature
of
their
problems. It
resembles
general
oncept
animal
formed
without
reference
to the
evolutionary
diversityand
connections f
animal
species rom
a
rather
restricted
observationalield
so that
structures nd
functions
ommon
perhaps
to
all
animals,as
distinct
from
non-living hings
and
from
plants,mingle
n
it with
others
characteristicnly
of certain
ypes
of animals,
of, say,
mammals
or of
vertebrates.
The
assumption s
that
in this
generalized
orm the
scientific
method
can be
transferred
rom he
fieldwhere
t
originated,
rom he
physical
ciences,
to all otherfields,to biologicalas well as to socialsciences,regardless f the
different
nature of
their
problems;
and that
wherever t
is
appliedit
will
work
its
magic.
Amongsocial
scientists n
particulart is
not
uncommon
o
attribute
difficulties nd
inadequacies
f
theirwork to
the fact
that they
do
not go
far
enough in
copying the
method
of
physical
sciences. It
is this
strong
concentration f
their
attention
on
problems f
method
which
ends
to
obscure
romtheir
view
the
difficulties hat
spring
romtheir
situation
and
from
their own
approaches
o the
problems hey
study.
The
superior
achievement
and status
of the
physical
sciences
tself
con-
stitutes a highlysignificant actor in the situation of thosewho workin the
field of
social
sciences. If,
as
participants
n the life
of a
turbulent
society,
they
are
constantly in
danger of
using in
their
inquiries
preconceived
nd
immovablesocial
convictionsas
the basis
for their
problemsand
theories,
as
scientiststhey
are in
dangerof
being
dominated
by models
derived
from
inquiries nto
physical
events and
stampedwith
the
authorityof the
physical
sciences.
The fact
itself
that
people
confrontedwith
the
task of
formulating
nd
exploringnew sets
of
problemsmodel
their
concepts
and
procedures n
those
whichhave
proved heir
worth n other
fields s in
no
way
surprising r
unique.
It is a recurrenteature n the history of menthat newcraftsandskills, and
among
hemnew
scientific
pecialisms,n the
early
stagesof their
development,
continue to rely
on older
models.
Some
time is
neededbefore a
new
group
of
specialistscan
emancipate
tself from
the ruling
style of
thinking
and of
acting;
and in
the
courseof
this process
their
attitude
towards
the older
groups,as in
other
processes
of
emancipation,s
apt
to
oscillate: they
may
go too
far for a
while and
may
go on too
long in
their uncritical
ubmission
to
the
authority
and
prestige of the
dominant
standards; and
then
again,
they
may go
too far in
their
repudiation
nd in
theirdenial
of the
functions
which the
older models
had
or have
in the
developmentof
their own.
In
most of these respectsthe emergenceof the youngersocial sciences from
underthe
wings of the
older
natural
sciences
follows the
usual
pattern.
But
there can
have
been
rarelya
situation n
whichthe
gradient
between
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240 PROBLEMS OF INVOLVEMENT AND DETACHMENT
the comparatively igh level of detachmentmanifest n the older branches
of knowledgeand the much lower represented y the youngerbrancheswas
equally steep. In the physicalsciences} t is not only the development nd
use of a specificmethod or the solutionof problems nd the testingof theories,
but the framingof problemsand theories itself which presupposes high
standardof detachment. The same method transferredo social sciences s
not infrequentlyused for the exploration f problemsand theoriesconceived
andstudiedunder he impactof strong nvolvernents. Hence he use, in social
sciences,of a methodakin to that evolved n the physical ciencesoften gives
to the former he appearance f a high evel of detachment r of objectivity
which those who use this method are in fact lacking. It often serves as a
means of circumventing ifficultieswhich spring from their dilemmawith-
out facing it; in many cases, it creates a facade of detachmentmaskinga
highly involved approach.
As a result,a crucialquestion s often regarded s sealedand solvedwhich
in fact is still in abeyance: the questionwhichof the proceduresndtechniques
of the physicalsciencesare commensurateo the task of social sciencesand
which are not. The abstraction rom these specificprocedures f
a
general
modelof the scientificmethod,and the claimoften madefor it as the supreme
characteristic f research hat is scientific,have led to the neglect, or even
to the exclusion rom the field of systematicresearch, f wide problem-areas
which do not lend themselveseasily to an explorationby meansof a method
for which the physical scienceshave provided he prototype. In order to
be able to use methodsof this kind and to prove themselves cientificn the
eyes of the world, nvestigators re frequently nduced o ask and to answer
relatively nsignificantquestionsand to leave unanswered thers perhapsof
greater significance. They are induced to cut their problems o as to suit
their method. The exclusiveand seemingly inal characterof many curre t
statements about the scientificmethod finds expression n the strange -lea
that problemswhich do not lend themselves o investigationsbv means of
a methodmodelledon that of the physicalsciencesare no concernof people
engaged n scientificresearch.
On closer investigation,one will probably find that the tendency to
consider highlyformalized ictureof this one set of sciences nd theirmethod
as the norm and ideal of scientific nquiriesgenerally s connectedwith a
specific dea aboutthe aim of sciences. It is, one might think, boundup with
the assumption hat among propositionsof empiricalsciences, as among
those of pure mathematics nd relatedforms of logic, the only relevantdis-
tinction to be made is that betweenpropositionswhich are true and others
which are false; and that the aim of scientificresearch nd of its procedures
is simply and solely that of findingthe truth , of sifting trlle from false
statements. However, he goal towardswhich positive sciencesare striving
is not, and by their very naturecannotbe, wholly denticalwth that of fields
like logic and mathematicswhich are collcernedwith the inherentorder of
certain tools of thinkingalone. It certainlyhappens n empirical nvestiga-
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NORBERT ELIAS
24I
tions
that people
make
statementswhich
are simply
found to be
false. But
oftenenough
ough
dichotomiesike
true
and false
are
highly
nadequate
in
theircase.
People
engaged n
empirical
esearch ften
put forward
proposi-
tions or theorieswhosemerit is that they are truer than others or, to use
a less
hallowed
erm, that
they
aremore
adequate,
more
consistent
both with
observations nd
in
themselves. In
general
erms,
one might
say it is
char-
acteristic of
these
scientificas
distinct from
non-scientific
orms of
solving
problems hat, in
the
acquisitionof
knowledge,
questions
emerge
and are
solved
as a result
of an
uninterrupted
wo-way traffic
betweentwo
layersof
knowledge:
that of
general
deas,
theoriesor
modelsand
that of
observations
and
perceptions f
specific
earents.
The latter if
not
sufficiently
nformed
by
the former
remains
unorganized nd
diffuse;
the
former f not
sufficientty
informedby
the
latter
remains
dominated
by feelings
and
imaginings. It
is
the objectiveof scientists,one might say, to develop a steadily expanding
body of
theories
or models
and
an equally
expanding
body of
observations
about
specificearents
by means
of a
continuous,critical
confrontation
o
greater
and
greater
congruity
with each
other.
The
methods
actually used
in
empirical
nvestigations,
nevitably,vary
a good
deal
from
discipline o
discipline n
accordancewith
the different
types of
problems hat
present
themselves
or solution.
What they
have in
common,what
identifies
hem
as
scientific
methods is
simply
that they
enable
scientists to
test
whether
theirfindings
nd
pronouncements
onstitutea
reliable
dvance n
the
direction
towardstheir commonobjective.
VII
Is
it possible
o
determinewith
greater
precision
nd
cogency he
limita-
tions of
methods
of
scientific
researchmodelled
on
those of
the
physical
sciences
?
Can one, in
particular, hrow
more
light on
the limits
to
the
usefulness f
mathematicalr, as
this term s
perhaps
oo
wide in this
context,
of
quantifying
modelsand
techniques
n
empirical
researches
At the
present
state of
development,he
weight and
relevanceof
quanti-
fying procedures learlydiffers n differentproblem-areas. In some, above
all
in the
physical
sciences,
one can
see to-day
no limit to
the
usefulness
of
procedureswhich
make
relations
of
quantities
tandfor the
non-quantitative
aspects
of the
relations of
data;
the
scope for
reducing
other
properties
to
quantities
and
for
workingout, on
the
basis of
such a
reduction,
highly
adequate
theoretical
constructs
appears o
be
without
bounds.
In
otherfields
of
research he
scope for
similar
reductions s
clearlyvery
much
narrower;
and
theoretical
constructs
based on
such
reductions
alone
often
prove
farless
adequate.
Have
problem-areas hich
do not lend
them-
selves as
wellas
the physical
ciences o the
application
f
quantifying
methods
of research ertaingeneralpropertieswhichcan accountfor such differences
in
the scope
and
relevance
of
quantifying
proceduresas
instruments
of
research
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242
PROBLEMS
OF
INVOLVEMENT
AND
DETACHMENT
It is possible
to think that this
problem
tself can
be readilysolved
in
terms
of quantities
alone.
As one passes
from studiesof
matterand energy
and
its various
transformations
o those
of organisms nd
their
development
as speciesand individualsand againto studiesof men as societiesandindi-
viduals
(in
not quitethe same
senseof the
word),according
o a not
uncommon
view,
the problems
which
one encounters
ecomesmorecomplex;
the greater
complexity
s often thought
to followfrom
the fact that
the number
of inter-
acting
parts, factors,
variables
or suchlike
ncreaseas
one moves from
the
study
of inorganic
matterto those
of organisms
nd of
men; andas a
result
of this increase
n numbers,
so the
argumentseems
to run,
measurements
and
mathematical
operationsgenerally,
becomemore and
morecomplicated
and
diicult.
If one accepts
he ideathat
it is the
aim of scientific
nvestiga-
tions everywhere
o
explain the behaviour
of composite
units of
observation
by means of measurementsrom that of their simplerconstituentparts,each
of the
variablesaffecting
the behaviour
of such a unit
wouldhave
to be
measuredby
itself so as to
determine
he quantitative
aspectsof
its relations
with
others. The
greater
the number
of variables,the
greaterwould
be
the number
of measurements
nd
the morecomplicated
wouldbe
the
mathe-
matical operations
necessary
o
determine heir
interplay. In
the light of
this
hypothesisthe
demandsmade
on the resources
n
manpower, n
com-
puting machines,
n mathematical
echniques
and
in money and
time would
progressively
ncrease
rom one set
of sciences o
the othersvith
the increase
in the
numberof factors
hat has
to be taken
into account.
Moreand
more,
these
demandswould
becomeprohibitive
and research
on quantitative
ines
alone
would no longer
be
possible. According
o this
view, it is for
that
reason
that one
has to resign oneself
to the
use of less
precise and
less
satisfactory
methods
of investigation
n
many fieldsof
studies.
In a
way, this
approach o
the observable
imitationsof
quantifying
methods n
research
s itself not uncharacteristic
f the manner
n which
orms
of thinking
most serviceable
n the
exploration
of physical
data become
dis-
tendedinto
what almost
represents
generalstyle
of thinking.
The
choice
of
a heap of more
and morefactors
or
variablesas a
model for increasing
complexity s determinedby a generalexpectationwhichis evidentlybased
on experiences
n
physicalresearch,
but which tends
to assume
he character
of
an a priori belief:
by the expectation
hat problems
of all kinds can
be
satisfactorily
olved
in terms of
quantitiesalone.
However, he
area within
which this
expectationcan
be safely used
as
a guideto
the formulation
f problems
and theories
has very definite
imits.
The
properties
of different
units of observation
characteristic
f different
disciplines
re not aloneaffected
by the number
f
interacting arts,
variables,
factcrsor
conditions,but
also by
the manner n
whichconstituents
of such
units are
connectedwith
each
other. Perhaps
the best way
to indicate
brieflythis aspectof these differencess the hypotheticalconstruction f a
model
of models
which represent
different
ramesof reference
of scientific
problems
n a highly
generalized
orm as
compositeunits
arranged ccording
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NORBERT ELIAS
243
to
the extent of
interdependencef their
constituentsor, more
generally,
according o
the degree
of organization
which they possess.
Arrangedn this
manner, his continuum
of modelswould
have one
pole
formedby generalmodels of units, such as congeries,agglomerations,eaps
or multitudes,
whose
constituentsare
associatedwith each other
temporarily
in
the loosest possible
manner
and may exist
independentlyof each
other
without
changingtheir
characteristic roperties. The
other
pole would be
formedby
general
modelsof unitssuch as
opensystems and
processeswhich
are highly
self-regulating nd
autonomous,
which consist of a
hierarchyof
interlocking
part-systems and
part-processesand
whose constituents are
interdependent o such
an extent that they
cannot be isolated
from their
unit without
radicalchanges in
their propertiesas
well as in those of the
unit itself.
Between these two poles would be spaced out intermediarymodels1
graded
according o
the degreeof
differentiation nd
integrationof their
constituents.
As one
moves along this
continuumof
models romparadigms
f loosely
composed o
others of
highlyorganizedunits,
as modelsof
congeries tep by
step give
way to those
of self-regulating
pen systems and
processeswith
more and more levels
many of
the devicesdeveloped
or scientificresearch
into units of
the first
type change, or even
lose, their function.
In many
cases, frombeing the
principal nstruments
and
techniquesof research, hey
become, at the most,
auxiliaries.
Less adequate, in that sense, becomesthe concept of an independent
variableof a unit of
observation
which is otherwise
kept invariantand, with
it,
the type of
observation nd
experimentation asedon
the supposition hat
what one
studies is a heap of
potentially
independentvariables
and their
effects.
Lessadequate, oo,
becomes he concept
of a
scientific aw as the general
theoreticalmould for
particular onnections
of
constituentsof a largerunit.
Forit is one
of the tacit
assumptions nderlying oth
the
conceptionand the
establishment
f a scientific aw
that the phenomena f
which one
wishes to
state in the form of a law that the patternof their connection s necessary
and
unchanging,do not
change
their properties
rreversibly f they are cut
off
from other
connectionsor from each
other. The
type of relationship
whose
regularitycan be fairly
satisfactorily
xpressed n the
form of a law
is a
relationshipwhichis
impermanenthough it has a
permanentpattern:
it can start
and cease
innumerableimes
withoutaffecting he
behaviourof
other
constituentsof the
largernexus within
which t occursor the
properties
1
Even in the elementary
form in
which it is presented here, such
a serial model may help
to clarify the
confusion that often arises
from an all too
clear-cut dichotomy
between congeries
and systems.
Not all frames
of reference of physical
problems cluster narrowly
around the
congeries pole of the model.
Not all
frames of reference of biological
or sociological problems
have their equivalent close to the other pole. They are, in each of these areas of inquiry, more
widely scattered
than it is often assumed.
And
although, in each of these areas,
their bulk can
probably be
assigned to a
specific region of the serial
model, frames of referenceof
the problems
of
diEerent disciplines,
projected on this model,
frequently overlap.
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244
PROBLEMS OF
INVOLVEMENT AND
DETACHMENT
of the
larger
nexus itself. General ass
for particularcases, in
short, are
instruments or the
solutionof problems
whose
referential rame s conceived
as a congeries.l
The more the framework f problemsresemblesn its characteristics
highly
self-regulating ystem
and process,the
greater in other words the
chancethat
constituentsare permanently
onnected
with eachother so that
they
are bound to
changetheir properties
rrevocablyf these
connections
are
.severed, he more ikely is
it that laws assumea
subsidiary ole as tools
of research; the
moredoes one require s
the
paramount ehicle orexploring
and
presentingregularitiesof
part-connections,ystem and
process-models
clearly
representative f the
fact that part-eventsare
linked to
each other
as constituentsof
a functioniIlg nit
without whi.ch
hey would not occuror
would
not occur
in this manner.
Nor do those time-honourednt.ellectual perationsknown as iIlduction
and deduction
retain quite the same
character
hroughout his continuum
of
models. In their classical
ormthey are
closely inkedup with
intellectual
movements up and down
between discrete and
isolated
universals,which
may be general
concepts, aws,
propositions r
hypotheses,and an inEnite
multitudeof
particular aseswhichare also
conceivedas
capableof preserving
their signiEcant
haracteristics
f they are studied n
isolation ndependently
of all
other
contlectiorss.
When models
of multitudes become
subordirlate
o models of highly
organized ystemsanother ype
of research
peration ains greater
prominence
modifying o someextent thoseof induction nddeduction, amelymovements
up and
down between models
of the
whole and those of its
parts.
It is difficult
o think of any well
established
errnsexpressing learly
the differential
ualitiesand the
complementary
haracter f thesetwo opera-
1 In
the case of the second law of
thermodynamics an
experimental and
statistical law has
been interpreted as a
statement about
qualities possessed by the
referential system as a whole
that is
by the physical universe.
However, if one may use
experiences n other fields
as a model
it is not always safe to
assume that properties
observed as those of
constituent parts of a system
are also properties of
the system as a
whole. Whether or not one
is justified, in this case, to
assume that regularities
observed in a part-regic)n f a
system, in a part-regionof
both time and
space,
can be interpreted as regularities
of the whole system only
pShysicists re
entitled to judge.
However, these general considerations about laws are hardly affected by this case. In
physics
as in other scientific disciplines
the referential
rameworkof problems s far
from uniform.
Although, in the
majority of cases, the units of
observation are simply conceitredas
heaps, there
are
others in which
they are envisaged as units
endowed with properties
approachingto those
of systems. But
compared with the models of
systems and
processes developed in some of the
biological and some of
the social sciences those which
have been produced in
physical sciences
show, on the whole, a
relatively high
independence of parts and
a relatively low degree of
organization.
This
may or may not account for
the fact that although the
status of laws, in
the classical
sense of the words, has
to some extent declined in
the physical
sciences with the ascendance of
models which have
some of the
characteristics of systems, the
change does not appear to be
very pronounced.
What apparently has become
more pronouncedis the implied
expectation
that the
diverse laws discovered in
studies of isolated connections
will eventually
coalesce and
form with each other a
comprehensive theoretical
scaffoldiIlg or the behaviour of
the over-all
system as a whole.
Perhaps it is not
yet quite clear why one should
expect that the unconnected
clusters of connections whose regularities one has more or less reliably determinedwill subse-
quently
link up and fall
into pattern. To expect that
they will do so, at any ratea
means assum-
ing that
in the end all congeries
including that of ene.gy-matter
will turn out to
be systems
of a
kind or aspects and parts of
systems.
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NORBERT ELIAS
245
tions. PerhapsoIle might call analytical ' those steps of research n which
the theoreticalrepresentation f a system is treated more or less as a back-
ground romwhichproblems f constituentpartsstand out as the primeobject
of researchand as a potential testing-ground or theoreticalrepresentations
of the whole; and one might call synoptic (not to say synthetic )
those steps which are aimed at forminga more coherent heoreticalrepre-
sentationof a system as a whole as a unifying ramework nd as a potential
testing-groundor