elias (1956) problems of involvement and detachment

8/10/2019 Elias (1956) Problems of involvement and Detachment

1/28

Problems of Involvement and DetachmentAuthor(s): Norbert EliasReviewed work(s):Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Sep., 1956), pp. 226-252Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/587994.

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2/28

etachment

NORBERT

ELIAS

Old Lady:

Are you not prejudiced

Author:

Madame,arelywill

you meeta moreprejudiced

an

norone who {ells

himselfhe keeps

his mind

moreopen. But cannot

hat be because ne

part

of ourmind, hat

svhich

we act with,becomes rejudiced

hrough xperience,

andstillwe keep

another artcompletely

pen o

observe nd udgewith

?

Old Lady:

Sir, I

do not know.

A thor: Madame,

eitherdo

I and it may well be

that we aretalkingnonsense.

Old Lady: That is

an odd term

and oneI did not

encountern my youth.

A thor:

Madame,we apply

the term now

to describe nsoundness

n abstract

conversation,

r, indeed,any overmetaphysical

endency n speech.

Old Lady:

I must

learnto use these terms

correctly.

E. Hemingway,

eathin the afternoon.

NE

cannotsay ol a

man's outlook

in any absolute

sense that it is

{ Xdetached

or involved(or, if one

prefers,

rational or irrational

,

^ objective

or subjective

). Only small

babies,and among

adults

perhaps

only insanepeople,

becomeinvolved in

whatever

they experience

with complete

abandon o

their feelingshere and

now; and

again only the

insanecan remain

otally unmovedby

what goes

on around hem. Normally

adultbehaviour ies on a scalesomewhere etweenthese two extremes.

In

some

groups,and in some

individuals

of these groups, t

may come nearer

to one of them than

in others; it may

shift hither

and thither as social

and

mental

pressures lse and fall.

But sociallife as

we knowit would come

to

an end

if standards

of adult behaviour

went too far in either

direction. As

far as

one can see,

the very existence

of orderedgroup ife

depends

on the

interplay

n men's thoughts

and actionsof impulses

n both directions,

hose

that involve

and those that

detach keeping

each other in check.

Theymay

clash and struggle

for dominance

or compromise

nd form alloys of

many

differentshades

and kinds however

varied, it

is the relation between

the

two whichsets people'scourse. In usingthese terms,1onerefers n shortto

1 It

is still the prevalent practice

to speak of psychological

characteristics

and of social

characteristicsof people

not only as different, but

as separable and in the last

resort independent

226

roblems

o Involvement

n d


3/28

NORBERT ELIAS

227

changing qiilibriabetween ets of mental activitieswhich n man's relations

with men, with non-humanobjects and with himself (whatever heir other

functionsmay be) have the function to involve and to detach.

As tools of thinking, therefore, involvement and detachment

wouldremainhighly ineffectual f they wereunderstood o adumbrate sharp

division betweentwo independent ets of phenomena. They do not refer to

two separateclassesof objects; used as universals hey are, at best, marginal

concepts. In the main, what we observeare people and people'smanifesta-

tions, such as patternsof speech or of thought, and of other activities, some

of which bear the stamp of higher, others of lesser detachmentor involve-

ment. It is the continuum hat lies between hese marginal olesthat presents

the principalproblem. Canone determinewith greateraccuracy he position

of specificattitudes or productsof men within this continuum One might,

impressionistically,ay for examplethat in societies ike ours people tend to

be more detached n their approaches o naturalthan to social events. Can

one trace, at least summarily,criteria for differentdegrees of detachment

and involvement? What in fact is meant,what does it imply f one says that

in societiessuch as ours with a relativelyhigh degreeof industrialization nd

of control over non-human orcesof nature,approaches o nature are on the

whole more detached than those to society ? The degree of detachment

shown by different ndividuals n similarsituationsmay differgreatly. Can

one, nevertheless, peak, in this respect, of differentdegreesof detachment

and involvementregardlessof these individualvariations?

II

The way in which individualmembersof a group experiencewhatever

affects heirsenses, he meaningwhich t has for them,depends n the standard

formsof dealingwith, and of thinkingand speakingabout, these phenomena

graduallyevolved in their society. Thus, although he degreeof detachment

sets of properties. And if this is the assumption underlying one's form of discourse, terms like

involved and detached , as they are used here, must appear as equivocal and vague.

They have been chosen in preference to other perhaps more familiar terms precisely because

they do not fall in line with linguistic usages which are based on the tacit assumption of the

ultimate independence of psychological and social properties of men. They do not suggest as

some current scientific concepts do that there are two separate sets of human functions or attri-

butes, one psychological and one social in character, which communicate with each other only

occasionally during a limited span of time with a definite beginning and a definite end by means

of those one-way connections which we call causes-and-effects and then withdraw from each

other until a new causal connection is established again with a definite beginning and a

definite end.

Both these terms express quite clearly that changes in a person's relation with others and

psychological changes are distinct but inseparable phenomena. The same holds good of their

use as expressions referring to men's relation to objects in general. They seem preferable

to others which like subjective and objective suggest a static and unbridgeable divide

between two entities subject and object . To give a brief and all too simple example of

their meaning in this context: A philosopheronce said, If Paul speaks of Peter he teUs us more

about Paul than about Peter. One can say, by way of comment, that in speaking of Peter

he is always telling us something about himself as well as about Peter. One would call his

approach involved as long as his own characteristics, the characteristics of the perceiver

overshadow those of the perceived. If Paul's propositions begin to tell more about Peter than

about himself the balance begins to turn in favour of detachment.


4/28

228 PROBLEMS

OF INVOLVEMENT

AND DETACHMENT

shown in one's encounterwith

natural forces may vary from indindual

to

indisridual nd

from situation to situation, the concepts

themselveswhich,

in societies like

ours, all individualsuse in thinking,

speakingand

acting,

concepts ike lightning , tree or wolf not less than electricity ,

organism ,

cause-and-effect or nature , in

the sense in whichthey

are used to-day,

representa relatively

high degree of detachment;

so does

the socially nduced

xperience f natureas a landscape

or as beautiful

.

The range of

individualvariations n detachment,

n other words, s limited

by the public

standardsof detachmentembodied

n modes of thinkingand

speakingaboutnatureand in the

widely nstitutionalized

se of natural orces

for humanends.

Compared sthpreviousages control

of emotions n experi-

encingnature,

as that of nature

tself, has grown. Involvementhas

lessened,

but it has not disappeared. Even

scientific approacheso nature

do not

require he extinctionof other more nvolvedandemotiveformsof approach.

What distinguishes hese from other

less detachedapproachess the

manner

in which tendenciestowards detachment

and towards

nvolvementbalance

each other and

blend.

Like otherpeople,scientists

engaged n the study

of natureare, to some

extent, prompted

n the pursuitof their task by personal

wishesand wants;

they are often

enough nfluenced y specificneeds

of the community

o which

they belong. They may wish to

foster their own career. They may

hope

that the results

of their inqulrieswill be in line with

theories hey haveenun-

ciated beforeor with the requirementsnd idealsof groupswith whichthey

identify themselves. But these

involvements, n the

naturalsciences,deter-

mine as a rule

nothingmorethan the generaldirection

of inquiries; they are,

in most cases,

counter-balanced

nd checkedby institutionalized rocedures

which compel scientists, more

or less, to detach themselves,for the

time

being, from the

urgent issues at hand. The immediate

problems,personal

or communal,

nduce problems

of a differentkind, scientificproblems

which

are no longer

directlyrelated o specificpersonsor

groups. The former,more

narrowly ime-bound,

often serve

merely as a motive force; the latter,

the

seientificproblemswhich they

may have induced,owe their forrnand

their

meaning o the widerand less time-bound ontinuum f theoriesandobserva-

tions evolved

in this or that problem-area y generations

of specialists.

Like other human activities

scientific nquiriesnto nature embody

sets

of values. To

say that natural sciences are non-evaluating

or value-

free is a misuse

of terms. But the sets of values,

the types of evaluations

which play a

part in scientifie nquiriesof this type

differfrom those

which

have as theirframe of reference

he interests,the well-beingor suffering

of

oneself or of social

units to which

one belongs. The aim of these

inqwries

is to find the inherent

orderof eventsas it is, independently

ot of

any, but

of any particularobserver,and

the importance, he relevanee, he

value of

what one observes s assessed n accordancewith the place and function t

appearsto have

withln this orderitself.

In the explorationof nature,

in short, scientists

have learned hat any


5/28

NORBERT ELIAS

229

direct encroachmentupon their work by short-term nterests or needs of

specific personsor groups is liable to jeopardize he usefulnesswhich their

workmay have in the end forthemselves r fortheirowngroup. Theproblems

which they formulateand, by means of their theories, ry to solve, have in

relation o personalor socialproblems f the day a high degreeof autonomy;

so have the sets of values which they use; their work is not value-free ,

but it is, in contrast to that of many social scientists, protectedby firmly

establishedprofessional tandardsand other institutionalsafeguardsagalnst

the intrusionof heteronomous valuations.l Here, the primary endencyof

man to take the short route from a strongly felt need to a precept or its

satisfactionhas becomemore or less subordinate o preceptsand procedures

whichrequire longer oute. Natural cientists eek to findways of satisfying

human needs by means of a detour the detour via detachment. They set

out to find solutionsfor problemspotentiallyrelevant for all human beings

and all human groups. The question characteristic f men's involvement:

What does it mean for me or for us ? has become ubordinateo questions

like What is it ? or How are these events connectedwith others? In

this form, the level of detachmentrepresentedby the scientist's work has

becomemoreor less institutionalized s part of a scientific radition eproduced

by means of a highly specialized raining,maintainedby various forms of

social control and socially induced emotional restraints; it has become

embodied n the conceptualtools, the basic assumptionsf he methods of

speakingand thinking which scientists use.

Moreover,onceptsand methodsof this type have spread,and are spread-

ing agasn and again, from the workshopsof the specialiststo the general

public. In most industrial societies, impersonal ypes of explanationsof

natural events and other conceptsbased on the idea of a relativelyautono-

mous order,of a courseof events independent f any specificgroupof human

observers,are used by people almost as a matter of course though most of

them are probablyunawareof the long struggle nvolved in the elaboration

and diffusionof these forms of thinking.

Yet, here too, in society at large, these more detached ormsof thinking

represent only orle layer in people's approaches o nature. Other more

involved and emotive forms of thinking about nature have by no means

disappeared.

1 This concept has been introduced here in preference to the distinction between scientific

procedures which are value-free and others which are not. It rather confuses the issue if

the term value , in its application to sciences, is reserved to those values which intrude

upon scientific theories and procedures, as it were, from outside. Not oniy has this narrow

use of the word led to the odd conclusion that it is possible to sever the connection between

the activity of evaluating and the values which serve as its guide, it has also tended to

limit the use of terms like value or evaluating in such a way that they seem applicable

only in cases of what is otherwise known as bias or prejudice ''. Yet, even the aim of

finding out the relatednessof data, their inherent orderor, as it is sometimes expressed, at approxi-

mating to the truth , implies that one regards the discovery of this relatedness or of the

truth as a value . In that sense, every scientific endeavour has moral implications.Instead of distinguishing between two types of sciences, one of which is value-free while the

other is not, one may find it both simpler and more apposite to distinguish n scientific pronounce-

ments betsveen two types of evaluations, one autonomous, the other heteronomous, of which

one or the other may be dominant.


6/28

230

PROBLEMS OF

INVOLVEMENT AND

DETACHMENT

Thus in

falling ll one may

find one's thoughts

stray

again and again to

the question:

Who is to blame

for this ?

'> The childhood

experienceof

pain as

the outcomeof an

attackand

perhapsa certainurge

to retaliate

may

assertthemselves venthoughunder he pressure f an overgrown onscience

the attack may

appearas deserved}

o that one may

come to

feel, rightly or

wrongly,

one has only

oneself to blame for

it. And

yet one may

accept at

the same time

the doctor'smore

detached

dictumthat this

illness followed

primarily rom a

completelyblind biological

course

of events and not

from

anybody's ntentions,not

from

consciousor

unconsciousmotives of any

kind.

More

nvolved formsof

thinking, n short,

continueto

form an integral

part of our

experienceof nature.

But in this area

of our

experience hey

have

become ncreasingly

verlaidand

counterbalancedy otherswhich

make

higherdemands

on men's faculty

of looking

at themselvesas

it were from

outsideand of viewingwhat they call mine or ours as partsystemsof

a larger ystem.

In their

experience f

naturemenhave been

able, in course

of time,

to fotmand to face

a pictureof the

physicaluniverse

which s

emotion-

ally far from

satisfactory,which, n

fact,

seems to become ess

and less so as

science

advances,but which

at thesametime

agreesbetterwith

the

cumulative

resultsof

systematic

observations. They

have learned

o imposeupon

them-

selvesgreater

restraint n their

approacheso natural

events

and in exchange

for the

short-term

atisfactionswhich they

had to

give up they have

gained

greaterpower o

controland to

manipulatenatural

orces or

their ownends,

and with it, in this sphere, greater security and other new long-term

satisfactions.

III

Thusin their

publicapproaches

o nature,men

have

travelleda longway

(and

have to

travel it again and

again as they grow

up) from the

primary,

the

childhoodpatternsof

thinking.

The road they

have travelled s

still far

fromclear. But

one can

see in broadoutline

omeof its

characteristic atterns

and

mechanisms.

When men, instead of using stones as they found them againsthuman

enemies

or

beasts, with greater

restraint of their

momentaryimpulses,

gradually

changedtowards

fashioning

stones in advance for

their

use as

weaponsor tools

(as we

may assume hey did

at some time),

when,

ncreasing

their

foresight, hey

gradually

hanged romgathering

niits androots

towards

gro+ring

lants deliberately

or their

own use, it

implied hat they

themselves

as well as their

social life

and theirnatural

surroundings,hat

their outlook

as well as their

actions

changed. The same

can be said of

those later stages

in which

changes n men's

thinking

aboutnature

becamemore and more

the

task of scientific

specialists. Throughout

hese developments

he mastery

of menoverthemselvesas expressedn theirmentalattitudestowardsnature

and their

masteryover

natural orces

by handling

hem, havegrown

ogether.

The level

and patterns of

detachmentrepresented

by public

standardsof


7/28

NORBERT

ELIAS

23I

thinkingabout

naturalevents were

n the past and still

are

dependenton the

level

andthemanner f

control epresented y

public tandards f

manipulating

them and vlce versa.

For a verylong time,therefore,men, n theirstrugglewith thenon-human

forcesof nature,must

have moved

n whatappears n

retrospectas a vicious

circle. They had little

controlover

natural orceson

which heyweredepend-

dent

for theirsurvival.

Whollydependenton

phenomenawhose

course hey

could neither

foreseenor influence

o any considerable

xtent,

they lived in

extreme

nsecurity,and, being

most

vulnerableand insecure, hey

could not

help feeling

strongly

about everyoccurrence

hey thought might

affect their

lives; they were too

deeply involved to

look at natural

phenomena, ike

distant

observers, almly. Thus,

on the one hand, they

had little

chanceof

controlling

heir ovvnstrong

feelings in relation to

nature and of forming

more detachedconceptsof naturalevents as long as they had little control

over them;

and they

had, on the other hand,

little chanceof

extending heir

control over

their non-human

urroundings s long as

they

could not gain

greatermasteryover

their own

strong eelingsn relation

o them and increase

their controlover

themselves.

The change towards

greater

control over natural

phenomenaappears

to

have followedwhat in

ourtraditional

anguagemight be called

the prin-

ciple of increasing

acilitation . It must

have been extremely

difficult or

men

to gain greater

controlover

natureas long as they

had little controlover

it; and the

morecontrol

hey gained, he

easierwas it for them to

extend it.

Nothing

n ourexperience

uggeststhat

part-processes f this

kind must

always work in the same

direction.

Some of the phases

n which they went

into

reversegear are

known fromthe past.

Increasing ocial

tensions and

strife may go

hand in

hand with both a

decreaseof men's ability

to control,

andan

increase n the

phantasy-content f

men's deasabout,

naturalas well

as social

phenomena. Whether

eed-back

mechanisms f this

kind work in

one or in the

otherdirection

depends, n short, on the

total

situationof the

social units

concerned.

IV

Paradoxically

nough, the

steadyincrease n the

capacity of men, both

for

a moredetached

approach o natural

orcesand for

controllinghem, and

the gradual

acceleration f this

process,have

helped o increase he

difficulties

which men have in

extending

their controlover

processesof social change

and

over their own

feelings in

thinkingabout them.

Dangers

threateningmen

from non-human

forces have

been slowly

decreasing.

Not the

least importanteffect

of a more detached

approach n

this

field has been that

of limiting

fears, of preventing

hem, that is, from

irradiatingwidelybeyondwhat canbe realistically ssessedas a threat. The

formerhelplessnessn the

face of

incomprehensiblend

unmanageable atural

forces has

slowly given way to a

feeling of

confidence,he

concomitant,one


8/28

232 PROBLEMS OF INVOLVEMENT AND

DETACHMENT

might say, of

increasing acilitation,of men's powerto

raise, in this sphere,

the general evel of

well-being nd to enlarge he area of security hrough he

applicationof

patient and systematicresearch.

But the growthof men's comprehensionf natural orcesand of the use

made of them for

human ends is associatedunth specificchanges n human

relationships; it goes hand in hand with the growing

nterdependence f

growingnumbersof

people. The gradualaccelerationn the incrementof

knowledgeand use

of non-human orces, bound up with specificchanges n

humanrelationsas it iSs has helped, n turn,to accelerate

he processof change

in the latter. The

networkof humanactivitiestends to become ncreasingly

complex,far-flung

and dosely knit. Moreand moregroups,and with them

more and more ndividuals, end to besomedependent n

each otherfor their

secunty and the

satisfactionof their needs in ways

which, for the greater

part, surpass he comprehensionf those involved. It is as if first thousands,

then millions, hen more and more millionswalked

through his world their

hands and feet

chained ogetherby invisible les. No

one is in charge. No

one stands outside.

Somewant to go this, othersthat

way. They fall upon

each other and,vanquishing r defeated,still remain

chained o each other.

No one can regulate

he movementsof the whole unless

a great part of them

are able to

understand, o see, as it were, from outside,the whole patterns

they fortn together. And they are not able to visualize

themselvesas part

of these largerpatterns because, being hemmed in and

moved uncompre-

hendinglyhitherandthither n wayswhichnoneof them ntended, hey cannot

help being

preoccupied ith the urgent,narrowandparochialproblemswhich

each of them has to

face. They can only look at

whateverhappens o them

from their narrow

ocationwithin the system. They aretoo deeply nvolved

to look at themselves rom without. Thus what is

formedof nothing but

human beings acts

upon each of them, and is

experiencedby many as ar

alien external force

not unlike the forces of nature.

The same

processwhichhas made men less

dependent n the vagariesof

nature has made

them more dependenton each other. Ishe changeswhich,

with regard o non-humanorces,have given men greater

powerand security,

have increasingly roughtupon them different ormsof insecurity. In their

reiationswith each

other men are again and againconfronted, s they were

in the past in theirdeaSingswith non-human orces,

with phenomena,with

problemswhich,

given their presentapproaches, re still beyond heir control.

They are incessantly aced with the task of adjusting

hemselves o changes

whichthough

perhapsof their own makingwerenot intendedby them. And

as these changes requentlybring n their wake unforeseen

ains for some atld

losses for others,

they tend to go hand in hand with tensions and frictions

between groups

which, at the same time, are

inescapablychained to each

other. Tests of strengthand the use of organized orce

serve often as costly

means of adjustmento changeswithin this tangle of interdependencies; n

manr of its levels no other means of adiustmentexist.

Thus vulnerable

and insecureas men are under

these conditions, hey


9/28

NORBERT

ELIAS

233

cannot

stand back and

look

at the

courseof

events calmly

ike

more

detached

observers.

Again, t

is, on the

other hand,

difficult or

men in that

situation

to

control

more

fully their

own

strong feelings

with

regard o

events

which,

they feel,

may deeply

affecttheir

lives, and to

approach

hem with greaterdetachment,as

long as

their

ability to

controlthe

course

of events is

small;

and it is, on

the

other

hand, difficult

or

them to

extendtheir

understanding

and control

of

theseevents

as long as

they cannot

approachhem

with

greater

detachment

andgain

greater

control

over

themselves.

Thus a circular

move-

ment

between

nner

and outer

controls,a

feedback

mechanismof a

kind, is

at

work not

only

in men's

relations

with the

non-human

orces of

nature,

but also in

their

relationswith

each

other. But

it operates

at

present n

these

two

spheres on

very

different

evels.

While in

men's

relations

with non-

human

forces the

standard

of both

the control

of

self and that

of

external

events is relativelyhigh, in relationsof men with men the sociallyrequired

and socially

bred

standard

of both is

considerably

ower.

The

similarities

between this

situation

and

that which

men had

to face

in past

ages in

their

relations

with the

forces of

nature,

are often

obscured

by the

more

obnous

differences.

We do

already

know that

men can

attain

a

considerable egree

of control

over

natural

phenomena

mpingingupon

their

lives

and a

fairlyhigh

degreeof

detachment

n

manipulating,nd in

thinking

of,

them. We do

not

know, and

we can

hardly

imagine,how a

comparable

degree of

detachmentand

control

may be

attained

with

regard to

social

phenomena.

Yet, for

thousandsof

years it was

equally

mpossible or

those

who struggledbeforeus to imagine hat one couldapproachand manipulate

natural

orcesas we do.

The

comparisonhrows

some light

on

their

situation

as

well as

on

ours.

V

It

also

throws

some light on

the

differences

hat

exist to-day

between

the

standardsof

certainty

and

achievementof the

naturaland the

social

sciences. It

is

oftenimplied,

f it is

not stated

explicitly, hat

the objects

of

the

former,by their

very

nature,

end

themselvesbetter

than

thoseof

the

latter to an exploration y meansof scientificmethodsensunnga highdegree

of

certainty.

However,

there is no

reason

to assume

that

social data,

that

the

relationsof

personsare

less

accessible

o man's

comprehension

han the

relationsof

non-human

henomena, r

that man's

ntellectual

powersas

such

are

incommensurateo

the task

of

evolving theones

and

methods

for the

study

of social

data to a

level of

fitness,

comparable

o that

reached

n the

study of

physicaldata.

What is

sigiificantly

different n

these

two fields

is

the

situationof

the

investigators

nd, as part

of it,

their

attitudeswith

regard

to

their

objects ;

it is, to

put it

in a

nutshell,the

relationship

etween

sxbjects and obyects. If this relationship,f situationandattitudesare

taken into

acJcounthe

problemsand

the

difficulties f an

equal

advance

n

the

social sciences

stand

out

moreclearly.

Q


10/28

234 PROBLEMS OF

INVOLVEMENT AND

DETACHMENT

The

generalaim of scientificpursuitss the same n both fields;

stripped

of a good

many philosophical

ncrustationst is to find out in whatway per-

ceiveddataare connectedwith each

other. But socialas distinct romnatural

sciences are concernedwith conjunctions f persons. Here, in one form or

the other,

men face themselves;1 the objects are also

subjects . The

task of socialscientists s to explore,and

to makemenunderstand,

he patterns

they form

together, the nature and the changingconfiguration f

all that

binds them

to each other. The investigators hemselves orm part

of these

patterns.

They cannot help

expenencing hem, directlyor by identification,

as immediate

articipantsromwithin;

and the greater he strainsandstresses

to which they or their groupsare

exposed, he moredifficult s it for them to

perfotm he mental operation,

underlying ll scientificpursiits, of detaching

themselvesfrom their role as immediate

participantsand from the limited

vista it offers.

There is no lack of attempts in the

social sciencesat detachingoneself

from one's

positionas an involvedexponentof social events, and at

working

out a wider

conceptual rameworkwithinwhich the problems f the

day can

find theirplace and their meaning.

Perhaps he most persistent ffort n that

directionhasbeen madeby the great

pioneering ociologists f the nineteenth

and early

twentiethcenturies. But theirworkalso showsmost

conspicuously

the difficulties

which, underpresent

conditions, tand in the way of such an

attempt. On

the one hand, they all attemptedto discover, rom

one angle

or the other, the inherent order of the

social developmentof

mankind, ts

laws as some of them called t. They tried to work out a comprehensive

and

universallyvalid theoretical rameworkwithin which the

problemsof

their own age

appearedas specificproblemsof detail and no

longer as the

centralproblem rom which those of

other ages received heir

relevanceand

their meaning. And yet, on the other

hand, they were so deeply nvolved in

the problems

of their own society that they often viewed in fact

the whole

development

f men's relationswith eachother in the light of the

hopes and

1 The

problem of facing oneself is no doubt far more complex than can be

shown here.

It plays its part in explorations of nature as well as

in those of society. For man forms part of

both. Every major change in men's conception of nature, therefore, goes hand in hand with

a change of the

picture they have of themselves.

So does any change in their conception of the

social universe.

Success and failure of any attempt to chatlge from a more involved

to a more

detached view of social phenomena is bound up

with the capacity of men to revise the picture

they have of

themselves in accordance with the results of more methodical studies,

and often

enough in a way

vYhich uns counter to deeply felt beliefs and ideals. In that respect

the problem

of increasing detachment i the social sciences is

hardly diSerent from that which plays its part

in the development of the natural sciences.

However, it

must still be regarded as an open problem how far men are capable

of facing

themselves , of

seeing themselves as they are

without the shining armour of fantasies shielding

them from

sufleringpast, present and future. It is fairly safe to say that their

capacity to do so

grows and declines with the degree of security

which they enjoyed and enjoy. But

it probably

has its limits.

However that may be, at present such

problems can be discussed only in societies which

demand and produce a high degree of

individualization and in which men are being brought up

to experiencethemselves, more perhaps than ever before, as beings set apart from each other by

very strong walls. There can be little doubt that

the picture of self which is thus built up in

the growiIlg

person makes it rather difficult to envisage oneself in a more detached

manner as

forming patterns with others and to study the

nature and structure of these patterns as such.


11/28

NORBERT ELIAS

235

fears,

the enmities

and

beliefs resulting

romtheir role

as

immediate

partici-

pants in the

struggles

and

conflictsof

their own

time.

These two

forms

of

approach-one

more

involved which

made

them

see the

development

of

humansociety as a whole in the light of the pressingproblemsof theirown

time,

the other

more

detached

whichenabled

hem to

visualize

he

short-term

problemsof their

own time

in

the light

of the

long-term

developmentof

society-were so

inextricably

nterwoven n

theirwork

that, in

retrospect,

t

is

difficult o sift

onefrom

the other

and to

sort out

their

contributiono

the

development

of a

more

universally

valid

system of

theories about

men

in

society

from

ideas

relevantonly

as an

expressionof their

own

ideals and

idiosyncrasiesn the

strugglesof a

particular

historical

period.

Since then, a

good

deal

more factual

materialabout

social

phenomena

has

been

broughtto

light. The

elaborationof

a more

impersonal

body of

theoriesand theiradjustment o a wldeningrange of observed acts brought

to light

under heir

guidance, as

considerably

dvancedn

somesocial

sciences,

and

advanced n

some

morethan

in

others.l To a

greater

or lesser

extent,

research n

all human

sciencesstill

tends to

oscillate

between

two levels

of

consciousness

nd two

forms

of

approach,he

one more

akin,

one might

say,

to a

simple

geocentric,

he other

more to a

heliocentric

pproach.

And

the

constant

upsurgeof

the former

n

connection

with acute

social and

political

tensions

effectively

bars in

most

social

sciences the

steady

continuity

of

research

whichhas

become o

markeda

characteristic f

many natural

ciences.

1

The evident

differences in

the

levels of development of different social sciences have

perhaps

not found

quite the

attention they

deserve as a

subject of

research. Like

the

differences

in

the

development of

natural and social

sciences generally,

they are

relevant to

any theory

of

knowledge and of

sciences.

To

set out here

more

comprehensively the

problems raised by

such differences

would

require

an

exposition

of the wider

theory of

knowledge implied in

these

observwations

on

detachment

and

involvement- it would

require

fuller

elaboration of the

general

conceptual

framework

that

has been used

here and

within which,

as one

has seen, the

development

of

scientific

thinking

as

of

thinking in

general, and that

of

changes in the

situation of

those who

thiIlk,

instead of

being allotted

to largely

independent fields of

studiesJ are

linked to each

other

as different,

but

inseparable and

interdependent facets of

the

same process.

Only with the

help of such

an

inte-

grating

framework is it

possible to

determine

with greater

precision different

stages and

levels

of

thinking and

knowing

whether or

not one

adopts concepts

like level of

detachment ,

level

of

Stness , level of

control and

others which

have been used

here.

On

these lines,

one might say,

for example,

that,

under present

conditions,

anthropologists

have a better chance of developing theories on human relations to a higher level of fitness than

say, those

engaged in the

study of highly

differentiated

societies to which

they

themselves

belong

or

which are

antagonists or partners

of societies

to which

they

belong; they have a

better

chance

not only

because it is

easier

to survey,

and to form

relatively fitting

theories about,

social units

which are small

and not too

complex in

structure, but also

because the

investigators

themselves

are, as a

rule, less

directly involved

in the

problems

they study.

Anthropologists, in

most cases

study

societies

to which

they do not

belong, other

sociologists mostly

societies of

which they

are

members.

But

in

saying this, one

refers only

to one

facet of the

relationship

between the

mode

of

thirlking

and the

situation of those

who think.

To

complete the

nexus one

would have to

add

that the

more

detached

theoretical tools

of thinking

which

anthropologists have a

chance

to

build up

in

accordance with

their specific

situation,

can

themselves act,

within

certain limits

as

a shield

against the

encroachment

upon their

scientific work,

and

perhaps even

on their

personai

outlook,

of more

involved, more

emotive forms

of

thinking, even

if tensions

mount

between

social

units to which

they

belong as

participant

members and

others in

relation to

which they

play mainly the part of investigators.

Here, too, in

comparative studies on

the

development of

social

sciences it may

be more

appropriate and more

profitable to

focus on the

relations of observers

and observed

than on

either

of

them or on

methods alone.


12/28

236 PROBLEMS OF

INVOLVEMENT AND DETACHMENT

The pressureof short-termproblemswhich

can no longer be solved in tra-

ditional ways,

of social problemswhichappearto require or their

solution

procedures

evolved and employed by scientific specialists, has

increased

together with the complexityof humanrelations tself. Fragmentation f

social research

has grown apace. Even as an aim of research he idea

of

a

wider heoreticalramework onnecting nd

unifying he problems nd results

of more limited

inquirieshas become more remote; to many it

appears

unattainable, o

others, in addition,undesirable. For the immediate

diffi-

culties of menspringingup in their own

midst fromthe unmanageableorces

of socialchange, romconflictsand frictions

among hemselves,have

remained

exceedinglygreat. The strength of

involvements,within the socialcontext

of men's lives,

if it has not actually ncreasedJ as hardly essened.

- Hence,whateverelse may have changed

ince the days of the

pioneering

sociologists, ertainbasic characteristics f the social scienceshave not. For

the time being,

social scientistsare liable to be caught in a dilemma.

They

workand live in a world n whichalmost

everywhere roups, mall and

great,

including heir

own groups,are engaged n

a struggle or positionand often

enough or

survival,some trying to rise and to better themselves n the

teeth

of strong

opposition, ome who have risenbefore trying to hold what

they

have and some going down.

Under

these conditionsthe membersof such groups can hardly

help

being deeply

affected n their thinkingabout social events by the

constant

threats arisingfrom these tensionsto theirway of life or to their standards

of life and

perhaps o their ife. As members f such groups cientific

pecial-

ists engaged in the study of society share

with others these vicissitudes.

Theirexperience

f themselvesas upholders f a particular ocialand

political

creedwhich is

threatened,as representativesf a specificway of life in

need

of defence, ike

the experience f their fellows,

can hardly ail to have astrong

emotionalundertone. Group-images,hose,

for instance, of classes or of

nations, self-justifications,he cases which

groupsmake out for

themselves,

represent,as a rule, an amalgamof realistic

observations nd collectivefan-

tasies (which

like the myths of simpler

people are real enough as motive

forces of action). To sift out the former rom the latter, to hold up before

these groupsa mirror n whichthey can see

themselves s they might be

seen,

not by an

involvedcritic romanother ontemporaryroup,but by an

inquirer

trying to see in

perspective he structureandfunctioning f their

relationship

with eachother, s not only difficult n itself

for anyonewhosegroup s involved

in such a stzggle; expressed n public, it

may also weaken the cohesion

and solidarity eelingof his groupand, with

it, its capacity o survive.

There

is, in fact, in all these groupsa point beyond

which none of its members an

go in his detachmentwithout appearing nd,

so far as his group s

concerned,

without becominga dangerousheretic,

howeverconsistenthis ideas or

his

theoriesmay be in themselvesand with observed acts, howevermuch thet

may approximate o what we call the

truth .

And yet, if

social scientists althoughusing more specialized

procedures


13/28

NORBERT

ELIAS

237

and a

more

technical

anguageare

in the

last resort

not much

ess

affected n

their

approach o the

problems

of

societyby

preconceived

deas and

ideals,

by

passions

and

partisanviews

than the

man in

the

street, are they

really

justified in calling themselves scientists ? Does any statement, any

hypothesisor

theorydeserve

he

epithet

scientific ,

if it is

ultimately

based

on

dogmatic

beliefs, on a priori

assumptions, n ideas

and

evaluations

which

are

impervious o

arguments

based on

a more

systematic

and

dispassionate

examination

of the

available

evidence? Can

social

scientists

make

any

specific

contribution o

the

solution of

major

problems

even of

their own

groups,

of their

owncountry,

class,

profession r

whatever t is, if

they

accept

as

the

self-endent

foundationof their

theories

some

of the

religiously

held

creedsand

normsof

one or the

other

of these

groupsso

that the

results

of

their

studiesare

destined

rom

the start to

agree,or

at

least not to

disagree,

with the basic tenets of these communalbeliefs? Withoutgreaterdetach-

ment and

autonomyof

thinking,can

they hope

to put in

the

handsof

their

fellow-men

more

fitting

tools of

thinking and

more

adequate

blueprints

or

the handling

of social

and

political

problems-more

adequate

blueprints

han

those

handed on

unreflectingly

rom

generation

to

generationor

evolved

haphazardly

n the heat

of the

battle ?

And

even if they

do not

acceptsuch

beliefs

unquestioningly,re

they not

often

impelled o

use them as

the

general

frame

of

reference or

their

studies simply

by

sentiments

of

solidarity, of

loyalty

or

perhapsof

fear ? Are

they not

sometimes

only too

justified

n

thinking hat it

might

weakena cause

which

they

regardas their

own if

they

were to subjectsystematically he religiously

held social

creedsand

ideals of

one of

their

own

groupsto a

more

dispassionate

cientific

examination, hat

it

might put

weapons n

the

hand of

opponentsor

that,

as a

result, they

themselves

might be

exposed to

ostracism

f to

nothing

worse?

The

dilemma

underlying

many of

thepresent

uncertainties f

the

sciences

of

men is,

as one can

see, not

simply

a

dilemmaof this

or that

historian,

economist,

political

scientistor

sociologist

to

nameonly

some of the

present

divisions); it is

not the

perplexity of

individual

social

scientists,

but that

of

social

scientists

as a

professional

roup. As

things

stand,

theirsocial

task

as scientistsandthe requirementsf theirpositionas members f othergroups

often

disagree;

and

the latter

are apt to

prevail as

long

as the

pressureof

group

tensions and

passions

remains

as high as

it is.

Theproblem

onfronting

hem is not

simply to

discard

he latter

rolein

favourof the

former.

They

cannot

cease to take

partin,

and to be

affected

by, the social

and

political

affairsof

theirgroups

and their

time.

Their

own

participation

and

involvement,

moreover, s

itself one

of the

conditions

or

comprehending

he problems

hey try

to

solve as

scientists.

For while

one

need not

know,in

order to

understand he

structureof

molecules,what

it

feels like to

be one of

its

atoms, in

orderto

understandhe

functioning

of

humangroupsone needs to know,as it were,from nsidehowhumanbeings

expenence

their

own and

other groups,

and

one

cannotknow

without

active

participationand

involvement.


14/28

238 PROBLEMS

OF

INVOLVEMENT

AND

DETACHMENT

The problem

confronting

hose

who study

one or

the

other aspects

of

human

groups

s how to

keep their two

rolesas

participant

and

as inquirer

clearly

and consistently

apart

and, as a

professional

roup,to establish

n

their workthe undisputeddominanceof the latter.

This is so

difficult

a task

that many

representatives

f

social sciences,

at

present,

appear

o regard he

determination

f their inquiries

by precon-

ceived

andreligiously

eld social

andpolitical

dealsas inevitable.

They

often

seem

to

consider hese

heteronomous

oundations

f their pronouncements

s

characteristic,

ot of

a specific

ituation

and, within

t, of a

specific

dilemma,

but

of their

subject-matter

s

such. The

latitude

they allow

each other

in

their use

of dogmatic

deals and

evaluations

as

a basis for

the

setting of

problems,

he

selectionof

material

and the

construction

f theories

s

very

wide;

and is

apt to

becomewider

still whenever

he pressure

f tensions

and

passionsmountsin society at large.

VI

The

chancewhich

social

scientists

have to

face and to

cope with

this

dilemma

might be

greater f it

werenot

for another

characteristic

f

their

situation

which

tends to

obscure he

natureof these

difficulties.

That is the

ascendancy

gained,

over

the

centuries, by

a manner

or style

of thinking

which

has proved

highly adequate

and successful

n men's

dealings

with

physical

events,

but which

is not always

equally

appropriate

f used

in

their

dealingswith others. Oneof the majorreasons orthe difficultieswithwhich

men have

to contend

n theirendeavour

o gain

morereliable

knowledge

bout

themselves

is

the

uncritical and

often dogmatic

application

of categories

and concepts

highly

adequate

n relation

o problems

on the

level

of matter

and energy

to

other levels

of experience

and among

them to that

of social

phenomena.

Not only specific

expectations

as

to how

perceived

data are

connected

with

each other,

specific

concepts

of causation

or of

explanation

formed

n this manner

are

generalized

ndused

almostas a

matter

of course

in

inquiries

about relations

of men;

this

mechanical

diffusion

of models

expressestself, too, for example, n the widespreaddentification f ration-

ality

with the use

of categories

developed

mainly

n

connection

with experi-

ences

of physical

events,

and in

the assumption

hat

the use of

other forms

of

thinking

must

necessarily

ndicate a

leaning

towards

metaphysics

and

irTationality.

The same

tendency

towards

over-generalization

hows itself

in

many

current

deas of what

is and what

is not scientific.

By and

large,theories

of

science

still

use as their

principalmodel

the

physical

sciencesften

not in

theircontemporary,

ut

in theirclassical

orm. Aspects

of their

procedures

are

widely

regarded

as the most

potent

and decisive

factor

responsible

or

their achievementsand ars he essentialcharacteristic f sciencesgenerally.

By

abstracting

uch aspects

from

the actual

procedures

nd

techniques

of

the physical

sciences,one

amves at

a general

model

of scientific

procedure


15/28

NORBERT

ELIAS

239

which

is

knownas '

the

scientific

method . In

name, t

represents

he

dis-

tinguishing

characteristics

ommonto all

scientific,

as

distinct

from non-

scientific, orms

of solving

problems. In

fact, it

often

constitutesa

curious

compoundof featureswhichmay be universalwith otherscharacteristic f

the

physical

sciences

only and

bound up with

the

specific nature

of

their

problems. It

resembles

general

oncept

animal

formed

without

reference

to the

evolutionary

diversityand

connections f

animal

species rom

a

rather

restricted

observationalield

so that

structures nd

functions

ommon

perhaps

to

all

animals,as

distinct

from

non-living hings

and

from

plants,mingle

n

it with

others

characteristicnly

of certain

ypes

of animals,

of, say,

mammals

or of

vertebrates.

The

assumption s

that

in this

generalized

orm the

scientific

method

can be

transferred

rom he

fieldwhere

t

originated,

rom he

physical

ciences,

to all otherfields,to biologicalas well as to socialsciences,regardless f the

different

nature of

their

problems;

and that

wherever t

is

appliedit

will

work

its

magic.

Amongsocial

scientists n

particulart is

not

uncommon

o

attribute

difficulties nd

inadequacies

f

theirwork to

the fact

that they

do

not go

far

enough in

copying the

method

of

physical

sciences. It

is this

strong

concentration f

their

attention

on

problems f

method

which

ends

to

obscure

romtheir

view

the

difficulties hat

spring

romtheir

situation

and

from

their own

approaches

o the

problems hey

study.

The

superior

achievement

and status

of the

physical

sciences

tself

con-

stitutes a highlysignificant actor in the situation of thosewho workin the

field of

social

sciences. If,

as

participants

n the life

of a

turbulent

society,

they

are

constantly in

danger of

using in

their

inquiries

preconceived

nd

immovablesocial

convictionsas

the basis

for their

problemsand

theories,

as

scientiststhey

are in

dangerof

being

dominated

by models

derived

from

inquiries nto

physical

events and

stampedwith

the

authorityof the

physical

sciences.

The fact

itself

that

people

confrontedwith

the

task of

formulating

nd

exploringnew sets

of

problemsmodel

their

concepts

and

procedures n

those

whichhave

proved heir

worth n other

fields s in

no

way

surprising r

unique.

It is a recurrenteature n the history of menthat newcraftsandskills, and

among

hemnew

scientific

pecialisms,n the

early

stagesof their

development,

continue to rely

on older

models.

Some

time is

neededbefore a

new

group

of

specialistscan

emancipate

tself from

the ruling

style of

thinking

and of

acting;

and in

the

courseof

this process

their

attitude

towards

the older

groups,as in

other

processes

of

emancipation,s

apt

to

oscillate: they

may

go too

far for a

while and

may

go on too

long in

their uncritical

ubmission

to

the

authority

and

prestige of the

dominant

standards; and

then

again,

they

may go

too far in

their

repudiation

nd in

theirdenial

of the

functions

which the

older models

had

or have

in the

developmentof

their own.

In

most of these respectsthe emergenceof the youngersocial sciences from

underthe

wings of the

older

natural

sciences

follows the

usual

pattern.

But

there can

have

been

rarelya

situation n

whichthe

gradient

between


16/28

240 PROBLEMS OF INVOLVEMENT AND DETACHMENT

the comparatively igh level of detachmentmanifest n the older branches

of knowledgeand the much lower represented y the youngerbrancheswas

equally steep. In the physicalsciences} t is not only the development nd

use of a specificmethod or the solutionof problems nd the testingof theories,

but the framingof problemsand theories itself which presupposes high

standardof detachment. The same method transferredo social sciences s

not infrequentlyused for the exploration f problemsand theoriesconceived

andstudiedunder he impactof strong nvolvernents. Hence he use, in social

sciences,of a methodakin to that evolved n the physical ciencesoften gives

to the former he appearance f a high evel of detachment r of objectivity

which those who use this method are in fact lacking. It often serves as a

means of circumventing ifficultieswhich spring from their dilemmawith-

out facing it; in many cases, it creates a facade of detachmentmaskinga

highly involved approach.

As a result,a crucialquestion s often regarded s sealedand solvedwhich

in fact is still in abeyance: the questionwhichof the proceduresndtechniques

of the physicalsciencesare commensurateo the task of social sciencesand

which are not. The abstraction rom these specificprocedures f

a

general

modelof the scientificmethod,and the claimoften madefor it as the supreme

characteristic f research hat is scientific,have led to the neglect, or even

to the exclusion rom the field of systematicresearch, f wide problem-areas

which do not lend themselveseasily to an explorationby meansof a method

for which the physical scienceshave provided he prototype. In order to

be able to use methodsof this kind and to prove themselves cientificn the

eyes of the world, nvestigators re frequently nduced o ask and to answer

relatively nsignificantquestionsand to leave unanswered thers perhapsof

greater significance. They are induced to cut their problems o as to suit

their method. The exclusiveand seemingly inal characterof many curre t

statements about the scientificmethod finds expression n the strange -lea

that problemswhich do not lend themselves o investigationsbv means of

a methodmodelledon that of the physicalsciencesare no concernof people

engaged n scientificresearch.

On closer investigation,one will probably find that the tendency to

consider highlyformalized ictureof this one set of sciences nd theirmethod

as the norm and ideal of scientific nquiriesgenerally s connectedwith a

specific dea aboutthe aim of sciences. It is, one might think, boundup with

the assumption hat among propositionsof empiricalsciences, as among

those of pure mathematics nd relatedforms of logic, the only relevantdis-

tinction to be made is that betweenpropositionswhich are true and others

which are false; and that the aim of scientificresearch nd of its procedures

is simply and solely that of findingthe truth , of sifting trlle from false

statements. However, he goal towardswhich positive sciencesare striving

is not, and by their very naturecannotbe, wholly denticalwth that of fields

like logic and mathematicswhich are collcernedwith the inherentorder of

certain tools of thinkingalone. It certainlyhappens n empirical nvestiga-


17/28

NORBERT ELIAS

24I

tions

that people

make

statementswhich

are simply

found to be

false. But

oftenenough

ough

dichotomiesike

true

and false

are

highly

nadequate

in

theircase.

People

engaged n

empirical

esearch ften

put forward

proposi-

tions or theorieswhosemerit is that they are truer than others or, to use

a less

hallowed

erm, that

they

aremore

adequate,

more

consistent

both with

observations nd

in

themselves. In

general

erms,

one might

say it is

char-

acteristic of

these

scientificas

distinct from

non-scientific

orms of

solving

problems hat, in

the

acquisitionof

knowledge,

questions

emerge

and are

solved

as a result

of an

uninterrupted

wo-way traffic

betweentwo

layersof

knowledge:

that of

general

deas,

theoriesor

modelsand

that of

observations

and

perceptions f

specific

earents.

The latter if

not

sufficiently

nformed

by

the former

remains

unorganized nd

diffuse;

the

former f not

sufficientty

informedby

the

latter

remains

dominated

by feelings

and

imaginings. It

is

the objectiveof scientists,one might say, to develop a steadily expanding

body of

theories

or models

and

an equally

expanding

body of

observations

about

specificearents

by means

of a

continuous,critical

confrontation

o

greater

and

greater

congruity

with each

other.

The

methods

actually used

in

empirical

nvestigations,

nevitably,vary

a good

deal

from

discipline o

discipline n

accordancewith

the different

types of

problems hat

present

themselves

or solution.

What they

have in

common,what

identifies

hem

as

scientific

methods is

simply

that they

enable

scientists to

test

whether

theirfindings

nd

pronouncements

onstitutea

reliable

dvance n

the

direction

towardstheir commonobjective.

VII

Is

it possible

o

determinewith

greater

precision

nd

cogency he

limita-

tions of

methods

of

scientific

researchmodelled

on

those of

the

physical

sciences

?

Can one, in

particular, hrow

more

light on

the limits

to

the

usefulness f

mathematicalr, as

this term s

perhaps

oo

wide in this

context,

of

quantifying

modelsand

techniques

n

empirical

researches

At the

present

state of

development,he

weight and

relevanceof

quanti-

fying procedures learlydiffers n differentproblem-areas. In some, above

all

in the

physical

sciences,

one can

see to-day

no limit to

the

usefulness

of

procedureswhich

make

relations

of

quantities

tandfor the

non-quantitative

aspects

of the

relations of

data;

the

scope for

reducing

other

properties

to

quantities

and

for

workingout, on

the

basis of

such a

reduction,

highly

adequate

theoretical

constructs

appears o

be

without

bounds.

In

otherfields

of

research he

scope for

similar

reductions s

clearlyvery

much

narrower;

and

theoretical

constructs

based on

such

reductions

alone

often

prove

farless

adequate.

Have

problem-areas hich

do not lend

them-

selves as

wellas

the physical

ciences o the

application

f

quantifying

methods

of research ertaingeneralpropertieswhichcan accountfor such differences

in

the scope

and

relevance

of

quantifying

proceduresas

instruments

of

research


18/28

242

PROBLEMS

OF

INVOLVEMENT

AND

DETACHMENT

It is possible

to think that this

problem

tself can

be readilysolved

in

terms

of quantities

alone.

As one passes

from studiesof

matterand energy

and

its various

transformations

o those

of organisms nd

their

development

as speciesand individualsand againto studiesof men as societiesandindi-

viduals

(in

not quitethe same

senseof the

word),according

o a not

uncommon

view,

the problems

which

one encounters

ecomesmorecomplex;

the greater

complexity

s often thought

to followfrom

the fact that

the number

of inter-

acting

parts, factors,

variables

or suchlike

ncreaseas

one moves from

the

study

of inorganic

matterto those

of organisms

nd of

men; andas a

result

of this increase

n numbers,

so the

argumentseems

to run,

measurements

and

mathematical

operationsgenerally,

becomemore and

morecomplicated

and

diicult.

If one accepts

he ideathat

it is the

aim of scientific

nvestiga-

tions everywhere

o

explain the behaviour

of composite

units of

observation

by means of measurementsrom that of their simplerconstituentparts,each

of the

variablesaffecting

the behaviour

of such a unit

wouldhave

to be

measuredby

itself so as to

determine

he quantitative

aspectsof

its relations

with

others. The

greater

the number

of variables,the

greaterwould

be

the number

of measurements

nd

the morecomplicated

wouldbe

the

mathe-

matical operations

necessary

o

determine heir

interplay. In

the light of

this

hypothesisthe

demandsmade

on the resources

n

manpower, n

com-

puting machines,

n mathematical

echniques

and

in money and

time would

progressively

ncrease

rom one set

of sciences o

the othersvith

the increase

in the

numberof factors

hat has

to be taken

into account.

Moreand

more,

these

demandswould

becomeprohibitive

and research

on quantitative

ines

alone

would no longer

be

possible. According

o this

view, it is for

that

reason

that one

has to resign oneself

to the

use of less

precise and

less

satisfactory

methods

of investigation

n

many fieldsof

studies.

In a

way, this

approach o

the observable

imitationsof

quantifying

methods n

research

s itself not uncharacteristic

f the manner

n which

orms

of thinking

most serviceable

n the

exploration

of physical

data become

dis-

tendedinto

what almost

represents

generalstyle

of thinking.

The

choice

of

a heap of more

and morefactors

or

variablesas a

model for increasing

complexity s determinedby a generalexpectationwhichis evidentlybased

on experiences

n

physicalresearch,

but which tends

to assume

he character

of

an a priori belief:

by the expectation

hat problems

of all kinds can

be

satisfactorily

olved

in terms of

quantitiesalone.

However, he

area within

which this

expectationcan

be safely used

as

a guideto

the formulation

f problems

and theories

has very definite

imits.

The

properties

of different

units of observation

characteristic

f different

disciplines

re not aloneaffected

by the number

f

interacting arts,

variables,

factcrsor

conditions,but

also by

the manner n

whichconstituents

of such

units are

connectedwith

each

other. Perhaps

the best way

to indicate

brieflythis aspectof these differencess the hypotheticalconstruction f a

model

of models

which represent

different

ramesof reference

of scientific

problems

n a highly

generalized

orm as

compositeunits

arranged ccording


19/28

NORBERT ELIAS

243

to

the extent of

interdependencef their

constituentsor, more

generally,

according o

the degree

of organization

which they possess.

Arrangedn this

manner, his continuum

of modelswould

have one

pole

formedby generalmodels of units, such as congeries,agglomerations,eaps

or multitudes,

whose

constituentsare

associatedwith each other

temporarily

in

the loosest possible

manner

and may exist

independentlyof each

other

without

changingtheir

characteristic roperties. The

other

pole would be

formedby

general

modelsof unitssuch as

opensystems and

processeswhich

are highly

self-regulating nd

autonomous,

which consist of a

hierarchyof

interlocking

part-systems and

part-processesand

whose constituents are

interdependent o such

an extent that they

cannot be isolated

from their

unit without

radicalchanges in

their propertiesas

well as in those of the

unit itself.

Between these two poles would be spaced out intermediarymodels1

graded

according o

the degreeof

differentiation nd

integrationof their

constituents.

As one

moves along this

continuumof

models romparadigms

f loosely

composed o

others of

highlyorganizedunits,

as modelsof

congeries tep by

step give

way to those

of self-regulating

pen systems and

processeswith

more and more levels

many of

the devicesdeveloped

or scientificresearch

into units of

the first

type change, or even

lose, their function.

In many

cases, frombeing the

principal nstruments

and

techniquesof research, hey

become, at the most,

auxiliaries.

Less adequate, in that sense, becomesthe concept of an independent

variableof a unit of

observation

which is otherwise

kept invariantand, with

it,

the type of

observation nd

experimentation asedon

the supposition hat

what one

studies is a heap of

potentially

independentvariables

and their

effects.

Lessadequate, oo,

becomes he concept

of a

scientific aw as the general

theoreticalmould for

particular onnections

of

constituentsof a largerunit.

Forit is one

of the tacit

assumptions nderlying oth

the

conceptionand the

establishment

f a scientific aw

that the phenomena f

which one

wishes to

state in the form of a law that the patternof their connection s necessary

and

unchanging,do not

change

their properties

rreversibly f they are cut

off

from other

connectionsor from each

other. The

type of relationship

whose

regularitycan be fairly

satisfactorily

xpressed n the

form of a law

is a

relationshipwhichis

impermanenthough it has a

permanentpattern:

it can start

and cease

innumerableimes

withoutaffecting he

behaviourof

other

constituentsof the

largernexus within

which t occursor the

properties

1

Even in the elementary

form in

which it is presented here, such

a serial model may help

to clarify the

confusion that often arises

from an all too

clear-cut dichotomy

between congeries

and systems.

Not all frames

of reference of physical

problems cluster narrowly

around the

congeries pole of the model.

Not all

frames of reference of biological

or sociological problems

have their equivalent close to the other pole. They are, in each of these areas of inquiry, more

widely scattered

than it is often assumed.

And

although, in each of these areas,

their bulk can

probably be

assigned to a

specific region of the serial

model, frames of referenceof

the problems

of

diEerent disciplines,

projected on this model,

frequently overlap.


20/28

244

PROBLEMS OF

INVOLVEMENT AND

DETACHMENT

of the

larger

nexus itself. General ass

for particularcases, in

short, are

instruments or the

solutionof problems

whose

referential rame s conceived

as a congeries.l

The more the framework f problemsresemblesn its characteristics

highly

self-regulating ystem

and process,the

greater in other words the

chancethat

constituentsare permanently

onnected

with eachother so that

they

are bound to

changetheir properties

rrevocablyf these

connections

are

.severed, he more ikely is

it that laws assumea

subsidiary ole as tools

of research; the

moredoes one require s

the

paramount ehicle orexploring

and

presentingregularitiesof

part-connections,ystem and

process-models

clearly

representative f the

fact that part-eventsare

linked to

each other

as constituentsof

a functioniIlg nit

without whi.ch

hey would not occuror

would

not occur

in this manner.

Nor do those time-honourednt.ellectual perationsknown as iIlduction

and deduction

retain quite the same

character

hroughout his continuum

of

models. In their classical

ormthey are

closely inkedup with

intellectual

movements up and down

between discrete and

isolated

universals,which

may be general

concepts, aws,

propositions r

hypotheses,and an inEnite

multitudeof

particular aseswhichare also

conceivedas

capableof preserving

their signiEcant

haracteristics

f they are studied n

isolation ndependently

of all

other

contlectiorss.

When models

of multitudes become

subordirlate

o models of highly

organized ystemsanother ype

of research

peration ains greater

prominence

modifying o someextent thoseof induction nddeduction, amelymovements

up and

down between models

of the

whole and those of its

parts.

It is difficult

o think of any well

established

errnsexpressing learly

the differential

ualitiesand the

complementary

haracter f thesetwo opera-

1 In

the case of the second law of

thermodynamics an

experimental and

statistical law has

been interpreted as a

statement about

qualities possessed by the

referential system as a whole

that is

by the physical universe.

However, if one may use

experiences n other fields

as a model

it is not always safe to

assume that properties

observed as those of

constituent parts of a system

are also properties of

the system as a

whole. Whether or not one

is justified, in this case, to

assume that regularities

observed in a part-regic)n f a

system, in a part-regionof

both time and

space,

can be interpreted as regularities

of the whole system only

pShysicists re

entitled to judge.

However, these general considerations about laws are hardly affected by this case. In

physics

as in other scientific disciplines

the referential

rameworkof problems s far

from uniform.

Although, in the

majority of cases, the units of

observation are simply conceitredas

heaps, there

are

others in which

they are envisaged as units

endowed with properties

approachingto those

of systems. But

compared with the models of

systems and

processes developed in some of the

biological and some of

the social sciences those which

have been produced in

physical sciences

show, on the whole, a

relatively high

independence of parts and

a relatively low degree of

organization.

This

may or may not account for

the fact that although the

status of laws, in

the classical

sense of the words, has

to some extent declined in

the physical

sciences with the ascendance of

models which have

some of the

characteristics of systems, the

change does not appear to be

very pronounced.

What apparently has become

more pronouncedis the implied

expectation

that the

diverse laws discovered in

studies of isolated connections

will eventually

coalesce and

form with each other a

comprehensive theoretical

scaffoldiIlg or the behaviour of

the over-all

system as a whole.

Perhaps it is not

yet quite clear why one should

expect that the unconnected

clusters of connections whose regularities one has more or less reliably determinedwill subse-

quently

link up and fall

into pattern. To expect that

they will do so, at any ratea

means assum-

ing that

in the end all congeries

including that of ene.gy-matter

will turn out to

be systems

of a

kind or aspects and parts of

systems.


21/28

NORBERT ELIAS

245

tions. PerhapsoIle might call analytical ' those steps of research n which

the theoreticalrepresentation f a system is treated more or less as a back-

ground romwhichproblems f constituentpartsstand out as the primeobject

of researchand as a potential testing-ground or theoreticalrepresentations

of the whole; and one might call synoptic (not to say synthetic )

those steps which are aimed at forminga more coherent heoreticalrepre-

sentationof a system as a whole as a unifying ramework nd as a potential

testing-groundor

elias (1956) problems of involvement and detachment

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