doxa and episteme

7/29/2019 Doxa and Episteme

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Doxa and Epistêmê as Modes of Acquaintance in Republic V

Jan Szaif (University of California at Davis)

The interpretation of Plato’s distinction between epistêmê and doxa is notoriously

difficult. One of the reasons for this is that Plato has different uses for these two terms

and often uses them in ways that are far removed from the meaning we moderns tend to

connect with the concepts of knowledge and belief.

The usual contemporary distinction between knowledge and (mere) true belief

relates to the quality of the justification or evidence the true belief in question is based

upon. This kind of perspective does occur in Plato. One of the targets of philosophical

dialectic is to provide a foundation for our judgments about concrete actions, situationsor rules that require the application of some general action-guiding concept like, for

instance, ‘just’. The ability to know if a certain course of action, in a given situation,

would be just presupposes, according to Plato, a clear and reliable grasp of what justice

is — an understanding of justice which is true to its objective essence. Thus the grasp of

such an essence (or eidos, Form) is viewed by Plato as a necessary prerequisite for a

justified belief concerning the justice or injustice of a particular action, and he is ready

to apply knowledge-words like eidenai or gnônai to judgments about particular actions

in that perspective (e. g. Rep. 520C).

But there are also contexts where he restricts knowability to the Forms as pure

intellectual objects and classifies the whole realm of perceptible bodies together with

their movements, changes and transient properties as things that are mere doxasta (i. e.

merely objects of doxa, incapable of becoming objects of genuine knowledge/epistêmê).

One important example for this can be found in Republic V , 476E ff., a passage that I

will examine in this paper. Apparently it uses the ‘argument from opposites’ (which

could also be called an ‘argument from context-relativity’) in a very questionable way

by arguing from the co-presence of opposites in the case of natural and social

instantiations of a Form to the conclusion that such instantiations don’t even allow for

an unqualifiedly true judgment and thus cannot be objects of knowledge. Another

striking example is the passage in Timaeus, 37B, which asserts that the world-soul

achieves nous (insight) and epistêmê with respect to the intellectual realm (to

logistikon), but with respect to the perceptible realm ( to aisthêton) only doxa and pistis

(the latter being a type of non-epistemic cognition with a higher degree of truth-

approximation and reliability). Yet in the Timaeus-passage, truth and stability/reliability

(to bebaion) are attributed to the doxai of the world-soul, as one would expect since the

world-soul has direct cognitive access to everything that happens within ‘its body’, i.e.



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the physical cosmos. So here it cannot be the lack of truth, and not even that of

reliability, which separates doxa from epistêmê.

So there seems to be an outright inconsistency in Plato’s ideas about knowing. On

the one hand, he denies that there can be knowledge about particulars in the sensible

world, on the other he affirms that the person who has grasped the essence of a certain

property can also know with respect to a particular whether or not it exhibits this

property. But this impression of a contradiction may subside if it turns out that he is

using different, yet compatible concepts of knowledge that go along with different

concepts of doxa. Such a solution seems certainly possible with regard to the Timaeus-

passage. It has been a recurring theme in Plato scholarship during the last three decades

that Plato’s concept of epistêmê, in many contexts, is a concept of understanding .1

Understanding can be taken as conceptual understanding or as scientific or theoreticalunderstanding (explanation), but for Plato these are two sides of the same coin, because

he conceives theoretical knowledge as the result of dialectic, and hence as the result of a

systematic effort of working toward adequate concepts that are true to the underlying

essences or Forms. He contends that the only fully rational ‘cosmos’ which can become

totally transparent or fully understood is the realm of pure intellectual objects. The

physical world does not allow for perfect understanding, because there is only partial

and imperfect rationality in its structures and movements.2

Accordingly, the object-

range of perfect theoretical understanding is the world of pure intellectual entities, and

the core of this understanding is one’s conceptual understanding which has been

perfected through the elucidation of the Forms and their interrelations.

So if one uses the words “epistêmê” and “doxa” as names for cognitive states that

differ according to the level of insight or understanding they can provide, then Plato’s

restriction of epistêmê to the realm of Forms is a consequence of his views on the

insufficient rationality and cognitive accessibility of physical cosmos. This view is

compatible with the claim that a person who has achieved adequate understanding of a

certain concept or property and has a clear, non-deceptive perception of a particular

situation or object, can recognize that this situation or object exhibits a certain property

and can know this to be the case—in a different sense of knowing which does not imply

full rational transparency of the object in all its properties and relations but only a well-

founded judgment that answers to some specific question regarding the object.

1 Cf. J. M. E. Moravcsik, “Understanding and Knowledge in Plato’s Philosophy”, Neue

Hefte für Philosophie 15/16 (1979), 53-69; Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, Oxford 1981; Myles Burnyeat, Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge, in E.

Berti (ed.), Aristotle on Science. The “Posterior Analytics”, Padua 1981, 97-139.2 Cf. Rep. 527D-530C, Tim. 47E ff.



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The phenomenon of the co-presence of opposites does not pose a real challenge to

the possibility of true and well-founded judgments about concrete instances. Plato

himself in Rep. IV , 436B-437A, shows how to handle this. In this passage he elaborates

the point that an object cannot exhibit opposite properties or movements except in

different respects. The apparent co-presence of opposite determinations should not

“disturb” us (436E), since it can always be dissolved by way of an analysis which either

points to a difference in respect or reveals that the opposing properties or movements

have two different bearers. In a section of the introductory conversation of the

Parmenides (129A-E), it is also emphasized that in the case of particular objects the co-

presence of opposites does not pose any real philosophical problem since it is always

possible to differentiate between the respects in which the opposites occur together. The

text, moreover, points out that there is no problem with a lack of truth when one or theother of the opposites is ascribed to the object in question. In both cases we have a true

statement (129D2).

In the light of this, the argument in Rep. V , 476E ff., proves to be very puzzling. It

seems to commit the very mistake of inferring from the co-presence of opposites the

impossibility of an unequivocally true ascription of, say, beauty with respect to a

particular instance of beauty. The consequence would be, it seems, that even people

with an adequate conceptual understanding of beauty or largeness would not be able to

apply these concepts to particular instances so as to produce true judgments. Thus they

would also not be able to know if this or that particular instance is something beautiful

or something large (given that truth is a necessary condition of knowledge). This result

seems incompatible with, for instance, a well-known passage in the context of the simile

of the Cave ( Rep. 520C) where the text clearly states that someone who has gained

philosophical insight and returns to the ‘cave’ (i.e. is willing to confront again the social

and natural reality), will be able to recognize the exemplifications of the Forms in the

‘cave’ and will know what participates in what. What is more, this result would run

afoul, it seems, of the whole tendency of the Socratic quest for a reliable foundation of

our practical judgments through the conceptual clarification of Forms. The practical side

of dialectic remains a major concern of Plato in the Republic and beyond. It is only

supplemented, not pushed aside, by the contemplative ideal of knowledge that seeks

fulfillment in a complete rational penetration of reality achievable only with respect to

the ‘noetic’ cosmos of the Forms.3

Whereas the Timaeus passage is compatible with the

3 Cf. Jan Szaif, Platons Begriff der Wahrheit , 2nd ed., Freiburg/München 1998, 163-168,

307-315. 1998, on the influence of practical and contemplative ends on Plato’s

conception of knowledge.



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possibility of true and well-founded judgments about concrete objects and situations, the

Rep. V passage seems to go too far and to contravene the applicability of philosophical

knowledge for practical purposes.

There is another serious difficulty posed by the argument in Rep. V . It

distinguishes epistêmê and doxa as two different powers (dunameis) of the soul. That

seems to contradict the affirmation later in Rep. VII (518A-519B) that the rational

faculty (the “eye of the soul”) is one and that it can achieve only doxa-type competence

as long as it remains focused on the physical and social world, but will produce

epistêmê once it has been “turned around” and refocused toward the realm of

intellectual objects through the efforts of dialectic.

In my subsequent remarks I will provide an analysis of the argument in Rep. V ,

476E-480A, and comment on the meaning of doxa and epistêmê in this context and their function as ‘powers’. My main contention will be that doxa and epistêmê should be

construed here as different qualities of (conceptualized) acquaintance whose

achievement or cognitive value is a function of the ontological quality of their objects.

First some remarks about the context of the argument that I am going to analyze: In

473CD, Socrates has come out with his contention that philosophers should be the

political rulers. Socrates (whose persona serves as a personification of the ideal

philosophical inquirer in the dialogue) wants to base the justification of this contention

on an explanation of the true nature of philosophers (474B). He starts with an analysis

of the meaning of the word “philosopher” as “lover of wisdom/learning”, emphasizing

that concepts of the form “lover of F” imply that the person is inclined to love and

appreciate all types or instances of that which is F. Thus only someone who loves all

kinds of learning can count as a lover of wisdom/learning. Glaucon objects (475D1-E1)

that this would enlarge the scope of philosophy so as to include the interests of people

who want to watch each new theatrical show ( philotheamones) or are fond of

insignificant crafts and knacks (technudria). Socrates replies that the philosophers—the

true ones (475E3)—are indeed ‘lovers of shows/sights’, but of a specific kind of sight,

namely the sight of truth (tês alêtheias philotheamones, E4). (With respect to this turn

of phrase one should bear in mind that the Greek word for truth— alêtheia —can be used

to name ‘reality’ from the point of view that it can become an object or content of

knowledge. Knowledge is always knowledge of some truth. I will come back to this

point later.)

With this answer, Socrates has hinted that the curiosity which is exhibited by the

lovers of theatrical shows and unphilosophical crafts does not concern ‘the truth’ and

thus cannot count as genuine love of wisdom or learning since wisdom and learning



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relate to truth. His ensuing discussion focuses on the ‘lovers of sights and sounds’ who

are clearly enough identified as the lovers of the dramatic performances (475D5-8)—

people who believe that those products of poetry are the best source for an

understanding of beauty, justice and virtue. So in the background we perceive the

recurrent Platonic theme that not poetry (or the arts in general) but only philosophy can

truly educate.4 His argumentation exploits the conceptual link between love of

knowledge and love of truth (cf. 485B-D). If, as he tries to show, the exploits of the

‘lovers of sights and sounds’, and of other people similar to them, don’t lead to

acquaintance with the truth, their kind of ‘learning’ cannot belong to the scope of a

genuine love for truth and learning.

Theatrical shows provide (amongst other things) examples of beauty (think of the

musical and lyrical parts of the Greek drama). The ‘lovers of sights and sounds’ willappreciate that each such performance gives them some new examples of beauty and

thus enriches their experience of beauty. They think that this will increase and deepen

their understanding of beauty. Yet Socrates points out that they are incapable of

“seeing” and appreciating the “nature of the beautiful itself” (476B). They acknowledge

the existence of the many instances of beauty yet are unable to grasp “beauty itself”.

Being unaware of the reality of the Form behind these instances, they mistake mere

images for the real thing. With this state of mind, says Socrates, they are similar to

dreamers who take dream-images for real things. They are in a state of mere doxa

(opining) and subject to a fundamental error regarding the nature of reality. This is very

different with philosophically educated people. They realize that a term like “beauty”

denotes a Form and that the instantiations of beauty in the world of ‘becoming’ are only

images of this. The latter will be able to discern the Form of beauty and the things that

participate in it, and they will not confuse the Form and its participants. Thus they will

know ( gignôskein) (476CD).—Note that the knowledge attributed to the knowing

person includes the ability to discern the participants. So the possibility of some sort of

knowledge with regard to objects in the sensible realm is affirmed here, yet as a

corollary of the knowledge of the Form.

Let us call the argument in 475E-476D, which I have just summarized, the Doxa-

as-Dreaming-Analogy (DDA). It characterizes the doxastic state of mind as a state of

deception and the objects a person in this state is acquainted with as being deceptive or

‘untrue’ insofar as they (like dream images) conceal their nature as mere copies. The

4Cf. Myles Burnyeat, Culture and Society in Plato’s Republic, in: The Tanner Lectures

on Human Values, vol. 20, ed. by G. B. Peterson, Salt Lake City 1999, 215-324. About

the vocabulary of thea, theôria etc. see also A. W. Nightingale, Spectacles of Truth in

Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in its Cultural Context , Cambridge 2004.



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only way to overcome this deception is philosophy and its practice of dialectic, since

only dialectic can make us aware of the reality of the Forms. (The word “dialectic”

serves Plato, roughly, as the name for whatever may be the appropriate argumentative

method or methods of investigating our concepts and the underlying objective Forms.)

DDA presupposes the truth of the theory of Forms. Now, since the ‘lovers of sights and

sounds’ don’t recognize the truth of this assumption, they won’t have to follow this

argumentation. From their point of view it is not a mistake to consider the many

instances of beauty as the only reality the term “beautiful” stands for. The subsequent

argument (467E7-480A13)5

is addressed to a hypothetical representative of those

‘lovers of sights and sounds’, and it is intended as a gentle (476E1) refutation of their

conviction that the kind of reality they acknowledge could be the basis of genuineknowledge, a refutation that does not rely on the acceptance of the theory of Forms.6

Yet it would be wrong to reduce the function of this argument to its dialectical

role as a refutation of the ‘lovers of sights and sounds’. The core of this argument is a

scheme of correlations between three cognitive states or ‘powers’ (dunameis) and three

ontological categories. I will call this scheme CS and the argument based on it CSA. It

is important to note that CS lays important groundwork for a whole sequence of

arguments and similes that will follow in books VI and VII. Therefore it is also no mere

5 There is a tremendous amount of literature on this text. I won’t be able to discuss the

conflicting views here in any detail. Important contributions include: R. E. Allen, “The

Argument from Opposites in Republic V,” in Review of Metaphysics 15 (1961), 325-

335; Julia Annas, loc. cit., 190-241; Myles Burnyeat, Plato On Why Mathematics is

Good for the Soul , in T. Smiley (ed.) Mathematics and Necessity ( Proc. Brit. Acad. 103)

Oxford 2000, 1-81; Nicholas Denyer: Language, Thought and Falsehood in Ancient

Greek Philosophy, London 1991, 46-67; Gail Fine, Knowledge and Belief in Republic

V-VII , in S. Everson (ed.): Epistemology, Cambridge 1990, 85-115; Francisco Gonzales,

“Propositional as Objects? A Critique of Gail Fine on Knowledge and Belief in Republic V,” Phronesis 41 (1996), 245-275; J.C.B. Gosling, “doxa and dunamis in

Plato’s Republic,” Phronesis 13 (1968), 119-130; Andreas Graeser, “PlatonsAuffassung von Wissen und Meinung in Politiea V,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 98

(1991), 365-388; B. E. Hestir, “A Conception of Truth in Republic V,” History of

Philosophy Quaterly 17 (2000), 311-332; Jaakko Hintikka, Knowledge and its Objects

in Plato, in J. M. E. Moravcsik (ed.): Patterns in Plato’s Thought , Dordrecht 1973, 1-

30; Charles Kahn, “Some Philosophical Uses of ‘to be’ in Plato,” Phronesis 26 (1981),

105-134; Yvon Lafrance, La théorie platonicienne de la doxa, Montreal/Paris 1981;John Palmer, Plato’s Reception of Parmenides, Oxford 1999, 31-87; Peter Stemmer:

“Das Kinderrätsel vom Eunuchen und der Fledermaus,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 92(1985), 79-97; Gregory Vlastos, Platonic Studies, 2nd ed., Princeton 1981, 43-57, 58-75.6

This was emphasized by Gosling loc. cit., 120 f., and is also a basic premise of Fine’s

interpretation (loc. cit., 87).



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accident that Socrates brings in the Forms at a certain point of his argumentation

although, at first sight, this might seem inconsistent with his professed aim of refuting

the ‘lovers of sights and sounds’ without presupposing the theory of Forms. The

refutational part of his argument, directed against the ‘lovers of sights and sounds’, can

indeed stand without reliance on the theory of Forms. But Socrates’ argumentation is at

the same time also addressed to Glaucon and Adeimantos, his two philosophically

educated and sympathetic interlocutors. For them Socrates connects the scheme CS with

the theory of Forms as a starting-point for his subsequent more complex explanations

concerning the relation of ontological categories and epistemic modes.

We can break down CSA as follows:

Section (a), 467E7-477B9, begins the exposition of CS. The ontological

categories he distinguishes are (1) that which (perfectly/unqualifiedly) is, (2) that whichis-and-is-not , and (3) that which is not at all (or in no way). (The corresponding

cognitive ‘powers’ are knowledge ( gnôsis / epistêmê), doxa, and ignorance (agnôsia)—

this last one rather being a specific form of absence of cognitive power. The ontological

categories of things that perfectly are and of things that are-and-are-not will later (in

section [d]) be equated with the Forms and their natural or social instantiations

respectively.

The basic idea of this scheme (which obviously harks back to the three ‘ways’

distinguished by the Presocratic Parmenides7) can be represented in this table:

CS

Type of cognitive dunamis Object (relatum) of the cognitive dunamis

1) knowledge ( gnôsis/epistêmê) what (perfectly/unqualifiedly) is [≡ a Form]

2) doxa what is and is not [≡ a mere exemplification

not the Form itself]

3) ignorance (agnôsia) what in no way is [≡ ‘nothing’]

Section (b), 477B10-478A5, explains the concept of a power (dunamis) and triesto validate the claim that epistêmê and doxa, qua cognitive powers, must relate to

different ranges of objects and result in different cognitive achievements.

On this basis section (c), 478A6-E6, sets out why we have to identify the objects-

range of doxa, as a fallible cognitive state intermediate between knowledge and

ignorance, with the things that are-and-are-not.

Section (d), 478E7-479E9, explains what sorts of objects belong into the category

of the things that are-and-are-not. The answer is that the things the ‘lovers of sights and

7 Cf. John Palmer, loc. cit., on Plato’s use of Parmenides in CSA.



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sounds’ recognize as the only reality, viz. the many instances of the Forms, are things

which are-and-are-not. In the course of this explanation the talk of being versus being-

and-not-being, which had remained very vague up to this point, acquires a more

concrete meaning. Thanks to this, it also becomes clearer why the mix of being and not-

being is supposed to thwart epistemic cognition.

The final section (e), 479E10-480A13, carries the argument to the conclusion that

people like the ‘lovers of sights and sounds’ should be called philodoxoi (lovers of

doxa) instead of philosophoi.

A number of questions need to be raised with respect to CS.

1) How can the nature of the correlations between the cognitive dunameis

and their types of objects be spelled out in terms of necessary and sufficientconditions? For instance, the ontological characteristic of unrestricted being

seems to function as a necessary condition for something’s being an object

of epistêmê. Is that so also in the case of complete non-being and agnôsia?

2) What is the sense of “dunamis” here?

3) What is the sense of “to be” here, and do the ontological categories

define non-overlapping sets of objects?

4) In which sense is doxa said to be fallible and epistêmê infallible?

If we answer all these questions, then we can hope to reach a well-founded conclusion

regarding the nature of the epistêmê and doxa as represented in this argument.

I will first tackle the third question regarding the concept of being (and I will have

to be rather ‘doctrinal’ because there is no room here for discussing Plato’s concept of

being in detail).

Ad 3: It is helpful to distinguish between an absolute and a copulative use of “is” or

“being” (esti, einai/on). Being is attributed “absolutely” in a statement of the form “A

is.” It is used for a copulative function in sentences of the form “A is B” (where “B” can

be replaced either by a general or a singular term). If the second term is a general term,

we also speak of predicative being. If it is a singular term, the statement expresses an

identity relation. The “is” (esti) which is predicated “absolutely” could mean either

existence or veridical ‘being the case’, according to the established usages in Ancient

Greek.

It is, however, essential to note that often Plato understands ‘being’, attributed

absolutely, as equivalent to ‘being something’ such that the word “something” functions

like a variable for general terms. In this case, the absolute use of “to be” indicates

predicative being. Predicative being is closely connected with veridical being, because if



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some x is F, it is also the case that x is F. Thus a veridical instance of being, i.e. the on

in the sense of a state of affairs which obtains and can be known, can ‘unfold’ into an

instance of predicative being (x being F).8

CSA is an example for the absolute use of “to be” and “not to be” for the

indication of predicative being and not-being with a veridical connotation. Take the

example of an instance of beauty. Section (d) tells us that this is an example of

something which IS and IS NOT, because it is and is not beautiful —or because it is

both true and false to say of it that it is beautiful. (We might think of Helen being

compared to some other, more beautiful entity, or viewed form some unfavorable

perspective). Accordingly, something which is beautiful and in no way is not beautiful,

would be an example of a thing which unqualifiedly IS (i.e. without a mix with not-

being). For Plato, this ontological description singles out the Form of the beautiful – theBeautiful-itself. —Of course this means that this talk of unrestricted being presupposes

the possibility of the ‘self-predication’ of Forms.9

The “is” in such a statement oscillates

in a problematic way between predication and identity. But either way it is ‘copulative’,

not existential.

Also in the case of the negative limit concept of that which in no way is

(=nothing) (477A3-4, 7, cf. 478B12-C4) we have to think of the copulative use: This

pseudo-object is nothing or in no way, because there is no way to characterize ‘it’

predicatively.

Hence, when Plato speaks of things that are and things that are-and-are-not, the

predicative or (more generally) copulative sense of “being” is to be understood. Yet this

cannot be the whole story. The Forms, which are the example of things that ARE, can

also be characterized in a negative way. For instance: “The Beautiful itself is not ugly.”

Or: “The Beautiful itself is not perishable.” Plato’s examples and comments (478E-

479D) suggest that a Form’s undiluted mode of being consists in the fact that the Form

is what it is unequivocally, since it perfectly excludes any contrary quality. The many

instantiations of this Form, on the other hand, don’t perfectly exclude contrary qualities.

In some way or other they exemplify not just Fness, but also the opposite of Fness, and

8On the terminology of ‘being’ in Ancient Greek and in Plato in particular cf. Charles

Kahn, On the Theory of the Verb ‘To Be’ , in M. K. Munitz (ed.), Logic and Ontology,

New York 1973, 1-20; idem, “A Return to the Theory of the Verb be and the Concept of

Being,” Ancient Philosophy 24 (2004), 381-405; idem, “Some Philosophical Uses of ‘to be’ in Plato,” Phronesis 26 (1981), 105-134; Lesley Brown, The Verb ‘To Be’ in Greek

Philosophy: Some Remarks, in S. Everson (ed.), Language, Cambridge 1994; Szaif, Platons Begriff der Wahrheit ... [loc. cit.], passim.9

Cf. John Malcolm, Plato on the Self-Predication of the Forms, Oxford 1991, for a

comprehensive survey and analysis of the positions on ‘self-predication’ in Plato.



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that is why their mode of being is indistinct and, as it were, “ambiguous” (cf. 479B11-

C5). To put it in a slightly more formal way: For any predicative content F or Fness:

Only F-itself is unequivocally F (i.e. without any aspect of being not-F), all other

objects that are F are also not F. In 479C3-5, the argument reaches an even more radical

analysis of the situation: Because the contrary characteristics cancel out each other and

yet obtain somehow, it is not possible to firmly conceive the thing in question as F or

not F or both or neither. Although it is not nothing at all, it eludes any firm cognitive

hold. (Note that we are talking here about instances, say, of beauty as instances of

beauty. The question is not if Helen, as Helen, does allow for any sort of firm cognitive

acquaintance, but if this instance of beauty, conceptualized as an instance of beauty, can

be firmly represented as such.)

Thus the ontological status of perfect/unrestricted being (to pantelôs on) is basedon the fact that such a thing is perfectly determined since the descriptive (or ‘eidetic’)

content thanks to which it is determined is not qualified or cancelled out by the co-

presence of a contrary eidetic content. Accordingly we can also say that ‘unrestricted

being’ here stands for perfect determinateness.

Do these ontological categories define exclusive sets of objects? An object might

be perfectly determined in one respect and not so in another. CSA exploits the

phenomenon that in the case of properties that constitute pairs of opposites the

ascriptions are often context-sensitive or ‘perspectival’. Nothing is large or small

absolutely, but only from a certain perspective, viz. depending on what counts as small

or large in the given context. Yet ascriptions of descriptive contents like being human or

being a finger are not perspectival in this way (523CD). Also they can’t come in pairs

of opposites (enantia, polar contraries) for the simple reason that such individuative

terms don’t have opposites. Therefore Plato’s argument in Rep. V can’t apply to such

characteristics. Hence, as far as that goes, his argument is open for the possibility that

the same object in perfectly determined and hence a ‘knowable’ in one respect, yet in

another respect a mere doxaston.10

To be sure, other passages in his middle-period

works articulate the thought that sensible objects in general and in all respects don’t

qualify as objects of epistêmê (probably as a consequence of Plato’s views concerning

the unity and imperishability of an object of epistêmê).11 So, in the end, the two classes

10Cf. Annas, loc. cit., 193-211.

11 Already the brief back reference in 485AB to the result of CSA has shifted to the

antithesis between things that always are and things that are subject to coming-into-

being and passing-away, which does affect the status of individuative properties.—For a

comprehensive discussion of Platonic arguments for the existence of Forms cf. Gail

Fine, On Ideas. Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms, Oxford 1993.



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of objects are meant to be exclusive, but that doesn’t yet follow from the distinction

between perspectival and non-perspectival being.

Ad 1: Regarding the correlations in CS we have to differentiate between terms for

cognitive states like “knowledge” (epistêmê) and terms for dispositional attributes like

“knowable” ( gnôston) which contain a modal component. At the outset of his argument

Plato introduces the correlations (1) and (3): With respect to (1), he claims that if

somebody knows something, this must be something which IS (or unqualifiedly IS). He

also states that that which unqualifiedly IS is unqualifiedly knowable. This statement is

not free of ambiguity since can mean that being implies knowability (i.e. is a sufficient

condition of knowability), but may also be taken to mean that being is logically

equivalent to knowability (i.e. is both a necessary and a sufficient condition of knowability). Later it becomes clear that the argument presupposes that unqualified

being is not only a sufficient, but also a necessary condition for knowability, for

Socrates claims that knowledge is “set over that which is” and has the function to know

of that-which-is which way it is (477B10 f, 478A6). Given that unqualified being is a

necessary condition for knowability, it follows that all instances of knowledge are, each

of them, of some unqualified being or other.

Thus we get the following two contentions, of which the first is meant to imply

the second:

i) For all objects x: If and only if x IS (unqualifiedly), is it possible that there be

some epistemic cognition y which is of x.

ii) For all cognitive states y: if y is an epistemic cognition, then there is some

object x, such that y is of x and x IS (unqualifiedly).

The first is a claim regarding the ‘knowability’ of the objects in the first ontological

category. The second is a claim about the kind of object the cognitive state of epistêmê

requires. Undiluted being is a necessary and sufficient condition of knowability and a

necessary condition for becoming an object of somebody’s actual epistêmê:

What about correlation (3)? Plato claims that that which IS NOT (anything at all)

is completely unknowable ( pantêi agnôston). Yet total lack of being is not only

sufficient for a total lack of knowability, it is also a necessary condition for it, since only

that which in no way is (something or other) will be completely inaccessible to any kind

of cognition. Of something which IS, there can be knowledge, but of something which

IS NOT anything at all, there must be ignorance. Plato hints at this asymmetry by

adding an “ex anankês” in the case of agnôsia’s ‘being set over non-being’ (477A9,

478C3) which he doesn’t do in the other cases.

Thus we obtain the following claims:



12

iii) For all objects x: if and only x is not (anything at all), is it necessary that there

be ignorance (i.e. no cognition at all) of x.

iv) For all cognitive states y: if there is some object x, such that y is of x and x IS

NOT (anything at all), then y is a state of ignorance.

Let us turn to correlation (2). Here we are not dealing with a total absence of

cognition, but with a different type of cognition and a different kind of cognitive

accessibility of an object. The same way as epistêmê correlates with that which IS, doxa

is said to correlate with that which IS AND IS NOT. Both are characterized as different

cognitive ‘powers’ which require a different type of object according to the ontological

distinction between undiluted being and being mixed with not-being. Thus we can

attribute to Plato the following two claims which match the claims (i) and (ii) regarding

epistêmê: (The second claim, which is about the object of doxa, is meant to be impliedin the first claim about the cognitive accessibility of objects of that mixed kind.)

v) For all objects x: If and only if x is and is not , is it possible that there be some

doxastic cognition y which is of x.

vi) For all cognitive states y: if y is a doxastic cognition, then there is some object

x, such that y is of x and x is and is not .

The suggestion that epistêmê and doxa are two different cognitive ‘powers’ with

different ranges of referential objects seems very strange to modern readers who are

used to the evidential or justificatory distinction between knowledge and mere true

belief. Yet it also seems incompatible with remarks in other contexts in the Republic

and elsewhere which affirm the possibility of (some sort of) knowledge with respect to

concrete instantiations and of opinion with respect to Forms. I can refer back to my

introductory remarks. Even the immediately preceding passage which contains DDA

turned out to imply the possibility of knowledge with respect to concrete instantiations.

There is no way out of this conundrum if we construe the ‘objects’ of the

cognitive states distinguished here as the referential objects of propositional cognition,

i.e. as that about which something is known or believed. May be a closer examination of

the way in which Plato conceives epistêmê and doxa as ‘powers’ will provide us with an

alternative.

Ad 2: Plato’s argument in section (b) about ‘powers’ is built upon an assumption (A)

about the general identity criterion for types of ‘power’ formulated in 477D2-5. It can

be rephrased in this way:

A: (1) ‘powers’ (dunameis) are the same in kind if and only if they relate to the

same objects and achieve the same things; (2) ‘Powers’ (dunameis) differ in



13

kind if and only if they relate to different kinds of objects and achieve

different things.

The “and” printed in italics in second first leg of (A) is the puzzling feature in this

assumption, but it is also crucial for the argument because the intended conclusion can

be obtained only if this “and” is kept and not replaced by an “or”. For the text will argue

from the premise that doxa has a different kind of achievement (and hence is a different

kind of dunamis) to the conclusion that its objects must also be different from those of

epistêmê. This inference would not be possible if we had an “or” instead of an “and” in

the second leg of (A). This means that Plato does not acknowledge the possibility of two

dunameis achieving different things with regard to the same kind of object. But why

should that possibility be excluded? This certainly looks question-begging and thus

represents a very questionable move in this argument. Yet we may try to add some extraexplanation to the argument that would justify the exclusion of the possibility that

powers can achieve different things with respect to the same relata.

Assumption (A) can make sense only if the object range is conceived of as

intrinsically connected with the kind of function or achievement of the power in

question. Later metaphysical terminology developed the concept of a ‘formal’ object: A

formal object is the type object of a faculty, ability or power that matches its defining

function, activity or effect. If we speak of the ability to slap and the ability to caress,

their formal objects would be that which is capable of being slapped or that which is

capable of being caressed. Of course the same person can be slapped and caressed. The

‘material’ objects, hence, can be the same. But there is still the difference of the formal

objects as defined by the kind of power or ability.

Can we suppose that something like this is going on here? The only illustrative

examples he mentions are sight and hearing (477C3). Unfortunately, he does not give us

any further indications as to how he wants us to use these examples. The easiest way of

specifying their formal objects would be to call them the visible and the audible. A more

sophisticated answer would identify the visible with, say, colors and shapes, the audible

with sounds. Now there is an additional complication. The examples Socrates gives in

section (d) of CSA suggest that we are invited to consider the objects of doxa and

epistêmê as not only formally, but also materially distinct: as two non-overlapping sets

of objects, viz. Forms on one side and transient or mixed instances on the other. If we

link the faculties of sight and hearing to colors and shapes or sounds respectively, we

would also obtain non-overlapping sets of objects. But this is rather an exception. It is

obviously not true in general that abilities or faculties define non-overlapping sets of

objects, and we don’t have to burden the argument here with such an extravagant

assumption. The premise that he needs in section (c) does not imply a stronger claim



14

than that the object-ranges of doxa and epistêmê are formally distinct. That they are also

materially distinct and even exclusive sets of objects, this is a consequence of the

ontological chorismos between the Forms and their physical and social instantiations, a

thesis which is not argued for in this passage.

Now, if we want to get clear about as what kind of power doxa and epistêmê are

conceived here, we have to understand how their formal objects are characterized. There

are basically two possibilities. If we construe doxa and epistêmê as tpyes of

propositional cognition, then their formal objects (the ‘opinable’ and the ‘knowable’)

would have to be identified as propositional contents or as propositionally structured

states of affairs. This would allow for a fairly straightforward answer to the question

how these two types relate to two formally distinct object-ranges: Since knowledge

implies truth, whereas opinion does not, knowledge is of true propositional contents (or existing states of affairs) while opinion is of true or false propositional contents.

Unfortunately this solution, supported by Gail Fine and others12

, does not square with

the way the objects of knowledge and opinion are described in section (d)—not as

propositional contents (like that Helen is beautiful ) but as Forms and as physical or

social instantiations of a Form (like beautiful things).13

The alternative is to read this distinction as one between types of object-cognition

or acquaintance. The usage which relates the nominal constructions “doxa tinos” and

“epistêmê tinos” (knowledge of something) or the verbal constructions “doxazein ti”

and “ gnonai/eidenai ti” (knowing something) to objects instead of propositional

contents is well established for Plato, the Theaetetus in particular providing ample

12 Cf. Gosling, loc. cit., Fine, Knowledge and Belief ...(loc. cit.).13 Defenders of the view that the objects which epistêmê and doxa are set over, are

propositions refer to 479D4, where the text specifies the objects of doxa as “ta tôn pollôn polla nomima kalou te peri kai tôn allôn”: “the many nomima of the multitude

with respect to what is beautiful et cetera”. Fine, for instance, translates “nomima” as

“beliefs” (loc. cit., 92). Yet “ nomimon” can also denote that which is an object of belief

or acknowledgement. In the present context, the word “nomimon” harks back to what

was said about the ‘lovers of sights and sounds’ in the preceding passage DDA: thatthey “acknowledge (nomizei) many beautiful things”, but not the beautiful itself

(476C2-3). So the nomima are the things acknowledged by them. In this case, then, the

“ peri” after “nomima” does not mean “about” so as to point to an object of reference of

a belief (that which the belief is about ), but more vaguely indicates the respect: ‘In

respect of beauty, they acknowledge nothing else than the many instances beauty which

are and are not beautiful.’



15

evidence for that.14 But does that also tally with the way he describes the achievement

of epistêmê and doxa in CSA?

The claim that we are dealing here with types of object-cognition is easier to

establish with respect to the concept of epistêmê. The type of object that corresponds to

epistêmê (or gnônai) is said to exhibit unrestricted, unqualified being-F, and the reason

indicated for this is that such a mode of being allows for a firm and stable cognitive

grasp ( pagiôs noêsai, 479C4). Since his examples for perfect beings are Forms (the

Beautiful itself etc.), we can infer that he has in mind the kind of acquaintance with a

Form that reveals the essence that can be ascribed to the Form—if his distinction is

indeed about modes of acquaintance. This kind of acquaintance would be the

achievement of a progress in conceptual understanding as aimed at by philosophical

dialectic.Yet one can object that the achievement of epistêmê is paraphrased as “to on

gnônai hôs echei ” (478A6). Isn’t this stating that the knowledge in question knows

“with respect to that-which-is, how it is”, and wouldn’t this knowing how it is (or what

it is like) be an instance of propositional knowledge? Now, this Greek phrase is actually

somewhat ambiguous between an objectual and a propositional construal: It can

certainly be construed in the way just cited. But since “to on” (“that which is”) functions

here also as the object of “ gnônai”, the more adequate translation seems to be “knowing

that-which-is as it is”.15 Yet this point is not really decisive. However we construe this

phrase, there is no incoherence in describing the epistemic acquaintance with a Form F-

itself such that it implies that one knows what this Form is like. Some formulation like

that could even be used with respect to some strictly non-propositional knowledge-by-

acquaintance as conceived by Russell. If somebody is acquainted with the color red,

they can certainly be said to know ‘what red is like’, although the content of this

knowledge is not expressible in a proposition. Moreover, Platonic theory of object-

cognition with respect to Forms should not be construed in this Russellian manner

anyway. To begin with, even if not all forms are definable according to Plato, some at

least are. And in their case it is possible to reproduce the content of one’s acquaintance

14 For the possibility of a non-propositional construction doxazein cf. Szaif, Platons

Begriff der Wahrheit ...(loc. cit.), 357 f. A general grammatical analysis for the verbs of knowing is provided by John Lyons, Structural Semantics. An Analysis of Part of the

Vocabulary of Plato, Oxford 1963.15 This is the way Cornford and G.M.A Grube (revised by C.D.C. Reeve) translate it.—

The ambiguity is not removed by the parallel formulation in 477B10-11. Although the

word-order is slightly different, the syntactical structure is the same.



16

in a definitional formula (with some qualifications though—I will come back to this

point at the end of my paper).

So it is possible to construe epistêmê as a mode of acquaintance or object-

cognition. If, in the light of this, it is granted that we are dealing here with a

classification of modes of object-cognition or acquaintance, it follows that we have to

construe doxa as acquaintance with natural or social instantiations of Forms, since doxa

is described as being of such instantiations.

The formal object of doxa is characterized by its mode of equivocal being which

cannot be determined as being either F or not-F or both or neither (479C3-5), so that the

acquaintance with such an object can provide only an unstable appearance ( phainesthai,

479A7, B2, 4), not a firm and stable intellectual grasp (noêsai). What then is the

characteristic achievement (the ho apergazetai) of doxa with respect to this type of object?

Plato says no more than that doxa’s activity is doxazein (478A8) and that it takes

place with respect to what is-and-is-not. This does not give us any additional

information since the meaning of the verb doxazein depends on how we are supposed to

understand the achievement of doxa. The clue we are looking for may lie in the

connection between doxa and changing appearance highlighted in section (d). An object

of doxa appears, say, beautiful and is, hence, conceived of as beautiful. But while the

grasp of some perfect being like the beautiful itself as beautiful/beauty is stable, the

conceptual representation of a doxastic instance is unstable as this object can also

appear ugly (e. g. if we change the context and compare it to something much more

beautiful, or if we see it from a different aspect). Both types of cognitive grasp represent

their object as being F, but only when the object is unqualifiedly F, is this representation

fully warranted, while in the mixed ontological case the object eludes this representation

as being F since it manifests itself both as F and as not-F.

Thus we can say that, according to CSA, the cognitive achievement of the activity

of doxazein is a certain kind of conceptualized representation of an object which is not

unequivocally F , as being F . It is a mode of representation of being which falls short of

its object and is unstable because its object lacks genuine being. Its representational

truth is equivocal and transient the same way as the instantiated being which it

represents is equivocal and transient.—If this is the ‘achievement’ of doxa, it does not

seem much of an ‘achievement’ at all, rather a lack of a cognitive achievement. But this

is of course the point Plato wants to drive home. This cognitive mode has no real value.

To be sure, it is better than total agnôsia, which is the cognitive state in which nothing

is presented to the mind—just a total lack of cognition, a black screen, as it were,

complete darkness. There is more ‘light’ in doxa than in agnôsia (cf. 478C13-14). But it



17

is only, as it were, a flickering light, a mix of light and darkness, presenting a certain

mode of being to the mind and then canceling it out it again.

I think that this interpretational strategy of construing epistêmê and doxa as two

kinds of acquaintance with things that are or appear F, is the only way to provide a

reading which stands in agreement with the text and does not lead into the absurd

consequence that it is impossible to form an opinion about a Form or that one cannot

know anything about concrete objects. When philosophers (as conceived in the

Republic) assess presumed participants of ‘F-itself’ in the physical and social world,

they will not simply represent them as being or not being F. They will distinguish

between the underived being-F or the Form and the derived being-F that is based on

‘participation’ in F-itself, and they will specify the relevant respects in which the case in

question qualifies as an exemplification of (derived) being-F . In other words: Theywon’t base their judgment on the simple and deceptive appearance of the thing as being

F. Theirs will be a differentiated judgment whose main cognitive basis is acquaintance

with the Form itself.

At this point I want to add some more general remarks as to why Plato bothers to

distinguish epistêmê and doxa as two levels of acquaintance with being-F . As Julia

Annas has rightly pointed out, the argument in Rep. V presupposes a certain

understanding of knowledge and tries to develop a concept of doxa as its counterpart.16

Now, if epistêmê is conceived as perfected conceptual understanding, rooted in the

adequate and firm cognitive grasp of the essence or Form denoted by the concept-word

in question, then we ought to expect that doxa stands for some deficient mode of

conceptual understanding.

So what is the point of doxa as a deficient mode of conceptual understanding for

an epistemological theory focused on the idea of the possibility of firm and objective

conceptual understanding? Let’s take up again the point about context-relativity and

imagine a little example of our own. If lover of beautiful sights stands in front of a

painting of Helen and exclaims: “She is beautiful!”, an uncompromising Platonist in

their company would of course retort that this is nothing compared to the beauty of a

geometrical construction. Another, more amiable philosopher might come to the aide of

the lover of sights and submit: “Well, with respect to her looks and as a human being, it

is certainly fair to say that she is extraordinarily beautiful.” If the lover of sights buys

that, they are already on the way to becoming aware of the distinction between Forms

and mixed instances. This more sophisticated judgment is immune against the argument

from context-relativity because it specifies the relevant context or respect and thus

16 Cf. Annas, loc. cit ., 193.



18

qualifies the attribution of the property in the appropriate way. It does more than just

articulate a mode of appearance. It has analyzed the appearance by situating it in its

context. This kind of realization of context-dependence is the first step toward

understanding why the universal content denoted by the concept-word cannot be

identical with any of these derived instances or their sum.

Yet people who haven’t yet opened themselves to the impact of Socratic dialectic,

will rely for their understanding of concepts like beauty, justice, or largeness, on their

acquaintance with what they see as uncontroversial or outstanding examples. When

Socrates asks someone to explain what justice is, or what beauty is, they will first cite

such examples (types or tokens), because it is examples of that kind which their

understanding of the concepts in question is based upon. In the case of value-concepts,

poetic productions play a significant role for the Greeks in providing such sociallyaccepted examples. (This refers us back to the ‘lovers and sights and sounds’.) Yet like

the orators and politicians, the poets as well lack insight into the real nature of the

values in question and thus cannot provide any reliable guidance. When Socrates

scrutinizes such examples presumed to be ‘clear’ instances of something which is F, it

turns out that their appearance of being-F is not clear at all because a change of context

will turn the appearance into its contrary. He will try to make his interlocutors realize

that they lack genuine understanding of the property or value in question as long as they

rely solely on their acquaintance with socially accepted examples. Yet he will grant that

their deficient understanding is more than total ignorance (agnôsia). They are in an

intermediate state which is not knowledge but at least provides some starting-points in

the quest for real understanding.

So from the point of view of a theory of conceptual progress, one needs to discuss

this mode of acquaintance because it is the basis of our insufficient conceptual

understanding before the onset of philosophical investigation. It is easy to show how,

from this point of view, CSA fits into the context of the central books of the Republic,

which are inspired by an ethical and pedagogical idea according to which the

objectivation of our leading concepts is of paramount significance for the realization of

human happiness. Genuine conceptual understanding requires that one become aware of

the existence of Forms and of the derivative character of determinations in the physical

and social world. This is the theme of DDA. Genuine conceptual understanding would

have to have the character of a firm and stable acquaintance with a descriptive content

and should not be subject to changes according to context and perspective. Yet the

instantiations in the physical and social world cannot provide this because their mode of

being is context-relative and unstable. This is the theme of CSA. Only the person who is

acquainted with the Form itself and has a clear representation of it in his soul will be



19

competent to judge upon and produce things that instantiate the Form in the physical

and social world. This is the theme of the passage that immediately follows upon CSA

(484A-D). It provides the epistemological justification for the contention that the

philosophers alone are entitled to rule over a human commonwealth. These three aspects

of the description of the doxastic state of mind and its objects (i.e. the concealment of

the underlying reality of the Forms, the instability of appearance, the insufficiency as

models or standards for judgment and production) together provide the basis for the

subsequent epistemological and pedagogical discussions in books VI and VII about how

we can advance toward a genuinely true conceptual representation of reality and value.

Ad 4) As to the remaining question in which sense epistêmê is infallible and doxa

fallible I can now confine myself to some brief comments. In a way, the answer can bevery simple: Since the doxastic representation is not true without qualification, it cannot

be called infallible. The epistemic acquaintance, on the other hand, provides a firm and

stable representation which is true of its object without any restriction and cannot turn

into something false. Yet the remark in 477E that doxa is apt to fail while epistêmê isn’t,

is likely to have a wider scope. It seems to characterize the doxastic state of mind in

general, i.e. the cognitive condition that we are in as long as we have not gained an

objective foundation for our concepts and rely on examples instead. The lack of

adequate and reliable concepts is a the source of mistaken judgements. People whose

understanding of justice is based solely on their acquaintance with supposedly clear

instances of justice and who try to extrapolate from these to new situations with the help

of similarities and analogies, may be lucky enough to hit upon a right answer here and

there. But they may quite as well go wrong, not having grasped the essence of justice.

To be sure, also someone with perfected conceptual understanding can go wrong if their

information about the details of the situation is insufficient. But the cause of their error

does not lie in their knowledge of the Form. In that sense, genuine conceptual

knowledge is infallible.

In my introductory remarks I mentioned the problem that CSA distinguishes

epistêmê and doxa as two different powers (dunameis) of the soul, while later on, in

Rep. VII , 518A-519B, he stresses that the rational dunamis of the soul (the “eye of the

soul”) is just one and that it is not implanted into our soul by philosophical or scientific

education, but has been active all along if with respect to the inappropriate kind of

objects. The word “dunamis” is used in many different ways by Plato. In the passage in

Rep. VII “dunamis” means a faculty, indeed the rational faculty of the soul. Yet in the

text in Rep. V that sets out CSA, it is crucial not to interpret “dunamis” as “faculty”. His

examples of sight and hearing are misleading in that respect because they are faculties.



20

In the Rep. VII passage, Socrates grants that the rational faculty, when it applies itself to

the objects and processes of the social or natural world, can achieve a high degree of

shrewdness and sharpness of mind with respect to these, even though it has not been

enlightened by philosophy. This is a kind of competence which is based on experience

and socially transmitted ideas, but without real understanding regarding the basic ethical

concepts that should lead one’s pursuit of private and public happiness. There are

several striking passages in books VI and VII that situate this sort competence at the

level of doxa.17 So, from the point of view of Rep. VII , 518A-519B, the one rational

faculty can and does produce doxa-type cognition. Furthermore, there is a clear thematic

sequence that links CSA with this passage in Rep. VII . The Sun follows up on the

description of epistêmê and doxa as different cognitive states and powers, describing

them as different achievements of the intellectual faculty (represented as an analogon tothe visual faculty) that correlate with the ontological quality of the object of

acquaintance such that only an object which exhibits “truth and being” allows for

epistêmê. The imagery of the Sun is then integrated into the much more complex

imagery of the Cave, and the passage in Rep. VII which emphasizes the unity of the

rational faculty, belongs to Socrates’ comments about the meaning of the Cave.

So all this, taken together, makes it quite clear that also doxa, as described in

CSA, is a product of the rational core of the soul when it is in a deficient condition. The

rational faculty of the soul, which is metaphorically named as ‘eye of the soul’, can

produce cognitive states with different levels of cognitive ‘power’ or ‘force’. Only

epistemic cognition is able to present an object to the mind that allows for a firm and

unequivocal grasp. Doxa does not achieve that.

I want to conclude with some general remarks on the concepts of truth and knowledge18

(as acquaintance with Forms) and about the problem of the assertibility of knowledge in

order to shed some more light on the background of CSA. When Socrates started his

reasoning as to why the kind of ‘learning’ which is provided by theatrical performances

or minor crafts, should not count as genuine interest in knowledge, he hinted at the

17Cf. Rep. 488C-E, 493A-C, 516E-517A, 517D.

18 On the relation between Plato’s concept of truth and his epistemology cf. Szaif,

Platons Begriff ...(loc. cit.), 72-324 (see also idem, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in der klassischen Antike“, in M. Enders, idem (eds.), Der philosophische Wahrheitsbegriff in

seiner Geschichte, Berlin/ New York 2006, 1-32.). Two recent interesting attempts at

elucidating the role of alêtheia in the simile of the Sun (which is pivotal for our

understanding the role of this concept in the Republic) are Franco Ferrari, “La causalità

del bene nella Repubblica di Platone,” Elenchos, 22 (2001), 5-37; B. E. Hestir, “Plato

and the Split Personality of Ontological Alêtheia”, Apeiron 37 (2004), 109-150.



21

connection between the concepts of knowledge and truth, calling the philosophers

‘lovers of the sight of the truth’ (475E), and he implied that the kind of experience such

performances and crafts can provide is irrelevant for the achievement of knowledge

because it can grant no acquaintance with ‘the truth’. At the same time, his remark also

points forward to one of the central thematic lines that can be followed books VI and

VII: The idea that the orientation toward truth and genuine being is the defining

characteristic of a philosophical pre-disposition and a philosophical life,19 and that the

main goal of the whole curriculum of mathematical and philosophical subjects for the

future philosopher-rulers, the crucial end of their cognitive ascent, is to let the students

become acquainted with ‘the truth’.20

The concept of ‘truth’ at play here is to a large

extent determined by the basic epistemological and metaphysical idea of Plato’s, viz.

the idea that real knowledge and understanding must be based on an objectiveclarification of our concepts and that this can be achieved only by becoming acquainted

with the underlying objective essences or Forms. Plato has adjusted his talk of truth to

the purposes of his epistemology and ontology of Forms.

A very important factor, in this connection, for Plato’s understanding of the term

‘truth’ is his tendency to see truth as the relatum of knowledge ( epistêmê). As he points

out in his discussion of the theory of Forms in the Parmenides, knowledge is supposed

to be “of the truth” (tês alêtheias, Parm. 134A). In this turn of phrase, alêtheia is

understood as reality which can become known. Since Plato conceives epistêmê

primarily as conceptual clarification on the basis of a specific type of object-cognition,

viz. cognition of the Forms, the corresponding concept of alêtheia as knowable reality is

not conceived as the counterpart of assertoric truth (which would be something like

facts or existing states of affairs). Rather he uses the phrase ‘the truth’ (or

interchangeably “that which is true”, ta alêthê) to name the whole realm of Forms.21

The Parmenides-passage is an example for that because it treats alêtheia as the generic

object of generic epistêmê, but the different Forms as the objects of the different kinds

of epistêmê (e. g. knowledge of justice, which is knowledge of the Form the Just). In a

similar manner, though only implicitly, the first of the two arguments in Rep. V (DDA)

19 Cf. Rep. 485A-487A, 489E-490D, Rep. 535 DE, (see also Legg. 730C ff.). On this

topic, cf. Jan Szaif, Die Aletheia in Platons Tugendlehre, in M. van Ackeren (ed.),

Platon Verstehen. Perspektiven der Forschung , Darmstadt 2004, 183-209.20 E. g. Rep. 525C5-6, 526B2-3, 527B9, E2-3.21 Cf. Phd. 84A8, Symp. 212A5, Rep. 519B4, Phdr. 247D4, 248C3-4, 249D5. This

usage is also incorporated into the three central similes of the Republic (cf. Rep. 508D4-

6, 510A9, 511E, 515C2, D6-7).



22

identifies ‘the truth’ with the Forms by identifying the ability to see or contemplate ‘the

truth’ with the ability ‘see’ the Forms.

Yet in the context of Plato’s theory of Forms, ‘truth’ does not only function as the

notion for knowable reality. When Plato identifies the Forms with the ‘the truth’ (hê

alêtheia) or ‘that which is true’ (ta alêthê), which he does frequently in the books VI

and VII, we are also supposed to understand that only the Forms are what they are in a

not-derivative way, while the being of the instances we are first familiar with, is only

derivative, only a copy of that which is the only ‘true F’, the essence itself. Also the idea

of the Form’s pure and undiluted being-what-it-is, not faulted by the admixture of

contrary properties, is supposed be an aspect of the truth of the Forms. (The linguistic

basis for these connotations of the word “true” is the attributive use of “true”).22

These very specific aspects of ontological truth restrict the application of this termto objects and, moreover, to a specific ontological category of objects, the Forms. This

concept of truth is adjusted to the purposes of his metaphysical epistemology of

acquaintance with Forms. (It needs to be mentioned that beside this theoretically loaded

concept of truth there is also a much more down-to-earth usage of “true” in the Republic

and elsewhere , which has the meaning of assertoric truth—a concept that he can’t

renounce if he wants to uphold the applicability of the knowledge of Forms to concrete

objects in the sensible word. Yet this meaning does not yet get Plato’s full philosophical

attention in the Republic.) Now, if the truth that can become the content of the epistemic

representation is a set of intellectual objects, not of propositions, does this mean that the

truth which can become known is not assertible at all?

For Plato, knowledge is first and foremost knowledge-what 23, i. e. the grasp of

essences. That is why the passage in the Parmenides breaks down truth (alêtheia), as the

generic object of knowledge, into Forms. In CSA, Plato speaks of ‘knowing that-what-

is as it is. Yet in the case of a Form knowing the thing as it is is knowing what it is. It is

the kind of knowledge Plato’s Socrates aims at when he discusses questions like “What

is beauty?”. Now, the grasp of such an essence is typically described by Plato as a kind

of acquaintance (witness the pervasive use of visual metaphors in passages that describe

the cognitive ascent to the Forms). On the other hand, it is also a methodological

22 The association between the term “true” (in its attributive meaning) and the idea of

the Form as an ‘original’ (the thing ‘itself’) of which certain other things are mere‘copies’, is particularly prominent in 510A, 520C, Symp. 212A (see also Rep. 484CD,

533A, Crat. 439AB, Soph. 240A). Phd. 67AB explicitly asserts the conceptualconnection between truth and purity (to eilikrines). Cf. the use of “eilikrinôs” in Rep. V,

479D5.23 Cf. Annas, loc. cit., 192.



23

principle of dialectical enquiry that it should try to provide a definition of the Form in

question, a definition that can be asserted and defended in an argumentative exchange.

So this type of acquaintance cannot be totally disconnected from assertibility. Yet how

it connects with assertibility, seems to be a rather complex issue in Plato.

A Form, in Plato, is a reified essence such that the content of which the Form is

supposed to be the one and only pure instantiation can be ascribed to the Form itself (the

so-called ‘self-predication’ of the Form). Therefore the content which is that as which

the Form becomes known, can also be asserted of the Form. This is the minimum of

assertibility which is fulfilled even by simple, unanalyzable Forms. Yet such an

assertion in which the unanalyzable content is predicated of itself, would have no more

information value regarding the content of this Form than a tautology. Thus this

propositional formulation would certainly be secondary to the pre-propositionalacquaintance with the Form and not be able to express the truth which has become

known, in an informative way. In the case of analyzable Forms, the question what it is

can be answered with an informative definitional statement. Yet even here it seems that

this propositional articulation is somehow secondary to the familiarity with the Form

which cannot be established simply by learning a definitional formula. Otherwise

philosophical instruction would be easy and could consist in memorizing definitional

formulae. This is definitely not Plato’s position. The ways in which dialectic can

establish knowledge of and acquaintance with Forms, are not the topic of this paper

though.

I want to end by summarizing what I see as three defining characteristics of

Plato’s concept of epistêmê that are in the background of the arguments in Rep. V . First,

knowledge is conceived primarily as a type of object-cognition or acquaintance, with

Forms as objects. Secondly, this object-cognition is primarily a kind of knowledge-what

and as such the foundation for a perfected conceptual understanding which is adequate

in virtue of being true to the Forms. Thirdly, this kind of object-cognition connects (in

ways that need further investigation) with the ability to assert and rationally defend

statements about the Form in question (and ultimately about the whole network of

Forms24

). In contrast to this, doxa is understood as a developmental stage of conceptual

understanding in which a person has nothing but derivative instantiations to rely upon—

24 This is a point that I have not touched upon at all in this paper. It is the reason why in

Plato knowledge as conceptual understanding based on acquaintance with the Forms

connects with knowledge as systematic understanding. this becomes more transparent in

Plato’s later dialogues. (Yet see Jan Szaif, “Platon über Wahrheit und Kohärenz,”

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 82 (2000), 119-148, on the role of the

systematicity of dialectical knowledge in the Republic)



instantiations of F-itself whose being-F is context-depended and transient. These

derivative instantiations will turn out not to provide a reliable basis if someone in this

condition is confronted with the question what it is to be an F. Not being acquainted

with that which is ‘true’—viz. the original itself behind the transient images, the one

pure and faultless instance of being-F—clinging instead to examples in the natural or

social world which are accepted by the multitude without a sufficient rational

foundation, they will not stand up to the dialectical test.

doxa and episteme

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