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Edgeworth Box Experiment Joseph Tao-yi Wang 2019/10/2 (Lecture 8b, Micro Theory I) 1 Joseph Tao-yi Wang Edgeworth Box Experiment

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Page 1: Edgeworth Box Experiment

Author Name

Edgeworth Box Experiment

Joseph Tao-yi Wang

2019/10/2

(Lecture 8b, Micro Theory I)

1

Joseph Tao-yi Wang Edgeworth Box Experiment

Page 2: Edgeworth Box Experiment

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Pareto Efficiency (PE)

Walrasian Equilibrium (WE)

FWT/SWTHomothetic Preferences

Road Map for Chapter 3

• Pareto Efficiency Allocation (PEA)

– Cannot make one better off without hurting others

• Walrasian (Price-taking) Equilibrium (WE)

–When Supply Meets Demand

– Focus on Exchange Economy First

• 1st Welfare Theorem:

– Any WE is PEA (Adam Smith Theorem)

• 2nd Welfare Theorem:

– Any PEA can be supported as a WE with transfers10/2/2019 2x2 Exchange EconomyJoseph Tao-yi Wang

Page 3: Edgeworth Box Experiment

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Pareto Efficiency (PE)

Walrasian Equilibrium (WE)

FWT/SWTHomothetic Preferences

2x2 Exchange Economy

• 2 Commodities: Good 1 and 2

• 2 Consumers: Alex and Bev -

– Endowment:

– Consumption Set:

– Strictly Monotonic Utility:

• Edgeworth Box

– These consumers could be representative agents, or literally TWO people (bargaining)

10/2/2019 2x2 Exchange EconomyJoseph Tao-yi Wang

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Pareto Efficiency (PE)

Walrasian Equilibrium (WE)

FWT/SWTHomothetic Preferences

Pareto Efficiency

• A feasible allocation is Pareto efficient if • there is no other feasible allocation that is• strictly preferred by at least one consumer • and is weakly preferred by all consumers.

10/2/2019 2x2 Exchange EconomyJoseph Tao-yi Wang

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Pareto Efficiency (PE)

Walrasian Equilibrium (WE)

FWT/SWTHomothetic Preferences

Pareto Efficient Allocations

10/2/2019 2x2 Exchange EconomyJoseph Tao-yi Wang

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PEA with Cobb-Douglas Utility

Joseph Tao-yi Wang 2x2 Exchange Economy

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PEA with Cobb-Douglas Utility

Joseph Tao-yi Wang 2x2 Exchange Economy

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PEA with Cobb-Douglas Utility

Contract Curve (all PEA)

Page 9: Edgeworth Box Experiment

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Pareto Efficiency (PE)

Walrasian Equilibrium (WE)

FWT/SWTHomothetic Preferences

Walrasian Equilibrium - 2x2 Exchange Economy• All Price-takers:

• 2 Consumers: Alex and Bev -

– Endowment:

– Consumption Set:

–Wealth:

• Market Demand:(Solution to consumer problem)

• Vector of Excess Demand:

– Vector of total Endowment:

10/2/2019 2x2 Exchange EconomyJoseph Tao-yi Wang

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• Let Excess Demand for Commodity j be

• The Market for Commodity j Clears if

– Excess Demand = 0 or Price = 0 (and ED < 0)

• Excess demand = shortage; negative ED means surplus

• Why is this important?

1. Walras Law

– The last market clears if all other markets clear

2. Market clearing defines Walrasian Equilibrium

Pareto Efficiency (PE)

Walrasian Equilibrium (WE)

FWT/SWTHomothetic Preferences

Definition: Market Clearing Prices

10/2/2019 2x2 Exchange EconomyJoseph Tao-yi Wang

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For any consumption bundle

and any -neighborhood

there is some bundle s.t.

• LNS implies consumer must spend all income

• If not, we have for optimal

• But then there exist

• In the budget set

• LNS , is not optimal!

Pareto Efficiency (PE)

Walrasian Equilibrium (WE)

FWT/SWTHomothetic Preferences

Local Non-Satiation Axiom (LNS)

10/2/2019 2x2 Exchange EconomyJoseph Tao-yi Wang

Page 12: Edgeworth Box Experiment

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For any consumption bundle

and any -neighborhood

there is some bundle s.t.

• LNS implies consumer must spend all income

• If not, we have for optimal

• But then there exist

• In the budget set

• LNS , is not optimal!

Pareto Efficiency (PE)

Walrasian Equilibrium (WE)

FWT/SWTHomothetic Preferences

Local Non-Satiation Axiom (LNS)

10/2/2019 2x2 Exchange EconomyJoseph Tao-yi Wang

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Pareto Efficiency (PE)

Walrasian Equilibrium (WE)

FWT/SWTHomothetic Preferences

Walras Law

• For any price vector , the market value of excess demands must be zero, because:

by LNS

• If one market clears, so must the other.

10/2/2019 2x2 Exchange EconomyJoseph Tao-yi Wang

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Pareto Efficiency (PE)

Walrasian Equilibrium (WE)

FWT/SWTHomothetic Preferences

Definition: Walrasian Equilibrium• The price vector is a Walrasian

Equilibrium price vector if all markets clear.–WE = price vector!!!

• EX: Excess supply (surplus) of commodity 1…

10/2/2019 2x2 Exchange EconomyJoseph Tao-yi Wang

Page 15: Edgeworth Box Experiment

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Pareto Efficiency (PE)

Walrasian Equilibrium (WE)

FWT/SWTHomothetic Preferences

Definition: Walrasian Equilibrium

• Lower price for commodity 1 if excess supply

– Until Markets Clear

• Cannot raise Alex’s utility without hurting Bev

– Hence, we have FWT…10/2/2019 2x2 Exchange EconomyJoseph Tao-yi Wang

Page 16: Edgeworth Box Experiment

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Pareto Efficiency (PE)

Walrasian Equilibrium (WE)

FWT/SWTHomothetic Preferences

First Welfare Theorem: WE PEA

• If preferences satisfy LNS, then a WalrasianEquilibrium allocation (in an exchange economy) is Pareto efficient.

• Sketch of Proof:

1. Any weakly (strictly) preferred bundle must cost at least as much (strictly more) as WE

2. Markets clear Pareto preferred allocation not feasible

10/2/2019 2x2 Exchange EconomyJoseph Tao-yi Wang

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Walrasian Equilibrium: Consumer A Problem

Joseph Tao-yi Wang Edgeworth Box Experiment

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Walrasian Equil.: Consumer Optimal Choice

Joseph Tao-yi Wang Edgeworth Box Experiment

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The Walrasian Equilibrium: Markets Clear

Joseph Tao-yi Wang Edgeworth Box Experiment

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Walras. Equil. in Edgeworth Box Experiment

Joseph Tao-yi Wang Edgeworth Box Experiment

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Walras. Equil. in Edgeworth Box Experiment

Contract Curve (all PEA)

WE

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Experimental Results: 江淳芳個經:第一回合

Contract Curve (all PEA)

WE

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Experimental Results: 江淳芳個經:第二回合

Contract Curve (all PEA)

WE

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Experimental Results: 黃貞穎個經:第一回合

Contract Curve (all PEA)

WE

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Experimental Results: 黃貞穎個經:第二回合

Contract Curve (all PEA)

WE

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Experimental Results: 袁國芝個經:第一回合

Contract Curve (all PEA)

WE

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Experimental Results: 袁國芝個經:第二回合

Contract Curve (all PEA)

WE

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Exp. Results: 王道一(碩一)個論一:第一回合

Contract Curve (all PEA)

WE

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Exp. Results: 王道一(大一)經原一:第一回合

Contract Curve (all PEA)

WE

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What Have We Learned?

• Bilateral trade happens in the Eye

• Prices converge toward WE prices

• Final positions converge toward core and WE– Average closer in 2nd round; variance decreases

• Still a lot of noise (but does not effect results)

• Markets work without full information (Hayek)

• What provided the force of competition?– Existence of perfect substitute (other A and Bs)

• How can we get further converge?– Experience? Larger space? Other trading rules?

Joseph Tao-yi Wang Edgeworth Box Experiment