effectiveness and efficiencies of pmcs

8/22/2019 Effectiveness and Efficiencies of PMCs

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NAVAL

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EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCIES OF PRIVATE

MILITARY CORPORATIONS

by

Robert A. Bur ge

J une 2008

Thesi s Co- Advi sor s: Thomas Br uneau

Rober t Looney


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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188Publ i c r epor t i ng bur den f or t hi s col l ect i on of i nf or mat i on i s esti mat ed to aver age 1 hour perr esponse, i ncl udi ng t he t i me for r evi ewi ng i nst r ucti on, sear chi ng exi st i ng data sour ces, gat her i ngand mai ntai ni ng t he dat a needed, and compl et i ng and r evi ewi ng t he col l ect i on of i nf ormati on. Sendcomment s r egardi ng thi s bur den est i mate or any ot her aspect of t hi s col l ect i on of i nf ormati on,i ncl udi ng suggesti ons f or r educi ng t hi s bur den, t o Washi ngt on headquart ers Ser vi ces, Di r ector atef or I nfor mati on Operat i ons and Report s, 1215 J ef f erson Davi s Hi ghway, Sui t e 1204, Ar l i ngt on, VA

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Ef f ecti veness and Ef f i ci enci esof Pri vat e Mi l i t ar y Cor por at i ons

6. AUTHOR(S) Robert A. Burge

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Naval Post graduat e SchoolMonter ey, CA 93943- 5000

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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

Thi s st udy i nvest i gates pr i vat e mi l i t ary cor porat i ons ( PMCs) t o exami net hei r ef f ecti veness and ef f i ci ency as a subst i t ut e f or t r adi t i onal mi l i t ar yf or ces. The PMC consi st s of a f or pr of i t f i r m t hat pr ovi des mi l i t ar y ser vi cest hat r ange f r om combat oper at i ons t o tr ai ni ng, secur i t y and l ogi st i cs suppor t .Whi l e t he PMCs r epr esent a sol ut i on t o i ssues such as i nsuf f i ci ent mi l i t ar yr esour ces t o pr ovi de di r ect support t o ot her nat i ons, t here r emai n a number of

pol i t i cal and st r uct ur al bar r i er s t o t hei r wi despr ead use.

15. NUMBER OF

PAGES101

14. SUBJECT TERMS Mer cenar y, Sol di er f or Hi r e, Out sour ci ng, Pri vat eMi l i t ar y Company, Ci vi l - Mi l i t ar y Rel at i ons

16. PRICE CODE

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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCIES OF PRIVATE MILITARY

CORPORATIONS

Robert A. Bur geMaj or , Cal i f or ni a Ar my Nat i onal Guar dB. S. , Sl i pper y Rock Uni ver si t y, 1990

Submi t t ed i n par t i al f ul f i l l ment of t her equi r ement s f or t he degr ee of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES

(CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS)

f romthe

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

June 2008

Aut hor : Rober t A. Bur ge

Approved by: Thomas Br uneauThesi s Co- Advi sor

Rober t LooneyThesi s Co- Advi sor

Har ol d A. Tr i nkunasChai r man, Depart ment of Nat i onal Secur i t yAf f ai r s


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ABSTRACT

Thi s st udy i nvest i gat es pr i vat e mi l i t ar y cor porat i ons

( PMCs) t o exami ne thei r ef f ect i veness and ef f i ci ency as a

subst i t ut e f or t r adi t i onal mi l i t ar y f or ces. The PMC consi st s

of a f or pr of i t f i r m t hat pr ovi des mi l i t ar y ser vi ces t hat

r ange f r om combat oper at i ons t o t r ai ni ng, secur i t y and

l ogi st i cs suppor t . Whi l e the PMCs r epr esent a sol ut i on t o

i ssues such as i nsuf f i ci ent mi l i t ar y r esour ces t o pr ovi de

di r ect support t o other nat i ons, t her e r emai n a number of

pol i t i cal and st r uct ur al bar r i er s t o t hei r wi despr ead use.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. PRIVATE MILITARY CORPORATIONS ...........................1A. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY ...............................1B. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY ............................2C. LITERATURE REVIEW ..................................3

1. Introduction ..................................32. Overview of Private Military Corporations .....43. Effectiveness and Efficiency of PMCs ..........84. Definitions of Effectiveness ..................95. Definitions of Efficiency ....................10

D. METHODOLOGY .......................................121. Background on the Issue ......................122. Case Study on Effectiveness ..................133. Case Study on Efficiency .....................134. Recommendations ..............................145. Limitations of the Study .....................14

II. BACKGROUND ON PRIVATE MILITARY CORPORATIONS ............15A. INTRODUCTION ......................................15B. HISTORY OF MERCENARIES ............................15

1. Early History: The Roman Empire ..............152. Britains Early Use of Mercenaries ...........173. Machiavellis Observations on Mercenaries ....184. Mercenaries in the American Revolution .......19

C. THE EVOLUTION OF MERCENARIES ......................211. Toward Private Military Corporations .........232. Current History of Private Military

Corporations .................................25D. SUMMARY ...........................................27

III. CASE STUDYTHE EFFECTIVENESS OF PMCS ...................29A. INTRODUCTION ......................................29B. DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE OF EFFECTIVENESS ............30C. EFFECTIVENESS OF PRIVATE MILITARY CORPORATIONS ....32

1. Private Military Corporations and Success ....322. Private Military Corporations and Extent of

Their Employment .............................35D. ANALYZING THE DATA ................................39

1. General Observations .........................392. Challenges with Private Military Corporations 41

E. CONCLUSION ........................................44IV. CASE STUDYTHE EFFICIENCY OF PMCS ......................47

A. INTRODUCTION ......................................47B. DEFINITION OF EFFICIENCY ..........................47


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C. EFFICIENCY OF PRIVATE MILITARY CORPORATIONS .......491. Economic Efficiencies ........................502. Internal Efficiencies: Cohesion ..............59

D. CONCLUSION ........................................62V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................65

A. SUMMARY OF THE DATA ...............................651. Effectiveness of Private MilitaryOrganizations ................................67

2. Efficiencies of Private MilitaryOrganizations ................................71

B. RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................73C. CONCLUSIONS .......................................77

LIST OF REFERENCES ..........................................81INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................87


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LIST OF TABLES

Tabl e 1. Cost s Compar i son f or PMC and UNPK Operat i ons. . . . 51


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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My deepest t hanks t o Pr of essor Thomas Br uneau f or hi s

ment or shi p, gui dance, suppor t and dedi cat i on t o excel l ence;t hese wer e i nval uabl e t o t he compl et i on of t hi s pr oj ect .

I woul d al so l i ke t o thank Pr of essor Rober t Looney f or

hi s suppor t and dedi cat i on t hr oughout t he wr i t i ng pr ocess.


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I. PRIVATE MILITARY CORPORATIONS

A. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

Cur r ent mi l i t ar y oper at i ons i n bot h I r aq and

Af ghani st an have br ought t o l i ght t he st r engt hs and

weaknesses of t he Uni t ed St at es Ar med Forces. Al t hough t he

cur r ent mi l i t ar y or gani zat i on has advanced capabi l i t i es f or

car r yi ng out ar med combat , t he or gani zat i on i s not l ar ge

enough t o suppor t al l of i t s anci l l ar y needs. As a di r ect

r esul t of t hi s si t uat i on, pr i vat e mi l i t ar y cor por at i ons or

PMCs are becomi ng an i mport ant and i nt egr al part of mi l i t ary

oper at i ons. Whi l e t hi s arr angement pr ovi des t he mi l i t ar y

wi t h t he cr i t i cal suppor t t hat i t needs t o ensur e t he

ef f ect i veness of cor e mi l i t ar y oper at i ons, t her e ar e some

quest i ons about t he ef f i cacy and ef f i ci ency of t hese

or gani zat i ons. Speci f i cal l y, oper at i ons at Hal l i bur t on s KBR

( Kel l ogg Br own and Root ) di vi si on have come under r ecent

f i r e over t he cost s of ser vi ces char ged t o t he U. S.gover nment . 1

As t he i mpor t ance of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons

cont i nues t o i ncr ease and cont r over sy over t he cost and

al l ocat i on of t axpayer f unds i nt ensi f i es, t her e i s a di r ect

i mpet us t o exami ne whet her or not pr i vat e mi l i t ary

or gani zat i ons of f er a cl ear advant age f or i mpr ovi ng mi l i t ar y

oper at i ons. Cl ear l y, t he cur r ent mi l i t ar y oper at i ons t aki ng

pl ace i n I r aq and Af ghani st an hi ghl i ght t he need f or such

servi ces. However , i n or der t o det er mi ne the i mpact of t hese

ser vi ces, i ssues of ef f ect i veness and ef f i ci ency must be

1The heat i s on. Economist, 371( 8381) , ( 2004) : 66.


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addr essed. Usi ng t hi s as a basi c f oundat i on f or

i nvest i gat i on, t he pur pose of t hi s r esear ch i s t o assess t he

cont ext , scope and pur pose of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y

or gani zat i ons. Thr ough a r evi ew of t hese i ssues i t wi l l be

possi bl e t o under st and t he ef f ect i veness and ef f i ci ency of

PMCs and t o make cr i t i cal r ecommendat i ons about how t hese

or gani zat i ons shoul d be ut i l i zed t o suppor t mi l i t ar y

oper at i ons.

B. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

A cr i t i cal r evi ew of what has been not ed about t he

i mpor t ance of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y cor por at i ons demonst r at es

t hat t hese or gani zat i ons ar e f ast becomi ng an essent i al par t

of mi l i t ar y oper at i ons. 2 As not ed by one schol ar : Whi l e

change i n our armed f orces i s l ong overdue, t he gr eatest

t r ansf or mat i on i s occur r i ng out si de t he gover nment , wi t h t he

whol esal e embr ace of pr i vat i zed mi l i t ary compani es ( PMCs) ,

f orei gn and domest i c. Thi s seemi ngl y pr agmat i c r esponse t o

i ncr easi ng commi t ment s and decreasi ng personnel wi l l have

si gni f i cant ef f ects on U. S. and al l i ed mi l i t ar y

oper at i ons. 3 Thus, as t he need f or U. S. mi l i t ar y pr esence

i ncr eases, and t he number of enl i st ed vol unt eer s decr eases,

t he U. S. gover nment wi l l have no ot her opt i on but t o ut i l i ze

t he ser vi ces of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y cor por at i ons.

As t he need f or pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons

i ncr eases, some cont r ol s and checks and bal ances wi l l need

t o be i nst i t ut ed by t he f eder al gover nment t o ensur e t hat

t hese or gani zat i ons ar e pr ovi di ng t he best possi bl e ser vi ce

2Paul Marx. Pr i vat e mi l i t ary compani es: Handl e wi t h car e. Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, 131( 2) , ( 2005) : 30.

3I bi d.


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whi l e r et ai ni ng a hi gh degr ee of cost ef f ect i veness.

Unf or t unat el y, at t he pr esent t i me, such cont r ol s have not

been i nst i t ut ed. However , i f pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons

are t o become a more pr omi nent and i nt egr al par t of t he U. S.

mi l i t ary, t he U. S. gover nment must have some measur es i n

pl ace t o ensur e t hat t axpayer money i s ut i l i zed ef f i ci ent l y.

I n addi t i on, gui del i nes f or r esponsi bi l i t i es and dut i es must

be out l i ned such t hat t he ef f ect i veness of t hese

or gani zat i ons can be subst ant i at ed.

When pl aced i n t hi s cont ext , t he i mpor t ance of t hi s

i ssue becomes more apparent . The i ncr easi ng r ol e of pr i vat e

mi l i t ar y cor por at i ons i n t he devel opment of U. S. mi l i t ar y

oper at i ons must be moni t ored i n order t o ensure t hat t hese

or gani zat i ons ar e bot h ef f ect i ve and ef f i ci ent . Thus, an

i nvest i gat i on i nt o t he pr esent st at e of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y

cor por at i ons and t hei r cur r ent ef f ect i veness and

ef f i ci enci es wi l l pr ovi de a st ar t i ng poi nt f or schol ar l y

i nvest i gat i on i nt o the devel opment of t hese or gani zat i ons.

Wi t hout some consi der at i on of t hese i ssues, t he U. S.

government and t axpayer s wi l l be unabl e to ensur e t he

ef f ect i veness and ef f i ci ency of t hese or gani zat i ons i n

suppor t i ng mi l i t ar y oper at i ons.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Introduction

Wi t h t he r eal i zat i on t hat t he pr i vat e mi l i t ar y

or gani zat i ons wi l l pl ay such a domi nant r ol e i n t he

devel opment of mi l i t ar y oper at i ons, some consi der at i on of

t he backgr ound and pur pose of t hese or gani zat i ons must be

t aken i nt o consi der at i on. For t hi s r eason, i t i s i mpor t ant


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t o do a r evi ew of what has been wr i t t en about pr i vat e

mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons and t hei r ut i l i t y f or moder n mi l i t ar y

oper at i ons. I n addi t i on, some consi der at i on of t he

ef f ect i veness and ef f i ci enci es of t hese or gani zat i ons must

be t aken i nt o consi der at i on. Ef f ect i veness and ef f i ci ency

must be def i ned, so t hat t hese var i abl es can be appl i ed t o

r esear ch on PMCs.

2. Overview of Private Military Corporations

Resear chers exami ni ng the pur pose and f ocus of pr i vat e

mi l i t ar y cor por at i ons repor t t hat al t hough t hi s t i t l e has

been gi ven t o a number of or gani zat i ons, def i ni ng t he

oper at i ons of t hese or gani zat i ons r emai ns pr obl emat i c. 4

Despi t e t he chal l enges of creat i ng a succi nct def i ni t i on f or

t hese or gani zat i ons, schol ar s ar gue t hat i n gener al t er ms, a

pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i on i s one whi ch pr ovi des

i nt er nat i onal ser vi ces t r adi t i onal l y pr ovi ded by nat i onal

mi l i t ar i es. 5 The r ange of servi ces t hat can be pr ovi ded i n

t hi s cont ext var i es and can i ncl ude any or al l of t he

f ol l owi ng:

Of f ensi ve combat oper at i ons ( pul l i ng t r i gger s) . Ar med secur i t y ser vi ces i n unst abl e st at es t o

pr i vat e cl i ent s.

4Doug Br ooks. Messi ahs or mercenar i es? The f utur e of i nternat i onalpr i vat e mi l i t ar y ser vi ces. International Peacekeeping, 7( 4) , ( 2000) :129. Doug Br ooks i s t he f ounder and Presi dent of t he I nt er nat i onalPeace Oper at i ons Associ at i on; he i s a speci al i st i n Af r i can secur i t yi ssues and has wr i t t en extensi vel y on t he r egul at i on and const r uct i veut i l i zat i on of t he pr i vat e sector f or i nt er nat i onal stabi l i zat i on,peacekeepi ng, and humani t ar i an mi ssi ons.

5I bi d. , 130.


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Ar med secur i t y ser vi ces i n unst abl e st at es t opubl i c or i nt er nat i onal cl i ent s, i ncl udi ng l aw and

or der oper at i ons.

Humani t ar i an pr ot ect i on, oper at i ons and suppor t . Mi l i t ar y sur vei l l ance, st r at egi c advi ce and

i nt el l i gence.

Demi ni ng. Mi l i t ar y sur vei l l ance, st r at egi c advi ce and

i nt el l i gence.

Mi l i t ar y and pol i ce t r ai ni ng. Logi st i cs and suppl y f or mi l i t ar y oper at i ons. 6Al t hough some del i neat i on wi t h r espect t o the dut i es

and act i ons t aken by pr i vat e mi l i t ar y cor por at i ons can be

out l i ned, schol ar s r epor t t hat pr i vat e mi l i t ar y oper at i ons

of t en i nvol ve ot her cat egor i es of ser vi ce. I n par t i cul ar ,

t he use of f r eel ance mercenar i es has been not ed. 7 The ter m

f r eel ance mer cenar i es r ef er s t o pr i vat e i ndi vi dual

sol di er s t hat of f er mi l i t ar y ser vi ces on t he open mar ket t o

t he hi ghest bi dder . Freel ance mer cenar i es ar e ver y di f f er ent

f r om PMC/ PSCs i n t er ms of oper at i ons, c l i ent s,

account abi l i t y and t he capaci t y of t he i nt er nat i onal

communi t y t o r egul at e t hei r act i vi t i es. 8 Pr i vat e

mer cenar i es have an i nver se r el at i onshi p wi t h PMCs, t hr i vi ng

i n areas wher e r eput abl e PMCs wi l l not oper ate. 9

Despi t e t he f act t hat modern mercenar i es are vi ewed as

t he ant i t hesi s of t he moder n pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i on,

6Br ooks, 130.

7I bi d.

8I bi d.

9I bi d. , 131.


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r esear ch demonst r ates t hat t he or i gi ns of PMCs can be f ound

i n t he act i ons of t hese i ndi vi dual s. A common and

appr opr i at e st ar t i ng poi nt f or t he di scussi on of t he st at e-

PMF (pr i vat e mi l i t ar y f i r m) r el at i onshi p i s t he

f ami l i ar f i gur e, t he mer cenar y sol di er t he per son who f i ght s

f or nei t her pat r i ot i sm nor l egal dut y, but f or economi c

gai n. 10 Over t he cour se of t i me, t he l awl ess act i ons of t he

mercenar i es were vi ewed by t he st at e t o be a thr eat t o

secur i t y. For t hi s r eason, mer cenar i es t r ansf or med i nt o

pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons, car r yi ng out many of t he

same dut i es as mer cenar i es, but sanct i oned by t he st ate. 11

Not sur pr i si ngl y, t he pr esence of f r eel ance mer cenar i es

has pr omot ed t he evol ut i on of a negat i ve opi ni on of pr i vat e

mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons. 12 Despi t e t hi s si t uat i on however ,

r esear chers r eport t hat i n t he 1990s, West er n gover nment s

began publ i cl y seeki ng t he ser vi ces of t hese or gani zat i ons.

Al t hough t he U. S. has ut i l i zed t he ser vi ces of PMCs si nce

t he Vi et nam War , i t was not unt i l t he ear l y 1990s t hat t he

gover nment act i vel y di scl osed t he use of t hese or gani zat i onst o t he publ i c. 13 Thus, i t has onl y been i n t he past t went y

years t hat t he publ i c has become wi del y aware of t he use of

pr i vat e or gani zat i ons t o suppor t mi l i t ar y oper at i ons. 14

10Vi r gi ni a Newel l and Benedi ct Sheehy. Corpor at e mi l i t ar i es andst at es: Actors, i nt er acti ons and r eacti ons. Texas International LawJournal, 41( 1) , ( 2006) : 69,ht t p: / / l i bpr oxy. nps. edu: 8080/ l ogi n?ur l =ht t p: / / pr oquest . umi . com/ pqdweb?did=1011270761&si d=5&Fmt =4&cl i ent I d=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD [ Accessed 15March 07] .

11I bi d. , 71.

12Paul J ackson. War i s much t oo ser i ous a t hi ng to be l ef t t omi l i t ar y men: Pri vat e mi l i t ary compani es, combat and r egul at i on. CivilWars, 5( 5) , ( 2002) : 32.

13I bi d.

14I bi d. , 33.


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Schol ar s exami ni ng t he i ssues associ at ed wi t h pr i vat e

mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons r epor t t hat :

As non- st at e act or s, PMFs enj oy t he r i ght s andpr i vi l eges of pr i vat e actor s, i ncl udi ng: t he

pr i vi l eges of f r ee movement s, r el at i vel y mi norscr ut i ny of act i on, and t he pr i vacy accor ded t oci t i zens and t he l ack of account abi l i t y t o t hegener al publ i c. [ ] These i nt er act i ons bet weenPMFs and st at es are gener al l y car r i ed out i npr i vat e wi t hout t he gl ar e of i nt er nat i onal publ i cscrut i ny t hat t ypi cal l y sur r ounds deci si ons byst at es t o expand, moder ni ze or mobi l i ze t hei rmi l i t ar y capaci t y. 15

What t hi s ef f ect i vel y demonst r at es i s t he i nt egr al

r el at i onshi p t hat devel ops bet ween t he pr i vat e mi l i t ar y

organi zat i on and a cont r act i ng gover nment . The nat ur e,

cont ext and scope of t hi s r el at i onshi p woul d be subj ect t o

subst ant i al publ i c scr ut i ny based on t he publ i c s awar eness

t hat t hese or gani zat i ons ar e bei ng ut i l i zed f or assi st i ng

mi l i t ar y oper at i ons.

Ar guabl y, t he hi st or y and evol ut i on of t he pr i vat e

mi l i t ar y or gani zat i on i s one t hat i s f r aught wi t h

compl exi t i es. The i ssues t hat have devel oped i n t hi s cont ext

ar e r ef l ect ed i n t he moder n r eal i t i es f or t hese

or gani zat i ons. As mor e i nf ormat i on i s acqui r ed about t hese

or gani zat i ons, schol ar s are now bei ng chal l enged to l ook

beyond t he hi st ory of devel opment t o garner a more i nt egr al

under st andi ng of t he i mpact of t hese or gani zat i ons on

mi l i t ar y oper at i ons.16

Al t hough some anal ysi s has beenunder t aken t o assess t he i mpact of moder n mi l i t ary

15Vi r gi ni a Newel l and Benedi ct Sheehy, 69.

16St even Br ayton. Out sour ci ng war : mer cenari es and t he pr i vat i zat i onof peacekeepi ng. Journal of International Affairs, 55( 2) , ( 2002) : 304.


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or gani zat i ons17, t he r esul t s t hat have been r epor t ed i n t he

l i t er at ur e demonst r at e a mi xed pi ct ur e about t he

ef f ect i veness and ef f i ci ency of t hese ser vi ces. 18

3. Effectiveness and Efficiency of PMCs

Wi t h t hi s r udi ment ary under st andi ng of t he cont ext and

scope of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y cor por at i ons hi ghl i ght ed, i t i s

now possi bl e to consi der what has been not ed about i ssues of

ef f ect i veness and ef f i ci ency i n t hese or gani zat i ons. J ackson

i n hi s revi ew of t he ef f or t s of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y

or gani zat i ons argues t hat despi t e t he negat i ve opi ni on of

t hese or gani zat i ons, PMCs have been hi ghl y ef f ect i ve i n

resol vi ng shor t - t erm conf l i ct . 19 However , t hi s aut hor does

not e t hat when PMCs are used as a f or ce f or st abi l i zat i on,

t hey have r el at i vel y l i t t l e i mpact on t he devel opment of

l ong- t er m st abi l i zat i on i n a gi ven r egi on. 20

I nt er est i ngl y, Br ayt on has al so demonst r at ed the

ef f ect i veness of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons i n shor t -

t erm conf l i ct resol ut i on. 21 Looki ng at t he oper at i ons ofExecut i ve Out comes i n Angol a and Si err a Leone, Br ayt on

asser t s t hat t hi s or gani zat i on was hi ghl y ef f ect i ve i n

r est or i ng st at e power . Al t hough Execut i ve Out comes was

successf ul i n i t s oper at i ons, Br ayt on does not e t hat

oper at i ons i n bot h Angol a and Si er r a Leone wer e cost l y t o

t he gover nment s. I n Si er r a Leone, t he cost s of ser vi ces

provi ded by Execut i ve Outcomes were more t han one- t hi r d of

17Paul J ackson, 34.

18Steven Br ayt on, 304.


20I bi d.



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t he count r y s mi l i t ar y budget f or t he year or $35 mi l l i on.

I n Angol a, t he t ot al cost s of ser vi ce wer e $40 mi l l i on. 22

Gi ven t hat bot h of t hese count r i es ar e sever el y

i mpover i shed, Br ayt on assert s t hat t her e are some quest i ons

wi t h r espect t o t he et hi cal i ssues i nvol ved i n pr ovi di ng

mi l i t ar y suppor t f or economi c gai n. 23

The r esul t s of f er ed by t hese aut hors demonst r at e t hat

whi l e pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons have been ef f ect i ve i n

t hei r ef f or t s t o per f or m t hei r assi gned t asks, t he cost s or

ef f i ci ency of t hese oper at i ons has been qui t e exor bi t ant .

Wi t h t hi s i n mi nd, i t becomes evi dent t hat t her e ar e two

speci f i c di mensi ons of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons t hat

need t o be consi der ed: ef f ect i veness and ef f i ci ency. Onl y by

addr essi ng t hese t wo i ssues, wi l l i t be possi bl e t o pr ovi de

a more accur ate under st andi ng of t he over al l i mpact of t hese

or gani zat i ons.

4. Definitions of Effectiveness

The i mpor t ance of ef f ect i veness t o t he cont ext of t hi si nvest i gat i on war r ant s a r evi ew of what has been noted about

t he def i ni t i on of t hi s t er m. A pr ecur sor y over vi ew of what

has been not ed about t he def i ni t i on of t hi s t er m suggest s

t hat i t has been def i ned i n a wi de r ange of cont exts. 24

Fl et cher , i n her i nvest i gat i on of def i ni ng ef f ect i veness,

asser t s t hat t he under pi nni ngs of ef f ect i veness must be

22Steven Br ayt on, 311.23I bi d.

24J . Fl et cher . Changi ng government , changi ng cul t ures? Movi ng t hequal i t y agenda t owards ef f ect i ve pr ocesses t o count erbal ance per f ormanceout comes. Journal of Nursing, 9( 3) , ( 2001) : 177.ht t p: / / navynps. l i br ar y. i ngent aconnect . com/ cont ent / bsc/ j nm/ 2001/ 00000009/00000003/ art 00007; j sessi oni d=16pbr4skc5p0z. vi ct or i a#avai l [ Accessed 28March 07] .


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del i neat ed bef or e a def i ni t i on of t he t er m can be

est abl i shed. Accor di ng t o t hi s aut hor , ef f ect i veness has no

r eal meani ng unl ess i t i s di r ect l y l i nked t o a measurement

of out comes of a speci f i c si t uat i on. 25 As such,

ef f ect i veness i s a cont ext ual var i abl e t hat must be def i ned

based on a speci f i c si t uat i on.

I n an ef f or t t o bet t er under st and how ef f ect i veness can

be cont ext ual l y def i ned, Godar d r epor t s t hat or gani zat i ons

can empl oy a host of speci f i c and obj ect i ve cr i t er i a t hat

can be used t o measur e organi zat i onal ef f ect i veness. 26 For

exampl e, or gani zat i ons can choose t o exami ne manager i al

ef f ect i veness based on a compar i son of cur r ent manager i al

ef f or t s i n t he or gani zat i on compar ed wi t h manager i al ef f or t s

exhi bi t ed by ot her or gani zat i ons or out l i ned i n t he popul ar

pr ess. 27 Ef f ect i veness measur es can al so be devel oped i n the

cont ext of mor e obj ect i ve measur es, whi ch l i mi t t he bi ases

t hat can occur i n assessment . Obj ect i ve measur es i ncl ude

t hose t hat pr ovi de a st at i st i cal anal ysi s of dat a f or t he

pur poses of dr awi ng speci f i c concl usi ons.28

5. Definitions of Efficiency

The i mpor t ance of ef f i ci ency has al so been i dent i f i ed

as cri t i cal t o t hi s i nvest i gat i on. Her e agai n a over vi ew of

what has been not ed about t he def i ni t i on of t hi s t er m seems

t o suggest t hat ef f i ci ency has been def i ned i n a number of

25J . Fl et cher , 178.

26J ohn Godard. Do i mpl ementat i on processes and r at i onal es mat t er ?The case of wor kpl ace r ef or ms. Journal of Management Studies, 36( 5) ,( 1999) : 682.

27I bi d. , 683.

28I bi d.


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cont exts. 29 I n spi t e of t hi s however , some schol ar s bel i eve

t hat ef f i ci ency i s a pur el y quant i t at i ve measur es. 30 As

r epor t ed by Li u, Ef f i ci ency r ef er s t o t he r at i o of i nput t o

out put ; hi gher ef f i ci ency can be achi eved i f gr eat er out put

i s pr oduced f r om a gi ven i nput . 31 Thi s aut hor goes on t o

ar gue t hat ef f i ci ency i s of t en t i ed di r ectl y t o i nequal i t y.

The mor e i nequal i t y t hat exi st s i n a gi ven si t uat i on, t he

mor e ef f i ci ency t hat wi l l be gar ner ed. Whi l e ef f i ci ency can

be measur ed i n quant i t at i ve t er ms, Li u i nsi st s t he mor e

qual i t at i ve def i ni t i ons of i nequal i t y ar e needed t o f ul l y

i l l umi nat e t he r ange of i mpact of t hi s i ssue. 32

Al t hough Li u bel i eves t hat ef f i ci ency has a speci f i c

def i ni t i on t hat pr ovi des f or st r i ct quant i t at i ve anal ysi s of

i nf or mat i on Knoedl er , i n her exami nat i on of ef f i ci ency,

asser t s t hat t hi s t er m can have bot h qual i t at i ve and

quant i t at i ve meani ngs. Thi s aut hor does note t hat i n most

i nst ances, t he quant i t at i ve aspect s of ef f i ci ency ar e

st r essed. 33 However , accor di ng t o Knoedl er , ef f i ci ency i s

of t en appl i ed as a cent r al var i abl e t o assess t he cost s ofan oper at i on and whet her or not t hese cost s are j ust i f i ed.

Even t hough quant i t at i ve assessment s are i mport ant , Knoedl er

cont ends t hat qual i t at i ve anal ysi s i s of t en needed t o

suppl ement any ef f i ci ency anal ysi s. 34

29J anet T. Knoedl er . Vebl en and t echni cal ef f i ci ency. Journal ofEconomic Issues, 31( 4) , ( 1997) : 1011.

30Guol i Li u. The pol i t i cs of mar ket i zat i on: I nequal i t y ver susef f i ci ency. Asi an Af f ai r s, An Amer i can Revi ew, 24( 3) , ( 1997) : 163.

31I bi d.

32I bi d. , 165.

33J anet T. Knoedl er , 1018.

34I bi d.


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D. METHODOLOGY

Based on t he revi ew of t he cur r ent l i t er at ur e on

pr i vat e mi l i t ar y cor por at i ons, i t i s evi dent t hat a gr eat er

under st andi ng of bot h t he ef f ect i veness and t he ef f i ci encyof t hese or gani zat i ons must be assessed. Usi ng t hi s as a

basi s f or devel opi ng a met hodol ogy, a case st udy exami ni ng

t hese speci f i c i ssues i n t he cont ext of cur r ent pr i vat e

mi l i t ar y cor por at i ons i s war r ant ed. A case st udy appr oach

wi l l al l ow f or an i nt ensi ve i nvest i gat i on of i ssues of

ef f ect i veness and ef f i ci ency, such t hat a cl ear f r amewor k

f or compar i son of PMCs on t hese t wo i ssues can be

under t aken. The f ol l owi ng pr ovi des a revi ew of t he

subsequent i nf or mat i on t hat wi l l f ol l ow i n t hi s r esear ch.

1. Background on the Issue

To provi de an over vi ew of t he cur r ent oper at i ons and

act i vi t i es under t aken by pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons, t he

l ong and compl ex hi st or y of mer cenar i es, t hei r r el at i onshi p

t o t he st at e and t he ser vi ces provi ded must be consi der ed i n

or der t o l ay t he gr oundwor k f or t hi s i nvest i gat i on. Whi l e

t hi s r esear ch i ndi cat es t hat PMCs evol ved f r om mer cenar i es,

i t i s i mpor t ant t o consi der t he evol ut i on of mer cenar i es i n

exami ni ng t he moder n PMC. A r evi ew of what has been not ed

about t hi s hi st or y suggest s t hat mer cenar i es wer e ut i l i zed

by the st at e dur i ng t he Roman Empi r e. 35

35Evel yn Shi r l ey Shuchburgh. A History of Rome to the Battle ofActium, ( New Yor k: Macmi l l an, 1912) : 156.


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2. Case Study on Effectiveness

Once t he basi c hi st ory of mer cenar i es and pr i vat e

mi l i t ar y cor por at i ons has been est abl i shed, i t wi l l t hen be

possi bl e t o cr eat e a case st udy on t he ef f ect i veness oft hese or gani zat i ons. Dr awi ng on i nf or mat i on on t he speci f i c

pur poses and goal s of t hese or gani zat i ons, a f r amework f or

del i neat i ng t he cont ext of measur i ng ef f ect i veness wi l l be

est abl i shed. Thi s case st udy wi l l synt hesi ze basi c

i nf or mat i on on t he pr i vat e mi l i t ar y cor por at i on as a cent r al

means f or hi ghl i ght i ng key cont ext ual el ement s of

ef f ect i veness. Based on t hi s f r amewor k, i t wi l l t hen be

possi bl e t o ef f ect i vel y eval uat e t he ef f ect i veness of

pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons. Resul t s of t he case st udy

wi l l t hen be ut i l i zed f or compar i son t o ef f i ci ency i ssues i n

t he pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i on.

3. Case Study on Efficiency

A case st udy on ef f i ci ency i n pr i vat e mi l i t ar y

or gani zat i ons wi l l al so be needed. Thi s case st udy wi l l al so

dr aw on backgr ound i nf ormat i on on PMCs i n an ef f or t t o

i dent i f y speci f i c ef f i ci ency var i abl es t hat can be used f or

anal ysi s. Once t hi s f r amewor k has been est abl i shed, i t wi l l

t hen be possi bl e to anal yze PMCs and t hei r oper at i ons t o

del i neat e and def i ne ef f i ci ency i n t hese or gani zat i ons. The

dat a f r om t hi s case st udy wi l l t hen be compar ed wi t h dat a on

t he ef f ect i veness of PMCs t o gar ner a mor e ef f ect i ve pi ct ur e

of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y cor por at i ons.


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4. Recommendations

The f i nal par t of t hi s i nvest i gat i on wi l l draw t ogether

dat a f r om t he case st udi es t o make some gener al i zat i ons

about t he ef f ect i veness and ef f i ci ency of pr i vat e mi l i t ar yor gani zat i ons. Based on t hi s dat a, i t wi l l be possi bl e t o

i dent i f y key i ssues f or t he devel opment and cont r ol of t hese

or gani zat i ons. Wi t h t hi s dat a, r ecommendat i ons f or

i mpl ement i ng ser vi ce wi l l be made. I t i s hoped t hat t hi s

dat a wi l l be used t o i nf or m pol i cy devel opment i n

est abl i shi ng mor e ef f ect i ve and ef f i ci ent cont r act s bet ween

pr i vat e mi l i t ar y cor por at i ons and t he f eder al gover nment .

5. Limitations of the Study

Al t hough t hi s r esear ch r epr esent s a compr ehensi ve st udy

of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons, t he r esear ch i s based on

secondar y sour ces. As such, no empi r i cal dat a wi l l be

col l ect ed i n t he cont ext of t hi s i nvest i gat i on. However ,

gi ven t he r el at i ve dear t h of i nf or mat i on and r esear ch on

t hi s subj ect, a cl ear qual i t at i ve basi s f or f ur t her

i nvest i gat i on must be est abl i shed. The case st udy appr oach

descr i bed i n t hi s met hodol ogy shoul d pr ovi de a spr i ngboar d

f or f ur t her empi r i cal r esear ch on t hi s subj ect .


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II. BACKGROUND ON PRIVATE MILITARY CORPORATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

An over vi ew of what has been not ed about t he

devel opment of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y cor por at i ons suggest s t hat

t hese i nst i t ut i ons evol ved f r om mer cenar y oper at i ons. 36

Al t hough consi der abl e evol ut i on has t aken pl ace i n t he

cont ext of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons si nce t he t i me of

mer cenar i es, t he real i zat i on t hat PMCs have t hei r or i gi ns i n

mer cenar y oper at i ons pr ovi des a cl ear st ar t i ng poi nt f or

exami ni ng t he backgr ound of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons.

As such, t hi s r evi ew wi l l consi der some of t he mor e not abl e

event s t hat have occur r ed i n t he hi st or y of evol ut i on of

pr i vat e mi l i t ar y cor por at i ons.

B. HISTORY OF MERCENARIES

1. Early History: The Roman Empire

As not ed ear l i er , hi st or i cal anal ysi s i ndi cat es t hat

Roman gover nment was among t he f i r st st ate i nst i t ut i ons t o

ut i l i ze mer cenar i es. 37 I n par t i cul ar , t he Mer cenar y War t hat

t ook pl ace i n 240 BC i s among t he f i r st ment i on of

mer cenar i es i n anci ent hi st or y. 38 Resear cher s exami ni ng t hi s

event r epor t t hat t he war r epr esent ed an upr i si ng of var i ous

mercenary groups t hat had been i n t he empl oy of Car t hage.

Havi ng ret ur ned home f r om def endi ng Rome i n Af r i ca, sever al

36Doug Br ooks, 130.

37Evel yn Shi r l ey Shuchburgh, 156.

38Susan Raven. Rome in Africa, ( London, Rout l edge, 1993) : 36.


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mer cenary gr oups awai t ed payment f or t hei r servi ces f r om

Hami l car . However , Hami l car ar gued t hat t he l osses sust ai ned

by the Roman ar my were so subst ant i al t hat he was not

wi l l i ng t o pay t he mer cenar i es. I n r esponse t he mer cenar i es

waged war agai nst Car t hage f or more t han t hr ee years. I n t he

end, t he mer cenar i es won, demonst r at i ng t hei r abi l i t y t o be

bot h savage and r ut hl ess. 39 I nt er est i ngl y, mor e i s wr i t t en

about t he Mercenary War t han t he use of mercenar i es i n

Car t hage s war agai nst Af r i ca.

Not sur pr i si ngl y, t hi s i nci dence of mer cenar y act i on i n

t he Roman Empi r e i s not t he onl y i nst ance i n whi ch t he

pr omi nence of mercenar i es i s noted. Dyck, i n hi s exami nat i on

of Rome s use of mer cenar i es, r epor t s t hat when Gai us J ul i us

Caesar under t ook hi s campai gn agai nst t he Germans i n 58 BC

he ut i l i zed 400 mer cenar i es f r om Ger many t o successf ul l y

push t he enemy back i nt o Gaul . 40 Dur i ng t hi s campai gn,

German mercenar i es worked on t he f r ont l i nes of t he Roman

ar my, ut i l i z i ng t r adi t i onal bat t l e t acti cs such as a

col umnar or boar ' s head char ge. Ost ensi bl y car r i ed out bya mass of enr aged ber serker s, such an at t ack was cal cul at ed

t o br eak t he enemy by i t s sheer f er oci t y. 41 Dyck i nsi st s

t hat Caesar s use of Ger man mercenar i es enabl ed t he Roman

ar my t o ut i l i ze t he bar bar i t y and f er oci t y of t he Ger man

ar my t o an advant age. 42

39Susan Raven, 37.

40Ludwi g H. Dyck. Gai us J ul i us Caesar t ook advant age of hi s Germanenemi es f er oci t y by enl i st i ng t hem i n hi s caval r y. Military History,22( 4) , ( 2005) : 66.

41I bi d.

42I bi d. , 67.


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2. Britains Early Use of Mercenaries

As t he Roman Empi r e began i t s s t eady decl i ne, t he

Br i t i sh Empi r e began t o begi n i t s sl ow evol ut i on. Dur i ng t he

cour se of t hi s pr ocess, hi st or i cal anal ysi s demonst r at est hat Br i t ai n al so ut i l i zed mer cenar i es. I n addi t i on t o usi ng

mer cenar i es t o f i ght bat t l es agai nst Rome, Br i t ai n al so used

mer cenar i es t o f i ght i nt er nal bat t l es among war r i ng f act i ons

wi t hi n i n t he st at e. 43 Lat er , Br i t ai n used mer cenar i es t o

f i ght agai nst t he col oni st dur i ng t he Amer i can Revol ut i on. 44

What t hi s hi st or y suggest s i s t hat a cl oser l ook at t he

Br i t i sh Empi r e and i t s use of mer cenar i es i s war r ant ed t o

bet t er under st and t he evol ut i on of t he moder n pr i vat e

mi l i t ar y cor por at i on.

Mi l l ar has exami ned t he ut i l i zat i on of mer cenar i es by

Henr y VI I I i n an ef f or t t o wage war on France. Accor di ng t o

Mi l l ar , Henr y est abl i shed a st r ong al l i ance wi t h Spai n and

t he Net her l ands; however t he army t hat had been assembl ed

was unpr of essi onal , at best . 45 Fur t her , Fr ance had devel oped

a st abl e permanent army, whi ch was capabl e t o def eat i ng

Engl and. I n or der t o wi n t he war , Henr y VI I I had t o empl oy

pr i vat e mer cenar i es: As r egar ds mer cenar i es, f r ee- l ance

war r i or s hi r ed and pai d f or by Henr y hi msel f , about 6, 200

were r etai ned: 2, 800 men- at - arms, mount ed arquebusi ers and

l i ght caval r ymen, pl us 3, 400 assor t ed i nf ant r ymen. Among t he

43G. W. S. Bar r ow. Feudal Britain: The Completion of the Medieval

Kingdom, 1066-1314, ( London: Edward Ar nol d, 1956) : 85.ht t p: / / www. quest i a. com/ l i br ar y/ book/ f eudal - br i t ai n- t he- compl et i onof -t he- medi eval - ki ngdoms- 1066- 1314- by- g- w- s- barr ow. j sp [ Accessed 02 Apri l07] .

44Dani el Mars t on. The American Revolution, 1774-1783, ( New York:Rout l edge, 2003) : 20.

45Gi l ber t J ohn Mi l l ar . Mer cenar i es under Henr y VI I I , 1544- 1546. History Today, 27( 3) , ( 1977) : 173.


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mercenary l eaders who, at t he begi nni ng of t he war , can be

i dent i f i ed, Ger mans, Dut chmen, I t al i ans and Spani ar ds

pr edomi nat e. 46

Exami ni ng t he speci f i c r easons why Henr y chose to

ut i l i ze mer cenar i es, Mi l l ar asser t s t hat whi l e t he

unpr of essi onal nat ur e of t he ar med f or ces was a dr i vi ng

f orce behi nd t he devel opment of a mercenary army, t her e was

anot her under l yi ng f or ce shapi ng mercenary use. What t he

Engl i sh l acked, and what f or ei gn sour ces al one coul d suppl y

i n quant i t i es, wer e bat t l e har dened r egul ar s ski l l ed i n t he

l at est pr act i ces of cont i nent al war f ar e. 47 I n shor t ,

Engl and needed i ndi vi dual s t hat wer e capabl e of engagi ng i n

f i er ce combat . Mi l l ar goes on t o repor t t hat whi l e r epor t s

of t he successes of t he mer cenar i es seem t o suggest t hat

t hese i ndi vi dual s provi ded Henr y wi t h t he requi r ed ser vi ces,

Henr y records t he act i ons of t he mer cenar i es as no good. 48

3. Machiavellis Observations on Mercenaries

By t he t i me Br i t ai n began r egul ar l y empl oyi ngmer cenar i es f or armed combat , Ni ccol o Machi avel l i had

wr i t t en hi s semi nal wor k, The Prince. I n t hi s wor k,

Machi avel l i addr essed t he use of mer cenar i es by r ul er s.

Al t hough Machi avel l i advocat es t he l i mi t ed use of

mer cenar i es i n a st at e or r epubl i c s army, he cont ends t hat

mer cenar i es cannot be t he sol e sour ce of a count r y s

mi l i t ar y power . Machi avel l i subst ant i at es t hi s asser t i on by

maki ng t he f ol l owi ng observat i ons:

46Gi l ber t J ohn Mi l l ar , 173.

47I bi d. , 174.

48I bi d. , 175.


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Mer cenar i es and auxi l i ar i es are usel ess anddanger ous; and i f one hol ds hi s st ate based ont hese ar ms, he wi l l st and nei t her f i r m nor saf e;f or t hey ar e di suni t ed, ambi t i ous and wi t houtdi sci pl i ne, unf ai t hf ul , val i ant bef or e f r i ends,cowardl y bef ore enemi es; t hey have nei t her t hef ear of God nor f i del i t y t o men, and dest r uct i oni s def er r ed onl y so l ong as t he at t ack i s; f or i npeace one i s r obbed by t hem, and i n war by t heenemy. The f act i s, t hey have no ot her at t r act i onor r eason f or keepi ng t he f i el d t han a t r i f l e ofst i pend, whi ch i s not suf f i ci ent t o make t hemwi l l i ng t o di e f or you. 49

4. Mercenaries in the American Revolution

Despi t e t he f act t hat such not abl y negat i ve sent i ment

had devel oped wi t h r espect t o mercenar i es, by t he t i me of

t he Amer i can Revol ut i on, t he cont r act i ng of mer cenar i es had

become a busi ness f or many Eur opean nat i ons. Accor di ng t o

one schol ar , Char l es ( 1670- 1730) was t he f i r st r ul er of

Hesse- Cassel t o adopt t he syst em of hi r i ng out hi s sol di er s

t o f orei gn powers as mercenar i es and as a way of i mpr ovi ng

nat i onal f i nance. Freder i ck I I ( 1760- 1786) hi r ed outHessi ans t o Engl and f or some 3, 191, 000 Br i t i sh pounds t o

assi st i n t he war vs. Nor t h Amer i can col oni es. 50 Thus, when

t he Br i t i sh wer e onl y abl e t o must er 55, 000 t r oops f or a war

agai nst t he col oni es, t he Ki ng of Engl and had no choi ce but

t o seek suppor t f r om mer cenar i es. I n many r espect s t he

49Ni ccol o Machi avel l i . Chapt er XI I . The Prince. [ 1532] .ht t p: / / home. c2i . net / espenj o/ home/ f yrst en/ pr i nce12. ht m [ Accessed 23March 07] .

50Lee Fl emi ng Reese. Hessi ans i n the Revol ut i onary War. Education,113( 1) , ( 1992) : 16.ht t p: / / l i bpr oxy. nps. edu: 8080/ l ogi n?ur l =ht t p: / / pr oquest . umi . com/ pqdweb?did=5830863&si d=7&Fmt =2&cl i ent I d=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD [ Accessed 16March 07] .


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Hessi ans t hat were empl oyed by t he Br i t i sh ar my become one

of t he most i nf amous mercenary gr oups i n hi st ory. 51

A r evi ew of what has been not ed about Hessi an

mercenar i es empl oyed dur i ng t he Amer i can Revol ut i on suggest s

t hat t hese i ndi vi dual s were among t he most demoral i zed

sol di er s t o wor k f or Br i t ai n. The Hessi ans who ser ved

i nvol unt ar y under t he Br i t i sh col or s, at f i r st oppor t uni t y,

def ect ed. Must er r ol l s of t he Hessi an r egi ment s showed t hat

pr obabl y more t han hal f si mpl y deser t ed; and i n t i mes

set t l ed down as peacef ul ci t i zens of t he col oni es whi ch t hey

had been sent t o subdue. I n addi t i on, t he Hessi ans were

known f or t hei r pr opensi t y t o t ur n on t he Br i t i sh t r oops.

Many became t hi eves and l oot ers; most were unr el i abl e i n

t hei r ef f or t s t o pr ovi de suppor t t o t he Br i t i sh mi l i t ar y. 52

I n addi t i on t o t he i nher ent pr obl ems associ at ed wi t h

t he Hessi an mer cenar i es, schol ar s al so repor t t hat t he

pl i ght of t he Hessi ans made t hem sympathet i c t o Amer i can

col oni st s. I t was a pol i cy of t he Amer i cans, and appr oved

by t he Congr ess as wel l and by Washi ngt on t o l ur e t he

Hessi ans. 53 I n many i nst ances, Hessi ans became so f ond of

t hei r Amer i can suppor t er s t hat t hey vol unt eer ed t o j oi n

Amer i can f or ces i n bat t l e. Af t er t he Revol ut i on, many of t he

Hessi ans wer e r el ocat ed t o var i ous par t s of Pennsyl vani a,

New J ersey and Maryl and; f ew were sent back t o Europe. 54

Unf or t unat el y, t he i nst abi l i t y of mer cenar y f or ces i n t he

war pr omul gat ed def eat f or t he Br i t i sh. Al t hough mer cenar i es

51Lee Fl emi ng Reese, 16.

52I bi d. , 17.

53I bi d.

54I bi d. , 18.


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wer e cont r act ed t o i mpr ove t he out come f or Br i t ai n, schol ar s

argue t hat Hessi an mercenar i es may have been t he deci di ng

f or ce t hat enabl ed t he col oni st s t o over come the Br i t i sh and

wi n t he war . 55

C. THE EVOLUTION OF MERCENARIES

The br i ef hi st or y of mer cenar i es provi ded i n t hi s

i nvest i gat i on demonst r at es t he compl exi t y of ut i l i zi ng

mer cenar i es f or managi ng i mpor t ant st at e af f ai r s. Al t hough

mercenar i es cl ear l y pr ovi de a means t o an end i n most

i nst ances, t he r eal i t y i s t hat mer cenar i es wer e unr el i abl e

and of t en uncommi t t ed t o t he needs of t he st ate. Fur t her , as

t hi s br i ef hi st or y demonst r at es, r ul er s have at t empt ed t o

di mi ni sh t he aut hor i t y of mer cenar i es by r ef usi ng t o pay or

f ai l i ng t o pr ovi de t hem wi t h t he r espect of t he st at e. I n

t he end, t he use of mercenar i es became a t enuous and

pr ecar i ous pr act i ce, whi ch cont r i but ed t o t he i nabi l i t y of

Br i t ai n t o ef f ect i vel y over come col oni al power s.

Al t hough t he hi st ory of mer cenar i es demonst r ates t hedevol ut i on of mer cenary gr oupsdemonst r at i ng them t o be

not hi ng mor e t han bar bar i ans, di sr espect f ul of t he st at e

ot her schol ars exami ni ng t he evol ut i on of mer cenar i es i nt o

pr i vat e mi l i t ar y cor por at i ons asser t t hat t her e wer e a host

of f act or s t hat pr ompt ed t he decl i ne of t r adi t i onal

mer cenar i es i n t he ni net eent h cent ur y. 56 Speci f i cal l y, Avant

ar gues t hat changes i n t he soci al and pol i t i cal cont ext of

t he nat i on pr ompt ed r ul er s t o devel op ci t i zen ar mi es t hat

55Lee Fl emi ng Reese, 19.

56Deborah Avant . Fr ommercenar y t o ci t i zen armi es: Expl ai ni ng changei n t he pr act i ce of war . International Organization, 54( 1) , ( 2000) : 41.


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coul d pr ovi de t he st at e wi t h a r el i abl e mi l i t ar y f or ce.

Thus, as ci t i zen ar mi es grew, st at es had l i t t l e use f or

mercenar i es. 57

I n an ef f or t t o demonst r at e how t he need f or ci t i zen

armi es arose, Avant exami nes t he devel opment of t hese

mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons dur i ng t he t i me of t he Napol eoni c

War s. Accor di ng t o t hi s aut hor , not abl e changes i n t he

cont ext and demogr aphi c composi t i on of soci ety had occur r ed,

pr ompt i ng l eader s t o consi der t he best met hods f or ef f ect i ve

pr ot ect i on of t he st at e. I n par t i cul ar , Avant asser t s t hat

t he mat er i al pr essures of soci et y f or ced the devel opment of

ci t i zen ar mi es: t er r i t or i al expansi on and or gani zat i onal

and t echnol ogi cal changes i n mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons wer e

r equi r ed t o r espond ef f ect i vel y t o t hi s gr owt h. 58

Addi t i onal l y, Avant ar gues t hat t he Age of Enl i ght enment had

br ought wi t h i t new met hods f or concept ual i zi ng t he

r el at i onshi p bet ween st at es and sol di er s. Avant asser t s t hat

t he conver gence of t hese t wo soci al f orces i s what pr ompt ed

t he evol ut i on of ci t i zen ar mi es dur i ng t he ei ght eent h andni net eent h cent ur i es. 59

The deci si on of var i ous st at es t o move t owar d ci t i zen

ar mi es was cl ear l y f uel ed by changes i n t he soci al cont ext

of devel opi ng soci et y. However , as Avant r eport s, many

st at es had come t o r eal i ze t he chal l enges i nvol ved i n

empl oyi ng mer cenar i es. I n r esponse t o t he compl exi t i es of

usi ng mer cenar y f or ces, r ul er s ent er ed i nt er nat i onal

agr eement s t o del i gi t i mi ze the use of mer cenar i es because

57Deborah Avant , 42.

58I bi d. , 44.

59I bi d.


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t hey were concerned wi t h bei ng dr awn i nt o war by t he act i ons

of t hei r ci t i zens. Thi s concer n l ed st at es t o make i t

i l l egal f or t hei r ci t i zens t o f i ght abr oad, t hus er odi ng t he

suppl y of mer cenar i es. 60 Thus, t he deci si on t o move away

f r om mer cenar i es was r ef l ect i ve of t he desi r e by the st at e

t o cont r ol exter nal conf l i ct s and t o i mpr ove t he out comes of

st at e bui l di ng i n r egi onal devel opment .

Ot her schol ars have made si mi l ar observat i ons about t he

evol ut i on of mer cenar i es dur i ng t he ni net eent h cent ur y. 61

For i nst ance, Shear er r epor t s t hat wi t h t he r i se of

nat i onal i sm i n t he ni net eent h cent ur y, t he i dea of f i ght i ng

f or one' s count r y r at her t han f or commer ci al i nt er est s

gai ned cur r ency. Gover nment s came t o command a monopol y over

vi ol ence and became i ncr easi ngl y keen on l i mi t i ng t he r i sks

t o t hei r neut r al i t y t hat ar ose when t hei r ci t i zens f ought

ot her peopl es' war s. 62 What t hi s ef f ect i vel y demonst r at es

i s t hat t he pr obl ems associ ated wi t h empl oyi ng mer cenar i es

had come f ul l ci r cl e. Gover nment s, r eal i zi ng t he pol i t i cal

i ssues r ai sed i n t he cont ext of cont r act i ng mer cenar i eschose t o acqui r e mor e cont r ol of pol i t i cal af f ai r s, maki ng

i t mor e di f f i cul t f or mer cenar i es t o pr of i t f r om st at e war s.

1. Toward Private Military Corporations

As t he pot ency of mercenar y f or ces began t o waneas a

r esul t of soci al and pol i t i cal f or cesst at es wer e st i l l

f aced wi t h subst ant i al chal l enges when i t came t o pr ot ect i ng

60Deborah Avant , 66- 7.

61Davi d Shearer . Out sour ci ng war. Foreign Policy, 112, ( 1998) : 68.ht t p: / / sear ch. ebscohost . com/ l ogi n. aspx?di r ect=t r ue&db=bt h&AN=1071350&si te=ehost - l i ve&scope=si t e [ Accessed 5 March 07] .

62I bi d. , 69.


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t hei r i nt er est s i n f or ei gn count r i es. Br ayt on i n hi s

assessment of t he r i se of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y cor por at i ons

asser t s t hat t hi s r eal i t y was especi al l y tr ue f or weak

government s i n devel opi ng nat i ons. 63 As r epor t ed by t hi s

schol ar :

The i ncr easi ng i nabi l i t y of weak governments t ocount er i nt er nal vi ol ence has cr eat ed a r eadymar ket f or pr i vat e mi l i t ar y f or ces. Fuel ed by apost - Col d War shi f t away f r om t he st r at egi cconf r ont at i on of maj or power s i n such count r i esas Mozambi que, Rwanda and Si er r a Leone, West er ncount r i es are mor e r el uct ant t o i nt er venemi l i t ar i l y i n weak st at es, and t hei r pol i t i ci ansar e di si ncl i ned t o expl ai n casual t i es t o t hei r

el ect or at es. 64

Thus, weak gover nment s not onl y f ound i t hard t o

subst ant i at e t hei r power , but al so devel oped nat i ons i n t he

West wer e unwi l l i ng to pr ovi de t he mi l i t ar y suppor t needed

t o hel p embat t l ed gover nment s. 65

The si t uat i on cr eat ed i n t he cont ext of weak

government s i s one t hat has ser ved as t he i mpetus f or t he

devel opment of t he moder n pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i on.

Br ayt on goes on t o argue t hat , when or i gi nal l y devel oped,

pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons sought t o wor k wi t h st at e

mi l i t ar i es t o i mpr ove oper at i ons. Thei r commer ci al goal s

ar e t o i mpr ove t hei r cl i ent s' mi l i t ar y capabi l i t i es,

permi t t i ng more ef f ect i ve combat per f ormance and deterr ence

capabi l i t y. The compani es provi de mi l i t ar y assessment s,

t r ai ni ng or weapons pr ocur ement . Di r ect i nvol vement i n

combat i s l ess common, al t hough some compani es adver t i se


64I bi d. , 306.

65I bi d.


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t hei r ski l l i n t hi s area. 66 Fur t her , Br ayton goes on t o

r epor t t hat t he new pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons st r uct ur e

cont r act s such t hat t hey ar e abl e t o avoi d t he pol i t i cal

i mpl i cat i ons t hat were once associ ated wi t h mer cenary

f or ces. 67

2. Current History of Private Military Corporations

Based on what has been not ed about t he evol ut i on of t he

pr i vat e mi l i t ar y cor por at i on, i t seems r easonabl e to ar gue

t hat t hese i nst i t ut i ons devel oped out of a di r ect need f or

weak government s t o assert t hei r power i n t he cont ext

domest i c and r egi onal conf l i ct . I nt er est i ngl y, however , as

not ed by Br ooks, t he moder n hi st or y of t he pr i vat e mi l i t ar y

or gani zat i on i s st i l l somewhat di f f i cul t t o assess. As

r epor t ed by thi s schol ar , The i nt er nat i onal pr i vat e

mi l i t ar y ser vi ces i ndustr y i s st i l l an i nf ant i ndustr y i n a

st at e of f l ux. Essent i al l y, t he bul k of t he i ndust r y has

onl y exi st ed si nce t he end of t he Col d War . 68 Al t hough

t her e i s a number of smal l , ni che PMCs, l ar ger or gani zat i ons

t hat of f er a wi de r ange of mi l i t ar y and mi l i t ar y suppor t

ser vi ces ar e onl y now emergi ng. 69

Br ooks notes t hat a f ew PMCs have gai ned subst ant i al

not or i et y i n r ecent year s. I n par t i cul ar , Br ooks not es t he

success of Amer i can- based Ar mor Hol di ngs. Based i n

J acksonvi l l e, Fl or i da, t he or gani zat i on began oper at i ons i n

1969 pr ovi di ng body ar mor , i ndust r i al secur i t y and non-


67I bi d.


69I bi d. , 133.


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l et hal weapons. Al t hough the or gani zat i ons st r uggl ed to

r emai n sol vent i n the 1970s, i n the l ate 1990s, Ar mor was

abl e t o i ncr eases i t s r evenues, maki ng more t han $150

mi l l i on annual l y. Ar mor has engaged i n aggr essi ve

acqui si t i ons al l owi ng t he or gani zat i on t o expand i t s

servi ces t o t he i nt er nat i onal communi t y. 70 Br ooks al so

consi der s t he devel opment of Def ense Syst ems Li mi t ed or DSL.

The or gani zat i on, whi ch i s based on Engl and, provi des t he

Br i t i sh mi l i t ar y wi t h suppor t on hi ghl y sensi t i ve pol i t i cal

mi ssi ons. Addi t i onal l y, t hi s or gani zat i on pr ovi des ser vi ce

t o t he Uni t ed Nat i ons, despi t e t he UN s desi r e not t o

pr i vat i ze i t s mi l i t ar y oper at i ons. 71

The assessment of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons

pr ovi ded by Br ooks r ef l ect s ef f or t s on t he par t of ci vi l i zed

soci et y t o pr ovi de mi l i t ar y suppor t t o devel opi ng nat i ons.

As r epor t ed by t hi s aut hor , pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons

of t en choose t o f ocus on peacekeepi ng, peace enf orcement ,

mi l i t ar y assi st ance and humani t ar i an rescue oper at i ons. 72

Al t hough t hese goal s appear t o hi ghl i ght a mor e al t r ui st i csi de of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons, i t i s i mpor t ant t o

not e t hat al t r ui sm i s not al ways t he case. 73 I n part i cul ar ,

one aut hor cont ends t hat , t he devel opment of mercenary

f i r ms i s di r ect l y r el at ed t o t he gl obal i zat i on of t he mar ket

economy and t wo maj or aspect s of i t : t he emergence of a mor e

70Doug Br ooks, 134.71I bi d. , 135.

72I bi d.

73Xavi er Renou. Pr i vat e mi l i t ar y compani es agai nst devel opment . Oxford Development Studies, 33( 1) , ( 2005) : 107.ht t p: / / search. ebscohost . com/ l ogi n. aspx?di r ect =t r ue&db=bth&AN=17343198&sit e=ehost - l i ve&scope=si t e [ Accessed 21 March 07] .


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vi ol ent wor l d and t he gr owi ng pr i vat i zat i on of war f ar e. 74

What t hi s ef f ect i vel y suggest s i s t hat not al l pr i vat e

mi l i t ar y cor por at i ons seek t o pr ovi de sol ut i ons t hat wi l l

f aci l i t at e peacekeepi ng. I n many i nst ances, pr i vat e mi l i t ar y

organi zat i ons have been devel oped t o hel p weak st at e

gover nment s i mpr ove thei r pol i t i cal and economi c hol d on a

par t i cul ar r egi on.

D. SUMMARY

The r evi ew of t he evol ut i on of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y

organi zat i ons pr ovi ded her e at t empt s t o hi ghl i ght many of

t he cr i t i cal i ssues t hat have shaped devel opment of t hese

new i nst i t ut i ons. Al t hough pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons

have moved away f r om t r adi t i onal mer cenar y act i vi t i es, t he

r esear ch pr ovi ded her e seems t o i ndi cate t hat mer cenary

f or ces have come f ul l ci r cl e i n t hei r evol ut i on t o pr i vat e

mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons. Speci f i cal l y, t hi s r esear ch

demonst r ates t hat mer cenary f orces devol ved i nt o chaot i c,

bar bar i c or gani zat i ons t hat coul d not be cont r ol l ed by t he

st at e. Thi s coupl ed wi t h changes i n soci et y f or ced a shi f t

t o ci t i zen ar mi es. Whi l e t hi s shi f t meant t he ost r aci sm of

mer cenar i es on l egal and pol i t i cal gr ounds, t he r i se of

st r ong ci t i zen ar mi es cr eat ed a cont ext i n whi ch smal l er

gover nment s t hat wer e unabl e t o rai se f or mi dabl e ci t i zen

ar mi es, had f ew opt i ons f or pr ot ect i ng t hei r i nt er est s.

As a di r ect consequence of i mbal ances i n pol i t i cal and

mi l i t ary power i n devel opi ng nat i ons, gover nment s soon f ound

t hat l egi t i mi zi ng mer cenar y act i on t hr ough t he est abl i shment

of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons was t he most f or mi dabl e

74Xavi er Renou, 108.


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met hod f or pr ot ect i ng t he power of t he i ndi vi dual st at e. I n

t he end, pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i onsr egar dl ess of t he

ser vi ces t hat t hey pr ovi dehave become a l egi t i mi zed

mer cenar y f or ce t hat evades t he pol i t i cal i mpl i cat i ons

associ at ed wi t h t r adi t i onal mer cenar y f or ces. Thus,

mer cenar y f or ces have come f ul l ci r cl e i n t he est abl i shment

of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y cor por at i ons.


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III. CASE STUDYTHE EFFECTIVENESS OF PMCS

A. INTRODUCTION

Wi t h a basi c hi st or y of t he pr i vat e mi l i t ar y

cor por at i on pr ovi ded, i t i s now possi bl e t o l ook at t hese

organi zat i ons i n t erms of modern devel opment and pr act i ce.

Al t hough i t i s evi dent t hat t he pr i vat i zat i on of PMCs have

f orced t hese or gani zat i ons t o oper ate wi t h some degr ee of

ef f ect i venessi n or der t o remai n i n busi nesst her e i s a

cl ear need t o del i neat e how ef f ect i ve these or gani zat i ons

have been i n i mpr ovi ng out comes f or t he st at e. Onl y by

exami ni ng t he ef f ect i veness of t he pr i vat e mi l i t ar y

or gani zat i on wi l l i t be possi bl e t o pr ovi de a mor e i nt egr al

under st andi ng of bot h t he f unct i on and i mpor t ant of t hese

or gani zat i ons f or moder n mi l i t ar y oper at i ons.

Al t hough t he pr oposal of exami ni ng t he ef f ect i veness of

pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons appear s t o be qui t e

st r ai ght f or war d, i t i s necessar y t o f i r st pr ovi de some

def i ni t i on and f r amewor k f or t he speci f i c di mensi ons of

ef f ect i veness t hat wi l l be ut i l i zed i n exami ni ng t hese

or gani zat i ons. To t hi s end, t hi s case st udy f i r st consi der s

a t hor ough r evi ew of what has been not ed about t he

def i ni t i on of ef f ect i veness. Thr ough a car ef ul exami nat i on

of t hi s var i abl e, i t wi l l be possi bl e t o devel op a f or mal

f r amewor k f or eval uat i ng t he ef f ect i veness of pr i vat e

mi l i t ar y cor por at i ons. Thi s f r amewor k wi l l t hen be ut i l i zed

t o pr ovi de a cl ear r evi ew of t he ef f ect i veness of moder n

pr i vat e mi l i t ar y cor por at i ons.


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B. DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE OF EFFECTIVENESS

Based i n t he dat a pr ovi ded above, i t becomes evi dent

t hat a cl ear r at i onal e f or assessi ng ef f ect i veness i n t he

pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i on must be devel oped. Thus, i nor der t o devel op t hi s rat i onal e, i t i s f i r st necessar y t o

consi der t he speci f i c pur pose and mi ssi on of t he pr i vat e

mi l i t ar y or gani zat i on. Revi ewi ng t he cur r ent l i t er at ur e on

t hi s subj ect , a wi de r ange of dut i es and r esponsi bi l i t i es

f or t he pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i on i s r eveal ed. 75 Pr i vat e

mi l i t ar y cor por at i ons pr ovi de st at es wi t h suppor t t hat

r anges f r om anci l l ar y suppor t f or combat oper at i ons t o

par t i ci pat i on i n combat act i vi t i es. Regar dl ess of t he

speci f i c act i ons t aken by t hese or gani zat i ons however , each

i s char ged wi t h pr ovi di ng t he st at e wi t h t he key suppor t

t hat i t needs i n or der t o ensur e success i n mi l i t ar y

oper at i ons.

I n an ef f or t t o bet t er under st and t he st at e s deci si on

t o empl oy t he use of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons, Newel l

and Sheehy ar gue that t he cent r al pur pose of empl oyi ng

pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons i s t o i mpr ove t he

ef f ecti veness of t he st at e i n i t s abi l i t y t o accompl i sh i t s

mi l i t ar y mi ssi ons. Speci f i cal l y, t hese aut hor s expl i cat e

t hi s pr ocess and r at i onal e as f ol l ows:

The pr i vat i zat i on of t he publ i c sect or i s a t r endi n i nst i t ut i onal l y and economi cal l y st r ong st at est hat has been domi nant si nce t he Reagan- That cher

ear . I t i s dr i ven by t he basi c bel i ef t hatgover nment s are i nef f i ci ent suppl i er s of goodsand servi ces, and by pol i t i cal commi t ment t o t hephi l osophy that such gover nment act i vi t y i mpi ngeson t he l i ber t y of ci t i zens. These bel i ef s



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t r ansl at e i nt o a pol i cy t hat seeks t o maxi mi zeef f i ci ency and ef f ect i veness whi l e mi ni mi zi ng t hecost s t o t he sat e and r equi r es t he i nt r oduct i onof compet i t i on i nt o pr evi ousl y cl osed publ i csect or s. 76

These aut hors go on t o ar gue t hat t hi s pr ocess cr eat es a

si t uat i on i n whi ch speci f i c rol es once f i l l ed by t he st at e

ar e not pr ovi ded by t he publ i c sect or . I n t hi s cont ext

gr eater account abi l i t y f or act i on and out comes becomes

cri t i cal f or assessi ng t hese or gani zat i ons. 77

Pl aci ng t hese asser t i ons i nt o t he cont ext of t he model s

pr ovi ded by Chi l der s and van House f or eval uat i ng t he

ef f ect i veness of t he or gani zat i on, i t appear s as i f t he goal

model and open syst ems model need t o be conver ged i n order

t o compr ehensi vel y under st and and def i ne ef f ect i veness i n

t he pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i on. I n t er ms of t he goal

model , t he over ar chi ng goal of t he st at e i n achi evi ng

success i n i t s mi l i t ar y oper at i on must be accessed, r at her

t han t he speci f i c goal s of t he PMC i n i ndi vi dual mi l i t ar y

oper at i ons. I n t he cont ext of t he open syst em model , t heef f ect i veness of t he pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i on shoul d be

r ef l ect ed i n t he wi l l i ngness of t he st at e t o cont i nue t o

hi r e pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons f or r esol vi ng conf l i ct.

I n shor t , i f PMCs per f or m t hei r dut i es cor r ect l y, st at es

shoul d wi n t hei r mi l i t ar y campai gns and cont i nue to seek t he

suppor t and assi st ance of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons.


77I bi d.


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C. EFFECTIVENESS OF PRIVATE MILITARY CORPORATIONS

Wi t h a speci f i c f r amework f or t he exami nat i on of

ef f ect i veness i n pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons devel oped i t

i s now possi bl e t o pr ovi de a revi ew of what has been notedabout t hese par t i cul ar par amet er s of ef f ect i veness. Thi s

r evi ew wi l l consi st of t he l i t er at ur e avai l abl e on

oper at i ons of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons i n hel pi ng

st at es secur e mi l i t ar y vi ctor i es. Fur t her , t hi s r evi ew wi l l

consi der t he ext ent t o whi ch pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons

cont i nue t o be ut i l i zed as a pr i nci pl e f or ce f or i mpr ovi ng

t he out comes of mi l i t ar y oper at i ons.

1. Private Military Corporations and Success

A cr i t i cal r evi ew of what has been not ed about t he

success of t he pr i vat e mi l i t ar y cor por at i on seems t o suggest

t hat , i n most i nst ances, t hese or gani zat i ons have been

hi ghl y successf ul i n hel pi ng st at es achi eve t hei r goal s.

J ackson, i n hi s r evi ew of t he over al l success of pr i vat e

mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons ar gues t hat i n t er ms of i nt er nat i onal

peacekeepi ng mi ss i ons undert aken by or gani zat i ons such as

t he Uni t ed Nat i ons, pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons have been

qui t e successf ul . 78 Speci f i cal l y, t hi s aut hor makes t he

f ol l owi ng observat i ons: Despi t e t hei r negat i ve i mage, many

of t hese PMCs were i n many cases more ef f ect i ve i n resol vi ng

conf l i ct s t han t he i nt er nat i onal communi t y, t ook an act i ve

i nt er est i n t he wel l - bei ng of t he l ocal popul at i on and

cannot be bl amed f or t he f act t hat t he l ong- t er m st abi l i t y

di d not come t o the count r i es i n whi ch t hey oper ated. 79


79I bi d. , 33.


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Br ayt on has al so not ed t he success of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y

or gani zat i ons. Speci f i cal l y, t hi s aut hor exami nes t he

out comes f or Execut i ve Out comes i n bot h Angol a and Si err a

Leone. Accor di ng t o t hi s aut hor , i n 1993 r ebel s f r om t he

Nat i onal Uni on f or t he Tot al I ndependence of Angol a ( UNI TA)

t ook cont r ol of oi l r eser ves dur i ng t he Angol an ci vi l war .

I n an ef f or t t o r egai n cont r ol t he st at e cont r act ed wi t h

Execut i ve Out comes t o r emove UNI TA f r om power . The

or gani zat i on qui ckl y sei zed cont r ol of oi l oper at i ons wi t h

mi ni mal casual t i es and damage to equi pment . As a r esul t of

t he success of t hi s oper at i on, Execut i ve Out comes was

awarded a per manent cont r act f or pr otect i ng t he count r y soi l r eser ves. 80

I n 1995, t he gover nment of Si er r a Leone f aced

subst ant i al pr obl ems as r ebel s had t aken cont r ol of key

di amond mi nes i n t he count r y. Execut i ve Outcomes was

cont r act ed t o r emove t he r ebel s f r om power . The or gani zat i on

accompl i shed i t s goal s i n a t i mel y manner , r est or i ng

government cont r ol over t he di amond mi nes. Execut i ve

Out comes r emai ned i n Si er r a Leone t o pr ovi de suppor t f or

l ocal mi l i t i as bat t l i ng t he r ebel Revol ut i onar y Uni t ed Front

( RUE) . Af t er 22 mont hs, t he government was agai n abl e t o

r egai n cont r ol of t he count r y f r om r ebel l eader s. Br ayt on

notes t hat servi ces pr ovi ded by Execut i ve Out comes t otal ed

$35 mi l l i on. Al t hough t hi s cost was mor e t han one- t hi r d of

t he count r y s annual def ense budget , t hi s cost was

consi der ed to be a bargai n compared t o t he ser vi ces pr ovi ded

by t he UN observer f or ce, whi ch suppl i ed mi l i t ar y suppor t



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af t er t he conf l i ct was r esol ved. For onl y ei ght mont hs of

ser vi ce, t he UN obser ver f orce cost t he government more t han

$47 mi l l i on. 81

Even t hough t her e i s evi dence t hat pr i vat e mi l i t ar y

organi zat i ons have i ndeed cr eated notabl e advant ages f or

r esol vi ng shor t - t er m conf l i ct , t her e have been concer ns

r ai sed about t he abi l i t y of t hese or gani zat i ons t o addr ess

t he l ong- t er m pr obl ems f aced by t he st at e. For i nst ance,

Newel l and Sheehy make t he f ol l owi ng obser vat i ons about t he

f ai l ur es of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons: Lacki ng publ i c

account abi l i t y, cor por at i ons f r equent l y f ai l t o oper at e

f aci l i t i es and of f er ser vi ces wi t h an eye t o t he publ i c

good. Whi l e t hey can har dl y be f aul t ed f or t hi saf t er al l ,

publ i c good i s not t hei r pr ovi ncet hey ar e responsi bl e f or

f ai l i ng t o f ul f i l l proper l y t hei r cont ract ual

obl i gat i ons. 82 These aut hors go on to notes t hat t he

f ai l ur e of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons t o successf ul l y

pr ovi de ser vi ce has f or ced some st at es t o consi der de-

pr i vat i zat i on of some mi l i t ar y oper at i ons.83

Schwar t z and Wat son have al so not ed some probl ems wi t h

t he over al l ef f ect i veness of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons.

I n par t i cul ar , t hese aut hor s not e t he chal l enges t hat have

devel oped i n t he cont ext of usi ng these or gani zat i ons t o

f i ght t he war on dr ugs i n Sout h Amer i ca. Whi l e most shor t -

t er m oper at i ons ar e successf ul t hese aut hor r epor t t hat when

mi ssi ons ar e not successf ul , t he U. S. mi l i t ar y i s expect ed

t o i nt er vene i n or der t o compl et e t he mi ssi on and r esol ve



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t he pr obl ems encount er ed by t he PMC. 84 Cr i t i cs of PMCs have

argued t hat , Ther e' s a gr eat l ack of t r anspar ency when you

cont r act out , yet i f somet hi ng happens, we' r e supposed t o

use our mi l i t ar y t o go i n and r escue t hem and get i nvol ved

i n ot her conf l i ct s . 85

I saac and Har r i son f ur t her scr ut i ni ze t he success of

pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons ar gui ng t he scrut i ny of t hese

i nst i t ut i ons has yi el ded a number of not abl e pr obl ems. PMFs

[ pr i vat e mi l i t ar y f i r ms] and t hei r empl oyees have been

accused of not havi ng t he requi si t e i nt egr i t y f or combat

oper at i ons, of over char gi ng cl i ent s, of cor r upt i on and war

prof i t eer i ng. 86 I n addi t i on, t hese or gani zat i ons have been

accused of ut i l i zi ng t hei r ambi guous l egal st at us t o gar ner

i mmuni t y f or most of t hei r act i ons. 87 Thus, whi l e pr i vat e

mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons may be successf ul i n t hei r ef f or t s t o

quel l conf l i ct , t he met hods used t o achi eve t hese ends draws

i nt o quest i on t he over al l abi l i t y of t hese i nst i t ut i ons to

be ef f ect i ve f or meet i ng t he goal s of t he st at e i n t er ms of

t he push t owar d pr i vat i zat i on i n mi l i t ar y oper at i ons.

2. Private Military Corporations and Extent of Their

Employment

I n addi t i on t o assessi ng t he success of act i ons t aken

by pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons, some assessment of t he

84Nel son D. Schwart z and Noshua Wat son. The Pentagon s pr i vat earmy. Fortune, 147( 5) , ( 2003) : 101.

85I bi d. , 102.

86Lar r y I saac and Dani el Har r i son. Corpor ate warr i ors : Changi ngf orms of pr i vat e ar med f orce i n Amer i ca. American SociologicalAssociation Conference Paper, Annual Meet i ng, Phi l adel phi a, PA, ( 2005) :18. ht t p: / / web. ebscohost . com/ ehost / pdf ?vi d=13&hi d=106&si d=b56a2785- 0b36-4b14- 9aaf - d974df 4d84bc%40sessi onmgr106 [ Accessed 5 Febr uar y 07] .

87I bi d.


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ext ent of t hei r use must al so be taken i nt o consi der at i on.

Whyt e, i n hi s exami nat i on of t he use of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y

or gani zat i ons by the Uni t ed St at es r epor t s t hat t he ut i l i t y

of t hese or gani zat i ons has been codi f i ed i n t he devel opment

of speci f i c l egi sl at i on t hat gover ns t he use of ser vi ces

f r om t hese compani es. 88 Speci f i cal l y, t hi s aut hor r epor t s

t hat , Under t he Uni t ed St at es r egul at or y syst em, pr ovi der s

of mi l i t ar y goods and ser vi ces must r egi st er wi t h t he St at e

Depar t ment . Any cont r act s wor t h mor e t han $50 mi l l i on must

be not i f i ed t o Congr ess. Cont r act s wi t h f or ei gn gover nment s

ar e al so ar r anged i ndi r ect l y t hr ough t he Pent agon s For ei gn

Mi l i t ar y Sal es Depar t ment wi t hout t he need f or a l i cense. 89What t hi s ef f ect i vel y suggest s i s t hat PMCs have become so

wi del y ut i l i zed i n t he Uni t ed St at es t hat f or mal pr ot ocol s

t o regul at e the act i ons of t hese or gani zat i ons has been

est abl i shed.

The f or mal prot ocol s t hat have been est abl i shed by t he

U. S. government have served as t he i mpetus f or shapi ng the

ut i l i zat i on of t hese or gani zat i ons by f or ei gn gover nment s.Whyt e goes on to report t hat when f orei gn count r i es cont act

t he U. S. f or mi l i t ar y suppor t , t he U. S. gover nment of t en

makes r ecommendat i ons f or cont r act i ng wi t h PMCs. PMCs are

now commonl y cont r act ed by f or ei gn government s on the

r ecommendat i on or encour agement of t he Uni t ed Stat es Def ense

Depart ment . Saudi Ar abi a, Kuwai t , Br unei and Mal aysi a have

al l more r ecent l y been part y of maj or cont r act s wi t h PMCs

88Dave Whyt e. Lethal r egul at i on: St at e- cor porat e cri me and theUni t ed Ki ngdom government s new mercenar i es. Journal of Law & Society,30( 4) , ( 2003) : 576.ht t p: / / sear ch. ebscohost . com/ l ogi n. aspx?di r ect=t r ue&db=si h&AN=11679907&sit e=ehost - l i ve&scope=si t e [Accessed 2 Apr i l 07] .

89I bi d. , 590.


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based i n t he Uni t ed St at es. 90 Thus, t he success of pr i vat e

mi l i t ar y cor por at i ons has been l egi t i mat ed t hough t he

devel opment of a f or mal pr ocess f or ut i l i zi ng PMC servi ce

and pr ovi di ng recommendat i ons f or PMC ser vi ce t o other

states.

Ot her schol ar s exami ni ng t he ut i l i t y of pr i vat e

mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons asser t t hat t hese or gani zat i ons ar e

mor e wi del y ut i l i zed by st at es because of t he capabi l i t i es

of t hese or gani zat i ons. 91 I n par t i cul ar , one schol ar r epor t s

t hat , PMCs ar e sai d t o have t he advant age of bei ng hi ghl y

f l exi bl e and t o have t he abi l i t y t o put f or ces i n t he f i el d

ext r emel y qui ckl y, as wel l as not havi ng t he need to go

t hrough a cumber some approval procedure t o do so. 92 What

t hi s demonst r at es i s t hat t her e ar e speci f i c char act er i st i cs

of t he pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i on t hat make t hem easi er

t o use t han t r adi t i onal mi l i t ar y f or ces. These

char acter i st i cs i ncrease t he ut i l i t y of t hese or gani zat i ons.

Anot her measur e of t he extent of use f or pr i vat e

mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons can be seen i n t he cur r ent war i n

I r aq. Accor di ng t o Roseman:

Accor di ng t o of f i ci al s of t he U. S. - l ed Coal i t i onPr ovi si onal Aut hor i t y, t her e ar e about 20, 000pr i vat e secur i t y cont r actor s i n I r aq, i ncl udi ngAmer i cans, I r aqi s and ot her f or ei gner s. Ani nvest i gat i on done by The Guardian est i matest hose pr i vat e cont r act or s are t he second l ar gestcont i ngent of ar med f or ces i n I r aq. Ot her sour cesest i mat e t hat pr i vat e mi l i t ar y and secur i t y

90Dave Whyt e, 590.


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cont r act or s ar e cont r i but i ng as much as 20per cent of t he t ot al U. S. - l ed occupat i on f or ce. 93

Thi s aut hor goes on t o r epor t t hat as many as 35

corporat i ons have been cont r act ed by t he U. S. gover nment t o

pr ovi de var i ous ser vi ces i n I r aq. These ser vi ces r ange f r om

pr ovi di ng suppor t ser vi ces t o mi l i t ar y per sonnel t o f ul l

combat suppor t , whi ch i ncl udes secur i t y and i nt el l i gence

pat rol l i ng. 94 I n part i cul ar , Roseman notes t he case of

Dyncor p, whi ch i s pr ovi di ng t r ai ni ng t he I r aqi pol i ce f or ce.

Taul bee has l i nked t he ut i l i zat i on of pr i vat e mi l i t ar y

ser vi ces t o the over al l success of t hese or gani zat i ons. As

r epor t ed by t hi s aut hor , t he dr amat i c i ncr ease i n t he use of

pr i vat e mi l i t ar y ser vi ces by st at es i n r ecent decades i s a

cl ear i ndi cat i on t hat t hese or gani zat i ons pr ovi de some

degr ee of success f or mi l i t ar y oper at i ons. 95 Thei r success

depends on generat i ng busi ness on an ongoi ng basi s,

pr esumabl y wi t h quest i on of pr of i t , l oss, gr owt h and

sust ai nabi l i t y gui di ng deci si ons. 96 What t hi s i mpl i es i s

t hat t he ut i l i zat i on of PMCs i s an i ndi cat i on of t hei rsuccess and t he success of PMCs ser ves as t he i mpetus t o

i ncr ease t hei r use by st at e l eader s. Based on t hese

par amet er s, one coul d ar gue t hat pr i vat e mi l i t ar y

or gani zat i ons have i ndeed been ef f ect i ve i n t hei r

oper at i ons.

93Ni l s Roseman. Pr i vat i zed war and cor porat e i mpuni t y. PeaceReview, 17( 2/ 3) , ( 2005) : 276.ht t p: / / l i bpr oxy. nps. edu: 8080/ l ogi n?ur l =ht t p: / / pr oquest . umi . com/ pqdweb?did=979968191&si d=8&Fmt =2&cl i ent I d=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD [ Accessed 17

J anuary 07] .

94I bi d.

95J ames Lar r y Taul bee. The pr i vat i zat i on of secur i t y: Modernconf l i ct , gl obal i zat i on and weak st at es. Civil Wars, 5( 2) , ( 2002) : 3.

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D. ANALYZING THE DATA

1. General Observations

The i nf or mat i on provi des a mi xed pi ct ure of t heef f ect i veness of t he pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i on. For

i nst ance, whi l e i nf or mat i on on t he success of t hese

or gani zat i ons suggest s t hat pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons

have pr oven t o be qui t e capabl e i n ef f ect i vel y cr eat i ng

shor t - t er m conf l i ct r esol ut i on, t hese or gani zat i ons do not

pr ovi de subst ant i al l ong- t er m suppor t i n t hi s ar ea. 97

Fur t her , whi l e pr i vat e mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons have been

successf ul i n pr ovi di ng suppor t i n speci f i c conf l i cts, t he

devel opment of t hese or gani zat i ons r ai ses a number of i ssues

wi t h r espect t o t he l egal a

effectiveness and efficiencies of pmcs

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