ENDS AND PRINCIPLES IN KANT'S MORAL THOUGHT

NIJHOFF INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES

VOLUME 22

General Editor: JAN T.J. SRZEDNICKI (Contributions to Philosophy) Editor: LYNNE M. BROUGHTON (Applying Philosophy) Editor: ST ANISLAV l. SURMA (Logic and Applying Logic)

Editorial Advisory Board:

R.M. Chisholm, Brown University, Rhode Island. Mats Furberg, Goteborg University, D.A.T. Gasking, University of Melbourne, H.L.A. Hart, University College, Oxford. S. Korner, University of Bristol and Yale University. H.J. McCloskey, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Melbourne. J. Passmore, Australian National University, Canberra. C. Perelman, Free University of Brussels. A. Quinton, Trinity College, Oxford. Nathan Rotenstreich, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Franco Spisani, Centro Superiore di Logica e, Scienze Comparate, Bologna. S.l. Surma, Auckland University, New Zealand. R. Ziedins, Waikato University, New Zealand.

For a list of other volumes in this series see final page of the volume.

John E. Atwell

Ends and Principles in Kant's Moral Thought

1986 MARTINUS NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS ~. a member of the KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS GROUP •• DORDRECHT / BOSTON / LANCASTER .~

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jar the United States and Canada: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 101 Philip Drive, Assinippi Park, Norwell, MA 02061, USA jar the UK and Ireland: Kluwer Academic Publishers, MTP Press Limited, Falcon House, Queen Square, Lancaster LAI lRN, UK jar all other countries: Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, Distribution Center, P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, The Netherlands

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Atwell, John E. Ends and principles in Kant's moral thought.

(Nijhoff international philosophy series; v. 22) 1. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804--Views on ethics.

2. Ethics, Modern--18th century. 1. Titre. II. Series. B2799.E8A89 1985 170' .92'4 85-7320

ISBN-13: 978-90-247-3167-1 001: 10.1007/978-94-009-4345-2

Copyright

e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-4345-2

© 1986 by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht.

Reprint of the original edition 1986

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, P.O. Box 163, 3300 AD Dordrecht, The Netherlands.

To my mother and father

Contents

References to Kant's works IX

Preface

Chapter I:

Chapter II:

Chapter III:

Chapter IV:

Chapter V:

Introduction: Background and the central problem 1. Human knowledge and the knowable world 2. Freedom: The chief condition of morality 3. Types of moral theories 4. Ends and principles: Inconsistencies?

Ends and the good will 1. Conditioned goods and the unconditioned good 2. Prima Jacie goods and the absolute good 3. The uniqueness of a good will 4. The irrelvance of ends 5. A note on respect for the moral law

Maxims 1. Three kinds of maxims: Incentival, actional, and

XI

2 5 7 9

13 14 18 20 27 32

33

dispositional 34 2. Alternative accounts of Kantian Maxims 39 3. Preliminary elucidation of actional maxims 44 4. What maxims (and the adoption of maxims) are not 47 5. On formulating maxims 51

Universality and the categorical imperative 1. The general nature of imperatives 2. The principle of universality of nature 3. Suicide and lying promises 4. Neglect of talents and refusal to help others

Ends and moral obligation 1. The problem of objecitve ends 2. Man as the objective end-in-itself 3. The alleged inconsistency 4. End which are duties

57 57 69 76 83

87 87 91 92 96

VIII

5. The highest good 101

Chapter VI: The principle of humanity 105 1. Initial remarks 106 2. Treatment of others as means III 3. Humanity in others as a positive end in itself: The duty of love for others 118 4. Respect for humanity in one's own person: Duties to oneself 125

Chapter VII: Autonomy of the Will 139 1. The principle of autonomy of the will as a moral criterion 143 2. Autonomy and the possibility of morals 146 3. The kingdom of ends 152 4. Responsibility for wrong acts and accountability for moral evil 160

Chapter VIII: Duties, rights, and ends in the political order 171 1. The alleged right to revolt 174 2. Kant's paradoxical stand on revolution 187 3. The alleged right to lie from benevolence 193 4. The end of nature in human history 202

Chapter IX: Happiness and law-morality 209 1. Morality and happiness 210 2. Law-morality and atheism 217 3. Conclusion 222

References to Kant's works

References throughout follow the Academy edition, with an abbreviation and the page number of the relevant volume being cited. Abbreviations and translations (sometimes slightly amended) are these:

A=B

CPR

Gr.

MM

CTJ

ReI.

T&P

First and second editions of the Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965)

Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956)

Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964) (though Paton uses "Metaphysic"); Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959)

Metaphysics of Morals; Part I (often called the Doctrine of Right, or Rechtslehre) is translated as the Metaphysical Elements of Justice by John Ladd (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), and Part II (often called the Tugendlehre) is translated as the Doctrine of Virtue by Mary J. Gregor (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964)

Critique of Teleological Judgment, which is Part II of the Critique of Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964)

Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960)

On the Old Saw: That May be Right in Theory But It Won't Work in Practice (or Theory and Practice), trans. E.B. Ashton (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1974)

PP Perpetual Peace, trans. Lewis White Beck, in Beck (ed.), Kant on History (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963)

IUH Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View, trans. Beck, in Beck (ed.), Kant on History

x

Strife Strife of the Faculties, Part II, called "An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?" trans. Robert E. Anchor, in Beck (ed.), Kant on History

Preface

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) stands among the greatest thinkers of the Western world. There is hardly an area of thought, at least of philosophical thought, to which he did not make significant and lasting contributions. Particularly noteworthy are his writings on the foundations and limits of human knowledge, the bidimensional nature of perceptual or "natural" objects (including human beings), the basic principles and ends of morality, the character of a just society and of a world at peace, the movement and direction of human history, the nature of beauty, the end or purpose of all creation, the proper education of young people, the true conception of religion, and on and on. Though Kant was a life-long resident of Konigsberg, Prussia - child, student, tutor, and then professor of philosophy (and other subjects) - his thought ranged over nearly all the world and even beyond. Reports reveal that he (a bachelor) was an amiable man, highly respected by his students and colleagues, and even loved by his several close friends. He was apparently a man of integrity, both in his personal relations and in his pursuit of knowledge and truth. Despite his somewhat pessimistic attitude toward the moral progress of mankind - judging from past history and contemporary events - he never wavered from a deep-seated faith in the goodness of the human heart, in man's "splendid disposition toward the good." And he never doubted the power of the human mind (once properly portrayed) to attain and profit from genuine knowledge.

My chief aim in this study is to elucidate several central concepts of Kant's moral thought in terms of the question, "Does Kant's 'formalism' - i.e., his emphasis on strict obedience to moral principles apart from any regard for the ends to be produced by such obedience - conflict with his 'teleologism' - above all, his undeniable emphasis on the moral duty to further certain ends?" Or, to put the question in slightly different terms, "Is Kant's principle-oriented ethics inconsistent with his (apparently undeniable) end-oriented ethics?" In the course of dealing with this general issue, I shall try to clarify the various principles (from maxims to the categorical imperative) and the various ends (from humanity as an end-in-itself to "ends which are duties") which figure so prominently in Kant's moral (political and historical) thought.

This study deals only with what Kant actually said about this or that issue, or what, in virtue of fundamental tenets, he should have said. I am not especially concerned with what others say that he said; and I am not trying to bring Kant "up to date," for example, to determine what he would have said about organ transplants, abortion, whistle-blowing, allocation of scarce resources in the medical field, or anything of that sort. I am not interested in what many recent authors call

XII

"Kantianism." There is no denying, however, that a sort of "Kantian approach" can be brought to bear on at least some of the ethical and moral isues of our time (though doing so is always, I think, a hazardous, and sometimes senseless, undertaking). That "approach" is perhaps basically one of never treating humanity merely as a means - though, as we shall see, what that means is hardly obvious. My study, in short, may be characterized in these terms: I want to discover what a man held or should have held about some of the central questions of ethics (or even only about the questions of what he conceived ethics to be).

As the chapter titles indicate, the content of this essay follows (though it is not merely a commentary on) the argument in Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals - where, incidentally, Kant's "formalism" appears most evidently - but that argument and the notions involved in it are explicated and examined largely by reference to numerous other works, ranging from the Critique of Pure Reason to Perpetual Peace. It is in Kant's "later" ethical writings, especially in the Metaphysics of Morals, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, the Critique of Judgment (second part, Critique of Teleological Judgment), and the essays and excerpts contained in Kant on History, that Kant's "teleologism" gets expressed most clearly and forcefully. Yet because these works are not always discussed in commentaries and criticisms of Kant's ethics, the teleological dimension of his thought often gets overlooked. There is, however, one signi(icant exception to this general fact: Keith Ward's book, The Development of Kant's View of Ethics (1972). Not only does Ward review Kant's moral thought from beginning to end, from the "pre-critical" period to the posthumous lectures and notes, he announces on page one of his essay that " ... Kantian ethics is, in a fundamental sense, a teleological ethic, concerned above all with ends of action, human fulfillment and happiness." To a considerable extent, I use this assertion (which I find ambiguous) and indeed Ward's entire commentary (which I admire in many respects) as a foil to my own essay. In addition to Ward's book, the teleological strand of Kant's ethics appears, though less insistently, in H.J. Paton's classic study, The Categorical Imperative, T.e. Williams' The Concept of the Categorical Imperative, and Hardy E. Jones' Kant's Principle of Personality. I have learned a great deal from these essays, and I have benefited from examining a number of others: Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason; Allen W. Wood, Kant's Moral Religion; Marcus George Singer, Generalization in Ethics; H.B. Acton, Kant's Moral Philosophy; Onora Nell, Acting on Principle; Johannes SchwartHinder, Der Mensch ist Person: Kants Lehre vom Menschen; Bruce Aune, Kant's Theory of Morals; Thomas Auxter, Kant's Teleological Ethics; and essays by John Silber, Thomas E. Hill, M.e. Singer, Hans Wagner, et al. (Several very recent articles of Kant's ethics I make no reference to, not because I find them uninteresting or unimportant, but because they appeared after I had reached my own position and/or because they do not address themselves to the issues directly relevant here.)

-XIII

Having studied and taught Kant's ethics for several years, and having been a sort of "Kant-follower" even before I heard of his name, I am convinced that, say, Kant's vision of the moral life - from his emphasis on principles to his deep concern with "certifying" one's most innermost moral being - can be disregarded only at the expense of one's own "integrity" or "autonomy." I firmly believe that much of Kant's teaching on preserving and attaining one's "moral autonomy" and on striving for "virtue" has a profound and enduring relevance to the heart of morality: respect for others' rights, maintenance of self-respect, but also personal benefit, self-contentment, and "moral health" coupled with the avoidance of personal disintegration. Outside of a few passages, these ideas receive little treatment here - as my chief topic of concern lies elsewhere - but they are undeniably ideas which Kant felt most deeply about, and they are undeniable ideas which ought never to be ignored in any consideration of the moral life.

I am all too aware of the unbalanced nature of this essay: some parts are quite elementary and others are highly abstract, difficult, and even abstruse. Some parts are best suited for beginners in Kant's moral thought, and others are directed to Kant-scholars. But of course, some aspects of Kant's thoughts are fairly straightforward, while others are not. So I simply acknowledge the unbalanced presentation, without apologizing for it and without being able to alter it. My hope is that nearly everyone will find here something of interest, information, and stimulation.

Finally, I would like to thank Lewis White Beck for his encouragement in carrying out this study, William H. Hay for asking me (over a period of twenty-four years) philosophical questions which I have no idea how to answer, and Marcus George Singer for first stimulating my work on Kant's ethics and later saying some kind words about it. I am also grateful to Temple University for study leaves and research grants which allowed me time to put this work together. Among my present colleagues and former students, special thanks should be extended to Sidney Axinn, Elizabeth and Monroe Beardsley, John Fisher, and Todd Moody. I have had available to me the fine typing services of Nadia Kravchenko's staff at Temple University; to the individuals involved I am most grateful. And, of course, there is always Priscilla.

Temple University Philadelphia, Pennsylvania