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nuclearsafety.gc.ca

Enhancing Nuclear Regulation in the Post-Fukushima World

Robert Lojk Regulatory Program Director

Directorate of Power Reactor Regulation

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

Presentation to the 2012 INPRO Dialogue Forum

August 27-31, 2012, Seoul, Korea

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 2012 INPRO Dialogue Forum - 2

Overview

• Introduction to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC)

• CNSC regulatory framework

• Fukushima-driven initiatives

• Status of actions

• Lessons learned

• Conclusions


Introduction to the Canadian Nuclear

Safety Commission (CNSC)

Regulates the use of nuclear energy and materials to protect the health, safety and security of Canadians and the environment, and to implement Canada’s international commitments on the peaceful use of nuclear energy

Canada’s nuclear watchdog


Independent Commission Tribunal

• Quasi-judicial administrative tribunal

• Commission members are independent

• Commission hearings are public and Webcast

• Decisions can only be reviewed by Federal Court

Transparent, science-based decision making


CNSC Staff Located Across Canada

HQ in Ottawa 5 site offices at power reactors 1 site office at Chalk River 4 regional offices Staff: ~ 840 Resources: $161.5 m (70% cost-recovered)

Licensees: 2,500 Total Licences: 3,300 • 220 licences under the Class II Nuclear Facilities and Prescribed

Equipment Regulations • 2,430 licences under the Nuclear Substances and Radiation Devices

Regulations

Saskatoon, Uranium Mines and Mills Division

Regional Office

Calgary, Western Regional Office Gentilly-2

Point Lepreau

Chalk River

Laval Eastern Regional Office

Bruce A & B

HQ

Darlington

Mississauga Southern Regional Office

Pickering A & B


CNSC Regulates All Nuclear-related

Facilities and Activities

• Uranium mines and mills

• Uranium fuel fabricators and processing

• Nuclear power plants

• Waste management facilities

• Nuclear substance processing

• Industrial and medical applications

• Nuclear research and educational

• Export/import controls

From cradle to grave…


Regulatory Oversight

CNSC Regulatory Framework


CNSC’s Overall Regulatory Approach

• CNSC sets high-level safety objectives

• CNSC sets performance objectives related to

− Capacity of systems to control reactivity

− Capacity of systems to shutdown reactor in a timely manner

− Reliability of the control and shutdown functions

• CNSC has no set requirements for reactivity feedback, positive or negative but magnitude is important

• Requirements meet international best practice including IAEA

• Peer reviewed and internationally accepted (CNS)

Robust regulatory approach, while permitting

flexibility in how to achieve safety objectives


CNSC Fukushima Timeline

March 11 - April 20, 2011

• Japanese earthquake and tsunami

• CNSC issued order to all nuclear facilities

• CNSC Task Force established

October, 2011 – March, 2012

• Multiple rounds of consultation

• IRRS Follow-up Mission

April 12, 2012

• External Advisory Committee report

May 3, 2012

• Proposed Action Plan, approved in principle

• August & October 2012, updates


CNSC Post-Fukushima Findings

Recommendations in Several Areas:

− Strengthening defence-in-depth • Station design for external hazards

• Impact of beyond design basis events

• Severe accident management measures

− Enhancing emergency preparedness • Offsite emergency response

• Multiple jurisdictions

− Improving regulatory framework and processes • Nuclear Safety and Control Act, regulations and regulatory

documents

• Compliance and licensing processes

− Improving Communications • Public needs a reliable source of information

• Technical information must be available in understandable language

• Transparency is key to building trust with the public


Post-Fukushima Action Plan

• 3-year implementation horizon

• Industry on side

• Site-specific action

• Principles

− Consistent with international reviews and benchmarks

− Best practices

− Evolving standards

Enhancing the safety case


Status of Actions:

Strengthening Defence-in-Depth (1/2)

Licensee Actions

• Improved capabilities to withstand prolonged loss of

power and heat sinks • Additional means for water make-up for beyond design basis

accidents

• Temporary connections for services (electrical and water)

• Improved response to containment

challenge/performance − Emergency filtered containment venting

• Installation of filtered containment vent system under consideration

− Control capabilities for hydrogen concentration • Installation of passive hydrogen recombiners (PARS) in progress


Status of Actions:

Strengthening Defence-in-Depth (2/2)

Licensee Actions

• Implementation of severe accident management

program

• Evaluation of the structural integrity of the spent fuel

pools at temperatures in excess of design temperature in

progress − Provision of alternate sources of water inventory

• Fire water system

• Assessments of instrument and equipment survivability

for severe accidents in progress


Status of Actions:

Enhancing Emergency Preparedness (1/2)

Licensee Actions

• Emergency mitigating equipment and resources − Back-up power requirements to primary and alternate emergency

facilities, and to emergency response equipment and critical loads

− Interim storage (onsite) of emergency mitigating equipment (portable generators)

• Automated real-time station boundary radiation monitoring systems

• Drills – “Huron Challenge Exercise”, October 2012


Status of Actions:

Enhancing Emergency Preparedness (2/2)

CNSC and Federal/Provincial Actions • Establish national-level oversight process for offsite

nuclear emergency plans, programs and performance − Objectives and requirements for effective and integrated

emergency management − Review planning basis of offsite arrangements in view of multi-

unit accident scenarios

• Revise federal and provincial plan − Expedite revision of plans and establish the frequency of

exercises

• Prioritization of full scale exercises − Federal (planned Fall 2013) − Provincial (New Brunswick/NBPN [completed March 2012];

Ontario/BP [planned October 2012]; Quebec/G-2 [Spring 2015])


Status of Actions: Improving Regulatory

Framework and Processes

CNSC Actions

• Class I Facilities Regulations − Submission of offsite emergency plans

• Radiation Protection Regulations − Applicability of operational versus emergency dose limits

• Updating key regulatory and guidance documents − “Omnibus” project to amend existing documents

− Applicable to operating reactors and New Builds

• Proposed new licence conditions − Severe accident management (SAM) Program

− Public information program

− Periodic safety review (PSR) process


Fukushima Nuclear Accident:

Overall Lessons Learned (1/2)

• Adequacy of station design for external hazards

• Need to preserve key safety functions in beyond design

basis accidents and address: − Hydrogen mitigation

− Irradiated fuel bay (IFB) cooling and/or inventory

− Emergency water and power systems availability

− Severe Accident Management measures efficacy

• Adequacy of emergency planning and response

• Consider complications arising from multi-unit sites and

coupling of hazards

Expect the unexpected


Fukushima Nuclear Accident:

Overall Lessons Learned (2/2)

• Risk of a major nuclear accident is very low but real − Public concerns about the safety of nuclear reactors worldwide

− Increased level of regulatory expectations and scrutiny in current

and new reactor designs

• Must re-think safety goals (RD-337) − Current safety goals are derived from the health impacts only

• Large releases are socially unacceptable and have

environmental and socio-economic impacts

• Need for a fundamental change in overall safety thinking:

from “prevention” of accidents to “prevention and mitigation”

Environmental and socio-economic

impacts


Conclusions:

General (1/2)

• Findings from CNSC Task Force Report issued

Oct 28, 2011 confirmed that Canadian nuclear

power plants are robust and rely on multiple

layers of defence

− No impact from credible external hazard

• Review of the Fukushima event and subsequent

actions will further enhance the safety of nuclear

power in Canada

• Enhanced safety leads to increased public

confidence

Canadian nuclear power plants are safe


Conclusions:

General (2/2)

• CNSC Action Plan − Focus on mitigation as well as prevention − Improved compliance activities − Enhanced stakeholder and public participation

• Industry’s comprehensive response − Performed reviews to identify gaps and

opportunities for improvement − Made progress in implementing safety upgrades − Physical improvement implementation

• International initiatives and cooperation

− There is a need for greater cooperation at both the industry and regulatory levels and between the two

Making Canadian nuclear power plants

even safer

nuclearsafety.gc.ca

nuclearsafety.gc.ca

Thank you for your attention!

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