Ruth Lorand Aesthetic Order, A Philosophy of Order, Beauty and Art Routledge NY 2000.

The theory is based on the fundamental claim that beauty is an expression of a particular type of order, namely the aesthetic order. Art is presented as the product of the attempt to master this order and thereby create beauty. The theory presented in this book accepts neither of these positions; it strives to explain beauty in terms of lawless order . The principal claim of the theory of aesthetic order is that order appears in two basic types: discursive and aesthetic. These types of order share the general characteristics of order: complexity, necessity and other quantitative features. 3 However, discursive order consists of a priori principles that are typically associated with the conventional concept of law and predictability. By contrast, aesthetic order cannot be captured by a priori principles. It is a lawless order—a kind of necessity that is not dictated by general laws. Discursive order expresses the general, the common and the reproducible; aesthetic order expresses the individual, the unique and the search for the innovative. CZY MOŻE BYĆ ASCETYCZNY PORZĄDEK SPOŁECZNY? Discursive order expresses the need to regard the particular as an instance of the general and the individual as a member of a group. Aesthetic order, by contrast, expresses the need to conceive of the individual as unique and yet lawful. Both types of order are indispensable, irreducible and mutually dependent—in a word, they complement each other.

7-> The book of Genesis begins with the creation of order out of chaos. Chaos, the state of no distinctions, was conquered when God separated heaven from earth, light from darkness and water from dry land. ORDER BY NAMING. Life on earth had begun with distinctions and order. Order concerns all aspects of life and has many manifestations. We discern order in Nature, in our thinking, in our goals and in our values. We distinguish between natural orders and artificial orders, actual orders and desired nonmaterialized orders, hidden and apparent orders, shared and private orders. In some cases we believe that order is inherent in things, in other cases we strive to impose order where we do not find it. But is there one basic understanding of what order is? Is such basic understanding necessary for the comprehension of particular orders? “The notion of order”, they argue, extends beyond the confines of a particular theory; permeates the whole infrastructure of concepts, ideas, and values; and enters the very framework in which human thought is understood and action carried out. To understand the full meaning of creativity, and what impedes it, it is necessary to go into the whole nature and significance of order. (Bohm and Peat, 1989:104–5). I tend to agree with Bohm and Peat mainly for methodological reasons: the understanding of the “whole nature” of order is a necessary step that should precede any particular implication of the concept within a theoretical framework. WSPÓLNE – TAKŻE DLA P. SPOŁECZNEGO. „ Although order is a fundamental concept, it is surprising how little attention it has received in philosophical discussions. It is common to find arguments concerning the existence, status, kinds and measure of order in a given system, but the idea of order itself is either briefly sketched, implied, or it is ignored altogether. Within the following analysis of order and disorder, I wish not only to prepare the necessary tools for a comprehensive theory of aesthetic order, but also to address this lacuna. I shall start, therefore, from the general idea of order and examine its basic presuppositions without particular affiliation to aesthetic matters.”8. DEF WYJŚCIOWA: The definition offered by Rudolf Arnheim may serve as a departure point: Order [is] the degree and kind of lawfulness governing the relations among the parts of an entity. (Arnheim, 1966:123). PRAWIDŁOWOŚCI ALE RZECZYWISTE TJ. KORELACJA CZY TEŻ ISTANIENIE NORM? This definition suggests that order resides in systems that are complex (they have distinct parts); that order is quantitative (it is manifested in degrees ); that order consists of relations among the parts; and, finally, that order is lawful —it involves a law, or a principle, that governs the relations among the parts. The definition further implies the question of the logical status of order: is “governing the relations” an expression of an objective or a subjective state of affairs? Let us examine closely these basic categories: complexity, ordering principle (law), degrees of order, lawfulness, relations among the parts and objectivity versus subjectivity.

It should be noted that the term “order” is commonly used in two different senses, often without acknowledging the two denotations of the term; each emphasizes a different aspect of order. First, “order” denotes an ordering principle: a law, a rule, a pattern or a form by which the elements of a given set may be arranged. We refer, for instance, to alphabetical order, arithmetical order, social order, and so on. In this sense “order” and “law” are considered synonymous. Second, “order” denotes the condition of a given set, its conformity to the ordering principle. SKALA REALIZACJI? We may compare, for instance, two libraries

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that arrange their books according to the same principle—let us say by authors’ surnames— thereby follow an identical order. This is order in the first sense. Yet these libraries 10 may differ in respect to “order” in the second sense: books may be shelved more carelessly in one library than in the other. In this second usage, “order” denotes the degree of conformity of the set to its ordering principle. DLA MNIE: ORDER JEST KONSEKWENCJĄ DZIAŁANIA RÓŻNYCH NARZĘDZI. Evaluating an object we may differentiate between its degree of complexity and its degree of conformity with the ordering principle. CZY NIE MA TRZECEJ – KONSEKWENCJIE ZGODNOŚCI Z ORDERING PRINCIPLE? TAK! Indeed, we cannot measure the degree of conformity of a non-existent set. But we can conceive of an ordering principle quite apart from its actualizations. CZY TO NIE POWODUJE TRUDNOŚCI RUJIA?

René Girard summarizes Claude Lévi-Strauss’s concept of order and disorder as “differentiationvs. undifferentiation” (Girard, 1984:80–1). This implies that complexity always entails orderand only simplicity (lack of differentiation) is disordered. Although differentiation that indicatescomplexity is a prerequisite for order, it is not a synonym of order. COŚ CO DŁUGO WYSTĘPUJE W ZŁOŻONOŚCI MUSI BYĆ UPORZĄDKOWANE. Girard ascribes to Lévi-Strauss the idea that disorder is a key concept in myths of creation despite the fact that disorder does not exist, “Why the disorder at the beginning? Lévi-Strauss would answer that it is there for purely logical reasons. In order to represent a process of differentiation myth needs its opposite as a point of departure. It requires the undifferentiated as background.” (Girard, 1984:81).

The ordering of a set by a principle may be realized in two different modes: either it is constituted or it is discovered . Constituting an order means that the observer forces a principle upon the set and thus creates an order that did not exist before. By contrast, to discover an order implies that the order is inherent in a given set and the observer merely encounters it. An inherent order, unlike the constituted order, is (ideally speaking) independent of the observer’s interests. Physics, as many believe, discovers order in the natural realm. Moral and legal laws, by definition, impose order upon the social realm 12. Ordering principles may differ in their degree of complexity. The number of their components and their interrelations may vary. The quantitative aspect of order, that is, the variety in degrees of coherence between sets and their ordering principles, forms the basis for comparisons and evaluations. For instance, one may compare two democracies and conclude that one coheres better than the other with the ideal democracy. Quantitativity does not necessarily require or assume a rigid method of measure; it is not clear how the degree of democracy should be measured, and yet such comparisons and “measurements” are not unusual. In some cases estimation of degree is intuitive and immediate; in others it involves theoretical and technical means. Order is associated with lawfulness. Being in order entails following a law or an ordering principle. This does not, however, mean that order and lawfulness are synonymous. James K.Feibleman expresses this idea while employing different terminology: [Order] has always been understood in terms of law, a law that consists in a similarity among disparate elements, often combined with the property of compulsion. (Feibleman, 1968:3) Yet Feibleman introduces to the discussion two new concepts that seem to complement the notion of “lawfulness”: (1) similarity among elements as a constant component of order; and (2) compulsion . This definition raises several questions. First, is similarity among elements a prerequisite of order? If this is so, what kind of similarity is required? Second, is compulsion an essential feature of order? If this is so, why is this feature only “often” associated with order, rather than “always”? As for the second feature—compulsion—it is indeed an essential feature of order in general, which means that all types of order share this feature. I prefer to use the term necessity or lawfulness rather than compulsion because of the different connotations. An ordering principle requires, postulates or defines certain relations rather than constraints or determines them. The principle states how the elements should be or are expected to be; it does not necessarily state their actual position. Arnheim’s definition (1966:123) also indicates that order is associated with necessity (lawfulness). However, order is not just “often” associated with necessity, as Feibleman puts it, but always associated with necessity. Though “necessity” is an essential feature of “order”, the terms are not synonymous. Order always entails necessity; necessity does not always entail order. To make this argument more rigorous one should distinguish between two claims: (1) that all sets exhibit some 19 degree of necessity and (2) that some sets or classes are necessary.

.19 1 The ordering principle of a given set establishes certain relations within the set that define the required

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locations of the elements. This creates a conditional necessity . It expresses neither the necessity of the set itself nor the necessity of its ordering principle; the set and its principle may be contingent. For instance, in an alphabetically ordered telephone directory it is necessary that “Olukalns Zane” comes before, say, “Olund Eric”. This necessity is dictated by the chosen ordering principle. It does not imply that the name list (the set) is in itself necessary (telephone directories did not exist before the invention of the telephone). The same is true about the chosen principle itself; one could arrange a telephone directory by a different principle, say, by the succession of the numbers. In this case “Olukalns Zane” could have been placed way after “Olund Eric”. 2 A set (or an ordering principle) may acquire its necessity from a broader set (or a higher principle) in which the given set is included as a sub-type (or the lower principle is a derivative of the higher). Another case of necessity is that of the primary set or principle that precedes all and is defined as necessary in itself. A primary set that is necessary in itself is, for instance, Spinoza’s substance. In the case of principles we may think of primary laws or logical axioms that are intuitively regarded as necessary in themselves. / Necessity is either inherent in the object (discovered), as we tend to believe about natural orders, or it may be imposed on the object (constituted), as it is with state laws. Imposed necessity governs the relevant sets as long as the decision is effective, whereas inherent necessity is believed to be independent of the perceiver’s preferences. Thus, necessity may have many forms; not all of them associated with determinism and predictability. The necessity expressed by state laws indicates what ought to be done in a given context; it does not predict actual acts since it is not the case that every “ought” materializes. Works of art present us with a different notion of necessity: they express, as I shall further argue, possibilities which by definition tolerate alternatives

1 Order does not exist in a simple state (homogeneity); an ordered object (a set) is by definition complex.2 An ordering principle defines the relations of the elements within the set. The set is thus evaluated in accordance with the principle that is expected to govern the set. An ordering principle may be constitutive or inherent in the object; it may be accidental or determined by a higher principle.3 Ordering principles may differ in their complexity and strength. A principle may be more or less complex than another principle; it may be stronger or weaker than other principles; it may be easy or difficult to perceive, recognize, or remember.4 Some orders are binary—they merely classify objects and lack any evaluative aspect. Others are quantitative; they are manifested in various degrees of coherence between a set and its ordering principle. The main focus in this book is on quantitative orders.5 Order consists of relations among the elements; however, order and relations are not synonymous. Relations may also occur in a disordered complex.6 Order is neither objective nor subjective in a rigid sense; it is relational, a mutual product of object and observer. It may be more or less sensitive toindividual differences, and in this sense, more or less objective (or subjective). 26

As a negative term, disorder may be construed in two ways: continuous and discrete. 1 If disorder is a continuous concept, then order and disorder exist on a continuum: maximum order defines the positive pole and maximum disorder is the negative pole. 2 If disorder is a discrete concept, disorder is the opposite of order. In this case there is no gradual, progressive or continuous transition from order to disorder. The following analysis examines more closely these two definitions, suggests a typology of disorder and aims at a third, positive definition of disorder. HOMOGENICZNOŚĆ, BRAK GRANIC, PRZYPADKOWOŚĆ. Bohm and Peat, for instance, use “chaos” both as a synonym for randomness and as an expression of a high order: The word chaotic provides a good description for the order of such movement (ocean waves as they break on rocks). Within the context of order that is visible to the eye of a close observer, this motion contains a number of sub-orders and is far from random. Nevertheless, to a more distant viewer these sub-orders become so fine that they are no longer visible to the eye and the order would be called random. (Bohm and Peat, 1989:126). In view of these requirements I suggest the following definition: disorder is a state of homogeneity in probabilities . Homogeneity in probabilities means that the object is perceived as expressing equal chance of some sort; it does not mean that the object is homogeneous in every respect. 42. Homogeneity of probabilities is expressed by all types of disorder, from different perspectives or on different levels. Let us re-examine the different kinds of disorder in view of this new definition: 1 Simple states are homogeneous in every respect. However, the concept of 44 probability in this context is vacuous. Limitless

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objects exhibit homogeneity regarding the role or location of the components within the object: there is no differentiation between center and background, and the actual limits are arbitrary and may equally be anywhere. 2 Randomness is a state in which the actual occu rrence or non-occurrence of a single element within the given set has equal probability. 3 Atomistic disorder is the case of an assembly of elements that tolerates equally any ordering principle. All principles have equal probability, and thus the chosen principle expresses a capricious choice, a mere convention. 4 Conflict of orders is the state in which various segments conform to different principles that cannot be united by a higher principle. The set as a whole tolerates equally any additional segment ordered by any principle (from a given contradiction any conclusion can be deduced; all conclusions are equally 5 Chaos is a state in which the elements or the segments are not clearly differentiated and therefore their essential qualities are not determined. These qualities may be differentiated and materialized in many ways. The methods, and even the nature of the essential qualities have (ideally) equal probability to create a satisfactory order. 6 Overall sensitivity expresses homogeneity in the role and significance of each element in the set. It indicates equal probability for each element in its effectiveness within the set as a whole. 7 Symmetry expresses homogeneity in the sense that each element has equal probability in being located anywhere within the set. In fact, every form of disorder exhibits some kind of symmetry since equal probability, in itself, isan expression of symmetry.

1 Disorder may have two negative definitions: negative pole of order and opposite pole of order.2 Disorder as the negative pole raises the problems of perfect order and disorder: how can the highest and the lowest degree of order be determined and comprehended?3 Absolute order and disorder are inconceivable.4 Optimal order and disorder express the pragmatic aspect of the above problem. It is the highest degree of order or disorder that is actually achieved.5 Disorder, as a complete opposite of order is a simple, homogeneous state. However, disorder also appears in sets (which are complex by definition). Consequently, order and disorder do have some common features and thus disorder is not an outright opposite of order. 6 Disorder is manifested in many types: simple state, the limitless, randomness, atomistic disorder, clash of orders, chaos, overall sensitivity and symmetry (in some sense).7 The core of all types of disorder is homogeneity in probability . It allows for 45 disorder in complex, heterogeneous objects. This is a positive definition of disorder that avoids the problem of the negative definitions and the issue of extreme poles. Homogeneity in probability is quantitative and relational in the sense that actual states may express more or less equality in their probabilities, depending on the context and the observer

The relation between a set and an ordering principle constitutes the infrastructure of any order. This relation allows for two logical possibilities: an ordering principle is either external (HAN FEI) to its set or internal to it (TWORZONA PRZEZ NICH – KONGZI). Being “external” means that the principle is independent of the particular sets and it therefore can be understood and contemplated apart from any particular case. The “external” principle is thus like an idea or a pattern that is capable of being imprinted in different materials and of reaching a variety of degrees in the accuracy of its imprinting. Being “internal” means that the principle cannot be detached from the particular set in which it is found and cannot be separately contemplated as an abstract, independent formula. The “internal” principle consists of the relations among the elements of a particular set; these relations do not maintain the same character in a different set that consists on other elements. In other words, the elements of the set constitute their own principle by generating an individual net of interrelationships among them 47.

Although the general concept of order has no inclination toward any one type of order, Western philosophy and science have traditionally expressed a strong bias to discursive order. The second type of order, as well as the very idea of its possibility, is commonly avoided. Prigogine expresses the position typical to Western philosophy when he defines order as an “outcome of some preconceived plan” (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984:41). ALE NACZY POLEGA TEN WYNIK? A plan is, by definition, “preconceived” 48 or else it is not a plan. As such, it always precedes its actualization and is “external” to its actualization; it is capable of existing apart of any actualization. Order, from this perspective, is determined by principles (the “plan”) that

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exist prior to any of their instances and independent of them. A plan, even if not accomplished, is still a plan. This quality of discursive orders allows the examination of theories, principles, laws or rules before and apart from their implementations. OCZYWIŚCIE NIE JEST TO MOŻLIWE W ESTETYCZNYM.

Feibleman’s definition of order as “a law that consists in similarity among disparate elements” (Feibleman, 1968:3). This begs the question: what kind of a similarity does the principle constitute? There are two possibilities here: similarity may occur either (1) among the elements of a set or (2) among all sets of a class. Is similarity among the elements of a set a prerequisite of order? This is not necessarily so. Is similarity among all sets of a class a prerequisite of order? The answer is positive. Feibleman’s definition as well as Prigogine’s is at best a half-truth. Although every outcome of a preconceived plan constitutes a form of order, the inverse is not necessarily true. This conventional concept does not exhaust all possible forms of order. The “absence” of a priori principles or lack of similarities does not necessarily result in disorder. Some forms of order are not generated in accordance with a priori principles. In the case of “a truly new form, invented by art or by Nature” so Bergson argues, “[…] the thing and the idea of the thing, its reality and its possibility”, are created “at one stroke” (Bergson, 1946:23). The two types of order differ in many respects, but they share the characteristics of the general concept of order: complexity, heterogeneity in probability and necessity in various degrees. Discursive order is manifested in many sub-types: moral principles, natural laws, state laws, logical and mathematical principles, archetypes of all sorts, recipes, and the like. There are, of course, substantial differences among these sub-types; they differ in their realm, modes, functions and significance, yet they are all based on principles that can be apprehended prior to and independent of their particular cases. Discursive order, consisting as it does of external relations between set and principle, has a strong affiliation to atomistic disorder . It may be recalled that in this category, order cannot emerge from within. Homogeneous, disconnected elements are indifferent (ideally speaking) to any form of order and therefore easy to manipulate via external principles. All the characteristics of discursive order are in fact different aspects of this affiliation. Discursive order may take two forms: quantitative or binary. Indifference may appear in various degrees, but the ideal extreme of absolute undifference does not express order at all; it is in fact a form of atomistic disorder. Some degree of sensitivity persists in any version of discursive order, for it is required to establish the connection among the elements and the principle; such a connection cannot be established without some degree of sensitivity. Therefore, discursive order is characterized here not by total indifference but rather by atendency to a high degree of indifference. No set can reach the level of absolute indifference without collapsing into a state of disorder. The indifference between elements and principles is mutual: (1) the same principle may govern different sets without being affected by the number of sets or their particular nature; (2) similarly, the same elements may be ordered by various principles and remain (ideally) the same. 1 Ordering principles are independent of the elements they order into a set. In many cases we need concrete instances in order to comprehend a principle, and some instances may be more useful than others for this purpose. However, the principle (being a Platonic entity) has a “life of its own”, independent ofthe particular instance by which it was perceived. Parliament may pass a law that for various reasons might never be implemented; such a law is no less a law than one which has been rigorously applied. The fact that principles may differ in their applicabilities suggests some degree of sensitivity towards their instances (no actual indifference is total).

Informative value, predictability and redundancy are different aspects of the same quality. These terms are borrowed from the Information Theory, according to which Messages are measured by a quantity of information, which is the originality, that is, the quantity of unpredictability (unforeseeability) that they present. (Moles, 1966:54) An element that is highly predictable has a low informative value and is highly redundant. In sets that exhibit low coherence to their principle, predictability and redundancy are low and the informative value of missing (unknown) elements is high. It should be noted that in the present analysis “informative value” is merely quantitative and entirely disconnected from content signification. Sets of discursive order typically carry low informative value. Being external to the set, the discursive principle carries a priori information. The prior knowledge of the principle supplies information about the set before the set is actually experienced. Thus, the higher the degree of conformity to the principle, the lower its informative value. In this sense a discursive set exhibits a tendency toward null informative value, although this tendency can never reach its absolute phase. / Informative value is the degree of novelty of information carried by the elements. Novelty is not a mere description of the set but rather an expression of the current

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knowledge of the observer. The degree of novelty expresses the relation between the known and the unknown and the gap between the expected and unexpected./. Prediction is an aspect of informative value. It is not the mere action of foreseeing the future, but a whole range of deductive reasoning. Knowledge of the future, if it is not deduced from analysis of the past (the given elements), has nothing to do with discursive orders. In this sense, prediction does not concern itself with anticipating the new, but only with extrapolating from the old. In a sense, this kind of prediction denies the existence of the new.4 Predicting elements of a set means deducing missing elements (information) based on those given. Laplace (like Spinoza and others before him) believed that the universe is perfectly ordered. In his Théorie Analytique des Probabilitiés he claims that knowing all the laws of Nature (the relevant ordering principles) as well as the positions and momenta of all the particles in the universe at a give instance (a minute section of the set), the omniscient intelligence is able to calculate the whole chain of events at all times. Laplace’s omniscient intelligence knows this chain of events with certitude, that is, with a probability one.

Redundancy in discursive order occurs on four levels: 1 redundancy of predictable details / Redundancy is a reflection of predictability. Details that are highly predictable are highly redundant. As soon as we deduce the formula of an arithmetic progression from a given section, the remainder of the progression is obvious and thus redundant. Redundancy, like other qualities of order, cannot be absolute. One cannot predict missing elements unless some part of the set is given (and thus not redundant)./ 2 redundancy of additional sets / If a highly ordered set is given, its ordering principle may be deduced and further applied to other sets. Once the principle is deduced, one does not need additional sets of the same principle. In other words, one sample may be enough/ 3 redundancy of irrelevant elements / Redundancy of irrelevant elements arises because a discursive ordering principle is bound to be more abstract than any of its sets. The complexity of the principlecannot be identical with the complexity of the set it governs. Heinz Von Foerster (1984) makes this point with respect to description: If the length of the description approximates the length of thearrangement, it is clear that we do not understand this arrangement, for the description just parrots the arrangement. (Von Foerster, 1981:184) /4 redundancy in strong orders / A strong order is easily recognizable even when conformity between a principle and a set is low. A strong order is, by definition, highly indifferent not only to its context but also to its degree of order. As a result, it allows high redundancy of details. It is as if, while experiencing the object, it becomes transparent and one sees the principle and not the object itself; the object thus becomes almost entirely redundant./

Open sets. An open set is a set in which the resolution of the borderlines does not determine its degree of coherence. High openness is the state in which substitution, subtraction and addition of elements do not affect the conformity between set and principle. The degree of “openness” depends on the degree of sensitivity (or indifference) of the ordering principle or on the strength of the principle.

1 Discursive order is the traditional, rational order. 2 It consists of principles that are a priori and, in this sense, external to and independent of any of their particular instances. 3 As such, discursive order has an affiliation to atomistic disorder: it is characterized by a tendency towards high indifference. The point of maximum indifference collapses into a state of atomistic disorder. 4 High discursive order expresses high redundancy, high predictability and low informative value. These features reflect each other and have many aspects and manifestations. 5 Discursive order consists of an open set and an open class. It is the order of the general, the repeatable and therefore the expected. 62 A clear message, namely a highly ordered message, is a message of low informative value, high redundancy and high predictability; thus, it reflects features of discursive order.

Discursive order depends on a priori principles. It can be thus contrasted in two alternative ways: (1) by disorder only—the case of an “absence” of ordering principles (the limitation of this notion was discussed in Chapter 2), or (2) by disorder as well as by a different type of order. The second alternative suggests that the “absence” of external principles (or a poor compliance to such principles) does not necessarily lead to disorder. In this case, each type of order is contrasted in two ways: by disorder and by an alternative order. 63 However, I argue that the second alternative is not only more adequate but also more beneficial for

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understanding different aspects of experience, Moreover, I argue that the acknowledgment of a second type of order is mandatory even in theories that explicitly avoid this type of order. Laws of any kind—natural, logical, moral or even state laws—may be divided into two types: they are either primary laws or laws derived from primary laws. Primary laws are the principles by which everything in the relevant realm (natural phenomena, logical arguments, or moral issues) is organized. They are not derived, by definition, from higher laws; they are not determined or justified by any principle external to them. They are self-constitutive and embody their own reasoning. Primary laws carry indispensable and irreducible information. If it were true that the only alternative to discursive order is disorder, primary laws (being highly informative and unpredictable) would form a perfect case of disorder. However, it would be both self-defeating and confusing to assert that the primary ordering principles are in themselves disordered. Disorder may develop into order, but it cannot, on its own, constitute order. Laws cannot be disordered; they ought to be lawful themselves in some sense. Since primary laws do not gain lawfulness from another, higher law, they must have some inherent lawfulness. Since primary laws do not conform to the demands of discursive order, or to the characteristics of disorder, we are compelled to pursue the idea of a non-discursive type of order. 64 The plea for a non-discursive order is extremely significant for the understanding of aesthetic experience and its interrelations with other domains. It is also indispensable for understanding some problems and gaps in other disciplines.

The following list of dialectical poles appears at the end of Moles’s book as a summary and conclusion, and demonstrates these shortcomings and their counter-intuitive nature: Order Disorder, Predictable Unpredictable, Banal Original, Redundant Informative, Intelligible Novel, Simple Complex, (Moles, 1966:208) Note that originality appears under disorder, and that order is characterized as simple, not as complex. Are sets of discursive order really simple? Moreover, elements of disorder are indeed unpredictable and so are good works of art, but do they belong, on this account alone, to the same category? Elements of a disordered system carry informative value but they also express homogeneity in probabilities. Does a good work of art, or any object of great beauty, being informative, express the same kind of homogeneity? Is disorder necessarily original just because it is unpredictable, as Moles argues? Do all original objects evoke in the observer a sense of disorder?

A mechanical order appears when on any given material we impress a predetermined form, notnecessarily arising out of the properties of the material…. The organic form, on the other hand, is innate; it shapes as it develops itself from within. (Raysor, 1930:224) The main characteristics of organic form, according to Coleridge, are the following: 1 The origin of the whole precedes the differentiation of the parts. The whole is primary, the parts are derived. 2 An organic form conveys the process of its own development to the observer. Its process is an essential part of it. 3 As it grows, the organism assimilates diverse elements into its own substance. 4 The achieved form of the organic object is directed from within. 5 The various parts of organic form are interdependent

However, good and fruitful ideas should not be ignored simply because they carry certain associations. As far as I can ascertain, Bergson, in his Creative Evolution, was the first to present an explicit theory of two orders. The distinction is presented mainly in Creative Evolution, Chapter III. Bergson appears to be following Pascal’s distinction between the mathematical and the intuitive mind (the first aphorisms of Pascal’s Pensées ). Bergson’s distinction between geometrical order and vital order inspired the present analysis. Nevertheless, there are some crucial points of disagreement 83 Bergson criticizes rationalist philosophy for its mechanical-geometrical approach that analyzes living, organized bodies and unorganized, lifeless bodies according to the same method. Logical deduction is confused here with prediction of events, “to foresee consists of projecting into the future what has been perceived in the past” (Bergson, 1944:9). This is, in fact, merely a matter of “predicting” the past, which is already known, not foreseeing the “truly new”, which is, by definition, unpredictable. Bergson’s main argument against the autonomy of the traditional concept of order is, therefore, concerned with predictability: We say of astronomical phenomena that they manifest an admirable order, meaning by this that they can be foreseen mathematically. And we find an order no less admirable in a symphony of Beethoven, which is genius, originality, and therefore unforeseeability itself (Bergson, 1944:245). The concept of unpredictable order is necessary for the understanding of the élan vital . As the title of Bergson’s seminal book indicates, evolution itself has a direction, its structure being determined in process. Yet, being creative, evolution is unpredictable and indeterministic. The élan vital is

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like a skillful painter’s brushstroke: free of external, mechanical constraints and yet necessary and meaningful. Prediction—or what we call prediction—is a mere deduction of probabilities based on past events. It is the logical conclusion of the past that, like any logical conclusion, is already implicit in the given. It tells us nothing about what is really new. Real prediction should supply truly new, non-deducible information. Such predictions, however, are logically impossible: a new event maintains its novelty precisely because it is unpredictable. If it is predictable it is not new, but if it is not new, it simply repeats past events and thus does not require prediction. On this account, rationalism (mainly in the seventeenth century) has renounced the existence of the genuinely new and, consequently, the reality of time. Bergson believes that the cost of giving up time in order to preserve intellectualism is too high. The price is a true understanding of reality; 85 The concept of disorder, according to Bergson, stems from the idea that there is only one type of order which, therefore, must be opposed by disorder. Bergson disagrees that order is a triumph over disorder: since disorder does not exist, it cannot be conquered. He offers instead a second type of order and thus makes the idea of ‘”disorder” dispensable: in the absence of one type of order one finds not a state of disorder but an alternative type of order. Geometric order is a spatial, intellectual order; vital order is durational and intuitive. Bergson mentions other orders as well, and it is not clear whether he is suggesting the existence of other orders, or simply using synonyms for the basic dualism that he proposes. For the sake of simplicity and clarity, I assume the latter: that Bergson has only two major types of order in mind. The geometric order is thus “physical”, “automatic”, “spatial”, “intellectual”, and it is the order of “unorganized (lifeless) bodies”. The second type of order, the vital order, is “intuitive”, “natural”, “positive”, “willed”, “creative”, “individual”, and it is the order of “organized (living) bodies”. Although each order has its role in human experience, the orders are not equally valuable. This point is significant in Bergson’s doctrine: vital order is true to the nature of things, a nature that consists of creative evolution. The values and status of the two orders stem from the value of their sources: Intuition and intellect present two opposite directions of the work of consciousness: intuition goes in the very direction of life, intellect goes in the inverse direction. (Bergson, 1944:291) Intuitive, vital order reflects the natural direction of the mind, whereas geometric order is alien to this inclination. To create its order, the intellect neglects real parts of the object, interrupts the heterogeneity of the durational object, breaks the whole into homogeneous units, and forces upon it a mechanical order. Geometric order is indifferent, or to use Bergson’s terms, motionless. Hence, it consists of solid, lifeless and homogeneous elements that do not have any inner tendencies. The elements of a geometrical object lack any “will” or direction of their own, which renders them susceptible to acceptance of any external pattern imposed upon them. The principles of geometric order are “impersonal premises [that] are given once for all” (Bergson, 1944:10). There is also a kind of indifference among all objects of geometric order and among the components of these objects, “perfect spatiality would consist in a perfect externality of parts in their relation to one another, that is to say, in a complete reciprocal independence” (Bergson, 1944:222). Vital order consists solely of relations directed from within. The intuition grasps a succession that is not juxtaposition, but is rather, says Bergson (1946:35), “a growth from within”. The ordered object and its vital principle are one. When a truly new form, artistic or natural, is born, the thing and the idea of the thing, its reality and its possibility, are “created at one stroke”. This attitude opposes Prigogine and Stengers’ notion that order consists (solely) of “a preconceived plan” (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984:41). Since the object and the idea of it are the same in cases of “new forms”, the vital form is individual to the object. Vital objects, each being truly new, do not share the same order, just as it is impossible to undergo exactly the same experience twice. Therefore, one cannot conceive principles of vital order on the basis of accumulated experience. In the absence of such principles, there is no basis for predicting new vital orders. W RU WAŻNE DOŚWIADCZENIA> This is the hub of Bergson’s observation: a state exists in which predictions are entirely impossible and yet this is a state of order, not disorder! Art is the major paradigm: We imagine that everything which occurs could have been foreseen by any sufficiently informed mind, and that, in the form of an idea, it was thus pre-existent to its realization; an absurd conception in the case of a work of art. (Bergson, 1946:22) There is yet a more general question concerning the priority of one order over the other. Is it necessary to privilege the intuitive order over the intellectual order, as Bergson does? My answer is no. Each order may use materials taken from the other, and each faculty—intuition or intellect—may depend on the other for certain functions !!!!! Moreover, the quantitative aspect of order is not typical of rationalist theories either, and Bergson unwittingly aligns himself with his opponents. Rationalism tends to espouse the notion of total order, and does not generally consider orders that may vary in degree. Paradoxical as it may sound, degrees of order are a matter of intuition. The intellect cannot give a sufficient account of variety in

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degrees of compliance or coherence, it can only accept it as a fact: objects of experience are not simply ordered or disordered, nor do they only belong to one kind of order or another. The binary approach to order, as well as the denial of disorder, is rather a rationalist notion. 92 Bergson sums up the issue of degrees by asserting that “reality is ordered exactly to the degree in which it satisfies our thought” (Bergson, 1944:224). This is a somewhat surprising statement. It may mean that the order we ideally impute to reality is of a satisfying degree, but this is surely not the degree of order actually found in things. It is quite obvious that in experience one finds various degrees of order in natural objects as well as in one’s own activities and products. If we found every object completely or satisfyingly ordered, the concept of order, let alone the concept of disorder, would have never occurred to us. It is quite clear that questions of degree cannot be avoided in the case of geometric order. Since geometric order entails external principles imposed on different objects, variations of conformity are bound to appear. This is even more so if we take Bergson’s own perspective: since events cannot be repeated, and no two objects are identical, there must be some difference among sets that conform to the same external principle. Each drop of water, according to Bergson, is a nonrepeatable unique entity. Consequently two drops of water cannot maintain exactly the same degree of order. Moreover, only pure geometric entities conform totally to their principle and thus the pure form and its principle become one and the same. Paradoxically enough, this also characterizes the intuition as being very logical. It is logical to conclude that two seemingly identical drops of water must be different. 93 Bergson’s commitment to dualism gives rise to a fallacy not dissimilar to the failure with which he charges rationalism: ignoring important aspects of real experience. The question, as I see it, is not whether order or disorder is real, since any order is according to Bergson a reflection of the operation of the mind. The question is whether the concept of disorder is reducible to the concept of either of the two types of order without a loss of important and useful distinctions. The answer, I believe, is negative. The concept of disorder, as I argued in Chapter 2, is not simply an absence of some kind of order. There is more to “disorder” than such an absence and it is certainly not a mere verbal entity. If it is true that “order” reflects the operation of the mind, it is also true, for similar reasons, that “disorder” reflects such operation. Moreover, there exist not only two types of order that relate to each other in various ways, but also different types of disorder, each type relating to types of order according to its particular characteristics. Geometric (or discursive) order is not automatically a vital disorder, and durational, vital order is not simply the absence of geometric order.

Summary1 Bergson distinguishes between vital and geometric orders and denies the existence of disorder.2 Vital order is an intuitive, unpredictable necessity, whereas geometric order is an intellectual, conventional, discursive order.3 The two orders, according to Bergson, do not interrelate. One can move only from intuition to intellect in a negative sense: the intellect disassembles the vital order, but vital orders cannot be created on the basis of intellectual orders.4 Disorder, according to Bergson, is meaningless; it is a mere “verbal entity”. Order cannot be totally absent. In the absence of one type of order, one always finds another type of order. 5 My criticism pertains to (1) the denial of positive interactions among the two orders in both direction; (2) the absence of the quantitative aspect in Bergson’s theory of order; and (3) the denial of a meaningful concept of disorder and its various interrelations with both types of order.

The concept of aesthetic order that is presented here differs significantly from the concepts offeredby the theories above, namely that it has quantitative as well as qualitative characteristics. Indeed, aesthetic order is quantitative; however, this does not entail a satisfying method for measuring it. The very ground of the quantitative aspect of aesthetic order is puzzling: how can any particular aesthetic order be measured if the set and its principle are inseparable? How can we differentiate between degrees of aesthetic order, if each object constitutes its own order?

Both types of order share the general qualities of order: complexity, heterogeneity in probabilities and necessity in various degrees. Both types extend between two hypothetical extremes; both arequantitative; both oppose various states of disorder. Yet, discursive order is merely quantitative, whereas aesthetic order is both quantitative and qualitative. As already stated, the degree of discursive order is the measure of the coherence between an external, a priori principle and a given object (the set). By contrast, the aesthetic principle, being internal to the given object, exists as a potential for the object’s aesthetic

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excellence. The principle is discovered through the direct experience of its materialization. Perhaps “discovered” is somewhat too strong a term in this context since the aesthetic principle never reveals itself as a clear and distinct concept that can be grasped apart from the object. Experiencing the object, the observer at once grasps the so-far-unknown potential and its degree of materialization. Yet, the idea of the potential (the principle) is not a clear and applicable concept. If an object is of low aesthetic value, the observer does not necessarily have the clear knowledge of its ideal state, and in most cases does not know how to achieve an aesthetic excellence. Knowledge of the aesthetic principle is obscure; it becomes clear and vivid only by being exposed to a high degree of aesthetic order. INNE PROBLEMY: PROBLEM KONKRETYZACJI VS GENERALIZACJI, JAK SOCJALIZOWAĆ.

The relations between the two orders have an affinity to the relations between the general and the individual. A discursive principle is general in the sense that it can be applied to many sets; an aesthetic principle is individual in the sense that it applies (ideally) to one set only. A discursive principle is an abstract formula; an aesthetic principle is concrete and cannot be separated from or abstracted of its particular case. It should be stressed, however, that the two orders could not be simply reduced to “general” and “individual”. Individuality on its own cannot capture the complexity of aesthetic order, and it certainly is insufficient for explaining the evaluative differences between individuals. Although generality may be considered quantitative, individuality per se is not a matter of degree. A general principle may be more or less general than another, i.e. its range of applications and degree of abstraction may vary. By contrast, no individual is more or less individual than another. An ugly object is no less individual and unique than a beautiful or a mediocre one.1 If we assume that aesthetic order must apply to all these cases and must account for their differences, “individuality” is a necessary but insufficient category. Aesthetic order is not exclusive to art, to objects of high beauty or to any specific group of objects. All objects of experience are subject to both orders: discursive and aesthetic 97.

Sensitivity in aesthetic order stands in contrast to the indifference that characterizes discursive order. Being sensitive does not mean that all aesthetic orders are equally .98 sensitive to all changes. There are different kinds of changes, and an object (or rather its aesthetic order) may be highly sensitive to one change but indifferent or less sensitive to another. The degree of sensitivity like the degree of indifference has its limit: total sensitivity, like total indifference, is a state of disorder rather then order. An object that is totally sensitive to any change whatsoever cannot even be experienced since it lacks the stability that is demanded for experience. This is one of the problems with Bergson’s notion of vital order and with theories of organic form. The sensitivity attributed to them is taken to an impossible extreme that eliminates the demarcation line between order and disorder. High sensitivity must be limited by some degree of indifference, and vice versa, or else the set collapses into a state of disorder. Thus, high aesthetic order means exactly that—high sensitivity, not absolute sensitivity. Highly pertinent questions remain: how much sensitivity can an object bear without collapsing into a state of disorder? and how is the limit to sensitivity determined? The answers to these questions depend, among other things, on the agent’s capacity to perceive minor changes. But how can we know if a certain limit is only individually dependent?

In his essay “Of the Standard of Taste” Hume (1985) refers to this issue by relating to us Sancho’s story from Don Quixote: Two of my kinsmen were once called to give their opinion of a hogshead, which was supposed to be excellent […] One of them […] pronounces the wine to be good, were it not for a small taste of leather, which he perceived in it. The other […] gives also his verdict in favor of the wine; but with the reserve of a taste of iron, which he could easily distinguish […] On emptying the hogshead, there was found at the bottom an old key with leathern thong tied to it. (Hume, 1985:234–5). Is this a sufficient answer? Is the ultimate test so obvious? Even if it could be proven in the above sense that a certain observer’s sensitivity reflects real qualities of the object, this would not change much in the aesthetic experience of a nonsensitive person. The awareness of the metal object in the wine may have a psychological effect on the taste, but it will not necessarily make one’s palate more sensitive in the future. People may admire (or pretend to admire) a work of art just because others praise it, not necessarily because they understand what all the fuss is about. PROBLEM RUJIA. Education and experience can, to some degree, develop or block sensitivities, but these cannot determine the normative question of how much sensitivity is required in order to experience a given object “correctly”. One thing is clear, determining the taste of a highly sensitive person as a standard of taste is practically ineffective.

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The internal relationships among the elements constitute at once the principle and the set. This means that the set constitutes its own individual principle. Thus, (almost) any modification of the elements would affect outright the principle itself, that is, the net of relationships between the elements and the potential they harbor. Different elements (different materials) indicate different potentials and, therefore, different aesthetic principles. The elements of an aesthetic set influence each other’s role within the whole. This level is interrelated with the first level: if a change in a single element affects the degree of materialization of the ordering principle, it certainly affects the rest of the elements. Alter the shade of one patch of color in a painting and the overall color feeling may be different. A change of pitch in a musical phrase may affect the whole melody. The alteration of one element restructures the interrelations among all the elements, changing the emphasis and significance of each part. Aesthetic ordering principles are sensitive to each other and influence each other’s degree of order. The fact that the set and its principle are inseparable means that aesthetic principles influence each other in the same way that elements within a single set do. In the last analysis, this is the aesthetic sensitivity between comparable objects. Acquaintances with new works often prompt us to re-evaluate an older work with similar qualities. Aesthetic orders are sensitive to their context, including the observer’s perspective, knowledge and previous experience. When Beethoven’s Mondschein is played as background music in a supermarket it is experienced differently from when it is played in a concert hall.

Aesthetic order exhibits a tendency toward low predictability, low redundancy and high informative value. Discursive order exhibits a tendency in the opposite direction. This tendency, like the tendency towards high sensitivity, is limited. It cannot reach the extreme of any direction 107. Predictability may occur in two forms: (1) deduction of the whole from a given part of a set; and (2) familiarity which enables prediction High deductibility expresses low aesthetic value. If the whole can be deduced from a part, it means that the tendency toward external relationships is strong and dominates the set. Deducing the whole from a given part indicates that the part and the whole are governed by the same principle that is external to both. Elements of aesthetic order may be redundant either because they can be deduced from a given part or because the object is already known. These two cases are equivalent to the above two cases of predictability. The first case indicates a low aesthetic order but the second does not. Unlike discursive order, aesthetic order does not tolerate irrelevant qualities; it is too sensitive to them. Irrelevant qualities are either excluded from the set because they are extraneous to it, or if they do belong within the set they interfere with its degree of order. There is a type of redundancy that, in spite of the above, plays an important role in aesthetic orders. Since the elements do not have the same function or significance within the set, some elements are bound to appear marginal or arbitrary in comparison with others. As a result they seem to be relatively redundant and replaceable. This kind of redundancy is needed to constitute internal heterogeneity in which the roles of the elements are differentiated; it is also needed to create the internal environment for the more essential elements. The central elements gain their significance in relation to their “internal context”. On their own, their significance may not be manifested. A novel cannot be read with equal attention to each sentence or detail. Some of the details may appear somewhat redundant. This does not mean that they can be erased from the novel without causing damage. Their apparent redundancy is necessary for preparing the grounds for the central elements. Informative value reflects non-predictability and low redundancy. It reflects the degree of novelty of the information carried by the elements. A highly informative set is a set that cannot be deduced from any of its given parts. Given a part of the whole, the perceiver is unable to predict the rest; the rest is thus highly informative. Although this level refers to the interrelationships of the elements, it also reflects the perceiver’s perspective. The informative value of repetitions. Even if an object was highly informative on first experience, once it is known itsrepetition does not carry the same degree of information. Nevertheless, as discussedabove, repetitions may reveal new elements or new aspects of the object, and insuch cases, the object’s reoccurrence does not elicit a mere repetition of the previous experience. The limitation of memory also plays an important role here(see Moles, 1966:122). Owing to this limitation the reoccurrence of an experiencemay be highly informative, despite the fact that the main outlines of the content are already known 111. The “value” component of “informative value” may not designate the quantitative but rather the qualitative measure of information. In this sense, a low informative value means that the information, although new, is of low importance . This may be regarded as a more “subjective” or rather individualistic measure. Although aesthetic order is characterized by a tendency towards high information, informative

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value on its own is insufficient to determine aesthetic value. As sets of aesthetic order, each performance may have its own order—the original text is only one element among many that determine its aesthetic worth. To sum up, aesthetic order is the order of the unpredictable, internal relationships within an individual set. It is an internal necessity that is not determined by a priori principles. It is contrary to discursive order in the following aspects: Aesthetic order Discursive order; Individual, private General, common; Internal relationships External relationships; No a priori principle A priori principles; Sensitive Indifferent; High informative value Low informative value; Low redundancy High redundancy; High novelty High predictability; Closed set and class Open set and class 114.

Maximum order would occur if all characteristics were manifested in their extreme. However, such a totality is not only practically unachievable, but also logically inconceivable. Let us re-examine a few aspects of this claim with regard to aesthetic order:1 Sensitivity: A perfect sensitivity would be a state in which there is nothing stable in a given set. A totally sensitive set would constantly change its order. Given the problem of time, identity and accumulative changes in the observer 115 the set would be in constant flux. Instead of achieving perfection, it would result (if anything) in an impossible state of total disorder and confusion. Ifwe cannot experience the same river twice, in the last analysis we cannot experience it even once. This is why the tendency towards high sensitivity cannot be even imagined in its totality.2 Information, redundancy and predictability: A totally new set in which information value is at maximum is also inconceivable. Novelty and information appear only in relation to old and known elements. Some degree of redundancy must be found in every set, or else it would be so strange, so alien, so disconnected from experience that it could not even be imagined, let alone experienced.3 Closed set: What would constitute a totally closed set? If we consider this metaphorically and attempt to imagine totally hermetic borders, we fall into the trap of an endless process. A closed set involves the definition of what belongs in the set and what does not. How can such a definition be finalized? How can it take into account every possible element in the universe and define its relevance or irrelevance to a particular set? Attempts to resolve these problems resulted in either including the whole world in each aesthetic set or totally isolating the aesthetic set from its external context. Both cases lead toabsurdities.

If at any given time we cannot imagine any set that would exhibit a higher aesthetic order than the present one, it by no means expresses maximum order but rather optimal order. Summary 1 Aesthetic order is a lawless order. It does not consist of a priori (external) principles; it is an “internal” order. The principle cannot be abstracted from the particular set and applied to another set. The complex of relationships among the elements determines the aesthetic order of the set; in this sense the set and the principle are one. 2 Aesthetic order is characterized by the tendency towards high sensitivity to internal as well as external changes. It is also characterized by a tendency towards high informative value, low predictability and low redundancy. 3 Aesthetic order forms a closed set and one-member class. It depends on defined borders and differentiation between relevant and irrelevant elements; the definition of borders often becomes a matter of interpretation and dispute. 4 The tendencies of aesthetic order, like those of discursive order, cannot reach maximum points. At their extremes, both types of order collapse into states of disorder. Maximum sensitivity, like maximum indifference, is a characteristic of disorder.

According to my theory the two types of order not only have positive interactions but also are mutually dependent . Neither of the types exists independently, nor can one be perceived in the absence of the other. Each order consists of “materials” definable in terms of its alternate order. The strong linkage between the two orders enables the mind to move back and forth without predilection for either discursive or aesthetic order. The focus on one order rather than another in a given context, and accordingly the movement from one order to another is decided by factors of the relevant context and not by a priori disposition. Each of the orders has its indispensable role to play in personal as well as cultural developments. Yet, the movement between the orders is not symmetrical; it is not the same and need not be the same in both directions, since the differences among the two orders are effective. These differences not only correspond to different needs but also evoke and require different mental operations 178. There is, however, an important aspect in which aesthetic order is different from “seeing as.” One may switch back and forth from the rabbit to the duck; it is always the same rabbit and the same duck. In this sense, “seeing as” is like switching between categories

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(discursive orders); they do not affect each other; they remain the same, indifferent to each other and to their changing context. Aesthetic orders “respond” differently. One cannot go back and forth from one aesthetic order to another without affecting the nature of the orders in question. If one finds an object beautiful, and after a while the object becomes banal and boring, one cannot simply decide to erase the present sense of banality and switch back to the previous sense of beauty. One may remember the previous experience, yearn for it and regret its loss, but one cannot simply return to the initial experience. This is a reflection of the sensitivity of aesthetic orders. Past experience shapes the present experience and one cannot return to a previous aesthetic order as if nothing has happened in between. Although we may remember our previous impression, we cannot revive it fully, nor can we see the object exactly as we saw it prior to “discovering” its beauty or for that matter its banality or ugliness. 181 We may switch between theories, categories or norms for the sake of argument without really accepting them. We can learn the “game” of a different theory and “play” it correctly without being convinced in the validity of the theory. However, we do not know an aesthetic order before we actually experience it as such. All we can do is pretend to admire what in fact we find ugly or dull, or pretend to dislike that which we find attractive. We may behave as if we experience beauty, but this is not the same as actually experiencing it. The two orders coexist and complement each other, and they are also mutually dependent. Their mutual dependence is a reflection of the linkage between unity and diversity, between internal and external relations, and between the general and the individual. One is not conceived without the other; each preconditions the other. The debate regarding the genuineness and priority of one over the other is settled here (though not solved) without an inclination to either of the extremes. A set that maintains one type of order exclusively is inconceivable, and since none of the orders can exist exclusively on its own the question of priority dissolves itself. Furthermore, since each type of order preconditions the other type, both orders are equally genuine./ The link between order and disorder is manifested in all aspects of life. We need not go as far as creation myths, thermodynamics or chaos theory in order to realize this link. Wars, accidents, confusions, plans that go wrong and children’s rooms are evidence that orders may collapse; social systems, technology, everyday routines and children’s rooms (again) reassure us that order may occasionally win. Disorder, no less than order, is a vital component of all aspects of life. There is no need to tire the reader with the obvious, or to go into philosophical problems that will take us far from the current central matter. The following therefore focuses solely on aesthetic order and its formation from various types of disorder. This examination draws attention to some typical patterns by which disorder is transformed into aesthetic order 195. A conflict of orders may generate a new aesthetic order. Conflicts among styles and conventions may give birth to new styles; conflicts between ideas may generate new ideas and new concepts. The history of art and the history of philosophy are strewn with such cases. This is not to say that every conflict gives birth to a new aesthetic order: not every war results in a redefinition of borders. Some conflictsare resolved by the retreat of each party back to its original position and the conflict thus becomes a forgotten episode; some conflicts lead to distraction and to the ruin of all parties without any clear beneficial results. A complex of forces within the history of a culture decides the question about which conflict proves fruitful and which remains a forgotten or a disastrous episode. Bohm, D. and Peat, F.D. (1989) Science, Order and Creativity, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Kuntz, P. (ed.) (1968) The Concept of Order, Seattle: University of Washington Press. Prigogine, I. and Stengers, I. (1984) Order Out of Chaos, Toronto: Bantam Books.

The cement of society, Elster 1989 Hume pisał o przyczynowości jako „cement of the univers”. To powoduje porządek we wszechświecie – zdarzenie jednego typu niezaprzeczalnie pojawia się po innym. „co wiąże (glues) społeczeństwo razem i zapobiega przed jego dezintegracją w chaos i wojnę?” nauki społeczne nie mogą być niczym więcej niż social chemistry – indukcyjna generacja bliska zjawiskom. Czas fizyki społecznej może nie nadejść nigdy. Dwie koncepcje SO – stabilne przewidywane wzory zachowań STATYCZNE oraz kooperatywne zachowania DYNAMICZNE SIECIOWE.→2 wizje nie porządku→ brak przewidywalności Makbet „sound and fury, a tale told by an idiot, signifying nothing” oraz brak kooperacji. Ekonomiści o równowadze i stanie Pareto. Szuka nieprzewidywalności w charakterze social action and interaction. To jest wpisane.

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Porządek społecznych

Although the focus of the paper is the psychological aspect of ZHU Xi’s thinking, it will be difficult to avoid

frequent references to his views on li 理 (pattern) and on the distinction between li 理 and qi 氣 (material force). In early Chinese thought, li is used verbally in the sense of ‘‘give order to,’’ and is often related to

another term zhi 治 , which means ‘‘bring order to’’ or ‘‘be in order’’ (Xunzi 5.7a; Hanfeizi 6.6b; Guanzi 10.3b, 16.3a; Huainanzi 21.8a). Li pertains to things as well as to affairs such as orderly or disorderly government (Xunzi 15.9b; Huainanzi 21.3a; Liji 11.15a–b; Zhuangzi 10.14a; Hanfeizi 20.7b). It is also something to be conformed to or followed (Mozi 3/3/15–17; Guanzi 13.8b; Hanfeizi 20.8a; Zhuangzi 10.18a). So, li resides in things and affairs, is the order or pattern of the way things operate, and one should follow li in dealing with things and affairs. The notion of li continued to be developed by later thinkers. For

example, GUO Xiang 郭象 (d. AD 312) regarded li as pertaining to everything and governing its

operations, whereas SHAO Yong 邵雍 (1011–1077) emphasized the idea of responding to things in accordance with their li , putting this in terms of viewing things with things or viewing things with their li (Guo 1965: 1.19a; Shao 1965: 6.26a–b.). ZHU Xi continued to emphasize the notion of li . For him, li

resides in things, and it accounts for the way things are (suo yi ran 所以然 ) as well as the way things should

be (dang ran 當然 ) (Zhu 1986: 414, 863; Zhu 1983–1986b: 2.6a; Zhu 1983–1986a: 2.11a; Zhu 1983–1986c:

9.14b). Following the Cheng brothers, he regarded the nature (xing 性 ) to be constituted by li (Cheng and Cheng 1965c: 22a.11a; Zhu 1986: 92–93, 1387, 2427). Furthermore, because li resides in human beings and constitutes their nature, it takes the form of the Confucian virtues (Zhu 1986: 63–64, 83, 92). So for him, the

nature is identical with li and is originally good, and badness is due to qi 氣 (material force).

SOCIETY AND CULTURE Principles of Scarcity and Solidarity Bryan S. Turner and Chris Rojek,SAGE Publications London 2001. The problem of social order is constitutive of sociology as such. That is, the question concerning the nature of social order is a question which sociological theory cannot ignore. Any sociological statement about social reality must carry with it, whether overtly or covertly, some set of assumptions about the very possibility of social order. The issue may be expressed in various ways, but ultimately this debate is best summarized by the title of a famous essay by Georg Simmel (1971): how is society possible? In short, Parsons argued that any positivistic theory of action, which took instrumental rationality as the only standard of meaningful action, would be incapable of producing a consistent theory of social order. Such utilitarianism could only solve the problem of order by `residual categories' which were ad hoc solutions, incompatible with the rational assumptions of the theory. For Parsons, the `hidden hand' in classical economics was an ad hoc solution of the fundamental sociological problem of social order. Thiscriticism of the classical economic explanation of both rational action and social order provided an abiding attack on marginal utility theory. 68

A sociological theory of social order would have to examine (what Emile Durkheim regarded as) the non-contractual element of contract (that is common values, collective sentiments) which underpins everyday reciprocities and relations. Although Parsons's version of the history of sociological theory has been heavily criticized, it can reasonably be argued (Holton and Turner, 1986; Turner, 1989; Robertson and Turner, 1990; Turner, 1991) that Parsons's defence of sociological explanations of social order is still a coherent alternative to, for example, rational choice explanations of social order (Hechter, 1989; Coleman, 1990). WYJAŚNIENIE MUSI ZAKŁADAĆ PRZYNAJMNIEJ WIEDZĘ O TYM CZYM JEST PORZĄDEK In more detail, a sociology of social order will examine the mixture of consent and constraint which structure these social relationships. 69 Traditional conditions of social order, such as a shared worldview or a common religion or communal propinquity, were undermined by the division of labour, the secularization of religious values, the urbanization of society, and the fragmentation and pluralism of culture (Nisbet, 1966). Few classical sociologists, apart from Simmel, thought that the metropolis, while a threat to conventional values, also offered new possibilities for individuality, creativity and social change. three traditional analytical frameworks which have provided explanations of social order. These perspectives were developed before the classical period of sociology, and they obviously provided, as it were, the background to the evolution of sociological approaches to the explanation of social order. 70 The ®rst approach emphasizes constraint and

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coercion as basic dimensions of society. Societies are held together and social con¯ict is contained by the fact that there are powerful means of constraint, regulation and coercion to subordinate opposition, to regulate dissent and to intimidate the population with the threat of superior force. In general terms, it is the state which has enjoyed this monopoly of violence, which is exercised in the interests of the dominant class or elite. For the sake of argument, we may conveniently regard this tradition as the legacy of Machiavelli's The Prince. Secondly, there is a sociologically more convincing tradition which suggests that social order rests on a common set of agreements or rules or conventions which bind people together into a community. In traditional societies, it is generally thought, following Durkheim, that it was religion which provided this social cement (Turner, 1994c) Thirdly, there is the notion of social reciprocity. There are two versions of this tradition. In the social contract version, rational men (we use this gendered noun deliberately) exchange their individual freedom for public order by giving authority to a third party (the state) to ensure that the conditions of social contract are secure. This social contract provides a framework for competitive relationships in the market place, but ensures a minimal degree of social co-operation because there are de®nite bene®ts to individuals from these collective arrangements. Sociologists, such as Parsons, have understood this traditional approach as a primitive theory of social order. It is a minimal theory of society and social contract theory is not, in its traditional version, especially interesting for sociology, because it lacks an understanding of the symbolic reality of social order. In any case, Hobbesian social contract theory is probably better regarded as a theory of the origins of the state rather than as a theory of social order. It is an in¯uential approach to society and has been partly incorporated into versions of rational choice theory. The second version of reciprocity theory is far more important for the present discussion. This theory suggests that social order emerges as an unintended consequence of the endless process of exchange (of goods, services and symbols) which creates a dense network of in®nite obligations, duties, claims and expectations rather than as an outcome of deliberate rational choice. Social actors are both integrated into, and constrained by, the facticity of the social order as a consequence of social exchange obligations and claims. Because human beings generally cannot satisfy their wants without exchange, the social division of labour creates an endless chain of claims and counter-claims, which hold individuals in a timeless linkage (typically across generations and thus also including the dead) of mutual obligation. In fact society could not survive without the emergence of a sense of intergenerational obligation. When these networks are in some rough balance, we have a condition of justice (as fairness) where these mutual dependencies are reciprocated. Where they are systematically distorted, we have a situation of exploitation. Much work has been done in anthropology on sacri®ce, potlatch and the gift (Mauss, 1954) as forms of reciprocity. We may therefore designate this approach to social order the Maussian legacy. 72 cial, but for the purposes of this chapter it is heuristically useful. Continuing with this formal, metatheoretical approach, the Machiavellian tradition puts the issue of power at the heart of any explanation of social order. Power is the causally most signi®cant factor in sociological orientations to the question of order. By contrast, the Parsonian legacy points to culture as the critical issue in understanding social stability because without a set of shared cultural values, no social order can survive. Finally, employing the term in a rather broad fashion, the Maussian approach offers an economic explanation of social order. In reciprocity or exchange theory, social order (speci®cally the social coherence of social groups) requires a general balance of exchange. Where these conditions are not maintained, individuals feel a sense of relative deprivation and they are unlikely to regard existing arrangements as fair and legitimate; they will be inclined to leave the group (Blau, 1964). This `indigenous' sense of fairness arises out of the in®nite stream of human exchange, and it is here that we should locate the social roots (or `elementary forms' in Durkheim's sense) of the general notion of equality (Turner, 1986). This `primitive' notion of injustice, which emerges when there is felt to be a rough imbalance of ongoing reciprocity, can be regarded as universal (Moore, 1970: 52). Thus, while it may be analytically instructive to consider separately various traditions which emphasize power, culture or economics in the explanation of social order, in practice any speci®c theory will tend to combine all three elements. As a preliminary observation, any general theory of social order must examine the interrelationships of political, cultural and economic components of social cohesion. The connections between these three structures produce the social basis of order.76 / Thus, so-called Parsonian structural functionalism was criticized because it was assumed to be inevitably ideologically conservative (Black, 1971). By asking the question, how is social order possible?, consensus theories neglected two equally signi®cant questions: how is social con¯ict possible and how do societies change? Parsonian sociology, because it appeared to concentrate exclusively on aspects of social order, was regarded as an ideological defence of capitalist society (Gouldner, 1971). This battle between

15

consensus and con¯ict theories preoccupied many (English) sociologists through the 1970s as a debate between the `two sociologies' (Dawe, 1970). The battle lines between these positions have been drawn and redrawn on many occasions, giving rise in recent years, for example, to signi®cant reformulations of functionalism with the rise of neo-functionalism and with various attempts to reconceptualize the central problematic of Parsonian sociology (Robertson and Turner, 1991). 78. The debate between so-called con¯ict theory and Parsonian sociology is no longer productive, and in this chapter we shall simply assume that any debate about social order will automatically include an analysis of the coercive and constraining aspects of social structure, and will seek to understand social change in terms of continuous processes of transformation.

Perhaps the important issue between consensus and con¯ict theories is whether the conditions that produce social order are regarded in positive or negative terms. Con¯ict theory has regarded social order as the consequence of negative constraints, coercive relationships, political force or ideological incorporation. Marxist theory in particular has assumed that, since it is not in the real interests of the working class to support or comply with capitalist relations of exploitation, there have to be special reasons 79 which explain working-class compliance. By contrast, Parsonian consensus theory assumed that social order exists because the rewards of membership are suf®ciently positive for the majority of a society to ®nd the existing system bene®cial and acceptable. The reward of individual conformity to social norms is psychological satisfaction, and hence there is a `double contingency' between social norms and individual rewards in the processes of socialization and internalization (Parsons, 1968). Parsons has been criticized for the fact that deviance occurs merely because there is inadequate or incomplete socialization. In this interpretation of Parsonian sociology, it is assumed that individuals enjoy conformity because deviance is, by de®nition, not socially rewarded (Wrong, 1961).

The ef¯orescence of these ideas in the English speaking world owes much to the interpretations of Talcott Parsons. Writing in the 1930s, Parsons (1937) presented the classical tradition, especially the writings of Durkheim and Weber, as a response to the problem of order set out by Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century. As we have seen, Hobbes argued that the unchecked pursuit of freedom would produce a sociological monstrosity: the famous `war of all against all'. He concluded that social order is only possible if men agree to surrender part of their sel®sh drives to a central authority. Parsons interprets the Hobbesian dilemma as a question of how social co-operation is possible. Since social order depends upon co-operation, the principles of social integration and the normative institutions of coercion are the crux of sociological enquiry. Parsons argues that the answers that Durkheim and Weber gave to these questions are more profound and fruitful than Hobbes's emphasis on self-interest. Above all they recognize 147 that social action is shaped by normative institutions and values which originate from the social structure rather than the logic of self-interest. Hobbes's contract solution to social order misses the place of self-sacri®ce in everyday life, the tendency to spurn one's own interests in favour of the interests of family, religion, occupation or state. For Parsons, the classical tradition corrects this by revealing the roots of individualism and morality in the social structure. His theory of structural functionalism is designed to integrate the needs of society and the individual into a cohesive whole. It follows Durkheim in identifying a managerialist role for sociology in the conduct of everyday life. Parsons himself was employed by the Amercian government to offer advice on postwar reconstruction in Japan. His view of professionalism envisaged the sociologist as playing an active role in policy formation and government. Giddens (1971) launched a famous counter-charge against this in¯uential conservative tradition. He submitted that it is wrong to portray the classical tradition as dominated by the problem of social order. Rather, classical sociology was preoccupied with the question of what is distinctive about capitalism, industrialization and the modern nation state. For example, Durkheim was in¯uenced as much by Kantian idealism as Hobbesian utilitarianism, because he was concerned to elucidate the distinctive character of moral life. He sought to evolve a system of moral individualism that would satisfy French conservative Catholics, landowners and peasants.

The origins of nineteenth-century sociology can be found in a continuous criticism of the individualistic and rationalist assumptions of economics. Our contention is that Talcott Parsons's The Structure of Social Action (1937) closed the classical period of sociology and opened the contemporary debate about action and structure, sentiments and actions, values and meaning. Parsonian sociology was a critique of marginalist economics, because it argued that rational actors in pursuit of their ends would, in a context of scarcity,

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employ fraud and force to satisfy their needs, other things being equal. Such a theory of rational action cannot produce a convincing theory of society, because it cannot explain social order. How do co-operation and solidarity exist if economic rationalism is the only or principal guide to action? Conventional economics arti®cially solved the problem by inventing explanations that could be derived from their basic rationalist assumptions ± such as the hidden hand of history or sentiment. Parsons solved the problem of order by arguing that human beings can engage in economic activity without destroying society, if they share common values and norms. The solution of economic and social order was to be found in culture and institutions, not in the psychology of Economic Man. Social actors are socialized into a common system of values when their social actions are psychologically rewarded. Our study of society and culture can be understood as an attempt to understand the structure of social action from the perspective of a post-Cartesian view of human embodiment and action. This is perhaps a good point both to summarize the argument made so far in this chapter, and to indicate some of the most important implications. From its origins, sociology placed the question of social order at the centre of enquiry. The Comtian equation of `order through progress' accentuated the positive aspects of cultural-scienti®c change

In Parsonian (1951) sociology, social order is presented as a functional prerequisite of society. Parsons argues that order is engendered through the internalization of shared values and norms. The critical and radical rebuttal of structural functionalism dwells on two arguments. First, the Parsonian view of order is ideologically impregnated. Structural functionalism is vitiated for tacitly supporting a particular order of power . Secondly, Parsonian sociology is attacked for failing to suf®ciently recognize that norms and values are under-internalized in society. Strata that are relatively marginalized in society exploit and develop retreatist and 64 oppositional systems of norms and values.

Law and social order, Russell Hardin, Philospohical Issues 2001/11, kreowanie porządku społecznego nazwane „centralnym programem prawa” - kierowany wzajemnymi korzyściami. 62 „jeżeli system prawa skutecznie kreuje porządek społeczny, to musi w dużym stopniu służyć wzajemnym korzyścią” LS służy WK gdy, ex ante, chroni porządek społeczny i szanse na dobrobytu. CZYLI RACIPROCITY w CENTRUM korzyści uspołeczenia. To Hobbes – władza suwerena do gwarantowania porządku. Wierzył że każdy suweren musi być wspierany bez obawy, że wprowadzi reformy przeciw tej regule. Porządek musi być kreowany intencjonalnie i zarządzany. Hume był mądrzejszy – możemy spontanicznie koordynować to, co zabezpiecza stabilność polityczną nawet, gdy nie ma zwierzchniej władzy - tą koordynację nazywał KONWENCJĄ. „konwencjonalne narzędzia”. Wyjaśnienie prawa działającego a faktu istnienia systemu prawnego są czymś innym. Konkretne prawo dobre bo wygenerowane przez system prawa, ten dobry gdy „serves us well”. System prawa jest skuteczny tylko w porównaniu do jego braku. - hobbes musi być słuszny do każdego systemu służącemu porządkowi. Hobbes myślał o tworzeniu działającego porządku społecznego, Austin Bentham działające prawo. Hobbes „wielka wizja skuteczności na poziomie całego społeczeństwa” 64. Wymóg tylko zasady wzajemnej korzyści. Proponuje „dwu stopniową teorię porządku społecznego”. Uzasadnienie prawa musi być dwu stopniowe – 1. WK aby stworzyć rząd i system prawa albo substancjalne zmiany w nich. 2. idziemy za dyktatem państwa i jego systemu prawa. Hobbes dał uzasadnienie ogólne dla systemu prawnego, jego argument nie dotyczy konkretnych praw. Dla Hobbesa trzy przyczyny kłótni: współzawodnictwo, antycypacja ataku, poszukiwanie sławy /by products of evoleved sociality/. Co daje sens indywidualnemu interesowni jest pokój. Pierwszy wymóg: regulacja współzawodnictwa i wymiany. Koordynacja przez suwerena. Teoria tworzenia i podtrzymania rządu. W stanie natury – niezliczone ilości dylematów więźnia a nie ma siły wymuszającej, dobro, zło, sprawiedliwość, brak nie ma na nie miejsca, one są tylko dla człowieka w społeczeństwie. Hume – nie musimy mieć drakońskiego stróża. Spontaniczna koordynacja dla powstania i utrzymania. Dla Hobbesa rząd jest dla WK. SO jest WK – z definicji koordynuje nas. Henry Hart – prawo jest narzędziem pozwalającym jednostką prowadzić satysfakcjonujące życie w zbiorowości. Hobbes 13-15 rozdział – socjologiczne możliwości prawa i porządku. Nie top-down, ale od psychologii jednostki w interakcjach społecznych.

Kulturowa ewolucja ma umożliwić innowację, nowość ale też stabilizację, ograniczenie inwentywności. Palmer 2010 pisze w „Evolutionary Advantages of Noninnovation”. Opinia że to co czyni nas ludźmi to

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innowacje, ciekawość, zmiany. Ale niedostrzegalne „ preserving the patterns of behavior they have copied from their parents or other ancestors—their cultural traditions” - The modification of innovation in culture evolution I am suggesting involves viewing the absence of cultural change as also being the result of an active process instead of merely a passive state that exists when the active processes of change are not taking place. Aktyny proces. JEGO PYTANIA: 1. How can patterns of cultural behavior remain essentially unchanged over many generations? That is, what are the proximate mechanisms preserving cultural traditions? 2. What was the evolutionary advantage, or advantages, of preserving cultural traditions over many generations? 162 ultimative mechanism. The goal of this chapter has been to expand the evolutionary view of culture so that it is seen as not just a powerful force in human behavioral change but also as a powerful force in the preservation of patterns of human behavior. 171 JEDNO WYMAGA DRUGIEGO.

HAYEK, Law, Legislation and Liberty All three volumes: Volume I Rules and Order, 1979 Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd; Intelligent beings may have laws of their own making; but they also have some which they never made. (Montesquieu, De I Esprit des lois, I, p. i)ʹ – dwie wizje porządku społecznego; „pattern of human activities” – instytucje, cele, It produced a renewed propensity to ascribe the origin of all institutions of culture to invention or design. Morals, religion and law, language and writing, money and the market, were thought of as having been deliberately constructed by somebody, or at least as owing whatever perfection they possessed to such design. This intentionalist or pragmatic account of history found its fullest expression in the conception of the formation of society by a social contract, first in Hobbes and then in Rousseau, who in many respects was a direct follower of Descartes VS. The other view, which has slowly and gradually advanced since antiquity but for a time was almost entirely overwhelmed by the more glamorous constructivist view, was that that orderliness of society which greatly increased the effectiveness of individual action was not due solely to institutions and practices which had been invented or designed for that purpose, but was largely due to a process described at first as ʹ growth and later as ʹ ʹ evolution ́ , a process in which practices which had first been adopted for other reasons, or even purely accidentally, were preserved because they enabled the group in which they had arisen to prevail over others. Since its first systematic development in the eighteenth century this view had to struggle not only against the anthropomorphism of primitive thinking but even more against the reinforcement these naive views had received from the new rationalist philosophy. It was indeed the challenge which this philosophy provided that led to the explicit formulation of the evolutionary view. 8 Broni nie przeracjonalizowanej wizji: Many of the institutions of society which are indispensable conditions for the successful pursuit of our conscious aims are in fact the result of customs, habits or practices which have been neither invented nor are observed with any such purpose in view. We live in a society in which we can successfully orientate ourselves, and in which our actions have a good chance of achieving their aims, not only because our fellows are governed by known aims or known connections between means and ends, but because they are also confined by rules whose purpose or origin we often do not know and of whose very existence we are often not aware ZOSAWIC MIEJSCE NIE FAJIA. TYLKO RULES. ALE JA SZEŻEJ TYCH MECHANIZMÓW JEST WIĘCEJ. NORAMTYWNE SĄ ŚWIERZE. Man is as much a rule‐following animal as a purpose‐seeking one. And he is successful not because he knows why he ought to observe the rules which he does observe, or is even capable of stating all these rules in words, but because his thinking and acting are governed by rules which have by a process of selection been evolved in the society in which he lives, and which are thus the product of the experience of generations. Or, to put this differently, our adaptation to our environment does not consist only, and perhaps not even chiefly, in an insight into the relations between cause and effect, but also in our actions being governed by rules adapted to the kind of world in which we live, that is, to circumstances which we are not aware of and which yet determine the pattern of our successful actions. The characteristic error of the constructivist rationalists in this respect is that they tend to base their argument on what has been called the synoptic delusion, that is, on the fiction that all the relevant facts are known to some one mind, and that it is possible to construct from this knowledge of the particulars a desirable social order. The first of these attributes which most rules of conduct originally possessed is that they are observed in action without being known to the acting person in articulated (ʹverbalized ʹ or explicit) form. They will manifest themselves in a regularity of action which can be explicitly described, but this regularity of action is not the result of the acting persons being capable of thus stating them. The second is that such rules come to be observed because in fact they give the group in which they are practised superior strength, and not because this effect is known to those who are guided by them. Although such rules come to

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be generally accepted because their observation produces certain consequences, they are not observed with the intention of producing those consequences‐consequences which the acting person need not know.

The false dichotomy of ʹnatural ʹ and ʹartificial ʹ The discussion of the problems with which we are concerned was long hampered by the universal acceptance of a misleading distinction which was introduced by the ancient Greeks and from whose confusing effect we have not yet wholly freed ourselves. This is the division of phenomena between those which in modern terms are ʹnatural ʹ and those which are ʹartificialʹ. The original Greek terms, which seem to have been introduced by the Sophists of the fifth century B.C., were physei, which means ʹby nature ʹ and, in contrast to it, either noma, best rendered as ʹby conventionʹ, or thesei, which means roughly ʹby deliberate decisionʹ. 18 The use of two terms with somewhat different meanings to express the second part of the division indicates the confusion which has beset the discussion ever since. The distinction intended may be either between objects which existed independently and objects which were the results of human action, or between objects which arose independently of, and objects which arose as the result of, human design. The failure to distinguish between these two meanings led to the situation where one author could argue with regard to a given phenomenon that it was artificial because it was the result of human action, while another might describe the same phenomenon as natural because it was evidently not the result of human design. Not until the eighteenth century did thinkers like Bernard Mandeville and David Hume make it clear that there existed a category of phenomena which, depending on which of the two definitions one adhered to, would fall into either the one or the other of the two categories and therefore ought to be assigned to a distinct third class of phenomena, later described by Adam Ferguson as ʹthe result of human action but not of human designʹ. 19 These were the phenomena which required for their explanation a distinct body of theory and which came to provide the object of the theoretical social sciences.

W drugim wieku naszej ery, Aulus Gellius, łaciński gramatyk przełożył gracki termin physei i thesei jako naturalis i positivus. To źródło dla większości europejskich języków dla określenia dwóch rodzajów prawa. Od 12 wieku naturalis zaczęto włączać to, co nie jest wynikiem inwencji ludzi albo celowego stworzenia (deliberate creation). Później – prawo naturalne przemienione w ʹlaw of reason czyli całkowicieʹ przeciwstawnie niż znaczyło wcześniej. !!!! 21 Afterthe beginnings made by the Scottish philosophers, the systematic development of the evolutionary aprQach to social phenomena took place mainly in Germany through Wilhelm von Humboldt and F. C. von Savigny.In the social sciences it was through Savigny ́ s follower Sir Henry Maine 31 that the evolutionary approach re ‐ entered the English tradition. And in the great survey of 1883 of the methods of the social sciences by thefounder of the Austrian school of economics, Carl Menger, the central position for all social sciences of the problem of the spontaneous formation of institutions and its genetic character was most fully restated on the continent 22 nieporozumienia - The first is the erroneous belief that it is a conception which the social sciences have borrowed from biology. It was in fact the other way round, and if Charles Darwin was able successfully to apply to biology a concept which he had largely learned from the social sciences, this does not make it less important in the field in which it originated. It was in the discussion of such social formations as language and morals, law and money, that in the eighteenth century the twin conceptions of evolution and the spontaneous formation of an order were at last clearly formulated, and provided the intellectual tools which Darwin and his contemporaries were able to apply to biological evolution. TEŻ źle PO PROSTU DUCH CZASÓW. A nineteenth‐century social theorist who needed Darwin to teach him the idea of evolution was not worth his salt. Unfortunately some did, and produced views which under the name of ʹSocial Darwinism ʹ have since been responsible for the distrust with which the concept of evolution has been regarded by social scientists.There are, of course, important differences between the manner in which the process of selection operates in the cultural transmission that leads to the formation of social institutions, and the manner in which it operates in the selection of innate biological characteristics and their transmission by physiological inheritance. The error of ʹSocial Darwinismʹ was that it concentrated on the selection of individuals rather than on that of institutions and practices, and on the selection of innate rather than on culturally transmitted capacities of the individuals. The other great misunderstanding which has led to a discrediting of the theory of social evolution, is the belief that the theory of evolution consists of ʹlaws of evolutionʹ. The theory of evolution proper provides no more than an account of a process the outcome of which will depend on a very large number of particular facts, far too 23 numerous for us to know in their entirety, and therefore does not lead to predictions about the future. We will mention at this point only briefly that the frequent attempts made to use the conception of evolution, not

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merely as an explanation of the rise of rules of conduct, but as the basis of a prescriptive science of ethics, also have no foundation in the legitimate theory of evolution, but belong to those extrapolations of observed tendencies as ʹlaws of evolution ʹ for which there is no justification.It is our concern here, however, only to show that such abuses of the concept of evolution in subjects like anthropology, ethics, and also law, which have discredited it for a time, were based on a misconception of the nature of the theory of evolution; and that, if it is taken in its correct meaning, it still remains true that the complex, spontaneously formed structures with which social theory has to deal, can be understood only as the result of a process of evolution and that, therefore, here ʹthe genetic element is inseparable from the idea of theoretical sciencesʹ. „constructivist fallacy” - intentionalism, artificialism,44 or, as we do here, constructivism

The central concept around which the discussion of this book will turn is that of order, and particularly the distinction between two kinds of order which we will provisionally call ʹmadeʹ and ʹgrownʹ orders. Order is an indispensable concept for the discussion of all complex phenomena, in which it must largely play the role the concept of law plays in the analysis of simpler phenomena. 1 There is no adequate term other than ʹorderʹ by which we can describe it, although ʹsystemʹ, ʹstructure ʹ or ʹpattern ʹ may occasionally serve instead. The term ʹorder ʹ has, of course, a long history in the social sciences, 2 but in recent times it has generally been avoided, largely because of the ambiguity of its meaning and its frequent association with authoritarian views. We cannot do without it, however, and shall have to guard against misinterpretation by sharply defining the general sense in which we shall employ it and then clearly distinguishing between the two different ways in which such order can originate. 34

The distinction of this kind of order from one which has been made by somebody putting the elements of a set in their places or directing their movements is indispensable for any understanding of the processes of society as well as for all social policy. There are several terms available for describing each kind of order. The made order which we have already referred to as an exogenous order or an arrangement may again be described as a construction, an artificial order or, especially where we have to deal with a directed social order, as an organization. The grown order, on the other hand, which we have referred to as a self‐generating or endogenous order, is in English most conveniently described as a spontaneous order. Classical Greek was more fortunate in possessing distinct single words for the two kinds of order, namely taxis for a made order, such as, for example, an order of battle, 8 and kosmos for a grown order, meaning originally ʹa right order in a state or a communityʹ. 9 We shall occasionally avail ourselves of these Greek words as.technical terms to describe the two kinds of order.

By ʹorder ʹ we shall thoughout describe a state of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements of various kinds are so related to each other that we may learn from our acquaintance /znajmość/ with some spatial or temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations concerning the rest, or at least expectations which have a good chance of proving correct. STAN RZECZY JAKIEGOŚ SYSTEMU W KTÓRYM WZAJEMNE RELACJE POMIĘDZY ELEMENTAMI SĄ TAKIE ŻE MOŻEMY NA POSTAWIE WIEDZY O PEWNYCH PRZESTZRENYYCH I CZASOWYCH CZĘŚCI CAŁOŚCI FORMOWAĆ WŁAŚCIWE PRZEWIDYWANIA>3 It is clear that every society must in this sense possess an order and that such an order will often exist without having been deliberately created. As has been said by a distinguished social anthropologist, ʹthat there is some order, consistency and constancy in social life, is obvious. If there were not, none of us would be able to go about our affairs or satisfy our most elementary needs. ʹ 4 Living as members of society and dependent for the satisfaction of most of our needs on various forms of co‐operation with others, we depend for the effective .pursuit of our aims clearly on the correspondence of the expectations concerning the actions of others on which our plans are based with what they will really do. This matching of the intentions and expectations that determine the actions of different individuals is the form in which order manifests itself in social life; and it will be the question of how such an order does come about that will be our immediate concern. The first answer to which our anthropomorphic habits of thought almost inevitably lead us is that it must be due to the design of some thinking mind. 5 And because order has been generally interpreted as such a deliberate arrangement by somebody, the concept has become unpopular among most friends of liberty and has been favoured mainly by authoritarians. According to this interpretation order in society must rest on a relation of command and obedience, or a hierarchical structure of the whole of society in which the will of superiors, and ultimately of some single supreme

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authority, determines what each individual must do. This authoritarian connotation of the concept of order derives, however, entirely from the belief that order can be created only by forces outside the system (or ʹexogenouslyʹ). It does not apply to an equilibrium set up from within 6 (or ʹendogenouslyʹ) such as that which the general theory of the market endeavours to explain. A spontaneous order of this kind has in many respects properties different from those of a made order. 37

Since a spontaneous order results from the individual elements adapting themselves to circumstances which directly affect only some of them, and which in their totality need not be known to anyone, it may extend to circumstances so complex that no mind can comprehend them all. Consequently, the concept becomes particularly important when we turn from mechanical to such ʹmore highly organized ʹ or essentially complexʹ phenomena as we encounter in the realms of life, mind and society. Here we have to deal with ʹgrownʹ structures with a degree of complexity which they have assumed and could assume only because they were produced by spontaneous ordering forces. They in consequence present us with peculiar difficulties in our effort to explain them as well as in any attempt to influence their character. Since we can know at most the rules observed by the elements of various kinds of which the structures are made up, but not all the individual elements and never all the particular circumstances in which each of them is placed, our knowledge will be restricted to the general character of the order which will form itself. And even where, as is true of a society of human beings, we may be in a position to alter at least some of the rules of conduct which the elements obey, we shall thereby be able to influence only the general character and not the detail of the resulting order.

In consequence, the degree of power of control over the extended and more complex order will be much smaller than that which we could exercise over a made order or taxis. There will be many aspects of it over which we will possess no control at all, or which at least we shall not be able to alter without interfering with‐and to that extent impeding‐the forces producing the spontaneous order. Any desire we may have concerning the particular position of individual elements, or the relation between particular individuals or groups, could not be satisfied without upsetting the overall order. The kind of power which in this respect we would possess over a concrete arrangement or taxis we would not have over a spontaneous order where we would know, and be able to influence, only the abstract aspects.

It is important to note here that there are two different respects in which order may be a matter of degree. How well ordered a set of objects or events is depends on how many of the attributes of (or the relations between) the elements we can learn to predict. Different orders may in this respect differ from each other in either or both of two ways: the orderliness may concern only very few relations between the elements, or a great many; and, second, the regularity thus defined may be great in the sense that it will be confirmed by all or nearly all instances, or it may be found to prevail only in a majority of the instances and thus allow us to predict its occurrence only with a certain degree of probability. In the first instance we may predict only a few of the features of the resulting structure, but do so with great confidence; such an order would be limited but may still be perfect. In the second instance we shall be able to predict much more, but with only a fair degree of certainty. The knowledge of the existence of an order will however still be useful even if this order is restricted in either or both these respects; and the reliance on spontaneously ordering forces may be preferable or even indispensable, although the order towards which a system tends will in fact be only more or less imperfectly approached. The market order in particular will regularly secure only a certain probability that the expected relations will prevail, but it is, nevertheless, the only way in which so many activities depending on dispersed knowledge can be effectively integrated into a single order.

We have already indicated that the formation of spontaneous orders is the result of their elements following certain rules in their responses to their immediate environment. The nature of these rules still needs fuller examination, partly because the word ʹrule ʹ is apt to suggest some erroneous ideas, and partly because the rules which determine a spontaneous order differ in important respects from another kind of rules which are needed in regulating an organization or taxis. On the first point, the instances of spontaneous orders which we have given from physics are instructive because they clearly show that the rules which govern the actions of the elements of such spontaneous orders need not be rules which are ʹknown ʹ to these elements; it is sufficient that the elements actually behave in a manner which can be described by such rules. The concept of

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rules as we use it in this context therefore does not imply that such rules exist in articulated (ʹverbalizedʹ) forms, but only that it is possible to discover rules which the actions of the individuals in fact follow. To emphasize this we have occasionally spoken of ʹregularity ʹ rather than of rules, but regularity, of course, means simply that the elements behave according to rules. That rules in this sense exist and operate without being explicitly known to those who obey them applies also to many of the rules which govern the actions of men and thereby determine a spontaneous social order. Man certainly does not know all the rules which guide his actions in the sense that he is able to state them in words. At least in primitive human society, scarcely less than in animal societies, the structure of social life is determined by rules of conduct which manifest themselves only by being in fact observed. Only when individual intellects begin to differ to a significant degree will it become necessary to express these rules in a form in which they can be communicated and explicitly taught, deviant behaviour corrected, and differences of opinion about appropriate behaviour decided. Although man never existed without laws that he obeyed, he did, of course, exist for hundreds of thousands of years without laws he ʹknew ʹ in the sense that he was able to articulate them. 43

The classical instance of rules of the behaviour of the elements which will not produce order comes from the physical sciences: it is the second law of thermodynamics or the law of enthropy, according to which the tendency of the molecules of a gas to move at constant speeds in straight lines produces a state for which the term ʹperfect disorder ʹ has been coined. Similarly, it is evident that in society some perfectly regular behaviour of the individuals could produce only disorder: if the rule were that any individual should try to kill any other he encountered, or flee as soon as he saw another, the result would clearly be the complete impossibility of an order in which the activities of the individuals were based on collaboration with others. Society can thus exist only if by a process of selection rules have evolved which lead individuals to behave in a manner which makes social life possible. It should be remembered that for this purpose selection will operate as between societies of different types, that is, be guided by the properties of their respective orders, but that the properties supporting this order will be properties of the individuals, namely their propensity to obey certain rules of conduct on which the order of action of the group as a whole rests. MOJA PERSPEKTYWA RULES JAKO NARZĘDZIA PORZĄDKU.In other words, the responses of the individuals to the events in their environment need be similar only in certain abstract aspects to ensure that a determinate overall order will result.

The question which is of central importance as much for social theory as for social policy is thus what properties the rules must possess so that the separate actions of the individuals will produce an overall order. Some such rules all individuals of a society will obey because of the similar manner in which their environment rep‐resents itself to their minds. Others they will follow spontaneously because they will be part of their common cultural tradition. But there will be still others which they may have to be made to obey, since, although it would be in the interest of each to disregard them, the overall order on which the success of their actions depends will arise only if these rules are generally followed. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! …. For the resulting order to be beneficial people must also observe some conventional rules, that is, rules which do not simply follow from their desires and their insight into relations of cause and effect, but which are normative and tell them what they ought to or ought not to do. HAY 66 CZEEGO JEST TEN PORZĄDEJ – DZIAŁAń?

We shall later have to consider more fully the precise relation between the various kinds of rules which the people in fact obey and the resulting order of actions. Our main interest will then be those rules which, because we can deliberately alter them, become the chief instrument whereby we can affect the resulting order, namely the rules of law. At the moment our concern must be to make clear that while the rules on which a spontaneous order rests, may also be of spontaneous origin, this need not always be the case. Although undoubtedly an order originally formed itself spontaneously because the individuals followed rules which had not been deliber‐ately made but had arisen spontaneously, people gradually learned to improve those rules; and it is at least conceivable that the formation of a spontaneous order relies entirely on rules that were deliberately made 44 … . .. must therefore be distinguished from the spontaneous origin of the rules on which it rests, and it is possible that an order which would still have to be described as spontaneous rests on rules which are entirely the result of deliberate design. In the kind of society with which we are familiar, of

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course, only some of the rules which people in fact observe, namely some of the rules of law (but never all, even of these) will be the product of deliberate design, while most of the rules of morals and custom will be spontaneous growths. That even an order which rests on made rules may be spontaneous in character is shown by the fact that its particular manifestation will always depend on many circumstances which the designer of these rules did not and could not know. The particular content of the order will depend on the concrete circumstances known only to the individuals who obey the rules and apply them to facts known only to them. It will be through the knowledge of these individuals both of the rules and of the particular facts that both will determine the resulting order.

In any group of men of more than the smallest size, collaboration will always rest both on spontaneous order as well as on deliberate organization. There is no doubt that for many limited tasks organization is the most powerful method of effective co‐ordination because it enables us to adapt the resulting order much more fully to our wishes, while where, because of the complexity of the circumstances to be taken into account, we must rely on the forces making for a spontaneous order, our power over the particular contents of this order is necessarily restricted.

One of our chief contentions will be that, though spontaneous order and organization will always coexist, it is still not possible to mix these two principles of order in any manner we like. If this is not more generally understood it is due to the fact that for the determination of both kinds of order we have to rely on rules, and that the important differences between the kinds of rules which the two different kinds of order require are generally not recognized.

To some extent every organization must rely also on rules and not only on specific commands. The reason here is the same as that which makes it necessary for a spontaneous order to rely solely on determination of the ends to be pursued by particular commands, the bare abstract rule would not be sufficient to tell each individual what he must do.

In the terms we have adopted this means that the general rules of law that a spontaneous order rests on aim at an abstract order, the particular or concrete content of which is not known or foreseen by anyone; while the commands as well as the rules which govern an organization serve particular results aimed at by those who are in command of the organization. The more complex the order aimed at, the greater will be that part of the separate actions which will have to be determined by circumstances not known to those who direct the whole, and the more dependent control will be on rules rather than on specific commands. In the most complex types of organizations, indeed, little more than the assignment of particular functions and the general aim will be determined by command of the supreme authority, while the performance of these functions will be regulated only by rules‐yet by rules which at leastto some degree are specific to the functions assigned to particular persons. Only when we pass from the biggest kind of organization, government, which as organization must still be dedicated to a circumscribed and determined set of specific purposes, to the overall order of the whole of society, do we find an order which relies solely on rules and is entirely spontaneous in character. The fact is, rather, that we can preserve an order of such complexity not by the method of directing the members, but only indirectly by en forcing and improving the rules conducive to the formation of a spontaneous order. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century the terms ʹorganism ʹ and ʹorganization ʹ have been frequently used to contrast the two types of order. As we have found it advisable to avoid the former term and to adopt the latter in a specific sense, some comments on their history may be appropriate. It was natural that the organismal analogy should have been used since ancient times to describe the spontaneous order of society, since organisms were the only kinds of spontaneous order with which everybody was familiar. Organisms are indeed a kind of spontaneous order and as such show many of the characteristics of other spontaneous orders. It was therefore tempting to borrow such terms as ʹgrowthʹ, ʹadaptationʹ, and ʹfunction ʹ from them. They are, however, spontaneous orders of a very special kind, possessing also properties which by no means necessarily belong to all spontaneous orders; the analogy in consequence soon becomes more misleading than helpful. They are, in consequence, in the terms we have used, orders of a more concrete kind than the spontaneous orders of society, which may be preserved although the total number of elements changes and the individual elements change their places. This relatively concrete character of the order of organisms shows itself in the fact that their existence as distinct

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wholes can be per‐ceived intuitively by the senses, while the abstract spontaneous order of social structures usually can only be reconstructed by the mind.The interpretation of society as an organism has almost invariably been used in support of hierarchic and authoritarian views to which the more general conception of the spontaneous order gives no support. Indeed, since Menenius Agrippa, on the occasion of the first secession of the Roman plebs, used the organismal metaphor to justify the privileges of a particular group, it must have been used innumerable times for similar purposes. The suggestion of fixed places assigned to particular elements according to their distinct ʹfunctionsʹ, and the much more concrete determination of the biological structures as compared with the abstract character of the spontaneous structures of society, have indeed made the organismal conception of very questionable value for social theory. It has been abused even more than the term ʹorder ʹ itself when interpreted as a made order or taxis, and has frequently been used to defend a hierarchical order, the necessity of ʹdegreeʹ, the relation of command and obedience, or the preservation of established positions of particular individuals, and for this reason has rightly become suspect. The term ʹorganizationʹ, on the other hand, which in the nineteenth century was frequently used in contrast to ʹorganism ʹ to express the distinction we have discussed, 19 and which we shall retain to describe a made order or taxis, is of comparatively recent origin. It seems to have come into general use at the time of the French Revolution, with reference to which Kant once observed that ʹin a recently undertaken reconstruction of a great people into a great state the word organization has been frequently and appropriately used for the institution of the magistracies and even the whole state. ʹ 20 The word became characteristic of the spirit of the Napoleonic period 21 and became the central conception in the plans for the ʹreconstruction of society ʹ of the chief founders of modern socialism, the Saint Simonians, and of Auguste Comte.22 Until the term ʹsocialism ʹ came into general, use ʹthe organization of society as a whole ʹ was in fact the accepted way of referring to inseparable 11 and those to whom the two were irreconcilable. We find one great tradition extending from the ancient Greeks and Cicero 12 through the Middle Ages 13 to the classical liberals like John Locke, David Hume, Immanuel Kant14 and the Scottish moral philosophers, down to various American statesmen 15 of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for whom law and liberty could not exist apart from each other; while to Thomas Hobbes, Jeremy Bentham16 and many French thinkers1? and the modern legal positivists law of necessity means an encroachment on freedom. This apparent conflict between long lines of great thinkers does not mean that they arrived at opposite conclusions, but merely that they were using the word ʹlaw ʹ in different senses. The thesis of this book is that a condition of liberty in which all are allowed to use their knowledge for their purposes, restrained only by rules of just conduct of universal application, is likely to produce for them the best conditions for achieving their aims; and that such a system is likely to be achieved and maintained only if all authority, including that of the majority of the people, is limited in the exercise of coercive power by general principles to which the community has committed itself. Individual freedom, wherever it has existed, has been largely the product of a prevailing respect for such principles which, however, have never been fully articu‐lated in constitutional documents.With respect to policy, the methodological insight that in the case 62 of complex spontaneous orders we will never be able to determine more than the general principles on which they operate or to predict the particular changes that any event in the environment will bring about, has far‐reaching consequences. It means that where we rely on spontaneous ordering forces we shall often not be able to foresee the particular changes by which the necessary adaptation to altered external circumstances will be brought about, and sometimes perhaps not even be able to conceive in what manner the restoration of a disturbed ʹequilibriJm ʹ or ʹbalance ʹ can be accomplished. This ignorance of how the mechanism of the spontaneous order will solve such a ʹproblem ʹ which we know must be solved somehow if the overall order is not to disintegrate, often produces a panic‐like alarm and the demand for government action for the restoration of the disturbed balance. The chief instrument of deliberate change in modern society is legislation. But however carefully we may think out beforehand every single act of law ‐ making, we are never free to redesign completely the legal system as a whole, or to remake it out of the whole cloth according to a coherent design. Law ‐ making is necessarily a continuous process in which every step produces hitherto unforeseen consequences for what we can or must do next. The parts of a legal system are not so much adjusted to each other according to a comprehensive overall view, as gradually adapted to each other by the successive application of general principles to particular problems ‐ principles, that is, which are often not even explicitly known but merely implicit in the particular measures that are taken. For those who imagine it possible to arrange deliberately all the particular activities of a Great Society according to a coherent plan, it should indeed be a sobering reflection that this has not proved possible even for such a part of the whole as the system of law. Few facts show more clearly _ow prevailing conceptions will bring about

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a continuous change, producing measures that in the beginning nobody had desired or foreseen but which appear inevitable in due course, than the process of the change of law. Every single step in this process is determined by problems that arise when the principles laid down by (or implicit in) earlier decisions are applied to circumstances which were then not foreseen. There is nothing specially mysterious about these ʹinner dynamics of the 65 law ʹ which produce change not willed as a whole by anybody. We shall later see that the whole conception of legal positivism which derives all law from the will of a legislator is a product of the intentionalist fallacy characteristic of constructivism, a relapse into those design theories of human institutions which stand in irreconcilable conflict with all we know about the evolution of law and most other human institutions. In the field of law, indeed, these young disciplines go far to confirm the evolutionary teaching of Edward Coke, Matthew Hale, David Hume and Edmund Burke, F. C. von Savigny, H. S. Maine and J. C. Carter, and are wholly contrary to the rationalist constructivism of Francis Bacon or Thomas Hobbes, Jeremy Bentham or John Austin, or of the German positivists from Paul Laband to Hans Kelsen.

The lessons of ethology and cultural anthropology The chief points on which the comparative study of behaviour has thrown such important light on the evolution of law are, first, that it has made clear that individuals had learned to observe (and enforce) rules of conduct long before such rules could be expressed in words; and second, that these rules had evolved because they led to the formation of an order of the activities of the group as a whole which, although they are the results of the regularities of the actions of the individuals, must be clearly distinguished from them, since it is the efficiency of the resulting order of actions which will determine whether groups whose members observe certain rules of conduct will prevail. 6 In view of the fact that man became man and developed reason and language while living for something like a million years in groups held together by common rules of conduct, and that one of the.first uses of reason and language must have been to teach and enforce these established rules, it will be useful first to consider the evolution of rules which were merely in fact obeyed, before we turn to the problem of their gradual articulation in words. Social orders resting on most complex systems of such rules of conduct weʹfind even among animals very low on the evolutionary scale. For our present purposes it does not matter that on these lower evolutionary levels the rules are probably mostly innate (or transmitted genetically) and few learned (or transmitted ʹculturallyʹ). It is now well established that among the higher vertebrates learning plays an important role in transmitting such rules, so that new rules may rapidly spread among large groups and, in the case of isolated groups, produce distinct ʹcultural ʹ traditions.7 There is little question, on the other hand, that man is also still guided not only by learned but by some innate rules. We are here chiefly interested in the learned rules and the manner of their transmission but in considering the problem of the interrelation of rules of conduct and the resulting overall order of actions, it does not matter with which kind of rules we have to deal, or whether, as will usually be the case, both kinds of rules interact. The study of comparative behaviour has shown that in many animal societies the process of selective evolution has produced highly ritualized forms of behaviour governed by rules of conduct which have the effect of reducing violence and other wasteful methods of adaptation and thus secure an order of peace. This order is often based on the delimitation of territorial ranges or ʹpropertyʹ, which serves not only to eliminate unnecessary fighting but even substitutes ʹpreventive ʹ for ʹrepressive ʹ checks on the growth of population, for example, through the male who has not established a territory being unable to mate and breed. Frequently we find complex orders of rank which secure that only the strongest males will propagate. Nobody who has studied the literature on animal societies will regard it as only a metaphorical expression when for instance one author speaks of ʹthe elaborate system of property tenure ʹ of crayfish and the ceremonial displays through which it is maintained, 8 or when another concludes a description of the rivalry between robins by saying that ʹvictory does not go to the strong but to the righteous‐the righteous of course being the owners of propertyʹ. 9We cannot give here more than these few examples of the fascinating worlds which through these studies are gradually revealed to US,10 but must turn to the problems that arise as man, living in such groups governed by a multiplicity of rules, gradually develops reason and language and uses them to teach and enforce the rules. At this stage it is sufficient to see that rules did exist, served a function essential to the preservation of the group, and were effectively transmitted and enforced, although they had never been ʹinventedʹ, expressed in words, or possessed a ʹpurpose ʹ known to anyone. Rule in this context means simply a propensity or disposition to act or not to act in a certain manner, which will manifest itself in what we call a practice 11 or custom. As such it will be one of the determinants of action which, however, need not show itself in every single action but may only prevail in most instances. Any such rule will always operate in combination and

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often in competition with other rules or dispositions and with particular impulses; and whether a rule will prevail in a particular case will depend on the strength of the propensity it describes and of the other dispositions or impulses operating at the same time. The conflict which will often arise between immediate desires and the built‐in rules or inhibitions is well attested by the observation of animals

An Essay on Two Conceptions of Social Order Constitutive Orders of Action, Objects and Identities vs Aggregated Orders of Individual Action, ANNE WARFIELD RAWLS

In the AG case, social order comes after individual action, and can only be measured as patterns of action – usually statistical – which is doubly seductive since it appeals to the current almost mystical belief that numbers are more scientific than words. The other approach assumes that constitutive orders are pervasive and important and consequently that the two sociologies have entirely different social phenomena in view. This second approach takes the position that constitutive rules, or expectancies, precede and define domains of action, and sets out to docu ment them in detail. This argument with regard to constitutive rules roughly characterizes the work of Harold Garfinkel, Erving Goffman, Harvey Sacks and those working in the domains they carved out – ethnomethodology (EM), the study of interaction orders (IO), and conversation analysis (CA). As in the case of moral philosophy, taking the first, summary rule, or AG, view of social order elevates considerations of individual choice and motivation to a position of undeserved prominence, while it also has the tendency to hide constitutive orders (CO) from view. 503 The idea behind the constitutive order approach is that in order to live in a mutually intelligible world as social beings, with mutually intelligible social identi ties, reasons and purposes, people must be guided by some set of rules, expecta tions or preferred orders of action at a basic level. In other words, there must be something like what Rousseau called a social contract, at least with regard to constitutive practices. If we want to subscribe to the idea of a crisis in soci ology, then I suggest that the crisis consists in large part of limitations in the way we have conceived of social orderHowever, if the sociality that invests human life with meaning is situated, constitutive and ordered, then there is a center for the production of both agency and meaning from which any number of assaults on the ‘power’ structure could be launched if one so desired. On this view, the alleged ‘failure’ of nation states, or unified social systems, is not a crisis, or at least not the crisis for the moral and rational being of humans that many believe it is. We make ourselves and our rationality in contexts of constitutive situated orders, not societal orders – and if Durkheim is right, we have done so ever since the advent of modern com munication and exchange made the world a much smaller place, making it impossible to maintain the sort of social distance necessary for old-style social orders to maintain themselves. Culturally, this would mean that people do not need to know their entire ‘cultural order’ and its formal logics to cope with everyday life; it is emergent, and so people do not need to be enculturated – they only need to be enskilled to act in everyday situations (Ingold 2000). However, the idea of emergence is not new to anthropology or the social sciences more generally. In the social sciences, Durkheim has perhaps been most influential in promoting this idea. In the second edition of The Rules of Sociological Method (1901) he wrote: ‘Whenever certain elements combine and thereby produce, by the fact of their combination, new phenomena, it is plain that these new phenomena reside not in their original elements but in the totality formed by their union’ (1964[1901]: xlvii–xlviii). He concludes by stating the most basic principle of complex dynamic systems: ‘These new phenomena cannot be reduced to their elements’ (1964[1901]: xlviii). We can appreciate the weakness of the distinction between rational constructivism and spontaneous order through a simple thought experiment.^ Suppose a new college is being planned, and the architects must decide where to pul the .sidewalks for students to use when they cross the ciuad from one class to another, (^n the one hand., the architect might simply lay out the sidewalks and pour the concrete in the places he takes to be the best walking paths. He might e\'cn design the walkw^ays to deviate slightly from the most efficient routes between the buildings in an attempt to manipulate students into keeping ofTthe grass. In such a case., the architect would be a rational constructivist., dictating the terms on which students conduct their lives. On the other hand, an architect reared on Hayekian principles would wait a year before pouring the concrete., to observe htiw^ the students actualh' do cross the quad. They would trample down the grass—producing a spontaneous order—.md he could then pour the concrete where they actually walk. The Hayekian architect would better suit the needs of actual individuals. The problem i.s that life is dynauiic: classrooms are reassigned, and students change their walking patterns.

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