MSSICrit Prepare H e p o r t enc Beccmend!ttior?s c?. O r g m i z c t i c n , Equipment and T m t i c a l E m p l o y m n t o r thc Armored Division.

Thr General Board W R S es t ab l i shed by General Orde r s 128 , Headquartera, E U O ~ C ~ I IThenter o f Opernzions, US Army, da t ed 1 7 June 1945, 8s amcnded by Gbceral Orders 182, d a t d 7 A'Jgust1945 and General Orders 312, d a t t d 20 November 1945, H s e -quar te rs United S t a t e s Forces, European Theater , t c p r c p e r e a f a c t u a l ana lye i s of tt,e s t r a t egy , toc-;ics, and ndmin r s f r a t i c n employed by t h e United States Forces ix the n,*rocuur. T h e ? . t e r .

TABLc OF COXTENTS

SUBJiCT

Chopter 1. Geceral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

"%ptbr 2 . Mission Assigned t o Armored Divisions i n t h e Eurgpean Theater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Chapter 3 . Actual Combet Forra t ions o f k raored Div i s ions in t h 6 EuropEan h e a t e r . . . . . . . . . . . . ?

Chapter 4. B i s t o r i c a l Zxamplss o f t h e Employment o f .Irmorcd Formntlons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Chapter 5 , Opini3ns oi'..veilable Commonders of Armor , . . 22

Chapter 6, Conclusions cnd kecorqendet ions . . . . . . . . 24

kppcndices :

1. Typict?l Taction1 Formations of the Armored D i v i s i o n s , Eurupeen Theater.

2 . Typicel Tac t i ca l F o r m t i o r , o f Light iirmorod D i v i s i o n .

3. Typical T a c t i c a l Formation of Raavy Armored Divisior. .

4, Char t of' Opinions, S e n i o r O f f i c e r s ,

5 . Opinions of Junior Combat O f f i c e r s .

6. Conference Conducted 7 Novcmhsr 1945.

7 . Chcrt o f Proposed hrnored Div is ion .

8. Chezts o f Proposed Company, Troop and Battery Orgnn izn t ions .

9 . Chcrt o f Possible T m t i c a ? Formation o f Froposad Armored DiPis ion.

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TIiE GLICKAL EOARD UNITED SUTES FORCES, EUROPIIXN THEAT'r;R

A!% 408

REPORT ON Thb OHG4WIWTION OF T h AliivERG3 3 N I S I O N

Prepared by:

B r i g Gen J. A . Hol ly , 012360, C h i e f , Armored Sectior.. Col J. A . Smith, 010220, FA ( A r n d ) Col 3. L. IIowze, 016055, Cav (Armd) Col Wal te r Burns ide , 015208, Cav (Armd) C o l J. C . Welborr,, 018863, Inf (Armd) Col A . E. H a r r i s , 018121, Cav (Armd) L t Col E. C . Crth, Jr. , 01.9663, In? (-4rmd)

p r inc ipa l consu l t an t s :

Col E. T. Owen, 015468, F i e l d A r t i l l e r y S e c t i o n . Col E. J. S a i l e y , 016174, A n t i s i r c r a f t A r t i l l e r y S e c t i o n . Col T. A . Broom, 018246, & a r t e m a s t e r S e c t i o n . C o l R. W , Jenna, 019564, 41 Xrmd I n f Regt. C o l W, E. Wilk inson , 020529, Medical Sec t ion . Col Ii. A . Mcrris, 020141, Engineer Sect ior . . ' Col I?. G. S t i l l w e l l , 021065, G - j S e c t i o n , Lt Go; R. T. Nolson, 017300, Signal Sec t ion . L t Cc? J. 3. Bouth, 0328240, 183 F i e l d A r t i l l e r y . Lt Cci E. 3 . Bevan, 0441090, 0rdr.ance S e c t i o n Capt 2. R. Duddy, 01285723, Provos t Marshal S e c t i o n .

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‘I” GLNLXL B3A.W UNITED S’PATaS FORCES, bUkOPEkN TE&T?’E;B

AFD 408

CRGkNIZbTION, EQUIFIM.JT A N D TACTICAL &ULOYh!!NT

OF THd hiQ3R3D DIVISION

GEN3RAL

1, purpose. The purpose o f t h i s s x d y i s t o p r e s e n t : m c t u r e of t h e i n z e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n o f armored

d i v i s i o n s as t h e y a c t u a l l y f o u g h t i n t h e European Thea te r , w i t h a d i scuss ion of t h e i r v a r i o u s t a c t i c a l grouping.

b . A d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e va r ious recommendations s o l i c i t e d from the commanders who f o u g h t t h i s e r e o r .

C. The conc lus ions and reconmendations of The Geae ra l Board, United S t a t e s Forces , Zuropean Thea te r , f o r t h e 3 r g & n i z a t i o n , equipment End t a c t i c a l employrrient of t h e armored d i v i s i o n .

2. Scope,-a. Chapter 2 i s a comparison o f mi s s ions a s s igned armor

i n the European Theater w i th t h o s e preaor -bed by F i e l d S e r v i c e Regula t ions .

b , Chapter 3 ‘ c o n t a i n s t h e t y p i o a l fo rma t ions u t i l i z e d i n combat, and 0- d i s c u s s i o n :hereof. Two a rnored d i v i s i o n s which opa r - a t e d i n t h e Europear. Thea ter ( t h e 2d and 3 d ) were organlzod accord ing t o Table o f O r g ~ n i z a t i o n Number 17 , d a t e d 1 March 1942, and a r e r e -f e r r e d t o ss ”heavy d i v i s i o n s ” . The r e m i n i n g 13 a rnored d i v i s i o n s were organized acco rd ing t o Tablc of Organ iza t ion Number 17, d a t e d 12 February 1944, and are r e f e r r e d t o R S “ l i g h t d i v i s i o n s “ . Char to showing t h e t y p i c a l combat fo rma t ions o f t h e v a r i o u s a r n o r e d d i v i s i o n s ( sxcept t h e 2 0 t h ) a r e a t t a c h e d as Appendix 1. hppexdioes 2 and 3 show the typicti1 t a c t i c a l fo rma t ions o f Iht two types o f d i v i s i o n s .

c 1 Chapter 4 s o n t a i n s h i s t o r i c c ? examples o f now t h e s m a l l e r t y p i c a l format ions were empiojiud i n combat.

d . Chapter 5 c o n t a i n s a synops is of t h e op in ions of s e n i o r commanders o f t h e armored f o r m a t i o n s which ope ra t ed i n t h e Ecropean Theater. Thess op in ions were ob ta ined th rough t h e medium o f ques t ion -na i r e s . $. cha . r t showing t h e s e o p i r i o n s i s a t t u o h e d marked Appendix 4 .

e . Chaprer 6 c o n t a i n s :he conc lus ions o f The Genera l Board, United S t n t e s T c r c e s , European Theater , and i t s recommendations f o r thE c rgun iza t lon , equipment a n j t a c t i c a l employment o f t h e a r n o r a d d i v i s ion .

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3, On t t c f o u r t h day following t h e i n i t i a l i n v a s i o n of' i~GXN.NLlY, the beazhhead w e 6 s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e t o provide assenbly a r e e s f o r en armored d i v i s i o n .

On t h i s day t h e 2 Armored D i v i s i o n landed on ' J teh bench. It was fol lowed c l o s e l y by t h e 3 , 4 , 5, and 6 nrmored D i v i s i o n s , and l a t e r by t e n addi:ional d i v i s i o n s , t h o l n s t in oti r ly 1945. Of t h e s e the 2 Armored D i v i s i o n was t h e o n l y one vihict had previous Gcmbat experience.

On 27 July, 1944 il breakthrough was made by i n f m t r y d i v i s i o n s 6 t ST 3, find t h c armor '*as ordhred through tne gap c r e n t e d .

Then fo l lowed t h e d a s h across F'WirJCL and E ~ L G i ~ ~ li n which American armor surpassed t h e Germens i n " b l i t z " werfnre , a l t h o u g h t h e l a t t e r had o r i g i n a t e d :he method. Undor courageous, f a r s i g h t e d leo.der-s h i p , t h e armored d i v i s i o n s were p r o p e r l y employed, a c c o r d i n g zo the p r i n c i p l e s l a r d down i n F i e l d S e r v i c e R e g u l a t i o n s . Tha overwhelrr.ing success proved That t h e p r i n i c i p l e s wzre s0w.d.

?his excel len: l e a d e r s h i p and s o u n d s n p l o p e n t oont inuer i , shrcugh the S i e g f r i e d Line, d u r i n g the b i t t e r f i g h t i n g i n t h e f . R E . d W d , t o the RHINZ Bnd on. into &.e vary h e a r t o f Gerrr.any, where t h e w r f s end f0ur.a t h e armor spearheading a l l advances.

4. Numerous examples i l l u s t r a . t i n g t h e assignment o f p r o p e r missions ' to armor and tk ie i r s u c c e s s f u l accomplishment may ba f o u n d i n the h i s t o r i c e l reoords of t h e European Theater . I n t h e f o l l o w i n g paragraphs, t h e miss ions c f Eirrcor, a s p r b s c r i b o d by F i e l d S e r v i c e Reg-u l a t i o n s , a r e e x t r a c t e d end i l l u s t r a t i o n s a r e ' b r i e f l y c i t e d . T h e s e i l l u s t r a t i o n s wer:: s e l e c t e d a s t y p i c a l . M0r.y moro a r e r e c o r d e d .

a . The pr imary r o l e of t h e krnorbd 3 i v i s i o n i 8 "OFFLE'NSIE OPfikAAT1ONS IN HOSTILE REGR A W i S , "

(1) Following the ST LO breakthrough t h e 2 , 3, 4 , 5, 6, and 7 Armored D i v i s i o n s Ferformed this m i s s i o n .

(2) F o l l w i n g t h e c r o s s i n g of the RHINa R T J 4 a l l i r r t o r e d Civisions were employed z f f e n s i v e i y bahind th6 German l i n e s .

b. "BWiXTHi?DUGE i - N dYEIdY ?i?OTTEC:'IVE; SCREhN k.NC ESGBLJSH U R L Y CCM"h~>'T r + L T S XOSTILE FDRCES."

On 7 March 1945 t h e 9 Armorcd D i v i s i o n s e i z c d t h e Ii.@AGEN BRIDG&, broke t h r o u g h t h e German s c r e e n on t h e e a s t bank of the I.JiiZ;h k1Wk and by 9 March 1945 e s t a b l i s h e d c o n t a c t w i t h t h e Germen m o b i l e r e s e r v e s which had been s e t up f o r t h e defense o f :he KIIWE.

O n i A p r i l 1945 the 3 Armorsd DiTnslon, f o l l o w i n g Q Jua-

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oeesfu l d r i v e from t h e F~~;:G.GLNbridgehsnd, c a p t u r e d PADaREORr;. This was e s s e n t i a l f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t cf c o n t a c t w i t h t h e Nin th U.S. ;.rmy whioh had been o p e r a t i n g t o t h e North.

d. "Mti~ ldTHh INITLTIVh EY hELNSOF SURFRISL ~.I.TJ.C%."

On 1 JEnuary 1945 xrhe 6 !,rmored D i v i s i c n a t t a c k e d n o r t h - e a s t of E'.S.SMGNG t o t h e v i c i n i t y MiGhhET. This was t h e f i r s t a s t i c n of a genera l o f f e n s i v e r e s u l t i n g in t h e :eduction o f t h e 1 IiDbidXbb s e l l e n = .

e. ''RXSWKE W Ih'iFbTUS OF I.;< ;TU.CK Ti T tU.S LObP VOMXNTUIU1."

The F i r s t Army 3 f f e n s i v e which began on 16 November(1) 1944 had come t o a s t a n d s t i l l n o r t h e a s t o f t h e RURTGEN FOK8:ST i n e a r l y Cecembor. On 10 December one combat commwd o f t h e 3 Armored D i v i s i o n l8unched a n atteck f rom Li;NG~RWHE, G d w L N Y , between t h e 9 nnr! 104 U.S. I n f a n t r y D i v i a i o r , ~ . This r e s t o r e d i m p e t u s t 3 t h e t t m c k and r e s u l t e d i n tk capture o f t h c west bank o f t h e 2UKR F.i'Jc,k i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f DKiW, G 6 2 i & N Y .

( 2 ) Lftcr c r o s s i n g t h e !vURX HIVhR on 3 October 1964 the a t t a c k o f ?he 30 I n f a n t r y D i v i s i c n wasebaggud down west o f UBICh, Gdi??:~iY. L. combat commend of The 2 1,rmored C i v i s i o n attackc-d t h r o q h t h o 30 I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n and s e i z e d U L C h . This allourad t h e 30 In-f a n t r y D i v i s i o n .to rkorganize end continue i t s a tp i ck .

f , t ' ; ~ d : ~ ~ ~ l ~& i i v b r &cqEhY Il\!Cb?&b.TLi,y P m -?RL J..TDICR B&hD FOT. DEFfiXSb."

On 16 March 1945 t h e 4 Lrr.orad D i v i s i c n pnssed Through t h e gap c r e a t e d by t h e 90 I n f a n t r y Div is ion End spearherded t h e a t t a c k o f t h e Third U.S. i.rmy i n t h e r e d u c t i o n of 'th6 PiAL.llru:'l%. This d i v i s i o n t r c v c l e d 48 m i l t s i n 52 h9urs through s c s t t e r a d r o s i s t o n c t .

g. "iT X C K OIL' I I;;LhOUi SROWT 1 & I d S T ! P&Pi.R>D FCSITlON."

On 2G Februcry 1945 the 6A.rnored D i v i s i o n c t t a c k o d OB 8.

4000 yd f r o n t , krcached t h o S i c g f r i c d Linc i n th6 v i c i n i t y IUSBURG, Gaklvv W'i and by 2 4 F'ebrunry 1945 htid p e n e t r a m d 20 miles i n t o t h e Gerrnan was t~1 -nd c f t n s e s ,

h. t'bRd.Il !€IROUGh O U il \(ID& FhuNT I ti: ins?'A 33iVOL.LIZkD oihijiy. I'

On 5 nfurch 1,945 t h e 11 Armored D i v i s i o n , o s c r i t i n g t o the l e f t recr of t h e 4 , l rncred Division, 'broks Through :he renr.&nts of The German dofanscs n o r t i e c . s t of LUUYIEOURG on o f r o n t c f a p p r o x i m a t e l y 10 miles and by 9 March hed rcuched t h e wes t bonk c f the X1IU i i I V k , k i n the v i c i n i t y of I.ND~;R&.CI.~.

i. ''d)JLLllT 1; SUCchSs."

(1) On 27 Ju ly 1944, t h e Carmen defenses h d been breached u t ST LO, FFu.liCE by t h o I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n s . The 2 , 3 , 4, 5 cr.d 6 Armored D i v i s i o n s , on F u r e i y o x l l o i t a t i o n miss ions , r o l l e d through n o r t h e r n FRkNCh and YL;GIU?II u n t i l s topped by the Gcrmm defenses i n the S i e g f r i e d Linc ir, tto middle o f Ses to r i se r .

( 2 ) In March mid i . p r i l , 1945, fo l lowing t h e c r o s s i n g o f

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t h e RHI.' XIVart, 311 Lrmored d i v i s i o n s were a-nployed t o exp l . s r t ttiis S U C G B B S .

J . "PURSUE 1. DAFwTED nI:EalY."

I n t k e e x p l o i t o t i o n f o l l o w n g t h e ST LC b r t u k t h r o u g h mcntioned ubove, t h e German f o r c e s vi6i-t r e t r e & . t l n g t a t h s S i e g f r i e d Line, L l l armored divisions t h e n on t h c c o n t i n e n t were i n p u r s u i t .

k. "FdFOMi STBiTbGIC hKVuLQPMhNT."

After brenk ing o u t of t h e UW.GsiU br idgchcad , ivhlch wc.s &ccompl. i shed by 26 March 1945, t h e 3 , 7 , and y Armored Di - r i s ions s p e a r -hended t h e odvsnci: of t h e i n f n n t r y d i v i s i o n s of tho F i r s t U.S. Army b o s t t o t h e DILL KI'$hk. On 28 March they tu rned n o r t h kind : .dvmctd t o t h c i r i c i n i t y o f Pi.Dr:RW)RN. 'The 2 i-nnored Divislon as a p c r t of t h e Ninth U.S. Lrmy made c o n t a c t w i t h t h e F i r s t t.rr.y ~ , t ThisLIPFSLDT. oompletsd tic Envelopment a f t h e HUHR pockat nnc r e s u l t e d i n the c u p -t u r e of 370,000 GCrmFa t r o o p s -

1. "I.TTi CX 10 DESTWY dNd~iY AXh42RLD UC31TS .?NEN FOFtChD TO W SO lib IL W.STBFC OF SELF~.~Pk!SiRVAT13NOFC (JH;H~NIDSTILE Tz,NKS T W U L T ~ N SaEIOUSLY ?cI DIbBUT'T OPfiFi'l'i3iUS OF Ol'Xbk l'&OPS."

Germon forces employed i n t h e h R D d M C 2 w i n t e r o f f e n s i v e i n Decercbsr 1944 und Jnnucry 1945 cons i s tEd of' t he Fifzh and S i x t h mnzcr brmies . During t h i s cclmpuign -he 2 , 3 , 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, end 11Armored Di-fisions w ~ r er e q u i r e d t o a t t h c k German urmorcd units i o o rde r t o p r e v e n t t h e a n n i h i h t l C n o f American t r o o p s originclly i n t h e ertn and f i n a l l y t o reduce t h e shlibnt.

m, "0PaD;TE: l.&.INS'i LIGHTLY 'h?!DlOHED FOiihZ: TlOigS O b i X S l L L -IATIONS. I '

On 31 A u g u s t 1944, t h e 2 Armored D i v i s i o n , p u r s u i n g t h e German f a r c e s Through BKLGIUh, c m e upon a l i e h t l y crmored Gcrmnn oo lum i n the v i c i n i t y of O R C I i N S cna comple t e ly des t royed i t .

n. "COUhTTEULTTi~CKI N vfITHDEL$BL10 DISRUPT l i 0bTIL~iOFtEuLTIONS."

During t h s p t r i o d 17 - 20 December, 1914, p r i o r t o t h k s t a b i l i z i n g o f t h e n l l i c d l i n b s in the hk!hiW&S, t h b 7 h r m o r e c D i v i - sion w s f o r c e d t o e x s c u t e rlumorous c o u n t e r u t t ~ i c k s i n Lhs v i c i n i t y 3f ST VITH, BLLGIUM.

0 . "LXdC1JTL DEL'.'IING I.CT1O.V."

In the c u r l y s t o g e s o f t he German n- t tnck i n the :iP&ENhiPS dur ing December 1944, the 7 und 9 ilrmored D i v i s i o n s mere employed t3 de lay the h o s t i l e ndvoncs.

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CCTU-L COMEILT M R Y d I O N S OF I RMORED 3IVISIONS

( 9 June 1944 to 10 m y 1945)

5. Source. I n order t o o b t a i n in fo rma t ion concern ing t h e :ctual t s c t i c c l -ions used by t h t var ious armored d i v i s i o n s , i; .ftor c c t i o n r c p o r t s and combat observer i n to rv iews were sLudi6d. Thust. r u p o r t s werL n v a i l a b l e on 211 rrr-inorec d i v i s i o n s i n t:hc 3uropean T h s a t a r w i t h t h t vxcspt ion of t h e 20 i rn iored Div i s ion , r q o r t s 011 which hed n o t bean t a b u l e t c d and f i l e d .

6. Ty?as. The v a s t d i f f c r i n c c s i n s t r c n g t h and o r g e n i z e t i o n of t h e hecvy-ight d i v i s i o n s moko tham incommensurcble. Consequent ly t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e p r e s c n t o 3 cnd d i scussod sepcircitely.

7 , iieuvy Div i s ions .

L I . Both t h e 2 r.nd 3 i.rm3rt.d Div i s ions operc te r l i n t h e Euro-peen Theater under t h o conl;rol of' t h e F i r s t U.S. Arny u n t i i Novcmbcr 1944, when 2 Arinorcd D i v i s i o n was s h i f t c d t3 rhg Nin th U . 8 . limy. Eoth divisior.8 hcd &n m t i e r r c r c f t and c' tc.nk c e s t r s y e r b a t t a l i o r , n t t cched a7.d those same br r t ra l io i i s re5c inod w- t:h t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e d iv-i s i o n s . One a d d i t i o n a l arniorsii f i e l d c.r:illary b a t t n l i o n (1OSmmSP) wcs n t t a c h s d t o c w h d i v i s i o n d u r i n g cor.bnt o p e r a t i o n s , hbdrm c:rtil-l e r y was ? . t tached i n vc ry ing q u e n t i t i e s , but normally n t l ea s t one be , t t a l ion of eiyncr howi tze r s sr guns w a s a t t a c h e d i n combat, I n f m -t r y vcry ing i n q u n n t i t y from a b a t t a l i 3 n - to a reg iment wn3 Et tncheC whenovar co rps mcdc ir o v a i l n b l e .

b. Bath d iv i s i0 r . s o p e r a t e d w i t h t h r o i combnt c o m n n d s , t?.e t h i r d cnc, be ing d;sign%%ed "C33". In cacb. d i v i s i o n t h e henc lquar tc rs of tho orgr.nic i z f a n t r y rog imtn t func t ioned as t h e hcpdquar to r s of C C R . h l t h s u g h improvised, CCR w s n t h i r d f i g h t i n g c0mbe.L command ond W C B

u t i l i z c d sxe.ctly o s werG CCA nnd 3123.

\" 0 . Combat commnnde c o n s i s t e d c s s e n t i i l l y o f two tclnk b c t t a l -ions , on6 orgcnic a rmor td i n f a n t r y bc . t t n l ion , a n t i n f a n t r y b a t t c l i c n (whenever an infc-n t ry r e g i m n t was a t t a c h s d r o t h e d i v i s i o n ) and t ank d e s t r o y e r , e n g i w c r nnd c n c i a i r c r a f t o l sments . Medica l and mnintun- ance elaments 1ver6 c t t s c h a d o r i n suppor t . Normr.lly two combat com-'I " Ids wer5 committsd t o n o t i o n ur-d t h e third was hbld i n r o 6 e r v e . Ench forward c o n b G t commmd was normal ly d i r t o c l y s q p o r t e d by t w o a rmsr id f i e i d c . r c i l l o r y b c t t c l i o n s rind t h e mcrliwn o r t i l l c r y wcs ir. g m e r a l suppor t .

d . Usua l ly eaoh oombat cormand operctod w i t h two t a s k f c r c e s o r columr~s. h t y p i c c l task f o t c b c o n s i s t e d of o t a n k b n t t a l l o n , DE

i n f a n t r y o r armored I n f a n t r y b u t t a l i o n , t ank d s s t r c y e r ond o n g i n s a r p l a toons , d i r e c t l y suppor ted '~yan armored f i e i d w t i l l e r y b ; t t a l i c n .

e . T c b l a s o f Orgcn iza t ion provided f o r n l i g h z t c n k b c t t a l - i o n und two medlwn t ank b a t t n l i o n s per armored reg iminc . P r i o r t o 1s.nding o n t h e European C o n t r n t n t bozh d i v i s i o n s t co rgon ized the ar-mored r e g i m n t s s o t h t coch t a c k b c t t a l i o n c o n s i s t e d o f o headquar-t c r s compay ( con ta in ing i issault guns and m o r t a r s ) , two nsdium tnnk comsanies, and one l i g h t t ank company.

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f. Attached i n f e n t r y wns t r o n s p o r t e d on t a n k s and i n 2 1/2 t o n t r u c k s ,

8 , L i g h t D i v i s i o n s .

a , L i g h t armored d i v i s i o n s cpcrh tod under t h e c c n t r o l o f e l l f3ur U. S. Lrmies i n the k r o p e s n Thecter , as well as the So:ond Bri7;ish Army.

b. Lt tnchments t c l i g h t armored d i v i s i o n s wcrc F r a s t i c c l l y t h e s u m as a t tachments t o h c o l y d i v i s i o n s .

G. These d i v i s i o n s a l s o opern ted with t b r c e ccmbct commsnds. MOST usad CCF: C B f. t h i r d f i g h t i n g combct cornmend; o t h e r s k c p t i t p r i -mar i ly i n ' r e s e r v e , r o t a t i n g t r o o p s through it from CCL and CCB. ':hcl.-e-ever p o s s i b l e the h e c d q u s r t e r s o f CGK was i n c r e a s e d t o p r c c t i c a l l y the s i z e o f tht he;dquarters o f CC\ and CCE. Armored group heodquar te rs and hzndqucrters companies when a t t h c h a d , were Uti l izL-d f o r t h i s pur-pose.

d. As i n t h c hecvy d i v i s i o n s , conbnt commards o f t h t l i g h t d i v i s i o n s usuully o p t r a t t c w i t h two t a s k f o r c e s ; one c o n s i s t e d o f n t ank b a t t a l i o n (less one mdium t a n k company), a r i f l e ccrr.pnny o f arm-ored i n f a n t r y , and t a n k &s'.rcyer nnd ongineer p l a t o o n s ; t h e otf ier t Q 6 k force wculd u s u a l l y c o n s i s t o f n n armored i n f a n t r y t c t t c l i o n ( l e s s one r i f l s compw.y), one medium tank compnny nnd t a n k d e s t r o y e r and engineer p la toons . hhen n d d i t i o n a l i n f c n t r y was a i t e c h e d t o t h e d i n - s i o n , t h e p r o p o r t i o n of i n f e n t r y i n ThL t a s k f o r c c s was :orraspor.dlngly incronscd. i.rnored n r t i l l L r y was e i t h e r r t t a c h e d t o o r i l l d i r e c t sup- porr; of each corn'cct commend,

e , Z. t tent icn i s i n v i t e d to t h e d i f f t r e n c e s e x i s t i n g in t h e composition o f t h s e t a s k f o r c e s : one i s heavy i n tanks and l i g h t i n i n f a n t r y unless o d d i t i o n n l i n f e n t r y i s c t t a c h t d ; t h e o t h e r i s s t r o n g i n i n f a n t r y ond cons idarnkly wef.kor i n t a n k s t r o n g t h . This obvious ly raqui red ar. ass ignmant o f ni iss ions t o t G s k f o r c e s waich were s u i t o b l e t o t h e i r mskoup. In f l u i d situations t h c a s s i g n v e n t of zcnes o r L I X L ~

of Bdvnnce of t i e d i f f e r e n t resk f o r c e s mcy o r m y n o t hrvc be62 s u i t -ablv t o t h e i r corcposition.

9 . pre l iminary Conclusions. From t h e nbcve nnd n s t u d y o f Lppcn-d ices 1, 2 and 3 the; fo l lowing p r e l i m i n c r y c o n c l u s i m s mc:y he drnwn:'

E . k . n t i z i r c r c f t and t a i k d e s t r o y e r b a t t n i i o n s were, t o u l l i n t e n t s c.nd purposcs , o r g n n i c a l l y a pc.rr o f t h e arniorcd d i v i s i o n s .

b. Attachment of an a d d i t i o n a l or rnred f i L l d artillcry b a t t n l i o n was so f r e q u e n t thF.t t h s nwnbtr of l i g h t b c t t o l i o n s IVLS cons tan t ly four pur d i v i s i o n .

c . One o r more nedium a r t i c l c r y b t t t n i i o n s were normfllly a t tachcd t o a n armored d i v i s i o n .

d. The a t tachment o f en i n f a n t r y rcgimenz t o armored d i v i -s ions brought t h e ra t io of tank b a t t a l i o n s t o i n f a n t r y b n t t a l i o n s i n heavy d i v i s i o n s t o 1 t o 1 and l i g h t d i v i s i o n s t o 1 t o 2 .

e . The t a s k f o r c e s o f l i g h t d i v i s i o n s apprcxlmated the s t r e n g t h o f a bc l t ta l ion and c x t a i n e d t c n k c3mpcnies and i iTe .n t ry compc.nics, The task f c r c t s o f t h e hLE.ty d i v i s i o n s ripproximated t h t s t r e n g t h o f a smnli regiment n c d contc ined EI t cnk b a t t a l i o n 2nd a n i n f a n t r y ba t ta l ior , . Ecch d i v i s i o n ncrmRliy cpcre ted w i t h s i r : tttsX forces .

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CMPTER 4

10. Combinations o f combnt e l e e e n t s . The nssignmon~o f n i s s i o n s t o t h e l a r g e r armored fo rma t ions end tht. t y p i c a l oombet h r n c t i o n s &doptt.d by tho Armorcd Div is lons have bean d iscussed i n Chapters 2 ctnd 3. In pr.re.graphs 11 t o 16 h r e p r e s m t e a some typicfil h i s t o r i c c l examp166 illusfrLting how t h c var ious combet e lements wer6 groil?ed Ln t h 6 lower cche lons nnd how t h c conmmrndcrs c s t u b l l y employed t h e i r 9 v a i l r b l c t o o l s t o nccomplish t h e miss io ix assigned them.

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11. Capture o f a C i ty by A m o r .

During t h e d r i v e i n t o Cect ra l Germany t h e 6 Armored D i v i -s ior . was d i r e c t e d t o seize MUkLPAUSkb, a c i t y o f t h i r t y thousand i n h a b i t a n t s .

On t h e n i g h t of' 3 - 4 A p r i l 1945 one b r i d g e over t h e 'fiEZiRk RIWK was c a p t u r e d i r . t a c t . The d i v i s i o n crossed on t h i s b r i d g e , Combat Comrrand I'g" l e a d i n g , f o l l o w e d w i t h o u t d i s t a n c e by Combat Command "A" . V e h i c l e s 'wore c r o s s e d w i t h o u t d i s t a n c e as enemy a i r was n o t a c t i v e and speed w a s n e c e s s a r y . The f l o w o f t r a f f i c Over t h e b r i d g e was never ha l ted . ',Vhen t h e h6ads o f c0lw.m were slowed by narrcm s t r o a t s o r by road b locks t h e e lements i n r e a r immedietely swung of? t h o r o a d s and . c o i l e d , t h u s never t h e column i n i t s crossing.s l o ~ ~ i i i g

CC'tAil was Srdorcd to c l o s e i n on t h e c i t y f rom t h e n o r t h ar.d northwest . CC"B" was ordered t o c l o s e on t h e c i t y from t h e s o u t h and southwest. A h a s t y r e c o n n a i s s a n c e was mads 'cy combat commanders and t h e i r task f o r c s commanders. Each o f t h e Combat commands had t h r e e t a s k f o r o e s . Under CC"A" were Task Forces 15, 68, and 9 ; u n d e r CC"B" were Task f o r c e s 50, 69, and 44. Thc fo l lowing t o b l e s show comFosi t ion o f Tnok Forces :

GC"A"

1s Tk 3n (-1 Med Co) P.md Inf Co Armd I n f Co

60 Tk Bn (-1 Med Co, Mea Tk Co

& 1 L t go) 9 A r m d I n f Bn(-lCo)

TD P l a t TD Plaz TD P l a t Armd Engr P l a t Armd Engr P l a t Arpd Engr P1e.t 212th Arxd FA 9n 2 7 4 t h Arn:d FP. Bn

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50th Armd Inf En (-1 Co) 69th Tk an (-1 Ned Co) 44th Arad Inf En(-l Co) Med Tk Cc Armd Irif Co :&d Tk Co TD P l a t TD P l k t TD P l a t Armd Engr P l a t Armd Engr P l a t Arrnd 3ngr P l a t Zjlst Armd ?A En 123th Rrmd FA En

CC"B" assembled near HEYLRODE, C3"A" 8,T o f 2IIGEXRIIEDiil. ( S e e s k e t c h ) . Both Commands s t a r t e d tha mci rc lement sf KJXLEiUSZN simultaneously.

Oppos i t ion WEE l i g h t . Sinal1 forces of enemy i n f a n t r y were c l s a r e d from the smal l towns ndjacent 1-4.EL?.4USE!J. Ant i - tank f i r e ~ C J

was ancounttred by TF #lS is BIC'fiNhIED3 irnd i n I & C E i r ; D Y r T anc v" q u i c k l y overcone. TF #15 m d ?F #69 b o t h by-passed IJJHLiRUSEN t s i f t o cont inue BEST, t h t n TF !,'ishboked south, then w e s t end blocked e l l e a s t e r n e x i t s o f t h e c i ty . Meonvhil6 T? +69 drove p a s t t h t c i t y End blocked f r o m tne nor th snd e a s t . By dusk e11 Task Forcts w e r e in p o s i t i o n RS shown on attached sketch and held 4.UhLUUSEN i n a v i c e -l i k e g r i p . Th6 Division Cornmdur decidcd t n r t the s t tnck ta c l c n r t h e c i t y would bs lcunched e t 0700, 5 A p r i l 1945. 211 a r t i l l e r y was emplaced s o as t o give support i f heavy res i s tcncs KLS encountered. A l l Task Forces he ld i n p lace exotpt TF -$nnd TF $50, which drove i n t o t h e city. Sporadic s t r e c t f igh t ing was c:lcountersd. Some t h r e e t o f o u r h m d r e d pr i sonsrs :verlj tckcn i n town, viherc-!is ssm Vvve.ve:vebun-dred wcre gathbred i n by TF 815 P S they t r i e d t o f l ~ stastwera.

The city WES z len red by Cg30 , jA p r i l 1945 with e mini" of losses. Th& cne?iy troops ' t ftr6 well aquipped and had c x c c l l c n t morc l s . I t was l ea rncd upon questioning t h e German o f f i c e r n t h r t t h e r c p i d cncirclemenT had completely disr.iptLd t h e i r plan o f deftnse; thus :-he quick c a p i t u l c t i o n or' %he en:irs gar r i son .

12. A t t e c k by One Contat Com.ond (Heavy Armored Division) t o Rbstore Inpu tus t o an A t t a c k vrh ich had Lost komsntm.

A t d a r k , 9 Decenber 1944, t h e Amcrican f r o n t l i n e s w e r e a1or.g a north-south l i n e through t h e e a s t e r n edge of UtNGr,Ii~JhHE, npprox. lmately fou r m i l m west of DURZN. There had becn l i t t l e rd -mnce d u r i n g t h o prsvious 10 days.

During the n i g h t 9-10 Deoembor 1944, one combat command of the 3 Armored D i v i s i o n , c o n s i s t i n g of h ~ ot m k b a t t c l i o n s , one armored i n f c n t r y b a t t a l i o n , one t m k d e s t r o y e r company, one r e c o n n a i s s a n c e company and one armored ang inee r company, moved i n t o UNGlXW9lE. I t s mission WDS t o a t t a c k e a r l y 10 December 1944 i n i t s zone [ s e e s k e t c h ) from t h a v i c i n i t y o f IliiqGbkWaIiE and C f i p t U T E BCE.TZ, ? r epa red f o r f u r t h e r ac t ion i n t he direc;ion 3f HSVEN.

The combot command was organized i n t o two task f o r o c s (TF-Y,nnd TF-3) and a r e s e r v e . TF-K c m t a i n e d a b a t t a l i o n o f t a n k s , less t h e l i g h t t a n k company, one armored i n f a n t r y company, ona p l a t o o n of Engineers, and on0 t a n k d e s t r o y e r p l a toon . TF-ii con ta ined a b a t t a l i o n of :anks, n b a t t a l i o n o f crmorad i f i f an t ry , l a s s one r i f l o compcny, one engineer plntoor. , and anu tmk d s s t r o y o r p l a toon . The r e s e r v e consis-t ed o f one l i g h t t ank company, one ruconna i s sanc t comFany and t h e

remaining p l a t o o n s o f e n g i c c e r s find tank d e s t r o y e r s . The e n t i r e d i v i -s i o n a r t i l l c r y was i n direc-c. s u p p o r t o f t h c combat commend.

Tbe p l n n c f a c t i o n wcs as fo l lows:

TF-K t c t a k e pGSltiCn6 in s u p p o r t j u s t dasz of t h e n o r t h - s o u t h rond e a s t of LANG&WLHE p r i o r t o d o y l i g h t . TF-H t o a t t e c k e a s t a t d e y l i g h t and cL;pture OEihGbiCH and GBICB. Upon the c a p t u r e of t h c ln t t s r , TF-K t o c a p t a r e t h o h i g h ground n o r t h of GSICh. Subsequent ly , TF-H, s u p p o r t e d by TF-K t G c a p t u r e gCHTZ,

Tho 6 0 t h I n f c n t r y Regiment, 9 t h I n f a n t r y Division was t u movc t c t h e v i c i z i t y o f GEICH, fo l lowing i t s c e p t u r c and a t t n c k e a s t t o capture HCNZERWHF. One b a t t e l i o n was t o t a k e over oocupnt ion o f ECHTZ a f t e r i t s cnpture .

The o p e r a t i o n begar. c . t 0750, 10 December 1944. TF-K l e d through t h e s i n g l e e x i t of LIINGEhYiHZ end occupied i t s s u p p o r t pos i -t i o n s . TF-H fo l lowed end deployed east of t h e town bnd a t t a c k e d w i t h tanks and I n f a n t r y t o g e t h e r . By noon it w t s t v i d t n t 5hEt unexpec ted h o s t i l e s t r e n g t h i n OBaRC-EICH would p r e v e n t t h e cnpLure o f GbICH t h a t day. Consequer.tly, TF-I{ WLS o r d e r e d 50 t 6 k ~t;ie h i g h gr3und n o r t h of GEICH withouL wciting f u r G G I C E t o f a l l . This a t t a c k was mad6 w i t h f o u r p lc toons a? mcdiw. t m k s deployed i n l i n e , f c l l c n e d a t npproxi-m t t s l y l0C y r r d s by t h e i n f e n t r y company. T h e h i g h ground v m s tcker . by 1420 a g a i n s t l i g h t r e s i s t s r . c t .

Meanwhile, it wcs r e e , l i z e d t h t t TF-K, o r i g i n a l l y designed as e secondary n t t a c k , vin6 s h o r t of i n f r . n t r y . r e q u e s t was ma.de (nnd14.

approved) t h c t t h e both Izfantry Regimmt b e g i n movement i n t o the GkICh and BChI"2 a r e a s ,

W i l e t h e above n i s s i o n WES being acconiplisked I?-H co r . t i nuad t o c l e o r up OBai lGZICh . This wos cccomplished a ~ ;approximoticly 1530 En3 i n f c n t r y and t m k s were i n c o x t a c t w i t h h o s t i l c e lements on t h e w e s t e r n edge of GaICti a t d a r k . The p c s i t i a n of t h t s e elements WLB s o exposed t h a t they were w i t h d r a m t o 09&361Ch a f t e r dark l e a v i n g o u t p o s t s i n c o n t a c t w i t h GEICH.

h t aFproximate ly 1430 TF-K was o r d a r e d t o u t t n c k and c c p t u r e dChFZ. i t 1615 this fo rce v a s pu3k.ing into t h e town, t h e t a n k s having l ed t o thi5 p o i n t Dnd t h e i n f c n t r y were beginning t o work ahced o f t h e tEnks down t h t s t r e e t s . By 2lOC TF-K hed COmpl6tO c o n r r c l o f t h e ob-j e c t i v e .

A t 0945 cne i i g h t t c r k p l n t c m , on0 roconnaisscnce p l a t o o n , und onc scuad of cngineero were d i s p a t c h E d on r;he n i s s i o n of e s t a b l i s h -ing n roadblock n t 60ThI.liiUS. This f o r c t fo l lowad one compnny of i n -f E n t r y which wos p e r t o f TF-H and e s t a b l i s h e d thE b look n b o u t t h e middle of the a f t e r n o o n . Thay were o r d a r e d t o hold t h i s a t a l l c o s t s a n d as a r e s u l t 8om6 50 German infbnt rymen 'wurd o u t off between ROTRHkUS nr.d GEICH.

C u r i n g tie n i g h t 10-11 December 1944 ?rdErs were i s s u e d R S

f01lows :

TF-H t o c t t a c k a t CyOo, 11 December 1944 f r o m ORr,XGEiCfi and capture GEICH i n coopernz ion w i t h t h e 2nd Bat tcL?ion , 6 0 t h 1 n f a r . t r y Regiment. Upon t h e c a p t u r e of G~ICH,TF-H t o push on r ap id ly to ECHTZ, c l e a r i n g o u t h o s t i l e r e s i s t a n c e n o r t h e a s t o f GhICE t o 50 con-t i n u e d throughout t h e n i g h t 10-11 Deccmber 1944.

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TF-I( t o i n i t i c t c rcconnai6snncc i n fo rce i n t h o d i r e c t i o n of HOVER beg inn ing n o t let-r thnn 0800, 11 December 1944, anc s h o u l d EOVh'LB prove t o bo h s l d l i g h t l y by t h e enemy t o zake it and o s t n b l i s h s u f f i - c i e n t forces t h e r e t o h o l d it,

Opere t i o n s began promptly e.t 0800, 11 December 1944, TF-I1 nnd 2nd B c t t a l i o n , 6 0 t h I n f r m t r y Regiment, huav i ly suppor t ed by c.rtil-l b r y , advanced s t e n d i l y nnd s e c u r e d G E X H by 0845. This t n s k f o r c e l e f t 0r.e medium tnnk company i n GEICH find began movement t o h C : i Z . The crmored i n f a n t r y b e t t a i i o n , l e s s one conpnny, bas de te shed f r o m t h i s t a s k f o r c e m d nss igned t o TF-K.

TF-K n e t e t r e n p r e s i s t n n c e on t h e n o v m e n t of' i t s r econna i s - sonce f o r c e towcrds HOVhN and wbs unable t o make p r o g r e s s . The r e e i s - t m c e c o n s i s t e d of n c v y smr.11 arm and a s s a u l t gu? f i r e from I10VLN cnd from C. p i l l b o x t o t h o west of t h b v i l l a g o , and by d i r e c t h i g h V6lOClty gun f i r e from c c r o s s t h e RUEX hLW5.

I t was r e d i z e d t h s t more t h m a rocor.naissar.ce f o r c z ,would be necessc.ry t o occupy EO", s o TF-K \NUS witklrcm into ECHTZ and o r d e r s were r o c r i v e d t o 1cur.ch a coord ina ted o t t c c k tho foilowing dfiy and cop-t u r o H3VEN.

The 1st B&tl ;s i ion, 60tn I n f a n t r y Regimtnl, ,which hod moved i n t o ECHTZ t h e p r6v ious n i g h t cnd hr.d F~6Sisted i n o c t p o s t i n g the. town, VIC.S a t t c c h e d t o t h e combat commmd. Orders were i s s u e d t o t h e t s sembled commondurs f o r t h e a t t n c k on 12 TJccbmber 1944. The plcn Wzs t o c t - tnck wi th t h e two i n f c n t r g ti t ta1ior .s n 'orecst , t h e oCHTZ-EOVZiq r c a d b e i n g t h e boundary ' x t w e u u b c t t e l i o i i s i n c l u s i v e t o t h e n o r t h b f i t t a l i o n . The t m k b F . t t i . l l o n of TF-K w u ~ jt o s u p p o r t t h e nrmcred i n f m t r y b c . t t a l i c n on t h t n c r t h . 3nt: medium tnnk sompmy f r o m TF-H was t o s u p p o r t tk.L 1 s t B n t t n l i o n , 60th I n f r w t r y on t h e sou th , i.s t h e ground wc.3 C o m p h Y E l y open nnd f l n t , smoke I V F . ~ t o be l c i d on KIVLN, nlong t h e viss tern r i v o r bank n o r t h o f t h e town, and a l o n g t h b ccmbnt corrme.nd bow.cicry on t h e no r th . Two 155mm s b i f - p r c p e l l e d guns were brought t o G C H I Z f o r t h c purpose of d e s t r o y i n g t h e p i l l b o x mentioned obovo a t H hcur . H hour W ~ SS S t a t 0745'.

Under cover o f t h e smoke t h e in r ' nc t ry edvcnccd a c r o s s t h e open gro?;nd between hcB'1'z and hOVEN. Ncwevbr, when t h e srroko on t h s s b u t h was l i f t e d , smell c.rms firs f r c m t h e v i l l c g o e.r.c p i l l b o x , which t h t 155m guns hrd f a i l e d 'io d e s t r o y , slcvied t h e i r z d v m c e cnd Lhky sub jec t ed t o hoicvy t i n s f i r e from c c r a s s t h e r i v e r . I t wos h e r c t h n x t h r g roh . to s t nunbLr o f c t l s u o l t i e s of t he a c t i o n wor6 s u f f e r o d . however, t h o ttjnks providod c;oso s u p p o r t End' j o ined t h c i n f a n t r y ir. tht: E,dvance &z t h c edge o f tho v i l l c g e , cnd HOVbN w c 5 untbrod c; 1020. There w s considcrLblu house t o house f i g h t i n g i;nd t h e v i i l n g t . MT~Y c c m p l c t c l y se -cured by 1600,

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13. I n f e n t r y With Tanks.

On t h e a f t e r n o o n o f I i p r i l 7 , 1745, CC"R", 2 krmorod D i v i s i o n completed mopping up tk.e two towns on phrse i i n c D ( S G G s k e t c h ) and a t 1530 wa8 r e p o r t e d ree.dy t o jump o f f t o t a k e phose l i n e E, c? r i d g e commanding EILDESfiEIM. CC"Rl ' s s t r i k i n g f o r c e we.s ccmposcd o f :wo t e s k fo rces , A , and 8, c ~ . c hcomposed o f o n t cornpcny c f m e d i m x n k s and one company of i n f e n t r y . Boundary between tt'sk f o r c e s vias -ha main E-W roEd l e a d i n g i n t o €llLDhSHhIi~.,

rhhc t a s k f o r c e s n t tocked a t 1540,both u s i n g the e c e t c d g w o f t h e smnll t o w n s cs l i n s s o f d e p c r t u r c . TF 'It.'' nttackod w i t , h t h e t a n k s Ebout l5C y a r d s nhcad of rhc inf i in t ry 1vh3 wtrc w e l l d i s p e r s d , 1-11 t a n k s k e p t up s t r c d y machine gun f i r e on w h c t oppenrcd t o be dug-in i n f a n t r y . Some 7 5 and 76 XE und WP was used on t h 6 'Eiooda n w r t h e t o p o f t h e r i d g e . Some smnll a r m f i r c was r e t ? x m d , b u t t h e mcchine gun f i r e o f t h e moving tenks k e p t rr ,ost of it n c u t r n l i z e d . A6 tlr6 ttmks approDchcd the "gcrn'l, Ccrman i n f a n t r y s t a r t e d moving o u t of t h e i r holes, a u r r e n d c r i n g . Cne 88mm AT-AA gu;: f i r e d 3 o r 4 r o , a d s , b u t P o z i t f u s e l O $ n f i r e W 6 S ? l a c e d or. i t by c b o t t e r y e r t i i l e r y and t h e c rew were e i t h e r wounded or abandoned their p o s i t i o n s , ? i v a well placed HE tank s h o t s i n t h e b a r n forced 25 Gerncms Cron it. The t a n k s contir.ued on, with one pla.toon of i r - fan t ry rounding up p r i s c n e r s , The r i d g e was rushed a t 1630, a dis rcncs cf 1 114 m i l e s having bcen covered . 'Iwo ? l n t o o n s of in fc .n t ry ccme UF j u s t s h o r t of t he r i d g c and t o o k t h e l e o d . The tanks fol lowed t o t h e r i d g e and t o o k h u l l down p o s i t i o n s , d i g g i n g I n f o r t h c n i g h t .

TF "B" n t t a s k e c ivi th T h e inf 'nntry r i d i n g on th? bccks o f t h e tanks, all t a n k mcchine gun's f i r i n g on zhc S l O p C S of t h c r o i l i n g t e r r a l c . Nc o 2 p o s i t i o n Was found to i t s f r c n t cr.d TF I 'B" nssisted

- 15 -

TF "1:" by p l a c i n g f i r e OP tht o t h e r r i d g o . I t ga ined its o b j e c t i v e a t 1615, t h e i n f c n t r y h r v i n g 2ism3untLc 2CO yards from t he t o p o f t h e r idge . The t m k s took h u l l dowi p o s i t i o n s cr.d TF "E" dug i n f u r t h e n ight .

The e n t i r e o p e r a t i o n n e t t e d 4 Germns killed, 1 4 wow.ded and 135 mfs. Lmerican losses were 1 infantrp.rr.cn kol;nded, Cpposizi.cn during t h e d r y had been l i g h t , with 5ntF.y sur rsndsr ing r6E:dily upon being f i r a d on.

The n t t a o k brought our tvro xethods of using i n f c n t r y wivith t a n k s :

1. In TF "A'', i n f a n t r y followed h n k s a t such R d i c t a n c c ns would precludc t h e i r bLing h i t by c r t i l l e r y .'ire p laced on t h e t a n k s . Tanks l c d as no nines o r LT guns hlid been encountered a l l day. I n f a n t r y did not r i d e tnnks , as dug i n enemy could be obscrvad.

2. I n TF "E", i n f a n t r y roclv tanks until near the t o F of the r i d g e , where they dismounted m d l e d t h e nttclck. Bo positions hnd bcen o b s s r v e d i n f r o n t o f TF "B", nnd by g c t f i n g thL m s k f o r c c n o r t h e n s t o f the German p o s i t i o n s q u i c k l y , it helped makt the German po8 ition untcnc,b1E .

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14. A t t a c k Against Enplaced Dual PurFose Weapons by Armor m t h Air Suppor t .

A = 33 Dual Purpose Emplaced 178111. \==-B = Assembly Position TF #15.

C = P o s i t i m Airground L ia i son Oks. n D = P o s i t i o n Suppor t ing L i g t t Arty En.

During l a t t u f t e rnoon on 14 A p r i l 1945 a f t e r h&ving cleared a nest of t h i r t y - f i v e dual purposed 88mm guns, t h e CommnnClng O f f i c e r of Task F o r c ~15, Combat Conunand "A", 6 Armored Div i s ion , was noti-f i e d by h i s rooonneissancc agen t s of m o t h e r enemy p o s i t i o n o n the oxis o f his rdvrnce .

€Is q u i z k l y smmoncd h i s compmy officers m a t h e s u p p o r t i n g a r t i l l e r y commandsrs and mcde a r e c o n m i s s c n o c . i ic formula ted his p l a n , mr-r'ic it k?.o;vn t o t h e C o n b e t Commnnd Commmdcr cnd ructived opprovnl,

!,ir suppor t WLS r eques t ed and on c w l y lnorning m i s s i o n W E S

obtoinod.

:he t a s k f o r c e moved Lnto a t t n c k p o s i t i o n "B" d u r l n g h o u r s o f dtirknsss. - 17 -

P U N OF ~ T ' I ~ I C K :

One medium %an> compnny w i t h one p l a t o o n of i n f a n t r y mcunted on tho t a n k s t o envelop t h e r i g h t o f memy p o s i t i o n "A", One m e d i m t m k company w i t h one p l a t o o n of i n f m t r y mounted on t h e tanks t a S E V O l O p

t ho l e f t 3f enemy F o s i t i o n nnd t o d r ive on and s e i z o t t e a i r f i s l d .

The l i g h t t a n k company, r e i n f o r c e d . b y one p l a t o o n o f mediu-n tanks and one p l a t o o n o f i n f a n t r y t o s o i z e t h e v i l l a g e o f NEu.

?he l i g h t a r t i l l a r y b a t t c l i o n plus one medium a r t i l l s r y b a t t i l i o n t o g ive gcnerc.1 s u p p o r t .

Time o f e t te ick: 0730, 1s h ? r i l 1945.

i t 3645, 1 5 A p r i l 1945 t h e a i r l i n i s o n of f ic f i r r i??ortcd t h n t one f l i g h t o f p47 I ' i g h t e r s was i n t h o a i r and c v a i l c b l c ,

A heavy ground haze enveloped t h e E n t i r e a r e a .

A t 0715 t h e haze l i f t e d c.nd S c t h b a t t e l i o n s of a r t i l l e r y l c i d on Target with smoke end high e x p l o s i v t .

Th? f l i g h t ccmmndtr s i g n a l l e d t h n t he wcs r e e d y f o r t h e r'm over t h e t n r g b t . Tho e r t i l l e r y s topped f i r i n g ; L b l m k t t of smoko marked c he t e r g o t . The f i g h t t r s droppcd t h e i r bombs, t h c t m k s w i t h i n f a n t r y mounced on t h a n movtd o u t r a p i d l y . The f i g h t t r s c i r c l td , made nnothar run, f i r e d t h e i r r o o k e t s and s-,rnfed. Tht enemy guns wera s i l e n t , .

Slowly thc s t e e l cordon of tanks moved i n on t h e oncmy p o s i -t i o n . Tho f i g h t e r s s t r a f e d a g a i n and then they made t w o ' c r y runs' as the t?nlts opened up w i t h machine guns and x n n o n s , The tanks c losed in , t h e i n f a n t r y dismounted w h i l s moving end fcllcv:sc, Tho p o s i t i o n was OvCr-rIun. T h i r t y - t h r c e dun1 pur2os6, ccncre:e t m 3 l c c i d 88mm guns and t h r e t hur-drod tirid f i f t y p r i s o n e r s were tnkcn w i t h o u t l o s s of' any equipment find with b u t two men wound6d.

- l a -

1;. S e l z u r c o f Remagen Br idge by un Armored Task Force .

E n r l y on t t s a f t e r n o o n o f 7 hkrch 1945 “Tcsk Force Engemnn”, c o n s i s t i n g o f t h s 14 Ton2 B a t t a l i o n (less one acdium t m k conipnny), 27 Armored I n f e n t r y Eie.ttslion, on6 rccor.nnissoncc p l a toon ctnd n detnchment of armored i n e c r s , rerrchbd the h i l l s (A) over look ing tho Rhine River neGr fi6mc&;n. L t Go1 bn&.cmon, observ ing t h n t t h o Ludandorf Bridgc wcs i r . tnc t and t h E t f l u t i n g Germnn veh ic l e s were moving c c r s s s t h i s b r i d g e , s s n t cn r.rmorsd inf f in . t ry company and one p ln toon of ioodium t cnks , w i t h t enks lCEldir.rj, r a p i d l y th rough RemeKen t o -;ht b r idge . The tanks f rom p o s i t i o n s on the wcs t b m k ( B ) su?pc . r ted t h e l n f ~ i i t r y w i t h d i r e c t f i r e . Tkb d ismcuntc .d armored i n f o n t r y -omp!tny r a n a c r o s s t h e b r idge , and the l e c d i n g p l a t o o n climbed the toncrs ( C ) on t h e e c s t bnnk r a d d e s t r o y e d tho machine guns which hnd been f i r i n g from then . The next p l a t o o n s e i z d d t h e tunnel cnd accq ic jd ToslC-ions down s t r eam [E)i n o r d e r t o p r o t c c t t h e l e f t fle.nk. The t h i r d p l a toon climbed the b lu f f ond d e s t r o y t d t h e s n i p e r s and a n z i r l r o r a f t &‘ais ( C ) which. hc.d been f i r i n g f r o n t h e r 6 . The t r g i n a a r s than moved o n t o t h e b r i d g e c.nd begnn the removal o f d t m o l i t i o n cherges which tnd f a i l e d t o exp lode , Tuhile t h i s WRS go ing on t h t remnincar > f t h e 27 Armored I n f n n t r y B R t -t n l i o n c r o s s e d d i s n o m t e d end e s t a b l i s h e d thF: I n i t i a l b r i d g t head .

- 19 -

16. Counter -n t tnck t o r e p e l n l o c c l p a n e t r a t i o n ,

1,t . the end c f Jmuory 1945 r;he XL,5 of t h c V i Corps W E S the niioder R i m r l i n e from ING~~. lLLaht t t h e f o o t o f the VOSG!$S, e n s t . t h r o u g h € I ~ . G L U Uto BISCEI?'#ILLLR. Thoro wore t h r a c I n f a n t r y Elvisions sr.a sev-a r c 1 Tc.sk Forcus defbnding tins Corps front. CCB, 14 Armored D i v i s i D n was i n Corps keserva w i t h t h o miss ion o f c o u n t e r - n t t r c k i n g t o r epe l cny p e a c t r r t i o n of t h c NLK.

During t h c n i g h t o f 27 Jonuury c. f o r c c o f Germr.n i n f a n t r y . crossed t h o r i v e r i n t h c v i c i n i t y o f SCh:dIGI&USkLT cnd occupied pos i - t i o n s i n th6 h e t v i l y wooded E y e r s et 6 r.nd B ( s e e s k e t c h ) . T h s i r ob-vious m i s s i o n wcs t o securu t h o river crossing ct SC~Vvilivr;IGf&.UuSu'4; t h e n t o advance or: :hi- tavm of OfiLUNGLN which c o r t r o l l c d thi r o a d n e t . ?' t r s k f o r c o 3f en ir .fnntry d i v i . s i o n hcd been uncblL l o c o n k i n -3.e p c n c t r a t i o n .

On the morning of 28 Jrnunry CCB wos ordered t o c o u n t e r - n t t n o k and r e s t o r e 6hs LER. The t o r r c . i n had been rendered d i f f i c u l t by snow and f r o s t .

The ly hrmor6a I n f s n t r y goz ta l ion , l e s s one company,. p l u s c Compcny of the 2 5 Tank B g t t a l i o n , supported by t h e 499 .irmored F i c l d h r t i l l u r y Bnttalicn movsd norTk. from its cssembly y o s i t i o n a t Bi'TZtlI-WRF, t o t h s r c c d running n o r t h e n s t from OKLUNGEX. The. mission WCIS t o d e s t r o y tht encmy cug i n c t A . Tht 25 Tcnk Br.t-,alion l e s s Co i!, p lu3 an c rmorud i f i f o n t r y compony wcs h e l d i n a n n t t n c k > o s i t i o n n s r t h w s s t

- 20 7

o f WITI'EEtSHEIM, prepared t o maneuver t o the l e f t o r r i g h t of t h e nt -tnckir.g f o r c e ns t h e s i t u n t i o n w o u l d demnd.

While tht i n f c n t r y ndw.ncad t o w r d it a r o i n f c r s a d l i g h t tr& p l a t o o n Edvcncod n o r t h on rond D , i t e mission t o ? r o t c o t tht ' f l a n k of t h e n t t c c k i n g f o r c e and t o n e u t r : l i z o any t h r e a t f ron t h e h o s t i i v fo rce in t h e woods a t B.

The i n f a n t r y , working c a r e f u l l y w i t h thc t a n k company, Jurrped o f f s h o r t l y a f t e r noon ond by 1600 hed ranched i t s o b j e c t i v e . The encmyrs p o s i t i o n w c s r e n d s r e d - u n t s n ~ b l e , so t h o t cil ,who w t r t n o t k i l l e d withdrew a c r o s s t h e r i v c r t h n T n i g h t ,

Tha 1igh-Z t cnk p o t r o i ?,ore t h a n ?roved i t s w r t h . I t l e f t rood D, kccompnnied by R s m l l f o r c e c,f i c f o n t r y , e n t e r e d woods P d and engaged t h e r e i n f o r c i n g ene-y i n f c n t r y , n'iny of whom were n o t dGg i n . Mecrly j O O bodies were -o,m.tcd i n woods B when the t c t i o r . W : ~ S

completed.

-" 2 1

17. h n c l y s i s o f Opinions.

e . X t t e n t i o n i s i n v i t e d t o Appendix 4. A n m b s r ,of nddi-tionc.1 q u e s t i o n n a i r e s were s e n t t o ‘o ther conunandcrs but answers wer6 rece ive? only frop. t h o s e i n d i c n t c d .

b. bn analysis of t h e opin ions expressed i n d i c a t e t h e f o l -lc i i ing d e f i n i tu t r e n d s :

The miss icns 3r.d methods o f cmp1oyrrer.t o f crmor l s l d down i n F i c l d Serv ice Rcgulations nre sound and c o r r t c t .

Tho Armored D i v i s i o n a s d i s t i n c t from the I r h n f r y D i v i s i o n shou ld bc e. conponsnt o f th6 post-wcr Army.

The s f r L n g t h o f t h c nrmorod d i v i s i o n should be in-crenscc? t3 npproximzte C,ht s i z e 3f t h e “hc-rvy d i v -i s i o n ” ,

Rogimuntol orgF.niznt ion i s fnvorad o v t r s e p o r n t e b f l t t n l i o n o r g r n l z s t l o n .

E i t h i n t h c regiment , tnnks acd i n f c n t r y s h o u l d b e coinbint d ,

Tanks ond infnn-cry should n c t be combined i n b n t t u l -i o n s .

C w ” e r i n g t h e t r e n d t o tanks armed w i t h high a i t y w.cpons CFpt ib ie of d e s t r o y i n g o t h e r t a n k s , Tank Dustroyar U n i t s t.rc n e t nccessory t o a n nrmorod div-i s i o n ,

//

The v a r i o u s elements of t r u c k units, a r t i i l e r y and s n t i - c i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y , normally a t t n c h a d , should be made o r g c n i c zfi nn ornored d i v i s i o n .

A f u l l t r a c k p e r s u m e l c w r i c r s h o u l i br: p r o v i d c d as t h o b a s i c i n f u n t r y and cnginetir squud v e h i - i o , The 6 t m c v b h i c l e , modif ied as a comrnand p o s t v e t i o l c , s h c u l d r a p l f c e 011 cormnd h a l f - l r o c k s .

The armored d i v i s i o n should be q u i p p e d w i t h t;vo \typss of t s n k s - rsconnnissnnca End o x p l o i t u t i o n . J. h e n v i l armored t-nk which for*%rmcr, should i n f e n t r y d i v i s i o n s n g c i z s t f o r t i f i e d & r e c s .

A d d i t i o n a l 1ir . ison n i r p l n n c s f o r l i n i s o n and comnmd purposes c r c necessary .

18. Junior o f f i c l j r s who s . c t u a l l y c o h c n d c d b u t t o l i o n s , conpnnies c,nd p l a t o o n s i n combat work’ ques t ioned on t he 4 e t e i l s o f th6 v a r i o u s compcny o r g a n i i a t i o n s . (see Appendix 5). Thsir o p i i i o n s n r e r e f l e c t e d i n t h e o r g r n i z n t i o n c h n r t s of t m k , rifle nnd b a t b . l i o n h i e d q u a r t u r s companies and will n o t be f u r t h o r d i s c u s s e d .

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19. Conference on Organizazion on? Equipment o f Lhe Armored D i v i s1on.

c., On 7 November 1945, e confersncc was h e l d n t Bad N R u h L i m , Gsrmeny, a t which t h e prelimi,nnry conclusions and r e c o m e n d c t i o n s of thb Lrmorcd S o c t i o n , Genercl Bozrd, durcpenn Theater were p r e s c n t c d and d i scussed , The f o l l o w i n g o f f i c e r s o t t t n d s d :

;t Cen Geoffrey Keyas X e j Gen F.. R. A l l e n ,L!Ej Gen J. M. Dcvinc h 3 j Gen R. W. Grow Erig Gcr. T. E. Boudinot Br ig Gcn J. D. B c . l m 6 r Brig ,GET. J. K. C o l l i e r Col C . V. Brcmley, Jr Col F. J. Brown Coi C . G . Dodge Col R. J. Hhndy Ccl C. I . H u t t o n b 1 J. L. Insktup C G l L. R. DG.+JGY Lt 2cul J. G . F a l b t r

XiM,ITTE;E WMBLRS

201 John irSmith Jr Co1 Wc.1t o r Burnside Col r(. L. H o w z t J r :ol A, E . H c r r i s L t Col E. c . 0 r t h

b. h : ~r c c c u n t of t h c opir . ions oxpressed nl;d t h e c o n c l u s i o n s renchad i n t h i s cn fc rcn -e i s ccntEined i n Appcndix 6. Y i t h t h o oxcc:ption of tF,csa p e r t c i n i n g t o t h c Cnvr!lry Squndrcn and t h t a r t i l l e r y , t h c r6oom6ndo t i cns o f t h i s g roup of o f f i c e r s hnvc be% incorpore t o d i n t o tht: recommendntions of The Generiil Ronrd, Un i t ed S t n t c s Fcrces , Europeon Thcvtcr .

L 2 3 -

CHhPTER 6

COIIICLUSIOh S ILND k.,;COM!&ND L TION S

20. Conciusions.

e . The employment of armor i n the EWopeEa Thea ter was bashd on the ne thods p r e s c r i b e d by F i e l d Serv ice Reguln t ions . Thesc methods are c o r r e c t and r e s u l t e d i n success.'

b. The use and employncnt of crmor i n t h e Europe.nn Thee tor c l e a r l y i n d i c a t c d the necessity f c r Arirored Div is ions d i s t i n c t froni In fan t ry Div i s ions .

C . The "Light Armored Div is ion" i s n o t sufficiently s z r c n g .

d. The "IIetivy Armored Division" was g r e c t l y d a f l c i e n t in i n f a n t r y ,

e. Elements which wcre found neoessRry f o r e t t a c h n m n t t o ormored d i v i s i o n s should be made orgcnic t o them.

f. Csmbnt commands w e r c brokcn down i n t o two or x o r c t a s k forcas and were g c n e r o l l y amplcyed i n r.ccordlan?e vrith t u c t i c e l i 3 i - h -

c i p l e s p r e s c r i b e 3 f o r employmtnt of t t e c.rnorcd d i v i s i o n .

g. Ccnbt t commrads were so: up 11s o p e r i t i o n c l h o u d q u w t e r s f o r con t ro l o f vnr ious ccmbi:ixrions of u n i t s , which were t emporLr i ly css igned . This is be l i eved t o be e wecknuss in orgcn iz&t ion .

h, The o rgcn izn t io r i o f thc n r ro rcd Ciivisior shcu ld be such as t o f n c i l i h t e the f o r m t i c n 3f task Zorces wi th in t h e t h r c e mcjor s t r i k i n g components. I t i s bslievsd t h e t e- corrposi tc tmk-infc.ntj-y re&iment w i l l cccor.p!isk t h i s and i n ndd i t lon in su ro t h a t t h e a s scu l t elements o f t h e d i m s i o n norinal ly oparP:ti: under t h u i r own Felmcr,cn;ljr nssigncd commmders.

21. Re c omendo t i o n s __._

e.. That t h e nrmored d i v i s i o n r e p r s s w t c d by Appendix 7 be adopted,. w i t h such w i n o r modifj.c-:lnons i n personnel o s developmeqt o f improvcd equipmen:: ir.dxczti.d. hppcntiix 8 conta ins t h e proposed org8niza t ion of the - \?r,.cur' ccmpcn;us, t rocps Pnd b c t t c r i e s . Appendix9 i l l u s z r a t e s EI pos:ft:c. -.actice: brcck down cf thc p r o p o s e d d i v i s i o n with t a s k fo rces ,

b. Thnt ?e!-t1ncr.t d o c t r i n - s , techfliqucs, T/Ofs and T. 'k ' s 5~ cmendcd by c p p r n p r i r t a q e n c i i e s o r t h ~ .Nr:r Ds.;iar.tmint.

- 24 ..

Typica l Tac t i ca l Fcrmatlon of 2 hrm0red Division Typica l 'I'ncticel Formetion of 3 Arrrored Drvision Typica l Tac t i ce l Formation of 4 Armored Division Typica l Tac t i ca l Fornntion of 5 Armored Divislon Typ ica l Tnct ioa l Formation of 6 Armored Divislon Typica l Tac t i ca l Fornation of 7 Armored Division Typica l Tec t ioa l Fcrmution of 8 Armored Division I 'ypicnl Tac t i ca l Formation o f 9 Armored Division 'Typical Tac t i ca l Formation of 10 Armored Divislon Typica l Tac t i ce l Formation of 11Armored Division Typical Tac t i ca l Formation of 1 2 Armored Division Typica l Tac t i ca l Formation of 13 Armored Division Typica l Tac t i c&l Formrtion cf 14 Armwed Division 'Typice.1 T B C T A C P ~Fcrma t ion of 16Armored Division

APPiNDIx 1

k d h Ca iol m F l a t m

C U P . : - CO Tk Ea C W l T I I S I :

Co18*T COULUD *A' CWT c w m la=

C-T C D W W "A"

C-T CayUm 'A" G(XiAT C O Y U S 'R'

TASX mACE #l

C3QR:- CO of T d Ba cm:-ca u Tmt. Bn CY)&- CO of A r d M Bo CaMC6IrIaJ COYPOSITXMr coYR15ITm:

I

TASK rSITL r2 T J a F Q a P3

U S K W E PI TASK m m i2 C U R : - CO of ‘Tx EncaYR;6nm:

Rlflc Co

Car Rca p1.t

A r d fngr c o (-1 Plrtl

ut Pb t

0IVISsTc.H

C-T GoIolLlC *A'

1ASU TUX6 #l ? A s K R $ a b2

ClQP.:- CO of lk Bn CmRi- CO af Tk Bo

CHART OF OPlNlONS OF SENIOR OFFICEHS

THZ GLNLML EOARD UNITLD STATLS FSRCA, ZJROI'iSN THUTW

Armored Sec t ion APO 408

OPINIGNS OF JED!IOE: CObSAT OFFIC6RS

The fo l loa l ing q u e s t i o n n a i r e was submit ted to 89 of f i ce r s , between t h e gr,ides o f 2d LieuLenant m d it Colone l , who had served an ave rage o f e i g h t arid one half (05) mont,hs w i t h v a r i o u s armored units (12 krniored D i v i s i o n s ar.d 3 Separa t e Tank 3 a t t a l i o m ) dur ing combat on t h e c o n t i n e n t of Lurope. 'B.e results a r e t a b u l a t e d be1o.r. ,Pnk o f f i c e r s a n s ered ques t , ions p e r t i n e n t t o t a n k s , l ikewise i n f a n t r y o f f i c e r s t o in fan t ry .(List of o f f i c e r s i s appended h e r e t o . )

QWTIOIU'NAIIZL XESJLTS

No Answer-c

1. H O ~ Nmany t a n k s shou ld there be in a t a n k platoon? L3 - 5 Tks

2 - 6 Tks 9 - 4 T k s 6 - 3 Tks

2. How many platoocs should t h e r e be in each iniar.try o r tank coinpary? 34, - 3 Tk P l a t

14 - 4 Tk P l a t 13 - 3 Inf P l a t 15 - I+ Inf Plat

3, How many officers shou ld t h e r e be i n :

a , Tank Coriipany? Average 6

b. Armored Infafitry Company? Average 7

4. a. Should we have l i g h t tanks '? 68 - Yes 8 - KO

b, If yes , where should they be .and how many? 3L - 1 Co/Bn

19 - w/Rcn

5, "hat weapons platoons shou ld t h e r e be ir!:

a. The Tank h t t a l i o r . Hq Go? 49 - AG P l a t 43 - Uort Plat

-1\10 &Lex

b, The Armored Jn fan t ry B a t t a l i o n Hq G O ? b8 - kG Plat 50 - Ehrt P l a t 28 - HIdG Plat

6. Wat reconnaissance unit shoiild the re be i n :

a . The Tank Bn: (Give s i z e , and component elements)? 12 - A/C & TS

21 - L t 'Cks & & TS b. The Armored i n f a n t r y Bn: (Give s i ze ,

and component eler.ients)? 1 L b - A/C & 4 TS 12 - L t Tks k t TS 13 - FIT & Ts

7. Should t h e Hc, Companies of t h e Tank Bn snd the Armored Infan t ry Bn be identical? 10 - Yes

53 - KO

8. Should the Service Go cf t h e ' T a n l c 9n and t h e Armred Infantry En be i d e n t i c a l ? 2 - Yes

68 - NO

9. a. Should t h e r e be a combined Hq and Serv ice Co in the l a r k Bn? 46 - NO

2 - Yes

b. The Armored Infantry Ba t t a l ion? 4 - Yes 31+ - No

10. "hat i s your op in ion o f t b P proposed Armd I n f Co? Sat isfac t3ry

11. a. Do ycu like t h e 105m Assault Gun? 79 - Yes 3 - NO

b. Hovd w r e they used? Bt ry - h d i r e c t F i r e

12. Should t h e 6O.m niortar be re ta ined? (Qual i fy your answer. ) 25 - Yes

3 3 - No

- 2 -

LIST OF JTJhIOLt COiBL.uTOFFICERS .CjJL;STIONED Length

Name Rank ASN T/O P o s i t i o n U n i t i n Combat

IZichard T. Johnson 1 s t L t 0513533 I n f P l a t & 7 AD 7 mos Co Cmdr

%muel L. I r w i n Lt co 0508520 Inf Bn Cmdr 7 eC 2 AD 9 nos

'3.llim S. Parkfas Capt 01293099 P l a t & Go 2 AD 10 mos Cmdr I n f

Robert F. B r o c h n n 1st Lt 34C6933 P l a t Ldr , I n f 2 AD 8 mos

Ym. H. Grcer hfa j 03233944 Sv Co Cmdr & 2 A C 11 mos Tns CO CC

Fred J. Zzelle 1 s t L t 0131499 P i a t Ldr , Inf 2 AD 12 mos

James H. Strack 1st Lt 0328306 P l a t Ldr , Inf 2 AD 5 mos

h b e r t C, YJells 1 s t Lt 0548201 P l a t L d r 6: Co 7 m 8 mos Cmdr , Inf

BW.c L Drews 2d Lt 02017674 1 s t Se t 6L 2 AD 9 mos P l a t Ldr , Inf

Allen Nelson 1 s t Lt 0539844 F l a t Ldr , Inf 2 Ail 10 mos

John P . Hun t ing ton 1st Lt 01325009 P l a t Ldr, I n f 5 AD 6 nios

P a u l Ivlurray, Jr . Capt 01304934 P l a t Ldr , Inf 2 AD 6 mos

Donald Vi. Dunr l I S L L t 01321895 P l a t Ldr , Inf 2 AD 15 mos

Geo. H. Culwe l l 1st L t 053275l+ -4GP l a t Ldr, 2 AD 6 mos Tk Bn

T e r r e l l E. 3 u d d l e s t o n 0101d753 Mort Plat & 2 AD 6 mos 1st Lt Rcn P l a t L d r ,

Tk Bn

Richard :,-, Sidenberg Capt 01166607 AG Plat Ldr, 2 AD 8 mos Tk Rn

LengthHame Rank ASN TI0 Posi t ion Unit i n

Canbat

Anthony Sokcvich 2d Lt 02018062 F l a t Ldr, Tk En 5 A D 6 mos dward F. Luisford 1st Lt 0101E3533 P l a t Ldr , Tk Bn 2 AD mos

!'!ilson Lt, Hankins Lt Col 022737 Bn B, S-3 Regt 2 A D 36 mos CC EX & C 3 Tk Bn

T:;m. G. Buck 1st Lt 0526679 Bn liotor Off, 2 9 mos Tk Bn

C, M. Jones Capt 025890 T l a t I d r & 2 AD 2 mos Uaint Off, Tk Bn

L o u i s F. Eresna 1st Lt 01012626 Plet Ldr , Tk Bn 2 hC 8 rnos

P" E. LaRock 1st Lt 01017133 Plat Ldr , Tlc BII 2 AD 9 mos

y!ftl, H . C OX Ist L t 01014781 Rcn & 2ed Tk 2 .AD b i mos P! at Ldr

liiichaei A . Senancik Is+.,L t 01016989 Plat Ldr, Tk Bn 2 AD 10 510s

Harold A. S h i e l d s 1st Zt 01822065 Plat L d r & 2 AD 10 mos Co Cmdr, Tk %

-.'m.S. Belcher 1st L t 01060354 Plat L d r , k f 2 AD 6 nos

Henry 2 . Eien Lt Col 0321828 En 5-2-3, 2 h D 13 mos GO Tk En

L. C . Hsrkness Lt Col 022181 CC Ex, Tk 2 D 18 mos En Cmdr

John L. Ryan c01 016451 co CCR, C of S 7 :.D 9 mos

J . S. Shrncran L t Col 0365939 C O Tic 9n 1 nD 15 mos

OZO3OO CO Tk Bn 707 TIC ~n 9 IWSH. 3. S t r e e t e r L t Col

7Henry Johnson 1st L t 010143!+6 kG Plat Ulr

(31015542 P l a t Ldr Tic 6 masHarry Baasse 1st L t

01016417 Pla t Ldr R. Co CO 9 ,noskichard h . Hard in Capt

0547695 P i a t Ldr Tk 12 AD 5 mosD. "!. McBride 1st Lt 01062227 Plat Ldr Tk 8 mosH. G. Leach i s t L t

- 2 -

Name

E. J. Eoch

l'!. L. Sanders

I J , R, Hoft

lN. F. Heavener

J. E. Carey

R. L. liIiller

R. L. Sweeney

C . J. Lklaughl in

F. B. Z i i ~

L, i,. Hitchcock

':?, J. Jones

B. S. Banaker

IC. R. Reintz

f',llan FOX

G. G. Vess

G. C . Sola

M. N. Hinds

d. C. Martin

td. S . G r i f f i n

z,c . "ood

G. D. Covey

Rank

1st L t

1st Lt

1st Lt

C apt

Capt

1st Lt

Maj

#:apt

1st L t

2d Lt

1st L t

1st it

2d Lt

1st L t

2d L t

2d Lt

2d Lt

1st Lt

L . t Col

Ya j

1st Lt

IiSN

01015095

0101.5727

Dl015708

01012279

ClG12485

01017265

02lr494

01013371

Ofg626c9

02OlOS03

01.999088

015LO753

01332L94

31540728

020G8546

02001800

01326706

0533464

017954

038'7302

0447211

Length T/O P o s i t i o n Unit in

Combat

Tk Plat Ldr 1 AD 14 mos

P l a t Ldr 745 Tk Bn 8 mos

Tk P l a t Ldr 7 AD 7 mos

En Motor Off 5 mos

P l a t Ldr & 7C7 Tk Bn 8 mos Co Zmdr

Med Tk P l a t Ldr 3 AD 3 mos

Tk Bn u e c Off 1 LD 24 mos

Tk Go Cmdr 3 mos I

Tk Co ?1 Ldr 7 ,:D 3 mos

,',rind Inf P l a t 6 m o s Ldr

1r.f ,'G Plat L d r 16 mos

P l a t Sgt 2( 9 mos P l a t Ldr

R i f l e Plat Ldr 3 mos

Rif le Co Fla t L d r 14 CIOS

biG P l a t S g t & 7 tD 9 mos Ldr

Sq Sr Plst Ldr 10mos

Inf P l a t ' L d r 6 i I D 2 mos

P l a t Ldr & 6 AD 10 mas l t i f l e Co Cmdr

In f Un Cmdr 7 i , D 6 mos

Co Cmdr, Inf 1 LD 30 .?os Bn Lxec

::T P l a t Ldr, I n f 1 h C 16 mos

- 3 -

Lengthi!SN T/0 P o s i t i o n U n i t in

Co r ba t

J. k . C O S t d l O 1st L t 01057391 P l a t Ldr Rifle Co 2 ms

;".E. Peterson Capt 0428448 iisst 5-3 AID 7 AD 11 mos

l 'fallace E . Barnes Col 016426 C of S 12 i lD

IKmdell Blanchard Col 015528 CC"R" Cmdr Lr hD 11 mos

,;lbin F. I rayk L t Go1 024158 S-3, W 0 & 4 AD 10 mos CO TIC Bn

Eobort B. Crayton Capt 0409499 Tk Co Cmdr 9 AD 7& "5

Ralph C . P i e r s o n 1s'; L t 01017818 Tk Plat Ldr 9 AD 4 mos

John S , Ridley Zuaj 01012297 Tk Co h . d r 4 AD 10 mos

Walter G. S tockdale 1st L t 01016200 Tk F l a t L d r 9 nD 5 mos

John G, Xi.rigsley Capt 01013199 Tk Plat & C O 4 AD 10mos Cndr

E. R. Serky Capt, 01016987 Tk Plat k CO 4 .qD 10mos Crcdr

Thornton B. IdccClamery Capt 01010497 Tk Co Cmdr 4 ,'.E 8 mos

Herman Rcich 1st L t 01018681 Tk Plat i d ? 14 ;.D 8 mos

R. A . Sarner 1st L t 0526677 Tk Pla t Ldr 4 AD 6 mos

R. B. &dmundaon 1st L t 01018320 SV Co Cmdr 16 !.D 22 days

'I1. R. Prince Lt C o l 020219 CO LIB 9 ,',D 3 mos

lh!alter '!!agner 2d L t 0208585 i i i f le P l a t Ldr 9 ILD 7 mos

H. H. Holder Ist L t 0437964 I n f P la t L d r 4 J D 9 fios

B. M. Coopormn 1st Lt 0538395 Rifle P l a t Ldr 4 ,',D 7 mos

Lee Eoss 1s; Lt 02000666 Pla t L d r , Inf 14 AD 7 mos

K. W. C o l l i n s L t C O l 022169 i JB Comdr 9 ;*D 8 IEOS

F. X. Binghan 1st Lt 01014136 F i f l e P la t Ldr 14 AD 6 mos

G , T. SeTnmes 1st Lt 0557741 Rif l e Plat L d r 9 AD 1 mo

- 4 -

Name Rank i,SN T/O P o s i t i o n Unit Length

i n Combat

V. 0 . Conway 2d Lt 02011714 R i f l e P l a t Ldr 111 LD 7 nos

J . J. Flanagan 2d Lt 02011610 Rifle P l a t L d r 14 AD 7 mos

J. J, I!eeline 2d Lt 0557676 R i f l e P l a t Ldr 4 AD 7 nos

A . J . Reetz 1st Lt 01016344 14ort P l a t Ldr 9 AD 6 mos

C. Brooks 1V;aj 0370297 A B Cmdr 20 AD L nos

J, C. Donohey Me j 0351335 s-2, EX m 14 AD 7 mos

John T, Cole Co l 05256 C c Cmdr 5 AD 9$ mos

G l e n n F. Rogers L t C o l 018366 Tk an & Gp C O

D d k b ~ . Oden it cox 020805 Tk Bn Co 4 AD 10 mos

- 5 -

APPLNDLY 6

OF TEE h#hOtiLD DIVISIbN

1. The foilowing i s a resume of t h e c o r m n t s and r eccmondo t ions of t h e group which 8tr;ended the conference vrith t h e Lrmored Div i s ion Committee on 7 Novembsr 1945. Those who were i n v i t e d will bo r e f c r r c d t o a6 t h e Group.

2 . The Group unmimously c.pproved the, rctimtr. tcl o rgoniznt ion . They a l s o npproved o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h i n t h t regiment of' one tc.nk t a t -t a l i o n and two i n f e n t r y b a t t a l i o n s with tvc d i s sen t ing votLs. Ccn-s i d e r a b l t d i scuss lon was had on the propor t ion cf i n f a n t r y compnics t o t c n k compznies. F i n a l l y t h o p rcpor t ion of t h ree infaf i t ry companies to t w o tonk compn?-.ies WGS ~ c o e p t s d . Opinions w r e expressed on t h e p ropor t ions o f th ree i n f c n t r y conponies t o b o tank companies, two ir.-f a n t r y c m p e n i e s t o one tank corpany, 8nd one in fnn t ry company t o one t a n k compnny. The following wcri t h o s e who favcrod t h c r n t i o o f t h r e e t o two: General Collier, Coionsls Inskt-ep, Hut tcr , Dodge, Dewey, Brown ond Hc.ndy. The fo l lowing d e s i r e d F p r o p ~ r t i o na f t w o i n f m t r y t o one t a n k companies: Genc-rnls Xcyes, X l l c n , Boudinot and Grow, cnd Colonol Bromlcy. C-snernl DeTrine was t h c only m c d;s~;ing equnl pro-p o r t i o n 3 f occ i n f o n t r y conipuriy t o one t n n k conip-cy.

3 . The Group rLcarxondcd t h c adopt ion o f a C o m l r y Squadrcn consiszing of a hcsdqunr%e:s, hcadquer tc rs end s t r v i c e t rocp , f s u r c n v e l r y t roops equipped w i t h light tnnks in s t eed cf ormsred o p r s , end an a s s a u l t gun troop. The h0r.d o f t h c Covalry Corrmitteo (Colcncl Biddl t i ) recommended t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n of &n inproved nrmored :cc for. t h e l i g h t tenk Fnd t h e R 6 d l t i o L o f r i f l c squnds wi th in tho p l a t o o n s f o r t h e r cconna i s sonce t roopc , b u t thvse rcccmzLndetions were n o t acccptcd b y t h e Group. T t vias t h e ccnsensvs o f the Group t h c t E. s u i t c b l e l i g h t t n n k should be produced f o r use ns n p r i m r y combat v e h i c l o f e r t h e Cnvol ry Squedron.

4. After hear ing 8 d i s o u s s i o n by Colonel Morris of t h e h g i n c e r S e c t i o n of thc: Bocrd on t h e reasons f o r t h t i r recoinmbndntions f o r t h e Engineer Regiment 3 s shown on t h e chEr t , t h e consunsus o f t h o Group was t h n t t h e Engineer component o f th6 proposed d i v i s i o n should c o n s i s t of an Engineer B a t t a l i o n of f o u r l i t 6 cmpcci , - s cmd ono Bridge 3mpEny w i t h He6AdqLcurter-s and Serv io t Conipcny.

5. A f t e r diso,ussion by t h e hcad of the L r t i l l o r y Sec t ion o f t h e Bcard f o r t h e o r t l l l e r y conponin t of t h e proposed d i v i s i o n m i c.ftar. l i s t e n i n g t c h i s rscommendations, t h e Group vo ted 7 t o 6 t o &opt a n orgcr. ic a r t i l l t r y ccmponant c o n s i s t i n g o f four l i g h t bl; t tolior.s and two mediun b u t t h l i o n s .

6. 1,fter a d i5cuss ion by Genercll Xrmstrcng, 3ead o f t h e A n t i - a i r c r a f t Sec t ion o f t he Board, t h e Group accepted by v o t e o f 11 t o 1 t h e proposed r n t i c i r c r n f t reg iment a s shown i n Appcndix 7,

7. The Quartermaster & . t t s l i o n racoi:mecded wc.s csccepted by t h e Group with t h e provis ion t h a t t h t ?.umber o f t r u c k compnnies ir. t h o b a t t a l i o n should depond upon t h e orgD.nic 1oF.d o f cmmni t ion t b . P t h i s t o be hauled i n a d i v i s i o n .

8. Thc maintennnce B a t t a l i o n a8 recommended vms acoepted unani - mously by the Group.

10, ne S p e c i a l Troops of the d i v i s i m were accepted a5 recon-mended.

11, It was reccmmended t h a t the a r t i l l e r y commander m d t h a t t he comnndsr of each armored regiment be a b r i g n d i e r general and thnt t he ~ ssiatnntd i v i s i o n commander be eliminated, AIsc t h a t R G-5 sec t ion , the composi t ion of which w i l l be determined l e t e r , be added tc t h e General S ta f f o f D i v i s i o n H e a d q ~ a r t e r s

It W ~ Sagreed by t h e Group that 8 t m k r s p h c m e n t section13,should he included i n t h e mintenonce compmies of each armored r e g i -ment I

lOES-7OW-l8ZW

MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT DIVISION FULL TRACK PERWNHPL CARRIERS a44

ARMORED GARS 77

LlOHt TANKS 79

MEDIUM TANKS i 7 s 62

61

ASSAULT OUNS

TANK RECOVERY VEHIGLLS

KMYM MOW SP a4

158 YM HOW 8p 36

MORTAR G A R R I M S e7

7 5 M Y BUN AUTONATIO M Si?

QUADRUPLE %!OW4 SUN A I 32

1 SCXIADRON

u-uuuu

I

,";"I ENGR BN

I

IREGIMENTI

I ME0

TK CO

1 MED

Tt( GO

[REGIMENT]

WVlSlON DlViSlON

3 8 - Z W I547 1

es-ew wo*I I

5 3 - 4 W 1108

MINT BN

I

L - r d

1-1

APPENDIX 8

CWRTS OF PROFOSED COWANY, TROOP

hXD MTTEM ORCLNI7ATIONS

Hecdquarters Armored Div i s ion . HeLdquertsrs Company, Armored Div is ion , Armored S i g n a l Compeny. M i l i t a r y Police Compcny. Heedquarters and He adq unr t ers Company,Armored Rtgimant. IL5int tnanco C cmpany,A rinc r e d Regiment . Light Tank Company, Armored Regiment nnd Cavalry Squndron. Serv ice Compmy, Armored Regiment. Headquarters and Heodqunrters Compcny, Tenk B t t t e l ion . Meeium Tank Cmpany, i.rmorad Rcgiment. Headquartere and Headquar te rs Company, Brmcred X f l o Bot tu i ion . Armored R i f l e Cor.pany. Xendquarters, HGLIdquartErs nnd Serv ice Troops, Cavolry Squadron. Cnvolry Troop. Drsgoon Troop. Caval ry hSSQUlt G W Troop. . Hea tqua r t e r s acd Eeo iquar tcrs Bat t e ry , ,‘.rrmored Divis ion A r t i l l e r y . Light Arinored F i e l d h r t i l l o r y 3 n t t a l i o n . Se rv ice Bat tc ry , Armored F i e l d . . r t i lLery Ba t t a l ion ( L O 5 and 155),l05m Armored F i e l d A r t i l l b r y Bat te ry . Medi? Armored F i e l d A r t i l l e r y Ba t tn l i cn . 155 Hcwitzer (Sp) Armored F i e l d A r t i l l e r y Bnttery. Hoadqunrters and Handquorters Bnttery, A n t i a i r c r a f t 1;r t i l l e r y Bot ta l i on. Serv ice Bat te ry , A n t i a i r c r o f t P , r t i l l o ry Bottc.lion. l n t i n i r c r c f t i . r t i : lary B o t t t r y . H e c d q w r t e r s and Hcndquart6rs Company Lrmored Engineor Regiment. Heedquarters De t cchnent JLrmorcd Engineer Ba t t a l i on. Armored Enginear Company. Hsodqucrtars und Heudquorters Company Xrnored Div i s i cn Tra ins . Supply Ba t t a l ion . Seudqvcr te rs and Headquar te rs Ccmpany Ordncnce Mcintencnco B a t t a l i o n ; Serv ice Compony, Ordnonoe hlnintsncnoe. Bnttnlion. Maintcnunce Company, Ordnunce Mcintmanc& Brxttcrlion. Heodquarters and Heaaquarzers Comptiny armorzd Medical B a t t a l i m . Medical Company.

<

h

d WTransportation f o r ?hd. Ecfi i;3D ~ TEq GO ,o

for 3ear Ecb in Tb Eq Co.

Personnel Carriers - l-2 Light Tanks - 5 Liaison Aircraft:

' L 4 4 L-5 - It

_^. . . . .

2 I 12 C

! ATCHD I i

: hED :

Personnel Carriers - 22

1 i I I

2 1 . 8 3 : 61 c! -mi 33 1 -1Yi . 18 2-2W ! 139 ---I-

EQ REPAIR 1

t

I - . - I - - - - - RADIODIT. SI 1 Y ;-

! 1 1---SEC SEC _^,1 t SEC- .! . . . r. '

-1-

i

I ! L

.. i

t

2 $---'-

r

3

I

1

: 35 -I

1 35

POLICE PLAT

* a

i

3 5 -!

TRAFFIC AND

iPOLICE P U T r--

NOTE: I, A l l p la toms shudd be tratned T n t ra f f ic , po l ice zlzd security duties,

i

NOTE: EX t o t a l U+lw/o Bank.

2 ! 30

1-3/4Tl-l/bT 1-Tra i le r

I

. - <

* Indent ical v i f i platoons of C 2 T T r s .

I

Pewomel Carriers - 2 Tank Recovery Vehicles - 8

Light Tanks - 2 Medim Tanks - 8

2 Lt Tkg 1 Tk 3ec Veh

NGTZ : Same strength and organization as proposed Medim Tank Conpiny.

. -- r..-.4.w-L-.,

t

10 2% Trks 3 2*T Trks 1 Pers Carrier 1 P e r Carrier

1 Pers Carrier 2 2-$T Trks 1 3/4T Trk

Persawel Carriers - 8 Asmared Ca?s 3c

Nedium Tanks - 3 Assault GWS 6

Tank Recovery Vehicle 9- 1

&rZ;ar Carrier - 3

2-Pers Carriers 3-Md T ~ sI1 1-Pa-s Carrier 3-BIortar Carriers 6-AG's 5 4 4 . T 3-811-mMortars 1-l/L+T4-1L.4T providea for

air-ground! lis- 3-Armd C l- l / '4T 3-Fers Carr iers i s an sec) I

.*.uIc-- 1

2-21/21) Trks 1-3/43 Trk

* Identical with platoons of CavalpT Troaps.

,--.

TANK PLATOON

5 Fled Tks 5 Me6 Tks

z I r 9 0 f 1 5

I

+ .__- I

Personnel Carriers - 8 Armored Cars - 3

'Itledium Tanks - 3 Assault Guns - 6

Ta& Ftecovery Vehicle - 3, Morta.r Carrier - 3

2 25I .------._IC-

f ASSAILT ! GUN \

\.

NOTE: This organization is ictent-ical with the Hq & Hq Co of the Tank B a t k l i o n .

1

Personnel Carriers - 20 Ywck, 1/4 Ton -- 3

?ruck, 2 1/2 ion, CaYgo - 2 ' T ~ z i l e r s- 3

I Pers C1 Pers c 1 Pers c 1 Pers C 1 P e r s C 1 1/4 T

1 . I 10 ..__ -HQSEC'

Armored C x s - 4 2 1/2 T Trucks - 15

Personnel Carriers - 3 1 1/2 T Iruck - 1

Recovery Vehicle - 1I

?

A

E v

firmored Cars - 10 Personnel Carriers - 4

1 36 -. L I

! CAV PLAT- -i

Personnel Carriers - I,!+

_ _ . .---

I

Personnel Carriers - 9 Assault Guns - 8

Tank Recovery Vehicle - 1

3

--i

1 f c-1c--

I1

'j t

0 ! i 5.

i

0 I 4

1 Trk 2i T l a T 1 Tk Rec Veh

1 Trk 2* T 1 + T 1 Trl, 1 T

. -.C".--

1 Pers C I $ T ;

3 AG 1 AG 1 Pers C

B r i g Geo - GG COl Lt Col

j !kj fkj

Ca?t Czpt Capt Capt C a g t czpt1st Lt. 1st Lt 1st L t 1st Lt 1st Lt in6 Lt

- Exec .s-3

- S - 3 A i r - s-2 - Asst s-3 - s-I, s-& - cr,,, - Asst s-2 - Asst s-2 ( C O i m t € T ;icrt2T) - L i z i s ~ r -P i l c t - s-3 (I & E)- Liaison Gro-mZ - $-Ets-l (A & 3) - Liaison Pilot - A i r O b - A i r Obs - ADC - ADG

1

i ? 1 t.iu

f

LIGHT kled Tanks - 3 AFNORXD FA Pers Carriers - 31

105mm SP HOFS - 18BN 2 1/2 Ton Trucks - 25

518 Recov Veh - 2 42 I 10 Ton lrjrecker - 1

I

ek

W

I

Trucks, 2 1/2 T - 21 Recovery vehicles - 2

Kreclrer, 10 'I- 1

n m v

Personnel Carriers - 7 1 0 5 ~ - 6HOW (SP)

i 11 62

BTRY c iHQ _ -._ I-

I T-'I

. lded Tanks - 3

P e r s Ca r r i e r s - 31 155" SP KOWS - 1s

I 2 1/2 TOXI!@ks - 25 Zecov Veh - 2

3.0 Ton Vrecker - 1

9 * 15 - 6 i 83 1 - 1 &GC - 10 ! r - - - - 6

! 1 I

i - I ! - 1

f

0 117 I I11 5-mgr.SEC 5

;-.

Personnel Carriers - 10 155 HOW SP - 6

2 1/2 Ton Trucks - 5

&-

1

*

! 10

1

2

3 2 1/2 T Trucks - 13

.PersonnelCarriers -

T l - 2 1 / 2 T 2 - 2 1 / 2 TI - Pers C 1 - l / 4 T 1 - I/& 5

75Dm M SP Glhs - 8 20mm Quad G u n s - 8

P e r s Carriers - 4 2 1/2 T Tn-cks - 1

i 29 2 1I

55 2 1 5 5

t i

1-Pers C 1 - Pers C 1 - Pers G 1 - 75" 2 - 1 / 4 Ton 1 - 2 1 / 2 *Ton 1 - l / h Ton I - ZOmm

2 - l /4 Ton

--- ---I II-'---

.

-I--- s I

1-PEI'S c 1 -Pen C 3-21/21'

2 .-.. t

c

i

I I '

rlt

Personnel Carriers - 4 Armored Cars - 3

8

2 Pers Carriers Ic -

It ."-----a-

1 5 2* T Trks

1 2ers Carr ier z 2+ T Trk

Trucks, 2 1/2 T - 112 Tmck5&4 T, Tractor -

Semi-Trailers - 10 3

Clu th ing Repair

Tersonnel Csrr iers - 1 Trucks, 1 1/2 T Cargo - 4. TnlCkst 2 112 T CtLrgO - 23 Trai le rs , Animal Cargo - 6 Trai lers , 2 1/2 Ton - 15 TTIIC~S,#reckcr, 10 Ton - 2 Trucks, 4-5 Ton, ’Cractor - 6

-- 1 t 9.

i-HQI ‘SEC I 1-1112 T 1-2 1/2 T

I--"--

-- .

'c 1_.

3-1/4T l--l/i+T 1-1 1/2 T 1-1 1/2 T 2-2 1/2 T 10-2 1/2 T l-Trk, Shop M535

i +'Irk, Emergency R e p i r 1 1, 0 ' 5 - 1 ! 29 1-Trk, Hvy Rreckhg

HQ MAINT BDM, SUP1 1 I I SEC &k MESS SEC ISEC .-- - . 1 1

Trks, 1 1/2T = 83-v-4 T 1-1/4 T 1-1/4.T .- 2 Trk, 2 1/2 T -271-1 1/2 T 1-2 1/2 T 1-1 1/2 T i s .Trk, Ihchine Shop Load A&B - 21-2 l j 2 T 3-2 112 T Trk, Shop E3335 - 4 Trk, belding - 1

Trk, Hvy Tirecking - 4 T&_, Automotive Lo.2d A&B - 2

Trk, E l e c R e p i r - 1 T r k , Ins t Repcir - 1

Trk, Emergency 2epai-r - 9 Trk, S r a l l A?ms 6EpaiT - 1

23 - 2d - 109 Trucks, 2 1/2 T, Cargo = 11

1..-..-I.---- --.-. -”

Ambulances - 12 Trucks, 2-& T Cargo - 7 Trucks, Surgical -

2 Tyk, Surgl + T 2 'Irk, 25 T1 3/4 T, c R 2 3/4 T, c i% R3 Trk, 2% 3' 2 Trlr.Zzf.cr1 TrI2 Prater 2 Trlr; 1. T2 Trl, I T

,-.--. -.

CDWOSIT1UN: Brmd T n f Rn

. I&? Tk Co %$Ed !& Cu Brmd Engr P l a t 105 A d FA 'En (Directsupport)