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    ARTICLE VII: Executive Department

    Sec. 1: President

    The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

    Sec. 2: Qualifications

    Natural-born citizen

    Registered voter

    Able to read and write

    At least 40 yrs old on the day of election

    Resident for at least 10 yrs immediately preceding the election

    Sec. 3: Vice-President

    Same qualifications and term of office as Pres

    Elected and removed in same manner as Pres

    May be a member of the Cabinet without need of confirmation

    Sec. 4: Election and Term of Office

    PRESIDENT six years without re-election

    VICE-PRESIDENT six years, 2 successive terms

    Q: If the Vice-President succeeds in the Presidency, is he allowed to run for

    President in the next election?

    A: Yes, provided he did not hold the office of the President for more than 4 yrs.

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    Congress as Board of Canvassers

    PROCEDURE:

    Duly certified returns from each province or city shall be transmitted to Congress,

    directed to the Senate President

    Upon receipt of certificate of canvass, the Senate President shall, not later than 30

    days after election day, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the

    House of reps in a joint public session

    Congress shall determine the due authenticity and due execution of the certificate

    canvass and start canvassing the votes

    Congress shall proclaim the candidate having the highest number of votes

    In case of tie, Congress shall vote separately and the candidate having the majority

    votes of all members of both Houses shall be proclaimed the winner

    Role of Congress in Presidential Election is to canvass the votes (See Barbers vs.

    Comelec)

    Supreme Court en banc as Presidential Electoral TribunalSole judge of all contents relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the

    President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose

    NOTA BENE:

    No pre-proclamation controversy is allowed against Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidates, EXCEPT: the correction of manifest errors in the certificate

    of canvass or election returns or State of Votes

    Only the candidate who garners the second or third highest number of votes may

    question the proclamation of a winner.

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    COMELEC has no jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies in presidential,

    vice-presidential, senatorial and congressional elections; Correction of Manifest

    Error in the Statement of Votes may be filed directly with COMELEC en banc

    Sandoval vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133842, Jan. 26, 2000

    The case involves the elective office of congressman of one legislative district, which

    is contested on the ground of manifest error arising from the non-inclusion of 19

    election returns in the canvass, thus making the same incomplete.

    While the COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation

    controversies, the exception to the general rule can be found under sec. 15 of RA

    7166 which prohibits candidates in the presidential, vice-presidential, senatorialand congressional elections from filing pre-proclamation cases.

    The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the

    election, which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. The law,

    nonetheless, provides an exception to the exception. The second sentence of Sec. 15

    allows the filing of petitions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of

    canvass or election returns even in elections for president, vice-president and

    members of the House for the simple reason that the correction of manifest error

    will not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winnerin the election.

    Correction of a manifest error in the Statement of Votes may be filed directly with

    the COMELEC en banc (rule 27, sec. 5, 1993 Rules of the COMELEC). This is another

    exception to the rule that pre-proclamation controversies must first be heard and

    decided by a division of the Commission.

    In determination of the case, the COMELEC must observe due process of law sincethis involves the exercise of its quasi-judicial power.

    Protestant cannot be substituted by widow in case of death of the former pending

    resolution of election protest; Substitute must be a real party in interest

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    Poe vs. Arroyo, PET Case No. 002, March 29, 2005

    FACTS:

    GMA and FPJ both ran for President in the May 10, 2004 elections. GMA obtained the

    highest number of votes, with FPJ at second place. On July 23, 2004, after GMA took

    her Oath of Office, FPJ seasonably filed an election protest but while case was

    pending, FPJ died of cardio-pulmonary arrest. Mrs. FPJ, through counsel, filed a

    petition for substitution, substituting herself for her deceased husband.

    ISSUE: Whether or not the window of a deceased candidate is a proper party in anelection contest

    RULING:

    ...only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. By this

    express enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined the real parties in

    interest concerning an on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if

    the declared winner had not been truly voted upon by the electorate, the candidatewho received that 2nd or 3rd highest number of votes would be the legitimate

    beneficiary in a successful election contest.

    Suppletory application of the Rules of Court

    Rule 3, Sec. 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. This rule allows

    substitution by a legal representative. It can be gleaned from the citation of this rule

    that movant/intervenor seeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legalrepresentative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by said Sec. 16. However,

    in our application of this rule to an election contest, we have every time ruled that a

    public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the

    heirs upon death. Thus, we consistently rejected substation by the widow or the

    heirs in election contests where the protestant dies during the pendency of the

    protest. In Vda. De De Mesa vs. Mencias, we recognized substitution upon the death

    of the protestee but denied substitution by the widow or heirs since they are not the

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    real parties in interest. Similarly, in the later case of De la Victoria vs. Commission

    on Elections, we struck down the claim of the surviving spouse and children of the

    protestee to the contested office for the same reason. Even in analogous cases

    before other electoral tribunals, involving substitution by the widow of a deceased

    protestant, in cases where the widow is not a real party in interest, we denied

    substitution by the wife or heirs.

    Who may question: Real Party in Interest

    ...We have held...that while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the

    public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the

    protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of

    all authority to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, we have allowed

    substitution and intervention by only by a real party in interest. A real party ininterest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the

    party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. In Vda. De De Mesa vs. Mencias and

    Lomugdang vs. Javier, we permitted substitution by the vice-mayor since the vice-

    mayor is a real party in interest considering that if the protest succeeds and the

    protestee is unseated, the vice-mayor succeeds to the office of the mayor that

    becomes vacant if the one duly elected cannot assume office. In contrast, herein

    movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of

    President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude that

    protestants widow is not a real party in interest to this election protest.

    Effect of resumption of old post on the election protest

    Santiago vs. Ramos, PET Case No. 001, Feb. 13, 1996

    In assuming the office of Senator, the protestant has effectively abandoned or

    withdrawn her election protests, thereby making it moot.

    The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the

    first three of which coincides with the last three years of the term of the President

    elected in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant

    Santiagos term if she would succeed in proving in the instant protest that she was

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    the true winner in the 1992 elections. In assuming the office of Senator then, the

    Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the very least,

    in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her determination to protect and pursue

    the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.

    Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest.

    Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it woulddissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election,

    thereby enhancing the all-to crucial political stability of the nation during this

    period of national recovery. It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the

    Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election protest may be summarily dismissed,

    regardless of the public policy and public interest implications thereof, on the

    following grounds: (1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance; (2) The

    petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof; (3) The

    filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for in these Rules; (4) The cash

    deposit, or the first P 100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after the filing

    of the protest; and (5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed

    with the Tribunal are not clearly legible. Other grounds for a motion to dismiss, e.g.,those provided in the Rules of Court which apply in a suppletory character, may

    likewise be pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer. After which, the Tribunal

    may, in its discretion, hold a preliminary hearing on such grounds. In sum, if an

    election be dismissed on technical grounds, then it must be, for a decidedly stronger

    reason, if it has become moot due to its abandonment by the Protestant.

    The protestant abandoned her election protest when she waived the revision of the

    remaining ballots and failed to inform the tribunal whether she still intends to

    present additional evidence after the completion of the revision of the ballots from

    the pilot areas

    This Tribunal cannot close its eyes to the fact that the Protestant has decided to

    waive the revision of the remaining unrevised ballots from 4,017 precincts out of

    the 17,527 precincts of the designated three pilot areas. This is an unabashed

    reversal from her original stand in her Motion and Manifestation dated 18 October

    1993. Taking this into account, this Tribunal declared in its resolution of 21 October

    1993: After deliberating on the foregoing pleadings and the arguments of the

    parties, the Tribunal rules for the Protestant insofar as the revision of the remaining

    ballot boxes from her pilot areas are concerned, and against the immediateapplication of Rule 61 of the Rules of the Tribunal to the Protestee in respect of the

    Counter-Protest. At this stage of the proceedings in this case it cannot be reasonably

    determined whether the revised ballots are considerable enough to establish a

    trend either in favor of or against the Protestant as would justify an appropriate

    action contemplated in Rule 61 of the Rules of the Tribunal, or whether the

    unrevised ballots from said areas would not, in the language of the Protestant,

    materially affect the result of the representative sample of the ballot boxes so far

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    revised. As to the 1,300 ballot boxes from Makati, the proper time to raise the

    objections to the ballot boxes and its contents would be during the revision stage.

    Consequently, we resolved therein to: A. ORDER the revision of the remaining

    unrevised ballot boxes enumerated in the aforequoted paragraph A to the 5 October

    1995 Resolution and for the purpose to DiRECT the Acting Clerk of Court of the

    Tribunal to collect said ballot boxes and other election documents andparaphernalia from their respective custodians in the event that their revisions in

    connection with other election protests in which they are involved have been

    terminated, and if such revisions are not yet completed, to coordinate with the

    appropriate tribunal or court in which such other election protests are pending and

    which have already obtained custody of the ballot boxes and started revision with

    the end in view of either seeking expeditious revisions in such other election

    protests or obtaining the custody of the ballot boxes and related election documents

    and paraphernalia for their immediate delivery to the Tribunal; and B. REQUIRE the

    Protestant to inform the Tribunal, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, if after

    the completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas she would present

    evidence in connection therewith. Until the present,however, the Protestant has notinformed the Tribunal whether after the completion of the revision of the ballots

    from her pilot areas, she still intends to present evidence in connection therewith.

    This failure then, is nothing short of a manifest indication that she no longer intends

    to do so.

    Sec. 6: Privilege and Salary

    PRIVILEGES:

    Official residence (Malacanang Palace)

    Immunity from suit not provided in the Constitution; to prevent distraction fromperformance of duties

    SALARY

    Fixed by law

    Cannot be decreased during tenure (actual time he held office) and cannot be

    increased during his term (only upon expiration of the term)

    Shall not receive during tenure any other emolument from Government or any other

    source

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    Sec. 7 and 8: Assumption of Office and Succession

    WHEN: before noon of June 30

    If President-elect fails to qualify, dies or is permanently incapacitated, Vice-President-elect becomes the President

    If the President-elect becomes incapacitated temporarily, the Vice-President-elect

    will act as President until such a time that the President can assume office

    If there is failure to elect the president, the Vice-President will assume or act as

    President

    If the President, during his term, dies, gets disabled permanently, is removed from

    office, or resigns, the Vice-President becomes the President

    SUCCESSION IN CASE OF VACANCY:

    Vice-President

    Senate President

    Speaker of the House

    Sec. 9: Vacancy of Vice-Presidency

    The President shall nominate one from the Senate and the House of Reps who shall

    assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of the

    Houses, voting separately

    Sec. 10: Special Election in Case of Vacancy

    WHEN: 10:00 a.m. of the third day after the vacancy

    Congress will convene without need of a call and within 7 days enact a law calling

    for a special election to be held not earlier than 45 days nor later than 60 days fromtime of such call

    Sec. 11: Acting President

    GROUND: inability to discharge the powers and duties of the office

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    HOW: written declaration of the President or majority of his Cabinet

    Vice-President shall assume office as Acting President

    RESUMPTION OF OFFICE: also through written declaration of the President; if

    majority of Cabinet denies such declaration, Congress shall decide the issue (if not in

    session, Congress will convene within 48 hrs) within 10 days (12 days if not insession), by 2/3 vote

    Sec. 12: Illness of the President

    Public shall be informed of the state of his health

    Members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the

    Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces shall not be denied access to the President during

    such illness

    Sec. 13: Prohibition

    Cannot hold any other office or employment during tenure

    Cannot, during tenure, directly or indirectly practice any profession, participate in

    any business or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or

    special privilege granted by the Government

    Strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office

    Presidents spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the 4th civil

    degree be appointed as members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of

    the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus

    or offices, including GOCCs and subsidiaries

    WHO CANNOT HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE DURING TENURE:

    President

    Vice-PresidentCabinet Members

    Deputies and Assistants

    EXCEPTIONS:

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    When Vice-President is appointed as member of the Cabinet

    When Vice-President acts as President

    When Secretary of Justice is also a member of the Judiciary

    Q: Does the President have the same prohibition as Congress?

    A: No, because Congress is only prohibited from holding offices in GOCCs and any

    other government instrumentality, agency or subsidiary during term while

    Executive is prohibited from holding any other office, whether public or private

    during tenure.

    Q: What is ex officio capacity?

    A: When an official holds other duties for the same office where he does not receive

    additional compensation and the office is required by his primary function.

    Sec. 14 and 15: Appointments extended by Acting President

    Effective unless revoked by the elected President within 90 days from his

    assumption or reassumption of office

    Acting President shall not make appointments 2 mos immediately before the nextpresidential elections and up to the end of his term, EXCEPT: temporary

    appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will

    prejudice public service or endanger public safety

    Sec. 16: Appointing Power

    TYPES OF APPOINTMENT:

    Regular

    Ad Interim

    Temporary

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    Acting Appointments, effect and validity (See Pimental vs. Executive Secretary)

    Q: When is Congress considered to be in recess?

    A: Recess it not the time between the adjournment of Congress and the start of itsregular session. The recess referred to here is the times of interval of the session of

    the same Congress.

    Q: How long will ad interim appointments last?

    A: Such appointments will last until disapproved by the Commission on

    Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.

    WHO ARE APPOINTED BY PRESIDENT:

    Heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,

    officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other

    officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution requires

    confirmation from Commission on Appointments

    All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise

    provided by law

    Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint

    Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the

    President alone

    Nature of Ad Interim Appointment; Rights of Ad Interim Appointee; How Ad Interim

    Appointment is Terminated; Effect of Ad Interim Appointment as to Reappointment

    Matibag vs. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002

    FACTS:

    COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as Acting Director IV of the EID. Suchappointment was renewed in temporary capacity twice, first by Chairperson

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    Demetrio and then by Commissioner Javier. Later, PGMA appointed, ad interim,

    Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC

    Commissioners, each for a term of 7 yrs. The three took their oaths of office and

    assumed their positions. However, since the Commission on Appointments did not

    act on said appointments, PGMA renewed the ad interim appointments.

    ISSUES:

    Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis

    of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary

    appointment prohibited by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C

    Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office

    by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad

    interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the same positions

    violate the prohibition on reappointment under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C

    RULING:

    Nature of an Ad Interim Appointment

    An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect

    immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointeehas qualified into office. The fact that is subject to confirmation by the Commission

    on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself

    makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective

    until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next

    adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Sec.16, Art.VII of the

    Constitution provides as follows:

    The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the

    Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall beeffective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the

    next adjournment of the Congress.

    Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next

    adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the

    President. xxx

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    ...the term ad interim appointment means a permanent appointment made by

    the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a

    temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term,

    although not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite legal

    meaning under Philippine jurisprudence.

    Rights of an Ad Interim Appointee

    An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that

    moment a government employee and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys

    the constitution protection that [n]o officer or employee in the civil service shall be

    removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. Thus, an ad interim

    appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified

    into office. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible

    only if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, and any

    withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office. Once an

    appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not

    only by statute but also by the Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after

    notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process.

    How Ad Interim Appointment is Terminated

    An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the

    Constitution. The first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the

    Commission on Appointments. The second cause is the adjournment of Congress

    without the Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment. These two

    causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all ad

    interim appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of

    Damocles over the heads of ad interim appointees. No one, however, can complain

    because it is the Constitution itself that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads

    of the ad interim appointees.

    Ad Interim Appointment vs. Temporary Appointment

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    While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided

    by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be

    withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or

    acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This

    is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from

    making to the three independent constitutional commissions, including theCOMELEC xxx

    Was the renewal of appointment valid?

    There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on

    Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a

    final decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking

    power on the appointing authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision onthe merits, being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its consent

    after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the Constitution does

    not provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final and binding

    on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this instance, the President

    can no longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition

    on reappointment, but because of a final decision by the Commission on

    Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment.

    An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the

    Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed

    appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the

    Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no

    final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to

    the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the

    President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee xxx

    The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution

    applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A

    disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interimappointment because the disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII of the

    Constitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2),

    Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived

    by a new ad interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under

    Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment will not result

    in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.

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    Appointment Power of President; Power of Control

    Rufino vs. Endriga, G.R. No. 139554, July 21, 2006

    Appointment Power of President

    Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three

    groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments,

    ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from

    the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are

    vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whomthe President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all

    other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided

    by law.

    Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose

    appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies,

    commissions, or boards. The present case involves the interpretation of Section 16,

    Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with respect to the appointment of this fourth

    group of officers.

    The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the

    Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the second and third groups

    of officers without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President

    appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing

    power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or

    board to appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15

    is found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board

    because the trustees fall under the third group of officers.

    Scope of Appointment Power of the Heads of Departments, Agencies, Commissions

    or Boards

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    The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended that Congress could by law

    vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the heads of departments,

    agencies, commissions, or boards. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional

    Commission explain this intent beyond any doubt.

    The framers of the 1987 Constitution changed the qualifying word inferior to the

    less disparaging phrase lower in rank purely for style. However, the clear intent

    remained that these inferior or lower in rank officers are the subordinates of the

    heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards who are vested by law with

    the power to appoint. The express language of the Constitution and the clear intent

    of its framers point to only one conclusion the officers whom the heads of

    departments, agencies, commissions, or boards may appoint must be of lower rank

    than those vested by law with the power to appoint.

    Congress may vest the authority to appoint only in the heads of the named offices

    Further, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes Congress to vest

    in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards the power to

    appoint lower-ranked officers. xxx

    In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the Secretary. The law may not

    authorize the Undersecretary, acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive department. In an agency, the power is vested in the

    head of the agency for it would be preposterous to vest it in the agency itself. In a

    commission, the head is the chairperson of the commission. In a board, the head is

    also the chairperson of the board. In the last three situations, the law may not also

    authorize officers other than the heads of the agency, commission, or board to

    appoint lower-ranked officers.

    The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards

    is a matter of legislative grace. Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold

    from, the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards the power to appoint lower-

    ranked officers. If it so grants, Congress may impose certain conditions for the

    exercise of such legislative delegation, like requiring the recommendation of

    subordinate officers or the concurrence of the other members of the commission or

    board.

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    This is in contrast to the Presidents power to appoint which is a self-executingpower vested by the Constitution itself and thus not subject to legislative limitations

    or conditions. The power to appoint conferred directly by the Constitution on the

    Supreme Court en banc and on the Constitutional Commissions is also self-executing

    and not subject to legislative limitations or conditions.

    The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked

    officers specifically in the heads of the specified offices, and in no other person.

    The word heads refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not

    to their members xxx.

    Presidents Power of Control

    The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends

    to all executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This

    constitutional power of the President is self-executing and does not require any

    implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the Presidents power of control

    over the Executive branch.

    xxx

    The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government. The

    CCP is also not one of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a

    quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under theExecutive branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency not

    placed by law or order creating them under any specific department falls underthe Office of the President.

    Since the President exercises control over all the executive departments, bureaus,

    and offices, the President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is anoffice in the Executive branch. In mandating that the President shall have control ofall executive x x x offices, Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not

    exempt any executive office one performing executive functions outside of the

    independent constitutional bodies from the Presidents power of control. There isno dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-

    judicial functions.

    The Presidents power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers in the

    Executive branch. This is true whether such officers are appointed by the President

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    or by heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of control

    means the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer

    involving the exercise of discretion.

    In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercisescontrol of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. There can be noinstance under the Constitution where an officer of the Executive branch is outside

    the control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary since there is only one

    President vested with executive power exercising control over the entire Executive

    branch. Any office in the Executive branch that is not under the control of the

    President is a lost command whose existence is without any legal or constitutional

    basis.

    The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a government office in theExecutive branch outside the control of the President in the guise of insulating that

    office from politics or making it independent. If the office is part of the Executive

    branch, it must remain subject to the control of the President. Otherwise, the

    Legislature can deprive the President of his constitutional power of control over all

    the executive x x x offices. If the Legislature can do this with the Executive branch,

    then the Legislature can also deal a similar blow to the Judicial branch by enacting a

    law putting decisions of certain lower courts beyond the review power of the

    Supreme Court. This will destroy the system of checks and balances finely

    structured in the 1987 Constitution among the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial

    branches.

    Of course, the Presidents power of control does not extend to quasi-judicial bodies

    whose proceedings and decisions are judicial in nature and subject to judicial

    review, even as such quasi-judicial bodies may be under the administrative

    supervision of the President. It also does not extend to local government units,

    which are merely under the general supervision of the President.

    Sec. 17: Power of Control

    Power to Reorganize

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    Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 142801-802, July 10, 2001

    FACTS:

    Pres. Estrada issued EO 191, deactivating the EIIB and transferring its functions to

    the BOC and NBI. As a result, the EIIB personnel were deemed separated from

    service.

    RULING:

    Deactivation vs. Abolition

    At first glance, it seems that the resolution of this case hinges on the question Doesthe deactivation of EIIB constitute abolition of an office? However, after coming

    to terms with the prevailing law and jurisprudence, we are certain that the ultimate

    queries should be a) Does the President have the authority to reorganize the

    executive department? And b) How should the reorganization be carried out?

    Surely, there exists a distinction between the words deactivate and abolish. Todeactivate means to render inactive or ineffective or to break up by discharging or

    reassigning personnel, while to abolish means to do away with, to annul, abrogate

    or destroy completely. In essence, abolition denotes an intention to do away with

    the office wholly and permanently. Thus, while in abolition, the office ceases to exist,

    the same is not true in deactivation where the office continues to exist, albeit

    remaining dormant or inoperative. Be that as it may, deactivation and abolition are

    both reorganization measures.

    GR: Congress has power to abolish

    The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged

    with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create

    includes the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either

    created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where

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    the office was created by the Constitution itself, may be abolished by the same

    legislature that brought it into existence.

    The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive

    department are concerned, the Presidents power of control may justify him toinactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the

    broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.

    What law gives President power to reorganize?

    In the whereas clause of E.O. No. 191, former President Estrada anchored his

    authority to deactivate EIIB on Section 77 of Republic Act 8745 (FY 1999 General

    Appropriations Act), a provision similar to Section 62 of R.A. 7645 quoted in Larin,thus;

    Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the

    President of the Philippines, no changes in key positions or organizational units in

    any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organizational

    structures and funded from appropriations provided by this Act.

    We adhere to the precedent or ruling in Larin that this provision recognizes theauthority of the President to effect organizational changes in the department or

    agency under the executive structure. Such a ruling further finds support in Section

    78 of Republic Act No. 8760. Under this law, the heads of departments, bureaus,

    offices and agencies and other entities in the Executive Branch are directed (a) to

    conduct a comprehensive review of their respective mandates, missions, objectives,

    functions, programs, projects, activities and systems and procedures; (b) identify

    activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which

    may be scaled down, phased-out or abolished; and (c) adopt measures that will

    result in the streamlined organization and improved overall performance of their

    respective agencies. Section 78 ends up with the mandate that the actual

    streamlining and productivity improvement in agency organization and operation

    shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office

    of the President. The law has spoken clearly. We are left only with the duty to

    sustain.

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    But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any

    department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must

    not lose sight of the very source of the power that which constitutes an express

    grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise

    known as the Administrative Code of 1987), the President, subject to the policy in

    the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shallhave the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the

    Office of the President. For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of otherDepartments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre, we

    ruled that reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation ofoffices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It

    takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government

    offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility

    between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls

    under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents continuing

    authority to reorganize.

    Was the reorganization valid?

    It having been duly established that the President has the authority to carry out

    reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department, what is then

    left for us to resolve is whether or not the reorganization is valid. In this jurisdiction,

    reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good

    faith. Reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy

    or to make bureaucracy more efficient. Pertinently, Republic Act No. 6656 providesfor the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the

    removal of civil service employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a)

    where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing

    pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and

    another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) where

    incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment,

    performance and merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the

    department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially

    the same functions as the original offices, and (e) where the removal violates the

    order of separation.

    While basically, the functions of the EIIB have devolved upon the Task Force

    Aduana, we find the latter to have additional new powers. The Task Force Aduana,

    being composed of elements from the Presidential Security Group (PSG) and

    Intelligence Service Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), has the essential

    power to effect searches, seizures and arrests. The EIIB did not have this power. The

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    Task Force Aduana has the power to enlist the assistance of any department,

    bureau, office, or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned

    or controlled corporations; and to use their personnel, facilities and resources.

    Again, the EIIB did not have this power. And, the Task Force Aduana has the

    additional authority to conduct investigation of cases involving ill-gotten wealth.

    This was not expressly granted to the EIIB.

    Consequently, it cannot be said that there is a feigned reorganization. In Blaquera v.

    Civil Sevice Commission, we ruled that a reorganization in good faith is one

    designed to trim the fat off the bureaucracy and institute economy and greater

    efficiency in its operation.

    Valid abolition of office is not separation

    Lastly, we hold that petitioners right to security of tenure is not violated. Nothing is

    better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of

    a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. Valid abolition of

    offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents.

    Alter Ego Doctrine or Qualified Political Agency

    Sec. of DOTC vs. Mabalot, 378 SCRA 129 (2000)

    FACTS:

    The Sec. of DOTC issued to LTFRB Chairman MO 96-735, transferring the regional

    functions of that office to DOTCCAR Regional Office, pending creation of a Regional

    LTFRO. Later, the new Sec. of DOTC issued DO 97-1025, establishing the DOTCCAR

    Regional Office as the Regional Office of the LTFRB to exercise regional functions ofthe LTFRB in the CAR subject to the direct supervision and control of the LTFRB

    Central Office. Mabalot protested.

    ISSUE: W/N the MO and DO are violative of the provision of the Constitution against

    encroachment on the powers of the legislative department

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    HELD:

    SC upheld the validity of the issuance of the challenged orders.

    In the absence of any patent or latent constitutional or statutory infirmity attending

    the issuance of the challenged orders, Court upholds. The President, through his

    duly constituted political agent and alter ego, may legally and validly decree the

    reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of the DOTCCAR as

    the LTFRB Regional Office of CAR with the concomitant transfer and performance of

    public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.

    There are three modes of establishing an administrative body: (1) Constitution; (2)

    Statute; and (3) by authority of law. This case falls under the third category.

    The DOTC Secretary, as alter ego of the President, is authorized by law to create and

    establish the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office. This is anchored on the Presidentspower of control under sec. 17, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution.

    Control

    By definition, control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set

    aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to

    substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. It includes the authority

    to order the doing of an act by a subordinate or to undo such act or to assume a

    power directly vested in him by law.

    Under sec. 20, Bk. III, E.O. 292, the Chief Executive is granted residual powers,stating that unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such

    other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under

    the laws xxx

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    What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is PD 1772 which amended PD

    1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing

    authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to

    group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to

    create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and

    materials.

    Granted that the President has the power to reorganize, was the reorganization of

    DOTCCAR valid?

    In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in

    good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for

    the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. The reorganization

    in the instant case was decreed in the interest of service and for purposes ofeconomy and more effective coOrdination of the DOTC functions in the Cordillera

    Administrative Region. It thus bear the earmarks of good faith.

    Power of President to Contract or Guarantee Foreign Loans may be delegated to

    Secretary of Finance but must first secure Prior Consent; What Powers May Not Be

    Delegated

    Constantino vs. Cuisia, .G.R. No. 106064, Oct. 13, 2005

    Power of President to contract or guarantee foreign loans (Sec. 20, Art. VII)

    For their first constitutional argument, petitioners submit that the buyback and

    bond-conversion schemes do not constitute the loan contract or guaranteecontemplated in the Constitution and are consequently prohibited. Sec. 20, Art. VII

    of the Constitution provides xxx

    The language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows the

    President to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on the

    issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt

    instruments are more onerous than others. This Court may not ascribe to the

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    Constitution meanings and restrictions that would unduly burden the powers of the

    President. The plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be

    construed in a sense that will allow the full exercise of the power provided therein.

    It would be the worst kind of judicial legislation if the courts were to misconstrue

    and change the meaning of the organic act.

    The only restriction that the Constitution provides, aside from the prior concurrence

    of the Monetary Board, is that the loans must be subject to limitations provided by

    law. In this regard, we note that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 245 as amended by Pres.

    Decree (P.D.) No. 142, s. 1973, entitled An Act Authorizing the Secretary of Finance

    to Borrow to Meet Public Expenditures Authorized by Law, and for Other Purposes,

    allows foreign loans to be contracted in the form of, inter alia, bonds.

    xxx

    Under the foregoing provisions, sovereign bonds may be issued not only to

    supplement government expenditures but also to provide for the purchase,

    redemption, or refunding of any obligation, either direct or guaranteed, of the

    Philippine Government.

    On the Buyback Scheme

    In their Comment, petitioners assert that the power to pay public debts lies with

    Congress and was deliberately withheld by the Constitution from the President. It is

    true that in the balance of power between the three branches of government, it is

    Congress that manages the countrys coffers by virtue of its taxing and spending

    powers. However, the law-making authority has promulgated a law ordaining an

    automatic appropriations provision for debt servicing by virtue of which the

    President is empowered to execute debt payments without the need for further

    appropriations.

    xxx

    Buyback is a necessary power which springs from the grant of the foreign

    borrowing power. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such

    provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make

    effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such

    collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from

    its terms. The President is not empowered to borrow money from foreign banks and

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    governments on the credit of the Republic only to be left bereft of authority to

    implement the payment despite appropriations therefor.

    On Delegation of Power

    Petitioners stress that unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the

    President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution

    in the person of the President. They argue that the gravity by which the exercise of

    the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the President alone must

    exercise this power. They submit that the requirement of prior concurrence of an

    entity specifically named by the Constitutionthe Monetary Boardreinforces thesubmission that not respondents but the President alone and personally can

    validly bind the country.

    Petitioners position is negated both by explicit constitutional and legal

    imprimaturs, as well as the doctrine of qualified political agency.

    The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of

    the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that

    the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the governments

    debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed

    as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives,and meet any other sovereign debt management goals.

    If, as petitioners would have it, the President were to personally exercise every

    aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running

    the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activities

    the propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the

    many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with

    creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary

    Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often

    than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of

    constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions

    and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would

    unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the government.

    Necessity thus gave birth to the doctrine of qualified political agency xxx

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    What powers may not be delegated

    xxx There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional

    circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental

    freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over thoseexercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the

    suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power

    notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this

    special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the

    constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a

    showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional

    import.

    We cannot conclude that the power of the President to contract or guarantee foreigndebts falls within the same exceptional class. Indubitably, the decision to contract or

    guarantee foreign debts is of vital public interest, but only akin to any contractual

    obligation undertaken by the sovereign, which arises not from any extraordinary

    incident, but from the established functions of governance.

    Secretary of Finance must get prior consent of President

    Another important qualification must be made. The Secretary of Finance or anydesignated alter ego of the President is bound to secure the latters prior consent to

    or subsequent ratification of his acts. In the matter of contracting or guaranteeing

    foreign loans, the repudiation by the President of the very acts performed in this

    regard by the alter ego will definitely have binding effect. Had petitioners herein

    succeeded in demonstrating that the President actually withheld approval and/or

    repudiated the Financing Program, there could be a cause of action to nullify the

    acts of respondents. Notably though, petitioners do not assert that respondents

    pursued the Program without prior authorization of the President or that the terms

    of the contract were agreed upon without the Presidents authorization. Congruent

    with the avowed preference of then President Aquino to honor and restructure

    existing foreign debts, the lack of showing that she countermanded the acts ofrespondents leads us to conclude that said acts carried presidential approval.

    Sec. 18: Commander-in-Chief Powers of the President:

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    Power to call on the military or armed forces

    Power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus

    Power to declare martial law

    CALLING OUT POWER

    Conditions for calling out the armed forces:

    To suppress lawless violence, rebellion or invasion

    Whenever it becomes necessary

    MARTIAL LAW

    Conditions for declaration of Martial Law:

    When there is (1) rebellion or (2) invasion (grounds)

    Public safety requires the declaration

    NOTA BENE: There must be actual rebellion or invasion. Differ this from the calling

    out power which does not require actual rebellion or invasion but only that

    whenever it (the exercise of the calling out power) becomes necessary to suppress

    lawless violence, rebellion or invasion. (See Sanlakas vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 159085,

    Feb. 3, 2004)

    What happens when Martial Law is declared:

    No suspension of operation of the Constitution

    No supplanting of the functioning of the civil courts and legislative assemblies

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    No conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where

    civil courts are able to function

    No automatic suspension of the writ of habeas corpus

    Constitutional guards against the power to declare Martial Law:

    Will last only for 60 days, unless sooner revoked by Congress

    Within 48 hours after declaration, President is required to submit a report to

    Congress

    Congress shall revoke or extend the period by jointly voting with an absolute

    majority and President may not reverse such revocation

    If Congress is not in session, they shall convene within 24 hours from such

    declaration without need for call

    Supreme Court may nullify the declaration on the ground of lack of factual basis,

    judgment to be rendered within 30 days from its filing by any ordinary citizen

    SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

    (NOTE: the conditions and effect of the suspension of the writ is similar to

    declaration of martial law)

    Restrictions to the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus:

    Apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion

    Apply only to persons judicially charged for offenses inherent in or directly

    connected with invasion

    The person arrested must be judicially charged within 3 days from arrest, otherwise

    he shall be released

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    Sec. 19: Executive Clemencies

    Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, thePresident may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and

    forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

    He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of

    all the Members of the Congress.

    EXECUTIVE CLEMENCIES:

    Amnesty

    Pardon

    Reprieve

    Commutation

    Remit fines and forfeitures

    Amnesty an act of grace by the Chief Executive as a result of the grant of amnesty,the criminal liability of the offender and all the effects of the crime are completely

    erased. It is a blanket pardon given to a class of persons who committed crimes thatare political in nature. To be valid, Congress has to concur with a majority vote

    (thus, it is a public act) and the accused must admit his guilt.

    Pardon a private act of the President granted after judgment by final conviction for

    ordinary offenses. It may be absolute or condition, in which case, acceptance of

    condition if burdensome to the accused is necessary. The effect is to relieve the

    accused from further punishment, thus, if given after sentence has been served, its

    effect is to extinguish the accessory penalties. In case of administrative cases, effect

    is reinstatement but no payment of backwages.

    Reprieve discretionary upon the President to suspend the enforcement of

    judgment

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    Sec. 20: Power to Contract or Guarantee Foreign Loans

    Scope of Power (See Constantino vs. Cuisia)

    Sec. 21: Treaty-making Power

    No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred

    in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

    Power to enter into and ratify treaties is sole prerogative of the Executive (See

    AKBAYAN vs. Aquino)

    Power to Ratify by President vs. Senates Power to Concur

    Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000

    Sec. 21, Art. VII vs. Sec. 25, Art. XVIII

    One focal point of inquiry in this controversy is the determination of which

    provision of the Constitution applies, with regard to the exercise by the senate of its

    constitutional power to concur with the VFA. Petitioners argue that Section 25,

    Article XVIII is applicable considering that the VFA has for its subject the presence of

    foreign military troops in the Philippines. Respondents, on the contrary, maintain

    that Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as the VFA is not a basing

    arrangement but an agreement which involves merely the temporary visits of

    United States personnel engaged in joint military exercises.

    The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the

    concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. Section 21,

    Article VII, which herein respondents invoke, reads:

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    No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred

    in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

    Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:

    After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the

    Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign

    military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except

    under a treaty duly concurred in by the senate and, when the Congress so requires,

    ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held

    for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

    Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements in general, inwhich case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the

    Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or international agreement, valid and

    binding on the part of the Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on

    treatise or international agreements and applies to any form of treaty with a wide

    variety of subject matter, such as, but not limited to, extradition or tax treatise or

    those economic in nature. All treaties or international agreements entered into by

    the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or

    appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.

    In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties

    which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the

    Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the

    requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to

    consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further

    requires that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the

    Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a

    majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so

    required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state.

    It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from contradicting

    each other, actually share some common ground. These constitutional provisions

    both embody phrases in the negative and thus, are deemed prohibitory in mandate

    and character. In particular, Section 21 opens with the clause No treaty x x x, andSection 25 contains the phrase shall not be allowed. Additionally, in both

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    instances, the concurrence of the Senate is indispensable to render the treaty or

    international agreement valid and effective.

    To our mind, the fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under

    Section 21, Article VII, and that the Senate extended its concurrence under the sameprovision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21, Article VII or

    Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of

    the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.

    On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States

    troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to

    govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United

    States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,

    movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment,materials and supplies.

    Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties

    involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case.

    To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21,

    Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of

    determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the

    Senate, as will be further discussed hereunder.

    Sec. 21, Art. VII should be read together with Sec. 25, Art. XVIII

    At this juncture, we shall then resolve the issue of whether or not the requirements

    of Section 25 were complied with when the Senate gave its concurrence to the VFA.

    Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the

    country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be

    under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so

    required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in anational referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

    There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the

    VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in

    accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, whether under the general

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    requirement in Section 21, Article VII, or the specific mandate mentioned in Section

    25, Article XVIII, the provision in the latter article requiring ratification by a

    majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since

    Congress has not required it.

    As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly requires that a treaty

    or international agreement, to be valid and effective, must be concurred in by at

    least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. On the other hand, Section 25,

    Article XVIII simply provides that the treaty be duly concurred in by the Senate.

    Applying the foregoing constitutional provisions, a two-thirds vote of all the

    members of the Senate is clearly required so that the concurrence contemplated by

    law may be validly obtained and deemed present. While it is true that Section 25,

    Article XVIII requires, among other things, that the treaty-the VFA, in the instantcase-be duly concurred in by the Senate, it is very true however that said provision

    must be related and viewed in light of the clear mandate embodied in Section 21,

    Article VII, which in more specific terms, requires that the concurrence of a treaty,

    or international agreement, be made by a two -thirds vote of all the members of the

    Senate. Indeed, Section 25, Article XVIII must not be treated in isolation to section

    21, Article, VII.

    As noted, the concurrence requirement under Section 25, Article XVIII must be

    construed in relation to the provisions of Section 21, Article VII. In a more particular

    language, the concurrence of the Senate contemplated under Section 25, Article

    XVIII means that at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate favorably vote

    to concur with the treaty-the VFA in the instant case.

    Under these circumstances, the charter provides that the Senate shall be composed

    of twenty-four (24) Senators. Without a tinge of doubt, two-thirds (2/3) of this

    figure, or not less than sixteen (16) members, favorably acting on the proposal is an

    unquestionable compliance with the requisite number of votes mentioned in Section

    21 of Article VII. The fact that there were actually twenty-three (23) incumbent

    Senators at the time the voting was made, will not alter in any significant way thecircumstance that more than two-thirds of the members of the Senate concurred

    with the proposed VFA, even if the two-thirds vote requirement is based on this

    figure of actual members (23). In this regard, the fundamental law is clear that two-

    thirds of the 24 Senators, or at least 16 favorable votes, suffice so as to render

    compliance with the strict constitutional mandate of giving concurrence to the

    subject treaty.

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    What constitutes a treaty

    This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that theother contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To

    require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to

    submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its

    Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. xxx

    Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an

    executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as

    binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an

    agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a

    treaty.

    Ratification by President vis--vis Concurrence of Senate

    Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the

    concurrence of the Senate should be taken as a clear an unequivocal expression of

    our nations consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to

    uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder.

    Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the

    state or of the government, as the case may be, through which the formal acceptance

    of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation the

    process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty is

    expressed by ratification when: (a) the treaty provides for such ratification, (b) it is

    otherwise established that the negotiating States agreed that ratification should be

    required, (c) the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to

    ratification, or (d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification

    appears from the full powers of its representative, or was expressed during thenegotiation.

    In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as

    commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving

    or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.

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    With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the

    exchange of notes between the Philippines and the United States of America, it now

    becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the principles of international

    law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article

    II of the Constitution, declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted

    principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the

    policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.

    Who has power to ratify treaties?

    By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head

    of State, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. In

    many ways, the President is the chief architect of the nations foreign policy; his

    dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then) conceded. Wielding vast

    powers an influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as Jefferson

    describes, is executive altogether."

    As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the

    Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at

    least two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of

    the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which

    pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive anddiplomatic powers granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself. Into the

    field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to

    invade it. Consequently, the acts or judgment calls of the President involving the

    VFA-specifically the acts of ratification and entering into a treaty and those

    necessary or incidental to the exercise of such principal acts - squarely fall within

    the sphere of his constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck down,

    much less calibrated by this Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of

    power or discretion.

    Senates Power to Concur

    As to the power to concur with treaties, the constitution lodges the same with the

    Senate alone. Thus, once the Senate performs that power, or exercises its

    prerogative within the boundaries prescribed by the Constitution, the concurrence

    cannot, in like manner, be viewed to constitute an abuse of power, much less grave

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    abuse thereof. Corollarily, the Senate, in the exercise of its discretion and acting

    within the limits of such power, may not be similarly faulted for having simply

    performed a task conferred and sanctioned by no less than the fundamental law.

    For the role of the Senate in relation to treaties is essentially legislative in character;the Senate, as an independent body possessed of its own erudite mind, has the

    prerogative to either accept or reject the proposed agreement, and whatever action

    it takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, pertains to the wisdom

    rather than the legality of the act. In this sense, the Senate partakes a principal, yet

    delicate, role in keeping the principles of separation of powers and of checks and

    balances alive and vigilantly ensures that these cherished rudiments remain true to

    their form in a democratic government such as ours. The Constitution thus

    animates, through this treaty-concurring power of the Senate, a healthy system of

    checks and balances indispensable toward our nations pursuit of political maturity

    and growth. True enough, rudimentary is the principle that matters pertaining to

    the wisdom of a legislative act are beyond the ambit and province of the courts to

    inquire.

    Power of President to Reclassify Public Lands and Sell the Same

    Reclaimed Lands vs. Submerged Lands; When invalid sales may no longer be

    invalidated

    Chavez vs. PEA & AMARI, G.R. No. 133250, May 6, 2003

    FACTS:

    The government through the PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI, a private

    corporation, in order to reclaim 157.84 hectares of lands comprising the Freedom

    Islands and 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay. The JVA provides,among others, the transfer of ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands to

    AMARI.

    ISSUE: Whether or not the JVA is valid

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    RULING:

    Reclaimed Lands are Alienable Lands of the Public Domain

    The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now

    covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public

    domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or

    transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these

    lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987

    Constitution and existing laws.

    Submerged Areas are Inalienable

    The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural

    resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open

    to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government

    can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these

    submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the

    public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In

    their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and

    outside the commerce of man.

    JVA is invalid

    The prevailing doctrine before, during and after the signing of the Amended JVA is

    that private corporations cannot hold, except by lease, alienable lands of the public

    domain. This is one of the two main reasons why the Decision annulled the

    Amended JVA. The other main reason is that submerged areas of Manila Bay, being

    part of the sea, are inalienable and beyond the commerce of man, a doctrine that has

    remained immutable since the Spanish Law on Waters of 1886. Clearly, the Decisionmerely reiterates, and does not overrule, any existing judicial doctrine.

    Even on the characterization of foreshore lands reclaimed by the government, the

    Decision does not overrule existing law or doctrine. Since the adoption of the

    Regalian doctrine in this jurisdiction, the sea and its foreshore areas have always

    been part of the public domain. And since the enactment of Act No. 1654 on May 18,

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    1907 until the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, statutory law never allowed

    foreshore lands reclaimed by the government to be sold to private corporations. The

    1973 and 1987 Constitution enshrined and expanded the ban to include any

    alienable land of the public domain.

    Exceptions to Invalid Sales: When they may be upheld

    There are, of course, decisions of the Court which, while recognizing a violation of

    the law or Constitution, hold that the sale or transfer of the land may no longer be

    invalidated because of weighty considerations of equity and social justice. The

    invalidation of the sale or transfer may also be superfluous if the purpose of the

    statutory or constitutional ban has been achieved. But none of these cases apply to

    Amari.

    Thus, the Court has ruled consistently that where a Filipino citizen sells land to an

    alien who later sells the land to a Filipino, the invalidity of the first transfer is

    corrected by the subsequent sale to a citizen. Similarly, where the alien who buys

    the land subsequently acquires Philippine citizenship, the sale is validated since the

    purpose of the constitutional ban to limit land ownership to Filipinos has been

    achieved. In short, the law disregards the constitutional disqualification of the buyer

    to hold land if the land is subsequently transferred to a qualified party, or the buyer

    himself becomes a qualified party. In the instant case, however, Amari has not

    transferred the Freedom Islands, or any portion of it, to any qualified party. In fact,

    Amari admits that title to the Freedom Islands still remains with PEA.

    The Court has also ruled consistently that a sale or transfer of the land may no

    longer be questioned under the principle of res judicata, provided the requisites for

    res judicata are present. Under this principle, the courts and the parties are bound

    by a prior final decision, otherwise there will be no end to litigation. As the Court

    declared...once a judgement has become final and executory, it can no longer be

    disturbed no matter how erroneous it may be. In the instant case, there is no prior

    final decision adjudicating the Freedom Islands to Amari.

    Properties of the Public Domain are outside the commerce of man; Abandonment

    does not amount to conversion; Congressional enactment needed to convey lands of

    the public domain

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    Laurel vs. Garcia, G.R. Nos. 92013 & 92047, July 25, 1990

    FACTS:

    The Roppongi Property is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the

    Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement, as part of the

    indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their

    suffering during WWII. The Roppongi property became the site of the Philippine

    Embassy until the latter was transferred to another site when the Roppongi building

    needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary

    funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time. After

    many years, the Aquino administration advanced the sale of the reparation

    properties, which included the Roppongi lot.

    RULING:

    Roppongi Property belongs to the Public Domain, hence outside the Commerce of

    Man

    The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled

    out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the correspondingcontract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the

    Japanese government, that these were assigned to the government sector and that

    the Roppongi property itself was specifically designated under the Reparations

    Agreement to house the Philippine Embassy. There can be no doubt that it is of

    public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become

    patrimonial; which respondents have failed to show.

    As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It

    cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general useand enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in

    the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the

    citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object

    of appropriation.

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    But since Roppongi Property has not been used for any public purpose, was there

    abandonment amounting to conversion of said property as patrimonial?

    The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy

    service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any suchconversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen

    and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A property continues to be part

    of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership "until

    there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from

    being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]) An abandonment of

    the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it

    patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite.

    Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use

    was attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to

    a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino

    Santiago v. Lazarao, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment must be a certain and

    positive act based on correct legal premises. In the present case, the recent

    Administrative Orders authorizing a study of the status and conditions of

    government properties in Japan were merely directives for investigation but did not

    in any way signify a clear intention to dispose of the properties. Further EO 296

    does not declare that the properties lost their public character, but merely intends

    to make the properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a

    sale, lease or other disposition.

    Conveyance effected by Congressional Enactment

    Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (Conveyances and

    contracts to which the Government is a party) provides that in cases in which the

    Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a party to any deed or other

    instrument conveying the title to real estate or to any other property the value of

    which is in excess of P100,000, the respective Department Secretary shall prepare

    the necessary papers which, together with the proper recommendations, shall be

    submitted to the Congress of the Philippines for approval by the same. Such deed,

    instrument, or contract shall be executed and signed by the President of the

    Philippines on behalf of the Government of the Philippines unless the Government

    of the Philippines unless the authority therefor be expressly vested by law in

    another officer." The requirement has been retained in Section 48, Book I of the

    Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292; Official authorized to convey real property),

    which provides that Whenever real property of the Government is authorized by

    law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the

    government by the following: (1) for property belonging to and titled in the name of

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