executive dept1.docx
TRANSCRIPT
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ARTICLE VII: Executive Department
Sec. 1: President
The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
Sec. 2: Qualifications
Natural-born citizen
Registered voter
Able to read and write
At least 40 yrs old on the day of election
Resident for at least 10 yrs immediately preceding the election
Sec. 3: Vice-President
Same qualifications and term of office as Pres
Elected and removed in same manner as Pres
May be a member of the Cabinet without need of confirmation
Sec. 4: Election and Term of Office
PRESIDENT six years without re-election
VICE-PRESIDENT six years, 2 successive terms
Q: If the Vice-President succeeds in the Presidency, is he allowed to run for
President in the next election?
A: Yes, provided he did not hold the office of the President for more than 4 yrs.
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Congress as Board of Canvassers
PROCEDURE:
Duly certified returns from each province or city shall be transmitted to Congress,
directed to the Senate President
Upon receipt of certificate of canvass, the Senate President shall, not later than 30
days after election day, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the
House of reps in a joint public session
Congress shall determine the due authenticity and due execution of the certificate
canvass and start canvassing the votes
Congress shall proclaim the candidate having the highest number of votes
In case of tie, Congress shall vote separately and the candidate having the majority
votes of all members of both Houses shall be proclaimed the winner
Role of Congress in Presidential Election is to canvass the votes (See Barbers vs.
Comelec)
Supreme Court en banc as Presidential Electoral TribunalSole judge of all contents relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose
NOTA BENE:
No pre-proclamation controversy is allowed against Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidates, EXCEPT: the correction of manifest errors in the certificate
of canvass or election returns or State of Votes
Only the candidate who garners the second or third highest number of votes may
question the proclamation of a winner.
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COMELEC has no jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies in presidential,
vice-presidential, senatorial and congressional elections; Correction of Manifest
Error in the Statement of Votes may be filed directly with COMELEC en banc
Sandoval vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133842, Jan. 26, 2000
The case involves the elective office of congressman of one legislative district, which
is contested on the ground of manifest error arising from the non-inclusion of 19
election returns in the canvass, thus making the same incomplete.
While the COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation
controversies, the exception to the general rule can be found under sec. 15 of RA
7166 which prohibits candidates in the presidential, vice-presidential, senatorialand congressional elections from filing pre-proclamation cases.
The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the
election, which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. The law,
nonetheless, provides an exception to the exception. The second sentence of Sec. 15
allows the filing of petitions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of
canvass or election returns even in elections for president, vice-president and
members of the House for the simple reason that the correction of manifest error
will not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winnerin the election.
Correction of a manifest error in the Statement of Votes may be filed directly with
the COMELEC en banc (rule 27, sec. 5, 1993 Rules of the COMELEC). This is another
exception to the rule that pre-proclamation controversies must first be heard and
decided by a division of the Commission.
In determination of the case, the COMELEC must observe due process of law sincethis involves the exercise of its quasi-judicial power.
Protestant cannot be substituted by widow in case of death of the former pending
resolution of election protest; Substitute must be a real party in interest
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Poe vs. Arroyo, PET Case No. 002, March 29, 2005
FACTS:
GMA and FPJ both ran for President in the May 10, 2004 elections. GMA obtained the
highest number of votes, with FPJ at second place. On July 23, 2004, after GMA took
her Oath of Office, FPJ seasonably filed an election protest but while case was
pending, FPJ died of cardio-pulmonary arrest. Mrs. FPJ, through counsel, filed a
petition for substitution, substituting herself for her deceased husband.
ISSUE: Whether or not the window of a deceased candidate is a proper party in anelection contest
RULING:
...only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. By this
express enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined the real parties in
interest concerning an on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if
the declared winner had not been truly voted upon by the electorate, the candidatewho received that 2nd or 3rd highest number of votes would be the legitimate
beneficiary in a successful election contest.
Suppletory application of the Rules of Court
Rule 3, Sec. 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. This rule allows
substitution by a legal representative. It can be gleaned from the citation of this rule
that movant/intervenor seeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legalrepresentative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by said Sec. 16. However,
in our application of this rule to an election contest, we have every time ruled that a
public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the
heirs upon death. Thus, we consistently rejected substation by the widow or the
heirs in election contests where the protestant dies during the pendency of the
protest. In Vda. De De Mesa vs. Mencias, we recognized substitution upon the death
of the protestee but denied substitution by the widow or heirs since they are not the
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real parties in interest. Similarly, in the later case of De la Victoria vs. Commission
on Elections, we struck down the claim of the surviving spouse and children of the
protestee to the contested office for the same reason. Even in analogous cases
before other electoral tribunals, involving substitution by the widow of a deceased
protestant, in cases where the widow is not a real party in interest, we denied
substitution by the wife or heirs.
Who may question: Real Party in Interest
...We have held...that while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the
public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the
protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of
all authority to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, we have allowed
substitution and intervention by only by a real party in interest. A real party ininterest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the
party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. In Vda. De De Mesa vs. Mencias and
Lomugdang vs. Javier, we permitted substitution by the vice-mayor since the vice-
mayor is a real party in interest considering that if the protest succeeds and the
protestee is unseated, the vice-mayor succeeds to the office of the mayor that
becomes vacant if the one duly elected cannot assume office. In contrast, herein
movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of
President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude that
protestants widow is not a real party in interest to this election protest.
Effect of resumption of old post on the election protest
Santiago vs. Ramos, PET Case No. 001, Feb. 13, 1996
In assuming the office of Senator, the protestant has effectively abandoned or
withdrawn her election protests, thereby making it moot.
The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the
first three of which coincides with the last three years of the term of the President
elected in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant
Santiagos term if she would succeed in proving in the instant protest that she was
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the true winner in the 1992 elections. In assuming the office of Senator then, the
Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the very least,
in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her determination to protect and pursue
the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.
Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest.
Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it woulddissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election,
thereby enhancing the all-to crucial political stability of the nation during this
period of national recovery. It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election protest may be summarily dismissed,
regardless of the public policy and public interest implications thereof, on the
following grounds: (1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance; (2) The
petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof; (3) The
filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for in these Rules; (4) The cash
deposit, or the first P 100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after the filing
of the protest; and (5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed
with the Tribunal are not clearly legible. Other grounds for a motion to dismiss, e.g.,those provided in the Rules of Court which apply in a suppletory character, may
likewise be pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer. After which, the Tribunal
may, in its discretion, hold a preliminary hearing on such grounds. In sum, if an
election be dismissed on technical grounds, then it must be, for a decidedly stronger
reason, if it has become moot due to its abandonment by the Protestant.
The protestant abandoned her election protest when she waived the revision of the
remaining ballots and failed to inform the tribunal whether she still intends to
present additional evidence after the completion of the revision of the ballots from
the pilot areas
This Tribunal cannot close its eyes to the fact that the Protestant has decided to
waive the revision of the remaining unrevised ballots from 4,017 precincts out of
the 17,527 precincts of the designated three pilot areas. This is an unabashed
reversal from her original stand in her Motion and Manifestation dated 18 October
1993. Taking this into account, this Tribunal declared in its resolution of 21 October
1993: After deliberating on the foregoing pleadings and the arguments of the
parties, the Tribunal rules for the Protestant insofar as the revision of the remaining
ballot boxes from her pilot areas are concerned, and against the immediateapplication of Rule 61 of the Rules of the Tribunal to the Protestee in respect of the
Counter-Protest. At this stage of the proceedings in this case it cannot be reasonably
determined whether the revised ballots are considerable enough to establish a
trend either in favor of or against the Protestant as would justify an appropriate
action contemplated in Rule 61 of the Rules of the Tribunal, or whether the
unrevised ballots from said areas would not, in the language of the Protestant,
materially affect the result of the representative sample of the ballot boxes so far
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revised. As to the 1,300 ballot boxes from Makati, the proper time to raise the
objections to the ballot boxes and its contents would be during the revision stage.
Consequently, we resolved therein to: A. ORDER the revision of the remaining
unrevised ballot boxes enumerated in the aforequoted paragraph A to the 5 October
1995 Resolution and for the purpose to DiRECT the Acting Clerk of Court of the
Tribunal to collect said ballot boxes and other election documents andparaphernalia from their respective custodians in the event that their revisions in
connection with other election protests in which they are involved have been
terminated, and if such revisions are not yet completed, to coordinate with the
appropriate tribunal or court in which such other election protests are pending and
which have already obtained custody of the ballot boxes and started revision with
the end in view of either seeking expeditious revisions in such other election
protests or obtaining the custody of the ballot boxes and related election documents
and paraphernalia for their immediate delivery to the Tribunal; and B. REQUIRE the
Protestant to inform the Tribunal, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, if after
the completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas she would present
evidence in connection therewith. Until the present,however, the Protestant has notinformed the Tribunal whether after the completion of the revision of the ballots
from her pilot areas, she still intends to present evidence in connection therewith.
This failure then, is nothing short of a manifest indication that she no longer intends
to do so.
Sec. 6: Privilege and Salary
PRIVILEGES:
Official residence (Malacanang Palace)
Immunity from suit not provided in the Constitution; to prevent distraction fromperformance of duties
SALARY
Fixed by law
Cannot be decreased during tenure (actual time he held office) and cannot be
increased during his term (only upon expiration of the term)
Shall not receive during tenure any other emolument from Government or any other
source
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Sec. 7 and 8: Assumption of Office and Succession
WHEN: before noon of June 30
If President-elect fails to qualify, dies or is permanently incapacitated, Vice-President-elect becomes the President
If the President-elect becomes incapacitated temporarily, the Vice-President-elect
will act as President until such a time that the President can assume office
If there is failure to elect the president, the Vice-President will assume or act as
President
If the President, during his term, dies, gets disabled permanently, is removed from
office, or resigns, the Vice-President becomes the President
SUCCESSION IN CASE OF VACANCY:
Vice-President
Senate President
Speaker of the House
Sec. 9: Vacancy of Vice-Presidency
The President shall nominate one from the Senate and the House of Reps who shall
assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of the
Houses, voting separately
Sec. 10: Special Election in Case of Vacancy
WHEN: 10:00 a.m. of the third day after the vacancy
Congress will convene without need of a call and within 7 days enact a law calling
for a special election to be held not earlier than 45 days nor later than 60 days fromtime of such call
Sec. 11: Acting President
GROUND: inability to discharge the powers and duties of the office
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HOW: written declaration of the President or majority of his Cabinet
Vice-President shall assume office as Acting President
RESUMPTION OF OFFICE: also through written declaration of the President; if
majority of Cabinet denies such declaration, Congress shall decide the issue (if not in
session, Congress will convene within 48 hrs) within 10 days (12 days if not insession), by 2/3 vote
Sec. 12: Illness of the President
Public shall be informed of the state of his health
Members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces shall not be denied access to the President during
such illness
Sec. 13: Prohibition
Cannot hold any other office or employment during tenure
Cannot, during tenure, directly or indirectly practice any profession, participate in
any business or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government
Strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office
Presidents spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the 4th civil
degree be appointed as members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of
the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus
or offices, including GOCCs and subsidiaries
WHO CANNOT HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE DURING TENURE:
President
Vice-PresidentCabinet Members
Deputies and Assistants
EXCEPTIONS:
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When Vice-President is appointed as member of the Cabinet
When Vice-President acts as President
When Secretary of Justice is also a member of the Judiciary
Q: Does the President have the same prohibition as Congress?
A: No, because Congress is only prohibited from holding offices in GOCCs and any
other government instrumentality, agency or subsidiary during term while
Executive is prohibited from holding any other office, whether public or private
during tenure.
Q: What is ex officio capacity?
A: When an official holds other duties for the same office where he does not receive
additional compensation and the office is required by his primary function.
Sec. 14 and 15: Appointments extended by Acting President
Effective unless revoked by the elected President within 90 days from his
assumption or reassumption of office
Acting President shall not make appointments 2 mos immediately before the nextpresidential elections and up to the end of his term, EXCEPT: temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety
Sec. 16: Appointing Power
TYPES OF APPOINTMENT:
Regular
Ad Interim
Temporary
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Acting Appointments, effect and validity (See Pimental vs. Executive Secretary)
Q: When is Congress considered to be in recess?
A: Recess it not the time between the adjournment of Congress and the start of itsregular session. The recess referred to here is the times of interval of the session of
the same Congress.
Q: How long will ad interim appointments last?
A: Such appointments will last until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.
WHO ARE APPOINTED BY PRESIDENT:
Heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution requires
confirmation from Commission on Appointments
All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided by law
Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint
Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone
Nature of Ad Interim Appointment; Rights of Ad Interim Appointee; How Ad Interim
Appointment is Terminated; Effect of Ad Interim Appointment as to Reappointment
Matibag vs. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
FACTS:
COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as Acting Director IV of the EID. Suchappointment was renewed in temporary capacity twice, first by Chairperson
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Demetrio and then by Commissioner Javier. Later, PGMA appointed, ad interim,
Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC
Commissioners, each for a term of 7 yrs. The three took their oaths of office and
assumed their positions. However, since the Commission on Appointments did not
act on said appointments, PGMA renewed the ad interim appointments.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis
of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary
appointment prohibited by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C
Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office
by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad
interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the same positions
violate the prohibition on reappointment under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C
RULING:
Nature of an Ad Interim Appointment
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointeehas qualified into office. The fact that is subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself
makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Sec.16, Art.VII of the
Constitution provides as follows:
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall beeffective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next
adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the
President. xxx
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...the term ad interim appointment means a permanent appointment made by
the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a
temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term,
although not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite legal
meaning under Philippine jurisprudence.
Rights of an Ad Interim Appointee
An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that
moment a government employee and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys
the constitution protection that [n]o officer or employee in the civil service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. Thus, an ad interim
appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified
into office. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible
only if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, and any
withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office. Once an
appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not
only by statute but also by the Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after
notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process.
How Ad Interim Appointment is Terminated
An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the
Constitution. The first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the
Commission on Appointments. The second cause is the adjournment of Congress
without the Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment. These two
causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all ad
interim appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of
Damocles over the heads of ad interim appointees. No one, however, can complain
because it is the Constitution itself that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads
of the ad interim appointees.
Ad Interim Appointment vs. Temporary Appointment
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While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided
by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be
withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or
acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This
is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from
making to the three independent constitutional commissions, including theCOMELEC xxx
Was the renewal of appointment valid?
There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a
final decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking
power on the appointing authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision onthe merits, being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its consent
after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the Constitution does
not provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final and binding
on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this instance, the President
can no longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition
on reappointment, but because of a final decision by the Commission on
Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment.
An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the
Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed
appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the
Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no
final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to
the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the
President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee xxx
The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution
applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A
disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interimappointment because the disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived
by a new ad interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment will not result
in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.
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Appointment Power of President; Power of Control
Rufino vs. Endriga, G.R. No. 139554, July 21, 2006
Appointment Power of President
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three
groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whomthe President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
by law.
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose
appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. The present case involves the interpretation of Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with respect to the appointment of this fourth
group of officers.
The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the second and third groups
of officers without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President
appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing
power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or
board to appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15
is found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board
because the trustees fall under the third group of officers.
Scope of Appointment Power of the Heads of Departments, Agencies, Commissions
or Boards
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The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended that Congress could by law
vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission explain this intent beyond any doubt.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution changed the qualifying word inferior to the
less disparaging phrase lower in rank purely for style. However, the clear intent
remained that these inferior or lower in rank officers are the subordinates of the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards who are vested by law with
the power to appoint. The express language of the Constitution and the clear intent
of its framers point to only one conclusion the officers whom the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards may appoint must be of lower rank
than those vested by law with the power to appoint.
Congress may vest the authority to appoint only in the heads of the named offices
Further, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes Congress to vest
in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards the power to
appoint lower-ranked officers. xxx
In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the Secretary. The law may not
authorize the Undersecretary, acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive department. In an agency, the power is vested in the
head of the agency for it would be preposterous to vest it in the agency itself. In a
commission, the head is the chairperson of the commission. In a board, the head is
also the chairperson of the board. In the last three situations, the law may not also
authorize officers other than the heads of the agency, commission, or board to
appoint lower-ranked officers.
The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards
is a matter of legislative grace. Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold
from, the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards the power to appoint lower-
ranked officers. If it so grants, Congress may impose certain conditions for the
exercise of such legislative delegation, like requiring the recommendation of
subordinate officers or the concurrence of the other members of the commission or
board.
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This is in contrast to the Presidents power to appoint which is a self-executingpower vested by the Constitution itself and thus not subject to legislative limitations
or conditions. The power to appoint conferred directly by the Constitution on the
Supreme Court en banc and on the Constitutional Commissions is also self-executing
and not subject to legislative limitations or conditions.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked
officers specifically in the heads of the specified offices, and in no other person.
The word heads refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not
to their members xxx.
Presidents Power of Control
The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends
to all executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This
constitutional power of the President is self-executing and does not require any
implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the Presidents power of control
over the Executive branch.
xxx
The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government. The
CCP is also not one of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a
quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under theExecutive branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency not
placed by law or order creating them under any specific department falls underthe Office of the President.
Since the President exercises control over all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices, the President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is anoffice in the Executive branch. In mandating that the President shall have control ofall executive x x x offices, Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not
exempt any executive office one performing executive functions outside of the
independent constitutional bodies from the Presidents power of control. There isno dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-
judicial functions.
The Presidents power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers in the
Executive branch. This is true whether such officers are appointed by the President
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or by heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of control
means the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer
involving the exercise of discretion.
In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercisescontrol of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. There can be noinstance under the Constitution where an officer of the Executive branch is outside
the control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary since there is only one
President vested with executive power exercising control over the entire Executive
branch. Any office in the Executive branch that is not under the control of the
President is a lost command whose existence is without any legal or constitutional
basis.
The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a government office in theExecutive branch outside the control of the President in the guise of insulating that
office from politics or making it independent. If the office is part of the Executive
branch, it must remain subject to the control of the President. Otherwise, the
Legislature can deprive the President of his constitutional power of control over all
the executive x x x offices. If the Legislature can do this with the Executive branch,
then the Legislature can also deal a similar blow to the Judicial branch by enacting a
law putting decisions of certain lower courts beyond the review power of the
Supreme Court. This will destroy the system of checks and balances finely
structured in the 1987 Constitution among the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial
branches.
Of course, the Presidents power of control does not extend to quasi-judicial bodies
whose proceedings and decisions are judicial in nature and subject to judicial
review, even as such quasi-judicial bodies may be under the administrative
supervision of the President. It also does not extend to local government units,
which are merely under the general supervision of the President.
Sec. 17: Power of Control
Power to Reorganize
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Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 142801-802, July 10, 2001
FACTS:
Pres. Estrada issued EO 191, deactivating the EIIB and transferring its functions to
the BOC and NBI. As a result, the EIIB personnel were deemed separated from
service.
RULING:
Deactivation vs. Abolition
At first glance, it seems that the resolution of this case hinges on the question Doesthe deactivation of EIIB constitute abolition of an office? However, after coming
to terms with the prevailing law and jurisprudence, we are certain that the ultimate
queries should be a) Does the President have the authority to reorganize the
executive department? And b) How should the reorganization be carried out?
Surely, there exists a distinction between the words deactivate and abolish. Todeactivate means to render inactive or ineffective or to break up by discharging or
reassigning personnel, while to abolish means to do away with, to annul, abrogate
or destroy completely. In essence, abolition denotes an intention to do away with
the office wholly and permanently. Thus, while in abolition, the office ceases to exist,
the same is not true in deactivation where the office continues to exist, albeit
remaining dormant or inoperative. Be that as it may, deactivation and abolition are
both reorganization measures.
GR: Congress has power to abolish
The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged
with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create
includes the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either
created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where
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the office was created by the Constitution itself, may be abolished by the same
legislature that brought it into existence.
The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive
department are concerned, the Presidents power of control may justify him toinactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the
broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.
What law gives President power to reorganize?
In the whereas clause of E.O. No. 191, former President Estrada anchored his
authority to deactivate EIIB on Section 77 of Republic Act 8745 (FY 1999 General
Appropriations Act), a provision similar to Section 62 of R.A. 7645 quoted in Larin,thus;
Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the
President of the Philippines, no changes in key positions or organizational units in
any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organizational
structures and funded from appropriations provided by this Act.
We adhere to the precedent or ruling in Larin that this provision recognizes theauthority of the President to effect organizational changes in the department or
agency under the executive structure. Such a ruling further finds support in Section
78 of Republic Act No. 8760. Under this law, the heads of departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies and other entities in the Executive Branch are directed (a) to
conduct a comprehensive review of their respective mandates, missions, objectives,
functions, programs, projects, activities and systems and procedures; (b) identify
activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which
may be scaled down, phased-out or abolished; and (c) adopt measures that will
result in the streamlined organization and improved overall performance of their
respective agencies. Section 78 ends up with the mandate that the actual
streamlining and productivity improvement in agency organization and operation
shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office
of the President. The law has spoken clearly. We are left only with the duty to
sustain.
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But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any
department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must
not lose sight of the very source of the power that which constitutes an express
grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987), the President, subject to the policy in
the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shallhave the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President. For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of otherDepartments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre, we
ruled that reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation ofoffices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It
takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government
offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility
between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls
under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents continuing
authority to reorganize.
Was the reorganization valid?
It having been duly established that the President has the authority to carry out
reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department, what is then
left for us to resolve is whether or not the reorganization is valid. In this jurisdiction,
reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good
faith. Reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy
or to make bureaucracy more efficient. Pertinently, Republic Act No. 6656 providesfor the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the
removal of civil service employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a)
where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing
pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and
another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) where
incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment,
performance and merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the
department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially
the same functions as the original offices, and (e) where the removal violates the
order of separation.
While basically, the functions of the EIIB have devolved upon the Task Force
Aduana, we find the latter to have additional new powers. The Task Force Aduana,
being composed of elements from the Presidential Security Group (PSG) and
Intelligence Service Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), has the essential
power to effect searches, seizures and arrests. The EIIB did not have this power. The
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Task Force Aduana has the power to enlist the assistance of any department,
bureau, office, or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations; and to use their personnel, facilities and resources.
Again, the EIIB did not have this power. And, the Task Force Aduana has the
additional authority to conduct investigation of cases involving ill-gotten wealth.
This was not expressly granted to the EIIB.
Consequently, it cannot be said that there is a feigned reorganization. In Blaquera v.
Civil Sevice Commission, we ruled that a reorganization in good faith is one
designed to trim the fat off the bureaucracy and institute economy and greater
efficiency in its operation.
Valid abolition of office is not separation
Lastly, we hold that petitioners right to security of tenure is not violated. Nothing is
better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of
a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. Valid abolition of
offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents.
Alter Ego Doctrine or Qualified Political Agency
Sec. of DOTC vs. Mabalot, 378 SCRA 129 (2000)
FACTS:
The Sec. of DOTC issued to LTFRB Chairman MO 96-735, transferring the regional
functions of that office to DOTCCAR Regional Office, pending creation of a Regional
LTFRO. Later, the new Sec. of DOTC issued DO 97-1025, establishing the DOTCCAR
Regional Office as the Regional Office of the LTFRB to exercise regional functions ofthe LTFRB in the CAR subject to the direct supervision and control of the LTFRB
Central Office. Mabalot protested.
ISSUE: W/N the MO and DO are violative of the provision of the Constitution against
encroachment on the powers of the legislative department
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HELD:
SC upheld the validity of the issuance of the challenged orders.
In the absence of any patent or latent constitutional or statutory infirmity attending
the issuance of the challenged orders, Court upholds. The President, through his
duly constituted political agent and alter ego, may legally and validly decree the
reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of the DOTCCAR as
the LTFRB Regional Office of CAR with the concomitant transfer and performance of
public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.
There are three modes of establishing an administrative body: (1) Constitution; (2)
Statute; and (3) by authority of law. This case falls under the third category.
The DOTC Secretary, as alter ego of the President, is authorized by law to create and
establish the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office. This is anchored on the Presidentspower of control under sec. 17, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution.
Control
By definition, control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. It includes the authority
to order the doing of an act by a subordinate or to undo such act or to assume a
power directly vested in him by law.
Under sec. 20, Bk. III, E.O. 292, the Chief Executive is granted residual powers,stating that unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such
other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under
the laws xxx
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What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is PD 1772 which amended PD
1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing
authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to
group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to
create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and
materials.
Granted that the President has the power to reorganize, was the reorganization of
DOTCCAR valid?
In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in
good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for
the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. The reorganization
in the instant case was decreed in the interest of service and for purposes ofeconomy and more effective coOrdination of the DOTC functions in the Cordillera
Administrative Region. It thus bear the earmarks of good faith.
Power of President to Contract or Guarantee Foreign Loans may be delegated to
Secretary of Finance but must first secure Prior Consent; What Powers May Not Be
Delegated
Constantino vs. Cuisia, .G.R. No. 106064, Oct. 13, 2005
Power of President to contract or guarantee foreign loans (Sec. 20, Art. VII)
For their first constitutional argument, petitioners submit that the buyback and
bond-conversion schemes do not constitute the loan contract or guaranteecontemplated in the Constitution and are consequently prohibited. Sec. 20, Art. VII
of the Constitution provides xxx
The language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows the
President to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on the
issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt
instruments are more onerous than others. This Court may not ascribe to the
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Constitution meanings and restrictions that would unduly burden the powers of the
President. The plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be
construed in a sense that will allow the full exercise of the power provided therein.
It would be the worst kind of judicial legislation if the courts were to misconstrue
and change the meaning of the organic act.
The only restriction that the Constitution provides, aside from the prior concurrence
of the Monetary Board, is that the loans must be subject to limitations provided by
law. In this regard, we note that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 245 as amended by Pres.
Decree (P.D.) No. 142, s. 1973, entitled An Act Authorizing the Secretary of Finance
to Borrow to Meet Public Expenditures Authorized by Law, and for Other Purposes,
allows foreign loans to be contracted in the form of, inter alia, bonds.
xxx
Under the foregoing provisions, sovereign bonds may be issued not only to
supplement government expenditures but also to provide for the purchase,
redemption, or refunding of any obligation, either direct or guaranteed, of the
Philippine Government.
On the Buyback Scheme
In their Comment, petitioners assert that the power to pay public debts lies with
Congress and was deliberately withheld by the Constitution from the President. It is
true that in the balance of power between the three branches of government, it is
Congress that manages the countrys coffers by virtue of its taxing and spending
powers. However, the law-making authority has promulgated a law ordaining an
automatic appropriations provision for debt servicing by virtue of which the
President is empowered to execute debt payments without the need for further
appropriations.
xxx
Buyback is a necessary power which springs from the grant of the foreign
borrowing power. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such
provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make
effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such
collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from
its terms. The President is not empowered to borrow money from foreign banks and
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governments on the credit of the Republic only to be left bereft of authority to
implement the payment despite appropriations therefor.
On Delegation of Power
Petitioners stress that unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the
President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution
in the person of the President. They argue that the gravity by which the exercise of
the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the President alone must
exercise this power. They submit that the requirement of prior concurrence of an
entity specifically named by the Constitutionthe Monetary Boardreinforces thesubmission that not respondents but the President alone and personally can
validly bind the country.
Petitioners position is negated both by explicit constitutional and legal
imprimaturs, as well as the doctrine of qualified political agency.
The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of
the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that
the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the governments
debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed
as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives,and meet any other sovereign debt management goals.
If, as petitioners would have it, the President were to personally exercise every
aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running
the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activities
the propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the
many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with
creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary
Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often
than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of
constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions
and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would
unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the government.
Necessity thus gave birth to the doctrine of qualified political agency xxx
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What powers may not be delegated
xxx There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional
circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental
freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over thoseexercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power
notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this
special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the
constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a
showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional
import.
We cannot conclude that the power of the President to contract or guarantee foreigndebts falls within the same exceptional class. Indubitably, the decision to contract or
guarantee foreign debts is of vital public interest, but only akin to any contractual
obligation undertaken by the sovereign, which arises not from any extraordinary
incident, but from the established functions of governance.
Secretary of Finance must get prior consent of President
Another important qualification must be made. The Secretary of Finance or anydesignated alter ego of the President is bound to secure the latters prior consent to
or subsequent ratification of his acts. In the matter of contracting or guaranteeing
foreign loans, the repudiation by the President of the very acts performed in this
regard by the alter ego will definitely have binding effect. Had petitioners herein
succeeded in demonstrating that the President actually withheld approval and/or
repudiated the Financing Program, there could be a cause of action to nullify the
acts of respondents. Notably though, petitioners do not assert that respondents
pursued the Program without prior authorization of the President or that the terms
of the contract were agreed upon without the Presidents authorization. Congruent
with the avowed preference of then President Aquino to honor and restructure
existing foreign debts, the lack of showing that she countermanded the acts ofrespondents leads us to conclude that said acts carried presidential approval.
Sec. 18: Commander-in-Chief Powers of the President:
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Power to call on the military or armed forces
Power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
Power to declare martial law
CALLING OUT POWER
Conditions for calling out the armed forces:
To suppress lawless violence, rebellion or invasion
Whenever it becomes necessary
MARTIAL LAW
Conditions for declaration of Martial Law:
When there is (1) rebellion or (2) invasion (grounds)
Public safety requires the declaration
NOTA BENE: There must be actual rebellion or invasion. Differ this from the calling
out power which does not require actual rebellion or invasion but only that
whenever it (the exercise of the calling out power) becomes necessary to suppress
lawless violence, rebellion or invasion. (See Sanlakas vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 159085,
Feb. 3, 2004)
What happens when Martial Law is declared:
No suspension of operation of the Constitution
No supplanting of the functioning of the civil courts and legislative assemblies
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No conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function
No automatic suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
Constitutional guards against the power to declare Martial Law:
Will last only for 60 days, unless sooner revoked by Congress
Within 48 hours after declaration, President is required to submit a report to
Congress
Congress shall revoke or extend the period by jointly voting with an absolute
majority and President may not reverse such revocation
If Congress is not in session, they shall convene within 24 hours from such
declaration without need for call
Supreme Court may nullify the declaration on the ground of lack of factual basis,
judgment to be rendered within 30 days from its filing by any ordinary citizen
SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
(NOTE: the conditions and effect of the suspension of the writ is similar to
declaration of martial law)
Restrictions to the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus:
Apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion
Apply only to persons judicially charged for offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion
The person arrested must be judicially charged within 3 days from arrest, otherwise
he shall be released
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Sec. 19: Executive Clemencies
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, thePresident may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of
all the Members of the Congress.
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCIES:
Amnesty
Pardon
Reprieve
Commutation
Remit fines and forfeitures
Amnesty an act of grace by the Chief Executive as a result of the grant of amnesty,the criminal liability of the offender and all the effects of the crime are completely
erased. It is a blanket pardon given to a class of persons who committed crimes thatare political in nature. To be valid, Congress has to concur with a majority vote
(thus, it is a public act) and the accused must admit his guilt.
Pardon a private act of the President granted after judgment by final conviction for
ordinary offenses. It may be absolute or condition, in which case, acceptance of
condition if burdensome to the accused is necessary. The effect is to relieve the
accused from further punishment, thus, if given after sentence has been served, its
effect is to extinguish the accessory penalties. In case of administrative cases, effect
is reinstatement but no payment of backwages.
Reprieve discretionary upon the President to suspend the enforcement of
judgment
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Sec. 20: Power to Contract or Guarantee Foreign Loans
Scope of Power (See Constantino vs. Cuisia)
Sec. 21: Treaty-making Power
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred
in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Power to enter into and ratify treaties is sole prerogative of the Executive (See
AKBAYAN vs. Aquino)
Power to Ratify by President vs. Senates Power to Concur
Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000
Sec. 21, Art. VII vs. Sec. 25, Art. XVIII
One focal point of inquiry in this controversy is the determination of which
provision of the Constitution applies, with regard to the exercise by the senate of its
constitutional power to concur with the VFA. Petitioners argue that Section 25,
Article XVIII is applicable considering that the VFA has for its subject the presence of
foreign military troops in the Philippines. Respondents, on the contrary, maintain
that Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as the VFA is not a basing
arrangement but an agreement which involves merely the temporary visits of
United States personnel engaged in joint military exercises.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the
concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. Section 21,
Article VII, which herein respondents invoke, reads:
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No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred
in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:
After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the senate and, when the Congress so requires,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held
for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements in general, inwhich case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the
Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or international agreement, valid and
binding on the part of the Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on
treatise or international agreements and applies to any form of treaty with a wide
variety of subject matter, such as, but not limited to, extradition or tax treatise or
those economic in nature. All treaties or international agreements entered into by
the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or
appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties
which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the
Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the
requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to
consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further
requires that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the
Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so
required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state.
It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from contradicting
each other, actually share some common ground. These constitutional provisions
both embody phrases in the negative and thus, are deemed prohibitory in mandate
and character. In particular, Section 21 opens with the clause No treaty x x x, andSection 25 contains the phrase shall not be allowed. Additionally, in both
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instances, the concurrence of the Senate is indispensable to render the treaty or
international agreement valid and effective.
To our mind, the fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under
Section 21, Article VII, and that the Senate extended its concurrence under the sameprovision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21, Article VII or
Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of
the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States
troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to
govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United
States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment,materials and supplies.
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties
involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case.
To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21,
Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of
determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the
Senate, as will be further discussed hereunder.
Sec. 21, Art. VII should be read together with Sec. 25, Art. XVIII
At this juncture, we shall then resolve the issue of whether or not the requirements
of Section 25 were complied with when the Senate gave its concurrence to the VFA.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be
under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so
required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in anational referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the
VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, whether under the general
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requirement in Section 21, Article VII, or the specific mandate mentioned in Section
25, Article XVIII, the provision in the latter article requiring ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since
Congress has not required it.
As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly requires that a treaty
or international agreement, to be valid and effective, must be concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. On the other hand, Section 25,
Article XVIII simply provides that the treaty be duly concurred in by the Senate.
Applying the foregoing constitutional provisions, a two-thirds vote of all the
members of the Senate is clearly required so that the concurrence contemplated by
law may be validly obtained and deemed present. While it is true that Section 25,
Article XVIII requires, among other things, that the treaty-the VFA, in the instantcase-be duly concurred in by the Senate, it is very true however that said provision
must be related and viewed in light of the clear mandate embodied in Section 21,
Article VII, which in more specific terms, requires that the concurrence of a treaty,
or international agreement, be made by a two -thirds vote of all the members of the
Senate. Indeed, Section 25, Article XVIII must not be treated in isolation to section
21, Article, VII.
As noted, the concurrence requirement under Section 25, Article XVIII must be
construed in relation to the provisions of Section 21, Article VII. In a more particular
language, the concurrence of the Senate contemplated under Section 25, Article
XVIII means that at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate favorably vote
to concur with the treaty-the VFA in the instant case.
Under these circumstances, the charter provides that the Senate shall be composed
of twenty-four (24) Senators. Without a tinge of doubt, two-thirds (2/3) of this
figure, or not less than sixteen (16) members, favorably acting on the proposal is an
unquestionable compliance with the requisite number of votes mentioned in Section
21 of Article VII. The fact that there were actually twenty-three (23) incumbent
Senators at the time the voting was made, will not alter in any significant way thecircumstance that more than two-thirds of the members of the Senate concurred
with the proposed VFA, even if the two-thirds vote requirement is based on this
figure of actual members (23). In this regard, the fundamental law is clear that two-
thirds of the 24 Senators, or at least 16 favorable votes, suffice so as to render
compliance with the strict constitutional mandate of giving concurrence to the
subject treaty.
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What constitutes a treaty
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that theother contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To
require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to
submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its
Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. xxx
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an
executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as
binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an
agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a
treaty.
Ratification by President vis--vis Concurrence of Senate
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the
concurrence of the Senate should be taken as a clear an unequivocal expression of
our nations consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to
uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder.
Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the
state or of the government, as the case may be, through which the formal acceptance
of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation the
process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty is
expressed by ratification when: (a) the treaty provides for such ratification, (b) it is
otherwise established that the negotiating States agreed that ratification should be
required, (c) the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to
ratification, or (d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification
appears from the full powers of its representative, or was expressed during thenegotiation.
In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as
commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving
or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
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With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the
exchange of notes between the Philippines and the United States of America, it now
becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the principles of international
law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article
II of the Constitution, declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.
Who has power to ratify treaties?
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head
of State, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. In
many ways, the President is the chief architect of the nations foreign policy; his
dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then) conceded. Wielding vast
powers an influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as Jefferson
describes, is executive altogether."
As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the
Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at
least two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of
the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which
pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive anddiplomatic powers granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself. Into the
field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to
invade it. Consequently, the acts or judgment calls of the President involving the
VFA-specifically the acts of ratification and entering into a treaty and those
necessary or incidental to the exercise of such principal acts - squarely fall within
the sphere of his constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck down,
much less calibrated by this Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of
power or discretion.
Senates Power to Concur
As to the power to concur with treaties, the constitution lodges the same with the
Senate alone. Thus, once the Senate performs that power, or exercises its
prerogative within the boundaries prescribed by the Constitution, the concurrence
cannot, in like manner, be viewed to constitute an abuse of power, much less grave
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abuse thereof. Corollarily, the Senate, in the exercise of its discretion and acting
within the limits of such power, may not be similarly faulted for having simply
performed a task conferred and sanctioned by no less than the fundamental law.
For the role of the Senate in relation to treaties is essentially legislative in character;the Senate, as an independent body possessed of its own erudite mind, has the
prerogative to either accept or reject the proposed agreement, and whatever action
it takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, pertains to the wisdom
rather than the legality of the act. In this sense, the Senate partakes a principal, yet
delicate, role in keeping the principles of separation of powers and of checks and
balances alive and vigilantly ensures that these cherished rudiments remain true to
their form in a democratic government such as ours. The Constitution thus
animates, through this treaty-concurring power of the Senate, a healthy system of
checks and balances indispensable toward our nations pursuit of political maturity
and growth. True enough, rudimentary is the principle that matters pertaining to
the wisdom of a legislative act are beyond the ambit and province of the courts to
inquire.
Power of President to Reclassify Public Lands and Sell the Same
Reclaimed Lands vs. Submerged Lands; When invalid sales may no longer be
invalidated
Chavez vs. PEA & AMARI, G.R. No. 133250, May 6, 2003
FACTS:
The government through the PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI, a private
corporation, in order to reclaim 157.84 hectares of lands comprising the Freedom
Islands and 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay. The JVA provides,among others, the transfer of ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands to
AMARI.
ISSUE: Whether or not the JVA is valid
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RULING:
Reclaimed Lands are Alienable Lands of the Public Domain
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these
lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
Submerged Areas are Inalienable
The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open
to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government
can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the
public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In
their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and
outside the commerce of man.
JVA is invalid
The prevailing doctrine before, during and after the signing of the Amended JVA is
that private corporations cannot hold, except by lease, alienable lands of the public
domain. This is one of the two main reasons why the Decision annulled the
Amended JVA. The other main reason is that submerged areas of Manila Bay, being
part of the sea, are inalienable and beyond the commerce of man, a doctrine that has
remained immutable since the Spanish Law on Waters of 1886. Clearly, the Decisionmerely reiterates, and does not overrule, any existing judicial doctrine.
Even on the characterization of foreshore lands reclaimed by the government, the
Decision does not overrule existing law or doctrine. Since the adoption of the
Regalian doctrine in this jurisdiction, the sea and its foreshore areas have always
been part of the public domain. And since the enactment of Act No. 1654 on May 18,
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1907 until the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, statutory law never allowed
foreshore lands reclaimed by the government to be sold to private corporations. The
1973 and 1987 Constitution enshrined and expanded the ban to include any
alienable land of the public domain.
Exceptions to Invalid Sales: When they may be upheld
There are, of course, decisions of the Court which, while recognizing a violation of
the law or Constitution, hold that the sale or transfer of the land may no longer be
invalidated because of weighty considerations of equity and social justice. The
invalidation of the sale or transfer may also be superfluous if the purpose of the
statutory or constitutional ban has been achieved. But none of these cases apply to
Amari.
Thus, the Court has ruled consistently that where a Filipino citizen sells land to an
alien who later sells the land to a Filipino, the invalidity of the first transfer is
corrected by the subsequent sale to a citizen. Similarly, where the alien who buys
the land subsequently acquires Philippine citizenship, the sale is validated since the
purpose of the constitutional ban to limit land ownership to Filipinos has been
achieved. In short, the law disregards the constitutional disqualification of the buyer
to hold land if the land is subsequently transferred to a qualified party, or the buyer
himself becomes a qualified party. In the instant case, however, Amari has not
transferred the Freedom Islands, or any portion of it, to any qualified party. In fact,
Amari admits that title to the Freedom Islands still remains with PEA.
The Court has also ruled consistently that a sale or transfer of the land may no
longer be questioned under the principle of res judicata, provided the requisites for
res judicata are present. Under this principle, the courts and the parties are bound
by a prior final decision, otherwise there will be no end to litigation. As the Court
declared...once a judgement has become final and executory, it can no longer be
disturbed no matter how erroneous it may be. In the instant case, there is no prior
final decision adjudicating the Freedom Islands to Amari.
Properties of the Public Domain are outside the commerce of man; Abandonment
does not amount to conversion; Congressional enactment needed to convey lands of
the public domain
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Laurel vs. Garcia, G.R. Nos. 92013 & 92047, July 25, 1990
FACTS:
The Roppongi Property is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the
Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement, as part of the
indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their
suffering during WWII. The Roppongi property became the site of the Philippine
Embassy until the latter was transferred to another site when the Roppongi building
needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary
funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time. After
many years, the Aquino administration advanced the sale of the reparation
properties, which included the Roppongi lot.
RULING:
Roppongi Property belongs to the Public Domain, hence outside the Commerce of
Man
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled
out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the correspondingcontract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the
Japanese government, that these were assigned to the government sector and that
the Roppongi property itself was specifically designated under the Reparations
Agreement to house the Philippine Embassy. There can be no doubt that it is of
public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become
patrimonial; which respondents have failed to show.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It
cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general useand enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in
the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the
citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object
of appropriation.
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But since Roppongi Property has not been used for any public purpose, was there
abandonment amounting to conversion of said property as patrimonial?
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy
service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any suchconversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen
and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A property continues to be part
of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership "until
there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from
being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]) An abandonment of
the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it
patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite.
Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use
was attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to
a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino
Santiago v. Lazarao, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment must be a certain and
positive act based on correct legal premises. In the present case, the recent
Administrative Orders authorizing a study of the status and conditions of
government properties in Japan were merely directives for investigation but did not
in any way signify a clear intention to dispose of the properties. Further EO 296
does not declare that the properties lost their public character, but merely intends
to make the properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a
sale, lease or other disposition.
Conveyance effected by Congressional Enactment
Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (Conveyances and
contracts to which the Government is a party) provides that in cases in which the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a party to any deed or other
instrument conveying the title to real estate or to any other property the value of
which is in excess of P100,000, the respective Department Secretary shall prepare
the necessary papers which, together with the proper recommendations, shall be
submitted to the Congress of the Philippines for approval by the same. Such deed,
instrument, or contract shall be executed and signed by the President of the
Philippines on behalf of the Government of the Philippines unless the Government
of the Philippines unless the authority therefor be expressly vested by law in
another officer." The requirement has been retained in Section 48, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292; Official authorized to convey real property),
which provides that Whenever real property of the Government is authorized by
law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the
government by the following: (1) for property belonging to and titled in the name of
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