exploring corruption practices in public procurement of
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International Journal of Managing Projects in BusinessExploring corruption practices in public procurement of infrastructural projects inGhanaE. Osei-Tutu E. Badu D. Owusu-Manu
Article information:To cite this document:E. Osei-Tutu E. Badu D. Owusu-Manu, (2010),"Exploring corruption practices in public procurement ofinfrastructural projects in Ghana", International Journal of Managing Projects in Business, Vol. 3 Iss 2 pp.236 - 256Permanent link to this document:http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17538371011036563
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Exploring corruption practices inpublic procurement of
infrastructural projects in GhanaE. Osei-Tutu
Building and Road Research Institute, Kumasi, Ghana, and
E. Badu and D. Owusu-ManuDepartment of Building Technology,
Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana
Abstract
Purpose – While corruption has long been recognized as a destructive social problem, the subject hasnot yet been given much attention in the literature of the management of procurement of infrastructureprojects in Ghana. The purpose of this paper is to explore and discuss corruption practices inherent inpublic procurement of infrastructural projects in Ghana with the aim of identifying corruption relatedchallenges that must be addressed in order to actualize the expected economic gains of infrastructuralprojects.
Design/methodology/approach – Drawing extensively on existing literature and published data,the methodology adopted for the paper consisted of multi-stage critical review of pertinent literature;review of 2007 Annual Report of the Public Procurement Authority and review of the PublicProcurement Act, 2003 (Act 663). The study assumes value-laden axiological philosophy, where thevalues and experiences of the authors provided the basis for the discussion.
Findings – Conflict of interest, bribery, embezzlement, kickbacks, tender manipulation and fraud areobserved corruption practices in the Ghanaian infrastructure projects delivery system. The severity ofcorruption practices have intensified the search for more innovative means of delivering infrastructureprojects that will achieve value for money. In the pursuit to control corruption practices, this wouldrequire constitution of a sound procurement system and pro-social equity policies that would fostergood governance, corporate social responsibility, transparency, accountability, judicious publicexpenditure and national progress. The Public Procurement Act 2003 (Act 663) is observed to proffersolutions for these underlying constructs but not without challenges.
Research limitations/implications – The nature of the research is review and explanatorywithout any empirical analysis to support the discussions and thus the results cannot be generalizedon a broader context of public procurement practice in Ghana.
Practical implications – Implementation of sound procurement performance measurements wouldbe imperative in the bid to curb corruption practices. The paper suggested a number of businessapproaches to combat corrupt practices in Ghana, which are explained in terms of political,psychological, technical, operational and retaliatory measures. In this paper, it is proposed thatknowledge about and debating corruption related issues is just as important to the modern publicprocurement as are the abilities to creatively and logically introduce monitoring systems whenplanning, executing and completing projects.
Originality/value – The work is novel providing meaningful insights into conceptual basis for adetailed empirical analysis. Being a pioneering study, further research tailored to compare the extentof corruption practices in various sectors of the economy of Ghana would be novel.
Keywords Corruption, Public procurement, Ghana
Paper type General review
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/1753-8378.htm
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Received 5 June 2009Accepted 30 August 2009
International Journal of ManagingProjects in BusinessVol. 3 No. 2, 2010pp. 236-256q Emerald Group Publishing Limited1753-8378DOI 10.1108/17538371011036563
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1. IntroductionCorruption is a social phenomenon that fosters an anti-democratic environment;characterized by uncertainty, unpredictability and declining moral values and disrespectfor constitutional institutions and authority (Mensah et al., 2003; Gyimah-Boadi, 2002).Evidence from across the globe confirms that corruption hinders economic development;reduces social services; diverts investments in infrastructure and social services andimpacts the poor disproportionately (Khramkin, 2007). Consistent with the report byLarmour (2006) and Westring (1997), it is safe to mention that, the implications ofcorruption related practices in the procurement systems have manifold negativeconsequences, most of which are manifested in economic, financial and social dimensions.These consequences of corruption are increasingly well understood but less is knownabout the reasons for its persistence (Hellman et al., 2000). Corruption has often beenreported by several headlines of print and transmittal media Ghana Centre for DemocraticDevelopment (CDD Ghana, 2000); used as gimmicks by politicians on many campaigntrails, but the status quo is no longer questioned (UNDP, 2004). Several research effortshave also been made to report on a number of these adversarial consequences of corruptionon national development agenda of many developed and developing countries (Mawenya,2008; Khramkin, 2007; Larmour, 2006; UNDP, 2004). Successive reviews have revealedsubstantial inefficiencies and concluded that value for money was not being achieved inthe procurement of government and donor-funded projects because of corruption(Lengwiler and Wolfstetter, 2006; Mawenya, 2008, 2007; Shakantu, 2003; Philip, 2002). Forexample, the American Society of Civil Engineers claim that corruption accounts for anestimated $340 billion of worldwide construction costs each year.
A global survey on corruption suggests that the volume of bribes exchanginghands through public sector procurement is estimated between $390-400 billion per year(Lengwiler and Wolfstetter, 2006). Mawenya (2008) estimated that corruption inSub-Saharan Africa is almost up to 70 per cent of public procurement contracts. In suchcases, bribes and fraudulent transactions inflate project costs by about 20-30 per cent(Mawenya, 2008). Again, the World Bank (2003) survey results reported that the cost ofcorruption in Africa is estimated at $148-billion a year (Mawenya, 2008). Other studieshave shown that corruption is pervasive in developing countries because of weakinstitutional infrastructures and the lack of effective monitoring mechanisms (Lengwilerand Wolfstetter, 2006). It is worth noting that the practice of corruption is not onlypervasive in developing countries but also severe in emerging, transition and developedeconomies as well (Mensah et al., 2003; The Economist, 2002; Hellman et al., 2000). For ininstance, the Department of Justice claims that between early 1994 and early 2001 “theUSA government learned of significant allegations of bribery by foreign firms in overfour competitions for international contracts valued at $200 billion” (Mensah et al., 2003;The Economist, 2002, March 2).
It should be acknowledged that, infrastructure sectors of most economies areparticularly exposed to corruption practices (Shakantu, 2003). These suggest that anyimprovement in reduction of corruption in the public procurement system will have adirect and substantial impact on the overall economic situation of the country and result inbudgetary savings and efficiency in public expenditures (Mawenya, 2008, 2007). Severalstudies have confirmed that procurement reforms and mainstreaming (PRM) has been avaluable instrument for implementing pro-social equity policies and has, historically, been
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used by governments to encourage more equitable social benefits (Westring, 1997;Larmour, 2006; Cavill and Sohail, 2005).
As explained by Idea International (2009) and supported by other studies, theattainment of these economic benefits through PRM creates a better chance to achievemillennium development goals and embark on other government objectives; enhancedrespect for rule of law; increased access by local market to government contracts;improvements in social sector services; better environmental management; and improvedcorporate social responsibility (Walker et al., 2008; Waddock, 2006). However, there are anumber of corruption related challenges that must be addressed in order to actualize theexpected economic and social gains. No doubt, many attempts have also been made bynational and international agencies to establish anti-corruption policies and strategies tocombat this corruption menace crippling our societies. This is in line with embeddedefforts of governments to attract foreign direct investments. For instance, in Ghana, awider reform agenda targeted at improving public financial management culminated inthe drafting of the Public Procurement Act (Act 663), to address the noted weaknesses inpublic procurement practices. Quoting from the Government of the Republic of Ghana(2003) reports:
[. . .] the objectives of the procurement reform endeavour efforts to promote nationaldevelopment; enhance harmony with other local and international laws; foster competition,efficiency, transparency and accountability and facilitate ease of procurement administration.
Towards realizing these anticipated benefits of sound procurement practices in Ghana,the Public Procurement Authority (PPA) formerly Public Procurement Board (PPB) wasestablished to facilitate the fullest implementation of the Public Procurement Act 2003(Act 663). Though significant progress has been achieved with the Act, it should berecognized that, corruption has still robed into public procurement processes (Westring,1997). Notwithstanding, while corruption has long been recognized as a destructivesocial problem, the subject has not yet been given much attention in the literature of themanagement of procurement of infrastructure projects in Ghana.
The reason for this observation may be on the premise that public procurement, being arelatively young profession, has not quite reached the maturity to be ready to form aconsensus on or to formally begin debating specific procurement process corruptionissues. Some interesting attempts towards this endeavour have actually been made inrecent years. One paper argues that each project’s life cycle stage demands that the projectteam display specific virtues such as: intellectual, social, emotional, moral and political;that are appropriate for the typical activities and closure documents of that particularstage (i.e. conceptual planning, process organization, implementation, controlling, andevaluation and system improvement) (Kloppenborg and Petrick, 1999). The focus of thepublic procurement reforms in tandem with project management practice hastraditionally been to identify and search for new and better methods for fulfilling twoprimary objectives: to meet specified performance within cost and on time (Meredith andMantel, 2002) and achieve one contentious objective of eradicating corruption inprocurement process (Mawenya, 2008). Conversional wisdom answers that althoughprocurement reforms come with codes which address general professional and personalconduct in the broader context of projects, clients, project teams and the public; they do notprovide a forum for addressing specific kinds of corruption related situations encounteredduring the procurement process.
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This is one reason why studies in corruption related practices in public procurementpractices have become a relevant field; and require researchers to explore this highlyphilosophical and complex knowledge domain. The aim of this paper therefore is toexplore the major corruption practices in public infrastructure project delivery in Ghana.Informed by appropriate theories on corruption, the paper discusses some of the keyconceptual and empirical issues that undermine infrastructure procurement in Ghana.The study is important because it would have direct and indirect implications for thesuccessful delivery of infrastructural projects.
The findings would also provide a potential impetus to trigger investor confidence andensure effective financial management of public funds. Again, findings from the paper areanticipated to induce private sector participation in investment climate of Ghana, whichhas been the major focus of the Government of Ghana in recent times. Although corruptionhas been largely treated as a highly unethical philosophy and complex discipline, it hasvaluable practical implications to offer the modern procurement of projects (Helgadottir,2008). In this paper, it is proposed that knowledge about and debating of corruption relatedissues is just as important to the modern public procurement as are the abilities tocreatively and logically introduce monitoring systems when planning, executing andcompleting projects. The methodology adopted for the paper consisted of multi-stagereview of pertinent literature, a review of 2007 Annual Procurement Audit Reportpublished by the PPA and a review of the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663). Theliterature synthesis on corruption practices clearly indicates the presence of cultural,ethical and leadership dimensions, which constructs are sustained through a process ofhuman action and interaction. These constructs together with the explorative nature of thepaper resemble the idealist assumptions and holds value-laden axiological position.Axiological positioning is concerned with values (Dainty, 2007) and social constructionistsconsider that researchers have values, and these values help to determine what arerecognized as facts and the interpretations which are drawn from them. Consequently, themany years experience of the authors, as consultants to the National PPA coupled withtheir direct involvement on a number of procurement auditing exercises, influenced theresearch process and provided the basis for the identification, extraction, explanation anddiscussion of the problem.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 considers some key conceptualdimensions and analysis of corruption practices. This has implications for understanding ofcorruption related issues inherent in the public procurement process. Section 3 draws on twomain theories of corruption to explain demand and supply sides of corruption. Section 4provides empirical details about corruption experience in Ghana that prompted thelegislative change and the drafting of the Public Procurement Act 2003. Section 5 deals withkey sections of the Public Procurement Act 2003 (Act 663) that informs the reader of the bidto curb corruption and concluded that the Act is a strategic initiative to ensure transparency,accountability and equal opportunity. Section 6 highlights on various forms of corruptionrelated practices that are problematic in the procurement practice and provides theunderstanding that corruption is not a single-phase phenomenon in the procurement processbut takes place at different stages in the procurement and project cycle. Section 7 discussessome interesting business approaches to combating corruption practices and concludedthat a comprehensive approach should be applied including balanced use of availableanti-corruption methods at all stages of public procurement process. Last, Section 8 provides
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the conclusions of the paper and highlights the practical implications for policy-makersattention.
2. Conceptual dimensions of corruption practicesConceptual definitions of corruption suggest that personal aims may sometimesundermine the work of organizations (Larmour, 2006). According to Mensah et al. (2003),corruption has been defined to encompass all forms of irregular, unethical, immoraland/or illegal practices and transactions, dealing and activities in the process ofhandling commercial or public transactions or in the performance of official duties.Consistently, several authors have indicated that corruption has defied many years ofeconomic and political reforms and has continued to grow and undermine efforts toimprove the living standards and to foster democratic governance (Mensah et al., 2003;Mensah, 2000, 2001; Buaben-Asamoa, 2003; Gyimah-Boadi, 2002; CDD Ghana, 2000).For instance, Shakantu (2003) defines corruption as a behaviour which deviates from thenorms, rules and duties governing the exercise of a privileged role or office for purposesof private gain. It may do so by ignoring prohibitions against certain acts, or by notfulfilling obligations to act or by not exercising legitimate discretion to act, for a privateadvantage or private motive (Szeftel, 1998). Transparency International, an anticorruption non-governmental organization (NGO), originally defined corruption as theuse of public office for private gains. This definition assumes corruption is “the abuse ofpublic or private office for personal gain”, by offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting,directly or indirectly, anything of value to improperly influence the actions of anotherparty. It is often argued that corruption is notoriously difficult to conceptualize; with nouniversal definition (Larmour, 2006). According to Hellman et al. (2000), corruption mayexist in several forms, mainly: administrative corruption (bribes to bureaucrats to alterthe implementation of rules and regulations), legal methods of affecting policy (such aslobbying), public procurement kickbacks (payments made to secure procurementcontracts), and state capture (the “purchase” of laws and policies by corporations).Quoting Chetwynd et al. (2003):
[. . .] state capture describes the situation where businesses have undue influence over thedecisions of public officials and allows large economic interests to distort the legalframework; and the policy-making process in a way that defeats the development of a marketeconomy.
Similarly, a study conducted by Larmour (2006) considered how studies of publicadministration and related ideas such as bureaucracy, management and governance haveassociated personal aspirations with corruption. Larmour concluded that corruption is thedark side of the relationship between personal interest and organizational goals.
Each concept or theoretical approach introduced above conforms that corruptionencompasses the common dimension of acting for the purpose of private gains.Furthermore, in the case of organizational administration, corruption is just another formof disobedience, thus, unauthorized or secret administrative act (Larmour, 2006). Wilson(2004) describes criminal fraud and corruption in terms of Cressey’s fraud triangle(Cressey, 1971). This model explains corruption and fraud as having three antecedentsthat must all be in place to sustain corruption and fraud. These are opportunity,rationalization and pressure. The opportunity is offered by an ability to perpetrate theaction, often with weak or ineffective systems in place that allow opportunities to bepresented to engage in fraud or corruption. Rationalization is the human attitude that
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allows the perpetrators concerned to convince themselves that these actions are acceptableor at least not particularly harmful – low pay can induce this for petty fraud or corruptionas it may induce frauds or corrupt people to feel that petty or grand corruption isrecompense for being underpaid. The person must be able to justify the action tothemselves as being a common practice, culturally accepted or a perquisite or not harmfuladvantage to be taken. Finally, pressure is the need for the benefits offered throughcorruption and fraud.
This could be associated with poverty, feeding a habit (as is often the case in fraud tosustain a gambling habit) or even to gain status through sharing some of the “spoils”with others in a corruption chain that builds that person’s credibility, status as a “bigman” or develops a dependency in others. In an influential paper by Philip (2002), it waspointed out that; most definitions of corruption imply a conception of the “naturallysound condition” from which corruption is seen as a deviation, or falling away fromnorms and good practices. The world over, corruption is believed to be endemic andpervasive, and a significant contributor to economic retreat, slow growth rate, inhibitionof the provision of public services and increase in the inequality. This has led tointernational organizations such as the World Bank (2003) to identify corruption as thesingle greatest obstacle to economic and social development. Several studies attestedthat corrupt practices in public procurement results in enormous losses for any countryand those losses are not only of financial nature but of quantitative, qualitative andpolitical losses (Khramkin, 2007; Larmour, 2006; Shakantu, 2003; Philip, 2002; Szeftel,1998). Financial losses associated with corruption practices deals with financial termsthat would be disadvantageous to the country. For instance, raising prices of procuredgoods too high as compared with the current market level, and setting prepayment as apublic contract clause instead of delay of payment are typical examples of corruptpractices that lead to financial losses.
Quantitative losses are concerned with raising volume of supplied goods or renderedservices too high or setting it too low in comparison with necessary amount; acquiringgoods and services for personal purposes of officials in charge and not for public needs.The issue of qualitative losses has to deal with breaking required conditions such assupply of goods, performance of works or rendering of services of improper quality;worse conditions of warranty and post-warranty service; insufficient requirements forthe quality control of works and services. Notwithstanding, political losses contendswith the deterioration of investment climate in the country; collapse of economical andfinancial system of the country, violation of the principles of free competition, and losstrust to governmental institutions and machineries by the citizenry. Again, as reportedby Abbey (2005), corruption may either deter investment or render it less productivethrough its adverse impact on the risk and cost of doing business.
3. Demand and supply of corruption practicesQuoting Mensah et al.(2003, p. 9), “demand-side corruption is often associated withpublic officials”. The activities that provide opportunity for demand-side corruptpractices are manifold, but some of the more significant include administration ofgovernment regulations, e.g. the issuance of licenses and permits, control overgovernment procurement, control over hiring, promotion, and firing of civil servants,control over access to public services and resources, control over auditing and taxadministration, poor supervision, over-politicization of the public service, and not least,
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poor remuneration and lack of incentives (Mensah et al., 2003; Morisset and Lumenga,2002). It has been argued that if governments do not pay civil servants well, there willcontinue to be “power without pay” floating about desperately and dangerously insearch of a living (Wilson, 2004; Mensah et al., 2003; Cressey, 1971). Delays in thedelivery of public services have been noted to be a fundamental cause of demand-sidecorruption (Morisset and Lumenga, 2002). For example, as commonly witnessed inmany developing countries, it takes up to two or three years to establish a new business(Mensah et al., 2003). Most of the associated delays in establishing businesses in thesecountries occur in securing land access and obtaining building permits.
As reported by Morisset and Lumenga (2002), the associated administrative costswere found to be positively correlated with estimates of the level of corruption andnegatively correlated with the quality of governance, degree of openness, and publicwages, among others. Morisset and Lumenga (2002) further argued that the level ofcorruption or the lack of good governance is expected to influence administrative costsas bureaucrats and politicians are more likely to capture the extra rents.
Supply-side corruption, on the other hand, reflects the role of the private sector incorruption, and involves factors that facilitate the payment of bribes by the private sector(Mensah et al., 2003). Supply-side corruption is driven by rent-seeking entrepreneursseeking to exploit political influence to their benefit. Business organizations and theirofficials influence public officials to make decisions that are more favourable to them thanto the general body of the citizenry. Such influences may be monetary or non-monetaryand can take the form of political campaign contributions, trips abroad, paying schoolfees for wards of public officials, or physical cash paid directly to the officials. In suchinstances, rent-seeking could be more profitable than productive activities. Whenrent-seeking is widespread, enterprising individuals realize that they could reap muchhigher profits by obtaining privileges in a system marked by continued governmentinterventions than by setting up risky new ventures to restructure old inefficientindustries or starting up new companies. Corruption and side payments become a naturaloutgrowth of the new rent-seeking system (Mensah, 2000).
Different theories have been advanced to explain the determinants of demand-sideand supply-side corruption. The “speed money theory”, the “queuing theory” or the“efficiency theory” of bribes (Lui, 1985; Leff, 1964) argue that assuming there is no stigmaassociated with bribery, or that the stigma associated with paying bribes does not dependon enterprise profitability, firms that benefit more from public services will generally offerlarger bribe payments for reduced waiting periods for services. Allocation of publicservices therefore would be according to the value that different enterprises place on suchservices. Such services will be allocated efficiently with the bribe acting as a perfect pricediscriminating mechanism. Although the benefit that an individual firm gains fromservices is unobservable, it is reasonable to assume that more profitable firms willgenerally benefit more from the public service (Mensah et al., 2003; Kanaga, 1999). Underthe “endogenous harassment theory” of corruption propounded by Myrdal (1968) andfurther elaborated by Kaufmann and Wei (1999), service providers use observableinformation such as industry, size, or profitability to guess each enterprise’s maximumwillingness-to-pay for public services and endogenously offer incentive compatible bribelevels that depend on such characteristics. Both the speed money and the endogenousharassment theories assume that the bribe amount paid by different firms increases withthe willingness to pay for public services (Mensah et al., 2003). The basic difference
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between these theories is that while in the case of the speed money theory the firmpaying the bribe self-selects the amount of the bribe according to its cost of waiting, theendogenous harassment theory assumes that the bribe taker has information oncharacteristics of the firm which affects its willingness to pay bribes (Kaufmann andWei, 1999; Myrdal, 1968).
4. Corruption situation in Ghana: towards strategic legislative change inpublic procurementThe results of the 2000 Ghana Governance and Corruption Survey conducted by theCDD Ghana (2000) and commissioned by the World Bank, present the strongest link yetbetween internal control and governance structures of business firms on the one handand corruption of public officials on the other. An influential paper by Mensah et al.(2003) sampled views from 1,500 households, 500 business enterprises and 1,000 publicofficials in all regions of Ghana, where it was found that corruption is a major problem inboth the public and private sectors. Quoting from Mensah et al. (2003, p. 23), the CDDGhana (2000) reported indicated that:
A total of 86 per cent of households see corruption as a major problem in the public sector,whereas 59 per cent of households see corruption as a major problem in the private sector;many firms make unofficial payments [44 per cent] to public officials with over a quarter [27per cent] frequently or always making such payments; unofficial payments constitute aregular feature of transactions between business firms and public service agencies; 56 percent of the firms reported that service is frequently delivered once they make an unofficialpayment; 46 per cent of unofficial payments to public officials are initiated by firms and 31per cent are solicited by the public officials themselves; and 50 per cent of firms know inadvance how much unofficial payment is required of them.
The customs, excise, and preventive service emerges as the most bribed public agencyaccording to firms in the service, manufacturing, wholesale, and retail sectors. Thepolice service, internal revenue service, and the judiciary are also believed to receiveunofficial payments from all sectors of business surveyed.
There appears to be worrisome evidence of a perception of high levels of corruption aswell as tolerance for corruption in Ghana. For instance, a recent survey in four-urbancities in Southern conducted by Ghana integrity initiative (GII) reported as follows:
[. . .] a high–70 per cent of respondents – said they had been involved in bribery andcorruption either as victims or perpetrators; and almost 90 per cent of respondents who hadwitnessed incidents of bribery and corruption usually looked on unconcerned (Abbey, 2005).
Clearly, this is an indication of an unacceptably high level of tolerance for corruptionamong Ghanaians. For instance, corruption was a major issue in Ghana’ 2000 election,which the incumbent lost. At the inaugural ceremony of the new President in January 7,2001, the new President declared a policy of zero tolerance (which later became a sloganacross the country) for corruption and promised to promulgate a code of conduct to guidepolitical appointees and establish an office in the Presidency to monitor the code. Thislater saw the implication of a senior political official in the then Sports Ministry of Ghanawho was caught in corruption and was prosecuted. The prosecution of the allegedMinister became a hotly contested issue across political lines and media headlines.
Again, in early 2001, the Vice President launched the Ghana anti-corruption coalition(GACC) and unveiled the action plan in a huge national event and promised to work
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closely with the GACC. The GACC assumed that the new political executive wouldparticipate in the Coalition on the strength of its pronouncements and the fact that whilstin opposition, some prominent members associated with the anti-corruption drive. Aftereffectively assuming power however, the political executive reconsidered its initialpledge to provide a nominee to sit on the GACC and instead, offered a liaison through theAttorney General. Admittedly, the reason given by the political executive to the GACC atthe time seemed plausible but current difficulties in implementation point out otherwise.
Following the establishment of the GACC and at the first workshop of the WBI courseheld in Washington DC, three organizations, the Commission on Human Rights andAdministrative Justice (CHRAJ), an independent constitutional body with a threefoldmandate including corruption control; the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) is a statutoryinvestigatory agency under the Attorney-Generals’ Office and the Institute of EconomicAffairs, a civil society policy think tank were identified as a core group and tasked withbuilding a coalition and drafting an action plan, then referred to as a matrix(Buaben-Asamoa, 2003; Manual on Corporate Governance in Ghana, 2000). Two civilsociety organizations, the CDD-Ghana, a policy think-tank and the GII subjected thematrix produced by the group to a review. The revised matrix, along with those of the sixother countries, was presented to the World Bank President, James Wolfensohn, at thesecond of the course workshops held in Durban during the 9th InternationalAnti-Corruption Conference of 1999 (CDD Ghana, 2000). Because of Donor andGovernment interest in the new trend of fighting corruption was high. The enthusiasmwas manifest in the ease with which sponsorship to the Durban conference was obtainedfor a large 21 man delegation made up of the budding Coalition, government officials,private sector representatives and civil society including the media. After Durban, theCoalition drew in the Private Enterprise Foundation an umbrella private sectoradvocacy organization, the Ghana Journalists Association and the National InstitutionalRenewal Programme, the secretariat that was overseeing ongoing public sector reforms.Through most of the years 2000-2001, The African Development Bank hosted theseeight institutions at meetings usually chaired by the Country Director and attended bythe full complement of Donors in Accra because of the perceived weak governance inboth the public and private sectors (Buaben-Asamoa, 2003).
Indicators of weak governance in both the public and private sectors include anabsence of laid-down procedures for procurement and tender, non-enforcement oflaid-down control principles, abuse of managerial powers, lax supervision, non-existenceof codes of conduct, and improper payments and accounting systems, to name a few(Li et al., 2000). When key indicators of sound corporate governance are breached,opportunities are created for individuals in business to make personal gains (Abbey, 2005).For example, a weak internal control system within a company creates incentives formanagers to make side deals with vendors or make side-payments to government officialsto obtain contracts. Public sector corporations with internal management weaknesses andlow remunerated officials will also provide receptacles for kickback payments fromprivate sector institutions and other organizations that deal with them. Consequently,corruption has been reported to be a nuisance for socio-economic and political growth andhas been the cause and consequence of structural decay bequeathed by decades ofrent-seeking politics of the post-colonial state in Ghana (Mensah et al., 2003). In effect, weakcorporate governance systems will provide various kinds of opportunities for corruption.In an attempt to curb corruption, three key fiduciary acts were passed by Parliament
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in 2003, which were designed to regulate, and bring order, control and sanity into thecountry’s financial administration and included the following: Financial AdministrationAct (Act 654), Internal Audit Agency Act (Act 658) and Public Procurement Act (Act 663).These acts were simultaneously promulgated to ensure transparency and accountabilityin public procurement, public business and also to promote fair competition among allinterested parties.
5. Achieving stable macroeconomic development through publicprocurement reforms in GhanaThrough a World Bank-assisted macroeconomic programme, Ghana has made a robustrecovery, achieved a fairly stable macroeconomic environment and assumed significantimportance in the global marketplace (Anvuur et al., 2006). A new vision of Ghanaemphasizes wealth creation, improved governance and reduced regional inequalities.A critical component of this new vision is the government’s efforts to promote theprivate sector as the engine of economic growth. To achieve set economic targets,the Government of Ghana identified the construction industry as a priority sector forforeign and private investment; an effort embraced by many governments the worldover. This is in recognition that the construction industry is undeniably positioned as adriver of economic activity and a major contributor of Gross Domestic Product in bothdeveloped and developing countries (Hillebrandt, 1985). For instance in Ghana, publicprocurement accounts for 50-70 per cent of the national budgets, representing 14 per centof gross domestic product (World Bank, 2003). Out of this, an estimated annual value ofUS$600 million has been earmarked for public procurement of goods, works, andconsultant services in the Ghanaian construction industry (Anvuur et al., 2006; WorldBank, 2003; Anvuur and Westring, 1997). Notwithstanding, it has been mentionedearlier in this paper that, procurement of infrastructure projects and works particularlyexposed to corruption practices (Shakantu, 2003). Indisputably, it has been estimatedthat annual savings of about US$150 million are realized through better management ofgovernment-financed procurement alone (Anvuur et al., 2006; World Bank, 2003).
However, before the drafting of the Public Procurement Act 2003 (Act 663), theprocurement of construction works, goods and services were regulated mainly throughcirculars from the Ministry of Finance, which complement a set of procedures evolved byconvention in connection with the control of procurement exercised by the ministry(Anvuur et al., 2006). Whilst World Bank projects used the World Bank ProcurementGuidelines, central, regional and district tender boards in Ghana processed and awardedcontracts within thresholds defined by the Ministry of Finance. The Architectural &Engineering Services Corporation was set up in 1973 to use in-house specialists to carryout the services or consultancy component of government construction contracts. In1967, Central, Regional, and District Tender Boards were set up as an attempt torationalize the public procurement regime. These tender boards served in an advisorycapacity and the final decision on contract awards was vested in either the sector or theRegional Minister for the relevant project. In 1996, guidelines issued by the Minister ofFinance made Tender Boards (apart from District Tender Boards) awarding authorities,though still no law provides for their creation. Noted inefficiencies identified with thelack of procurement management mainstreaming and reforms include, weakinstitutional infrastructures; lack of effective monitoring mechanisms; inadequateintegration of procurement function within the strategic perspective of results-based
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public management, a dearth of knowledge of national and international donorsstandards, practices and procedures; inferior quality of bidding documents; very longdelays in the execution of procurement cycle; lack of negotiation skills; frequent report ofcorruption related practices; and insufficient transparency and equity (IdeaInternational, 2009; Lengwiler and Wolfstetter, 2006).
In the bid to achieve national macroeconomic development targets, institutionalreforms and effective exploitation of appropriate development framework to the existinginfrastructure and the upcoming ones are undoubtedly indispensable (Mensah et al., 2003).
Along this goal, the Public Procurement Act 2003 (Act 663) was promulgated toregulate procurement processes and reduce corruption (Westring, 1997). The rest ofthe discussions under this section indicate some important sections of the PublicProcurement Act 2003, which are geared towards streamlining procurement processes;and achieving the benefits associated with procurement reforms and mainstreaming.The Public Procurement Act 2003 (Act 663) establishes the five basic pillars of publicprocurement, mainly:
(1) comprehensive, transparent legal and institutional framework;
(2) clear and standardized procurement procedures and standard tenderdocuments;
(3) independent control system;
(4) proficient procurement staff; and
(5) anti-corruption measures.
For instance, regarding the legal and institutional framework; the Act provides for theestablishment of a PPB as a legal corporate entity. Procurement entities are defined ascomprising metropolitan, municipal and district assembles (MMDAs) and all para-statalestablishments that utilize public funds (Government of the Republic of Ghana, 2003). Atender committee in each procurement entity provides a one-stop shop for concurrentapprovals, awards and management of contracts to predefined value thresholds.
The tender committee may make use of external consultants in the performance of itsfunctions. The tender committee then refers any procurement exceeding its contract valuethreshold to the appropriate tender review board at the district, regional, ministerial orcentral government level. The tender review board reviews all procurement activities forcompliance with the Act, provides concurrent approval or otherwise of procurementreferrals, hears complaints and escalates unresolved issues to the Board (Government ofthe Republic of Ghana, 2003; Anvuur et al., 2006). In connection with procurementprocedures and documentations, the acts stipulates procedures for the sizing of tenderpackages, soliciting and evaluating tenders and for contract award. In particular, the Actprovides for the pre-qualification of tenderers for large and complex works and technicalservices contracts. Provision has been made in the Act that all contracts must be tenderedon an open competitive basis, except otherwise provided for in the Act. In furtherance tothis, the Act provides that, restricted tendering is justifiable only on the grounds ofproviding greater economy and efficiency and subject to the approval of the PPA.
Meanwhile, two-stage tendering is only allowed where detailed specifications cannotbe made available before going to tender or the optimal solution is unknown and tendersare solicited to provide this. National Competitive Bidding shall be used when theprocurement entity so decides and subject to contract value thresholds specified in the Act.
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The Act indicates that International Competitive Bidding shall be used when effectivecompetition cannot be achieved without the inclusion of foreign firms. It has been providedthat, all procurement must use the appropriate standard tender/contract document andmodifications can only be introduced through tender/contract data sheets or specialconditions of contract. The successful tender for works contracts shall be the lowestevaluated tender price ascertained on the basis of criteria specified in the bid invitationdocuments, which shall include:
. the tender price subject to any margin of preference for domestic contractors;
. the lifecycle costs of the tendered solution;
. the potential for economic development, local involvement or technologytransfer; and
. national security considerations.
The selection of consultants shall be on quality and cost-based criteria with the pricecomponent assessed in a similar manner as for works. Quality-based selection is allowedfor complex or highly specialized assignments, and least-cost selection is reserved forsmall value assignments. All these measure are geared towards improving judicious useof public funds and reducing escalation of government budget and expenditure.
6. Corruption in procurement processes: taxonomy and practicesConventional wisdom tells that, “corruption does not happen in a vacuum but involves amedium to thrive”. That is to say that corruption takes place when client officialsentrusted with procurement (first party) collude with the third party (suppliers,contractors) and break the law (second party) in pursuit of personal interests, whichtraditionally involves bribery and fraudulent practices. Studies by Mawenya (2008) andTransparency International (2005) show that corruption practices can be grouped inthree broad areas: corruption within the public sector, corruption between public sectorand consumers and corruption in the interaction between public and private sector(procurement). Accordingly, Transparency International (2005) reported that there aretwo types of corruption in public procurement practice, namely; petty corruption andgrand corruption. Petty corruption is concerned with smaller contracts, notably thoseinvolving goods, services and minor projects for local government authorities(Mawenya, 2008). Similarly, grand corruption is concerned with larger contracts whichare normally executed primarily by central governments, through own or donor funding(Transparency International, 2005).
Notable among such contracts are: public works in construction projects; contracts forthe supply of goods in large quantities (e.g. office supplies, motor vehicles, powergenerators, pharmaceuticals); and contracts relating to concessions to operate publicutilities. These types of large contracts are often targeted by corrupt public officials andpoliticians in partnership with unscrupulous business corporations or their agents.Corruption in public procurement can be attributed to a combination of socio-economicfactors. Perhaps the most crucial is bad governance, manifested by lack of transparency,weak accountability and lack of integrity by public officials entrusted with procurement.These officials often violate regulations and procedures with impunity. Second, pervasivepoverty and low salaries that do not reflect marketplace realities create a powerfulmotive for public servants entrusted with procurement to engage in corruption. In fact,
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most petty corruption in local government authorities can be attributed to low salaries.And as a result, letters and payment certificates and claims from consultants andcontractors/suppliers are usually delayed by low-ranked officials engaged in suchpetty corruption. Third, procurement procedures normally include several steps, frompreparation of documents to prequalification of applicants to evaluation of bids to contractadministration and supervision. These steps tend to prolong the procurement process andpaves way for corruption to thrive. Fourth, high-ranking public officials and politiciansmay have undue influence on procurement processes and the allocation of governmentbudget.
Greed and the desire for wealth motivate them to take advantage of their powerfulpositions. Corrupt suppliers, contractors and consultants are driven by one or more ofseveral motives; the most common being the passion to win contract at all cost. It isfrequently manifested when a potential contractor or supplier seeks an unfaircompetitive advantage and bribes an official to gain access to confidential information;be included in the pre-qualified list; eliminate a competitor from the pre-qualified list;influence the proposal evaluation process; or level the playing field just in case all othercompetitors are offering bribes. Suppliers, contractors and consultants who pay bribesto win business are sometimes depicted as innocent parties forced by ruthless officials toprovide kickbacks. Using the Cressey’s triangle (Cressey, 1971), the following can bevisualized. Table I applies at both the petty corruption and grand corruption levels.
The foregoing discussion on taxonomy of corruption could not have been endedwithout mentioning the various corruption practices embedded in procurement processes.Conventionally speaking, at all levels and stages in the procurement process, it has beenidentified that neither of the stages are immune to corrupt practices. Corruption takesplace at different stages of the procurement cycle; mainly, pre-qualification stage,conceptual and design stage, tendering and contract stage and contract execution stage(Transparency International, 2005). During pre-qualification and tendering phases, forexample, client officials and representatives may bend procurement rules to favourpreferred bidders in exchange for bribes. The following corruption practices are commonduring the conceptual and design stage: official planning for the project not because the
Cressey’s fraudtriangle elements Examples
Opportunity At the project instigation phase, falsely attribution a need for the projectthrough political lobbying. At the design and development phase “over-designing”, specifying a design that is restricted to one or few suppliers whocan join in corrupt practices. At the procurement stage through “rigging” theprocess. At the project delivery phase through poor supervision or allowingdefective work to be accepted. Each of these relates to poor, weak orsystemically faulty governance frameworks that inhibits transparency
Rationalization A culture in which a certain level of corruption is accepted as normal. A feelingthat some form of corrupt payoff is a perquisite or that corruption is of lowharm to the general community. A feeling of being exploited and thereforecorruption is a form of compensation
Pressure Low pay or a need for status afforded by being a provider within a corruptionchain. Greed or a need for a higher standard of living that is offered byprevailing salary and benefits
Table I.Applying Cressey’smodel to procurementprojects
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society needs it but because the corrupt officials will have some personal gains such aswinning more electoral votes; official planning in favour for high valued projects whichmay not address an immediate or long term socioeconomic problem; over designing andoverpricing projects because of personal gains; and ignoring an unfavourableenvironmental impact assessment/planning proposal or approval. Again, during thetendering and contract stage; manipulation of laid-down procedures on tendering andbidding is the gameplay; kickbacks for construction and supply contracts are common;and politicians influencing the choice of contractors or suppliers also disrupt theprocurement processes. Lastly, during the contract execution phase, a number ofcorruption practices are also identified with the procurement processes. For instance,in-house officials normally condone and connive with main contractors to take oversubcontracting activities; delivery of inferior materials; lowering the specifications forsub-quality standard of construction works; works inspectors and consultants concealsubstandard works by contractors; payment of claims which actually cannot be accountedfor; and payment of contingency sums without any tangible basis. All these pervasivepractices have short-long term adverse consequences on economic progression of thecountry.
7. Business approaches to combating corruption practicesIt has already been noted by this paper that corruption has deep roots in contemporaryAfrican and Ghanaian society, culture, economy, and politics (Abbey, 2005; Mensah et al.,2003). “The prevalence of corruption reflects a toxic combination of motive, reflectingmaterial needs in a low income and non living wage economy, high dependency ratios,weak social insurance” (Gyimah-Boadi, 2002; Li et al., 2000); and the usual humangreed and opportunity, provided by huge system loopholes, laxities in legal andadministrative systems, a culture of non-transparency compounded by wide discretionarypowers at the disposal of public officials (Wilson, 2004 and Cressey, 1971); low likelihoodof detection of wrongdoing and abuse of office, especially in these conditions of nontransparency (Kanaga, 1999); low likelihood of punishment and high likelihood of evasionof punishment in the context of a flawed and corrupt criminal justice system andweak enforcement of rules (Larmour, 2006). The new legal, constitutional and democraticapproach to fighting corruption in Africa today is reflected in the emergence ofconstitutionalism following the promulgation of more or less liberal constitutions in recenttimes. The creation of specialized and autonomous anti-corruption agencies, horizontaland vertical oversight bodies, and other agencies of external restraint and publicaccountability represents the best expression of the new and institutional approach tocorruption control in Africa today (Gyimah-Boadi, 2002). Confronting corruption in asustained manner would require comprehensive and integrative approaches that combinepreventive, public education and punitive elements. Remedying the problem of corruptionbegins from an awareness and recognition of its prevalence.
It is clear that combating corrupt practices in procurement systems in public sectorsof the economy is impossible without comprehensive approach to this complicatedproblem. Though, corruption cannot be completely eliminated from procurementprocesses, it can be managed in a lager extent. There is a general recognition thatcorruption is a multi-faceted problem without single solution and confronting corruptionrequires a combination of measures; implemented in an integrated manner at regional,national and global levels. This paper cannot pretend to exhaust the list of possible
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measures but limits the discussions in line with few crucial business approaches. Theanti-corruption strategies adopted by most countries are based on a holistic approachthat addresses political will and commitment, legal and regulatory framework,transparency and accountability, public service reforms and constructive engagementwith non-state actors (Mawenya, 2007; Mensah et al., 2003). It is important to note that atransparent procurement system promotes competition and empowerment of domesticsuppliers, contractors and consultants. It also fosters procurement standards andpractices that ensure that clients get value for money, restore budgetary deficits andfoster national progress. However, the battle against corruption should begin with astrong political will and explicit commitment to eradicate all its manifestations. Newrules and campaign gimmicks adopted by politicians alone are not enough forprocurement reforms (Philip, 2002). However, political commitment is a necessarycondition for procurement reforms and curbs corruption. Without political will andcommitment by the leadership of the country, grand corruption is perpetuated at analarming rate; whilst petty corruption becomes endemic and more difficult to stop(Philip, 2002).
There are tangible indications of political will by some stakeholders at the lower levelto effect change, but this fight can never be won if those at the apex of the pyramid leanback (Szeftel, 1998). In general, however, ordinary citizens feel that the government is notsufficiently committed to combat corruption; hence their zeal and energy to put in effortsdwindle. Experience shows that, corruption can be dealt with by conforming to formaland informal institutional methods, such as psychological methods (Goredema, 2002);technical methods (Cavill and Sohail, 2005); regulation of processes (Mawenya, 2007 andGoredema, 2002); and retaliatory measures (Khramkin, 2007). Adopting thepsychological methods to curb corruption requires confronting the challenge of thewish of employees for fraudulent enrichment for the expense of the employer. This couldbe done through examination of biographical particulars of candidate and referencesfrom his/her previous places of employment.
This is the simplest and most common method that allows from the very outset toavoid admitting to potentially corruption-generating activities candidates that have(criminal) records or were dismissed for corrupt practices. Presently, in Ghana,personnel departments of most government institutions do such examinations whileconsidering applicants to take vacant place in the public office. Again, periodical loyaltytesting of employees combined with demonstrative disclosure and punishment ofperpetrators are very effective psychological anti-corruption practices (Gyimah-Boadi,2002). Other psychological anti-corruption practices include setting up the system ofmutual control of employees (Mawenya, 2007); efficient motivation of personnel(Lengwiler and Wolfstetter, 2006); rotation of employees (Mawenya, 2008); and makingintolerance to corruption a principle of organization’s code of conduct (Goredema, 2002).
Following on from the earlier discussion of the Cressey triangle the approach illustratedin Figure 1 can be adopted as summarizing the above discussion and expanded uponbelow. Literature synthesis indicates that the technical methods of combating corruptionsignificantly reduces the chance of agreement between procurement departments’personnel and sellers as they prevent from personal contacts between participants of thedeal and raise the risk for corrupt official to be caught. Equipping meeting rooms andwork-places of public procurement personnel with control and video surveillance system,monitoring of official correspondence, use of up-to-date information technologies and
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adoption of open-space office rooms are identified technical approaches in literature(Khramkin, 2007). On the other hand, the operational (procedure) methods of combatingcorruption are aimed at procurement according to all formalized internal rules andprocedures that reduce risk of corruption.
In this case anti-corruption practices should be arranged in two ways in an attempt toprovide equal opportunity and fairness for all in the bidding process. This is a centralfeature of a sound and transparent procurement system. First, effective and transparentprocurement system of rules regulating in detail the stages of procedure of placing ofpublic contract which may potentially be of corruption-generating nature.
Presently, in Ghana, the Public Procurement Act 2003 (Act 663) currently in usedetails and regulates the whole process of placing of public and municipal contracts. Forinstance Section 47 (2) of Act 663 enjoins that all local, regional, national andinternational contracts should be competitive and should be advertised using printablemedia; transparent and objective tender evaluation criteria; prompt and effective reviewprocedures for handling complaints by aggrieved bidders; media, civil society andgeneral public involvement in monitoring public procurement; and adequate protectionfor whistle-blowers. Also, Section 31 of Act 663 requires public entities to publishcontract awards in the form and manner prescribed by the PPA. These features arenormally incorporated in the procurement guidelines and also set by several multilateraland bilateral donors. Second, efficient mechanisms of compliance control system shouldbe implemented (Mensah et al., 2003). That is to say that in a system of anti-corruptionregulations there should be initial checkpoints, which would enable independent agentsto follow-up and audit public procurement procedures.
In the context of Ghana, under Sections 3(d) and (h) of Act 663, the PPA is mandated tomonitor and supervise public procurement and carry out assessment of procurementEntities within the first quarter of the year to cover all procurement activitiesundertaken by the Entities. The legislations and laws in the country also providesclearly defined institutional arrangements within which public procurement takes place,including mechanisms for monitoring, how procurement is implemented and proceduresfor handling complaints.
The retaliatory measures of combating corruption in public procurement practicesare aimed at making corrupt practices “unprofitable” for the employees in charge for
Figure 1.A response to prevent
corruption
Rationalization
Sound + strong governanceTransparencyControl processes
Empowerment of people to report corruptionImproved and fair workplace conditionsPressure against accepting corruption
Cultural change to denigrate corruptionTraining + awareness about corruption’s harmful impact
Leadership examples that condemn corruptionLegislation and prosecution against corruption
Opportunity Pressure
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placing of public contracts. The legislative domain is the most dynamic component ofthe anti-corruption effort in Africa, and there are a number of countries that haveadopted, or are adopting, new anti-corruption legislation (Goredema, 2002). Some ofthese legislations as enshrined in the constitution of Ghana, recognize that fightingcorruption requires both criminal justice and civil legislation procedures to be usedcomprehensively. The By-Article 218(e) of the Constitution of Ghana mandates theCHRAJ to investigate all instances of alleged or suspected corruption and themis-appropriation of public funds by public official. Again, the SFO Act, 1993, was alsodesigned and promulgated to detect certain types of corruption and economic crime,such as procurement fraud. The SFO is a specialized agency to monitor, investigate and,by the authority of the Attorney General, prosecute any offence involving seriousfinancial loss to the state. These constitutionally mandated institutions should not beinterfered by the political weights in the discharge of their authorized duties as it haspreviously been the situation in Ghana.
The constitution of Ghana also recognizes the importance of balance betweenanti-corruption measures that are preventive in nature and those that are punitive. Thepurpose of the former is to regulate the context within which corruption takes place,while the latter category focuses on punishment and sanctions. The former categoryincludes statutes for regulating the public sector and public corporations.
Legislation to regulate public procurement, for instance, belongs in this category.It should be recognized that the application of each anti-corruption method in practiceas discussed above is restricted by its specific nature and requires additional publicresources. For example, the effectiveness of psychological methods depends onprofessional skills of experts employed for the job: in-depth interviewing, psychologicaltesting of applicants, monitoring and analysis of personal information of applicants andemployees. Again, the use of technical methods is limited and subject to the properties ofthe procured goods and services as well as to the popularity of technical method withpotential suppliers (Khramkin, 2007; Mensah et al., 2003; Gyimah-Boadi, 2002). Similarly,the effectiveness of operational methods can only be guaranteed if they are totally andexactly complied with. So this is closely related to effectiveness of mechanisms ofestablished regulations and procedures control. The efficiency of retaliatory measuresproves to be insignificant if there is no “inevitability of punishment” mechanism. To getnoticeable reduction of corrupt practices, a comprehensive approach should be appliedincluding balanced use of all anti-corruption methods at all stages of public procurementprocess.
8. ConclusionsLike many developed and developing countries, the Government of Ghana has alsoidentified the construction industry as a priority sector for foreign and private investment.However, it should be acknowledged that, infrastructure sectors of most economies areparticularly exposed to corruption practices since they involve monopolies of criticalpublic services, huge construction works and opportunities for concessions; all of thembeing possible sources of huge profits. It is important to note this paper along with othershave revealed substantial inefficiencies and concluded that value for money is notachieved in both government – and donor-funded projects in Ghana because ofcorruption. As noted by the paper, there are a number of corruption related challengesthat must be addressed in order to actualize the expected economic gains associated with
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procurement practice. This paper affirmed that corruption occurs throughout theprocurement process and project cycle; with the root causes being project participantssuch as political influencers, public servants, clients, consultants, contractors andsuppliers. Additionally the Cressey triangle as illustrated in Table I and Figure 1 providesa model to visualize how corruption may occur and how it may be combated. The paperargued that implications of corruption related practices in public procurement system ofGhana have manifold negative consequences, which results in enormous losses for thecountry. It further established that those losses are not only of financial nature but ofqualitative losses, quantitative losses, political losses and social dimensions.
The paper reported that corruption can be dealt with by adopting formal and informalinstitutional methods, such as psychological methods; technical methods; regulation ofprocesses; and retaliatory measures. In the pursuit to control corruption practices, thepaper suggested that, anti-corruption policies and pro-social equity policies that wouldfoster good governance should be improved in order to increase the effectiveness ofdevelopment programmes targeted at controlling public expenditure. The paper however,signaled a caution that the application of each anti-corruption method discussed in thepaper is restricted by its specific nature and requires additional public resources. It wasobserved by the paper that the reform agenda targeted at improving public financialmanagement that culminated penciling of the Public Procurement Act (Act 663) was anecessary prerequisite for ensuring sanity, fairness, transparency, probity andaccountability in public procurement of infrastructural projects.
The paper further affirmed that the Public Procurement Act 2003 (Act 663) profferssolutions for these underlying constructs. The paper has implications for policy makersin an attempt to strategize to curb corruption practices inherent in the publicprocurement system of Ghana. Complete conformance to the approaches of combatingcorruption described by the paper would guarantee the rule of law, the protection ofpublic property and grant equal opportunity for all.
Though, the paper acknowledged that there is no strict formal recipe as to how thesubject of corruption in public procurement should be approached; there should beefforts made to combat it. The important issue is that fundamental rule should beobserved, thus, everyone involved with the procurement process should try: to be a goodperson, do the right thing and avoid doing the wrong thing – obscure, twisted andcomplicated race for profits, personal gains, power and projects at the expense ofnational interest. Consequently, it should be iterated and affirmed that, tacklingcorruption in requires the elaboration of a comprehensive strategy that involves effortsfrom all stakeholders, including public sector, private companies and consumers. Such astrategy should aim at promoting and consolidating the rule of law. On the publicsector’s side, enhancing or promoting the culture of transparency and accountability aswell as promoting effective regulation are crucial. On the private sector’s side, corporategovernance and transparent practices need to be reinforced. Consumers’ activeparticipation in programs designed to increase accountability of service providersshould be promoted by for example enhancing the advocacy capacity of consumerassociations.
References
Abbey, J.L.S. (2005), “The growth and corruption correlation: its impact on the achievement ofmiddle income status”, report prepared by Centre for Policy Analysis in Collaboration
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Further reading
Latham, M. (1994), Constructing the Team, final report of the Government/Industry Review ofProcurement and Contractual Arrangements in the UK Construction Industry, HMSO,London.
Corresponding authorD. Owusu-Manu can be contacted at: [email protected]
To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail: [email protected] visit our web site for further details: www.emeraldinsight.com/reprints
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