final nsi vitta analysis the characterization and...

Winter 2016TheCharacterizationandConditionsoftheGray

Zone

AVirtualThinkTankAnalysis(ViTTa)

NSI, Inc. George Popp [email protected] Sarah Canna [email protected]

DeeperAnalyses.ClarifyingInsights.BetterDecisions.

www.NSIteam.com

PreparedforStrategicMulti-LayerAssessment

GrayZoneConflicts,Challenges,andOpportunities:AMulti-AgencyDeepDive

Assessment

T h e C h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n a n d C o n d i t i o n s o f t h e G r a y Z o n e

1

TableofContentsIntroduction...........................................................................................................................................2ExpertElicitation..................................................................................................................................3SMA’sDefinitionoftheGrayZone.............................................................................................................3TheImportanceofProperlyDefiningtheGrayZone.......................................................................................6

TheGrayZoneCannotMeanEverythingifitistoMeanAnything.................................................6GrayZoneThresholds....................................................................................................................................7TheLowerThresholdoftheGrayZone..................................................................................................................7TheUpperThresholdoftheGrayZone..................................................................................................................8GrayorNotGray?.............................................................................................................................................................9

GrayZoneActors.............................................................................................................................................9DoOtherCountries(BeyondRussia,China,andtheUS)OperateWithintheGrayZone?............10DoOtherCountriesTalkAbouttheGrayZone?...............................................................................................11DoNon-StateActors(Independentand/orasProxies)OperateWithintheGrayZone?..............11Non-StateActorsasProxies....................................................................................................................................................11Non-StateActorsOperatingIndependently.....................................................................................................................12

TheRoleofInternationalNorms.............................................................................................................13WinningintheGrayZone...........................................................................................................................17

Conclusion............................................................................................................................................19AppendixA:SubjectMatterExpertBiographies.....................................................................23MichaelMazarr..............................................................................................................................................23HalBrands.......................................................................................................................................................24ErikGartzke....................................................................................................................................................25ChristopherPaul............................................................................................................................................26


2NSIRESEARCH ▪ INNOVATION ▪ EXCELLENCE

Introduction

WithinUnitedStatesgovernment(USG)andDepartmentofDefense(DoD)spheres,thegrayzone isarelatively new terminology and phenomena of focus for characterizing the changing nature ofcompetition, conflict, and warfare between actors in the evolving international system of today.Accordingly,inJanuary2016,GeneralJosephVotel(USArmy)requested1thattheStrategicMulti-LayerAssessment(SMA)teamconductastudyofthegrayzone.TheSMAteamwasaskedtoassesshowtheUSG can diagnose, identify, and assess indirect strategies, and develop response options againstassociatedtypesofgrayzonechallenges.Morespecifically,therequestemphasizedthatiftheUSGistorespond effectively to the threats and opportunities presented in the increasingly gray securityenvironment,itrequiresamuchmoredetailedmapofthegrayzonethanitcurrentlypossesses.

To properly conduct any effort focused on researching, understanding, and assessing this gray zonespace, it is imperative to first ensure that the effort is using sound, appropriate, and comprehensivedefinitions—to effectively assess the gray zone, one must appropriately define the gray zone. Theimportanceofproperdefinitions isparticularly relevantwhen it comes to the studyof thegray zone,which is an inherentlyambiguous concept in itself andhasanumberof varyingdefinitionsalready inexistence.

Recognizing the importance of properly characterizing and defining the gray zone concept, the SMAteamputsignificanteffortintodevelopingasound,comprehensivedefinitionofthegrayzone.Througha series of panel discussions and intense inter-team discussions, and with the assistance of a whitepaperonthetopic,theSMAteam,inconjunctionwithUSSOCOM,developedthefollowingdefinitionsforthegrayzone,grayzoneactivity,andgrayzonethreats.

Thegrayzone isaconceptualspacebetweenpeaceandwar,occurringwhenactorspurposefullyuse multiple elements of power to achieve political-security objectives with activities that areambiguousor cloudattributionandexceed the thresholdofordinary competition, yet fall belowtheleveloflarge-scaledirectmilitaryconflict,andthreatenUSandalliedinterestsbychallenging,undermining,orviolatinginternationalcustoms,norms,orlaws.

Gray zone activity is an adversary's purposeful use of single or multiple elements of power toachievesecurityobjectivesbywayofactivitiesthatareambiguousorcloudattribution,andexceedthethresholdofordinarycompetition,yetapparentlyfallbelowthelevelofopenwarfare.

• Inmostcases,oncesignificant,attributablecoerciveforcehasbeenused,theactivitiesareno longer considered to be in the gray zone but have transitioned into the realm oftraditionalwarfare.

• While gray zone activities may involve non-security domains and elements of nationalpower, they are activities taken by an actor for the purpose of gaining some broadly-definedsecurityadvantageoveranother.

Grayzonethreatsareactionsofastateornon-stateactorthatchallengeorviolate internationalcustoms, norms, and laws for the purpose of pursuing one or more broadly-defined nationalsecurityinterestswithoutprovokingdirectmilitaryresponse.

• Grayzonethreatscanoccurinthreewaysrelativetointernationalrulesandnorms,theycan:

1PleaseemailMr.SamRhematsamuel.d.rhem.ctr@mail.milforacopyoftherequest.



1. challenge common understandings, conventions, and international norms whilestoppingshortofclearviolationsofinternationallaw(e.g.,muchofChina'suseofthe"LittleBlueMen");

2. employviolationsofbothinternationalnormsandlawsinwaysintendedtoavoidthepenaltiesassociatedwithlegalviolations(e.g.,RussianactivitiesinCrimea);or

3. violentextremistorganizations (VEOs)andnon-stateactors integratingelementsofpowertoadvanceparticularsecurityinterests

Inaneffort to validate theSMA team’sdefinitionof thegray zone,NSI applied itsVirtual ThinkTank(ViTTa) subjectmatterexpertelicitationmethodology to theproblemset.Aspartof thisViTTaeffort,NSI interviewedleadinggrayzoneexpertstobetterunderstandthecharacterizationandconditionsofthe gray zone, putting particular emphasis on having the experts assess the SMA team’s gray zonedefinition.NSIrecorded2andtranscribedtheinterviews,whichformedthebasisofthisreport.Thegoalof this report is topresent theexperts’ insights relating to the characterizationand conditionsof thegray zone and, in particular, highlight expert feedback, insight, and commentary regarding the SMAteam’sgrayzonedefinition.

ExpertElicitation

This specific ViTTa effort captured insights and feedback from subject matter expert elicitationinterviewswithfouroftheleadingexpertsonthegrayzone.Thesubjectmatterexpertsinterviewedforthis effort are listed in the table below. The insights from the subject matter expert elicitation areprovidedthroughouttheremainderofthisreport.

Name AffiliationMichaelMazarr RANDCorporation

HalBrands JohnsHopkinsUniversityErikGartzke UniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego

ChristopherPaul RANDCorporation

SMA’sDefinitionoftheGrayZone

To effectively assess the gray zone, onemust appropriately define the gray zone. For themost part,Mazarr, Brands, and Gartzke agreed that the SMA team’s definition of the gray zone is a sufficientstarting point for such analysis. Paul, on the other hand, was somewhat less satisfied with the SMAteam’sgrayzonedefinition,andpointedoutsomeproblemshebelievedexistwithinthedefinition.

Mazarr noted that he would not make any changes to the definition, arguing that the definition asprovidedisstrongandcapturesthekeyaspectsofthegrayzone.Inparticular,MazarrbelievedthattheSMA team’sdefinition correctly addresses three central aspectsof the gray zone. First, thedefinitioncorrectlyidentifiesthegrayzoneasthespacebetweenpeaceandwar,andbelowtheleveloftraditionalwar.Second,thedefinitioncorrectlyincorporatesthephrase“purposefullyusemultipleinstrumentsofpower,”which is an important part of the gray zone and something that distinguishes the gray zonefrommanyoftheendeavorsthataresometimesconfusedwithgrayzoneactivities—thedifferencewith2ToaccessaudiofilesfromSMAworkshops,virtualpanels,speakerseriesevents,andinterviews,pleasegototheSMASharePointSiteathttps://nsiteam.net/x_sma/default.aspx.Torequestausernameandpassword,[email protected].



thegrayzoneisthatitconsistsofthepurposefulemploymentofinstrumentsofpowerinacampaign-like fashion. Third, the definition correctly notes that gray zone activities challenge, undermine, orviolateinternationalcustoms,norms,orlaws,whichisanimportantaspectofthegrayzone.

Brandsfoundthedefinitiontobegenerallysufficient,andnotedthatthewayinwhichtheSMAteamisdefining the gray zone is more or less how he himself defines the gray zone. However, Brands didhighlighttwoaspectsofthedefinitioninwhichherecommendedtheSMAteamclarify.

First,withrespecttothelowerthresholdofthegrayzoneaspresentedinthedefinition,Brandspointedoutthattheideaofexceedingthethresholdofordinarycompetitionissortofvagueandsubjective,andcoulduseclarification.Brandsrecommendedeitherexcludingthe“exceedingthethresholdofordinarycompetition”portionof thedefinitionorproviding greater clarity as towhatordinary competition is,because if it isbelieved thatordinarycompetition isgoing to involve theuseofcoercive instruments,which are tools of ordinary statecraft, then it is not quite clear what that dividing line is betweenordinarycompetitionandgrayzoneactivity.

Second, Brands pointed to the clause within the definition that says “and threaten US and alliedinterestsbychallenging,undermining,orviolatinginternationalcustoms,norms,or laws,”andwarnedthat the SMA team could get somepushback aboutwhether or not the gray zone shouldbedefinedfromaUS-centricperspective.IfthegoalistodefinethegrayzonefromtheperspectiveoftheUnitedStatesandUnitedStatesdoctrine,thenBrandsbelievedthisclausemakesalotofsense;however,atthesametime,BrandspointedoutthattheUnitedStateshaslongusedgrayzoneapproachesofitsown,soclearlyagrayzoneactiondoesnotnecessarilyhavetobesomethingthatthreatensUnitedStatesandalliedinterests—itcouldbesomethingthattheUnitedStatesdoestoitsadversaries.Ultimately,though,thiswilldependontheperspectivethatisbeingtakenindefiningthegrayzone,andBrandsencouragedtheSMAteamtonotethatitisdefiningthegrayzonefromaUnitedStatesperspectiveifthatisinfactthecase.

Gartzke found thedefinition tobea veryusefulpointofdeparture, andagreed that the SMA team’sdefinition capturesmany of the features that should be captured in a definition of the gray zone. Inparticular,GartzkehighlightedtwokeyaspectsofthegrayzonethattheSMAteamtouchesuponwithinitsdefinition.

First, Gartzke emphasized that what differentiates the gray zone from other kinds of low-intensityconflict (e.g., insurgencyand terrorism) is thatgray zoneactionsare typically takenbycapableactors(typically states)whocoulddoa lotmoredamageandbea lotmore confrontational, butare sortofpullingtheirpunchesandfightingwithonearmtiedbehindtheirownback,becausewhiletheydowanttochangethingsintheworld,theydonotwanttobreakthesystemthattheythemselvesbenefitfrom.Gartzke believed that this is a very useful way to frame the gray zone concept because it is alwaystemptingtothinkaboutadversariesasbeingverystrong,capable,threatening,andperfectactors,butoneofthethingsthatdifferentiatesthegrayzoneisthatadversariesinthegrayzonearefightinginalessviolentandlessovertwaythantheypotentiallycouldbe.

GartzkearguedthatgrayzoneconflictisaproductofthesuccessofUnitedStatesgrandstrategyintheworld over the past 60-70 years. If we think about the United States’ grand strategy asdisproportionatelystatusquoorientedandfocusedon1)usingtheimplementsofdeterrence(especiallystrategic nuclear deterrence) and 2) engagement through economic relations, globalization andintegrationoftrade,anddevelopmentofprosperityaroundtheglobe,thenthesetwomechanismsworkreallywell.Infact,theymayhaveworkedsowellthatforalongtimetheUnitedStateshasnothadan



adversaryornearcompetitor thatwasthoroughlydissatisfiedwiththeworldtothepointwheretheywantedtochangetheinternationalsystem(e.g.,liketheSovietUniondid).WhiletheUnitedStateshashadadversarieslikeAlQaedaandnowISILthatarethoroughlydissatisfied,theseactorsareultimatelyrelativelyweakandrepresentproto-statesatthebest.ThenearcompetitorsthattheUnitedStateshashad, andeven theones theUnited States faces today (i.e., theRussians andChinese), have certainlybeen dissatisfied about certain things and have made this dissatisfaction clear, but they are not sodissatisfied that they want a revolution or to change the political and economic order of theinternationalsystemthattheUnitedStateshasestablished—RussiaandChinajustwanttohavemoresayinhowthesystemisrun,notcompletelydestroyit.

Second, Gartzke questioned theway in which the SMA team’s gray zone definition incorporates theconcept of ambiguity. While Gartzke believed that ambiguity is an important strategic concept ingeneral,hedidnotbelievethatitisnecessarilyalwaysakeycomponentofthegrayzone.Indiscussionsofthegrayzone,peopletendtounquestionablylinkambiguitytothegrayzoneconcept,butthislinkageistypicallyambiguousabouttheuseofambiguity—everyonetendstonodtheirheadsandagreethatanadversaryisout-foxingtheUnitedStatesbecausetheyarebeingambiguous;however,thewaythattheUnited States’ adversaries actually tend to use ambiguity is very careful, selective, and strategic.Essentially, Gartzke was not quite sure that gray zone conflict itself is necessarily always tied toambiguity,althoughheagreedthatambiguityiscertainlyatoolofgrayzoneconflict.

Paul, on the other hand, was not as impressed asMazarr, Brands, and Gartzke were with the SMAteam’sdefinition,andhighlightedsomeproblemshebelievedexistwithintheSMAteam’sdefinitionofthegrayzone.

First, Paul noted that part of the SMA team’s definition says that “actors purposefully use multipleelementsofpower;”however,hewasnotnecessarilysurethisisalwaysthecaseinthegrayzone.Paulwonderediftherecouldbeagrayzonecasewhereanactorengagesingrayzoneaggressionusingjustoneinstrumentofnationalpower.Paulagreedthatoftentimesgrayzoneaggressionsynthesizesacrossinstrumentsofpower,buthewasnotsurethatthisnecessarilyalwayshastobethecase.

Second, likeGartzkeearlier,Paulpointed to theportionof theSMA team’sdefinition that says “withactivities thatareambiguousorcloudattribution,”andalsowondered if this isnecessarilyalwaysthecase in the gray zone. Paul again agreed that it is frequently the case that there is some effort atobfuscationortoconstrainattributionwhenitcomestograyzoneactions;however,PaulencouragedtheSMAteamtotryandturn-the-screwsmoretightlyanddecidewhetherornotthegrayzoneconceptthat this definition is framing really actually requires those efforts at obfuscation and constrainingattribution,orcouldtherebeacasewhereanactionisfullyattributableandstillbeconsideredaspartofthegrayzoneprovidedthatitisbelowthedefinedupperthreshold.

Third, Paul agreed that the key part of the gray zone definition is that the gray zone represents thespace between routine competition and some upper threshold; however, he did not agree that theupperthresholdofthegrayzoneislarge-scaledirectmilitaryconflict.Instead,PaulencouragedtheSMAteamtousetheterminologyof“fallsbelowthelevelofproportionalresponse”astheupperthresholdofthegrayzoneinitsdefinition.Essentially,aggressorsinthegrayzoneideallywanttoactwithouttheUnitedStatesdoinganythingback inresponse,butcertainlywithouttheUnitedStatesdoinganythingconsequentialbackinresponse.Forexample,ifagrayzoneaggressoradvancesitsinterestssignificantly,and in response theUnitedStates simplycomplainspubliclyor issuesademarcheorevenengages insome form of patty-cake sanctions, then that low-cost United States response is likely acceptable to



themsolongasthecostoftheresponseisnotproportionaltothebenefitgainedfromtheaction(i.e.,ifthe bite that theUnited States takes back in response, givenwhatever instrument of national powerused, isnotasbigas thebite theaggressor took first, thentheaggressor isprobablygoingtobe finewith that scenario). Ultimately, Paul did not believe that gray zone actors are simply trying to avoidgetting to the levelof large-scaledirectmilitaryconflict—certainly they trying toavoidgetting to thatlevelof large-scaledirectmilitary conflict, butPaulbelieved that their avoidance threshold is actuallylower than that, and Paul suggested “falls below the level of proportional response” as a moreappropriateupperthresholdofthegrayzone.

Fourth, following on the critique of his third point about the upper threshold of the gray zone, Paulsuggested adding either the term “intentionally” or “by design” somewhere into the portion of thedefinitionwhere it says “yet fall below the level of.” Paul noted that an important part of gray zoneaggressionisthatanadversaryfirstidentifieswhereitthinkstheUnitedStates’upperthresholdis,andthenintentionallyutilizesactionsthatstaybelowthatthreshold.

TheImportanceofProperlyDefiningtheGrayZone

Overall, both Paul and Gartzke also emphasized the importance of properly approaching andundertakingeffortstodefinethegrayzone.Paularguedthatgettingthescopingandboundingofthegray zone definition correct is key, and warned that some of the things that might currently beconsideredaswithinthegrayzonemightactuallybebettercategorizedassomethingelse.Therefore,Paulbelieved that itmightnotbeabad idea to startby identifyingactors, actions, andconditionsofconcern,andthenbreakthingsdowninawaythatresultsinmoreconceptcategoriesthanjustsimplyone gray zone concept—doing thismight help to narrow the gray zone concept down to somethingpotentiallymoremanageable.Ultimately, Paul argued that itmight bebeneficial for the current grayzone concept tobe further scoped—as longas the scoping is 1)necessaryand2)done inaway thatmore properly gets to the concept of what is trying to be addressed in the first placewith the grayzone—to actually reveal multiple flavors of problems and/or sub-categories with multiple slightlydifferentdefinitions.

Similarly,Gartzkearguedthat there is sometimesa tendency to fall in lovewithdefinitions;however,thegrayzonewillultimatelybeausefulconcept if thedefinition isausefuldefinition foroperationaland strategic practitioners to apply in identifying a category of behaviors that concern them and aredistinctfromotherconceptsofinterest.Then,atthatpoint,academics,policymakers,andpractitionerscan all join inon addressing thepractical questionsof howdowe intervene in this process,whatdothesethingslooklike,andwhatcanwedoaboutthem.

TheGrayZoneCannotMeanEverythingifitistoMeanAnything

Oneofthecommoncritiquesofthegrayzoneconceptisthatthereisatendencytoconflatetoomanythings into the gray zone definition and framework. Brands and Paul echoed similar criticism of grayzonediscussion,andarguedthatthegrayzonecannotmeaneverythingifitistomeananything.Morespecifically,Paularguedthatitwouldbecompletelyunproductivetoattempttotryandclassifyorimplythatalmostalloftheconflictsoverthelastcenturycouldtheoreticallybeclassifiedasgrayzoneconflict,becausealloftheseconflictshaddifferentconflictcharacteristicsandarenotusefullysimilarinanyway.Mazarr also agreed that the tendency to conflate too many things into the gray zone space isproblematic, noting, in particular, concern over a seeming tendency to conflate so-called gray zoneactivitiesandso-calledhybridactivitiestogetherintothegrayzonedefinition.



Paulbelievedthat,ultimately,thegrayzoneconceptismeanttobeappliedtothecurrentChineseandRussian activities and aggressions, and in his opinion, Chinese and Russian gray zone activities haveenoughsimilarities tobe talkedaboutusing thisgrayzone language.On theotherhand,bothBrandsandPaul agreed that a group like ISIL should in nowaybe classified aswithin the gray zone. Brandsnoted that there seems to be a tendency to define the gray zone as everything short of majorconventionalstate-on-statewarand,therefore,becauseISILispursuingsomesortofhybridapproach,itoftenmeansthatISILgetscategorizedintothegrayzone.However,BrandsarguedthatISILrunsafoulwithanumberofthecharacteristicsthatarecriticaltodefininggrayzoneactions.Forexample,thereisnotreallyanyambiguityaboutwhatISILisdoingandit isnottryingtooperatebelowanythreshold—ISIL’sactionsaremeanttobeasgoryandattentiongrabbingaspossible.Therefore,BrandsconcludedthatifyouincludeISILaswithinthegrayzone,thenthegrayzonereallyhasnomeaning.LikeBrands,Paul vehementlydisagreedwith considering ISIL as a gray zone challenge, noting that the things thatbelonginthegrayzonedefinitiondonotapplytoISIL.PaulalsocitedthatISILisnotintentionallytryingtoactbelowacertainthreshold,arguinginsteadthatitisthepoliticalwillandself-imposedconstraintoftheUnitedStatesthatkeepstheISILconflictfromescalating,notbecauseofanyrestraintonthepartofISIL.

GrayZoneThresholds

Acentralaspectofdefiningthegrayzoneisidentifyingthethresholdsinwhichthegrayzoneisbound.Assuch,theSMAteam’sgrayzonedefinitionidentifiesthethresholdsofthegrayzoneasactivitiesthatare ambiguous or cloud attribution and exceed the threshold of ordinary competition (at the lowerthreshold), yet fall below the level of large-scale direct military conflict (at the upper threshold).Furthermore, the definition highlights that inmost cases, once significant, attributable coercive forcehasbeenused,theactivitiesarenolongerconsideredtobeinthegrayzone.

Overall,Mazarr found the thresholds identifiedwithin theSMA team’s gray zonedefinition tobe theexactly correct distinctions for what he deemed to be the appropriate thresholds of the gray zone.Though,Mazarr didwarn that some couldpotentially quibblewith theuseof the “cloud attribution”phrase because a situation could arise where gray zone activity is attributable or at least largelyassumedtobeattributabletoagivenactor.SimilartoMazarr,Gartzkefoundthethresholdsidentifiedwithin the SMA team’s definition to be behaviorally and descriptively adequate. However, Gartzkewarned that using these thresholds could lead to something like low-intensity conflict carried out byweakactorsornon-stateactorsbeingincorrectlyclassifiedaswithinthegrayzone.Gartzkeemphasizedthe importance of making the distinction between capable actors and weak actors that try tomasqueradeascapableactors,because,ultimately, thegrayzoneconsistsofverycapableactors thatareworkingveryhardto1)downplaytheircapabilities,oratleastnotusethemorexerciseeverythingtheyarecapableof,and2)disassociatethemselvesfromtheactionsthattheyaretaking.

TheLowerThresholdoftheGrayZone

MazarrgenerallyagreedwiththelowerthresholdofthegrayzoneasidentifiedwithintheSMAteam’sdefinition, arguing that anactionwouldhave tobeabove the levelof general competitivediplomacywhilealsodesignedtoharmorinsomewayaffectthepowerofanothercountryinorderforthatactiontobeclassifiedasabovethelowerthresholdofthegrayzone.

Brands, however, raised concern over using the “exceeding ordinary competition” terminology indefiningthelowerthresholdofthegrayzone.Brandspointedoutthat labelingthelowerthresholdas



ordinarycompetitionmightjustaddconfusionbecauseinsomecasesgrayzoneactivityisactuallyquiteordinary(e.g.,insomeinstances,acasecouldevenbemadethatgrayzoneactivitiesaremoreordinarythannon-grayzoneactivitiesforsomeChineseactionsintheSouthChinaSeaorelsewhereineastAsia).Furthermore,Brandsarguedthat ifanaction thatmight typicallybeconsideredtobesimplyordinarycompetition can be tied back to a larger grand strategy or campaign, then it would fit within thedefinitionofthegrayzone.Forexample,theuseofeconomicpressureissomethingthatcountriesdoallthetime,butwhethertheseeconomicpressure-typeactivitiesshouldbeconsideredaswithinthegrayzonereallydependsonwhattheactoristryingtoachieveandwhattheactivitiesarebeingpairedwith.Ultimately,Brandsarguedthat ifyouaregoingtousetheordinarycompetitionterminology,thenyouhavetomoreclearlydefinewhatordinarycompetitionis.

Brandsalsoemphasizedthatcoerciveactioninthegrayzoneisdesignedtoachievethefruitsofmilitaryactionwithoutopenlyresortingtomilitaryaction—essentially,grayzoneactivityisdesignedtoachievesomechange in thestatusquo,or someotherkindofgain,withoutopenly resorting to force.Brandsstressed that a crucial aspect of the gray zone is that gray zone actions are coercive, revisionist, andmeasuredinnature,aswellasbelowthethresholdoflarge-scaledirectmilitaryconflict.Overall,Brandsarguedthatinorderforanactiontobeclassifiedaswithinthegrayzone,theactionhastobeonethatisdesignedtoachievesomesortofcoerciveandrevisionistintention(e.g.,Russianinformationoperationsontheirownshouldnotnecessarilybeclassifiedaswithinthegrayzone,butiftheRussianinformationoperations go in concert with something like the subversion of eastern Ukraine, then they shouldabsolutelybeclassifiedasaformofgrayzoneconflict).

TheUpperThresholdoftheGrayZone

MazarrandPaulconflictedsomewhatontheirbeliefsregardingtheappropriateupperthresholdofthegrayzone.Mazarrarguedthatinorderforthegrayzoneconcepttobemeaningful,thegrayzonehastobe defined as a discrete kind of conflict and, therefore, the gray zone likely has to have the upperthresholdthathasbeenprovided intheSMAteam’sdefinition,which isessentiallybelowthe levelofcombined arms coercive force and openwarfare. In relation to the thresholds identified in the SMAteam’sdefinition,MazarrbelievedthatmuchofwhathastakenplaceintermsofChineseactionsintheSouthChinaSeaup to thispointhasnotyet reallypushed theupper thresholdof thegray zone,andRussiaistheonlyactorthathassignificantlyblurredthespacesurroundingtheupperthresholdofthegrayzone.

Paul,ontheotherhand,asdiscussedearlier,arguedthattheupperthresholdofthegrayzoneshouldinsteadbedefinedasfallingbelowthelevelofproportionalresponse—it isnotthattheUnitedStatesutterly fails to respond toa gray zoneaggressor, it is that theUnitedStatesdoesnot respond to thesame level. Paul believed that gray zone aggressors act with somewhat of a cost-benefit analysis inmind—essentially, actingwithin a spacewith a decision calculuswhere thebenefit gained from theiractionwilloutweighthecostreceivedfromtheresponsetotheiraction(i.e.,fallingbelowthelevelofproportionalresponse).Furthermore,Paulnotedthatifagrayzoneaggressorreceivesthisproportionalresponsetotheiractions,thenitmeansthattheirinitialintentionthatmadetheactiongrayhasfailed—though, notably, the conflict still could be considered gray if the aggressor’s initial intent was toultimatelytriggeraproportionalresponse.

PaulpointedtothecaseofRussia’sactions in,andeventualannexationof,Crimea,whichhestressedhadmanygrayzonecomponents:1)ithadsomeadditionalambiguity,butnotsomuchthatitwasnotclearthattherewassomekindofRussianaggressiongoingon,2)RussiacertainlykepttheUnitedStates



andtheWestbelowthethresholdoflarge-scaledirectintervention,and3)equallycertainly,theUnitedStatesmadesomekindofresponsewiththingslikediplomaticoverturesandcomplaints,but,whiletheUnitedStatesdidrespond,theUnitedStates’responsewascertainlynotaproportionalresponse.IntheCrimeacase,theUnitedStatespunishedtheRussiansbutthepunishmentdidnotchangetheresultofthemtakingCrimea.TheUnitedStates’responsetotheRussianactionsdidnotincreaseRussia’scosttoanequal leveltothatofthebenefit that it receivedfromtheannexation,which isultimatelythegrayzoneaggressor’sgoalattheendoftheday—Russia’sultimategoalistoeitherstymieresponseentirelyorkeeptheresponsefrombeingequivalenttothebenefitthattheyhavegained.

GrayorNotGray?

Given the inherentuncertaintyof thegray zone itself, it is sometimesdifficult to identifywhetheranactionisgrayornot.Brandsarguedthatwhendeterminingwhetheranactionisgray,boththenatureofthespecificactionandthe intent itselfmustbeexamined. In interpretingwhetherornotanaction isgray, Brands proposed thinking about a checklist or series of light switches, where all of the lightswitcheshavetobeturnedoninorderforsomethingtocountasagrayzoneaction.Forexample,theUnited States runs what somemay consider propaganda campaigns every day, but most would notconsiderapropagandacampaigntobeagrayzonecampaign;however,ifthepropagandacampaignwasalsopartofaneffortthatinvolvedsomethinglikethecovertactions(e.g.,UScovertactionsagainsttheGuatemalan government that took place during the 1950s) or something like threats of militarymaneuvers,thenthepropagandaactionscouldcertainlybeconsideredaspartofagrayzonecampaignbecause of all of the additional things that go along with the initial propaganda actions—the intentbehindit,thegoalsthatitsetsouttoachieve,etc.Brandsemphasizedthatallofthelightswitches(i.e.,thenatureoftheaction,theintentoftheaction,etc.)mustbeflippedoninorderforanactiontobeclassifiedasgray,which,asaresult,meansthatit isunclearwhethercertainactionsshouldalwaysbeclassified as gray or never be classified as gray, becausewhat is really important is the aim and thenatureoftheaction.

SimilartoBrands,Mazarrbelievedthatmuchofevaluatingthegrayzoneandgrayzoneactionsdependson theoverall context, intent, andwhat is trying tobe accomplished—thoughMazarrnoted that theanswerstothesequestionsareinmostcasesgoingtobeverysubjective.Mazarrarguedthatoncetheoverallgrayzonechallengeisdefinedandthenanumberofstatesthatappeartobeusingcoordinatedsetsofactionsinthatwayareidentified,thenthecategorizationofactionsasgrayornotgrayisnotsomuchtheissue—rather,itismoreamatterofevaluatingtheactionsindividuallytodeterminewhattheintentis,whattoolsarebeingused,and,moreimportantly,whetherthegivencountryisreallygainingstrategicallyfromtheaction.Ultimately,Mazarrbelievedthatevaluatingpotentialgrayzonecampaignsin this kind of strategic context is more useful than trying to assess the categorization of specificpotentialgrayzoneactions.

GrayZoneActors

MuchofthegrayzonediscussiontendstofocusonRussia,China,andtheUnitedStatesastheprimaryactorswithin thegrayzonespace,andtheSMEsagreed thatRussia,China,andtheUnitedStatesareindeedtheprimaryactorsoperatingwithinthecurrentgrayzoneenvironment.



DoOtherCountries(BeyondRussia,China,andtheUS)OperateWithintheGrayZone?

GiventhatmuchoftheUnitedStates’focuswhenitcomestothegrayzonetendstobeonRussiaandChina, it is logical to wonder if other actors—beyond just Russia and China—should be classified asoperatingwithinthegrayzonespace.

Gartzkebelieved that it is possible to talkona continuumabout countrieswith varyingagendas thatdepartfromthestatusquo,arguingthatnobodyisevercompletelyhappy—actorshavevaryingdegreesofhappiness—butonethingthatmarksstabilityiswhenthehappinessofstatesorindividualslinesupwiththeirabilitytochangethesystemthattheyoperatein.Ifthepowerfulactorsaremostlyhappy,themediumstrengthactorsareprettyhappy,andtherelativelymoderatelycapablestatesdonothatethesystem,thenthesystemisstable.However,ifthepowerfulactorsreallyhatethesystem,thenwearefacedwith a fundamental problem.What we are facing currently is a secondary problem: there arereasonably powerful actors that do not completely hate the system but they would like to slightlychange the system on themargins, and this is what the gray zone actors of today are trying to do.Gartzkenoted thatwhat is interestingabout this ishowconcerned theseactorsare that theydonotdisruptordestroythesystem.Forexample,today,Russiawantstowinbuttheyalsowanttokeepthepricedown,and this is thekindof reality that is typically seen in situationswhere theactorsarenottrying todisrupt theentireworld,but ratherare trying tonudge it inadirection that looksbetter tothem.Ultimately,Gartzkeconcludedthatgrayzoneactorsarenotunlimitedaimsrevisionists,theyarelimitedaimsrevisionists.

With respect to specific examples of other actors (beyond Russia, China, and the United States)operatingintoday’sgrayzonespace,GartzkeandPaulpointedtoanumberofstatesforconsideration.Gartzke believed that Iran should be considered as a gray zone actor, and emphasized that IranrepresentsarealproblemforsomeoftheUnitedStates’partnersintheMiddleEast.PaulbelievedthatonecouldalsolookatsomeoftheproxyactionsofSaudiArabiaand,asaresult,bedriventoconsiderSaudiArabiaasoperatingwithinthegrayzonespace.SaudiArabiacommitsalotofmoneytoitsproxyactors,andthiscouldcertainlybeconsideredaformofgrayzoneaggression.Forexample,PaulnotedthattheWahhabimovement,whichisatthecornerstoneofalotoftheIslamicviolentextremismthattheUnitedStateshasfacedoverthelastdecade,startedinSaudiArabia.Therearetextbooksthatareproduced in Saudi Arabia and distributed elsewhere in theworld, and these textbooks are incrediblyanti-Semitic andprovide falsehistoriesof theUnitedStates, Israel, andother countries in away thatmightnotrepresentanimmediateattackonUnitedStatesinterestsbutdocertainlyposealonger-termchallengetointernationalnormsrelatingtorespectforothersandreligiousfreedom.

Gartzke and Paul agreed that North Korea presents an interesting case for consideration, but theyconflicted somewhat on whether or not North Korea meets the necessary and sufficient conditionsassociated with being classified as a gray zone actor. Both Gartzke and Paul emphasized that NorthKoreaisarelativelyweakstatewithlesscapabilitythantypicalgrayzoneactors.However,whileGartzkearguedthatNorthKoreaiscurrentlyanoutlierforconsiderationasagrayzoneactorbecausedespiteitsintentonbeinganunlimitedaims revisionist, it isultimatelya relativelyweak state,Paul argued thatNorth Korea should be considered within the gray zone space because it engages in gray zoneaggressionthroughnuclearsaber-rattlingactivitiesandefforts.

Mazarr, on the other hand, did not believe that other actors are really currently operating to a levelnecessarytobesufficientlyclassifiedaswithinthegrayzone.MazarrarguedthatRussia,China,andtheUnited States are the real gray zone cases, and the current actions of other international actors are



probablymoreproperlycategorizedasotherkindsofnationalactivitiesandinterests.However,Mazarrdid agree that Iran presents an interesting case for consideration—particularlywith respect to Iran’slong-termsupportforcertainkindsofmovementsintheregion(e.g.,theoperationsofQudsForcecellsinvariousembassies,etc.).MazarrnotedthatinlookingattheseIranianproxy-relatedactionsfromthebottom-upandjustonpurecategorization,onecouldsaythattheyaregrayzoneactions;however, inlookingattheseactionsfromanIranianoverallstrategyperspective,Mazarrconcludedthattheyseemtobeamoretypicallong-termproxyandclandestineefforttodestabilizeenemiesthatdoesnothavetobeconsideredaspartofthegrayzonebecausetheactionsdonotnecessarilyhavethebroaderintentanddonotnecessarilyintegrateinstrumentsofpowerinthewaythatagrayzonecampaignwould.

DoOtherCountriesTalkAbouttheGrayZone?

TheSMEsprovidednoevidence thatRussia,China,or countriesother than theUnitedStatesuse thegray zone terminology explicitly, and it appears that the specific gray zone termmightbeUS-specificterminology. Furthermore, SMEs emphasized that United States adversaries like Russia and Chinaactuallylookatthepeace-conflictcontinuuminanentirelydifferentwaythantheUnitedStates.

BrandsandMazarrpointedoutthattheUnitedStatestendstothinkintermsofbinaryconceptionsofpeaceandwarandabout specific conflict zones,butRussiaandChinadonotdo the same.FromtheperspectivesofRussiaandChina,therearenozonesand, instead,nationalcompetitionandconflict isviewedonaspectrumofactivitiesthatdonotnecessarilyrespectanyboundaries.WhileMazarrnotedthatitispresumablethatRussiaandChinade-factohaveadefinitionofthegrayzonethattheydonotexplicitlycallthegrayzone(e.g.,RussiannewgenerationwarfareandChineseunrestrictedwarfare),heemphasized that ultimately Russian and Chinese official doctrines are more generic about an open-endedspectrumofconflict.

Gartzke highlighted that he has not foundmuch discussion of the gray zone in theMiddle East, butnotedthatinAsiathereisalittlebitmorediscussionnotsomuchaboutgrayzonebutaboutconceptsthatlooklikegrayzone,sotheremaybeanassimilationofthegrayzoneterminAsia.

DoNon-StateActors(Independentand/orasProxies)OperateWithintheGrayZone?

Thereseemstobemuchdebateabouttheroleofnon-stateactorsinthegrayzone.3Somearguethatnon-stateactorsoperatingbothindependentlyandasproxiescanbeclassifiedaswithinthedefinitionofthegrayzone,somearguethatnon-stateactorsdonotmeetthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsassociatedwithbeingclassifiedasagrayzoneactor,andsomearguethatonlynon-stateactorsbeingusedasaproxybyamorepowerfulstateactorshouldbeconsideredwithinthegrayzonespace.

Non-StateActorsasProxies

MazarrandPaulagreedthattheuseofnon-stateactorsasstate-sponsoredproxiescanfallwithinthedefinition of the gray zone. Mazarr argued that part of the whole gray zone idea, particularly withrespecttotheconceptofattribution,isthatbynature,grayzonecampaignsaregoingtoinvolvestatesusing non-state actors as proxies or otherwise as part of their strategies. The nature of gray zonecampaigns isthattheyreflectmuchmoreofacombinedactivity (governmentandnon-governmental)3AseparateViTTaanalysiswasconductedtoprovideamorein-depthanalysisofwhethernon-stateactorsmeetthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsassociatedwithbeingdefinedaswithinthegrayzone.PleaseemailSarahCanna,[email protected],foracopyofthereport.



thanhigh-endwarfare.Paularguedthatoneofthekeydefiningcharacteristicsofthegrayzonespaceisthat an actor has certain interests but if they were to pursue those interests in a straightforwardWestphaliandeclarationofwarkindofway,thenitwouldnotgowellforthemforavarietyofdifferentreasons,sotheactordoesnotdosoandinsteadchoosesanibblingstrategyinwhichtheactortriestostaybelowa threshold. There arenumerousdifferent strategies in the gray zone for stayingbelowathreshold,someofwhichincludeusingproxies,usingaggressioninnon-militaryspheresthatiseasiertoclaimisnotaggression,etc.

Non-StateActorsOperatingIndependently

Withrespecttowhetherornotnon-stateactorsoperating independently fallswithinthedefinitionofthegrayzone,Brandsdidnotbelievethatthereisanyreasonwhyonecouldsaythatanon-stateactorby definition could not independently pursue gray zone activity. However, Brands noted that it isimportanttorememberthatactorsusuallyoperateinthegrayzonebecausetheyunderstandthereisacost associated with flagrantly transgressing some international norm, and states tend to be moreconscious of those costs than non-state actors. Ultimately, while Brands noted that there is notnecessarilyareasonastowhyonecouldsaythatanon-stateactorbydefinitioncouldnotpursueagrayzoneactivity,heemphasizedthatthegrayzoneapproachisprobablylessattractivetoanon-stateactorbecausenon-stateactorsdonotnecessarilyhavethesamecost-benefitcalculusasastateactor.

Mazarr agreed with Brands that non-state actors operating independently could potentially beconsideredaswithinthegrayzonespace,butMazarrpointedoutthatnon-stateactorstendtobefarmorelimitedincapabilitiesandcapacitythanstateactors.Therefore,anon-stateactorwouldhavetobuildinsomethingthatismoreelaborateandstate-likeinthekindofgrayzonecampaignitisrunningbefore it should be classified as a full equivalent to a state gray zone actor.Mazarr emphasized thatwhetherornotanindependentnon-stateactorshouldbeclassifiedasoperatingwithinthegrayzoneissomewhatafunctionofthepowersthatanon-stateactorhas,becauseifwearesayingthatagrayzonecampaign consistsofmultiple instrumentsofpower, thenwemust remember that a lotof non-stateactorsdonothaveaccesstothesamerangeofinstrumentsofpowerthatastatedoes.

MazarrpointedtoHezbollahasapossibleexampleofanon-stateactorthatisindependentlyoperatingin the gray zone space because one could look at Hezbollah and logically classify it as meeting theconditions associated with operating in the gray zone. Mazarr believed that Hezbollah is actuallyprobablyclosertotheRussiaandChinagrayzonemodelthanjustaboutanyotherstate:bydefinition,Hezbollahforthemostparthastooperatebelowthe levelofwhattheUnitedStatesconsidersmajorconflict,andHezbollahundertakesanumberofactionsthatcouldbeclassifiedasgray(e.g.,propagandaefforts,narrativeshapingefforts,someviolenteffortsintheformofartilleryandterrorism,presumablycyber efforts, etc.). Ultimately, in terms of the range of instruments they have to call on and theresourcestheycanputbehindthem,Hezbollahiskindofapaleimitationofafullstateapparatus,butinterms of the general gray zone concept, Mazarr concluded that Hezbollah is probably a reasonableconsiderationforanon-stateactoroperatingindependentlywithinthegrayzone.

Gartzke,on theotherhand,didnotbelieve thatnon-stateactorsoperating independently should fallwithin the definition of the gray zone. Gartzke argued that if we include non-state actorswithin thedefinitionofthegrayzone,thenweruntheriskofmischaracterizingtheobjectivesoftheadversaryifwearedefiningnon-stateactorsinthesamewayasstateactorsinthisgrayzonespace.



Gartzkepointedoutthatforthemostpart,sincetheendoftheColdWar,theUnitedStateshaslargelyfaced two types of actors: 1) actors that are happywith the international systemand are capable ofchanging it, but are not going to change it because they like the systemmostly theway it is, and 2)actors that are unhappywith the international system, but these actors tend to beweak and prettymuchunabletochangethesystem.Wherethesystemoforderstarts to fray is that todaytheUnitedStates faces actors that can change the systemandare starting to thinkaboutwhether changing thesystemonthemarginsmakessenseforthem.Thebulkoftheworld’scountriesthatcandosomethingtochangetheinternationalsystemarehappywiththesystemandaredoingvery littletochangeit.Afew countries are slightly dissatisfied and are now doing things to slightly change the system, butGartzke believed it is more appropriate to classify these states as “evolutionary actors” and not“revolutionaryactors.”Forexample,theRussiansdonotwanttheworldeconomytocollapse,becauseitcouldheavilyimpacttheirownprosperity,andthesamethingistrueforChina,butwhattheyreallywant istohavemoresay intheoverallsystemandhave influenceontherightsandwrongsthattheyhaveseenoccurinthecontextofthatsystem,eventhoughtheythemselvesarepartiestothatsystem.AlQaeda,ontheotherhand,definitelywantstochangetheinternationalsystem,butithasverylimitedcapabilities.AlQaedacanirritatethesystem,causeheadaches,createpoliceproblems,etc.,andthisiswhytheUnitedStatescaresaboutAlQaeda,becausethesethingsarepartofthemissionforthespecialoperationscommunityandanymilitaryorganizationtodealwiththeexceptionstotherules,butthatdoesnotmeanthesystemitselfisfragile.

Ultimately,Gartzkeemphasizedtheimportanceofdistinguishingbetweendisgruntledstateactorsanddisgruntlednon-stateactors:disgruntledstateactorsaremostlyhappybuttheyhaveafewobjectivesand a lot of capabilities, so they use a limited form of their extensive capabilities to operate on themarginstochangethesystem,whiledisgruntlednon-stateactorsareveryweak,sotheyareusingalloftheircapabilitiestotryandchangethesystemmarginallybecausethatisthebestthattheycando.

TheRoleofInternationalNorms

Acentralissuewithindiscussionofthegrayzone,grayzoneactors,andgrayzoneactionsistheroleofinternational norms. International norms play a major role in setting the rules of the road, and anunderstanding of these accepted norms and behaviors amongst all actors in the system is critical toensuringthatactors(particularlyaggressors)knowwhattypesofactionsandactivitieswillbeallowedandwhattypesofactionsandactivitiescrossoveranaccepted lineofbehavior.However, inthegrayzone,understandingsof thesehistoricallyaccepted internationalnormsandbehaviorscansometimesbe blurred, either intentionally or unintentionally. Furthermore, given the changing and evolvinginternationalsystemoftoday,whathappensifactorshaveopposingorunsharedviewsoninternationalnorms,andhowwouldthatimpacthowtheUnitedStatesshouldthinkaboutthegrayzone?

Mazarr stressed that this is the dominant overarching question of the gray zone concept because,ultimately, maneuvering in the gray zone is all about establishing the rules of the road. Mazarremphasized four key points regarding the role of international norms, and unshared views regardinginternationalnormsandbehaviors,inthegrayzone.

• First,escalationrisksarisefromvaryingthreatperceptions.Oneoftheobviousrisksofgrayzoneactivityisescalation,andthisiscertainlythecaseingrayzonecaseslikeUkrainebutisalsoariskwithChinaandNorthKorea(ifNorthKoreaistobeincludedinthegrayzonespace).Akeyaspectofescalationisdependentonthreatperceptions,andoperatinginthegrayzoneovertimecancreatethesensethatyouareatwar.InanexamplelikeChina,iftheUnitedStatesviewsitselfin



aprolongedgrayzonespacewithChina,thenovertimetheUnitedStatesrunstheriskofChinaeventuallydoingsomethingthattheUnitedStatesblowsoutofproportionbecauseitthinksitisatwarwiththisenemystate.

• Second,anerodingofwidelyagreeduponand/oraccepted internationalnormsandbehaviorsaround these gray zone actions amongst themajor actors in the international systemhas thepotentialtoeatawayatthestabilityofinternationalorderovertime.Ifactorscannotcollectivelyfindaway,primarilyamongthethreemajorcountriesthatareconsideredtobeoperatinginthegrayzone(Russia,China,theUnitedStates),tocategorize,thinkabout,analyze,andpotentiallydrawsomelimitsonallofthisgrayzoneactivityinwaysthatcreateasenseofroughorderandnorms around it, then all of this gray zone activity could erode international order, thusdestabilizingtheinternationalsystem.

• Third,itisaterriblethingtobefacedwithhalfwayrevisionists.RussiatodayisnotacountrythatisagiantNorthKorea—Russiaisacountrythatisaconstructiveplayerinmanyelementsoftheexistinginternationalorder.Russiaisundertakingthesegrayzoneactivitiestowardanissuethatitperceivesasavitalnational interest,and in theprocess it isviolatingnorms that theUnitedStatesthinksithastoenforce.

• Fourth,grayzoneaggressionistroublesomebecauseitcreatestheneedtopunishandcreateadeterrenteffectinregardtocountriesthatarerightontheedgeofbeingwillingtocontinuetoact inwhat theUnited States thinksof as a responsible role in theUS-led international order.Essentially,theUnitedStateshastopunishhardenoughtocreatetheincentivetocreatenormsaround gray zone activity, but not so hard that it pushes an actor like Russia to disregard thenorms and use these gray zone tactics all over the place, thus creating a situationwhere theUnited States cannot count on constructive participation and institutions to have any success.Furthermore, punishing gray zone actors can be counterproductive and could put the UnitedStatesatriskofescalation. IftheUnitedStatesencountersacasewhereit istryingtopunishagrayzoneaggressorforanactionthatfromaUnitedStatesperspectiveviolatesanorm,butfromtheaggressor’sperspective, theaction iswithin the rulesandnotviolatingany lawsornorms,andthereforetheaggressorperceivesthat it isunfairlybeingpunished,thentheUnitedStatesrunstheriskofunintendedescalation.

Overall,Mazarremphasizedthatnormbuildingisreally important,butthechallengeofdoingit,giventhesekindsofhalfwayrevisionistpowers, isenormouslydifficult.This isespeciallytruewhenthegrayzonecreatesthreatperceptionsthatleadsomeUnitedStatesdecisionmakerstothinktheUnitedStatesisdealingwithenemies—particularlywhentheUnitedStates is,andhasbeen,doingmilitaryplanningagainstthoseperceivedenemies.Inparticular,MazarrbelievedthattheUnitedStatesfacesadilemmaover so-called spheresof influence.Russia andChinaareprimarilyusing their gray zone strategies topursuedeeplyheldnationalinterestsaboutareasveryclosetothem,whicharefarmoreimportanttothemthantheyaretotheUnitedStates.FromtheUnitedStatesperspective,UnitedStatesinterestingrayzonestrategiesisprimarilymorefocusedonprecedencesettingandpreservingthelargerrulesoforder so that theUnited Statesdoesnot eventually get into a situationwhere, for example, becauseChina has been able to get away with various actions using gray zone techniques, it will then turnaroundinacoupleofyearsandcontinuetoaccelerateitsambitions.MazarrbelievedthatultimatelytheUnitedStates’biggeststrategicdecisionsareasubsetof itsdecision forhowtodealwith thesesemi-revisionistpowers.

Paul agreedwithMazarr thatunsharedviewsof internationalnormsamongstactorsoperating in thegray zone presents a significant challenge for the United States. In particular, Paul argued that the



United Stateswill face amajor challenge if a situation ariseswhere there is a norm that itwants topromote but someother actor does not share that norm. Paul noted that the obvious temptation inmost gray zone challenges is a kind of a tit-for-tat response scenario. For example, if an aggressorconductsacyber-attackagainsttheUnitedStates,thenwhyshouldn’ttheUnitedStateslaunchacyber-attackback inresponse?ThereasontheUnitedStatesdoesnot launchacyber-attackback isbecausedoingsowillviolateanormthattheUnitedStatesishopingtopromote.Therefore,Paularguedthatthechallengeistofindwaystopunishnormativeviolationswithresponseactionsthatarenotthemselvesnormativeviolations.

Paul believed that asmuch as gray zone aggressors are trying to avoid theUnited States respondingproportionally to an aggression, the United States needs to make proportional responses but notnecessarily in kind. For example, if an aggressor attacks the United States or gains advantage andweakens United States’ interests in something like the informational realm, then maybe the UnitedStatesshouldseekproportionalretributionbut intheeconomicormilitaryrealm—ultimately, there isnothingsayingthattheUnitedStatesalwayshastonecessarilyreplyandrespondinkind.

Brandsstressedtheimportanceofperspectivewhenthinkingabouttheroleofinternationalnorms,andunshared international norms, in the gray zone.Brandshighlighted twopoints in particular regardingtheimportanceofunderstandingperspectivewhenthinkingaboutthegrayzone.

• First,ifanactorhasadifferentperspectiveonwhattheproperstateoftheinternationalorderisandwhatthegoverningrulesshouldbe,thenhowthatactorviewsvariouseventsandactionsisgoing to differ from how the United States views the same events and actions. For example,someoftheUnitedStates’adversariestendtothinkthattheUnitedStatesisthemasterofthegrayzone,andthey feel that theyareactually learninghowtooperate in thisgrayzonespacefromtheUnitedStates.For instance,theRussians lookatwhathappened insomeofthepost-Sovietrepublicsinthe1990sand2000swiththecolorrevolutionsand,whiletheyexaggeratetheUnited States’ role in this, they think it represents a classic instance of the United Statesessentiallypursuingsoftregimechangethroughnon-militarymeans.

• Second, if an actor has a different idea ofwhat the rules of the international order are, thenclearly theactor is going tohaveadifferent ideaofwhether someactionviolatesor supportsthat international order. For example, the Russians appear to believe fairly strongly in theprinciple that they should be able to protect Russian speaking populations in other countries,evenifthethreatstothosepopulationsarelargelyimaginedormanufactured.ThatisanorminwhichRussiabelievesinquitestronglyandappearstobewillingtoactupon.TheChinesebelievethatthereissortofanaturalstateofthingsandnaturalorderthatneedstoberestoredintheSouthChinaSeaandeastAsia,soChinadoesnotviewitsactionsintheseareasastransgressingajustorder,butratherrestoringajustorder.

Ultimately, Brands argued that an actor’s perspective on the gray zone and international norms isdependent on whom that actor is in the first place and what principles that actor thinks shouldcharacterizetheinternationalsystem—aChinese/Russiangovernmentofficialorscholarwouldprobablyprovide a very different perspective on the gray zone than a United States government official orscholar.

BrandsalsoemphasizedthatthereisnotalotofconfusionaboutwhattheUnitedStatesthinksarethenorms of the international system; however, the issue for the United States is that those norms aremore contestednow than theywere10yearsago—the strengthof thenorms that theUnitedStates



associateswiththeinternationalorderprobablyreacheditspeakaround2005,andhasbeeninmodestbut not trivial decline since then. Brands noted that further conflicting this problem for the UnitedStates is that theunderlyingbalanceof influenceandpower in the international systemhaschanged,whichhasallowedcountrieslikeRussiaandChinathathaveadifferentviewoftheinternationalsystem,andhavealwayshadthedesiretohavemoresayintheinternationalsystem,toassertthoseviewsmorestronglythantheywereabletoatthepeakofAmerica’sColdWardominance.Allinternationalconflictis rooted in somedisagreementover theway theworld isorganized, theway inwhich the spoils aredivided,etc.,andoperatinginthegrayzoneisnodifferent—itisjustadifferentwayofpursuingthosedisagreements. Ultimately, however, the United States is still the dominant actor in the system, andRussiaandChinachoosingtooperateinthegrayzonereflectsthefactthattheydostillrecognizeandunderstand that there is a cost to transgressing what the leading actor (the United States) in theinternational system holds as foundational norms of that system, and operating at this lower-levelthroughgrayzoneactivityillustratesRussianandChinesedesireandconcertedefforttoavoidsignificantpunishment.

Gartzkeprovidedadifferentperspectiveon thequestionofwhathappens if actorshaveopposingorunsharedviewsoninternationalnorms,andhowwouldthatimpacthowtheUnitedStatesshouldthinkabout thegray zone.Gartzkeargued thatopposingorunsharednormsarepartof themotivation forthesekindsofgrayzonecontests.Toillustratethispoint,GartzkeusedtheexampleofRussia.Russiannormsintheirnearabroadarethatthesenear-statesareclientsandpartnersthatusedtobepartoftheSovietUnion’sterritoryandgreaterRussia’sboundariesorrightonitsborder,anditsnearabroadisalegitimatesphereof influenceforthenewRussianempire.Russia isveryeagerfortheWesttoacceptthatRussiashouldhaveasphereofinfluence,muchlikehowtheRussiansseethattheUnitedStateshasa sphere of influence in eastern Europe and increasingly central Europe. This is not a norm that theUnitedStatesiseagertoacceptandthereisnoreasonwhytheUnitedStatesshouldembraceit,buttheUnitedStatesdidembracesomethingsimilarduringtheColdWarwhenoneafteranothertheRussian-dominatedeasternEuropeanWarsawPactnationshadcivilunrestanduprisings, inwhich theUnitedStatesmadevery clear that it supported intellectually andphilosophicallybutnotmaterially (i.e., theUnited States did not go into Hungary in 1956 or Poland in the 1980s). Gartzke suspected that theRussianscould imagineaworldmoving forwardthat lookssomething like that,wherewhile theWestwill never publically embrace Russia’s control, influence, and dominance over their immediateneighbors,theWestwillpassivelyacceptitovertime.Inasense,theUnitedStateshasalreadystartedtodo so. Forexample, there isanewnormbeingestablished today: Ukraine isnota single country,ratherUkraine is twocountries.WhilemanyUkrainianshate this idea, the longer itpersists themorelikelyitistoinitiallybeade-factoreality,thenbecomeamoralreality,theneventuallybecomealegalreality.

Gartzke highlighted that the United States in a way currently faces a paradox: the stability of theinternationalsystemthat ithascreatedactually invitesactsof instabilitybecauseotheractorsbelievethat the system is fundamentally stable and everyone benefits frommaintaining that stability,whichmakesitthatmuchmoretemptingtofreerideandcheatalongtheedges.GartzkearguedthatthewayinwhichtheUnitedStates’nearcompetitorsareactingrightnowisirresponsibleandalittlebitjuvenile,but it is also rational inbroad strokesas longas theybelieve that theUnitedStatesandothermajoreconomic powers will continue to work hard tomaintain the global system because they ultimatelybenefit from it. Thismeans that these near competitors can freeride on the systemboth in termsofundercontributingtothecostofmaintainingtheglobaleconomybutalsointermsoftakingadvantage



ofsecurityrelationshipsandfreeridingbyunderminingbitsandpiecesoftheveryeconomicandmilitarystabilitythatglobalizationhasproduced

Gartzkealsoargued that the idea that gray zone conflict is designed to subvertnorms isproblematicbecauseinlimitedwar,andespeciallyverylimitedwar,normsareextraordinarilyimportant—oneoftheworstthingsthatcouldhappenforanaggressorinagrayzoneconflictisfortheothersidetodecidetogotowar.Ultimately,theaggressorinagrayzoneconflictwantstoprevail,butwantstoprevailwhilealsonotupsettingthelargerapplecart(i.e.,theregionalorglobaleconomy).GartzkepointedoutthatthisisespeciallytrueinAsiawheretheparties(especiallyChina)arenottryingtosubvertexistingnormsbutratheraretryingtogettheexistingnormstoevolve,becausethenatureofnormsandinternationalpolitics is that theyare formed inpractice,moreso thandomesticpolitics—at the international level,international lawiswhateverstatesdooftenenough.Therefore, if,forexample,overaperiodoftimethe international community by practice accepts China’s conception of its territorial boundaries asextending farout into theSouthChinaSeaandEastChinaSea, then thatbecomes thenormand thepractice and eventually becomes international law. Gartzke believes that this is likely what Chinadesires:Chinadoesnotwantawarwithanyofitsneighbors,andcertainlynotwiththeUnitedStates,but China does want to prevail in this squabble that is important to them, but not fundamental toChina’s existence, by trying to nudge everyone into eventually, though possibly unenthusiastically,acceptinganewevolvedsetofnorms. IfChinaundermines thenotionof the legitimacyof thenormsthemselves, then China is going to fail—China needs those fundamental norms, but it just wants tochangethemslightly.

WinningintheGrayZone

In traditional large-scalemilitary conflictandwar, it is typically rathereasy touniversally identifyanddefinewhichsidewins,butdefiningwhatitmeanstowininthegrayzoneappearstobemoreabstractanddependentontheparticularobjectivesforaparticularconflict.

MazarrarguedthattherearetwoprimarycomponentstovictoryinthegrayzonefromaUnitedStatesperspective.

• First, at the most general strategic level, Mazarr believed that winning in the gray zone isreaffirmingtheUnitedStates’preferredsetofacceptedinternationalnormsandbehaviorstoadegree that prevents all of these gray zone actions from spinning out of control to create asituationwherelotsofcountriesareconstantlypushinguptotheboundaryofmajorconflictortheuseofviolentforcewitheachother.Asmuchasthisgrayzoneactivityhascroppedupfromtime to time with particular adversaries, it has not been the pattern for the last severaldecades—evenwhen great powers have been engaged in severe rivalry, they typically do nottend to constantly chip away at one anotherwith gray zone techniques,which can ultimatelyraisehugesensitivitiesintermsofhowthegrayzoneactionscouldpotentiallymakehomelandsvulnerablethroughthingslikecyber-attacksandpropaganda.Mazarremphasizedthatoneofthekeyfactorstosuccessregardingthisfirstcomponenttovictoryistheestablishmentofsomekindofoverarchinginstitution,process,setofconferences,etc.thatallactorscommittoasakindofdisputeresolutionmechanism.

• Second,afterreaffirmingitspreferredsetofacceptedinternationalnormsandbehaviors,MazarrbelievedthatthenextcomponenttowinninginthegrayzonefortheUnitedStatesistofocusonwinningwithrespecttospecific issues—ratherthanthinkingaboutwinningwithrespecttothegray zone overall—and effectively punishing, deterring, and/or persuading adversaries against



actionsthattheUnitedStatesfeelsarechallengingitspreferredsetof internationalnormsandbehaviors.

Brands agreed with Mazarr’s first component to winning in the gray zone from a United Statesperspective,arguingthatwinninginthegrayzonemeansupholdingthenormsandarrangementsthatarebeingchallengedthroughgrayzoneactivities.Brandsnotedthatbecauseof theway inwhich theSMAteamhasdefinedthegrayzone,theUnitedStatesisinherentlyonthedefensiveinthisgrayzonespace—theUnitedStatesisresistinggrayzoneactionsthatarebeingdonetotheUnitedStatesanditsallies.Therefore,winninginthisconceptwouldentaildenyingthecoerciveaimsandobjectivesofactorsthatarethreateningtheUnitedStatesanditsallies.

Gartzke emphasized that winningmeans different things at different levels of analysis, and at somelevelswinningcanbedifficulttoexplicitlydefine.

• At the operations level, Gartzke argued that winning is pretty cut-and-dry: there is amissionstatementandthatmissioniseitheraccomplishedornotaccomplished.

• At theUnited States’ strategy level,Gartzkebelieved thatdefiningwinning is difficult.GartzkenotedthatintheUnitedStatesthereseemstobeatendencytocharacterizeadversariesinthegrayzonespaceaswinningallofthetime;however,Gartzkeemphasizedthatitisimportanttoremember that adversariesmakemistakes just like theUnited States does.When adversariesintervene in gray zone conflict, it is possible that they are actually setting themselves up forfailure.Therefore,Gartzkestressedthatatthestrategylevel,theUnitedStatesshouldhavethewisdomtoletitsadversariesmakemistakesinthegrayzonespace.Ifoneofthereasonsthatanaggressorinagrayzoneconflictispullingitspunchesandfightingwithonearmbehinditsbackisbecause it is afraid todo somethingmore significant, because the adversaryhas alreadybeendeterred from general conflict, then chances are that the kind of engagement in which theaggressor ispursuing is the secondbestuseof itsmilitary capability, and isultimatelynot theway in which the aggressor fights best. Therefore, if that is the case, then there are certainadvantages to letting adversaries go at it because they will likely be fighting inefficiently andineffectively,whichmeanstheyaremorelikelytolose,wasteresources,and/orgetmireddownin conflict that they will ultimately regret. Gartzke pointed out that often times and inmanycontexts,attheoperationallevel,theUnitedStatesneverthinksofinactionasaction;however,at the strategy level, thinkingof inactionas action is essential—onoccasion, aggression in thegray zone by an adversary is not necessarily an imperative for the United States to react.Ultimately,Gartzkearguedthat theUnitedStates isnotnecessarily inabadsituationwhenanadversary chooses to tie one hand behind its back and fight in the gray zone space; and,furthermore, because the adversary might be setting itself up for failure, the United Statesshouldnotalwaysfeelobligatedtorespond.

• Atthegrandstrategiclevel,thereisanotionthatonecountrywinsallofthetime,andGartzkearguedthattheUnitedStatesmustacceptthatthisnotionisimpracticalandinfactcanleadtheUnitedStatesdownanavenueinwhichitislikelytomakealotofmistakes.Gartzkebelievedthisto be especially true moving forward given the evolving power structure of the internationalsystem. As the United Statesmoves from being themost powerful actor in the world to stillbeingmorepowerfulthanitsadversariesbutwiththegapinpowershrinking,itmeansthatthewisepathmaybetheonethatfocusesmoreonpickingbattles,settingpriorities,anddoingwellatthethingsthataremostimportanttotheUnitedStates.Gartzkearguedthatgrayzoneconflictby its nature invites the United States to treat these types of gray actions as secondary andtertiary, and sometimes that is what the United States should do. Ultimately, Gartzke



emphasized thatpartof theUnitedStates’grandstrategymoving forwardhas tobe toacceptthatonoccasiontherewillbeactorsthattheUnitedStatesopposesandthattakeactionsthattheUnited Statesprefers themnot to take, butwhich theUnited States should let them takebecausetheyareultimatelynotimportantenoughtoUnitedStates’interests.

Goingforward,GartzkeexpectedthattheUnitedStateswillhavetodealwithanincreasingnumberofpowerfulactorsdoingmoreandmoregrayzoneactivitiesbecausethe international system isnowatthe point where the extent of United States expansion in the world has reached a crest. Therefore,GartzkearguedthatthechallengefortheUnitedStatesinthisenvironmentwillbetodecide,whileinapositionofdecliningrelativepower,whetheritismoreimportantfortheUnitedStatestoretaincontrol,political protection, and military protection over all of the places it has committed to protect, orwhethertheUnitedStateswantstominimizefrictionandconflictswiththesenearchallengingpowersas they grow in relative power. Gartzke believed that either one of these options is acceptable inpoliticalterms,butemphasizedthatthis isthetradeoffthattheUnitedStatesnowfaces—youcannotholdalloftheassetsunlessyouarepredominantlypowerfuloryouarewillingtotakerisks,andifyouwantstability,thenyouhavetoshare,andifyoudonotwanttoshare,thenyouhavetoacceptsomelevelofinstability.

Unlike the other SMEs, Paul believed that by asking how to define winning in the gray zone, one isactuallyaskingthewrongquestion.Paularguedthatthereisnowinninginthegrayzone,but,instead,anactorshouldfocusonsuccessinthegrayzonebyevaluatingeitherprogresstowardsitsobjectivesorprogressawayfromitsobjectives.Ultimately,PaularguedthatsuccessinthegrayzonefortheUnitedStatesismakingincrementalprogresstowardsUnitedStates’objectives,becausePaulbelievedthatanactorcannotactuallywininanenduringwayinthegrayzone.

Conclusion

Toeffectivelyassess thegray zone,onemustappropriatelydefine thegray zone.Given that thegrayzoneisarelativelynewterminologyandconceptwithintheUSGforcharacterizingthechangingnatureof competition, conflict, andwarfarebetweenactors in the international system,and isan inherentlyambiguous concept in itself that has a number of varying definitions already in existence, this ringsespeciallytrue.

Therefore,whenUSSOCOMrequestedthattheSMAteamconductastudytoassessthegrayzone,theSMA team put significant effort into bringing together an array of perspectives and resources forcollaboration todevelopa rigorous,well-scopeddefinitionof thegrayzone, recognizing thatproperlyconductinganyeffortfocusedonresearching,understanding,and/orassessingthisgrayzoneconcept,requiresfirstensuringthattheeffortisusingsound,appropriate,comprehensivedefinitions.

Theresultwas the following: Thegrayzone isaconceptualspacebetweenpeaceandwar,occurringwhenactorspurposefullyusemultipleelementsofpower toachievepolitical-securityobjectiveswithactivitiesthatareambiguousorcloudattributionandexceedthethresholdofordinarycompetition,yetfall below the level of large-scale direct military conflict, and threaten US and allied interests bychallenging,undermining,orviolatinginternationalcustoms,norms,orlaws.

InanefforttovalidatetheSMAteam’sgrayzonedefinition,NSIimplementeditsViTTasubjectmatterexpert elicitationmethodology and interviewed leading gray zone experts about the characterizationand conditions of the gray zone,with particular attention put on having the experts assess the SMA



team’s gray zone definition. Overall, three of the experts aligned in agreement that the SMA team’sdefinitionofthegrayzoneisstrongandrepresentsasufficientstartingpointforassessingthegrayzone,whereasoneexpertwasslightlymoreconcernedthatthedefinitionmighthavesomeminorproblemsandareasforimprovement.

While this report, as a whole, presents a compendium of the insights and feedback regarding thecharacterizationandconditionsof thegrayzone fromthesubjectmatterexperts, theprimarygoalofthisViTTaeffortandreportistopresentexpertfeedback,insight,andcommentaryregardingtheSMAteam’sgrayzonedefinition.Thus,thelistbelowsummarizessomeoftheexperts’keypositivefeedback,critiques,andsuggestededitsthatspecificallyrelatetotheSMAteam’sgrayzonedefinition.

ThisViTTaeffortandreportwasnotmeanttodevelopanewgrayzonedefinition,butinsteadtoprovidetheSMAteamwithexpertelicitationregardingitsdefinitionofthegrayzone,sothecommentarybelowshould be of consideration to the SMA team going forward in future efforts regarding the gray zonespace.

Positivefeedback:

• Thedefinitioncorrectlyidentifiesthegrayzoneasthespacebetweenpeaceandwar,andbelowthe level of traditional military conflict, and appropriately asserts that gray zone activitieschallenge, undermine, and/or violate international customs, norms, and/or laws. These are allcentralcharacteristicsofthegrayzonespace.

• The definition properly specifies that actors in the gray zone purposefully utilize multipleinstrumentsof power in a campaign-like fashion to achieve some largerobjective,which is animportantcharacteristicofthegrayzoneandsomethingthatdistinguishes it frommanyoftheotherendeavorsthataresometimesconfusedwithgrayzoneactivities.

• Thedefinitionappropriatelyintimatesthatgrayzoneactionsaretypicallytakenbycapableactors(usuallystates)whocoulddomoredamageandbemoreconfrontationalbutareactinginalessviolentandlessovertwaythantheypotentiallycouldbe,becausewhiletheymaybedissatisfiedaboutcertainthingsandmaymakethisdissatisfactionclear,theyarenotsodissatisfiedthattheywantacompleterevolutionor todestroythepoliticalandeconomicorderof the internationalsystemthat theUnitedStateshasestablished (i.e.,RussiaandChinawant tohavemoresay inhow the international system is run, but theydonotwant to completelydestroy the system).This is an important gray zone characteristic, and one that differentiates the gray zone fromothertypesoflow-intensityconflict,suchasinsurgencyandterrorism.

• The definition’s characterization of the upper threshold as essentially below the level ofcombined arms coercive force and open warfare is a useful, and seemingly appropriate,descriptionbecauseinorderforthegrayzoneconcepttobemeaningful,thegrayzonespacehastobesufficientlydefinedasadiscretekindofconflict.

Critiques:

• The definition describes the gray zone from a US-centric perspective. This is particularlynoticeablewith the portion of the definition that points to gray zone activities as threateningUnitedStatesandalliedinterests.ItisnotnecessarilyproblematictodefinethegrayzonefromaUS-centricperspective,particularlyifthatwaswhattheSMAteamwasrequestedtodoaspartofthisoverallgrayzoneeffort;however,itisimportanttorememberthattheUnitedStateshaslongusedgrayzonetacticsofitsown,soclearlyagrayzoneactiondoesnotnecessarilyhaveto



besomethingthatthreatensonlyUnitedStatesandalliedinterests—itcouldbesomethingthattheUnitedStatesdoestoitsadversaries.

• Thepurposefuluseofmultiple instrumentsofpower iscertainlyan importantcharacteristicofthe gray zone and, as mentioned above in the positive feedback section, is something thatdifferentiatesthegrayzonefromotherendeavorsthataresometimesconfusedwithgrayzoneactivities; however, while it is clear that gray zone aggression typically synthesizes multipleinstrumentsofpower,itisnotentirelyclearthatthisnecessarilyalwayshastobethecase(i.e.,couldtherebeagrayzonecasewhereanactorengages ingrayzoneaggressionusingjustoneinstrumentofnationalpower?).

• Discussionsofthegrayzonetendtounquestionablylinkambiguitytothegrayzoneconcept,andthisdefinitionincorporatesanambiguitycomponent;however,thoughambiguityisanimportantstrategicconceptingeneral,itisnotclearthatthegrayzoneinitselfisnecessarilyalwaystiedtoambiguity.Indeed,ambiguityiscertainlyatoolofgrayzoneconflictanditisfrequentlythecasethatthere issomeefforttoobfuscateand/orconstrainattributionwhen itcomestograyzoneactions, but are those efforts to obfuscate and constrain attribution actually required for anactiontobeconsideredgray,orcouldtherebeacasewhereanaction is fullyattributableandstill considered to be part of the gray zone, provided that it is below the defined upperthreshold?

• Theway inwhich the lowerandupper thresholdsof thegray zonearecurrently characterizedwithin the definition could, potentially, prompt one to incorrectly classify something like low-intensityconflictthat iscarriedoutbyweakactorsornon-stateactorsaswithinthegrayzone.Thus, itwillbeimportanttomakethedistinctionbetweencapableactorsandweakactorsthattrytomasqueradeascapableactorsbecause,ultimately,thegrayzoneconsistsofcapableactorsthat are working hard to downplay their capabilities, or at least not use them or exerciseeverything they are capable of, and disassociate themselves from the actions that they aretaking.

Suggestededits:

• Characterizingthelowerthresholdofthegrayzoneassimply“exceedsordinarycompetition”issomewhat vague and subjective, and would benefit from additional clarification. This lowerthresholdcharacterizationcouldalsocreateconfusionbecause,insomecases,grayzoneactivitycanactuallybequiteordinary.Ifanactionthatistypicallythoughtofasjustordinarycompetitioncanbetiedbacktoalargergrandstrategyorcampaign,itwouldthenpresumablyfitwithinthedefinitionofthegrayzone.Therefore,withinthedefinition,itwouldbeconstructivetoprovidefurther explanation as towhat exactly ordinary competitionmeans because, as the definitionreadscurrently, it isnotquiteclearwhatthedividinglineisbetweenordinarycompetitionandgrayzoneactivity.

• Characterizing the upper threshold as “below the level of large-scale direct military conflict”mightnotbethemostaccuratecharacterizationofwhat, inreality, theupperthresholdof thegrayzoneactually is.Aggressors inthegrayzone ideallywanttoactwithouttheUnitedStatesdoing anything back in response, but certainly without the United States doing anythingconsequential back in response; therefore, a more accurate characterization of the upperthreshold of the gray zone might be: “falls below the level of proportional response.” Forinstance, if a gray zone aggressor takes action that advances its interests significantly, and inresponse theUnited States simply complains publicly, issues a demarche, or engages in someminor formof sanctions, then that low-costUnited States response is likely acceptable to the



aggressor,solongasthecostoftheresponseisnotproportionaltothebenefitgainedfromtheaction.Ultimately,itisnotclearthatgrayzoneactorsaresolelytryingtoavoidescalatingtotheleveloflarge-scaledirectmilitaryconflict—certainlytheytryingtoavoidgettingtothatlevel,buttheiravoidance thresholdactually seems tobe lower, socharacterizing theupper thresholdofthegrayzoneas“fallsbelowthe levelofproportional response”mightbeamoreappropriateandcomprehensive.

• Animportantaspectofgrayzoneaggression isthatanadversaryfirst identifieswhere itthinkstheUnitedStates’upper threshold is,and then intentionallyutilizesactions that remainbelowthat threshold. Therefore, itmightbe constructive toaddeither “intentionally”or “bydesign”somewhere into theportionof thedefinitionwhere it says“yet fallbelowthe levelof”beforenotingtheupperthreshold.



AppendixA:SubjectMatterExpertBiographies

MichaelMazarr

Michael J.Mazarr is an associatedirectorofRANDArroyoCenter's Strategy,Doctrine, andResourcesProgram, and a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. He comes to RAND from the U.S.NationalWarCollegewherehewasprofessorandassociatedeanofacademics.Hehasalsoworkedinresearchinstitutes,onCapitolHill,andasaspecialassistanttotheChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff.Hisprimary interestsareU.S.defensepolicyandforcestructure,EastAsiansecurity,nuclearweaponsanddeterrence,and judgmentanddecisionmakingunderuncertainty.MazarrholdsaPh.D. inpublicpolicyfromtheUniversityofMaryland.



HalBrands

Hal Brands is a Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns HopkinsUniversitySchoolofAdvancedInternationalStudies(SAIS).Heistheauthororeditorofseveralbooks,includingMaking the UnipolarMoment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-ColdWar Order(2016),WhatGoodisGrandStrategy?PowerandPurposeinAmericanStatecraftfromHarryS.TrumantoGeorgeW.Bush(2014),LatinAmerica'sColdWar(2010),FromBerlintoBaghdad:America'sSearchforPurpose in thePost-ColdWarWorld (2008),andThePowerof thePast:HistoryandStatecraft (co-editedwithJeremiSuri,2015).

He was a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow from 2015 to 2016. He has alsoconsulted with a range of government offices and agencies in the intelligence and national securitycommunities.

He received his BA from Stanford University (2005) and his PhD from Yale University (2009). HepreviouslyworkedasanassistantandassociateprofessoratDukeUniversity'sSanfordSchoolofPublicPolicy,andasaresearcherattheInstituteforDefenseAnalyses.



ErikGartzke

Professor Erik Gartzke, University of California San Diego, studies the impact of information on war,peaceandinternationalinstitutions.Studentsofinternationalpoliticsareincreasinglyawarethatwhatleaders and others know or believe is key to understanding fundamental international processes.Professor Gartzke's research has appeared inthe American Journal of Political Science,InternationalOrganization, International Studies Quarterly,the Journal of Conflict Resolution,the Journal ofPoliticsandelsewhere.Heiscurrentlyworkingontwobooks,oneonglobalizationandtheotheronthedemocraticpeace,aswellasdozensofarticles.



ChristopherPaul

ChristopherPaulisaseniorsocialscientistattheRANDCorporationandprofessoratthePardeeRANDGraduateSchool.HeisalsoamemberoftheadjunctfacultyintheCenterforEconomicDevelopmentinthe Heinz College at Carnegie Mellon University. Prior to joining RAND full-time in July 2002, PaulworkedasanadjunctatRANDforsixyearsandonthestatisticsfacultyattheUniversityofCalifornia,Los Angeles (UCLA) in 2001–02. Paul has developed methodological competencies in comparativehistorical and case study approaches, evaluation research, various formsof quantitative analysis, andsurveyresearch.PaulreceivedhisPh.D.insociologyfromUCLA.

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