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FORMALONTOLOGY AS ANOPERATIVE TOOLIN THE THORIES OF THE OBJECTS OF THELIFE‐WORLD:STUMPF,HUSSERLANDINGARDEN
HoracioBanega(UniversityofBuenosAiresandNationalUniversi‐tyofQuilmes)
Itisacceptedthatcertainmereologicalconceptsandphenomenolog‐ical conceptualisations presented in Carl Stumpf’s Uber den psy‐chologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung and TonpsychologieplayedanimportantroleinthedevelopmentoftheHusserlianformalontology. In the thirdLogical Investigation,whichdisplays the for‐mal relationsbetweenpartandwholeandamongparts thatmakeoutawhole,oneofthemainconceptsofcontemporaryformalontol‐ogyandmetaphysicsissettled:ontologicaldependenceorfoundation(Fundierung).Mymain objective is todisplay Stumpf’s conceptsofpartial content, independent content, spatialwholes, soundwholes,andthedifferentkindsofconnectionamongparts,inparticular, fu‐sion(Verschmelzung).Second,IwillshowhowHusserlimprovedthisbackground, in particularwith regards to the exact nature of thetheory of manifolds (Mannigfaltigkeitslehre), in discussion withGeorg Cantor, the father of set theory. Third, I will focus onIngarden’suseofformalontologyandonthedifferentmodesofbeingthat canbe justi iedbyappealing to theconceptofontologicalde‐pendence in its Ingardenianvariations. Ifmy interpretation isade‐quate,itshouldbeinferredthatformalontologyistheoperativethe‐oryofphenomenologicalphilosophy,andthismustbeacknowledgedin its fullsigni icancewithrespecttothesupposed independenceofthephenomenologicalmethodsince .Afurtherconsequence,notdevelopedinthisessay,isthatformalontologycanbemathematised.
.Introduction
Husserl’stheoryofscience,aspresentedin§ ofProlegomenatoPureLogic,volumeIoftheLogicalInvestigations,impliesaformaltheoryofallpossible formal theories.This isdue to themain idea that logic ismathematics—an idea opposed toGottlob Frege’s—and to the in lu‐ence of Bernard Bolzano and Bernard Riemann, among others. Thisscienceofsciencesisarticulatedbymeaningfulcategoriesontheside
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oftheory,categoriesthatmustbereferredtoastheobjectualdomain,which is determined by the ontological categories. In this way, wemust take into account that, for Husserl, ontological categories areformalinsofarastheyarecompletelyfreedfromanymaterialdomainof the application of the formal meaningful categories. Therefore,formalontology,asdevelopedinthethirdLogicalInvestigation,isthecorresponding“objectivecorrelateoftheconceptofapossibletheory,de initeonlyinrespectofform.”1
Volume XXI of Husserliana2 provides insight into the theoreticalsourceofHusserlianformalontology.3Inparticular,itstrivestode inethetheoryofmanifoldsorthedebateovertheeffectivenatureofwhatwill laterbecalled “set theory.”Thus,what in§ ofProlegomena iscalleda“TheoryofManifolds”(Mannigfaltigkeitslehre)iswhatHusserl
1EdmundHusserl,LogischeUntersuchunghen.ZweiterBand,UntersuchungenzurPhänomenologieundTheoriederErkenntnis.HusserlianaXIX/ andXIX/ ,(ed.)U.Panzer (TheHague:MartinusNijhoff, ), hereafter referred to asHuaXIX/ andHuaXIX/ ; tr.byJ.N.FindlayasLogical Investigations,Vols. & (London:Routledge, ),hereafterreferredtoasLI/ orLI/ .ThepassagequotedisfromLI/ , .2 Edmund Husserl, Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie. ( – ), (ed.)IngeborgStrohmeyer(TheHague:MartinusNijhoff, ).3 Gilbert Null, Peter Simons, and Kit Fine were the irst to formalise the thirdLogical Investigation. In private electronic communication, Gilbert Null toldme,“By theway, I advise you to replaceLesniewski’s term ‘mereology’ for the term‘constituentontology’whenreferringtoHusserl’s(realist)part‐foundationtheory.Lesniewski andhis followers (Leonard, Goodman,Quine, Eberle, et al.)were allnominalists, andmereology isanominalistpart‐whole theory,because it satis iesGoodman’s Principles of Nominalism. Husserl’s constituent ontology violatesGoodman’sPrinciplesofNominalism,soitisnotnominalistontology,andhenceitshouldnot be called ‘mereology’. I know this usage hasbecomequite extended,andyouarethe irstIamtellingthatthisusageisunacceptable.ItsunacceptabilityisadirectconsequenceofacaseIwillmakeinHusserl’sRealistConstituentOntol‐ogy of Dependence, where I will state that Husserl’s Constituent Ontology ofDependence is not a mereology because it violates Goodman’s Principles ofNominalism.Soyouwilldoyourfutureselfafavorifyouhenceforthavoidrefer‐ring toHusserl’sRealist ConstituentOntology ofDependence as amereology.” IthinkthatProfessorNullisquiteright,soIwillfollowhissuggestion.However,Ialsobelievethat“formalontology”canbeconsideredsynonymouswith“constitu‐entontology.”GilbertNull’smostrecentpapersonthistopicare“TheOntologyofIntentionality I: the Dependence Ontological Account of Order; Mediate andImmediateMomentsandPiecesofDependentandIndependentObjects,”HusserlStudies,vol. ,no. ( ), – ;“TheOntologyofIntentionalityII:DependenceOntologyasProlegomenontoNoeticModalSemantics,”HusserlStudies,vol. ,no. ( ), – ; and “Two‐Valued Logics of Intentionality: Temporality, Truth,Modality,andIdentity,”HusserlStudies,vol. ,no. ( ), – .Thepapertowhichhemadereferenceisprovisionallytitled“StalkingtheImmediateMoment.”
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investigatedaround – .Hewas, at that time, trying todevelophis Raumbuch. So geometry, space and set theory are in the back‐groundof thewhole ofLogical Investigations, and particularly of hisTheoryofPartsandWholes.
It is worth highlighting that “geometry” heremakes reference toRiemann,famousnotonlyforhavingpromotednon‐Euclideangeome‐tries,butalso forhisworkof ,OntheHypothesesthatLieat theFoundationsofGeometry,inwhichhedescribesa“verygeneralphilo‐sophical distinction between discrete and continuous manifolds.”4Discrete manifolds admit only such mode of determination or frag‐mentationasisallowedbythediscretetransitfromoneindividualtoanother, but the fragmentation of a continuous manifold always re‐sultsinanindividualofthesamenatureasthatofthewholeofwhichitisapart.Thisisthecasewithspace,inonepossibleinterpretation.Theotherissueworthnotingis that inRiemann’stheory, there isnoroom for intuition, be it Kantian or Husserlian. The nature of realspaceisamatterofempiricalinvestigation,andmathematicsispurelyconceptual.
In this paper, I will present formal ontology as an operative‐theoretical frame which phenomenological theories employ withoutthematisingitexplicitlyassuch.Iwillfocusonsomeantecedentsthatthematised a similar statement. First, I will show how Carl Stumpfshapedhisparticularversionof“phenomenologicalmereology”inhisÜberdenpsychologischenUrsprungderRaumvorstellungof ,inhiswell‐knownchapter thatdealswithpsychologicalparts.Withrefer‐encetophilosophicalmethodology,Iwilldescribehowheworkedontherelationbetweenconceivabilityandmetaphysicalpossibility,andhow this can be understood as compatible with phenomenologicalmethodology.Then, followingcertain insightsofPeterSimons5, Iwilldevelopthedifferentkindsofwholesthatcanbefoundthere.Wecanind the emerging Husserlian topology in the concept of “pregnantwhole.”Butthisconceptofwholeisnotunderstandableatallwithoutconsidering the concept of foundation or ontological dependence. Ithasbeendemonstrated that thisconceptof foundation is intensionalin nature, but also that extensionality can be saved by adopting thetopologicalstrategy.Third,IwillshowhowHusserlhimselfappliedhisformalontologyinthecaseoftherelationoftheelementsofpresenta‐
4GuillermoRosadoHaddock,“Husserl’sPhilosophyofMathematics:ItsOriginandRelevance,”HusserlStudies,vol. ,no.XX( ), – ,here .5PeterSimons, “TheFormalizationofHusserl’sTheoryofWholesandParts,” inPartsandMoments.StudiesinLogicandFormalOntology,(ed.)B.Smith(Munich:PhilosophiaVerlag, ), – .
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tions in the ifth Logical Investigation. Serrano de Haro has claimedthat this application of formal ontology is not as valid as might bethoughtat irstglance.Iwillexaminehiscriticismstoshowthattheyare valid only if we introduce elements under the consideration ofLogical Investigationswhicharealien to them, for instance,elementsfrom Ideas I. Finally,basedoncertain insightsofRoman Ingarden, IwilltrytoapplythedifferencebetweenabstractandconcreteobjectstoatopicquiteIngardianinnature:dramaticstructure.Therelevanceoftheapplicationofthisdifferencetoobjectsofthiskind—thatis, toconsciousness and dramatic structure—is that both of them are ob‐jects of the life‐world. In addition, dramatic structure is an abstractobjectthatexistsoutsideourownmental life,so itcanbe takenasaparadigmaticcaseofsocialandtextualobjects.
Onthebasisofmyanalyses,Ishalldrawcertainconclusionsaboutformalontologyandphenomenology:mypointisthatformalontologyistheoperativetheory inphenomenologicalphilosophy,andthatthesigni icanceofthisclaimcanbefullyunderstoodonlywithrespecttotheindependenceofformalontologyfromphenomenologicalmethodthat has been supposed since . But I intend this to be valid forphenomenology understood as Husserl himself understood it—namely,asascienceofthelife‐world.
.CarlStumpf:“inVerehrungundFreundschaft,zugeeig‐net”
Carl Stumpf ( – ) made a vast contribution to the ield ofexperimentalpsychologyandparticularlytothepsychologyofsoundand the psychology ofmusic. This should come as no surprise ifweconsiderthattheSchoolofBrentano,wherehewastrained,intendedtodevelopaphilosophysyllabusrelatedtotheexperimentalsciencesofhistime.WhileattendingthelecturesofBrentanohimself,Stumpf,attractedbytheintellectualpathshe iguredcouldbeopenedfollow‐ing the experimental methodology promoted by his mentor, set hismindtostudyphilosophy.6However,inphilosophyheisbetterknownasHusserl’sprofessor.FranzBrentanocouldnotactasthesisadvisor,so he recommended his students to different professors who wereabletoperformthistask.Stumpf’sresearchcametherebytobesuper‐vised by Hermann Lotze, while Husserl’s was supervised by Stumpf
6Foragood introduction,seeDenisFisette,“CarlStumpf,”TheStanfordEncyclo‐pediaofPhilosophy(Spring ),(ed.)EdwardN.Zalta,at[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr /entries/stumpf/].
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himself. Stumpf was admired by the founder of phenomenologicalphilosophy: Logical Investigations is “dedicated to Carl Stumpf withHonourandinFriendship.”
In ,StumpfpublishedOnthePsychologicalOriginofthePresen‐tation of Space7, in which he established certain concepts that arecurrently called “mereological.”8 In addition, it is possible to indtheoretical strategies to justify his statements, which involve thecomplexrelationbetweenconceivabilityandpossibility,thatistosay,the relation between a speci ic skill or faculty and modalities. ForStumpf,apresentationofacolourwithoutanextension isnotpossi‐ble;conversely,apresentationofanextensionwithoutacolourisnotpossibleeither.Thevariationof themembersof therelationdemon‐strates—in what we would call today a “thought experiment”—thatthedecreaseofoneimpliesinsomewaythealterationoftheotherandvice versa. This variation is determined by the so‐called “laws ofessence”or,inAristotelianterms,“genericlaws.”Asiswellknowninmereological literature, this variation between different parts of awholepresents twosortsofparts:dependentpartsand independentparts. Independent parts can survive separation from the whole ofwhichtheyarepart,whilstdependentpartscannot.Itshouldbenotedthat Stumpf called these parts “partial contents” (Teilinhalte) and“independentcontents”(selbständigeInhalte),anditwasHusserlwhoundertookthenewformulationinhisthirdLogicalInvestigation.
Stumpf clearly states his point of view in the irst lines of his fa‐mouschapter :“Asifitwereaboveallmattersdesirableandneces‐sarytorememberthephenomenaofordinaryconsciousness,whichinthis as in all cases prompt scienti ic inquiry.”9 Regarding Stumpf’sadoptionof this standpoint,RobinRollingerclaims that “amoresuc‐cinct statement in favorof theprecedenceofphenomenological con‐siderationscouldhardlybehopedfor.”10AccordingtoStumpf,thecase
7 Carl Stumpf,ÜberdenpsychologischenUrsprungderRaumvorstellung (Amster‐dam:Bonset, ).HereafterreferredtoasPUR.8Again,seeGilbertNull’sstatement(note ,above)aboutcontemporarymereolo‐gy and the theorisations of Stanislaw Lesniewski and Nelson Goodman. Theprimitive concept of both systems is the relational concept “be part of.” For anexcellentintroduction,seeAchilleVarzi,“Mereology,”TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy (Spring ), (ed.) Edward N. Zalta, at [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr /entries/mereology/].9“…alsseiesvorallenDingenwünschenswerthundnothwendig,sichderPhänome‐nedesgewöhnlichenBewusstseinszuerinnern,die ja indiesemwie in jedemFallediewissenschaftlicheNachforschunganregen.”(PUR, )10 Robin D. Rollinger, Husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano (Dordrecht:Kluwer, ), .
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to be accounted for and analysed lies in the fact that, in commonperception,wehaveapresentationofacolouredsurface,beitgreen,red or any other colour. He set aside considerations that appeal tomuscularsensationsandtheconceptthatclaimsthatone’sownsensa‐tionsareaggregatesofsmallerimpressions,insofaras“inthisconsid‐erationthereisnothinginterestingforthecommonsense.”(PUR, )Thecaseallowsustorealisethattwocontentsarepresented,sinceweare able to differentiate them in one way or another: we say “thatsurfaceisred,”butalso,“theredofthatsurfaceisunpleasanttome.”The contents are jointly presented in diverseways, butwhat deter‐minestheirrelationistheirbelongingtogetherortheaf initybetweenthem.Stillmoreimportant,attentionshouldbepaidtotheformofthecombination intheirpresentation,whatStumpfcalls “themodesandways of presenting together.” Once it is possible to establish whathappenswiththedegreesofaf initybetweencontents,theauthorwilldisplaythetwomainformsofcombinationintheirpresentation.Nowthe combination of contents is placed in thepresentation. The (phe‐nomenological)descriptionthatStumpfpresentsaimsatshowingtherelation these two contents will have, in one way or another, when“presentedtogether”(zusammenvorstellen)and,asaconsequence,hewillnot, forthetimebeing,dealwiththegeneticquestion(theques‐tionoforigin).
The irstcaseunderconsiderationistheconjunctionofincompati‐blecontents,whichcanworkasafoundationorbasisofajudgement.Take, for instance, the judgement “it is impossible that an iron bemadeofwood.”IfweagreewithBrentanothateveryjudgementisanontologically dependent act of an originary presentation (a percep‐tion),allowingthatinthiscasethepresentationofironisavailabletous, then the presentation of wood and a kind of combination in thepresentation,whichallowsforthecombinedpresentation,performsitsroleasthebasisofthejudgement.Inthiscase,Stumpfdoesnottelluswhichcouldbethatkindofcombination,butheclaimsthatthecom‐bination could be akindof connection: “Itmaybea peculiarway ofpresentingtogether,butitisneverthelessawayofdoingso.”11
Thefollowingcasetobeanalysedinvolvesthecombinedpresenta‐tion of qualities perceptible by different senses, such as colour andsound.Thisisconsideredpossiblebecausewealreadyknowthattheyaredifferent.Ifwealwayshadaccesstosoundqualitiesalone,andnocontact with chromatic qualities, we would not be aware of theirsimilaritiesordifferences.Thepossibilityof thisperceptivesituation11“MageseineabsonderlicheWeisedesZusammenvorstellenssein,esistebendocheineWeise.”(PUR, )
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willdependonhavingparticularactsofpresentationalone.Ifwedidnotperformactsof combinedpresentation,wewouldnotbeable toperceive,forinstance,theoperaasawhole,despitethefactthatthosewho support the irst possibility claim that soundqualities alternatewithvisualqualities atsuch speed thatwemayseem toperceive theopera as awhole, and not irst itsmusic and then itsmise en scène.Stumpfclaimsthat“inthiscasethemereappearanceofthepresentingtogetherwouldbeenough;appearancewhichismadeavailabletousin anycase.”Heconcludes theanalysisbyclaiming: “In this case thecontentsbelongtogethermorecloselythaninthepreviouscase;theyareindeedstillthoroughlydifferent,butatleastnotopposed.”12
Letusnotethattheargumentbeginswiththeimpossibilityofsin‐gularlypresentingacomplexevent,assumingthatthepresentationissingular, and extends to the possibility of analysing the combinedpresentationsregardlessoftheirtrueorigin.ItisinthismannerthatIbelieveacharacteristicfeatureofthetheoreticalstrategyadoptedbyStumpfarises,anditconsistsinestablishingthematterintermsofthecomplexrelationbetweenconceivability,metaphysicalpossibilityandnecessity.13
If thepresentation (perception) of theoperawere conceived as amanifoldofparticularpresentationsthatbelongtoeachsensorial ieldinvolved(inthiscase,colourandsound)withoutanyintimaterelationamong them, then it would be possible that the presentation itselfwerenotone,butdiverseinquantityandquality.Sinceheisanalysingthepresentationregardlessof its trueorigin, takingconceivabilityasthe starting point (“themere appearance of the presenting togetherwill be enough”), he is able to consider the psychological andmeta‐physical possibility of the presentation of the opera asone inwhichcontents coming fromdifferent sensorial ields have been combinedtogether, andwhose combinationsmay be analysed. It seems tomethatatthisstage,thetaskbeingdescribediswhatwilllaterbeknownasthebasicphenomenologicalattitudeinitsnoeticaspect:theanaly‐sisofthepresentationassuch—thatis,aftertheepocheandreductionin their different psychological, eidetic and transcendental versions
12“EsistnunindiesemFallschoneineengereZusammengehörigkeitderInhaltealsimvorigen,siesindzwarnochdurchausverschieden,aberwenigstensnichtentge‐gengesetzt.”(PUR, )13 Cf. T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, eds., Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, );GraemeForbes,TheMetaphysicsofModality(NewYork:ClarendonPress, ),ch. ;L.Reinhardt,“MetaphysicalPossibility,”Mind,vol. ,no. ( ), – ;andS.Yablo, “IsConceivabilityaGuidetoPossibil‐ity?”PhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch,vol. ,no. ( ), – .
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havebeenperformed,what isknown inphenomenological literatureastheapodicticepocheandreduction.14
Qualitiesofthesamesenseorsensual ieldcanbepresentedcom‐binedwhenapositiveaf inity takesplace: “Wesay that thecontentsbelong to the same genus.” We can simultaneously hear differentsoundsinthesamechord.Butwecanalsodifferentiatethem.Thisisthe fourth possibility of presenting together. Moreover, we can pre‐senttheintensity, lengthandqualitycombined inonespeci icsensa‐tion.AsStumpfexplains:
…notonlywillitbedesirabletoacknowledgeacombinedpresenta‐tionofthediverse,butaparticularshouldbedifferentiatedaccord‐ingtodifferentrelationsaswell.Here, inanyevent,when itdoesnot yet have to dowith the genesis of the combination but onlywiththeaf inityofthecontents,wemaypartlyusethemoregen‐eralexpressionofsynopsis.15
With these four cases of combined presentation, Stumpf goes on toconsiderandanalysethemeaningoftherelationofsynthesisorasso‐ciationinthecombinedpresentation.Forthispurpose,andbearinginmindour general objective, he divides the contents into partial con‐tentsandindependentcontents.Letmeintroducethemost‐citedpieceof Stumpf’sworkonmereological literature,whichconcerns itsphe‐nomenologicalorigins:“Andwedetermineasde initionandcriterionof this difference: independent contents are present where the ele‐mentsofacomplexofpresentationscouldalsobepresentedseparate‐ly by virtue of their nature; partial contents where this is not thecase.”16The irststrategy,theonehewillactuallyadopt,impliesacaseinwhichqualityandextensionarenotjointlypresented.Resortingtowhat are referred to in contemporary literature as “thought experi‐ments,” he concludes that it is actually impossible to conceive purespacewithoutquality.But Icannotoverlook the fact that thesecond
14SeeR.Sokolowski,HusserlianMeditations:HowWordsPresentThings(Evanston,NorthwesternUniversityPress, ).15 “…sodass man nicht sowohl ein Zusammenvorstellen von Mehrerem, als einUnterscheiden eines Einzigen nachmehreren Beziehungen hier wird anerkennenwollen.Immerhinmögenwirhier,woesnochnichtaufdieGenesisderVerbindungankommt, sondern nur auf die Verwandtschaft der Inhalte, den allgemeinerenAusdruckderUebersichthalbergebrauchen.”(PUR, )16“…undbestimmenalsDe initionundKriteriondiesesUnterschiedes:selbständigeInhaltesinddavorhanden,wodieElementeeinesVorstellungscomplexesihrerNaturnachauchgetrennt vorgestelltwerdenkönnen;Theilinhalteda,wodiesnichtderFallist.”(PUR, )
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strategyhementionsimpliesanappealtotrue,externalexperiments.Due to the state of the sciences of his time, he could not dependonexternal experiments to corroborate his hypothesis. I would like tostress that, in spite of appealing to common sense to tackle the re‐search,hewouldnot reject the ideaofresorting to the laboratory toverifyhismainstatement.
Stumpf’sanalysesup to thispoint leadus toconclude thatexten‐sionandqualityseemtobepartialcontents,butitisnotyetcleartousif this perceived situation is causedby the truenature of the repre‐sentedcontents.17 Inorder toachievehismainobjective, theversionof the thought experiment Stumpfwill use is what can be acknowl‐edgedasanantecedentofHusserlianeideticvariation.Hewilladoptthe procedure of variation of extension in relation to quality, andmodi icationofqualitywithrespecttoextension,inordertograspthemeasure and proportion of their coordinate variation. If there is acoordinateandreciprocalvariationofoneregardingtheother,Stumpfwill have achieved his aim of demonstrating that they are partialcontents,inaccordancewiththeirownnature.
Inotherwords,ifhecanconceiveextensionseparatedfromquali‐ty,thenanindependentcontentwouldbepossible.Thesameappliestoquality.Letusnotethathealreadyknowsthatextensionandqualityarepartialcontents,andwhatheistryingtoverifyiswhethertheyareso inaccordancewiththeirownnature. Inmyview, it is inthissensethatwhatisatstakehereisanontologicalrealismwithitscoordinatedepistemological realism, where the psychological contents can beconsidered to hold a one‐to‐one correspondence relation with theobjects to which they make reference and to which I have accesswithout distortion. Consequently, I have access to reality because Ihave access to the contents ofmyownmind. Inmereological terms,Stumpfwilltrytoprovewhetherextensionandqualitykeeparelationfrom part towhole, or from part to part thatmakes up a whole. Inotherwords,hewilltrytodeterminewhetherqualityisapart,togeth‐erwithextension,ofawhole,andwhetherextensionispartofawholetogetherwithquality.Stumpfexecutesaseriesofvariationswherethelinguistic use as an expression or indication of what is being per‐formedappearsalongwithwhathe is tryingtoprove.ThispointhasbeenemphasisedbyBarrySmithandKevinMulliganintheirseminalresearch on Husserlian “constitutive ontology.” We say that “color
17SeeB.SmithandK.Mulligan,“PiecesofaTheory,”inPartsandMoments.Studiesin Logic and Formal Ontology, (ed.) Barry Smith (Munich: Philosophia Verlag,
), – .
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decreasesandshrinkstillitdisappears,”andwhatthisdenotesisthatextensiondecreasesandsodoescolouralongwithit.
It is clear, from what it has been claimed up to this point, thatStumpf thinks he is in a good position to assess that extension andquality “are partial contents, [and] they cannot exist in accordancewiththeirownnatureseparatedfromeachotherinpresentation,norcan theybepresented in isolation.” It seemsworthpointingout thatthe concept introduced as such is the antecedent to the notion ofontologicaldependence,whichimpliesnotonlymetaphysicalpossibil‐ity but also necessity. It is in this statement, according to MargretKaiserEl‐Safti18,thatthenotionofawholewhichisnotameresumisfounded.
ItispossibletosumupStumpf’sresultsbynotingthatheimprovedphenomenological methodology by implementing the relation be‐tween conceivability and metaphysical possibility, and that he suc‐ceeded in differentiating among different kinds of connections be‐tweenparts,and, inconsequence,diversekindsofwholes.Finally,hewasmotivatedbyhiscon idence inscienti icresearchasamodel forphilosophy,acon idencetakenaspositiveforphenomenologynowa‐days.
.HusserlianConstituentFormalOntology
IhavedescribedhowwasitthatStumpfdealtwithmereologyregard‐ing the psychological origin of the presentation of space. Husserl’simprovementon this topicconsistedof theapplicationofhismathe‐maticalcon iguration,andhisownversionofpart‐wholerelationswassupposedlydevelopedindiscussionswithGeorgCantoraboutemerg‐ing set theory. Therefore, Riemann, Cantor, Sophus Lie, Felix Klein,BolzanoandStumpflieattherootofthethirdLogicalInvestigation.Iwill develop themain concepts of this Investigation, and then I shallproceed with their applications to consciousness and, ultimately, todramaticstructure.
(a)PeterSimons’ThreeConceptsofWhole
There are at least three concepts of “whole” presented in the thirdLogical Investigation. ( )The irst isamereaggregateof individuals,whichiswhatwe ind,forinstance,inGoodman’scalculusofindividu‐18MargretKaiserEl‐Safti,“CarlStumpfsLehrevonGanzenunddenTeilen,”Axioma‐thes,vol. ,no. ( ), – .
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als. In extensional mereology, it refers to the concept of arbitrarymereologicalsum,forexample,theglassofwateronmydeskandmyrecent perception of Nahuel Huapi Lake. ( ) The second implies anaggregate of individuals that is uni ied by a principle of uni ication.Thisconceptis,infact,rejectedbyHusserlbecauseofthedangerofanin initeregress.Ifaandbareuni iedbyU,thentheremustbeanotherUwhichuni ies the aggregate a‐b‐U, and soonad in initum. ( )Thethird concept is that of a whole in a “pregnant sense.” This kind ofwhole is onewhose parts are uni ied by the relation ofmultilateralfoundation.Husserlsays:“Totalkabout thesinglenessof the founda‐tion implies that every content is foundationally connected, whetherdirectly or indirectly, to every content.” (LI/ , ) Husserl believedthat“content”and“object”aremutuallyco‐extensive terms, sowhenhesays“content,”wecanread“part,”andwecaninterpretthisstate‐mentasaddressingtheissueoftheconnectivityofthepartswithoutaunifyingprincipleoutsidethewholewhichperformsthatrole.19
Ishallnextturntoananalysisoftherelationalconceptof“founda‐tion.”First,however,Ishouldstresswhatseemstobetheissuehere.Whathastoberenderedhereisthewayinwhichcertainelementsholdtogether. It appears as if this issuewas bornwith philosophy itself.Aristotle,forinstance,appearstohavenootherprobleminhisPoeticsthan to demonstrate that the form of the perfect poem is tragedybecauseof theway inwhich itsmain elementshold together,whichmeansthatascenehasnecessarilytobefollowedbyanotherone,thusimplyingaformofmereologicalessentialism.20
(b)Foundation(Fundierung)andOntologicalDependence
It is by nomeans easy to develop, in a summarisedmanner, all theimplicationsofthedifferentinterpretationsofthisconcept,whichissocentralnotonly toHusserl’sphilosophybutalso tometaphysicsandontology in general. Husserl’s own reading of “foundation” implies“ontologicaldependence.”IfXisfoundedbyY,thenXisontologicallydependentonY.Inmodalterms,followingSimons’interpretation,thismeans that ifX exists, thenY also necessarily exists, and thismeansthat they exist in all possible worlds, because the interpretation isbasedonareadingofmodalitiesasdere.19IwouldclaimthatwhatIreferredtointheprevioussectiononStumpf’smere‐ology with respect to ontological and epistemological realism in the School ofBrentanocanaccountforHusserl’sacknowledgementthat“content”and“object”aresoeasilyinterchangeable.20SeebelowonIngardenandAristotle’sPoetics.
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Accordingtomyowninterpretation,theoriginofthisconceptliesintheexactparallelbetweenlogicalsigni icativecategoriesandlogicalontological categories,asspeci iedbyHusserl inProlegomena,whichdemonstrates that the modes of connection between objects in aspeci icdomainarecongruentwiththemodesofconnectionbetweenthesentencesaboutthosesameobjectsinatheorythatincludesthemas domain. This does not involve a one‐to‐one correspondence or amirroring between objectual domain and sentences, but, rather, averi icationofsuchcorrespondencebetweenthemodesofarticulationof sentences and themodes of construction of states of affairs. ThisseemsquiterelatedtoathesisoftheTractatus,butwhatseemsmoreimportant as the determining feature that causes sentences to be atheory,eventhetheoryofalltheories,istheconnectivelink,orfounda‐tionallink.Thislinkisstructuralorfunctional.Itisnotasinglenexus,butaconnectedseriesof them,whichshowsorbearsdeductivecon‐nectivity.Now,thisdeductiveconnectivityseemstohavetheconceptoffoundationasobjectualcounterpart.Ifthisinterpretationiscorrect,thenthe logical relationof implication is incorrespondencewith theontological relation of foundation. And, if we bear inmind that in asingularprocessofinferencefromtruepremisestotrueconsequence,the consequence preserves the truth, thenwhat is preserved in theprocessoffoundationisreality(Wirklichkeit).
More important formypurposes is that regarding the relation tofoundation, Husserl intends to draw a distinction between concreteand abstract objects. An abstract object is one which is founded onanotherobject,abstractorconcrete.Theconcreteobjectisnotfound‐edonanotheroutsideitself.So,thisistheindependentobject.Inaddi‐tion, itshouldbeemphasisedthatthenotionof“substance”doesnotappear at all. Therefore, nowhere does it appear that unity isa realproblem,becauseinHusserl’sviewofthismatter,unityisa“categori‐calpredicate.”
The“pregnant”conceptofwholecanbeconsideredasfoundedon‐lyinitsproperparts.InthesameLogicalInvestigation,Husserlde ines“boundary”asadependentpartoftheobjectitisboundto.Thus,thewholethatispregnanthasitsownboundaryfrominside,unlessithasbeenacceptedasadependentpartoftwoobjects,asitisinBrentano’scase.Thisisadif icultpoint,becauseitisnotclearwhatthisinterpre‐tation would amount to without further quali ications. In certaininterpretations, it seemsas if theonlyexistingpregnantwholewerethe universe, and that all the objects that inhabit it are dependentpartsofit.
Another interpretation that links the pregnant concept of wholeandtherelationoffoundationconsistsofreadingtheaforementioned
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de initionbyHusserlasimplyingatopologicalrelation,whichismorebasicthanthemereologicalrelation“bepartof.”Thepredicatehereis“connection,” and its more intended interpretation is “overlapping”:twoindividualsshareacommonpart.Moreover,furtherpredicatesof“internal part,” “tangentialpart,” “internaloverlap,” “tangential over‐lap,”“boundary”and“internalproperpart”appear.21
Intheseterms,then,thepartsofthiskindofwholearedirectlyorindirectly interrelatedby the relationof connection.And ifwe inter‐pret thisoneas“overlapping,”asminimalconsiderationssuggestwemust, then wewould have to accept that all the parts of the wholeshareapart,butnotnecessarilythesamepart,andthatnotallneces‐sarilysharethesamepart.Notethatthelinkhereisestablishedbythepredicate “share.” InWhitehead’s terms, the minimal part shared isonepoint.Thus“connection,”forWhitehead,meanstoshareatleastapoint.Tobeincontact,then,meanstobetopologicallyconnected.
.HusserlandPresentations
Regarding the formal ontology of dependence treated in the thirdLogical Investigation, Barry Smith claims that “perhaps the mostinterestingemploymentofthetheoryhowever—ifonlyinviewofthealmost total neglect of this fact byHusserl’smyriadofmodern com‐mentators—wasbyHusserlhimselfwithinthedisciplineofphenome‐nology.”22 Smith adds, however, in a footnote to this passage: “SeeSokolowski,HusserlianMeditations, for a notable exception.” RobertSokolowskicanbeseenasoneofthe irstcontemporaryphenomenol‐ogists tounderstandtherelevanceofthisInvestigation forthewholeof Husserlian phenomenology. As early as – , in “The Logic ofParts and Wholes in Husserl’s Investigations,” he claimed that allHusserlianphenomenologyusedthislogicofpartsandwholes.2321 See Achille Varzi and Roberto Casati, Parts and Places (Cambridge: The MITPress, ), ff., whomaintain that the “pregnant” concept ofwholemust beinterpretedastopological.22BarrySmith,“LogicandFormalOntology,”Manuscrito,vol.XXIII,no. (October,
), – , .This isarevisedversionof thepaperthatappeared in J.N.Mohanty andW.McKenna, eds.,Husserl’s Phenomenology.A Textbook (Lanham:UniversityPressofAmerica, ), – .23RobertSokolowski,“TheLogicofPartsandWholesinHusserl’sInvestigations,”inReadingsonEdmundHusserl’sLogical Investigations, (ed.) J.N.Mohanty (TheHague:MartinusNijhoff, ), – , reprinted version of the original paper,irstpublishedinPhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch,vol. ,no. ( –
), – ;andRobertSokolowski,HusserlianMeditations.HowWordsPresentThings (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, ). I do not yet have an
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IntheSpanish‐speakingphenomenologicalworld,AgustınSerranodeHaro, in his fundamental essay on this subject, claimed that “theanalysisoftheVLU ixesitsabstractmomentsintherelativeconcreteof the intentionalexperience;and thehigherabstract formsandmo‐mentsofunityinthehigherconcreteofthephenomenologicalego.His[Husserl’s] ‘experiments’arenomore thanthevariationof fantasy.…Therefore, his point of theoretical reference is not the point of thephysicalist, but the theorization about the necessary dependenceamongcontents,whichhedevelopsintheThirdInvestigation.”24
Therefore, given these antecedents, I shall nowdemonstratehowformalontologyhelpsustounderstandthetopicof theunityofcon‐sciousness, and why, in my view, it is so important to remind our‐selvesthatformalontologyisformalinthe irstplace.Ishallalsotakethe opportunity to develop a counter‐argument against a thesis ad‐vanced by Serrano de Haro, who criticises Husserl’s mereologicalaccountoftheunityofconsciousnessinthe ifthLogicalInvestigation.
(a)TheStructureofPresentations
Husserl claims that “each concretely, complete, objectifying act hasthree components: its quality, itsmatter and its representative con‐tent.”(LI/ , ;HuaXIX/ , )Thequalityoftheactiswhatdeter‐mines the kind of act it is, “its general character,” as presentative,judicative, affective, etc. Thematter of the act is itsmost importantaspect because it confers referentiality to it. And its representativecontent iswhatcanbeused todiscriminatebetweenperceptionandother kinds of presentations. As Smith puts it, it is the proxy of theobjectreferredtobythematteroftheact.
First, it shouldbenoted that the relationofqualityandmatter isoneofmutualdependence.AsHusserlhimselfclaims,matterwithoutqualityisunthinkable,andviceversa.Therelationofmutualdepend‐encedoesnot,however, imply that theyare fused,because thesamemattercanbeardifferentqualities,anddifferentmatterscanbeinter‐twinedwiththesamequality.Itispossibletomakethismoreexplicitwith the following example: “A man who frames the presentationinterpretation of Smith’s accusation about the neglect of these claims in thephenomenologicaltradition.24 Agustın Serrano de Haro Martınez, Fenomenología Trascendental yOntología(Madrid: Editorial de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, ), . Mytranslation.HereafterreferredtoasFTO.SeealsoPilarFernandezBeites,“TeoríadeTodosyPartes:HusserlyZubiri,”SignosFilosó icos,vol.IX,no. (January–June
), – .
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‘ThereareintelligentbeingsonMars’framesthesamepresentationasthemanwho asserts ‘There are intelligent beings onMars,’ and thesameasthemanwhoasks‘ArethereintelligentbeingsonMars?’andthemanwhowishes ‘If only therewere intelligent beings onMars!’andsoon.”(LI/ , ‐ ;HuaXIX/ , )Asisfrequentlypointedoutintheliterature,therelationobtainedfromqualityandmatterisoneof interweaving, but not of fusion. “Interwoven” is the relation be‐tweencolourandextension,whichcanbediscernedinthemind,butnot in reality. “Fusion” is the relationbetween thepartsof a surfacewhich“ lowoneintotheother,”andcanthusbedistinguishedfromamathematical standpoint. But, what is the relation between both ofthemandtherepresentativecontent?
Thisrelationismorecomplicatedtoexplain,becausewemustac‐count for the notion of ful ilment. “Ful ilment” is the intuitivegivennessoftheobjectasitwasintended.Inotherwords,itistheactitself that combines theempty intentionwith intuition,orsensitivitywith thought.SinceHusserlusesageometricalnotionof coincidenceor overlapping—which is the extensional mereological relation ofsharingapartbetweentwoobjects(Deckung)inordertoaccountforairst combination between the intended object and the intuited ob‐ject—itispossibletothinkofthisrelationofful ilmentastopologicalinnature. Inotherwords, theintendedobjectandtheintuitedobjectmustshareat leastonepartsoas tomake the intendedobject a fullintuitionofthesameobject;otherwise,theymustbecongruent,astwogeometrical iguresplacedoneontopoftheother.WhatIamarguingis that the sharedpartbetween the intendedobject and the intuitedobject iswhat constitutes the representative content. Because it is ashared part, it is a part common to both of them; therefore it is anabstractpart,oramomentofthesynthesisofoverlapping.Becausethematteroftheactiswhatlendsitreferentiality,andbecauseitisinter‐twinedwiththequalityoftheact,weneedanotheraspectoftheacttolenditrealityoreffectiveness; inotherwords,weneedtheaspectofthe act that can tell us if there is satisfaction of referentiality of thematter.That aspect is themomentof ful ilment in itsdynamic inter‐pretation.
Becausetherepresentativecontentisalreadyamoment,doesital‐so have tobe amoment in thewhole act? I do not think so. LetmestressthatthequotationabovebelongstothesixthLogicalInvestiga‐tion, where the topic is how knowledge is possible, and Husserl’sconcern is to avoid the nightmare of lacking a good criterion withwhich todifferentiate amerepresentation fromperception,ormoretechnically, to split off perception from fantasy. Consequently, sincewecanhavea“merepresentation,”wecansaythattherepresentative
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contentisnotamomentbutapieceofthewholeact.Doesthismeanthatthe“representativecontent”isanindependentpartoftheact?No,not if by “independent part” we understand “absolute independentpart.” It is here that the theoretical ef icacy of different relationsbetweenpartsandwholesinthethirdLogicalInvestigationbeginstobefullyemployed.
Husserlconsidersthat“tobeapiece”or“tobeamoment”mustnotbe interpreted in absolute terms, because different “measures” and“distances”need tobe coveredby these formal relations.Rememberthat“pieces”(Stücke)areindependentpartsand“moments”(Momen‐te)aredependentparts.Inaddition,theyarealsoconcrete(independ‐ent) parts and abstract (dependent) parts. But, in § of the thirdLogicalInvestigation(attheendofthe irstchapter),Husserlstates:
Independencewehavesofarconceivedabsolutely,asalackofde‐pendence on all associated contents: non‐independence was itscontradictory opposite, a corresponding dependence on at leastonesuchcontent. It is,however, importantto treatbothconceptsrelativelyalso, in suchaway, that is, that theabsolutedistinctionthenbecomesalimitingcaseoftherelative.[Thestimulusforthatliesinthethingsthemselves.]Inthesphereofmeresense‐data(notthatofthethingsrepresentedorapparentinsuchsense‐data)the“moment” of visual extent, with all its parts, counts as non‐independent,butwithinthisextentconceivedinabstractoeachofitspiecescountsasrelativelyindependentwhileeachofits“moments,”e.g. the “moment” of “form” as opposed to that of position andmagnitude, counts as relatively non‐independent. (LI/ , , sen‐tence in square brackets omitted in Findlay’s translation; Hua,XIX/ , )So,ifby“independentpart”weunderstand“relativelyindependent
part,”thentherepresentativecontentisarelativelyindependentpart.But, at the same time, it is a “relatively dependent part” when weconsiderit inrelationtotheful ilmentorsynthesisofoverlapping. Itseems, then, that the structure of presentations, at this stage of thedevelopmentoftheHusserlianphenomenologyofperception,couldbemodelledinthisway:
(a)qualityandmatterareinterwoven,hencetheyaremomentsofthewholeact;(b) representative content is a piece of thewhole act, and amo‐mentoftheactofknowledge;(c)therelationbetweenqualityandmatterisessential fortheactofmerepresentation;
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(d)therelationbetweenquality,matterandrepresentativecontentisessentialfortheactofknowledge;(e)sincetherepresentativecontentisarelativelyindependentpartof thewhole act, the relationwhich combines itwith quality andmatter ismere association.Here, however, the expression “wholeact”denotes“merepresentation.”When“wholeact”denotes“actofknowledge,”therelationthatcombinestherepresentativecontentwith quality andmatter becomes interwoven through the sharedpartofthesynthesisofoverlappingincludedinthesynthesisofful‐ilment.
(b)TheFormalasFreedfromAllMaterialDomain
SerranodeHaroclaimsthatHusserlianconstituentontologycannotbeusedtoaccountforthelifeofconsciousness25byvirtueoftheperva‐sivenessof theconceptof combination (Komplexion).Theconceptofcombinationissogeneralthatitseemstobethehighestmereologicalcategory,accountingforallkindsofwholesandparts.SerranodeHarorealises that “combination” is a formal concept, meaning that it isuniversallyapplicablebecauseitiscompletelyfreedfromallmaterialdomain,justascontemporaryformallogicintendstobe.Whathe indsmorecontroversialisthattheformalconceptofcombinationdoesnotseemas easily applicable toNatorp’s concept ofpureego asHusserlseemstosupposeinhisdiscussionofNatorp.
SerranomakesastrongpointinhistreatmentofHusserl’spositionregardingtheattentionfactorinexperiences.AccordingtoSerrano:
The I as a new disjunctive content of the experience…cannot beadded, inanycase, to the intentionalessence, intuitive ful illmentandattentionfactor.Thisisprovedbythefactthatanyoftheformsof connection which determine combinations become unable toconceive the connectionwhich is expressed in the speci ic atten‐tion.BetweentheI,whichguidestheattention,andthespecialat‐tention,therecannotbeanykindofconnectiontoclaimhomogene‐ityoftheconnectedterms.Neithercantherebeafoundation,oraninterweaving,whichwouldforceustoconsideranyvariationoftheI towards thedirectionor in thedegreeof attention, just like thealterationofcomponents:suchastheappearanceofanIspeci ical‐lydifferentwithinthesamegenus.(FTO, )
25SeeSerranodeHaro,“Origendelasdi icultadesseñaladasenlaideamereológicadecomplexión,”inFTO, – .
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As faras Iunderstandhisstatement, Serrano is introducingano‐tionofanIthat istotally incompatiblewiththewholecontentoftheLogicalInvestigations.Ofcourse,Idonotimplythattheproblemisnotpresentinthetextunderscrutiny.However,letusanalyseonepossi‐bleanswertoSerranodeHarointhespiritofthe“constituentontolo‐gy”ofthethirdLogicalInvestigation.First,Idonotseehowtheatten‐tion factor cannot be introduced as another part of the whole act,being relatively independent or absolutely dependent. Serrano deHaro’spointisthat,alongwiththeattentionfactor,asubjectivefactorisintroduced,whichinlaterHusserlianphenomenologywillbecalledthe“subjectivepoleoftheintentionalray”andwillconstitutethepureego,whichHusserlproceededto investigatebetween and .What would then happen if the subjective factor introduced by theattentionfactorwerenomorethanamomentofvariationinthewholeact,andnothingelse?TheansweristhatthatsubjectivefactordoesnotgettobeanIatallbecausetherewouldbeasmanyegosasexperienc‐es to modify their attention factors. Therefore, at this point, I mustintroducewhatIbelieveisapreliminaryexplanationoftheuni icationofexperienceswithoutanypureego,andifthisstatementcanbereadasvalid, thenIwillhaveachievedafullappreciationof theeffective‐nessofformalontologyasaformaltheorythataccountsforthelifeofconsciousness.
IhaveclaimedthatthestructureofpresentationsisarticulatedasHusserlhimselfindicated,withdifferentmomentsandpiecesconnect‐edbydiverserelationsofcombination.Imustcompletetheaccountbyclaiming that in the situationof ful illment,wehavenotonlywhat Ihave described above, but also the horizons of the perceptive situa‐tion,whichpavethewayfortheinterconnectionbetweenpresentationsandexperiences.WhenIachievetheintuitiongivenbytheobjectinitsfullnessasintended,othersidesoftheobjectnotgiveninintuitionareintendedagain(internalhorizon),whileintheforeground(technical‐ly, the “externalhorizon”)appearotherobjectsnotgivenbypercep‐tion at all. In this referentiality of experiences to other experiences,they are linked to one another by relations of foundation. In otherwords,IclaimthatconsciousnessinLogicalInvestigationsisanexam‐pleofawholeina“pregnantsense,”akindofwhole inwhichallthepartsareessential.Thisimpliesmereologicalessentialism,whichIwillnotdiscusshere,yetIsupposethatSerranodeHarowouldagreewithmeonthispointand,further,thatitisbecauseitimpliesmereologicalessentialism that this view should be rejected. But I do not ind sounacceptable this conception of subjectivity as a “domain of experi‐ences”withoutanykindoflinkexceptrelationsoffoundationbetweenthem.No substance, no pure ego. I canmake this last statement be‐
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causeIlimitmyselftoregardingthatformalontologyastheobjectivecounterpart of a scienti ic theory, and I do not interpret its formalconceptsasconnectedwithanymaterialdomain.
.ATributetoRomanIngarden
I have presented Husserlian constituent formal ontology from thethirdLogicalInvestigationandIhaveappliedittotheveryHusserlianconsiderationofconsciousnessanditspartsandmomentsinthe ifthLogical Investigation.Wecansee thatabstractandconcretedetermi‐nationsare formal,whichallowsus todealwithbothof them in thelife‐world.Inthispartofmypaper,Iwanttomoveforwardandapplytheseconceptstoakindofobjectwhich,byde inition,isnotconcrete.Ifmyworkinghypothesis is valid, then Iwill be able to validate themain statementof thispresentation: formalontology is anoperativetoolinphenomenology.
IbelievethatRomanIngardenisbetterknownthanCarlStumpf,soIwillnotsaymuchabouthim.Letmejuststatethatbothofthemcanbe considered the main opponents to the transcendental turn per‐formedbyHusserlin .AsJeffMitscherlingsays:“Oneofthemostdevoted of Husserl’s students, Ingardenwas also one of the earliestopponentsofhisteacher’stranscendentalturn,andTheLiteraryWorkofArt—writtenduring the sameperiodaswasHusserl’sFormalandTranscendentalLogic(whichwaspublishedin )—isbasicallythedevelopmentofwhatwemightcalla‘realistic’stanceinoppositiontoHusserl’s theory.”26 In turn, Amie Thomasson emphasises the rele‐vanceandimportanceofIngarden’sphilosophynotonlyforaesthetics,butalsoforanontologyoftheobjectsofdailyworldsingeneral.27
Ihaveentitled this last partofmycontribution “ATribute toRo‐manIngarden”becauseitisbasedonhisspirit,yetnotsomuchonhis“letter.”However,partofhis“letter,”whichhasinspiredmywork,canbefoundinIngarden’stwopapers,“AMarginalCommentaryonAristo‐tle’sPoetics” and “AMarginalCommentaryonAristotle’sPoetics.Part
26JeffMitscherling,“RomanIngarden’s‘TheLiteraryWorkofArt’:ExpositionandAnalyses,”PhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch,vol. ,no. (March ),
– , here . Because Mitscherling applies to concrete works of art whatIngardencouldnotdo inhisseminalwork, Iconsiderthis tobeoneof themostrelevantpapersonthistopic.27SeeAmieThomasson,“RomanIngarden,”TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhiloso‐phy (Winter Edition), (ed.) Edward N. Zalta, at[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win /entries/ingarden/].
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II.”28BasedonmyreadingandinterpretationofAristotle’sPoetics29,Iwillsuggestamereologicalreadingofthemainelementsthattogethercompriseawhole,inanAristoteliansense,inthePoetics.Ofcourse,asRoman Ingarden himself claimed, “My aim here is not historical in‐quiry. It isnotmypurposetoevaluateAristotle in the lightofGreekthoughtortoconsiderhisroleinitsdevelopment,leavinghimallthewhileinaworlddistantandapartfromus.”30Asiswellknown,inhisPoetics, Aristotle identi ies six qualitative parts of the tragic poem,withoutwhichwewouldnothave thatwholewhichwe identifyasa“dramaticstructure.”31
Thereareseveralstructuringmodelswhichresult inthedifferentdramatic structures available in dramatic texts throughout theaterhistory.The irstattempttostabiliseand ixthesestructuringmodelsappearsinAristotle’sPoetics.Iwillpresentsevenproblems,whichcanbe found in the Poetics, and will then demonstrate how Husserlianconstituentontologycansolvemanyofthem,inparticular,thenatureofdramaticstructureandthemodeofcombination:
(a)Thereisaconfusionofthestructureofthedramaticworkwiththeconnectionsamongitsqualitativeparts;32(b)Thetypeofconnectiverelationbetweenthequalitativepartsofthetragedy;(c)Thepoetishewhoperceives“structuralanalogies”;
28 See Roman Ingarden, “A Marginal Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics,” TheJournalofAestheticsandArtCriticism,vol. ,no. (Winter ), – ,and“AMarginalCommentaryonAristotle’sPoetics.PartII,”TheJournalofAestheticsandArtCriticism,vol. ,no. (Spring ), – .29 Aristotle,ThePoetics ofAristotle, (tr.) StephenHalliwell (NorthWales: Duck‐worth, ).HereafterreferredtoasPA.30Ingarden,“AMarginalCommentaryofAristotle’sPoetics,” , .31Thisresearchondramaticstructureshasbeenpossiblethankstothe inancialsupport granted by Instituto Nacional de Teatro, obtained through the Project:DramaticStructures:Models,TopologyandIdeology, – ,andoftheNation‐alGrantsforResearchGroupsawardedbytheFondoNacionaldelasArtes, –
,bothinBuenosAires,Argentina.32 Aristotle uses a metaphysic matter‐form explanation scheme, which can beappliedtoallthingsandeventsinthesublunarandcelestialworld.Theso‐calledconfusionis“ours,”totheextentthatweunderstandthattheconstraintofgenreiswhatAristotlemeansbystructure,whichcanbeclassi iedastheformalpartofthedramaticwork issue in his philosophy. But the consideration of the connectionbetweenthequalitativepartsiswhat,inliteraryanddramatictradition,hasbeenlabelledasstructure.Thisconsiderationcouldbecalledformalsemanticstructure,and thus Eduardo Sinnot, the Spanish translator, refers toqualitativeparts. SeeAristotle’sPoética(BuenosAires:Colihue, ), .
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(d)Thede initionofmimesis and themimesisobject (“thosewhoact”);(e)Theassumptionoftheessentialconnectionbetweenhumanac‐tion,ethicsandrhetoric;(f)Thedisputebetweendramaticandepicpoetry, concerning theevaluationofthetypeofpoetrythatcanbestdeveloptheobjectiveof“instillingfearandcompassion”intheaudience,inordertobringaboutcatharsis,asamoralandcognitivepurge;(g)Thepreviouspointsuggeststheef icacyAristotleattributedtopoetryingeneral,whichintroducestheproblemoftherelationbe‐tweendramaticpoetryandsocietyoraudience.Ifthesesevenpointsaretakenintoaccount,itispossibletomake
outaconceptualmapofthedifferentde lectionswhichhavefocussedonthequestionofdramaticstructurethroughoutthehistoryofthea‐treandnarration.IamnotincludingalloftheproblemswithinthesepointsorwithinAristotle’sPoetics;Iassert,instead,thatthislistmustbe considered according to my purpose and my above‐mentionedtheoretical frame. Furthermore, I do not consider all of these pointshere, and Iwould likemy following statements to be interpreted asworkinghypotheses.
The irststepistoinquireabouttheontologicalnatureofthedra‐matic text inorder to specify its structure.Particularly,what typeofobjectisatextualstructure?Atthispoint,myansweristhatweshouldapplyHusserlian formal ontology,because it provides a good theoryon abstract objects as ontologically dependent on concrete objects. Imentioned earlier that the notion of ontological dependence impliesthatanobjectaonlyexistsifanobjectbexists.Inthiscase,isobjectaorobjectbthestructure?Inotherwords,istherestructurebeyondtheexistenceoftexts,oristherestructureonlybecausetherearetexts?Itisworth pointing out that the question on the ontological nature ofstructureshasbeensetasidebymost structuralist semioticians,withsome exceptions, such as Umberto Eco in The Absent Structure. Mymain working hypothesis, then, states that structures are abstractobjects that depend upon those concrete objects of which materialtextsconsist.Sincetheirappearancedependsuponahumansubjectorhumansubjectsofaparticularculture,Iunderstandthesetobearte‐facts.33
33ItcanbesaidthatmymainantecedentisAmieThomasson’sFictionandMeta‐physics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, );see,forexample,pagexi:“IntheviewIproposehere, ictionalcharactersareabstractartifacts—relevantlysimilartoentitiesasordinaryastheories, laws,governments,and literaryworks,
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This irstproblemisalsorelatedtothequestionsofunity,totalityand plurality of narrative structure.What conditionsmust an objectassemblesoastobeabletostatethatitholdsunity?Isthatunitytotalandcomplete?Isunity(ofaction,ofspace)anecessaryandsuf icientconditionforacompleteortotalobjecttobe?Notethatthisisaverycomplexissue,whosequestionsdifferentschoolshavetriedtoanswernegatively.Myparticularrelevantworkinghypothesisherestatesthat,for theBaroque and the Renaissance (Calderon de la Barca,WilliamShakespeare),totalitydoesn’tnecessarily implyunity,astheremaybeplural totalities without unity of action or space. If the problem oftotality covers the problem of limit (Which scene can be left out?Which scene is missing? Is every scene necessary? Is every actionnecessary?Cannoneof thembe left out? Isn’t oneof themmissing?Whichistheend?),thentopologycompletesthemereologicalanalysis.
Another questionworth considering concerns theaccess to thesestructures. Thus, Aristotle says in his Poetics: “By far the most im‐portantthingis facilitywithmetaphor.Thisaloneisasignofnaturalability, and something one can never learn from another: for thesuccessful use of metaphor entails the perception of similarities.”( a – ;PA, ).Myworkinghypothesisstatesthatifitispossibletoperceiveaformalpropertyoftheobjects,suchasresemblance,thenit becomes a subject for the theory of categorical perception or thetheoryofabstractobjects.34Likewise, thewriterperceives thestruc‐ture from the relation between concepts and percepts35, and that iswhatthephrase“theimageasksfor/rulesstructure(notthewriter)”meanstous.
Another point Iwant tomake concerns the necessary literary orextra‐scenicnatureofthewrittendramaticproduction.Thisisanotherway of approaching the problem of typology of structures: Is theandtetheredtotheeverydayworldaroundusbydependenciesonbooks,readers,andauthors.”For theartefactual theoryofart,seeRistoHilpinen, “Artifact,”TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy (Fall Edition), (ed.)EdwardN.Zalta, at[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives /fall /entries/artifact/]. A discussion ofthis ontological point of view was applied to the object “staging” by HoracioBanega and Federico Penelas at a roundtable titled Aproximaciones ontológico‐semánticasalhecho teatral (“Ontological‐semantic Approaches to the TheatricalEvent”),“Elobjetopuesta‐en‐escenaysuspartespropias:unanálisisexploratorio,”heldattheXIIICongresoNacionaldeFiloso ía,Rosario,Argentina, – Novem‐ber .34 See Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band. Zweiter Teil.Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntniss, (ed.) UrsulaPanzer(TheHague:MartinusNijhoff, ).35We regard “concepts” as the linguistic categorisation thatapplies to sensorialandsensitivematerial(andwecallthismaterial“percepts”).
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structureofanoveldifferentfromadramaticstructure?Isadramaticpiece different from a poem? Is the structure of a dramatic piecedifferent from that of amusical piece?Does the hypertext, as a con‐temporary phenomenon, have any positive relation to the dramaticstructure?IbelieveAristotleexhibitedsomedoubtabouttheprimacyof tragic poetry over epic, regarding the objectives ascribed to theconsumptionofnarrationsorart,asifhewereaheadoftheappearanceofthenovelandthecinema.Thispointforcesmetoasserttheneces‐saryliteraryorextra‐scenicnatureofwrittendramaticproduction.
Iallowmyselftodoubtthenecessaryandeternalexistenceofthea‐tre,asweknow it.Therefore, thisworkinghypothesisstates that thedramatictextisaliterarytextand,apartfromnovelsandcinema,themultiplenotionsofhypertext,whichhavebeen fuelledby theboomofthe Internet,willallow theexpansionof the conceptsofdramatic textand scenic practice.36 Thus, in this way, I believe Husserlian formalontologycanhelpmetodesignatheoryoftheobjectsofthelife‐worldinadirectmanner.
.Conclusions
I intended to show that formal ontology is a formal theory thatper‐vadestheworkcarriedoutbyStumpfandHusserl,andthat itcanbeapplied to domains pioneered by Ingarden. What can be inferredabout the relation between this formal theory and phenomenologyitself?
In the last few years, certain problematic statements associatedwith that relation have appeared. In his latest published book, ThePhilosophyofEdmundHusserl.AHistoricalDevelopment,J.N.Mohanty,in a section quite related to what I analysed above in ifth LogicalInvestigation,claimsthat“in ,HusserlhadanobjectiveconceptoftheI.TheIisanempiricalthinglikeotherthings.Likeotherthings,it
36Thede initionofdramaticworkasan“embryonicnovel,”anditsconsequentofbearing an essential relation with narrative, is Ricardo Monti’s, who basicallydrawson certainAristotelianandHegelianconsiderations; seeMonti, “El teatro,unespacio literario,”EspaciodeCríticaeInvestigaciónTeatral,vol. ,no. (April
).MauricioKartunrede inesitas“bonsainovel.”Regardingthepossibilityofdramaticproductionbeing connectedwithpoetry, thuschallenging thepreviousde inition, see Luis Cano, [http://www.autores.org.ar/lcano/lcano/Identikit/obras.htm] and Alejandro Tantanian, [http://www.autores.org.ar/atantanian/obras/obras.htm]. For hypertext and its relation with Aristotle’s Poetics, seePamela Jennings, “Narrative Structures for New Media: Towards a New De ini‐tion,”Leonardo,vol. ,no. ( ), – .
FormalOntology
isawholeconsistingofparts.Hisapplicationofthewhole‐partcatego‐rytotheIisregardedbymanyasanunexpressedpresuppositionofthistheory.”37Mohantydoesnotsayanythingelseaboutthis“unexpressedpresupposition”ofHusserl’stheory.
DanielSchmickingexpressestheviewclosesttotheoneIhavein‐tendedtoestablishhere.Asheexplains:
Contrarytoof icialassertions, inHusserl’sphenomenology,whichisDennett’smain target, there is, for instance, a theory of formalontology presupposed by Husserl’s descriptions and analyses,which certainly is no case of spontaneous or provisional theoriz‐ing.…Iproposetolumpthesestepstogetherintoonetool:the in‐vestigationof invariantstructuresandtheirrelationships.Thistoolis in turndependent on another tool, formal ontology,which is apure theoretic component of phenomenology. The importance ofpart‐wholerelationsandofformalcategoriesanddependenciesingeneralhasbeenwidelyunderratedorneglectedinphenomenolo‐gy (for instance, Husserl’s texts teem with “foundation” [Fun‐dierung] and “[real] moment” [das (reelle) Moment], the lattersometimesmistakenlyrenderedas“instant”).38Ifitwereacknowledgedthatformalontologydeterminesphenom‐
enology, then itwouldbepossible togiveamoreprecise accountofthemathematical structuresunderlying the formal theoryandof therelationshipwiththemorphologicalessencesdescribedbyphenome‐nology. If it is acknowledged that formal ontology is the objectivecounterpartofthetheoryofobjectsofthelife‐world,andthatErlebnisbelongsassuchtothatsameworld, then itwillbepossible toassessthe adequacy of phenomenological descriptions for those same ob‐jects.But,muchmoreproblematic,whatwouldhappenifweweretogettothelimitofourlearnedphenomenologyandbegintothinkthatthis encounter (Erfahrung) is already structuredby part‐whole rela‐tions?Asanalytical‐mindedphilosophers tellus, since theBigDividecame to being, it could be that there is nothing similar to a pre‐predicative encounter. I do not believe that this statement implies a
37J.N.Mohanty,ThePhilosophyofEdmundHusserl.AHistoricalDevelopment(NewHaven: Yale University Press, ), (italics mine). In a footnote, Mohantyadds: “Cramer made these points in his Gottingen lectures of (author’snotes).”38DanielSchmicking,“AToolboxofPhenomenologicalMethods,” inHandbookofPhenomenologyandCognitiveScience, (ed.)S.GallagherandD.Schmicking (Dor‐drecht:Springer, ), – ,here and .
