freedom of religion digests

8/19/2019 Freedom of Religion Digests

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FREEDOM OF RELIGION

#KANYE2020 #YEEZUS #LISTENTOTHEKIDSBRO

Case Title Facts Issue Ruling

Aglipay v. RuizG.R. No. 45459

Barambangan

Petitioner: Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church

Respondent: Juan Ruiz, Director of Posts

In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church.

The petitioner, in the fulfilment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, a member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President. In spite of the protest of the petitioner’s attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold although

the greater part remained unsold.

The further sale was sought to be prevented by the petitioner. He alleged that the provisions of Section 23, Subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution were violated in the issuance and selling of the commemorative postage stamps. It was provided therein that, ‘No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.’

Is theissuance ofstamps inviolation of the

principle ofseparation ofc hurch an dstate?

No.

Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate, is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in

human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. Insofar as it instils into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.

When the Filipino people, in the preamble of the Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in

human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.

There has been no constitutional infraction in this case. Act No. 4052 granted the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Sec. of Public Works and Communications, discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs. Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question, still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act

assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition. The court resolved to deny the petition for a writ of prohibition.

Garces v. EstenzoG.R. No. L-53487

Cabalang

PET: ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAO OSMEÑA, NICETAS DAGAR and JESUS EDULLANTESRES: HON.. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO

1. On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5: Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every Fifth day of April of the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia. Reso #5 provided for:

(1) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and(2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay

projects

WON theResolutionsviolated the

Consti.provision onFreedom of

Religion

That contention is glaringly devoid of merit.

The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular matter .

The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor


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2. On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution

No. 6 which specified that, in accordance with the practice in Eastern Leyte, Councilman Tomas Cabatingan, the Chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta, would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor as chairman of the next feast day.

3. Funds were raised by means of solicitations and cash donations of the barangay residents and those of the neighboring places of Valencia.

4. On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic church of Barangay Valencia. A controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return that image to the barangay council on the pretext that it was the property of the church.

5. Father Osmeña allegedly uttered defamatory remarks against the barangay captain, Manuel C. Veloso, apparently in connection with the disputed image. That incident provoked

Veloso to file against Father Osmeña. Father Osmeña retaliated by filing administrative complaints against Veloso with the city mayor's office and the Department of Local Government and Community Development on the grounds of immorality, grave abuse of authority.

PET CONTENDS: that the resolutions contravene the constitutional provisions that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion" and that "no public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, xxx”

interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents.

The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of thewooden image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoringthe Catholic church. A more practical reason for that arrangementwould be that the image, if placed in a layman's custody, couldeasily be made available to any family desiring to borrow theimage in connection with prayers and novenas.

There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmeña claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to determine who should have custody thereof.

Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state.

Everson v. Board

of Education

Daria

The Petitioner in his status as a taxpayer filed suit challenging the

ability of the Respondent to reimburse funds to parents of parochialschool students for the transportation of their children to and fromschool.

The Petitioner brought suit alleging that the New Jerseyreimbursement statute respects the establishment of religion, byallowing the parents of parochial school students to benefit from thereimbursement scheme.

The New Jersey Court of Appeals held that the statute did notviolate the Constitution and the Supreme Court of the United States(Supreme Court) granted certiorari to consider the issue.

Won the

statute isconstitutional

In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme

Court found the statute was constitutional because it was designedto provide a benefit to the parents of all school children, distinctfrom any religious function in which the children engaged.

Engel v. Vitale Steven I. Engel,

et al. v. William J. Vitale, Jr., et al.' whether or notthe prayer was Yes.


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Datuin The respondent Board of Education of Union Free School DistrictNo. 9, New Hyde Park, New York, acting in its official capacityunder state law, directed the School District's principal to cause thefollowing prayer to be said aloud by each class in the presence of ateacher at the beginning of each school day:

"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, andwe beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and ourCountry."

This daily procedure was adopted on the recommendation of theState Board of Regents, a governmental agency created by theState Constitution to which the New York Legislature has grantedbroad supervisory, executive, andlegislative powers over the State's public school system.Thesestate officials composed the prayer which they recommended andpublished as a part of their "Statement on Moral and SpiritualTraining in the Schools," saying:

"We believe that this Statement will be subscribed to by all men andwomen of good will, and we call upon all of them to aid in giving lifeto our program."

Shortly after the practice of reciting the Regents' prayer wasadopted by the School District, the parents of ten pupils brought thisaction in a New York State Court insisting that use of this officialprayer in the public schools was contrary to the beliefs, religions, orreligious practices of both themselves and their children. Amongother things, these parents challenged the constitutionality of boththe state law authorizing the School District to direct the use ofprayer in public schools and the School District's regulation orderingthe recitation of this particular prayer on the ground that theseactions of official governmental agencies violate that part of theFirst Amendment of the Federal Constitution which commands that"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion" -- a command which was "made applicable to the State ofNew York by the Fourteenth Amendment of the said Constitution."The New York Court of Appeals, over the dissents of Judges Dyeand Fuld, sustained an order of the lower state courts which hadupheld the power of New York to use the Regents' prayer as a partof the daily procedures of its public schools so long as the schoolsdid not compel any pupil to join in the prayer over his or his parents'objection.

violative of the1stamendmentand 14thamendment?

Amendment ICongress shall make no law respecting an establishment ofreligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging thefreedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the peoplepeaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for aredress of grievances.

Rationale:

1.The New York's program of daily classroom invocation of God'sblessings as prescribed in the Regents' prayer is a religiousactivity. It is a solemn avowal of divine faith and supplication forthe blessings of the Almighty.

2.It is a violation of the Establishment Clause because that prayerwas composed by governmental officials as a part of agovernmental program to further religious beliefs. Thus, itbreaches the constitutional wall of separation between Church andState. We think that the constitutional prohibition against lawsrespecting an establishment of religion must at least mean that, inthis country, it is no part of the business of government tocompose official prayers for any group of the American people to

recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government. Itis a matter of history that this very practice of establishinggovernmentally composed prayers for religious services was oneof the reasons which caused many of our early colonists to leaveEngland and seek religious freedom in America

3.By the time of the adoption of the Constitution, our history showsthat there was a widespread awareness among many Americansof the dangers of a union of Church and State. These peopleknew, some of them from bitter personal experience, that one ofthe greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual to worship inhis own way lay in the Government's placing its official stamp ofapproval upon one particular kind of prayer or one particular form

of religious services. They knew the anguish, hardship and bitterstrife that could come when zealous religious groups struggledwith one another to obtain the Government's stamp of approvalfrom each King, Queen, or Protector that came to temporarypower. The Constitution was intended to avert a part of this dangerby leaving the government of this country in the hands of thepeople, rather than in the hands of any monarch. But thissafeguard was not enough. Our Founders were no more willing tolet the content of their prayers and their privilege of prayingwhenever they pleased be influenced by the ballot box than theywere to let these vital matters of personal conscience depend uponthe succession of monarchs. The First Amendment was added tothe Constitution to stand as a guarantee that neither the power nor

the prestige of the Federal Government would be used to control,support or influence the kinds of prayer the American people can


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say that the people's religions must not be subjected to thepressures of government for change each time a new politicaladministration is elected to office.

4. When the power, prestige and financial support ofgovernment is placed behind a particular religious belief, theindirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities toconform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain. But the purposes underlying the Establishment Clause go much

further than that. Its first and most immediate purpose restedon the belief that a union of government and religion tends todestroy government and to degrade religion. The history ofgovernmentally established religion, both in England and in thiscountry, showed that whenever government had allied itself withone particular form of religion, the inevitable result had been that ithad incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of thosewho held contrary beliefs. That same history showed that manypeople had lost their respect for any religion that had relied uponthe support of government to spread its faith. The EstablishmentClause thus stands as an expression of principle on the part of theFounders of our Constitution that religion is too personal, toosacred, too holy, to permit its "unhallowed perversion" by a civil

magistrate. Another purpose of the Establishment Clause restedupon an awareness of the historical fact that governmentallyestablished religions and religious persecutions go hand in hand

5.It is true that New York's establishment of its Regents' prayer asan officially approved religious doctrine of that State does notamount to a total establishment of one particular religious sect tothe exclusion of all others -- that, indeed, the governmentalendorsement of that prayer seems relatively insignificant whencompared to the governmental encroachments upon religion whichwere commonplace 200 years ago. To those who may subscribeto the view that, because the Regents' official prayer is so brief andgeneral there can be no danger to religious freedom in its

governmental establishment, however, it may be appropriate tosay in the words of James Madison, the author of the First

Amendment:"[I]t is proper to take alarm at the first experiment onour liberties. . . . Who does not see that the same authority whichcan establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, mayestablish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, inexclusion of all other Sects? That the same authority which canforce a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for thesupport of any one establishment may force him to conform to anyother establishment in all cases whatsoever?The judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York is reversed,and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistentwith this opinion.

Abington v. 1. The appellees Edward Lewis Schempp, his wife Sidney, Whether or not YES.


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Schempp

De Veyra

and their children, Roger Ellory and Donna, are of the Unitarian faith, and are members of the Unitarian Church in Germantown, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where they, regularly attend religious services.

2. Spouses’ children attend a public school (Abington Senior High School) in the School District of Abington Township, appellant herein.

1.

3. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, by law,

24 Pa.Stat. § 15-1516, as amended, Pub.Law 1928 (Supp. 1960) Dec. 17, 1959, requires that:

At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day.

Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the written request of his parent or guardian.

4. Pursuant thereto, on each school day at the Abington Senior High School between 8:15 and 8:30 a.m. at least 10 verses from the Holy Bible are read followed by the recitation of the Lord’s prayer

For purposes of explanation if asked by sir:While the pupils are attending their home rooms or advisory sections, opening exercises are conducted pursuant to the statute. The exercises are broadcast into each room in the school building through an intercommunications system, and are conducted under the supervision of a teacher by students attending the school's radio and television workshop. Selected students from this course gather each morning in the school's workshop studio for the exercises, which include readings by one of the students of 10 verses of the Holy Bible, broadcast to each room in the building. This is followed by the recitation of the Lord's Prayer, likewise over the intercommunications system, but also by the students in the

various classrooms, who are asked to stand and join in repeating the prayer in unison. The exercises are closed with the flag salute and such pertinent announcements as are of interest to the students. Participation in the opening exercises, as directed by the statute, is voluntary. The student reading the verses from the Bible may select the passages and read from any version he chooses, although the only copies furnished by the school are the King James version, copies of which were circulated to each teacher by the school district. During the period in which the exercises have been conducted, the King James, the Douay, and the Revised Standard versions of the Bible have been used, as well as the Jewish Holy Scriptures. There are no prefatory statements, no questions asked or solicited, no comments or explanations made,

and no interpretations given at or during the exercises. The students and parents are advised that the student may absent

2 4 Pa.StatSection15-1516, asamended isviolative of the Constitution.

The government is neutral, and, while protecting all, it prefers none, and it disparages none.

First , this Court has decisively settled that the First Amendment's mandate that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" has been made wholly applicable to the States by the Fourteenth

Amendment. Second , this Court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids only governmental preference of one religion over another.

Almost 20 years ago in Everson, supra, at 15, the Court said that:“[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a

church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. The First

Amendment's purpose was not to strike merely at the official establishment of a single sect, creed or religion, outlawing only a formal relation such as had prevailed in England and some of the colonies. Necessarily, it was to uproot all such relationships. But the object was broader than separating church and state in this narrow sense. It was to create a complete and permanent

separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion.”

Furthermore, The interrelationship of the Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses was first touched upon by Mr. Justice Roberts for the Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, at 303-304, where it was said that their "inhibition of legislation" hada double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law

of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it

safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the Amendment embraces two concepts -- freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.

As a matter of fact,a half dozen years later in Everson v. Board of Education, supra, at 14-15, this Court, through MR. JUSTICE BLACK, stated that the "scope of the First Amendment . . . was designed forever to suppress" the establishment of religion or the prohibition of the free exercise thereof. In short, the Court held that the Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and nonbelievers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to

be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.


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himself from the classroom or, should he elect to remain, not participate in the exercises.

5. The Schempp family, husband and wife and two of their three children, brought suit to enjoin enforcement of the statute, contending that their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (Establishment Clause) are, have been, and will continue to be, violated unless this statute be declared unconstitutional as violative of these provisions

of the First Amendment. They testified as to specific religious doctrines purveyed by a literal reading of the Bible "which were contrary to the religious beliefs which they held, and to their familial teaching."

The Court repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person "to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion." Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against nonbelievers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs.

In the case at bar, the religious character of the exercises is undeniable. Given that finding, the exercises and the law requiring them are in violation of the Establishment Clause. But even if its purpose is not strictly religious, it is sought to be accomplished through readings, without comment, from the Bible. Surely the place of the Bible as an instrument of religion cannot be gainsaid, and the State's recognition of the pervading religious character of the ceremony is evident from the rule's specific permission of the alternative use of the Catholic Douay version, as well as the recent amendment permitting nonattendance at the exercises.

Tudor v. Board ofEducation

Javier

Petitioner: Bernard TudorRespondent: Board of Education of the Borough of RutherfordPonente: Vanderbilt

The Gideons International is a nonprofit corporation organizedunder the laws of the State of Illinois, whose object is “to win menand women for the Lord Jesus Christ through placing the BibleGod’s Holy words or portions in hotels, hospitals, schools,institutions, and also through the distribution of same for personaluse.

Prior the distribution of the books the present action wascommenced seeking the validity of the distrubution under the

Fedeal and NJ Consti and seeking injunction against it. The trial judge granted a temporary injunction restraining the board ofeducation from carrying out the terms of its resolution until furtherdetermination of the action. After a full hearing the trial judge favorthe Gideons and vacated the restraint and stay. However, the stayhas been continued pending appeal.

Bernard Tudor, jewish and Ralph LEcoque, Catholic, each being aNJ citizen and taxpayer and a parent of a pupil in a Rutherfordpublic school contends that the Gideon Bible is about Protestantfaith, which violates the principles of Judaism and Catholicism.

WONdistributingGideon Biblesviolates theConstitution

The defendant board of education is accused of showing apreference by permitting the distribution of the King James versionof the New Testament, which is unacceptable to those of theJewish faith and, in fact, in conflict with their tenets. This violatesthe mandate of the First Amendment, as incorporated into theFourteenth Amendment, prohibiting the making of any law"respecting an establishment of religion," and the requirement of

Article I, paragraph 4 of the New Jersey Constitution that "thereshall be no establishment of one religious sect, in preference toanother." By its very terms the New Jersey constitutional provisionprohibits any such religious preference.

The state or any instrumentality thereof cannot under anycircumstances show a preference for one religion over another.Such favoritism cannot be tolerated and must be disapproved as aclear violation of the Bill of Rights of our Constitutions.

Gerona v.

Secretary ofEducation

The respondents-appellees (Secretary of Education, et al.) have

banned the children of the petitioners and all other of Jehovah’sWitnesses from admission to public schools, particularly the

Whether or not

there was aviolation of the

No, there was no violation of the said constitutional provisions.

Freedom to believe is limitless and bounded only by one’s


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G.R. No. L-13954

Pojas

Buenavista Community School, or preventing their return in theschool if already banned, solely on account of their refusal to salutethe flag.

This case is an appeal by the petitioners-appellants from thedecision of the Court of First Instance of Masbate, which dismissedtheir appeal.

On June 2, 1955, RA 1265 (An Act making Flag Ceremony

Compulsary in all Educational Institutions) was approved. Section 2thereof authorizes the Secretary of Education to issue rules andregulations regarding the proper conduct of a flag ceremony. Forthat purpose, Department Order No. 8 was issued by the Secretary.

The Director of Public Schools issued Circular No. 22 addressed tothe Division Superintendent of Schools enclosing a copy ofDepartment Order No. 8 for strict compliance.

Petitioners' children attending the Buenavista Community School,Uson, Masbate, refused to salute the flag, sing the national anthemand recite the patriotic pledge contrary to the requirement ofDepartment Order No. 8; as a result they were expelled from school

sometime in September, 1955. It is said that other children similarlysituated who refused or failed to comply with the requirement aboutsaluting the flag are under threats of being also expelled from allpublic schools in the Philippines.

Petitioners thru counsel wrote to the Secretary of Educationpetitioning that in the implementation of this flag ceremony, theyand their children attending school be allowed to remain silent andstand at attention with their arms and hands down and straight atthe sides and that they be exempted from executing the formalsalute, singing of the National Anthem and the reciting of thepatriotic pledge

The Secretary of Education denied the petition and that nofavorable action may be done in for the reinstatement of theexpelled students.

Petitioners do not question the constitutionality of RA 1265. Theyonly question the constitutionality of Department Order No. 8.

Petitioners contend that the act is against their religious beliefs."Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likenessof anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath,or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow downthyself to them, nor serve them." They consider that the flag is an"image within this command. For this reason they refuse to salute it.

Constitutionalprovision onfreedom ofreligion andexercise ofreligion.

imagination. However, the exercise of beliefs is not absolute.If theexercise of said religious belief clashes with the establishedinstitutions of society and with the law, then the former must yieldand give way to the latter. The Government steps in and eitherrestrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it.

The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration;rather it is symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, ofsovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that

the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act andprofession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to thefatherland which the flag stands for.


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Ebralinag v. TheDivision

SuperintendentG.R. No. 95770

Barambangan

Petitioner: Roel Ebralinag, et. al.

Respondent: The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu

In G.R. No. 95770 "Roel Ebralinag, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Manuel F. Biongcog, Cebu District Supervisor," the petitioners are 43 high school and elementary school students in several towns of in Cebu province.

All minors, they are assisted by their parents who belong to the

religious group known as Jehovah's Witness. This is a consolidated petition.

All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by DO No. 8 of the DECS making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions

In G.R. No. 95887, "May Amolo, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Antonio A. Sangutan," the petitioners are 25 high school and grade school students enrolled in public schools

in Asturias, Cebu, whose parents are Jehovah's Witnesses. Both petitions were prepared by the same counsel, Attorney Felino M. Ganal.

The Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion’ only given to God.They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control

In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses, and enrolled in various public and private schools, who refused to sing the Philippine national anthem, salute the Philippine flag and recite the patriotic pledge.

The students and their parents filed these special civil actions for Mandamus

,Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that the public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion — (1) in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to free public education, and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship

Is theexpulsionvalid?

No.

The court upheld the petitioners' right under the Constitution to refuse to salute the Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs. Religious freedom as a fundamental right deserving the "highest priority and amplest protection among human rights. It reversed the expulsion orders made by the public respondents therein as violative of both the free exercise of religion clause and the right of citizens to education under the 1987 Constitution.

Although the Court upholds in this decision nevertheless, that another foreign invasion of our country will not be necessary in order for our countrymen to appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag.


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The Court issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordered to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders.

German v.Barangan

G.R. No. L-68828

Cabalang

PET: RELI GERMAN, RAMON PEDROSA, TIRSO SANTILLAN, ET AL.RES: GEN. SANTIAGO BARANGAN and MA. JOR ISABELOLARIOSA

1. At about 5:00 in the afternoon of October 2, 1984, petitioners, composed of about 50 businessmen, students and office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the ostensible purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang grounds located in the same street.

2. Wearing the now familiar inscribed yellow T-shirts, they started to march down said street with raised clenched fists and shouts of anti-government invectives

3. Along the way, however, they were barred by respondent Major

lsabelo Lariosa, upon orders of his superior and co-respondent Gen. Santiago Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the ground that St. Jude Chapel was located within the Malacañang security area.

4. However, because of the alleged warning given them by respondent Major Lariosa that any similar attempt by petitioners to enter the church in the future would likewise be prevented, petitioners took this present recourse.

PET alleged purpose in converging at J.P. Laurel Street was to pray and hear mass at St. Jude church.

RES assured petitioners and the Court that they have never restricted, and will never restrict, any person or persons from entering and worshipping at said church. They maintain, however, that petitioner's' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship, but to conduct an anti-government demonstration at a place close to the very residence and offices of the President of the Republic

WONpetitioner’s

right toreligious

freedom wasviolated

The foregoing cannot but cast serious doubts on the sincerity and good faith of petitioners in invoking the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious worship and of locomotion.

While it is beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable right to religious freedom, the exercise thereof, and of all fundamental rights for that matter, must be done in good faith.

Even assuming that petitioners' claim to the free exercise of religion is genuine and valid, still respondent's reaction to the mass action may not be characterized as violative of the freedom of religious worship.★ The reasonableness of this restriction is readily perceived

and appreciated if it is considered that the same is designed to protect the lives of the President and his family, as well as other government officials, diplomats and foreign guests transacting business with

Malacañang. The need to secure the safety of heads of state and other government officials cannot be overemphasized. The same having been established in the interest of national security.

In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action.

American BibleSociety v. City of

ManilaG.R. No. L-9637

Daria

American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit,religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing businessin the Philippines through its Philippine agency established inManila in November, 1898

City of Manila is a municipal corporation with powers that areto be exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No.

WON ABS isliable to paytax fordistributingand sellinh

bibles

No9Under Sec. 1 of Ordinance 3000, one of the ordinance in

question, person or entity engaged in any of the business, tradesor occupation enumerated under Sec. 3 must obtain a Mayor’spermit and license from the City Treasurer. American Bible

Society’s business is not among those enumerated∙ However, item 79 of Sec. 3 of the Ordinance provides that


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409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila

American Bible Society has been distributing and sellingbibles and/or gospel portions throughout the Philippines andtranslating the same into several Philippine dialect

City Treasurer of Manila informed American Bible Society that itwas violating several Ordinances for operating without thenecessary permit and license, thereby requiring the corporation to

secure the permit and license fees covering the period from 4Q1945-2Q 1953

To avoid closing of its business, American Bible Society paidthe City of Manila its permit and license fees under protest

American Bible filed a complaint, questioning the constitutionalityand legality of the Ordinances 2529 and 3000, and prayed for arefund of the payment made to the City of Manila. They contended:a. They had been in the Philippines since 1899 and were notrequired to pay any license fee or sales taxb. it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles∙ City of Manila prayed that the complaint be dismissed,

reiterating the constitutionality of the Ordinances in question∙ Trial Court dismissed the complaint∙ American Bible Society appealed to the Court of Appeals

all other businesses, trade or occupation not mentioned, exceptthose upon which the City is not empowered to license or to taxP5.00∙ Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to dependupon the power of the City to license or tax said business, trade oroccupation.∙ 2 provisions of law that may have bearing on this case:a. Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code, theMunicipal Board of the City of Manila is empowered to tax and fix

the license fees on retail dealers engaged in the sale of booksb. Sec. 18(o) of RA 409: to tax and fix the license fee ondealers in general merchandise, including importers and indentors,except those dealers who may be expressly subject to thepayment of some other municipal tax. Further, Dealers in generalmerchandise shall be classified as (a) wholesale dealers and (b)retail dealers. For purposes of the tax on retail dealers, generalmerchandise shall be classified into four main classes: namely (1)luxury articles, (2) semi-luxury articles, (3) essential commodities,and (4) miscellaneous articles. A separate license shall beprescribed for each class but where commodities of differentclasses are sold in the same establishment, it shall not becompulsory for the owner to secure more than one license if he

pays the higher or highest rate of tax prescribed by ordinance.Wholesale dealers shall pay the license tax as such, as may beprovided by ordinance∙ The only difference between the 2 provisions is the limitationas to the amount of tax or license fee that a retail dealer has to payper annum

Under Sec. 27(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 or the NationalInternal Revenue Code, Corporations or associations organizedand operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . oreducational purposes, . . .: Provided, however, That the income ofwhatever kind and character from any of its properties, real orpersonal, or from any activity conducted for profit, regardless of the

disposition made of such income, shall be liable to the tax imposedunder this Code shall not be taxed∙ The price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphletswas in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of thesame but this cannot mean that American Bible Society wasengaged in the business or occupation of selling said"merchandise" for profit∙ Therefore, the Ordinance cannot be applied for in doing so itwould impair American Bible Society’s free exercise andenjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as itsrights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

Iglesia ni Cristo v.

Court of AppealsG.R. No. 119673

IGLESIA NI CRISTO (INC.), petitioner, vs . THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS, BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTIONPICTURES AND TELEVISION and HONORABLE HENRIETTA S.

Whether or not

Board has jurisdiction to

1. Y es

2 fold aspects of religious profession and worship namely

:


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Datuin

MENDEZ,

Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization,has a television program entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo aired onChannel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. Theprogram presents and propagates petitioners religious beliefs,doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies withother religions. Sometime in the months of September, October andNovember 1992, petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of

Review for Motion Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TVprogram Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classifiedthe series as X or not for public viewing on the ground that theyoffend and constitute an attack against other religions which isexpressly prohibited by law. Petitioner pursued two (2) courses ofaction against the respondent Board. On November 28, 1992, itappealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TVSeries No. 128. It succeeded in its appeal for on December 18,1992, the Office of the President reversed the decision of therespondent Board. Forthwith, the Board allowed Series No. 128 tobe publicly telecast.On December 14, 1992, petitioner also filedagainst the respondent Board Civil Petitioner alleged that therespondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of

discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TVprogram and in x-rating them.The records show that the respondent Board disallowed theprogram series for attacking other religions. Thus, Exhibits A, A-1,(respondent Boards Voting Slip for Television) reveal that itsreviewing members x-rated Series 115 for x x x criticizing differentreligions, based on their own interpretation of the Bible. Theysuggested that the program should only explain petitioners x x xown faith and beliefs and avoid attacks on other faiths. Exhibit Bshows that Series No. 119 was x-rated because the Iglesia ni Cristoinsists on the literal translation of the bible and says that ourCatholic veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condonedbecause nowhere it is found in the bible that we should do so. This

is intolerance x x x. Exhibit C shows that Series No. 121 wasx-rated x x x for reasons of the attacks, they do on, specifically, theCatholic religion. x x x (T)hey can not tell, dictate any other religionthat they are right and the rest are wrong x x x. Exhibit D alsoshows that Series No. 128 was not favorably recommendedbecause it x x x outrages Catholic and Protestants beliefs. Onsecond review, it was x-rated because of its unbalancedinterpretations of some parts of the Bible. [18] In sum, therespondent Board x-rated petitioners TV program series Nos. 115,119, 121 and 128 because of petitioners controversial biblicalinterpretations and its attacks against contrary religious beliefs. Therespondent appellate court agreed and even held that the saidattacks are indecent, contrary to law and good customs.

review/hearcase of INC?

Whether or nottherespondentBoardgravelyabuse its

discretionwhen it

prohibited theairing of

petitioner’sreligious

program.?

1. Freedom to believe (absolute)2. Freedom to act on one’s belief – where an individual

externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions affecting thepublic, this freedom to do so becomes subject to theregulation authority of the state.

We thus reject petitioner’s postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the respondent Board. Its publicbroadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom

of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even theeyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that theexercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when itwill bring about the clear and present danger of some substantiveevil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i .e., seriousdetriment to the more overriding interest of public health, publicmorals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise ofreligion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counselsthe Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues tobe a volatile area of concern in our country today. Across the seaand in our shore, the bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by menwere caused by irreconcilable religious differences. Our country isstill not safe from the recurrence of this stultifying strife considering

our warring religious beliefs and the fanaticism with which some ofus cling and claw to these beliefs. For sure, we shall continue tosubject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religionto a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exerciseto the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and itsexercise destroys, the State should not stand still

2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program.

[A] ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it

fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.

The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for “attacking” either religions, especially the Catholic Church. An examination of the evidence . . . will show that the so-called “attacks” are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. xxx.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/119673.htm#_edn18


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The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. . . In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State where there ought to be no difference between the

appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology

. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of duelling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.

In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. In American Bible Society v

. City of Manila, this Court held: “The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious

information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and present danger

of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.” In Victoriano vs

. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further ruled that “. . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger

.”

The records show that the decision of the respondent Board,affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft offindings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video

tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion.There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes willbring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatenedharm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannotbe justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of asubstantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a realityalready on ground .

People v. Lagmanand Zosa

De Veyra

1. Appellants Tranquilino and Primitivo de Sosa are chargedwith a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1,known as the National Defense Law.2. These two appellants, being Filipinos and having reachedthe age of twenty years in 1936, wilfully and unlawfully refusedto register in the military service between the 1st and 7th ofApril of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been

Whether or notC.A. No. 1 isunconstitutional.

NO.

The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsorymilitary service, does not go against this constitutional provisionbut is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty ofthe Government to defend the State cannot be performed exceptthrough an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of


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required to do so.3. It appears that, notwithstanding that both were duly notifiedby the corresponding authorities to appear before the AcceptanceBoard in order to register for military service in accordance with law,and that the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had notregistered up to the date of the filing of the information.4. In defense, they allege that they have not registered in themilitary service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has amother and a brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino

Lagman also has a father to support, has no military learnings, anddoes not wish to kill or be killed.5. Both impugn the validity of the National Defense Law, underwhich the accused were sentenced, on the ground that it isunconstitutional. Section 2, Article II of the Constitution of thePhilippines provides as follows:SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of government,and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by lawto render personal military or civil service.6. Court of First Instance sentenced the appelants to one monthand one day of imprisonment, with the costs. Hence, this appeal.

the citizens would be to make this duty of the Governmentexcusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer toenlist therein. The right of the Government to require compulsorymilitary service is a consequence of its duty to defend the Stateand is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, andproperty of the citizen. It was said that, without violating theConstitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be,against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even againsthis religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of

the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down inits defense.

The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families tosupport does not excuse them from their duty to presentthemselves before the Acceptance Board because, if suchcircumstance exists, they can ask for determent in complying withtheir duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniaryallowance to attend to these family responsibilities

Thus, C.A. No. 1 is constitutional.

In re: Summers

javier

Petitioner: Clyde Owen Summers

Ponente: Justice Reed

Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari to review the action of the SC ofIllinois in denying petitioner’s prayer for admission to the practice oflaw in that state. It was alleged that the denial was on the soleground that he is a conscientious objector to war. Petitionerchallenges here the right of the SC to exclude him from the barunder the due process clause.

It appears that Summers has complied with all prerequisites foradmission to the bar of Illinois except that he has not obtained thecertificate of the Committee on Character and Fitness. Justicesanswered that such allegations was not true because assuming

there was a controversy, petitioner was not barred because of hisreligions, but because of his nability to take such oath, the jucticessubmit, shows that the Committee properly refused to certify to hismoral character and moral fitness to be an officer of the court,charged with the administration of justice under the Illinois law. Hisgood citizenship, they think, judged by the standards required forpracticing law in Illinois, is not satisfactorily shown.

Petitioner contends that he just tries to practice the preaching of theNew Testament and that the profession of law does not shut itsgates to persons who have qualified in all other aspects, even whenthey follow in the footsteps of the Great Teacher.

WON such

denial violatesReligiousfreedom

The Illinois Constitution required citizens to serve in the state

militia in time of war, and all lawyers admitted to the bar wererequired to uphold the state constitution. Petitioner could notuphold that constitutional requirement due to his religious beliefs,and the Supreme Court upheld the denial of his license of practice.

Victoriano v.Elizalde Rope Benjamin Victoriano, the appellee, is a member of the religious sectknown as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", and is an employee of the Elizalde


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Workers UnionG.R. No. L-25246

Pojas

Rope Factory, Inc. (Company) since 1958. As such employee, hewas a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (Union)

Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior toits amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was notprecluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization torequire as a condition of employment membership therein, ifsuch labor organization is the representative of the employees."

Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to— paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No.875, as follows:

... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religioussects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labororganization."

Iglesia Ni Cristo prohibits the affiliation of its members with anylabor organization. Thus, appellee presented his resignation toappellant Union.

Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking

the latter to separate Appellee from the service in view of the factthat he was resigning from the Union as a member. Themanagement of the Company in turn notified Appellee and hiscounsel that unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactoryarrangement with the Union, the Company would be constrained todismiss him from the service.

Appellee then filed a petition for injunction to enjoin therespondent-appellant company from dismissing him from service.

The CFI of Manila rendered judgment in favor of petitioner-appellee.

Thus, respondent-appellant filed this appeal, assigning as errors,

among others, that(1) Republic Act No. 3350 discriminatorily favors those religioussects which ban their members from joining labor unions, inviolation of Article Ill, Section 1 (7) of the 1935 Constitution; and that(2) the same law violates the constitutional provision that "noreligious test shall be required for the exercise of a civil right."

Pamil v. TeleronG.R. No. L-34854

Barambangan

Petitioner: Fortunato R. Pamil

Respondent: Victorino C. Teleron, Judge of CFI Bohol, Branch III

In 1971, Private respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was elected and duly proclaimed as mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol. Petitioner filed a suit for quo warranto, to disqualify respondent based on Section 2175 of the Administrative Code provision: "In no

Is anecclesiasticeligible to anelectivemunicipalposition?

No.

The attack on the continuing effectivity of Section 2175 having failed, it must be, as noted at the outset, given full force and application. Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, as far as ecclesiastics are concerned, must be accorded respect. The presumption of validity calls for its application. Under the circumstances, certiorari

lies.


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case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality."

The suit did not prosper, with the lower court held that the ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. Petitioner then elevated the matter to this Tribunal. It is his contention that there was no such implied repeal that it is still in full

force and effect. Thus was the specific question raised.

Estrada v. Escritor A.M. P-02-1651

Cabalang

PET: ALEJANDRO ESTRADARES: SOLEDAD ESCRITOR

1. In a sworn letter-complaint, complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr. , presiding judge of RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old.

2. Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner and is a resident not of Las Pias City but of Bacoor, Cavite. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.

3. In the preliminary conference, Estrada confirmed that he filed the letter-complaint for immorality against Escritor because in his frequent visits to the Hall of Justice of Las Pias City, he learned from conversations the stories about therein Escritor.

4. Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the

judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998.

5. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watchtower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness

.

6. At the time Escritor executed her pledge, her husband was still alive but living with another woman. Quilapio was likewise married at that time, but had been separated in fact from his

WON RESright to

religiousfreedom

should carveout as anexception

from theprevailing

rules & jurispru. on

illicitrelations forwhich gov.employees

are heldadmin. liable

*Decision is too long with history of Church pa.

The case at bar being one of first impression, we now subject the respondents claim of religious freedom to the compelling state interest test from a benevolent neutrality stance.★ Benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion

under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise

their religion without hindrance.

In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether respondents right to religious freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on the one hand, and giving up her employment and keeping her religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a burden on her free exercise of religion.

The burden on respondent in the case at bar is even greater as the price she has to pay for her employment is not only her religious precept but also her family which, by the Declaration Pledging

Faithfulness, stands honorable before God and men.

The second step is to ascertain respondents sincerity in her religious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice and is not merely using the Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness to avoid punishment for immorality. She did not secure the Declaration only after entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict and defined, much less only after an administrative case for immorality was filed against her.

In any event, even if the Court deems sufficient respondents evidence on the sincerity of her religious belief and its centrality in her faith, the case at bar cannot still be decided using the compelling state interest test

. The case at bar is one


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wife. During her testimony, Escritor volunteered to present members of her congregation to confirm the truthfulness of their Declarations of Pledging Faithfulness, but Judge Caoibes deemed it unnecessary.

of first impression, thus the parties were not aware of the burdens of proof they should discharge in the Courts use of the compelling state interest test.

It is apparent from the OCAs reliance upon this ruling that the state interest it upholds is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. However, there is nothing in the OCAs memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that

it should override respondent's plea of religious freedom.

Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Courts action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. We cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondent's claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the compelling state interest test. The government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the states compelling interest which can override respondents religious belief and practice. To repeat, this is a case of first impression where we are applying the compelling state interest test in a case involving

purely religious conduct.

Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case.

Taruc v. BishopDela CruzG.R. No. 144801

Daria

Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church(PIC). On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitionersexpelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent Church.Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitionersfiled a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction againstBishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court.They contendedthat their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trialthus violating their right to due process of law.

WON there isa violation oftheir religiousrights

No

The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religiousinstitution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of theofficials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization.It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities inthe performance of their discretionary and official functions.Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions/organizationsto conform to just church regulations. “Civil Courts will not interferein the internal affairs of a religious organization except for theprotection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be thesubject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdictionto determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession ofchurch property.” Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right inthe present case.


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freedom of religion digests

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