geostrategy, resources and geopolitics: implications for the us navy and naval port system

Pergamon

PlI:SO308-597X(97)O0011-0

Marine Policy, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 309 323, 1997 ~" 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved

Printed in Great Britain 0308-597X/97 $17.00 + 0.00

Geostrategy, resou rces and geopolitics: implications for the US Navy and naval port system

Brian Slack and John Starr

This paper examines the factors that have helped shape US naval policy over the last 15 years: strategic relationships, resources and geopolitics. As the Navy seeks to redefine its role in the post- Cold-War era, the same elements, in different proportions, are again determining the future roles and character of the most powerful navy in ~he world. The disposition of the assets, and the functions of bases, are shown to be influenced by them in a variety of ways. Naval bases are feeling the direct impacts of the cutbacks being imposed on the Navy. The geography of these cutbacks is explored and, with reterence to a number of examples, problems and opportunities afforded by reductions and base closures are discussed. © 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd

Key words--geostrategy, US Navy, naval bases, naval policy

Brian Slack is at the Department of Geography at Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3G 1M8. Until his recent retirement, Professor John T. Starr was a member of the Department of Geography, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, Baltimore, MD 21228- 5398, USA.

Introduction

Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has been the undisputed dominant naval power in the world. The size of its navy, together with its global reach and fire power, have placed it in this unique position. Unlike the fleets of many former great naval powers such as the United Kingdom and France, which have shrunk greatly and assumed roles as regional forces, the US Navy maintains a global presence with a fleet that, while smaller than before, still dominates the world stage.

As dominant as the US Navy continues to be, it is being confronted by a number of challenges that require major readjustments in naval policy. Many of these changes have clear spatial implications. US policy has had to adapt to the radically changed geostrategical realities of the post- Cold-War era; it has had to adjust to declining resources; and it has been forced to react to political pressures, at home and abroad. An overview of these three interrelated elements is undertaken in this paper as a prelude to an analysis of the naval bases and shipyards that sustain and maintain the US fleet. The future of bases is an important issue in US naval policy. These bases are being influenced by the same factors that are re-shaping policy: geostrategic relations, resource availability, and politics. As elsewhere in the world, however, naval ports cannot be considered solely in terms of naval policy. They exert enormous social and economic influence over their host civilian communities, and their sites dominate many local landscapes. The changes imposed on bases by new policies have considerable impacts both positive and negat ive--on the naval port cities.

309

Geostrategy, resources and geopolitics: B Slack and J Starr

This paper focuses on the changes that shaped US naval policy and the navy base system in the 1980s and early 1990s. During this period strikingly different circumstances prevailed. The early part was dominated by Cold War geopolitical conditions, the latter years by "the new world order". The early years witnessed a massive build-up of navy resources, the latter was marked by retrenchments and cutbacks. As a result, there has been a great diversity of situations and experiences. In the space of little more than a decade naval policy has had to switch from the known to the unknown, and navy bases and their host communities have had to adjust from relative plenty to relative scarcity.

US naval policy

Under ideal conditions naval policy would be determined by a country determining its strategic interests and goals, and then securing the resources that are required to attain these objectives. This rarely occurs. In some instances the strategic interests and goals may not be clearly defined (some would argue that this is occurring today in the US), while in others the resources may not be made available for the navy to fulfill its defined role. In addition, the fact that naval vessels can be expected to be in service for 25 years or more means that fleets may be made up of assets that may be inappropriate for contemporary needs. US naval policy demonstrates all these divergencies.

Geostrategic inlluences

From the late 1940s US military policy has been shaped by the Cold War, with its particular geographical attributes. The enemy was clearly identified as the Soviet Union and its allies. In response, the US spearheaded a world-wide network of military and diplomatic alliances, focusing most of the military resources on Europe, while anticipating a potential global war. The evolving role for the Navy was two-fold [1]. Through its submarine-launched missiles, it assumed an important position in the US nuclear deterrence triad [along with strategic bombers and silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)]. Its second role was to fight a conventional war with the Soviet fleet. Here, there developed the strategy of "forward deployment", in which the Navy would close in on, engage, and destroy Soviet fleets in their home waters early in a global conflict [2]. Having eliminated the Soviet naval threat, the carrier battle groups would support extended operations ashore [3]. This policy involved the projection of US naval power in three relatively confined "deployment hubs": north-east Atlantic, northwest Pacific, and eastern Mediterranean Black Sea.

The end of the Cold War has ushered in a period of readjustment for the US military. The whole defense establishment is finding it hard to define its missions and geostrategies now that the monolithic opponent of the Soviet Union exists no more. There has been an outpouring of debates, opinions and analyses, many of which have been colored by the events associated with the Gulf War. Most argue that the end of the Cold War will mark a period of "hot peace", with the proliferation of local conflicts that could break out anywhere in the world. It is assumed that this will be a period of uncertainty, with few advanced warnings about the outbreak of hostilities. These postulated conditions differ greatly from those associated with the Cold War, when the enemy was

310

Geostrategy, resources and geopolitics." B Slack and J Starr

known and when it was assumed that naval battles would be concentrated in a few regional seas. In addition, it is anticipated that there will be a proliferation of sophisticated weaponry in many areas of instability. Although it is unlikely that these arsenals would be nuclear, missiles are expected to be more widely available. The challenge facing Pentagon planners, therefore, is to develop a new geostrategy to confront these conditions.

Resources

Naval policy is frequently shaped by the resources available to carry out missions. Naval strategy and resources are rarely synchronous with each other. Indeed, a recent review of US military strategies over the last 20 years has argued that the US has had a mix of plans and strategies that reflected unrealistic assumptions about resources [2]. Many times policy has been driven by resource conditions rather than the requirements of strategy. The budget allocations made available to the Navy, and the size of the US fleet, have fluctuated considerably over the period under review. While there had been comparable fluctuations in previous years, the divergences did not have the same effect as those today.

At the end of the Second World War, total defense spending in constant 1990 dollars stood at $800 billion [1]. It quickly fell to $78 billion in 1948, but rose during the Korean War to $331 billion. Falling in the mid-1950s to $250 billion, it rose once again to a peak of $324 billion during the Vietnam War. A similar roller-coaster trend has occurred since. By 1976, defense spending fell to $203 billion, reflecting the post-Vietnam anti-military sentiments that swept the US, culminating in the election of Jimmy Carter. The defense establishment became increasingly concerned about the decline in budgets because it claimed military preparedness was compromised. Earlier declines were cushioned by the enormous inventory of assets constructed during the Second World War. By the late 1970s these reserve ships were nearing the end of their useful life. Thus, when President Reagan began his term of office, budgets were increased, peaking at $330 billion in 1985. Since that zenith, budgets have again fallen; indeed the rate of reduction has become absolute, falling to $284 billion in 1994.

The recent fluctuations in budgets have rarely reflected geostrategic requirements. While the most recent round of cutbacks has been identified as the peace dividend of the end of the Cold War, in fact service budgets have been falling since 1985, before Perestroika [2]. The political will to continue funding the US military at previous levels has largely evaporated in light of the more pressing national threats of unemployment, recession, and recurring budget deficits.

Inevitably, the size of the fleet is influenced by budget allocations. Table 1 reveals the number and types of ships in the fleet for selected years since 1950. The end of the Carter presidency marked the lowest point in the US fleet in the post-war period, and because the reserve fleet was by then aged, without the latest weaponry, this represented a challenge that President Reagan sought to turn around. He developed the goal of a 600-ship navy, without defining what would be the role of the new fleet. Here was an example of resources driving policy. While the goal of a 600-ship fleet was never achieved, the legacy of the Reagan build-up was to provide the Navy with an impressive number of new vessels. With the Navy receiving the largest share of the defense

311


Table 1. Size of the US active fleet

Type of ship 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990

Carriers 15 23 19 13 14 Cruisers/BB 14 14 10 27 45 Destroyers 137 226 176 80 69 Frigates 10 41 47 71 100 Submarines

Strategic 2 41 41 36 Nuclear attack 8 47 78 95 Non-nuclear 72 103 56 5 2

Amphibious Helo-carriers 4 7 8 13 Other 91 109 90 55 53 Support ships 279 282 250 84 148 Totals 618 812 743 462 575

Source: George [1].

Table 2. US base force structure, 1995

Strategic submarines (SSBNs) 18 Aircraft carriers 12 Attack submarines 800 Surface combatants 150 Amphibious ships 50 Combat logistics force 50 Support, reserve, other 90 Total 450

Source: George [1].

budget ($121 billion in 1985), it secured a number of "high end" investments, large and expensive warships. Thus, two Nimitz-class nuclear powered aircraft carriers were built, and the sophisticated Aegis class cruisers and destroyers were added. This is in contrast to the navies of most of the allies, which have been able to build only frigates.

The budget cutbacks since 1985 have put a brake on the growth of the fleet, and in 1990 President Bush announced a new "base force" of 450 ships projected for 1995 (Table 2). Subsequent announcements, and further cuts by President Clinton, have made even this "base force" appear doubtful.

Geopolitical influences

Geostrategy and resources are in themselves very much determined by political and geopolitical factors, and it is often difficult to separate them. However, there are several geopolitical influences, both domestic and foreign, that are independent of the elements discussed so far and that have helped to shape naval policy.

Geopolitical factors, such as treaties, reflect political attitudes in the signatory countries. In pursuing its geostrategic goal of containing the former Soviet Union and its allies, the US entered into a large number of regional, multilateral, and bilateral military treaties. In this manner the US sought to establish military bases or, at least, use of foreign facilities. Changing political circumstances in some of these countries have placed great strains on the alliances, and have resulted in a de .facto embargo of US use of foreign ports. Two examples illustrate this very well. Opposition to nuclear arms has proved to be very strong in many Western nations. In the case of New Zealand it led to the Lange government barring a US destroyer from visiting a New Zealand port because the US would neither confirm nor deny the ship was nuclear-

312


armed [4]. This led to a break in the ANZUS (Australia New Zealand- United States) treaty framework. More recently, the new government of the Philippines, responding to nationalistic pressures, has not renewed the lease on the Navy's main foreign base in the Pacific at Subic Bay [5]. In addition, it may be noted that many countries are reluctant to allow use of bases by US forces for out-of-theatre operations [1].

The denial of use of foreign bases, therefore, is one of the most serious factors shaping future US naval policy. There is a growing recognition that the Navy will have to return to a pre-World War II situation of operating largely from domestic bases. Outside Europe, the Navy can look forward in the future to operating unrestrictedly only from Guam and Diego Garcia, with the opportunity for service calls in Singapore, and possibly Japan.

Further geopolitical elements that influence naval policy are arms control and reduction treaties. For more than 15 years, steps were taken by the US and the USSR initially to freeze, and then reduce, strategic nuclear weapons. The success of the process was due to the political will in both countries to control and limit their nuclear capabilities. As an important member of the US triad, the Navy had an important stake in the stipulations of the treaties. While the earlier SALT treaties sought to freeze nuclear arsenals, the START I and START II agreements were designed to reduce their size radically. The START I treaty set a limit of 6000 warheads on each side, regardless of the delivery systems, and START II stipulated a further cutback to 3 000 warheads by 2003 [1].

The evolving US naval policy

In defining its new policy the US Navy has to confront all the elements discussed above: an increase of local conflicts, the proliferation of advanced military technology, uncertainty, declining budgets, a shrinking fleet, arms control, and fewer overseas bases. In an under- reported speech by President Bush in 1990 (he made it the day of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait), a new national security strategy was announced. This comprised four elements: deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and force reconstitution. These points were raised in subsequent discussions by Secretary of Defense Cheney and by various Navy Chiefs [6].

Deterrence implies maintenance of the nuclear shield as the primary defense mechanism of the US. Here, however, resources, geopolitics and policy collide. The naval "base force" for 1995 included 18 Trident submarines (the 12 existing Poseidon submarines having been retired). These Tridents alone accounted for 3 456 warheads. Under Start I rules the Navy would have the major share of the nuclear deterrence shield. Under Start II agreements, the 18 Tridents alone would exceed allowed limits, long before their expected retirement from the fleet in 2012.

Forward presence, the second element of the new strategy, implies the ability to project US power globally, and in potential trouble spots in particular. The US intends to continue its role as a world power. One of the difficulties in pursuing this role is the lack of overseas bases, particularly for Army and Air Force operations. Only the Navy can project power in virtually every theatre through its carrier battle groups. The "base force" announcements indicate that 12 of these battle groups will be maintained. Each group is gathered around a nuclear powered

313


aircraft carrier, which in a war situation would be accompanied by an anti-aircraft screen of two to three Aegis cruisers and two to three guided missile destroyers, plus an anti-submarine screen of at least four destroyers or frigates [1]. Few doubt the effectiveness of these battle groups to project US power in potential trouble spots, but a number of questions have been raised about the ability of the Navy to sustain its interventions. Most serious is the question of logistical support [7]. Future deployments will almost certainly involve the groups operating far from bases. The US fleet of supply vessels has been allowed to run down, and the Gulf War demonstrated that the US required 6 months to build up its land forces. In addition, because during the Reagan years it focused on new "high end" ships, the Navy found itself wanting in mine sweeping capabilities in the Persian Gulf. Again, this could limit the effectiveness of naval operations in distant trouble spots.

Crisis response implies the ability of the US to undertake rapid deployment of US assets into crisis areas. It is assumed that the Navy will be first on the scene [8]. Plans are already being prepared for the creation of a more flexible expeditionary style force, in which the Marines will play a vital role. The Marines are being integrated more fully in naval planning. The current Navy rapid reaction or "Ga to r " force is being expanded [1, p. 169]. Perhaps the only obstacle for the realisation of this goal is again the issue of logistical support of an expeditionary force in distant theatres of conflict.

Force reconstitution calls for the readjustment of assets that were designed for the Cold War in order to serve the new strategic and tactical needs of the US military [6]. For the Navy, this requires redeploying the attack submarines that were designed to search out and destroy Soviet submarines, and converting them to become guided missile submarines for antishore operations (the first Tomahawk missile launched at Baghdad came from a submarine). The Navy has announced the new concept of "flexible transition", in which ships of all types will be classified as front line "battle force combatants" (BFC) or "protection of shipping" (POS) escorts. The purpose is to build multi-mission BFCs with comparable radar and battle management systems, envisaging that - -as ships get older-- they will be moved into the escort role [1, p. 149].

Naval bases

Commensurate with the size of the fleet, the US Navy maintains an impressive set of naval stations at home and abroad, along with naval shipyards and naval air bases in the US. It is through these bases that the most direct effects of Navy activities are felt. As locations where naval personnel are concentrated, and because they frequently employ large numbers of civilian workers, the bases exert considerable economic impacts on the host cities in terms of revenue and employment. Furthermore, the presence of such large numbers of sailors confers upon naval cities unique social characteristics.

Naval bases are subject to the vagaries of Navy policy as much as the role and size of the fleet. Yet it is interesting to observe that naval analysts and commentators tend to ignore the bases, focusing instead on the heady issues of strategy and ships. The only time bases will be considered is with respect to foreign facilities. Issues about the more numerous domestic installations have been raised largely by non-naval

314


observers, since bases have become an important political issue in many forums.

Homeports

While it is a well-established practice to refer a navy ship's base as a homeport, the term "homepor t" became identified with a policy developed by Navy Secretary Lehman during President Reagan's first term. Lehman was the architect of the Navy build-up in the early 1980s. It was he who enunciated most clearly the strategy of "forward deployment". In 1982 he announced a policy of expanding the number of naval ports. This was put forward because the Navy had to consider where to place the new ships being commissioned as part of the goal of creating a fleet of 600 vessels. The "homepor t" program had six principal objectives [4]:

Reduce vulnerability--earlier reductions in the fleet led to a concentration of ships at fewer and fewer bases, thereby constituting a potential "Pearl Harbor" . The program called for maintaining the size of existing bases, but dispersing the additional ships to avoid further concentration. Move closer to operating areas--by reducing steaming times to operating areas, the Navy claimed it would improve fleet responsiveness. New bases in the Pacific North West would help protect the sea lanes of Alaskan oil; and, bases in the Gulf of Mexico would improve access to the Caribbean basin. Enhance battle group integrity--by assigning battle groups to particular homeports, the Navy claimed it could remove the delays previously encountered when ships from different bases had to be assembled. This would improve fleet responsiveness to crisis situations. Improve training and recruiting~dispersal would give the Navy better access to a range of training environments. The dispersal of reserve ships with the active-fleet vessels would enhance training and recruiting. Expand logistics infrastructure--establishing new bases could benefit the Navy through increasing naval infrastructure. Preserve industrial base--by expanding the number of bases where repair and maintenance would be undertaken, the industrial base would be enlarged, thereby widening the pool of competitive shipyards.

It is evident that justifications for the "homepor t" program represent a mix of strategic and resource considerations. Base policy, therefore, can be seen as being subject to the same factors as overall naval policy discussed above. The Navy used three criteria to choose the "homeports" from the list of possible candidates [4]: Military suitabilio'--potential sites had to be accessible to open water, and be capable of providing sufficient berthing and manoevring space. Local community support--the Secretary of the Navy repeatedly said that the Navy would not go where it was not welcome. Cost of construction--this included not only the cost of land, but also the availability of housing and community resources.

Despite the diversity of criteria put forward, it became apparent as the program developed that local politics was the most important factor. The first "homepor t" competitions, those involving the selection of bases in the North East and in the Pacific Northwest, resulted in the selection of Staten Island, NY (chosen from seven options) and Everett, WA (selected from 13 options). The selection of Staten Island was

315

Geostrategy, resources and geopolitics. B Slack and J Starr

made, despite sizeable local opposition to nuclear-equipped vessels, because of the support of State and congressional leaders. The choice of Everett was predicated on local support, the amount of space available, and congestion at other sites, such as Seattle. Later competitions became even more politicized. The Central Pacific competition involved three candidates--San Francisco, Pearl Harbor and Long Beach (none really new naval ports). Extensive political lobbying resulted in the ships available for dispersal being split amongst all three! By the time of the last competition, in the Gulf Coast, States and communities were well- aware of the financial implications of the locational decision. Sixteen candidates submitted formal applications. Again the choice was made to split the ships amongst seven sites: Ingleside (TX), Galveston (TX), Lake Charles (LA), Pascagoula (MS), Mobile (AL), Panama City (FL), and Key West (FL), a revealing inter-state allocation.

An interesting aspect of the "homepor t" program that reflects the political dimension of the process is the case of Baltimore [4]. The Navy had never considered Baltimore as a possible candidate. However, it was directed to do so by an amendment added to the 1985 military appropriation construction bill. The Navy undertook a review of five possible sites, and reported that none was suitable because of the port 's location more than 150 miles from the open sea. Despite this, the Navy was instructed to identify what steps it was taking to make Baltimore a "homepor t" in the 1986 appropriations bill [9].

By 1986 the "homepor t" program began to lose favour. The first major attack came from a report to Congress in 1985 from the General Accounting Office (GAO). It calculated that the program would exceed $1 billion, when the ships could have been allocated to existing bases for $160 million [10]. As defense appropriations in general began to shrink, "homeports" became an obvious target for the budget critics.

At the same time that the policy faced criticisms based on resource considerations, its strategic logic was subjected to scrutiny [4]. The threat of a "Pearl Harbor"- type attack was dismissed, and it was noted that dispersal actually increased the threat of losses to saboteurs. In addition, it was observed that dispersal would not improve fleet responsiveness, since such responses are made by ships already at sea. By decentralizing repair and maintenance it was feared that the efficiency of the existing centers might be compromised.

Other critics began to surface, especially over the issue of nuclear weapons. In San Francisco and New York a great deal of local opposition erupted, including prominent local politicians, such as Mayor Dinkins of New York [11]. Others expressed disquiet over the impacts of new bases on small communities. Everett worried over increased taxes, while Ingleside, a community of 5 000, began to express concern over how it would cope with the influx of 4655 military personnel [ 12].

In 1990 the New York Times issued an editorial calling for an end to "homeport ing" [13]. While focusing on the arguments raised by its opponents, including budgetary and strategic questions, its strongest point was to urge rejection of "port-barreling". The policy was seen also as an attempt by the Navy to broaden its constituency, from a few naval towns of limited political influence, to one where politicians from many parts of the country would have a stake in promoting the Navy's interests. In May 1990, the program was indeed halted, caught up in the broader debate on base closings [11].

316


The history of the "homepor t" policy is interesting as an example of naval base policy in a period of plenty. While the policy was justified originally on strategic grounds, it very quickly became engulfed in regional and local politics. Strong congressional figures, such as Senator Bentsen of Texas, were able to pursue the interests of their constituencies, at the expense of overall naval effectiveness. As much as the critics could argue against "homeport ing" on strategic grounds, it was finally halted by broader resource concerns.

Base closings

By 1985, Congress was becoming increasingly critical of the growth of defense expenditures. In light of these resource pressures, the Pentagon began to cut back, concentrating its shrinking budgets on assets that were considered essential. Many of the Navy's older ships were decommissioned, including a large number that had been slated for reconversion. Bases were also an obvious target for closure. All branches of the military began a process of evaluation of their base structures. In 1988 the candidates for closure were submitted to the President and Congress for approval. Through 1989 the list of proposed closures became a political football in Congress. The Democratic majority opposed the list in general, on the grounds that a disproportionate number of the proposed bases were in Democratically- held districts. Individual congressional representatives of both parties fought to exclude bases in their constituencies from the list of closures. After a rancorous debate in which only one of the proposals (an Air Force base) was approved, all parties recognized that a new, less partisan system must be established, so that the next round of proposed base closures could be dealt with more effectively [14].

A new procedure was put in place to consider the 1991 proposed base closures [15]. The list drawn up by the Pentagon, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, was submitted to an eight-member presidential Commission. This independent body had 75 days to review and modify the list before presenting its recommendations to the President. The President, in turn, had 30 days to forward the recommendations to Congress, both Houses of which were required to pass or reject the list in its entirety. The latter provision was designed to prevent purely political influences on the closing decision.

In April 1991, Secretary Cheney presented a list of 31 proposed base closings to the Commission. In July it presented its recommendations to President Bush and included 27 of the 31 original bases, along with two others that had not been on the original list [16]. These were duly passed on to Congress, where they unleashed a strong reaction from many members [13]. Since opponents of individual base closures could only seek to defeat the proposal in its entirety, the Commission's recommendations were ultimately accepted, against the opposition of members from Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Three naval stations (Sand Point, WA, Long Beach, CA, and Philadelphia, PA), two naval air stations (Moffat Field, CA, and Chase Field, TX), and one navy shipyard (Philadelphia, PA) were approved for closure [17].

Subsequent analysis of the base closure procedure, by the General Accounting Office, raised concerns about the base selection process employed by the Navy [15]. Whereas the Army developed a well-defined set of criteria, including measures of military value, return on investment, and impact on the community, the Navy's choices appear to

317


have been more arbitrary. The GAO was particularly critical of the selection of the Philadelphia naval shipyard for closure. This shipyard was the Navy's most productive and most efficient, having been the only one that was making a profit. Others have expressed concern about the ability of the Commission to scrutinize effectively the military lists with only 75 days allowed for consideration [15].

Despite such criticisms, the procedure was employed in subsequent rounds of base closures in 1993 and 1995. The aim was to remove local and regional political pressures from the process, presumably leaving the selection to be based on resource and military strategic considerations. But it is now clear that, while the final vote in Congress on the entire package has removed the political trading that was characteristic of the former procedure, there is still a great deal of political influence-peddling in the earlier stages of the selection process.

It must be recognized that the closure decision is only the first step in a painful process of adaption both for the Navy as well as for local communities. The action of carrying out the closures is proving to be a very expensive one for the Navy, and naval port cities are having to face serious readjustments with the Navy's departure.

Naval bases generate significant economic benefits for their host communities. Naval personnel and their dependents may represent an important component of the local population, and their spending helps sustain the local economy. Many employ large numbers of local non- military workers, and local businesses may be dependent upon Navy contracts. For example, in 1993 the US naval presence in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, included 27709 personnel on active duty, along with 27274 dependents. The base employed 15 221 civilian employees. Thus, more than 70000 people were directly linked to the US Navy's activities in Hawaii. The payroll exceeded $1 billion per year, and an additional $280 million was spent annually on local purchases and contracts [18]. When these benefits are threatened by cutbacks, the impacts can be severe. The Department of Defense has recognized for some time that base closings have a negative effect on the host communities. In 1961, it established the Office of Economic Adjustment to assist the regions affected. This Office, with its annual budget of $7 million and staff of 20, may have coped with earlier base closings, but there is great skepticism about its ability to handle the growing number that are taking place [19]. Inevitably, it must act in conjunction with other federal agencies as well as local and State governments.

Experience has shown that loss of a base or a shipyard is viewed with great pessimism by the communities affected. Fearing the loss of jobs and the social impacts, communities are usually among the strongest opponents of closure. On the other hand, there is evidence that the broader region tends to be more pragmatic, accepting the inevitability of change, viewing closure as an opportunity for redevelopment and renovation. Thus, the town of Alameda, CA, "whose downtown includes nine bars and a tattoo parlour" [20], fought the addition of its naval air station to the list of possible closings, while many others in the San Francisco Bay area were attracted by possible economic opportunities afforded by the potential closure. In a similar fashion the reaction of Philadelphia to the proposed closure of its shipyard was to focus on the projected job losses and tax revenue shortfalls. These were estimated to be in the order of 45 000 jobs, 20 000 of which would be lost by the city of Philadelphia, and lost tax revenues of $114 million, of

318


which Philadelphia's share would be $50 million [21]. In this case forward-looking proposals were to add new naval functions, such as replacing the lost carrier overhaul work with combat systems maintenance for Aegis ships [22], or establishing a national maritime industrial center as a catalyst for the development of advanced technologies and manufacturing processes necessary for competitive shipbuilding and repair [23].

Navy bases occupy extensive waterfront sites, and hence are considered as prime areas for conversion. The announced closures have brought forward a large number of ideas for redevelopment, including industrial parks and residential developments. While private developers might view the bases in terms of their potential for profits in real estate, Federal laws favor their non-private use [24]. Under the 1987 McKinney Act the land must be first offered to the Department of Housing and Urban Affairs for possible use by the homeless. Subsequently, other Federal agencies have priority. Potential future use then falls to State and local governments. Only if no public body has come forward to offer a use for a former base will the private sector be invited. This is confirmed by a GAO study that determined that 90% of all shut down bases have remained under Federal or State control [25].

Two difficulties have emerged with the process of base closings. Public bodies may offer popular uses for former bases, such as occurred when the Department of the Interior was encouraged to take over the Presidio in San Francisco in 1989 as a national recreation area. Because some 250 buildings would have to be removed, and extensive landscaping undertaken, the conversion costs were estimated at $60 million, and annual operating costs were placed at between $40 million and $60 million. The National Parks Service could not afford the expenditure. It was only because of a special Congressional budget allocation of $65 million that the project went ahead [26]. But for already financially constrained public agencies, popular uses may not be feasible. The second difficulty is that many of these most popular conversion proposals do little to alleviate the economic dislocation caused by loss of jobs. Evidence from earlier base closings in the 1960s and 1970s indicates that economic adjustments take many years, and require a great deal of planning and coordination among all levels of government [24]. Thirty-five former military bases have been converted to industrial parks by local and State governments, while 42 others have been transformed into airports. The most numerous type of conversion (57) supports educational institutions [24]. The short-term prospect for many of the communities hit by the present round of closures appears bleak indeed.

The Navy itself is having to confront costs and dislocations from the base-closing process. It had always been assumed that the closing of a base would incur certain decommissioning costs, but now that the military is having to shut them on an unprecedented scale it has encountered expenses from an unexpected quarter. The Department of Defense had always argued that it was exempt from regulations of the Environmental Protection Agency. The Supreme Court has rejected this stand, and thus the military now finds itself confronted with the cost of cleaning up its closed bases [26]. Many are being found to be contaminated with radioactive waste, PCBs, solvents, and pesticides. The worst offenders are the former air bases (of which the Navy closed three in the 1991 round). Congress is having to appropriate significantly

319

Geostrategy, resources and geopofitics: B Slack and J Starr

larger sums to cover the clean-up costs ($100 million in 1991, and $220 million in 1992), and some have estimated that the total clean-up at all bases will reach $35 billion [19,27]. This is undoubtedly an additional factor that limits the opportunities for conversion and regional revitalization.

The evolving Navy base system

Despite the recent dramatic downsizing of the Navy, the fact remains that the US fleet and base system are still very extensive. It is important to recognize that the effects of the policy changes discussed above have been spatially differentiated. The spatial structure of the base system is quite different from that of the late 1970s, and the rank order of importance of bases has changed as a result of re-allocations. In this section the evolving geographical patterns are analysed, and the varying fortunes of the major base facilities are examined.

Changes in the pattern of domestic naval bases since 1980 show an increase in the number of ports and in the number of states in which bases are located (see Table 3 and Figure 1). In 1980, the US Navy operated out of 14 domestic base areas, relatively concentrated in but 11 of the nation's 24 coastal states. The degree of concentration was even more marked in terms of the disposition of the fleet. Two complexes alone, Norfolk and San Diego, accounted for 48% of total vessel assignments. Indeed, 78% of ship assignments were in the top five naval ports. (One must, of course, be careful in interpreting these data and those for subsequent years, since ship totals comprise vessels of vastly different sizes--from nuclear powered aircraft carriers to small supply ships.)

By 1985 the effects of the "homepor t" program and the Reagan build- up were apparent (Figures 1 and 2). The number of domestic naval bases

Table 3. Active ship assignments by port: 1980, 1985, 1993

Port 1980 1985 1993

San Diego, CA 118 109 75 Nor fo lk , VA 113 123 108 Char les ton , SC 65 68 49 Pear l Harbor , HI 47 41 34 G r o t o n / N e w London, CT 32 31 17 Maypo r t , FL 23 36 22 San F ranc i sco Bay, CA 19 24 20 Newpor t , RI 7 11 6 Long Beach, CA 6 26 24 Puget Sound, WA 5 18 18 Ear le, NJ 3 3 5 K ings Bay, GA 1 2 6 P a n a m a City, FL 1 1 - - Pensaco la , FL 1 1 - - Key West, FL - - 6 6 Por tsmouth , NH - - 4 2 Ph i lade lph ia , PA - - 4 2 N e w York , NY - - 2 6 Bath, ME - - 2 - - Por t Hueneme, CA - - 2 - - Ing les ide , TX - - - - 9 Pascagou la , MS - - - - 4 Mob i le , A L - - - - 3 Fore ign and non -ass igned 38 76 24 Total 479 a 591 440

Source: US Navy. aThe d i sc repancy be tween the to ta ls here and in Tab le 1 resu l ts f r om l ists d i f fe rent agenc ies at d i f fe rent da tes in 1980.

of vessels taken by

320


Active Ship Assignments by Port: 1980, 1985, 1993

L A M S

A L

EAST COAST q~o~ qe,~,o~,~oe

9~qe~SO~ °6"la~

I~hila(lelDhia ~ p ~ A O ~ . ~ ~ ~

N c v ~ "~°~eOheth 4¢,~

& > ¢D

WEST COAST

. . . . Harbor HI

O R / C A

Non-assigned and Foreign

~°~t ~ue'Te'~e c4 i

San Francisco Bay CA -~o,~ OO~oh ::~ °/e~° c,~

1993

1985

1980

Active Ship Assignments

Figure 1. Active ship assignments by port: 1980, 1985, 1993.

had increased to 20 and three additional states were added. The dispersal is reflected in the reduced share of the top ports; Norfolk and San Diego accounted for 39% of the fleet, and the share of the top five fell to 64%.

Recent data suggest continuation of some trends and reversal of others. The trend towards geographical dispersal continues with the addition of three new states having homeports, but the total number of naval centers actually declines to 19 (Figure 2). The relative share of the top ports remains approximately the same as in 1985, with the five largest ports accounting for 66% of the fleet, although Norfolk increases its share as the top naval station, with 25% of all vessels.

From these changes, several features are worth noting. During the period 1980 1993, shifts occurred in the rankings of individual naval ports, and in the broader levels of importance of the maritime ranges. Examination of the maritime ranges reveals an interesting pattern of alternating absolute increases and decreases in vessel assignments. Thus, New England experienced a decline of 14 vessels, while the mid-Atlantic grew by 10; the South Atlantic declined by 17, and the Gulf Coast increased by 20; California experienced a decline of 24, while the Pacific Northwest grew by 13 and Hawaii declined by the same number. Meanwhile, of the seven foreign bases maintained by the Navy as homeports in 1980, two were withdrawn by 1993: Holy Loch (UK) and Subic Bay (Philippines). The US still maintains two facilities in Italy

321


~ 140

1~

~ ' ~ ' ~ " 1% '~ .,~ ~

6o .~

~. "40 .~

"~o ~

Figure 2. Rank order change of act ive ship assignments.

(Gaeta and La Maddalena), two in Japan (Yokosuka and Sasebo), and one in Guam.

These shifts prompt four observations. First, US naval base structure has been shaped to a great degree by budgetary cutbacks and the "homepor t" program. Second, the cutbacks appear to have affected in particular many of the larger bases; this is chiefly because they were homeports to numerous reserve vessels that have been decommissioned. Thirdly, however, there have been exceptions to this size rule. Norfolk, especially, has been relatively unscathed, and has emerged as the primary naval facility in the US. Finally, although the "homepor t" program has been terminated, its influences continue to be felt. Several new bases, particularly in the Gulf of Mexico, are in operation; and, on the Pacific coast, a decline in the relative importance of San Diego is similarly attributable to "homeport ing" and the associated growth of former secondary bases--especially in Puget Sound and Long Beach.

Conclusion

During the period under review, the US Navy has had to respond to unprecedented changes. These have been summarized under three headings: geostrategy, resources, and geopolitics. The effects of these dislocations have been felt throughout the naval establishment, but none has been more evident than on the naval bases. These facilities have mirrored the changing fortunes of the Navy itself over the past decade, from relative plenty and a clear Cold War strategy, to budgetary cutbacks and a yet uncertain strategic role.

322


There appears little doubt that the future holds further resource cutbacks. Naval policy will have to adapt to this reality, and the question will be how can the Navy maintain a world-wide presence with a shrinking resource base? Fortunately, perhaps, the answers to this question can be postponed for a few years. The Navy can expect to live until the next century on the proceeds of the Reagan build-up, since the life expectancy of most capital ships will carry them beyond the present decade.

For the naval bases, however, there appears to be little hope of change from the present course of cutbacks. As vessels are decommissioned and manpower reduced, the Navy is continuing to close down stations. A return to a more concentrated system of base structure appears likely. However, it is evident the selection procedure is flawed. The rounds of base closings have uncovered weaknesses in the Navy's approach and in the Congressional approval process. Furthermore, because more base closures are inevitable, specific policies involving all levels of government must be developed to help cushion the severe social and economic dislocations engendered, and to promote community revitalization.

R e f e r e n c e s

1. George, J. L., The US Navy in the 1990s. US Naval Institute, New York, 1992, p. 13.

2. Cordesman, A., US strategy in the 1990s: requirements vs resources Annals, American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1991, 517, 39-65

3. Friedman, N., The future shape of the US Navy. Annals, American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1991, 517, 106-119.

4, Bowen, A. M. and O'Rourke, R., Ports for the Fleet, Proceedings~Naval Review, 1986, May, 137-151

5. See the paper by Rimmer elsewhere in this issue.

6. Garwdrrett, H. L., Kelso, F. B. and Gray, A. M, The way ahead. Proceedings~Naval Institute, 1991, April, 36-47

7. Summer, H,, How to be the world's policeman. New York Times Magazine, 19 May 1991, p. 40

8. Schmitt, E., Streamlined Navy rethinks its role, New York Times, 2 Oct 1992, p. A9

9. Journal of Commerce, 31 Oct 1985, p. 3B.

10. General Accounting Office, Navy ships: Information on the benefits and costs of establishing new homeports, GAO/NSIAD-86-146, Washington, 1985.

Keller, B., Homeports criticized. New York Times, 7 September, 1985, p. A7.

11. Shea, M. P., Targeting of Navy 'homeports' puts politicians on spot. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 1990, 48, 1672-1675

12. Texas town awaits Navy with hope and a case of nerves. New York Times, 16 February, 1988.

13. Ifill, G., Base closings pit some repub- licans against Bush. New York Times, 15 April 1991 p. A10.

14. Finally, end home pork. New York Times, Editorial, 24 April 1990.

15. Koven, S., Base closings and the pol i t ics--administrat ion dichotomy. Public Administration Review, 1992, 52, 526-531.

16. Defense base closure and realignment commission, Report to the President: 1991, Washington, DC, 1991.

17. Ifill, G., Bush says he will rely on Cheney in decision on base closing list. New York Times, 2 July 1991, p. A10.

18. US Navy, Navy and Marine Corps in Hawaii, Pearl Harbor, 1992, p 5.

19. Palmer, E. A., Cleanup at bases slated to close. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 1992, 50, 548-549.

20. Gross, J., Base closings seen as an opportunity inside a problem.

New York Times, 4 February p. N17.

21. Pennsylvania Economy League, Economic Impact of the Philadelphia Naval Base and the Shipyard in the Philadelphia Metropolitan Area, Report #579, Pennsylvania Economy League, Philadelphia, PA, 1990.

22. Penjerdel Council, Triad of excel- lence: Proposal to establish a Delaware Valley synergistic naval engineering and overhaul complex, Penjerdel Council, Philadelphia, PA, 1991.

23. Mulhern, J. J., Economic Readjustment in Southeastern Pennsylvania: A Strategic Look at Wealth Creation in the Region's Defense Facilities. Fels Center of Government, University of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA, 1992.

24. Stewart, R., Some communities detect benefits in base closings. Los Angeles Times, 12 May 1991 p. AI.

25. Sales of bases below Defense Department estimates. New York Times, 18 November, 1994.

26. Morain, D., Complex, costly cleanups may snarl base closings. Los Angeles Times, 19 June 1990 p. A1.

27. Coletta, P. E. (ed.), United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Domestic. Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1986.

323

geostrategy, resources and geopolitics: implications for the us navy and naval port system

Documents