Germany‘s External and Transatlantic Relations After

the Cold War: An (Almost) Impossible

Balance

Presentation at theGoethe Institute Johannesburg

Klaus Segbers, Free University of BerlinApril 2, 2004

Content

1 The Global Context: A New Context

2 Germany‘s External Institutionalism

3 Transatlantic Relations: Family Dispute or Divorce?

4 Outlook

1.1 The Global Context 1

Post-Westphalian system (globalization)

Post-Cold War system

Post-bipolar system

1.2 What is globalization?

Globalization is a concept with many connotations and meanings.

For our purposes, we understand it as a process generated by world-wide interplay of capital flows and communication flows enabled by new technologies.

G. entails increasing commodification. This process - in one way or another –

connects and divides countries, societies, firms and individuals, far beyond national boundaries.

1.3 What is globalization? While perceptions and interpretations of these trends differ,and while abilities to cope with them differ as well,it becomes ever more difficult, if not impossible to ‘opt out’ and to pursue auto-centric, de-coupled paths of development.Globalization ‘is widely perceived … as a universal causal agent’ (Cameron/ Palan 1999).

So it also would happen without a „neo-liberal“ agenda.

1.4 The Global Context 2

More actors, more levels, more games, more (and conflicting) rulesPost-WW 2 agenda is changingLess real sovereignty for governmentsDecreasing consistency of policies

2.1 German National Context: Structures

„Zivilmacht“ (civilian power concept)

Corporatism (politics as bargaining and mediation of conflict regulation)

„Handelsstaat“ (trading state; dependency on importing energy)

Social and non-state actors and dimensions

Germany's Dependence on Energy Import

98%

82%

55%

Mineral Oil Natural Gas Coal

75% of energy consumption have to be imported

Source: Verbundnetz Gas AG 2002

2.3 National Context: History

Historical Contingencies

Unification of 1991

Normalization and pragmatization of Germany‘s foreign relations

Foreign Deployments of German Forces

ca. 300

ca. 1.820

ca. 430

ca. 40

12

ca. 1.320

ca. 3.350

11

7.300 Bundeswehr soldiers are involved in global conflict resolution

2.4 Germany‘s Foreign Policy Outcome

Pursuing own interests via

integration

institution building

greater relevance of EU

not necessarily siding with U.S. on all matters (since 1998)

2.5 Germany‘s Domestic Priority Issues

„Domestic“ issues are by far more important than „external“ questions. Germany is in a process of deep changes of employment, health, pension, education and tax systems. In general, there is not yet a break-through, despite “Agenda 2010”. In many ways, Germany is still a „blocked“ society.

2.6 Germany‘s European Agenda

Institutional reforms

Enlargement

Stability pact (still…)

Rebuilding GASP/ CFSP

2.7 Germany‘s Global Agenda

Maintaining and developing effective institutions and regimes

Future role of U.S.A.: balancing, interlocking, or inclusion?

Demographic trends: regulating migration

3.1 The transatlantic setting 1

The obvious problems and contradictions between the fomer partners during the Cold War are substantial.They are much more than a bump on a road, or election rhetoric. This is a new experience for all parties involved

3.2 The setting 2

While there still are substantial similarities between the U.S. and the societies in Western Europe, it is increasingly risky to assume that there are “natural” common interests, like during the Cold War.The common agenda of the East-West conflict does not exist anymore. And there is apparently not (yet?) a new common agenda, readily at hand to replace the old one.

3.3 The setting 3

Also, the Cold War bipolar structure was not a natural one, but also a transitional stage. And so we are moving on now.In addition to these structural changes, we also observe a generational change.

3.4 The setting 4

There are significant power differentials, in terms of military power projection capabilities, economic dynamism and cultural penetration. Most of the people you are talking to these days in he U.S. are expecting that the Europeans, finally, accept things as they are and follow the U.S. lead.

3.5 European concerns 1

There is wide consensus in Europe that this U.S. administration“relied on the unilateral exercise of American power rather than on international law and institutions”,“championed a proactive doctrine of preemption and de-emphacized the reactive strategies of deterrence and containment”,“preferred regime change to direct negotiations with countries and leaders” that were loathed,went for “ad hoc coalitions of the willing to gain support and ignored permament alliances”,engaged himself in exploiting “Europe’s internal divisions”.

3.6 European concerns 2

Taken together, this is a “revolution of U.S. foreign policy”, as one hears also in the State Department, leading to a “rewriting the rules of America’s engagement in the world”. So there certainly are more fundamental changes going on than just some minor misunderstandings.

4.1 Options and prospects 1

Once institutions and regimes of global politics are bypassed or marginalized, it is – from a European perspective – even more important to closely analyze the behavior of the one dominant actor on this global scene.

4.2 Living with the hegemon?

What kind of hegemonic actor are we talking about?Is it a benign one? This concerns intentions.Is it a rational one? This concerns consistency and procedures.And, finally, is it an actor directing his power toward destruction (of hostile regimes and groups) and subsequently toward (re)construction, or is it an actor commanding mainly a „power of denial“?

4.3 Conditions not met...

On the first count, huge opportunities were missed after 9/11.On the second criterion, the decision to intervene militarily in Iraq did not follow a consistent big narrative. Rather, this was the outcome of interactions between different domestic groups with diverse agendas, interests and ideologies, converging basically in their aim to “go”. On the third count, a glance through media reports over the last 12 months and the last hours may be sufficient for an answer.

4.4 Another „unorganic“ empire?

There is a basic cleavage inside the administration - between classical realists and neoconservative fundamentalists. Realists are mainly interested in maintaining and, if possible, strengthening the power base of the U.S.„Idealists“ – neocons, do have a mission. They want to „democratize“ the world, whatever the costs are. Also, the new empire apparently is increasingly overstretched (budget) and short of a convincing „mission“.

4.5 European options, 1

These contradictions and controversies inside the Bush administration and between these two main camps do not (automatically) strengthen European positions. European interests and positions are only taken seriously when they come with some force and strength.

4.6 European options, 2

Europa must strive for more internal coherence in the field of foreign and security policies, and also for more strength. Without this, a new and workable relationship is hardly to achieve.At the same time, any kind of credible counter-balancing U.S. capabilities is unrealistic in the foreseeable future. Investments on such a scale are not possible in the coming years (unless there will be more “Madrids”).But political balancing may work (Turkey…).

4.7 Global Issues

How to manage a disequilibrium of global asymmetric configurations of actors? How to institutionalize the U.S. in a global world?How to modernize and stabilize the Near and Middle East (if we want that...)?How to make political Islam and (post)modernity compatible?How to control WMD‘s?How to re-build the European CFSP?What to do with the extra - EU spaces in Europe?What do do with failing states?What are relevant macro-tendencies b/w anarchy; institutionalization; selective stability?

The end...

http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~segbers

2.6 FP’s Conditioning Variables

Permanent media exposure

Permanent elections

Changing domestic and European coalitions

Continuing multi-level games

4.3 Conditions for a hegemon

On the first count, huge opportunities were missed after 9/11. Not many societies perceive the U.S. as benign.

A “acceptable” hegemon must meet one fundamental condition – as a hegemonic power, he must have at least a medium-range time horizon, and he must have developed encompassing interests. Is this the case with the current U.S. administation?