grosvenor coal mine underground operations

GROSVENOR COAL MINE Underground Operations

PLN – Grosvenor Mine Overview Plan

GRO-1435-PLN-Grosvenor Mine

Overview Plan

Original Issue Date:

13/12/2013

Version: 2 Printed: 16/06/2020

of 48 Date of Issue: 11/11/2015

PRINTED COPIES OF THIS DOCUMENT ARE UNCONTROLLED AND DEEMED VALID ONLY ON THE DAY OF PRINTING

Underground operations

grosvenor mine overview plan

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 4

2. Mine Characteristics ............................................................................................................................... 6

2.1 Location ........................................................................................................................................ 6

2.2 Seam Characteristics .................................................................................................................... 7

2.3 Coal Quality .................................................................................................................................. 7

2.4 Mine Reserves .............................................................................................................................. 7

2.5 Subsidence Constraints ................................................................................................................ 8 2.5.1 Blair Athol Rail Line / Eungella Eastern Water Pipe Line ................................................... 8 2.5.2 Goonyella Railway .............................................................................................................. 8 2.5.3 Lease Boundary .................................................................................................................. 8 2.5.4 Moranbah Township............................................................................................................ 8 2.5.5 Isaac River .......................................................................................................................... 8

2.6 Geology and Geotechnical ........................................................................................................... 9 2.6.1 Permian Coal Measures ..................................................................................................... 9 2.6.2 Moranbah Coal Measures Stratigraphy .............................................................................. 9 2.6.3 Seam Splitting ................................................................................................................... 10 2.6.4 Depth of Cover .................................................................................................................. 10 2.6.5 Stress Orientation ............................................................................................................. 10 2.6.6 Geotechnical considerations ............................................................................................. 11 2.6.7 Gas Content ...................................................................................................................... 12 2.6.8 Gas Reservoir at the Time of Mining ................................................................................ 13 2.6.9 Outburst Risk .................................................................................................................... 14

2.7 Spontaneous Combustion .......................................................................................................... 15

3. Mine Operations ................................................................................................................................... 15

3.1 Mine Design and Layout ............................................................................................................. 15

3.2 Pillar design ................................................................................................................................ 16 3.2.1 Main headings ................................................................................................................... 16 3.2.2 Chain pillars ...................................................................................................................... 16

3.3 Surface Infrastructure ................................................................................................................. 17 3.3.1 Administration buildings .................................................................................................... 17 3.3.2 Change house ................................................................................................................... 17 3.3.3 Diesel Storage ................................................................................................................... 17 3.3.4 Workshop/warehouse building .......................................................................................... 17 3.3.5 Coal transportation ............................................................................................................ 18

3.4 Production Capacity .................................................................................................................... 18 3.4.1 Longwall Productivity ........................................................................................................ 18 3.4.2 Development Productivity ................................................................................................. 18

3.5 Mining Methodology and Equipment .......................................................................................... 19 3.5.1 Mine Development ............................................................................................................ 19 3.5.2 Longwall Mining ................................................................................................................ 19 3.5.3 Conveyors ......................................................................................................................... 21 3.5.4 Transport Arrangements ................................................................................................... 21

3.6 Ventilation System ...................................................................................................................... 22 3.6.1 Ventilation requirements ................................................................................................... 22 3.6.2 Airways .............................................................................................................................. 22 3.6.3 Surface Fans ..................................................................................................................... 22 3.6.4 Ventilation and gas monitoring .......................................................................................... 22 3.6.5 Heat management............................................................................................................. 23

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4. Integrated Operational Risk Management ............................................................................................ 23

4.1 Group Technical Standard 02 Integrated Risk Management Standard...................................... 23

4.2 Operational Risk Assessment Methodology ............................................................................... 24

4.3 Four Layered Approach .............................................................................................................. 26

4.4 Baseline Operational Risk Analysis of Grosvenor Operations ................................................... 28 4.4.1 Operational Risk Analysis Process ................................................................................... 28 4.4.2 Site Operational Processes Baseline................................................................................ 29 4.4.3 Hazard Inventory: Baseline Hazard Map ......................................................................... 30 4.4.4 Principle Hazards .............................................................................................................. 31

4.5 System Integrity .......................................................................................................................... 33

5. Operational Structures .......................................................................................................................... 39

5.1 Management Structure ............................................................................................................... 39

6.2 SHMS Document Structure ............................................................................................................ 39

6. Roles and Responsibilities ................................................................................................................... 41

7. Resources Required ............................................................................................................................. 42

8. Trigger Action Response Plans ............................................................................................................ 42

9. Communication ..................................................................................................................................... 42

10. Training ................................................................................................................................................. 42

11. Corrective Action .................................................................................................................................. 43

12. Audit and Management Review ............................................................................................................ 43

13. Records ................................................................................................................................................ 44

14. Legislation ............................................................................................................................................. 44

15. Appendix I Control Effectiveness Matrix ............................................................................................. 45

16. Appendix II Business Unit Risk Matrix ................................................................................................ 46

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1. Introduction

A safe and productive underground mine begins with a detailed understanding of the processes involved

in the operation of the mine and the effective control of the hazards and risks present within those

processes.

Grosvenor Mine has developed a Safety and Health Management System [SHMS] based on an integrated

risk management process aimed at documenting the processes, hazards, risks and controls across the

activities at the mine.

1.1 Purpose

The Grosvenor Mine Overview Plan [GMOP] provides context and background data of the mine

characteristics and proposed mining operations together with the risk management processes used to

identify and control the hazards at the mine.

1.2 Scope

The GMOP applies to the Grosvenor Mine [Underground Operations] including the drivage of the two

access drifts, ventilation shafts and the first workings development of the pit bottom area, mains and first

longwall panel gate roads. The plan applies to all persons working at the underground mine.

1.3 Definitions

Term Definition

Control any measure used to modify risk or manage work processes

Control

Effectiveness

a matrix based assessment of Control Hierarchy and Control Quality that

provides an analysis of the effectiveness of a control. Effectiveness is

defined as being –

Green: indicating that the control should be very effective. This is the

desired effectiveness of every control but the matrix indicates that even a

90% quality Administrative or PPE control is not considered to be an

effective control. The intent of the matrix is to promote the development

and application of “harder” controls such as Engineering or Substitution

Yellow: indicates a satisfactory control could be improved to a green

control either through improving its Quality or by changing its Type. Yellow

controls should be improved first if total control effectiveness for an

unwanted event is inadequate.

Red: indicates that the control does not contribute effectively to reducing

the risk of an unwanted event

There should be two Green preventative controls for every cause of a

priority unwanted event. Refer GRO-201-PRO-Risk Management.

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Term Definition

Control

Hierarchy

the classification of types of control according to their potential to reduce

risk. In descending order are -

Elimination: the complete elimination of the hazard by design

Substitution / Minimise: replacing the hazard, material or process with a

less hazardous one, or significantly reduce the magnitude of the hazard or

material so consequences are greatly reduced

Engineering: incorporate controls into the design or redesign the

equipment or work process

Separation: placing a physical barrier on the hazard by guarding or

enclosing it

Administrative / Procedural: providing control such as training and

procedures

Personal Protective Equipment: use of appropriate and properly fitted

PPE where other controls are not practical

Control

Quality

the quality of a control based on its–

Reliability: will the control operate on demand as intended

Survivability: will the control remain unimpaired during the unwanted

event

Availability: will the control be available to perform its function

and categorised into ranges between < 30%; 30%-60%; 60%-90% and >

90%

Critical

Control

a “Green” level control that is- Specific, Measureable, Attainable, Realistic,

Timely, Evaluated and Reviewed. Refer GRO-201-PRO-Risk

Management.

Critical

Control

Register

a register that documents the Critical Controls at the operation. It is a

“live” document intended to record and communicate the current status of

the effectiveness of the operation’s critical controls

Hazard any energy that has the potential to do harm

Principal

Hazard

a hazard at the coal mine with the potential to cause multiple fatalities

[CMSHA Section 20]

Principal

Hazard

Management

Plan (PHMP)

a documented plan to identify, analyse and assess risks associated with

principal hazards, including the identification, analysis and assessment of

the controls implemented to reduce the risks to acceptable levels

Risk a calculation of the Likelihood of a unwanted event occurring and the

Consequence should that event occur

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Term Definition

Risk and

Control

Register

a register that documents the identification and analysis of the hazards,

risks, and preventative and mitigation controls at an operation. It is a “live”

document intended to record and communicate the current status of

effectiveness of the operation’s hazard’s, risks and controls.

Standard

Operating

Procedures

(SOP)

a documented way of working, or an arrangement of facilities, at the coal

mine to achieve an acceptable level of risk, developed after consultation

with coal mine workers [CMSHA Section 14] The term SOP only applies to

those procedures prescribed in the CMSHR 2001

Trigger

Action

Response

Plan (TARP)

a documented set of escalating actions that are to be taken in the event

that certain criteria are met

First Action

Response

Plans

(FARP)

simple documents that set out the immediate steps required to be taken by

those persons first on the scene at an incident

Unwanted

Event Any unwanted release of energy

2. Mine Characteristics

2.1 Location

The Grosvenor Construction Mine Project is located in the Bowen Basin of Central Queensland in Australia,

approximately 180 kilometres south-west of the coastal port city of Mackay and 5 kilometres north-west of

the town of Moranbah. The resource adjoins Anglo American Metallurgical Coal’s Moranbah North Mine to

the north.

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Figure 1 Moranbah Township and Grosvenor Mine

2.2 Seam Characteristics

The Goonyella Middle (GM) is the target for mining operations at Grosvenor. It is recognisable throughout

the region, correlating with the GM seam at Moranbah North and the Harrow Creek seam at Peak Downs.

This seam is also the lateral equivalent of the Aquila and Tieri seams at German Creek. The depth to the

GM seam is from 160 at pit bottom to 500 metres at the north east corner of the Grosvenor mine plan area.

2.3 Coal Quality

The Grosvenor resource has a slightly higher ash product [9.5%] than the neighbouring Moranbah North

Mine [8.5%] when washed to optimal yield. However, a reducing supply of the GM seam coal from

competitors and demand from the market should provide for the Grosvenor GM seam coal to be washed

at this higher yield.

2.4 Mine Reserves

The minable reserves of the Grosvenor mine are detailed in Table 1 below.

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Mine Block Thickness

mined (m)

ROM tonnes Yield Saleable

tonnes

Development 3.6 12,924,748

Longwall 3.6-4.2 134,041,990

Totals 146,966,738 69.4% 102,030,136

Table 1 Mine Reserves

2.5 Subsidence Constraints

The following summarises the mining constraints adopted in the feasibility study.

2.5.1 Blair Athol Rail Line / Eungella Eastern Water Pipe Line

The Feasibility Study plan includes the relocation of the Blair Athol rail line immediately after crossing the

Isaac River to a location directly over the main headings. The adjacent raw water pipe line will be relocated

with the rail line. For the entire route of the combined relocated rail line/water pipe line, a longwall extraction

exclusion zone based on an angle of draw of 26 degrees to minimum measurable subsidence has been

applied as a constraint for the purposes of feasibility study mine planning.

2.5.2 Goonyella Railway

The Goonyella railway line constrains the Grosvenor panels to the north. The panels have been stopped

short of the railway line to avoid subsidence of the railway line and the adjacent pipeline.

2.5.3 Lease Boundary

The lease boundary forms a partial constraint to the north. The longwall panels are stopped short of the

lease boundary to avoid subsiding beyond the lease boundary.

2.5.4 Moranbah Township

Protecting the Moranbah Township and adjoining mining/exploration leases from any measurable impacts

associated with subsidence will be crucial to avoiding compensation and minimising community concerns.

This is not considered an issue for Phase 1 of the project as the extraction area is removed far enough

away from the township to avoid any impact.

2.5.5 Isaac River

The Isaac River flows from north to south across the Grosvenor tenements on a NNW-SSE trend that is, in

general, perpendicular to the major interpreted faults. Maximum surface strains, and hence potential

surface damage, will exist where the river crosses the boundaries of the subsidence basin between chain

pillars.

Numerous studies and comprehensive risk analysis have been completed at MNM to assess the potential

for water inflow and associated consequences through longwall extraction beneath the Isaac River. MNM

has successfully undermined the river at a depth of cover of 160-170m in LW105, and again in LW107 at a

depth of cover of 200-220m. Extensive piling of the banks to retain stability in combination with sealing the

natural channel was completed prior to undermining.

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The minimum depth of cover under the river in the project area is 220m and the maximum 380m. Based

on experience to date at MNM, it is considered highly unlikely at these cover depths that water from the

river will seep into workings from subsidence cracking developing from longwall extraction. Extraction

beneath the Isaac River therefore, although requiring remedial and environmental rehabilitation measures,

is not considered to represent a constraint to mine planning.

2.6 Geology and Geotechnical

2.6.1 Permian Coal Measures

The Grosvenor project area straddles the subcrop boundary between Moranbah and Fort Cooper Coal

measures. The Moranbah Coal Measures range in thickness from 190m to 350m, and contains splits from

nine coal seam groups, with and average coal thickness of 20m. Sandstone, siltstone, mudstone and coal

are the predominant lithology, with one distinctive tuffaceous marker bed, the P tuff, recognised throughout

the area.

The overlying Fort Cooper Coal measures subcrop over the eastern half of the area, with the base of the

unit characterised by a thick inter-bedded sequence of tuff, mudstone and coal (Fair Hill seam).

2.6.2 Moranbah Coal Measures Stratigraphy

The coal measures within the Grosvenor Project area lie along the strike from those currently mined at the

Moranbah North Mine and BMA’s Peak Downs Mine to the south. A similar seam nomenclature to

Moranbah North has been adopted for seams of the Grosvenor deposit to facilitate a combined geological

model. The lowermost seam is the Goonyella Lower (GL) some 60m below the Goonyella Middle (GM)

seam at Moranbah North. Progressing to the south, the inter-burden between these two seams increases

to over 140m at the south eastern lease boundary.

2.6.2.1 Goonyella Middle Seam

The widespread Goonyella Middle (GM) seam is the most prospective seam within the stratigraphy and is

recognised throughout the region, correlating directly with the GM seam at Moranbah North and the Harrow

Creek seam at Peak Downs. This is also the lateral equivalent of the Aquila and Tieri seams at German

creek. The nature of the seam changes from the familiar seam recognised at Moranbah North as seam

splitting occurs in the general location of the Moranbah township. In the north of the Grosvenor project

area, the GM seam has a thickness of 4.5-5.5m. Closer to town, the seam thins due to seam splitting to

be 2.5-3.5m thick.

2.6.2.2 Goonyella Middle Seam Rider

A thin rider seam called the Goonyella Middle seam rider (GMR), is present in the immediate roof at

Moranbah North splitting away towards the southern end of the 100’s longwall panels. This split is

maintained across the Grosvenor project area with the seam some 25-35m above the GM seam and more

closely associated with the P Tuff.

2.6.2.3 P Tuff

The P Tuff is a regionally exclusive tuffaceous marker bed that can be recognised throughout much of the

Grosvenor project area varying in thickness from 0.4- to 2m. Commonly associated with the P Tuff are thin

coaly bands above and below the tuff band. The P Tuff usually lies about 10-15m below the P seam, but

the interval thickens to 43m in DDG010 to the south of the town

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2.6.2.4 P Seam

The P Seam occurs as three discrete seams at Moranbah North (GR, PL1 and PL2). These coalesce and

are present as one seam across the majority of the Grosvenor area splitting towards the far east. Despite

the coalescence, the seams are easily distinguished using geophysics, and a number of consistent partings

are present. The lowermost PL2 seam averages 0.6-1.2m in thickness and is separated from the overlying

PL1 by a 0.1-0.15m tuffaceous claystone parting. Despite being an excellent coking coal, the PL1 seam

coal contains high inherent ash levels that make washing to a suitable ash coking coal difficult at an

economic yield.

2.6.3 Seam Splitting

Unlike the GM seam at Moranbah North, the seam at Grosvenor does not maintain a uniform thickness

across the deposit. The seam undergoes 3 ply splitting events to significantly reduce the workable seam

thickness across the lease.

Just south of the railway line north of the Moranbah township, the parting between the 4A and the 4B plies

thickens from its normal 0.15-0.2m. This rapidly thickens to the south with the lower 4B, 5T and 5B plies

separating from the main seam by approximately 12m. Where the parting is 0.3m or greater, the plies are

regarded as being split and no longer included in the GM seam thickness. The 0.3m interburden contour is

taken as the split line. This effectively thins the seam from 4.5-6.5m north of the split line to 3.5m south of

the split line.

2.6.4 Depth of Cover

The depth to the GM seam from the surface varies from 60m to 120m at the subcrop to 500m at the north

east corner of the Grosvenor mine plan area. The variation in cover thickness at the subcrop is due to

thickening of Tertiary sediments towards the north. Cover depth at Moranbah North is seen as contributing

to mining hazard with difficult conditions often experienced with the longwall at depths greater than 220m.

This is interpreted as the point where the in-situ horizontal stress is equivalent to the strength of the coal

(5-6MPa) leading to rib and coal beam instability. The 1750t supports have successfully mined LW108 at

depths of 300m with the design better able to cope with damaged roof beam coal. Similar conditions are

expected in the proposed Grosvenor mining area and the knowledge gained at Moranbah North are to be

built into the design of the Grosvenor supports.

2.6.5 Stress Orientation

The major horizontal stress direction rotates to the east over the eastern part of the Grosvenor 1 lease

area. The gate roads are incrementally rotated in the eastern area as a means of minimising stress

concentration impacts during longwall retreat and optimising chain pillar size.

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Figure 2 Grosvenor Mine Horizontal Stress Orientation

2.6.6 Geotechnical considerations

The behaviour of roadways within the Goonyella Middle Seam is categorised for a range of geotechnical

domains at various depths and for both development and retreating longwall operations. Table describes

the domains identified for analysis.

The input data for the models was based on available stress and coring/rock testing in combination with

borehole geophysics.

Domain Type

Section

Working

Seam

Section

Description

A Seam

Split

Lithology

~4.5m Lithology dominated by GM1 Split from GMS. GM1 to

GM2 interburden thickness is variable to 2.4m (1.6

modelled). Interburden comprised of weak, low density

material. Introduction of moderate strength strata above

~7m (above seam floor) and below seam.

Virgin gas content 9 to 11 m3/t.

B Normal

Lithology-

(West of

Split

Line)

~5m Weakly bedded, laminated strata immediately overlying

GMS. Moderate strength strata from ~6m (above seam

floor) and below seam. Potential for weaker floor in

some areas.

Virgin gas content less than 4 m3/t

C Weak

Sub-Crop

Lithology

~5m Weak, bedded sequence immediately above and below

GMS.

Potential for weakly bedded silt/sandstone immediately

above seam.

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Virgin gas content <5m3/t.

Currently no Grosvenor 1 mining will occur in Domain C.

D Normal

Lithology

(East of

Split

Line)

~5m Weakly bedded, laminated strata immediately overlying

GMS. Moderate strength strata from ~6m (above seam

floor) and below seam. Potential for weaker floor in

some areas.

Virgin gas content 4 to +11 m3/t.

Table 2: Description of the Grosvenor Geotechnical Domains

Figure shows the extent of the geotechnical domains for ground support recommendations.

Figure 3: Geotechnical Domains

2.6.7 Gas Content

With the exception of the inbye half of the mine plan (Teviot Brook area), the gas reservoir database for

Grosvenor is extensive for the P and GM seams. From testing undertaken to date, the composition of all

seams is predominately CH4 with compositions ranging from 97% to 100%.

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The gas parameters for the P seam are:

▪ Measured virgin gas content varies from 6.5m3/t to 11.5m3/t at seam ash content.

▪ Measured permeability ranges from 264mD at a depth of 157m to 0.7mD at 389m.

▪ Calculated gas reservoir size ranges from 40m3/m2 to about 80m3/m2.

The gas parameters for the GM seam are:

▪ Measured virgin gas content varies from 5.2m3/t to 11m3/t at seam ash content.

▪ Measured permeability ranges from 225mD at a depth of 219m to 0.1mD at 471m.

▪ Calculated gas reservoir size ranges from 41m3/m2 at MG1 entry to about 115m3/m2 in the

deeper north-eastern areas of the mine plan.

2.6.8 Gas Reservoir at the Time of Mining

The mining schedule will progressively impact the gas production wells of Arrow Energy. The timing of

these impacts have been assessed on the flow rates and remaining gas for each well at the time of

intersection. Gas content at the time of mining has been calculated to be between 3 and 7 m3/t in the P

seam as shown in Figure and from 2 to 10 m3/t in the GM seam as shown in Figure , indicating the need

to implement a pre-drainage program for outburst mitigation ahead of mining in the GM seam, in addition

to the current Arrow pre-drainage program.

Reservoir modeling simulating gas emission rates during mining incorporating the remaining gas content

estimations, indicate the intake CH4 concentrations will exceed design limits at planned ventilation

quantities and panel advance rates during the development of Tailgate 1, Maingate 1 and Maingate 2.

Where panel advance rates are increased by 50%, design intake CH4 limits are exceeded in those gates

as well as in Maingate 6. This means additional pre-drainage will be required to ensure gas is at acceptable

mining levels prior to mining operations in these areas.

Figure 4: Expected Gas Content at the Time of Mining – P Seam (Qm, m3/t @ seam ash)

2.8

3.2

3.3

2.9

2.4

2.7

2.6

2.2

2.7

5.1

4.1

3.3

5.6

6.6

3.6

4.5

6.8

6.7

6.5

6.3

6.6

6.8

6.8

5.8

5.8

5.8

5.4

5.9

3.1

5.7

7.1

3.7

4.7

6.0

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Figure 5: Expected Gas Content at the Time of Mining – GM Seam (Qm, m3/t @ seam ash)

2.6.9 Outburst Risk

Although the Arrow Energy coal seam methane drainage program will have removed a considerable

quantity of gas from the GM seam up to the time of intersection of the SIS holes, the GeoGAS study

indicates that the remaining gas content will still be above the outburst threshold over a considerable portion

of the proposed workings. An outburst management plan will be developed and implemented and will also

address the following:

• Intersection of gas drainage boreholes

• Compliance coring and the permit to mine process

• Pre-drainage required for areas of known outburst levels

• Treatment of structure from an outburst perspective.

• Remote mining if required

Outburst and gas drainage thresholds at 99% CH4 and sample ash for the GM seam have been determined

using GeoGAS’s 900DRI method as:

▪ Outburst threshold 7 m3/t.

▪ Gas drainage threshold 6 m3/t (Mean less 2 Standard Deviations).

Plotting the estimated gas content at seam ash at the time of mining for the GM seam suggests that the

gas content will exceed the outburst and gas drainage threshold across the inbye areas as shown in Figure

.

1.5

3.0

1.4

1.5

1.3

2.0

2.4

2.4

3.8

2.0

2.3

2.5

1.9

3.3

1.4

3.2

2.6

2.5

4.6

4.0

3.6

6.1

3.6

5.2

3.4

3.4

7.4

4.7

4.8

4.6 5.6

6.7

8.2

8.8

7.4

10.0

8.9

7.0

5.4

5.5

2.4

7.0

6.7

7.4

6.6

7.1

5.8

5.2

2.6

4.3

4.4

4.6

4.9

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Figure 6: GM Seam Gas Content at the Time of Mining and Outburst Thresholds (@ Seam Ash)

2.7 Spontaneous Combustion

The test work on the Grosvenor drill cores from the GM seam indicates that the propensity of the coal to

spontaneous combustion is low and is consistent with the results of tests previously undertaken for the GM

seam at MNM. It is noted however that Moranbah North Mine has experienced events where high levels of

carbon monoxide generated from oxidation of the coal in the goaf has resulted in the withdrawal of the

workforce from the mine and the cessation on work underground for extended periods.

In order to minimise the risk of spontaneous combustion the following controls will considered for

Grosvenor:

• Use of U ventilation on the longwall to minimize differential pressure across the goaf

• Operation of the goaf drainage plant to minimise air being drawn into the goaf

• Installation of 140kPa seals in the cut throughs behind the longwall

• Operation and maintenance of extensive tube bundle and real time gas monitoring system to

provide early indication of spontaneous combustion.

• Operation of a floxal nitrogen generator for active goaf inertisation at all times.

3. Mine Operations

3.1 Mine Design and Layout

The mine access is located near the subcrop of the Goonyella Middle seam approximately 5 kilometres

north-east of the Moranbah township. The positioning of the pit bottom area is such that the seam is

accessed at a depth of 160 metres with almost immediate access for the development of the tailgate and

maingate of the first longwall panel.

Mine access will be via two drifts –

Men & Materials approximately 7.0m in diameter, 1.2km long and at a grade of 1:8 the M&M

Drift will be used for rubber tyred personnel, materials and equipment access.

1.5

3.0

1.4

1.5

1.3

2.0

2.4

2.4

3.8

2.0

2.3

2.5

1.9

3.3

1.4

3.2

2.6

2.5

4.6

4.0

3.6

6.1

3.6

5.2

3.4

3.4

7.4

4.7

4.8

4.6 5.6

6.7

8.2

8.8

7.4

10.0

8.9

7.0

5.4

5.5

2.4

7.0

6.7

7.4

6.6

7.1

5.8

5.2

2.6

4.3

4.4

4.6

4.9

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Conveyor Drift approximately 7m in diameter, 0.9km long at a grade of 1:6 the conveyor drift

will also serve as the secondary escapeway from the mine.

Both the drifts are to be driven with an Earth Pressure Balance Tunnel Boring Machine (EPBTBM) and will

be fully lined with pre-cast concrete segments.

Two vertical shafts are to be developed

Upcast (return) shaft blind bored approximately 5.8m diameter fully concrete lined fitted with

exhausting ventilation fans

Downcast (intake) shaft blind bored approximately 2 x 2.5m diameter fully concrete lined equipped

with emergency evacuation facilities to act as (temporarily) secondary escapeway during pit-bottom

development.

The mine will be developed in an easterly direction sub-parallel to the strike of the seam. The longwall

blocks are orientated to the north-east with the seam dipping down in the same direction at approximately

1:15.

The longwall panels will be up to 300m wide, 6200m long and contain up to 11Mt of ROM coal. At the

extremity of the mine the seam depth will approach 500m.

The panels are to be extracted in sequence from west to east with the longwall panels to progressively

rotate in a clockwise direction to allow change of stress direction and increase of the width of gate road

pillars with depth.

3.2 Pillar design

3.2.1 Main headings

The criteria for the design of the main headings is a factor of safety of approximately 2.5 and a width to

height ratio of 8. The pillar widths are based on a pillar length of 95 metres. The table below shows the

design parameters for main pillar widths for a range of depths based upon the above criteria.

Depth of cover (m) Pillar Width Rib to Rib (m)

<300 30

300-350 35

350-400 40

400-450 42

Table 3 Main Headings Pillar Design Parameters

3.2.2 Chain pillars

The chain pillar widths are designed with a conservative factor of safety of 1.25.

The table below shows the design parameters for main pillar widths for a range of depths based upon the

above criteria. All pillar sizes are based upon 90 metre pillar lengths (final pillar length in design is 100m).

Two heading chain pillar lengths Three heading chain pillar lengths

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Depth of cover (m) Pillar Width Rib to Rib

(m)

Depth of cover (m) Pillar Width Rib to Rib

(m)

150 30 150 2*30

200 35 200 2*30

250 42 250 2*30

300 50 300 2*37

350 60 350 2*45

400 67 400 2*52

450 70 450 2*60

500 2*65

Table 4 Chain Pillar Design Parameters

3.3 Surface Infrastructure

3.3.1 Administration buildings

The administration buildings comprise offices, workstations and adjacent training room sized to

accommodate up to 60 persons. The cap lamp and self-rescuer storage facility is sized to accommodate

600 lamps and self-rescuers

A muster area adjacent to the administration buildings provides a covered area for crews to gather prior to

starting work.

3.3.2 Change house

The change house will provide separate wash and ablution facilities for male and female personnel. Each

facility will contain clean and dirty change areas which will include adequate locker numbers for personnel.

3.3.3 Diesel Storage

Two 80,000 litre diesel tanks will be installed. The re-order point will be set at approximately 110,000 litres

to provide a reserve of almost 11 days usage at typical demand plus 20%.

3.3.4 Workshop/warehouse building

The work shop building comprises -

• Six MV workshop bays with for onsite servicing of mining vehicles

• Service area for limited on site servicing of light vehicles

• A dedicated welding bay with fume extraction

• General purpose maintenance shop for fixed plant

• Workshop offices area incorporating crib and toilet facilities

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The warehouse building comprises -

• A stores area with storage racking and separate sorting area

• Office with stores counter to workshop area

• A covered loading bay for handling incoming and outgoing materials.

3.3.5 Coal transportation

Raw coal will be transported to the Moranbah North Mine via a new overland conveyor for processing at

the Moranbah North Coal preparation plant. The product coal will be loaded out through the existing MNM

train load out to unit trains of 10,000 tonnes capacity and railed along the existing railway network.

Tailings and reject will be combined at the Moranbah North CPP into a slurry and pumped to the existing

co-disposal area located to the west of the CPP.

3.4 Production Capacity

3.4.1 Longwall Productivity

The longwall has been scheduled as a bi-directional cut with an 850mm web cutting at a height of between

3 and 4.2 metres. Utilisation rates have been set at 75 cutting hours per week. Longwall ROM is planned

to be between 5Mt and 7.5Mt per annum with the variation driven by panel length and forecast mining

conditions.

3.4.2 Development Productivity

Development operations will be standard Continuous Miner development units utilising on-board bolting

rigs for primary support and shuttle cars for coal clearance. The Joy 12ED25 has been selected as the

continuous miner for development.

There will be three development units, two gateroad development units and one mains development unit.

A fourth unit may be mobilised from periodically to maintain appropriate development float in line with the

mine schedule.

Table 5 below shows the scheduled base development rate [metres per week] based upon depth of cover

and geological domain.

Domain A Domain B Domain C

Depth of

cover (m)

Two

heading

gateroads

Three

heading

gateroads

Two

heading

gateroads

Three

heading

gateroads

Two

heading

gateroads

Three

heading

gateroads

< 225 176 167 197 197 197 197

225-275 158 149 183 176 183 176

275-350 133 126 154 145 154 145

>350 125 117 142 134 142 134

Table 5 Development Rates metres/week

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3.5 Mining Methodology and Equipment

3.5.1 Mine Development

Development operations will be standard Continuous Miner development units utilising on-board bolting

rigs for primary support and shuttle cars for coal clearance. The Joy 12ED25 has been selected as the

continuous miner for development coupled with 10SC42 shuttle cars.

3.5.2 Longwall Mining

The longwall has been scheduled as a uni-directional cut with an 850mm web cutting at a height of between

3 and 4.2 metres. A single 4500tph shearer has been proposed for operation at Grosvenor.

Table 6 below summarises the parameters and expected requirements of the longwall system.

Parameter Requirement

Longwall panel width 300 metres (rib to rib)

Longwall panel length 6200 metres

Mining extraction range Typical 4.0 metres(nominal cutting height, minimum 3.5 and maximum

4.5 metres

Retreat distance Approx. 70000 metres over life of mine

Total tones Approx. 132Mt over life of mine

Cutting processes Uni-di, Bi-di and half web capability

Nominal wed depth 850mm

Nameplate capacity 4500tph

process cycle capacity >3500tph

Average cycle capacity >2850tph

Resourced time 168 hours per week

Planned maintenance

work

40 hours per week

Estimated operating

time

95 - 100 hours per week

Equipment Requirement

Roof supports Two leg, 2 metre nominal spacing (width), 2.3-4.8 m hydraulic range

Support density yield>145t/m2 before cut

Immediate Face Support (IFS) canopy and single side shield

Full electro hydraulic system

suitable for longwall automation

Integrated dust suppression sprays

Shearer Double ended raging arm with multi motor shearer

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Suit 4500 tph nameplate capacity longwall

Radio remote control

Bi-directional data communication system

suitable for longwall automation

Armoured Face

Conveyor (AFC)

Continuous rating 4500tph, peak volume capacity 5000tph

capable of a reserve chain pull of 170 tonnes

Automatic chain tensioning system

Beam Stage Loader Continuous rating 5000tph

Automatic Chain tensioning system

Full dust cover and system including dust extraction

Crusher Continuous rating 5000tph

Output regulation <4700tph

Output material sizing to ,300mm

Boot End Skid type with steering, side shift and levelling

Overlap to suit two face advances

Belt conveyor tail pulley to transfer load to the stage loader

Belt lifting unit to assist with conveyor structure salvage

Suit 1600mm belt width maingate conveyor

Longwall Pump Station Track mounted pump and tanks capable of being relocated underground

by tramming or towing with mine LHDs

Located in cut through outbye of the longwall face, one station

connected to the longwall system by monorail, second station on

maintenance, ready for reconnection to monorail upon services

relocation

Hydraulic supply for roof supports with 20% reserve capacity

water supply for shearer cooling and dust suppression sprays

water supply for roof support dust suppression sprays

Monorail System Suit 200m of longwall retreat between retractions

Included 110 metres movement materials management system

Includes monorail installation and salvage platforms and relocation

sleds

Electrical System Incoming supply 11kV

Face Voltage 3.3kV (AFC drives 11kV optional)

Designed to limit voltage drop during AFC overloaded starts to 20% of

nominal motor voltage

Automation System Includes LASC standards

Table 6 Longwall Equipment Schedule

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3.5.3 Conveyors

Table 7 below outlines conveyor configurations. Note that the same conveyors will be used for both

development and longwall.

Design Parameters

Parameter Units

Gate Road Duty

(CVU 101-109)

Trunk Conveyor T1 Duty

(CVU002)

Drift Conveyor

UC101 (CVU001)

Develop L/wall At Start-up LW1 Final At Start-

up Final

Required

volumetric

capacity

tph up to

1000

4725 7800 7800 3000 6800

Required

continuous

capacity

tph up to

510

4500 4500 from LW

200 from MG2

200 from MG3

400 from mains

5800 700 6000

Belt length m varies up to

6625m

1600 2760 1082

Belt lift m varies up to 280m 63.5 85.5 177

Belt Width mm 1600 2000 2000

Belt speed m/s 1.5-2.0 5.2 1.5-2.0 5.1 1.5-2.0 5.1

Equipment Parameters

Head drive

power

kW 1x750 3x750 2x750 2x750 1500kW

Tripper

drive power

kW No

tripper

up to

3x750

No tripper 2x750 N/A

No. of

trippers

Nil up to 3 Nil 1 N/A

Belting type PN2500 4x4mm PN2000 6x4mm ST2800 8x7mm

Carry

trough

idlers

3*400

3m spacing

3*350

3m spacing

3*350

3m spacing

Return

trough

idlers

2*100

6m spacing

2*100

6m spacing

2*100

3m spacing

Table 7 Conveyor Configurations

3.5.4 Transport Arrangements

Men and Materials transport will be conducted by rubber tyred diesel vehicles operating principally within

the Men & Material drift. The Conveyor drift does have the capacity to accommodate rubber tyred diesel

vehicles.

Coal clearance will be exclusively by conveyor belts installed in the separated conveyor roadways and the

Conveyor drift.

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3.6 Ventilation System

3.6.1 Ventilation requirements

Total mine ventilation requirements will change with the number of panels and their extent, including

standing gate roads. A nominal assessment of ventilation requirements is shown in the table below. These

quantities are indicative and will depend on seam gas management requirements, standards of mains

stoppings and configuration of the rear block shaft (intake or exhaust)

Item Quantity (m3/sec)

Longwall 2 heading 75

Development Panels (last c/t) 55

Mains panel (cumulative of flanks) 70

Standing gateroad 40

Total Panels 350

Conveyor Drift and belt road air dump 80

Fuel bay 15

Transformer and pumps 15

Misc 10

Total Ancillary 120

Total Ventilation requirement 540

Table 8 Ventilation Quantities

3.6.2 Airways

The initial development of the mine will be ventilated by the men and materials drift on intake, the conveyor

drift on intake, an upcast (return) shaft of 5.5 metres diameter and a free venting intake shaft.

3.6.3 Surface Fans

The upcast shaft will be fitted with three identical centrifugal fans with VVVF speed control. The specification

calling for 2 fans to deliver 400m3/sec with the third spare on the initial shaft. The fan static pressure at this

operating point will be approximately 4 kPa. Three fans operating in parallel may be required for LoM

ventilation requirements.

3.6.4 Ventilation and gas monitoring

The ventilation system will be monitored as follows

1. 30 point infrared tube bundle system reticulated throughout the mine to monitor the active location

of the explosive fringe in the active goaf, status of the goaf stream, status of sealed goafs and

chosen roadway analysis in conjunction with real time monitors.

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2. Real time monitoring as required by regulations, monitoring for oxygen, carbon monoxide, carbon

dioxide and methane.

3. Safegas / Seagas system or similar to collect data, provide trends and alarms and predetermined

TARPS.

4. Gas chromatograph to analyse discrete samples from active and sealed areas

5. Surface barometric pressure transducers

6. Air velocity transducers

7. Surface fan pressure transducers

8. Pressure differential transducers at select locations between intake and return

9. Green House Gas monitoring system

3.6.5 Heat management

The general approach for heat management is as follows

1. Maintain relatively high velocities on longwall and development faces to minimize effective

temperatures. In development areas 760mm duct will be used instead of 600mm duct.

2. As far as practicable, ventilate large equipment to return airways e.g. bleed over gate road drive

heads through coffin seals and main pumps through stoppings to return airways

3. Segregation of drift, mains trunk and gateroad belts and use of belt road air dumps

4. Provide for bulk cooling of intake air

4. Integrated Operational Risk Management

4.1 Group Technical Standard 02 Integrated Risk Management Standard

As defined in GTS02 the Integrated Risk Management Process flow diagram, depicted below shall be the basis for risk management throughout Anglo American.

Figure 2 Anglo Risk Management Process [based on ISO 31 000 Risk Management

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A key output from integrated risk management shall be a single, integrated Risk and Critical Control

Register for each Business Unit, operation and project. These registers shall be structured such that the

Business Units can analyse and consolidate the data from across its operations/projects allowing the

material risks to the Business Unit to be reflected and managed from a single integrated Business Unit

Risk and Critical Control Register.

These registers shall be structured such that the data required for reporting purposes can be readily

filtered from the respective registers.

4.2 Operational Risk Assessment Methodology

It is crucial that all Coal Mine Workers at Grosvenor Mine operations knows what is expected in terms of

managing safety in their workplace. Anglo has invested heavily in the development a simple, uniform

approach to Safety Risk Management so that all personnel have the training, tools and resources

required to help them make the right decisions in their workplaces.

In using this approach, Anglo has adopted a cohesive Four-Layer Approach recognising that safety risk is

affected by decisions made for different reasons, at different layers within the organisation and should be

controlled at each of these decision points. Decisions made at the top can have a huge impact on

underlying layers. Within each layer, application of risk assessment methods and tools will vary

depending on the nature of the assessment, the detail required and a number of other factors. It is likely

that several tools would be used in each layer.

Figure 5 illustrates this Four Layered Approach with a more detailed Step by Step Guide on applying this

approach included in Table 3.

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OVERALL FUNCTION, SITE MAJOR HAZARD, BASELINE OR FULL SITE RISK ASSESSMENT.

Objective: to look across an entire site, find potential major incidents and analyse, establish controls, document, and apply approaches so related risks are as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). This layer also applies to executive decisions made in head offices and in specialist functions.

PROJECT, CHANGE OR ISSUE-BASEDRISK ASSESSMENT.

Objective: to review equipment, changes, and major incidents for risks so related risks are tolerable.

ROUTINE AND NON-ROUTINE TASK BASEDRISK ASSESSMENT.

Objective: to develop effective safe work expectations - guidelines, standard operating practices (SOPs), job plans, etc. - and review tasks where adequate SOPs are not available so related risks are ALARP.

‘EVERYDAY’, CONTINUOUS, FACE LEVEL RISK ASSESSMENT.

Objective: to have the person ‘stop and think’ and proceed with a task only if safe.

Figure 5 The Four Layered Approach to Risk Management

The growing global reach of Anglo’s operations, combined with widely varying underlying safety cultures

and maturity, has resulted in a range of risk management processes that vary in quality and application.

Anglo’s Peer Review process and fatality investigations have highlighted the importance of creating a

standard Anglo approach to managing risk assessments and methods of risk control. In this same way, it

has been recognised that these same leading edge practices and resources are equally as applicable to

the effective control of all hazards and risks across an operation, not just safety risks. Operational

Performance, Regulatory Impacts, Occupational Health, Environmental Management and Community

Expectations [to name a few] are all potential sources of harm to our businesses and must all be subject

to the same rigour of risk management analysis and effective control.

As such, Anglo has developed a Group Technical Standard GTS 02 Operational Risk Management

[and a range of supporting guidelines and templates] to provide a standardised risk management

approach across its operations.

This standard forms the basis of the Integrated Operation Risk Management Processes in place at

Grosvenor Mine.

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4.3 Four Layered Approach

Layer 1 Baseline Full Site Risk Assessment Layer 2 Project / Change or Issue Based Risk Assessment

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Layer 3 Routine Task Risk Assessment Layer 4 Individual Risk Assessment

Table 3 The Four Layered Approach to Risk Management

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4.4 Baseline Operational Risk Analysis of Grosvenor Operations

4.4.1 Operational Risk Analysis Process

The Baseline Operational Risk Analysis undertaken at Grosvenor Mine was conducted by -

i. Defining the site boundaries and limits of review

ii. Consider life cycle aspects in new projects from concept and design, through to operations and

maintenance and, if relevant, disposal and closure

iii. Systematically breaking down the entire site by Functional Activity, Process or Location to

appropriate detail to identify the hazards and associated risks within those Functions, Processes

or Locations

iv. Establish a relevant hazard inventory for the Operational functions at the site that includes clear

understanding of the existence, magnitude, release mechanisms and potential impacts of the

hazards [the Hazard Profile]

v. Rank the identified hazards and unwanted events to define the major potential unwanted incidents

for further analysis

vi. Analyse the major potential unwanted incidents to an adequate depth with appropriate risk

assessment methods (WRAC, FMEA, HAZOP, FTA, BTA, etc.)

vii. Define the existing Preventative and Mitigation/Recovery controls in place

viii. Conduct a Control Effectiveness analysis of the existing controls [the Control Profile]

ix. Review the Hazard Profile against the Control Profile and determine if the risks are at Acceptable

Levels and As Low As Reasonably Practical [ALARP]

x. If risks are not ALARP, define new controls and conduct new effectiveness analysis until risks are

tolerable

xi. Determine an Action Plan for establishing new required controls

xii. Define the Critical Controls and assign ownership, accountabilities and the monitoring and auditing

requirements for each

xiii. Transfer the critical controls into the Critical Control Monitoring system to ensure they remain

available, reliable and survivable throughout the life-cycle of the hazard

xiv. Document the information from the analyses in a Risk & Critical Control Register

xv. Ensuring the Risk & Critical Control Register it is kept up to date including integration of results

from the Critical Control Monitoring system as well as any risk assessment analysis done at any of

the Four Layer risk assessments

The outcomes of this Step-by-Step process are summarised in the following sections with full details

incorporated into the site Safety and Health Management System.

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4.4.2 Site Operational Processes Baseline

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4.4.3 Hazard Inventory: Baseline Hazard Map

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4.4.4 Principle Hazards

As developed during the Operational Baseline Risk Analysis Process and defined in the Hazard Inventory,

those hazards with the potential to cause Multiple Fatalities are -

1. Fire (Surface and UG)

2. Explosion

3. Strata Failure

4. Spontaneous Combustion

5. Outburst

6. Inrush / Inundation

7. Vehicle Interactions

8. Ventilation

9. Gas Drainage

10. Gas Monitoring [Management]

11. Emergency Preparedness & Response

12. Toxic/Irrespirable atmosphere

Each of these Principle Hazards have been subject to either a detailed Bow-Tie Analysis and/or HAZOP

analysis. The functional process of the Bow-Tie Analysis is to develop-

i. Fault Tree Analysis of Causation and identification of Preventative Controls

ii. Event Tree Analysis of Consequences and identification of Mitigation / Recovery Controls

iii. Control Analysis of each group of controls to determine Control Profile [Effectiveness]

iv. Risk Analysis of each Causation and Consequence element to determine Risk Profile

[Ranking]

v. Comparison of Risk Profile vs. Control Profile to determine Acceptability of Risk

vi. Identification of New and/or Improved Controls where risk levels as regarded as unacceptable

vii. Identification of Critical Controls, assigning Owners to each critical control and defining

Monitoring Requirements and Risk Indicators for each

viii. Identification of any Specific Actions required to execute any of the control strategies, together

with action owner and completion date, finally

ix. Defining the Assurance, Status Tracking and/or Governance systems to ensure all controls

are in place and remain effective

The outcomes of these Bow-Tie analyses are contained in detail in the site portfolio of Bow-Tie Analysis

[as drawn using Bow-Tie XP] and the GTS02 compliant Baseline WRAC and Risk and Critical Control

Registers.

The functional process of the detailed HAZOPS analysis is to -

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i. Break the designed control system into Nodes for detailed analysis

ii. Define the required Performance Criteria for each node

iii. Identify potential Deviations from these normal operations

iv. Identify how each deviation may occur, its potential consequence and whether it presents

an Operational or Hazardous risk

v. Identification of Preventative and Mitigation/Recovery Controls for each plausible

deviation

vi. Control Analysis of each group of controls to determine Control Profile [Effectiveness]

vii. Comparison of Risk Profile vs. Control Profile to determine Acceptability of Risk

viii. Identification of New and/or Improved Controls where risk levels as regarded as

unacceptable

ix. Identification of Critical Controls, assigning Owners to each critical control and defining

Monitoring Requirements and Risk Indicators for each

x. Identification of any Specific Actions required to execute any of the control strategies,

together with action owner and completion date, finally

xi. Defining the Assurance, Status Tracking and/or Governance systems to ensure all

controls are in place and remain effective

Essentially, the HAZOP examination procedure systematically questions every part of a process Or

operation to discover qualitatively how deviations from normal operation can occur and whether further

protective measures, altered operating procedures or design changes are required. The examination

procedure uses a full description of the process which will, almost invariably, include a Process &

Instrumentation Diagram [P&ID] or equivalent, and systematically questions every part of it to discover

how deviations from the intention of the design can occur and determine whether these deviations can

give rise to hazards. The questioning is sequentially focused around a number of guide words which are

derived from method study techniques. The guide words ensure that the questions posed to test the

integrity of each part of the design will explore every conceivable way in which operation could deviate

from the design intention. Some of the causes may be so unlikely that the derived consequences will be

rejected as not being meaningful. Some of the consequences may be trivial and need be considered no

further. However, there may be some deviations with causes that are conceivable and consequences that

are potentially serious. The potential problems are then noted for remedial action.

The main advantage of this technique is its systematic thoroughness in failure case identification. The

method may be used at the design stage, when plant alterations or extensions are to be made, or applied

to an existing facility.

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4.5 System Integrity

To provide a level of governance and assurance over the critical controls identified by the Integrated

Operational Risk Management process, three elements together comprising the Critical Controls

Management System have been developed. These being-

1. All Critical Controls are developed in compliance with the GTS 02 Integrated Risk

Management Standard, detailed in the site Risk and Critical Control Register and

recorded in the site Enablon risk management module and/or the Ellipse System

2. All Critical Control Assurance Actions required to validate that the critical controls have

been implemented and remain effective are defined, issued, recorded and reported

against using the site Enablon risk management module and/or the Ellipse System

3. A set of System Integrity Controls developed to ensure that the Critical Control

Management System itself remains effective are also defined, issued, recorded and

reported against using the site Enablon risk management module and/or the Ellipse

System

Compliance with the requirements of the Critical Control Monitoring System is key to ensuring the

ongoing effective control of the hazards and risks across Grosvenor Mine. These system integrity controls

are captured in the underpinning HAZOP for the Management Overview Plan.

Further to this, a suite of “Quality Control Assurance” Critical Controls were also identified for an

additional level of onsite governance. These Critical Controls were identified by the General Managers

and Underground Mine Managers from across the UG operations in response to the Grasstree Mine loss

of life incidents. These Critical Controls were based on recent incident history and were determined as

fundamental risks that required an additional level of assurance built into their auditing process. The

Quality Control Assurance Critical Controls scrutinise the audits completed in areas where high probability

Critical Control failures have been identified. The addition of these assurance processes validates that

quality Critical Control audits are taking place and that the effectiveness scores given to the Critical

Controls are truly representative.

A summary of the System Integrity Controls are listed below:

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Node Deviation / Unwanted Event

Critical Control

Critical Control Responsibility

Critical Control Owner

Critical Control Monitoring Req'ts /

Risk Indicators

Critical Control Management System

Risk Management activities are not conducted to a standard

Formal, documented and auditable Integrated Operational Risk Management processes

HSE Supt HSE Manager Ensure that Risk Management at a functional, process or project level occurs to standard


Change management activities are not conducted to a standard

Formal, documented Change Management processes

HSE Supt HSE Manager Ensure that PHMP Change Management occurs to standard


Change management activities are not conducted to a standard

Formal, documented Change Management processes

HSE Supt HSE Manager Ensure that Change Management at a functional, process or project level occurs to standard


Senior Management review of the CCMS is not conducted

Site Senior Executive Statutory and Corporate Obligations

HSE Supt HSE Manager Ensure the following is undertaken: • Systemised monitoring of Processes, Hazard Inventories and Control Effectiveness have been identified, are in place, effective, comprehensive and working. • Critical Control Assurance Actions (quality) are occurring to standard

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Critical Control




Risk Indicators


Critical Control strategies are not maintained

Formal, documented and auditable Integrated Operational Risk Management processes - Identified Critical Controls that are • Specific • Measureable • Attainable • Realistic • Timely • Evaluated and • Reviewed - Formal Critical Control Monitoring System - Formal System Integrity Controls

HSE Supt HSE Manager Ensure the following is undertaken: • Systemised monitoring of Principal Hazard Risks and Controls have been identified, are in place, effective, comprehensive and working. • Critical Control Assurance Actions (quality) are occurring to standard


Existing control strategies are NOT updated based on the findings from Incidents [at site and other places]

Formal, documented and auditable Learning from Incidents processes - Formal Critical Control Monitoring System - Formal System Integrity Controls

HSE Supt

HSE Manager Ensure Actions from incidents related to PHMP’s are being, tracked to completion, and completed to standard (quality)

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Critical Control




Risk Indicators


Hard barrier controls are not installed in accordance with standards

Formal, documented and auditable Construction Standards, Installation Standards, Panel Standards - Statutory Inspections - Formal Critical Control Monitoring System - Formal System Integrity Controls

HSE Supt HSE Manager Ensure Principal hazard control installation standard checks or inspections are in place; effective, comprehensive, and working (e.g. seal construction standards, etc.)


Early indications of increased levels of risks are not defined, identified or acted upon

Formal, documented and auditable Integrated Operational Risk Management processes - Formal Principal Hazard Management Plans, Principal Control Management Plans - Site Risk & Critical Control Register - Critical Control Monitoring System - Formal System Integrity Controls

UMM HSE Manager Ensure TARPs are relevant and utilised within scope


Inspections are not completed to required standards

Formal, documented and Mine Inspections risk assessment and inspection SOPs

UMM HSE Manager

Ensure that Mine Inspections are completed to standard (including inspection quality, timeliness, & reporting quality).

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Critical Control




Risk Indicators


Control Room does not recognise early signs of increasing risks and does not initiate timely defined response

Formal Principal Hazard Management Plans that incorporate Trigger Action Response Plans - Critical Control Monitoring System

UMM HSE Manager Ensure that TARPs are applied in-line with requirements to manage the hazard and response to alarms in Control Room are as per TARP’s


Coal Mine Workers are unfamiliar with the requirements of the PHMP and CCMS processes

Comprehensive Training Needs Analysis - Authorised Mine Training Scheme - SceanarioTES training recording and monitoring system

UMM HSE Manager Ensure: • Personnel have received effective training on PHMP’s (Multiple Fatality Hazard Awareness) • TARP familiarisation and response training is effective and ongoing


Assurance on the maintenance of CCMS is not maintained

Formal Critical Control Monitoring System that assigns specific accountabilities, frequencies and Technical Requirements for implementing and assuring that Critical Controls are in place and remain effectives - System Integrity controls to assure that the CCMS itself remains effective

SHE Supt

HSE Manager Ensure that Critical Control Assurance Actions are being scheduled as per PHMP’s and all changes are authorised through Change Management and/or document control.

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Critical Control




Risk Indicators


Effective critical control strategies are not maintained

Formal Critical Control Monitoring System that assigns specific accountabilities, frequencies and Technical Requirements for implementing and assuring that Critical Controls are in place and remain effectives - System Integrity controls to assure that the CCMS itself remains effective

She Supt HSE Manager Ensure that Systemised monitoring of Principal Hazards controls is effective and Critical Control Actions are being completed as scheduled.

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5. Operational Structures

5.1 Management Structure

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6.2 SHMS Document Structure

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6. Roles and Responsibilities

Core responsibilities to ensure the ongoing effectiveness of the control strategies identified by the

Integrated Operational Risk Management and integrated into the site Safety and Health Management

System are:

Role Responsibility

All Employees & Contractors

o Comply with, and apply, standards as defined in Grosvenor systems, plans, and

procedures

o Regularly check for, and where possible control and /or report, possible hazards in

the work area

o Do not enter any area that has not been inspected

o Take action in line with alarm protocols and the Trigger Action Response Plan

o Complete Critical Control Activities to standard

o To the extent of the worker’s or person’s capability, participate in and conform to

the risk management practices of the mine

o Rectify defects to standard in timely manner where possible.

o Report defects which cannot be rectified.

o Always ensure that you know TARP levels

o Always follow your training in an Emergency

ERZ Controller o Notify the Shift Supervisor of any abnormal conditions

o Suspend mining operations if there are conditions present that contain an

unacceptable level of risk

o Ensure that gas monitoring installations are maintained at the necessary standard,

o Ensure that gas monitors are advanced in line with panel advancement/retreat,

o Report any unusual gas emissions to the Ventilation Officer.

o Act immediately to control and /or report, possible hazards in the work area

o Take action in line with alarm protocols and the Trigger Action Response Plans

o Complete Critical Control Activities to standard

o Complete Self Audits under this plan to standard

o Communicate to standard as specified in this plan

Undermanager o Complete ERZ Controller activities to standard

o Suspend mining activities if warning signs present an unacceptable level of risk

o Audit this plan per Critical Control Assurance action, and Self-audit actions

o Take action on notification of any abnormal conditions

o Audit and review monitoring controls

o Act to control and /or report, possible hazards in the work area

o Complete Critical Control Activities & Critical Control Assurance Actions under this

plan to standard

o Audit this plan as per Critical Control Assurance Activities, and Audit and

Management sections of this document

o Communicate as per Communication Section this document

UMM o Complete Critical Control Activities & Critical Control Assurance Actions under this

plan to standard

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o Communicate as per Communication Section this document

o Authorise changes to PHMP Critical Control Actions, Critical Control Assurance

Actions, and Critical Control Assurance Action Checklists after due regard to:

• the effectiveness of the change in controlling the Principal Hazard, and

the risk of Human Error

HS&E Manager o Communicate as per Communication Section of this document

o Complete activities as per Critical Control Assurance Actions section of this

document

Training Superintendent

o Ensure a system of training is present that trains new starters in the required areas

of Critical Control

o Refresher training conducted for permanent employee’s as per Training

o Section of this document

Site Senior Executive

o Ensure consistent ongoing management and review of this plan and to trigger,

review and authorise any changes to this document

o Ensure that this plan is implemented across the operation

o Authorise changes to PHMP Critical Control Actions, Critical Control Assurance

Actions, and Critical Control Assurance Action Checklists after due regard to the

effectiveness of the change in controlling the Principal Hazard

ROLE RESPONSIBILITIES

7. Resources Required

In addition to the general provision of sufficient resources to enable the site Safety and Health

Management System to be effective, Grosvenor Mine commits to provide the following specific resources:

RESOURCE

• Resources (time, competency and/or experience) necessary to complete Critical Control

Assurance Actions to the nominated standard (quality)

• SSE visual felt leadership in the completion of Critical Control Audits to the nominated standard

(quality)

8. Trigger Action Response Plans

No specific TARP’s have been identified for this plan.

9. Communication

Information pertaining to this plan shall be communicated to all coal mine workers at Grosvenor mine in

accordance with the HSE Communication System. PERSON RESPONSIBLE DE

10. Training

Generic training requirements are specified in the Mine Training Scheme with basic understanding of the

SHMS incorporated in this scheme and delivered through Induction Programs/Refreshers.

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Training modules specific to this plan are -NNEL GROU

Module Description

Fre

qu

en

cy

Personnel Group

Op

era

tors

&

Tra

de

sm

en

Cre

w

Su

pe

rvis

ors

an

d

Co

ord

ina

tors

P

rod

uc

tio

n

Sta

ff

Te

ch

nic

al

Sta

ff

Oth

er

Sta

ff

Pe

rso

nn

el a

nd

Co

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ac

tors

Basic Principal Hazard Management System

Introduction and basic explanation of Integrated Operational Risk Management process, the Safety and Health Management System, the SHMS Mine Overview Plan, all Principal Hazard Management Plans and the Critical Controls Management System

Induction & Refresher

11. Corrective Action

Corrective Actions/Defects will be reported using the Hazard, Defect and Incident Management System

and will be recorded and managed in Enablon.

12. Audit and Management Review

The SSE shall ensure that the Critical Control audits detailed in the Critical Control Management system

integrated with Enablon, including the System Integrity controls, are completed at the designated times.

The Plan shall be subject to a program of auditing to determine whether the mine activities conform to the

Plan, and whether the arrangements in the Plan are adequate, implemented and effective. This program

shall include:

• Internal critical control auditing on a yearly basis, and

• External auditing every 3 years (e.g. OMS, OCA and GTS auditing).

• The audit findings shall be acted upon through the corrective action process and review

mechanisms.

• Internal and external audits of the Plan will be identified in the mine Audit Schedule.

In undertaking any review the Document Owner must be cognitive that the PHMS is an integrated

system. Subsequent revisions to this document or system should only be done with a defined

understanding of the basis and structure of the entire “as developed” system.

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13. Records

Legislation requires that the following records related to the Integrated Operational Risk Management

process, the Safety and Health Management System, the SHMS Mine Overview Plan, all Principal

Hazard Management Plans and the Critical Controls Management System be maintained and kept at the

mine site:

o Any risk assessment while ever the hazard is present at the mine

Additionally the following records are to be kept:

o Hazard, Defect and Incident Reports

o Critical Control audit findings

14. Legislation

The Integrated Operational Risk Management process, the Safety and Health Management System, the

SHMS Mine Overview Plan, all Principal Hazard Management Plans and the Critical Controls

Management System have been developed in accordance with the requirements of the Coal Mining

Safety and Health Act (CMSHA) 1999, and the Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2001.

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15. Appendix I Control Effectiveness Matrix

Control Type 6 Elimination: the complete elimination of the hazard by design

5 Substitution / Minimise: replacing the hazard, material or

process with a less hazardous one, or significantly the magnitude

of the hazard or material so consequences are greatly reduced

4 Engineering: incorporate controls into the design or redesign

the equipment or work process

3 Separation: placing a physical barrier on the hazard by

guarding or enclosing it

2 Administrative / Procedural: providing control such as

training and procedures

1 Personal Protective Equipment: use of appropriate and

properly fitted PPE where other controls are not practical

Control Quality

Co

ntr

ol T

yp

e

A >90%

B 60-

90%

C 30-

60%

D <30%

6 Elimination

5 Substitution

4 Engineering

3 Separation

2 Administrative

1 PPE

Control Quality

• Reliability: will the control operate on demand as intended

• Survivability: will the control remain unimpaired during the unwanted event

• Availability: will the control be available to perform its function

The Control Effectiveness method provides four percentage categories that express an overall opinion of reliability, survivability and availability. A- 90% or more of the time the control will operate, survive and

function as required B- 60 to 90% of the time the control will operate, survive and

function as required C- 30 to 60% the control will operate, survive and function as

required D- Less than 30% of the time the control will operate, survive

and function as required

Control Effectiveness A GREEN control rating indicates that the control should be effective. This is the desired effectiveness of every control but the matrix indicates that even a 90% quality Administrative or PPE control is not considered to be an effective control. The intent of this design is to promote the development and application of harder controls such as Engineering or Substitution A YELLOW control rating indicates a satisfactory control that could be improved to a green either through improving its Quality or by changing its Type. Yellow controls should be improved first if total control effectiveness for an unwanted event is inadequate RED control rating indicates that the control does not contribute effectively to reducing the risk of an unwanted event. The CER method provides a rating for each control. Overall Event Control Effectiveness is a summary of the total effectiveness of all controls. To establish this overall status the set of controls and their CER ratings should be examined. The decision that the set is adequate can be tested by the rule :- There should be two GREEN preventative controls for every cause of a priority unwanted event

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16. Appendix II Business Unit Risk Matrix

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BUSINESS UNIT RISK MATRIX

CONSEQUENCE (Where an event has more than one ‘Consequence Type’, choose the ‘Consequence Type’ with the highest rating)

Consequence Type 1 - Insignificant 2 - Minor 3 - Moderate 4 - High 5 - Major

Projects

Schedule Less than 1% impact on overall project timeline

May result in overall project timeline overrun equal to or more than 1% and less than 3%

May result in overall project timeline overrun of equal to or more than 3% and less than 10%

May result in overall project timeline overrun of equal to or more than 10% and less than 30%

May result in overall project timeline overrun of 30% or more

Cost Less than 1% impact on the overall budget of the project

May result in overall project budget overrun equal to or more than 1% and less than 3%

May result in overall project budget overrun of equal to or more than 3% and less than 10%

May result in overall project budget overrun of equal to or more than 10% and less than 30%

May result in overall project budget overrun of 30% or more

Quality and Technical Integrity

No significant impact on quality of deliverables or effect on production

Quality issues that can be addressed prior to handover or could affect production by more than 1% and less than 3%

Quality issues that can be addressed during ramp-up or could affect production by more than 3% and less than 10%

Quality issues that require significant intervention to maintain performance or could affect production by more than 10% and less than 30%

Quality issues that require significant intervention to achieve performance or could affect production by 30% or more

Financial (Use PDBI Values as guidance)

No disruption to operation / Less than 1% loss of budgeted operating profit and listed assets

Brief disruption to operation / 1 % to less than 3% loss of budgeted operating profit and listed assets

Partial shutdown of operation / 3 % to less than 10% loss of budgeted operating profit and listed assets

Partial loss of operation / 10% to less than 30% loss of budgeted operating profit and listed assets

Substantial or total loss of operation / 30% or higer loss of budgeted operating profit and listed assets

Safety First aid case Medical treatment case Lost time injury Permanent disability or single fatality

Numerous permanent disabilities or multiple fatalities

Occupational Health Exposure to health hazard resulting in temporary discomfort

Exposure to health hazard resulting in symptoms requiring medical intervention and full recovery (no lost time)

Exposure to health hazards/ agents (over the OEL) resulting in reversible impact on health (with lost time) or permanent change with no disability or loss of quality of life

Exposure to health hazards/ agents (significantly over the OEL) resulting in irreversible impact on health with loss of quality of life or single fatality

Exposure to health hazards/ agents (significantly over the OEL) resulting in irreversible impact on health with loss of quality of life of a numerous group/population or multiple fatalities

Environment Lasting days or less; limited to small area (metres); receptor of low significance/ sensitivity (industrial area)

Lasting weeks; reduced area (hundreds of metres); no environmentally sensitive species/ habitat)

Lasting months; impact on an extended area (kilometres); area with some environmental sensitivity (scarce/ valuable environment).

Lasting years; impact on sub-basin; environmentally sensitive environment/ receptor (endangerous species/ habitats)

Permanent impact; affects a whole basin or region; highly sensitive environment (endangerous species, wetlands, protected habitats)

Legal & Regulatory Technical non-compliance. No warning received; no regulatory reporting required

Breach of regulatory requirements; report/involvement of authority. Attracts administrative fine

Minor breach of law; report/investigation by authority. Attracts compensation/ penalties/ enforcement action

Breach of the law; may attract criminal prosecution, penalties/ enforcement action. Individual licence temporarily revoked

Significant breach of the law. Individual or company law suits; permit to operate substantially modified or withdrawn

Social / Communities Minor disturbance of culture/ social structures

Some impacts on local population, mostly repairable. Single stakeholder complaint in reporting period

On going social issues. Isolated complaints from community members/ stakeholders

Significant social impacts. Organized community protests threatening continuity of operations

Major widespread social impacts. Community reaction affecting business continuity. “License to operate” under jeopardy

Reputation Minor impact; awareness/ concern from specific individuals

Limited impact; concern/ complaints from certain groups/ organizations (e.g. NGOs)period

Local impact; public concern/ adverse publicity localised within neighbouring communities

Suspected reputational damage; local/ regional public concern and reactions

Noticeable reputational damage; national/ international public attention and repercussions

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CONSEQUENCE

1 - Insignificant 2 - Minor 3 - Moderate 4 - High 5 - Major

LIKELIHOOD RISK RATING

5 Almost Certain 1 year

The unwanted event has occurred frequently; occurs in order of one or more times per year & is likely to reoccur within 1 year

11 (Medium)

16 (Significant)

20 (Significant)

23 (High)

25 (High)

4 - Likely 3 years

The unwanted event has occurred infrequently; occurs in order of less than once per year & is likely to reoccur within 3 years

7 (Medium)

12 (Medium)

17 (Significant)

21 (High)

24 (High)

3 - Possible 10 years

The unwanted event has happened in the business at some time; or could happen within 10 years

4 (Low)

8 (Medium)

13 (Significant)

18 (Significant)

22 (High)

2 – Unlikely 30 years

The unwanted event has happened in the business at some time; or could happen within 30 years

2 (Low)

5 (Low)

9 (Medium)

14 (Significant)

19 (Significant)

1 - Rare >30 years

The unwanted event has never been known to occur in the business; or it is highly unlikely that it will occur within 30 years

1 (Low)

3 (Low)

6 (Medium)

10 (Medium)

15 (Significant)

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grosvenor coal mine underground operations

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