he ap racker · the nap tracker the first year audit of the national action plan rule of law -...

THE NAP TRACKERTHE NAP TRACKERTHE NAP TRACKERThe First Year Audit of the National Action PlanThe First Year Audit of the National Action PlanThe First Year Audit of the National Action Plan

Rule of Law - Security - Governance

WITH ANALYSIS BY:

Ahmer Bilal Soo�i

Amir Zia

Ehsan Sadiq

Faisal Ali Raja

Farhan Zahid

Shoaib Suddle

Imtiaz Gul

Madiha Latif

Raza Rumi

Shehzada Zul�iqar

Sher Ali Khalti

Shiraz Paracha

Yawar Ali Khan

Zaair Hussain

Zeeshan Salahuddin

Table of Contents

Acronyms 4

The NAP Tracker 9

Introduction 9

Acknowledgements 17

NationalActionPlan:AComment,byDr.ShoaibSuddle 18

Part 1: Moratorium Lifted 21

1.1Introduction 21

1.2MethodsofExecution 21

1.3WorldwideComparison 21 1.4ExecutionsbyMonthSinceDecember,2014 24

1.5ControversiesandCriticism 25

1.6DoestheDeathPenaltyServeasaDeterrent? 29

1.7Conclusion 30

1.8:OPINION:Unpardonable,byZaairHussain 31

Part 2: Military Courts 33

2.1Introduction 33

2.2ARTICLE:MilitaryCourts:OldFears,NewHopes,

bySherAliKhalti 35

2.3NumberofCasesandOutcomes 40

2.4ControversiesandCriticism 40

2.5MilitaryCourtsaroundtheWorld 42

2.6Conclusion 43

2.7OPINION:MilitaryCourts,byAhmerBilalSoofi 44

Part 3: Proscribed Organizations 47

3.1Introduction 47

3.2ListofProscribedOrganizationsinPakistan 47

3.3MeasuresagainstProscribedOrganizations 51

3.4OPINION:Whatdoestheterm“proscribed”solve?

byZeeshanSalahuddin 62

3.5OPINION:MessagesofTerror,byFaisalAliRaja 64

3.6OPINION:TheNationalActionPlanandCybercrime, 67

byMadihaLatif

Part 4: Counterterrorism 71

4.1Introduction 71

4.2NationalCounterTerrorismAuthority(NACTA) 73

4.3CPECSecurity 76

4.4SpecialAnti-TerrorismForce/PakistanSpecial

ServicesGroup 79

4.5CaseStudy:Punjab 80 4.6OPINION:Ensuringagainstre-emergenceofproscribed

outfits,byDr.FarhanZahid 83

Part 5: Sectarianism 87

5.1Introduction 87

5.2MinoritiesinPakistan 87

5.3GovernmentProgressagainstSpreading

Hatred/Sectarianism 91

5.4TheCouncilofIslamicIdeology(CII) 93

5.5HowNAPChangedPakistaninaYearbyDr.EhsanSadiq 95

Part 6: Local Conflicts 99

6.1Introduction 99

6.2FATAReforms 99

6.3FATA:OperationZarb-e-Azb 101

6.4:KarachiOperation 103

6.5:BaluchistanInsurgency 107

6.6ARTICLE:FATAReforms:thePoliticalEconomy,

byImtiazGul 110

6.7OPINION:NAPistogoalongwayinKP/FATA,

byShirazPracha 115

6.8OPINION:Karachi’sWoes,byAmirZia 119

6.9OPINION:TheBalochistanSaga,byShahzadaZulfiqar 121

Part 7: Seminaries 127

7.1Introduction 127

7.2SeminariesinPakistan 127

7.3UnderstandingSeminaries 131

7.4HistoryofSeminaryReforms 132

7.5Funding/FinancingofSeminaries 133

7.6Obstacles 134

7.7Conclution 134

Part 8: Refugees and IDPs 137

8.1Introduction 137

8.2Refugees 137

8.3InternallyDisplacedPersons(IDPs) 142

8.4Refugees-Worldwide 144

8.5OPINION:IDPs,RefugeesandTheNationalActionPlan,

byImtiazGul 146

Part 9: Criminal Courts 153

9.1Introduction 153

9.2TheCriminalProcedureCodeofPakistan 153

9.3ProgressonLegalReforms 155

9.4OPINION:CRPCReforms:TheWayForward,

byYawarAliKhan 157

Part 10: Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 161

10.1:HasthePost-JihadMomentArrived?byRazaRumi 161

10.2:RecommendationsonthePathForward,

byZeeshanSalahuddin 170

10.3:PolicyRecommendations 172

Annex I: Executions 176

Annex II: The Twenty Points in The National Action Plan 189

Annex III: Death Penalty Offenses 191

Annex IV: Military Court Verdicts 192

Annex V: Proscribed Organizations by the Interior Ministry 194

Annex VI: Laws Pertaining to Minorities 197

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4 © Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

Acronyms# Acronyms

1 ADR AlternativeDisputeResolution

2 AeI-B Anjuman-e-IttehadBalochan

3 AHF AIHarmainFoundation

4 AJK AzadJammuKashmir

5 AL AwamiLeague

6 AMLA Anti-MoneyLaunderingAct

7 ANP AwamiNationalParty

8 ANSF Afghan’sNationalSecurityForces

9 APC AllPartiesConference

10 APMSO AllPakistanMohajirStudentsOrganization

11 APS ArmyPublicSchool

12 AQ Al-Qaeda

13 ASWJ Ahl-e-SunnatWalJamaat

14 ATA Anti-TerrorismAct

15 ATCs Anti-TerrorismCourts

16 BLA BalochLiberationArmy

17 BLF BalochistanLiberationFront

18 BLUF BalochistanLiberationUnitedFront

19 BMDT BalochistanMusallaDefaTanzeem

20 BRA BalochRepublicanArmy

21 BRP BalochRepublicanParty

22 BSO-A BalochStudentsOrganizationsAzad

23 BVS BiometricVerificationSystem

24 CFT CombatingtheFinancingofTerrorism

25 CIED CommissionofInquiryonEnforcedDisappearances

26 CII CouncilofIslamicIdeology

27 CM ChiefMinister

28 COAS ChiefofArmyStaff

29 CPEC ChinaPakistanEconomicCorridor

30 CrPC CodeofCriminalProcedure

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5© Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

31 CSTC ChinaShipTradingCompany

32 CT CounterTerrorism

33 CTD CounterTerrorismDepartment

34 DG DirectorGeneral

35 DHA DefenseHousingAuthority

36 DIK DeraIsmailKhan

37 ETIM EastTurkestanIslamicMovement

38 EU EuropeanUnion

39 FATA FederallyAdministeredTribalAreas

40 FC FrontierCorps

41 FCR FrontierCrimesRegulations

42 FIA FederalInvestigationAgency

43 FIF Filah-i-InsaniatFoundation

44 FIR FirstInformationReport

45 FMU FinancialMonitoringUnit

46 GB GilgitBaltistan

47 HRC HumanRightsCommittee

48 HRCP HumanRightsCommissionofPakistan

49 HRW HumanRightsWatch

50 IB IntelligenceBureau

51 ICCPR InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights

52 ICG InternationalCrisisGroup

53 ICJ InternationalCommissionofJurists

54 ICT IslamabadCapitalTerritory

55 IDPs InternallyDisplacedPersons

56 IGP InspectorGeneralofPunjabPolice

57 IHL InternationalHumanitarianLaw

58 IJU IslamicJihadUnion

59 IMCWE Inter-MinisterialCommitteeforWebsiteEvaluation

60 IMU IslamicMovementofUzbekistan

61 IPC Inter-ProvincialCoordination

62 IS IslamicState

63 ISI InterServicesIntelligence

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64 ISPR Inter-ServicesPublicRelations

65 ITMP Ittehad-e-Tanzeemat-e-MadarisPakistan

66 IVBMP InternationalVoiceforBalochMissingPersons

67 JeM Jaish-e-Muhammad

68 JI Jamaat-e-Islami

69 JPP JusticeProjectPakistan

70 JSMM JeaySindhMuttahidaMahaz

71 JuA Jamaat-ul-Ahrar

72 JuD Jamaat-ud-Dawa

73 JUI Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam

74 KP KhyberPukhtunkhwa

75 LEA LawEnforcementAgency

76 LeB Lashkar-e-Balochistan

77 LeJ Laskhar-e-Jhangvi

78 LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba

79 MCS MilitaryCourtsServices

80 MIP Millet-e-IslamiPakistan

81 MNA MemberNationalAssembly

82 MOFA MinistryofForeignAffairs

83 MoIT MinistryofInformationTechnology

84 MPA MemberProvincialAssembly

85 MQM MuttahidaQaumiMovement

86 MQM-H MuttahidaQaumiMovement-Haqiqi

87 MSO MuslimStudentsOrganization

88 NA NationalAssembly

89 NACTA NationalCounterTerrorismAuthority

90 NADRA NationalDataRegistrationAuthority

91 NAP NationalActionPlan

92 NATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization

93 NFC NationalFinanceCommission

94 NRC NorwegianRefugeeCouncil

95 NRCC NationalResponseCentreforCyberCrime

96 NWA NorthWaziristan

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97 NWFP North-WestFrontierProvince

98 PA PoliticalAgent

99 PAC People’sAmanCommittee

100 PECB PakistanElectronicCrimeBill

101 PEMRA PakistanElectronicMediaRegulatoryAuthority

102 PITRO PunjabInformationofTemporaryResidentsOrdinance

103 PML-N PakistanMuslimLeague-Nawaz

104 PPA/PoPA ProtectionofPakistanAct

105 PPC PakistanPenalCode

106 PPP PakistanPeople’sParty

107 PRC ProofofRegistrationCard

108 PSSG PakistanSpecialServiceGroup

109 PTA PakistanTelecommunicationAuthority

110 PTI PakistanTehreek-e-Insaf

111 PUC PakistanUlemaCouncil

112 RAF RoyalAirForce

113 RAW ResearchandAnalysisWing

114 RN RoyalNavy

115 RRU Rehabilitation&ReconstructionUnit

116 RT RabitaTrust

117 SAC SummaryAppealCourt

118 SAFRON FederalMinistryofStatesandFrontierRegions

119 SATP SouthAsiaTerrorismPortal

120 SBCA SindhBuildingControlAuthority

121 SBP StateBankofPakistan

122 SC SupremeCourt

123 SCBA SupremeCourtBarAssociation

124 SCC ServiceCivilianCourt

125 SCP SupremeCourtofPakistan

126 SEARCCT SoutheastAsiaRegionalCentreforCounterTerrorism

127 SMP Sepah-e-MuhammadPakistan

128 SSG SpecialServicesGroup

129 SSP Sipah-e-SahabaPakistan

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130 STR SuspiciousTransactionReport

131 SWA SouthWaziristanAgency

132 TGG TariqGeedarGroup

133 TI Tehreek-e-Islami

134 TNA TanzeemNaujawana-e-AhleSunnat

135 TNSM Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammad

136 TTB Tehrik-e-TalibanBajaur

137 TTM Tehrik-e-TalibanMohmand

138 TTP Tehreek-e-Taliban,Pakistan

139 TTS Tehrik-e-TalibanSwat

140 UBA UnitedBalochArmy

141 UK UnitedKingdom

142 UN UnitedNations

143 UNHCR UnitedNationsCommissionerforRefugees

144 UNRWA UnitedNationsReliefandWorksAgency

145 UNSCR UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution

146 US UnitedStates

147 WoT WaronTerror

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The nAPTrAckerInTroDUcTIonTheNAPTrackerinitiativeaimstomeasurethe progressmade on theNational ActionPlan(NAP),enactedonDecember25,2014,following the horrendous attack on inno-cent schoolchildren in Peshawar, KhyberPukhtunkhwa(KP).Terroristsbrokeintothethe Army Public School in Peshawar Can-tonement area of Peshawar city in KhyberPukhtunkhwaprovince.Thetargetedteachersandschoolchildrenindiscriminant-ly,killing132youngchildrenintheprocess.Theincident,theworstattackofter-rorinPakistan’shistory,wasaparadigmshiftforPakistan.Inastateofnationalgrief,theNAPemergedasabeaconofhopeforabeleagurednationgalvanizedbytragedy.Thepurposeofthedocumentwastoexactacomprehensivestrategytoeliminatethethreatofextremismandmilitancyinthecountry.

Upuntil thatpoint,Pakistanhadalreadysuffered tremendously in theWaronTerror(WoT),bothintermsofinfrastructureandhumanlife.Dependingonwhichsourceyouquote,thelossoflifeisestimatedbetween60,000to82,000souls.Civiliansaccountforwelloverathird,andwelloverhalfofthosefiguresrespec-tively.Despitesuchadrasticnumberofindividualsdyingduringthisperiod,theNAPwasenacted11yearsintotheconflict.

Belated implementationnotwithstanding,onpaper, theNAP isagoodstart toeliminateandrootoutterrorismfromthecountry.BearinmindthattheideaspresentedintheNAPareneithernovel,norinnovative.Theyhavebeenaroundatleastaslongasthisconflict,andsome,suchasseminaryregistration/reform,evenlongerthanthat.TheimplementationofNAPcanbeclassifiedas‘extreme-ly successful’or ‘woefully inadequate’,dependingon thecriteriausedand thestakeholdersquoted.Thisreportattemptstocoverbothaspectsofthedebate.

InthewakeoftheNAP,16committeeswereformedtomonitorprogressontheNAPalongavarietyofvectorsandparameters.Thesecommittees,theirheadsandmembersareasfollows:

The Themes1.MoratoriumLifted2.MilitaryCourts3.ProscribedOrganizations4.Counterterrorism5.Sectarianism/Minorities6.LocalConflicts7.Seminaries8.Refugees/IDPs9.CriminalJusticeSystem

Theseninethemeshavebeenderivedfromthe20pointsoftheNAP.

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# Committee Head Member

1. Maincommittee

NawazSharif,PrimeMinister

• ChaudhryNisar,InteriorMinister

• IshaqDar,FinanceMinister

• AhsanIqbal,PlanningMinister

• PervaizRasheed,InformationMinister

• KhawajaAsif,DefenseMinister

• AbdulQadirBaloch,SAFRONMinister

• SardarMehtab,KPGovernor

• SartajAziz,SpecialAdvisortothePrimeMinister

• ZafarullahKhan,SpecialAssistanttothePrimeMinister

2. Armed militias

ChaudhryNisar,InteriorMinister

• Lt.GeneralRizwanAkhtar,DirectorGeneralInter-ServicesIntelligence

• AftabSultan,DirectorGeneralIntelli-genceBureau

• Maj.GeneralAamerRiaz,DirectorGeneralMilitaryOperations

• MuhammadAzamKhan,ProvincialHomeSecretaryoftheFederallyAdministeredTribalAreas

• Ch.MuhammadBarjeesTahir,Pro-vincialHomeSecretaryGilgit-Baltis-tanandAzadJammuandKashmir

• ArifAhmedKhan,InteriorSecretary

• IhsanGhani,NationalCoordinatoroftheNationalCounterTerrorismAuthority

3. Hate speech,extremist-material


• SardarMuhammadYousaf,MinisterofReligiousAffairs

• AhsanIqbal,PlanningMinister



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• MuhammadMalick,ManagingDirec-tor PakistanTelevision

• Maj.(R)AzamSuleman,HomeSecre-taryPunjab

• Capt.(R)MunirAzam,HomeSecre-taryKP

• MumtazAliShah,HomeSecretarySindh

• AkbarDurrani,HomeSecretaryBalochistan

• SyedAbdulMananAgha,SecretaryReligiousAffairs&InterfaithHarmo-ny,Balochistan

• Dr.BazMuhammadJunejo,Secre-taryAuqaf,ReligiousAffairs,Zakat&UshrDepartment,Sindh

• Mr.AbdullahKhanMehsud,Secre-taryAuqaf,Hajj,Religious&MinorityAffairs,KP

• MuhammadSaqibAziz,SecretaryAuqafDepartment,Punjab



4. Financesofterrorist Organisa-tions

IshaqDar,Fed-eralFinanceMinister

• AshrafMehmoodWathra,GovernorStateBank



• TariqBajwa,ChairmanFederalBoardofRevenue

• AkbarHoti,DirectorGeneralFederalInvestigationAgency

• WaqarMasoodKhan,FinanceSec-retary

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5. Re-emer-genceof bannedorganisa-tions




• MuhammadMalick,ManagingDirec-tor PakistanTelevision





• HamidAliKhan,theInteriorSecre-tary

6. Counter terrorismforce



• KhawajaAsif,DefenceMinister

• Maj.GeneralAamerRiaz,DirectorGeneralMilitaryOperations

• Dr.WaqarMasoodKhan,FederalSecretaryFinanceDivision

7. Religiouspersecu-tion




• SardarMuhammadYousaf,MinisterandSecretaryofReligiousAffairs

• AllProvincialPoliceOfficers

• ZafarIqbalAwan,InspectorGeneralofPoliceofGilgitBaltistan

• MalikKhudaBakhshAwan,Inspec-tor GeneralofPoliceofAzadJam-muKashmirandIslamabadCapitalTerritory



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8. Madrassahregulation


• SardarMuhammadYousaf,MinisterandSecretaryofReligiousAffairs

• BalighurRehman,StateMinisterEducation









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9. Terroristglorifiation bymedia

PervezRash-eed,Informa-tionMinister

• ChaudhryNisar,InteriorMinister

• IrfanSiddiqui,SpecialAssistanttothePrimeMinister

• ZafarullahKhan,SpecialAssistanttothePrimeMinister

• Dr.NazirSaeed,InformationSecre-tary

10. FederallyAdmin-isteredTribalAreareforms

IqbalZafarJhagra,Gover-norKP


• Lt.General(R)AbdulQadirBaloch,SAFRONMinister

• TariqBajwa,SecretaryEconomicAffairs

• Lt.GeneralHidayaturRehman,CorpsCommander11thCorpsPesha-war

• MohammadAzamKhan,ChiefSec-retaryFederallyAdministeredTribalAreas

11. Disman-tlingterror-ist commu-nicationnetworks


• AnushaRahman,MinisterofStateforInformationTechnologyandTele-communications

12. Karachioperation


• IshratulIbad,GovernorSindh

• QaimAliShah,ChiefMinisterSindh

• Maj.GeneralBilalAkbar,DirectorGeneralRangers

13. Punjab ChaudhryNisar,Interior11


• AftabSultan,Director-GeneraloftheIntelligenceBureau


• ProvincialPoliceOfficers

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14. Sectarianterrorism


• AftabSultan,DirectorGeneraloftheIntelligenceBureau





• ProvincialPoliceOfficers



15. Afghanrefugees


• IqbalZafarJhagra,GovernorKP

• Lt.General(R)AbdulQadirBaloch,SAFRONminister

• UsmanYousafMobeen,ChairmanoftheNationalDatabaseandRegistra-tionAuthority

16. Criminaljusticereforms







• Justice(R)MuhammadRazaKhan,IntelligenceBureauandLawSecre-tary


• JointIntelligenceX,theSecretariatofInterServiceIntelligence

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NAP Tracker

TheauditisforthefirstyearoftheNAP,orthirteenmonthstobeprecise.Theex-tramonthisaddedbecausethestatemachinerytookawhiletorespondtosuchaheavymandate,andresearchersonthisreportfeltthata13-monthauditwouldofferabetteroverallpicture.Thethirteenmonthperiodalsoallowsustolookattheentireoftheyear2015duringthistimeperiod.AnysubsequentNAPTrackerreportswillrunfromthe1stofJanuarytothe31stofDecemberthefollowingyear,andthusaccountforprecisely12months.

Itmustalsobesaidthatthisreportwilllargelyignoreanystepsoutsidetheau-ditperiod.Forexample,ifPakistanpassedalawtoamendtheCrPCandensurespeedytrialsin2013,thatwillnotbeconsideredprogressundertheNAP,thoughitmaybereferenced.Further,thisreport,thefirstofitskind,isbasedprimarilyonopen-sourceinformation.Itistheintentionofthisthinktanktoexpandthescopeinsubsequentannualreports.

Inthisreport,thereareninethemes,andeachthememaybecomprisedofoneormorepointsintheNAP.Thiscategorizationcanbefoundatthebeginningofeachindividualsectioninatextboxtotheright.Theconcludingchaptercontainspolicyrecommendationsonawayforward.

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AcknowleDgemenTsThis reportwaswrittenandcompiledbyZeeshanSalahuddin, SeniorResearchFellow, and assisted by Farhana Kanwal, Research Associate, and Anam Fati-ma,ResearchIntern.TheresearcherswouldalsoliketothankMr.ImtiazGulforgreen-lightingthisinitiativeandforallhissupport.Wemustalsothankthefour-teenanalysts,subjectmatterexpertsandcolumnistswhohavecontributedtothisreport.

Specifically,theseincludeAhmerBilalSoofi,AmirZia,EhsanSadiq,FaisalAliRaja,FarhanZahid,ShoaibSuddle,ImtiazGul,MadihaLatif,RazaRumi,ShehzadaZu-lfiqar,SherAliKhalti,ShirazPracha,YawarAliKhanandZaairHussain.

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nATIonAl AcTIon PlAn: A commenT by Dr. Shoaib Suddle

The Pakistan government launched a twenty-point counter-terrorism NationalActionPlan(NAP),apparentlywiththeconsensusofmilitaryandmajorpoliticalparties,intheaftermathofDecember16,2014tragedywhenterroriststargetedArmyPublicSchool,Peshawar,killing140people,mostlyyoungstudents.Indeed,NAPwasregardedagamechangerinthenation’slongfightagainstterrorism.

Addressingahigh-levelmeetingonJanuary21,2015,thePrimeMinistervowedtomobilizeall state resources to ensure letter and spiritimplementationofNAP.HesaidtheleadershipandthenationstoodunitedtowipeoutterrorismandtheterroristswouldnotfindanysafehavensonthesoilofPakistan.“Theterroristswere theenemiesofstabilityandharmonyandeverystepwouldbe taken fortheircompleteelimination,”thePrimeMinistersaidonFebruary23,2015.

Unfortunately,notwithstandingthepoliticalelite’srhetoricoverthepastoneyear,thekeyaspectsofNAPhaveremainedmarredbypoorimplementationandlessthanprofessedoutcomes.Thesluggishperformanceincriticalareaslikerevamp-ingandreformingcriminal justicesystem;appointing joint investigationteams,specialprosecutorsandspecialtrialcourtsundertheProtectionofPakistanAct2014;strengtheningandactivationofNACTA;establishingJoint IntelligenceDi-rectorate; taking Karachi operation to its logical conclusion; dismantling terrorinfrastructure;chokingterrorfinancing;dismantlingradicalideologiesleadingtoextremismandterrorism;regulatingandmonitoringforeignfundingofseminar-ies; effectively deactivating proscribed organizations / sectarian networks; andreformingseminariescurriculumhascloudedeventheZarb-e-Azbandassociatedintelligence-basedoperations.

ThereareanumberofreasonsforthelacklusterperformanceofNAP.First,therequiredfundingforpromptimplementationofNAPwasneitherworkedoutnorearmarkedatthetimeofitslaunch.Noplan,muchlessaplanasgiganticasNAP,canhopetomakeadifferencewithoutadequateandsustainedfunding.

Second,notimelineswerespecifiedforimplementingspecificaspectsofNAP.Norwererespectiverolesandresponsibilitiesoffederalandprovincialgovernmentsandotherstakeholdersclearlydelineated.This resulted inavoidableconfusionand,resultantly,poorinteragencycoordination.

Third,thepotentiallyefficientandeffectivecounterterrorismtools–jointinves-tigationteams,dedicatedspecialistprosecutorsandtrialcourts,reverseburdenofproof-providedundertheProtectionofPakistanAct2014andmadepartof

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21stConstitutionalAmendmenthaveyettobecomeoperational.Theresultisthathardlyanyconvictionsofarrestedterroristsortheiraideshavetakenplaceotherthaninthemilitarycourts.

Fourth,asuccessfulKarachioperationof latehasgoneoutofsteamthanks tocriminalization of politics and politicization of law enforcement afflicting Paki-stan’sweakgovernancestructures.

Fifth,muchtalkedaboutreform,fundingcontrolandmonitoringofseminariesisnotbackedbyreliabledatalistingparticularsofteachersandseminariesthathaveactuallybeenbroughtto justiceorproceededagainstforaggressivelypursuingextremistagenda.Norhavedetailsofthosereceivingforeignfundingbeenmadepublic.TheresultisthattheskepticsareunconvincedabouttherealefficacyofNAP.

Sixth,realtimeinstitutionalizedsharingof intelligencebetweenrelevantstake-holdersisafarcryfromwhatNAP’spurposewas.

Seven,NACTAisstillstrugglingtostandonitsowntwofeet.TheBoardofGover-norsofNACTA,withPrimeMinisterasitsChairperson,isstatutorilyrequiredtomeetatleastonceeveryquarter.TheBoardhasn’tmetevenonceoverthepastthreeyears.ThisexplainswhereNACTAfitsonthegovernment’spriorityradar.

Eighth, inadequateandanachronisticpublicsafetycapacityhasremainedabigdebilitatingfactor.Likewise,reinventionandrevampingofpolicestation,theba-sicpoliceunit,andmediumtolong-termcriminaljusticereformneedhigherpri-orityontheNAPtrajectory.

Lastbutnotleast,withoutstrongpoliticalwillthetaskofbringingabouturgenttransformation of counterterrorism narrative and strategywill remain illusory.Whatisneededissincere,impassionedandrobustimplementationofNAPbyaboldandtrendingpoliticalandpublicsafetyleadership.Withouttotalownershipandunflinchingcommitmentandsustainedresolvetodelegitimizeextremistide-ologyanddismantle terrorist infrastructure, theexistential threat toPakistan’speaceandstabilitywillnotbetamedsooner.

Dr. Shoaib Suddle is a veteran police officer who has served multiple Inspector General posts. He is the foremost police and CrPC reform specialist in the coun-try. He can be reached at [email protected].

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PArT 1: morATorIUm lIFTeD1.1 Introduction

TheveryfirstpointintheNAP,andourfirsttheme,istheliftingofthemoratoriumthathadbeenineffectsince2008.Paki-stanPeople’sPartycameintopowerinthe2008elections,installingformerPrimeMinisterBenazirBhutto’shusbandAsifAliZardariasthePresident.Bhuttowasalifelongopponentofthedeathpenalty,andinherhonor,thepartyinstatedanindefinitemoratoriumonthedeathpenaltyinPakistan.

MostbelievethemoratoriumwasliftedaftertheArmyPublicSchool(APS)attackonDecember16, 2014. In actuality, themoratoriumhad come toanend twoyearsprior,whenaformersoldier,MuhammadHussainwashangedatCentralJailMianwali,onNovember14,2012afterbeingconvictedofmurderbyamilitarycourt1.TheenactmentofNAPdrasticallyacceleratedthisprocess,butthemora-toriumhadalreadybeenviolated.EvenaftertheAPSattack,thefirstexecutionsoccuredonDecember19,2014,sixdaysbeforetheNAPwasformalyannouncedandadopted.

1.2 Methods of Execution

Pakistanalmostexclusivelyuseshangingasitschosenmethodofexecution.Ston-ingwasalsolegislativelyintroducedin1990,however,ithasneverbeenusedasamethodofexecutionandwaslegislativelydemotedin20062.Variousothermeth-odsareusedaroundtheworld,includinglethalinjection,shooting,electrocution,stoningandseveralothers.

1.3 Worldwide Comparison

SinceNAP,andasofJanuary24,2016(thefirst13months),atotalof345individ-ualshavebeenhangedforvariouscrimesinPakistan3.Ofthese,327werehanged

1PakistanisoldierMuhammedHussainisexecutedformurder.(2012).RetrievedFebruary16,2016,fromhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20337183.2Habbard,A.(2007).Slowmarchtothegallows:DeathpenaltyinPakistan(PublicationNo.464/2).RetrievedFebruary14,2016,fromhttps://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/Pakistan464angconjointpdm.pdf.3SeeAnnexI:Executions.

morATorUm lIFTeDNAP POINT 1: Implementationofdeathsentenceofthosecon-victedincasesofterrorism.

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intheyear2015alone.Previously,2007wastheyearwiththemostnumberofexecutionsinthelastdecadeinPakistan,with134peopleexecuted.

Graph 1.1: Executions since 20044

The327executionsin2015placePakistanthirdintheworldintermsofthenum-berofindividualsexecutedbythestate.Chinaiswidelyrecognizedasthecoun-trywiththemostnumberofexecutions,butbecausethisdata isconsideredastate-secret,therearenoofficialfiguresavailable.Therewereanestimated2,400executionseachinChinain2013and20145.Thisisdownsignificantlyfrom2002,when an estimated 12,000peoplewere executed in China. Iran ranks second,

4Whohasbeenexecuted?(n.d.).RetrievedFebruary16,2016,fromhttp://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/who-has-been-executed/.5ChinaExecuted2,400Peoplein2013,DuiHua.RetrivedMay2,2016,fromhttp://duihua.org/wp/?page_id=9270#.VEYCPVN1sYg.twitter.

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withanestimated9696–1,0847peopleexecutedin2015,althoughthegovern-mentofficiallymaintainsthat364wereexecuted.Evenwhengovernmentcountisused,PakistanranksthirdintheworldintermsofexecutionsassumingChina’sunknowexecutionsrankhighest.ThisisfollowedbySaudiArabia,whichreport-edlyexecuted158peoplein20158.

Graph 1.2: Executions in 2015 by country9

6IHRDCChartofExecutionsbytheIslamicRepublicofIran-2015.(n.d.).RetrievedFebruary16,2016,fromhttp://www.iranhrdc.org/english/publications/human-rights-data/chart-of-execu-tions/1000000564-ihrdc-chart-of-executions-by-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-2015.html.7ReportedExecutions2015.(2016).RetrievedFebruary17,2016,fromhttps://iranrightsorg/.8CornellLawUniversity(2016).DeathPenaltyDatabase-SaudiArabia.RetrievedFebruary17,2016,fromhttp://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/country-search-post.cfm?country=SaudiArabia.9DeathPenaltyWorldwide-Executionsin2015.(n.d.).RetrievedFebruary16,2016,fromhttp://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/country-search-post.cfm

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# Country No. of Executions9

1 China Unknown

2 Iran 969/1081

3 Pakistan 327

4 SaudiArabia 158

5 USA 28

6 Indonesia 14

7 Somalia 13

8 Eqypt 12

1.4 Executions by Month Since December, 2014

Graph 1.3: Executions by month since December, 2014.

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Month Executions

December,2014 7

January,2015 13

February,2015 4

March,2015 42

April,2015 36

May,2015 39

June,2015 37

July,2015 22

August,2015 18

September,2015 25

October,2015 45

November,2015 10

December,2015 36

January,2016 11

October2015ranksthehighestwith45totalexecutionsinasinglemonth,andFebruary2015sawthefewestexecutionsat4.Asidefromaslowstart,Pakistanhasbeenfairlyconsistentlyexecutingjustunderoneconvictaday.

1.5 Controversies and Criticism

Thedecisiontoliftthemoratoriumhascomeundersignificantcriticismfrombothforeigngovernmentsandhumanrightsactivistsandorganizations.

1.5.1NumberofInmatesonDeathRow

Amnestyinternationalreportsthatover8,200arecurrentlyondeathrowinPaki-stan.10ThisfigureiscontradictedbyMinisterofStateforInteriorBaleeghurRah-man,whotoldtheSenateofPakistaninOctober2015that6,016prisonerswereondeathrowinthecountry’sjails.11 Eitherway,giventhecurrentrate,Pakistan

10Niaz,T.(2015,October07).Over6000condemnedprisonersinPakistan.RetrievedFebruary28,2016,fromhttp://nation.com.pk/national/07-Oct-2015/over-6000-condemned-prisoners-in-paki-stan.11Reprieve-Pakistanreaches150hangings,amidplansforjuvenileexecution.(2015,June04).RetrievedFebruary28,2016,fromhttp://www.reprieve.org.uk/press/pakistan-reaches-150-hang-ings-amid-plans-for-juvenile-execution.

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willtaketwodecadestoexecutealldeathrowconvicts,notaccountingforanyadditionalconvitionsinsaidtimeperiod.

Graph 1.4: Number of reported inmates on death row in Pakistan

1.5.2HumanRightsWatch

HumanRightsWatch (HRW) termedPakistan’sdecision to liftabanoncapitalpunishmentasa“flawedandrecklessresponse”tothehorrificPeshawarSchoolAttackandurgedPakistantoreinstatethemoratoriumondeathpenaltyasasteptowardsitsabolition.Adaylater,onDecember19,2014,thefirsthangingstookplace.

DeputyAsiaDirectorPhelimKinesaidinsteadofthisemotionalresponseinastate of national grief, theGovernment of Pakistanmust address the securi-tythreatsthatcreatethesesituationsforcriminalsandmilitantstothrive.Hetermedthedeathpenaltyasan inherentlycrueland irrevocablepunishment,“ThePakistangovernmentcantakeapowerfulsymbolicstandagainstthemassmurderinPeshawarbyreaffirmingitsoppositiontokillingandimmediatelyre-

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instatingthedeathpenaltymoratorium”.12

MorecriticismfollowedinMarch,2015.Kinesaid,“ThePakistanigovernment’sill-conceiveddecisiontocompletelyabandonitsdeathpenaltymoratoriumputsthousandsof livesatrisk.Governmentapprovalofapotentialnationwideexe-cutionspreeisaknee-jerkreactiontoaterriblecrimeratherthanaconsideredresponsetolegitimatesecurityconcerns.”

Pakistanilawdictatescapitalpunishmentfor27offenses,includingmurder,rape,treason,andblasphemy.13,14A joint report issuedearlier inDecemberby thenongovernmentalhumanrightsorganizationJusticeProjectPakistan(JPP)andReprieveconcludedthatanoveruseofanti-terrorismlawsbyPakistan’ssecuri-tyforcesandjudiciaryhasbeenobservedwhichisreflectedbyahighnumberofpeopleondeathrowforterrorismrelatedconvictions.Thereportstatesthat“insteadofbeingreservedforthemostseriouscasesofrecognizableactsofterror, theanti-terror legislation is in factbeingusedtotryordinarycriminalcases,eitherinadeliberateattempttoevadetheproceduralsafeguardsguar-anteedbyordinarycourtsorduetothevagueandoverlybroaddefinitionsof‘terrorism’inthelegislation.”15

1.5.3InternationalCommunityandtheEU

TheEUandmostwesterncountrieshavealsoexpressedgraveconcernsoverthedeathpenaltyandits impact inPakistan.EUspokespersonCatherineRaysaidtheEUhasconstantlycalledfortheuniversalabolitionofcapitalpunishment.16

EUenvoytoPakistanLars-GunnarWigemarkandotherdelgatesreactedtotheupliftingofmoratoriuminajointstatement,“Webelivethatthedeathpenaltyisnotaneffectivetoolinfightagainstterrorism.”EUdemandedtheimmediateres-torationofmoratoriumondeathpenalty.HeadofEuropeanParliamentSub-Com-mitteeonHumanRightsAnaGomes voiced the EU’s stance against thedeathpenalty.“TheEUisopposedtothecapitalpunishmentinallcaseswithoutexcep-

12WebDesk.(2014,December18).Liftingmoratorium‘aflawedresponsetoPeshawarschoolattack’:HRW.RetrievedMay5,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/808906/hrw-term-lift-of-moratorium-a-flawed-response-to-peshawar-school-attack/13Deathpenaltyoffences.(2015,November26).RetrievedFebruary16,2016,fromhttp://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/death-penalty-offences/.14SeeAnnexIII:DeathPenaltyOffenses.15Pakistan:TakeDeathPenaltyOfftheTableResumingExecutionsforAllCapitalCrimesaHugeStepBackward.(2015,March12).RetrievedFebruary28,2016,fromhttps://www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/12/pakistan-take-death-penalty-table.16Haider,M.(2015,January11).EUdemandsreinstatementofdeathpenaltymoratoriuminPaki-stan.RetrievedFebruary27,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1187562.

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tion.TheEUdelegationhopesthatthemoratoriumonthedeathpenaltywillbeextended,whichwillbeakeystepintherightdirection,”Gomessaid,addingthatitwillbeviewedasmajorsetbackifPakistanliftedthemoratorium.1718

1.5.4HumanRightsCommissionofPakistan

Pakistanhastofaceoppositionontheinternationalaswellasnationallevelontheupliftingofthemoratorium.HumanRightsCommissionofPakistan(HRCP)hadconcernsregardingthehighnumberofexecutionsandthehangingsofinmatesallegedlyconvictedasjuveniles.Inastatement,theHRCPsaid:“Theresumptionofexecutionsaswellasthepacewithwhichtheyarebeingcarriedoutismatterofconcern.ThestateofPakistanexecuted134personsinthe12monthsof2007.Inalittleoverfivemonthsin2015,thatnumberhasalreadybeenexceeded.Whatisevenmore troubling is that thisfigurehasbeenreachedwhennearlysevenmonthsoftheyeararestillleft.”19

HRCPrestatedthatwrongfulandunjustconvictionscouldbemadebecauseofwelldocumenteddeficienciesandinthelawandflawedcriminaljusticesystem.Infact,theprevailingcircumstanceshavemadeitconsiderablymoredifficultfortheaccused toassert theirdueprocess rights,particularly thepresumptionofinnocenceuntilguiltisproved.Evenifthegovernmentthinksthatacompleteab-olitiontoexecutionsisnotpossibleimmediatelyforanyreason,HRCPhasurgedthegovernmenttostopexecutingallbut those foundguiltyofcommittingthemostseriouscrime.

1.5.5AmnestyInternational

AmnestyInternational’sresponseisasexpected.“Pakistan’songoingzealforexe-cutionsisanaffronttohumanrightsandtheglobaltrendagainstthedeathpen-alty,”DavidGriffiths,thegroup’sSouthAsiaResearchDirector,saidinthestate-ment.

Sinceawheel-chairedmanwasset forexecution,Pakistangovernmenthad tofaceseverereactionsfromrights-basedorganizationsandtheinternationalcom-

17Haider,M.(2014,December24).EUopposesremovalofmoratoriumondeathpenaltyinPaki-stan.RetrievedMay2,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1152894.18 Gishkori,Z.(2013,August28).Capitalpunishment:EUcautionsagainstliftingmoratorium.RetrievedMay2,2016,from http://tribune.com.pk/story/596285/capital-punishment-eu-cau-tions-against-lifted-moratorium/. 19Haider,M.(2015,January11).EUdemandsreinstatementofdeathpenaltymoratoriuminPaki-stan.RetrievedFebruary27,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1187562.

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munity.20“EveniftheauthoritiesstaytheexecutionofAbdulBasit,amanwithparaplegia,Pakistanisstillexecutingpeopleatarateofalmostoneaday,”Grif-fithssaid.

Therightsgroupalsoallegedthatmanyoftheexecutionsdonotmeetinterna-tionalfairtrialstandards.21

1.6 Does the Death Penalty Serve as a Deterrent?

ThePakistanigovernmentbelievesthatthedeathpenaltyservesasasignificantdeterrenttothecriminalmindset.“You’veseenthenumberofterroristattacksgoingdowndrastically,”thePrimeMinister’sSpecialAssistantforLaw,AshtarAus-afAli,toldReuters.“Oneofthereasonsisfear.Fearofbeingexecuted.”22

Datasuggeststhatterrorismandoverallcasualtieshaveseenasignificantdeclinein2015.However,thereisnodatatosuggestacorrelationbetweenexecutionsandreductionincrime.

Kine’sresponsewasasfollows:“Pakistan’sgovernmentshoulddemonstratewiseleadershipbyrecognizingthewell-documentedfailureofthedeathpenaltyasacrimedeterrentandjoiningthegrowingnumberofcountriesthathaveabolishedcapitalpunishment.Thegovernmentshouldtreatthedeathpenaltyforwhatitis:acruelandirrevocablepunishmentratherthanapolicysolutiontocomplexcrimeandsecurityproblems.”

Griffithsstatesthatthere isnoevidencethe“relentless”executionshavedoneanythingtocounterextremisminthecountry.

PleasealsoseeSection1.8belowforanargumentforwhetherthedeathpenaltyservesasanactualdeterrenttocrime,militancyandinsurgency.

20Hall,J.(2015,August22).Pakistanplanstoexecuteaseverelydisabledmanbyhanginghimtodeathwhileheremainsseatedinhiswheelchair.RetrievedFebruary17,2016,fromhttp://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3204936/Pakistan-plans-execute-severely-disabled-man-hang-ing-death-remains-seated-wheelchair.html.21AFP.(2015,November25).Executionofdisabledmandelayedforfourthtime.RetrievedFebru-ary11,2016,fromhttp://nation.com.pk/islamabad/25-Nov-2015/execution-of-disabled-man-de-layed-for-fourth-time.22Houreld,K.(2015,July27).Insight-MilitantsinminorityinPakistanexecutiondrive,deterrenteffectdebated.RetrievedJanuary11,2016,fromhttp://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-pakistan-execu-tions-insight-idUKKCN0Q00WI20150727.

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1.7 Conclusion

Bythegovernment’sstandards,executinginmatesondeathrowhasbeenanec-essaryandsuccessfulsteptowardstheimplementationoftheNAP.However,thecomplexityofthesituationinPakistanhasseriousimplicationsforthispoint intheNAP,andthecriticismfromrights-basedorganizationsaswellasforeigngov-ernments, inaddition to the lackofevidence that thedeathpenalty servesasadeterrent,will continuetoputpressureon thegovernment to reconsider itsstance.However,thereisnoevidencetosuggestthatthisprocesswillslowdownorrecedeintheslightest,andexecutionswilllikelycontinueunabatedintheyeartocome.

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1.8: OPINION: Unpardonable by Zaair Hussain

TheattackonAPSPeshawarwasoneofthosemomentsuponwhichanation’shistoryturns.Ahundredandthirtytwoofourchildrenweremurdered incoldblood,ourheartsshattered,andthemoratoriumonthedeathpenaltysnappedlikeatwig.

Theabolition,likethemoratoriumitself,wasnotanactofthejudiciary.Itwasanactoftheexecutive,apoliticalact.Awoundednationroaredforblood,andPrimeMinisterNawazSharifchosenottostandbetweenthemaddenedcrowdandtheirpoundofflesh.

Philosophically,theideaofcapitalpunishment(inspecialcasesandcontexts)isnotentirelywithoutmerit.Broadly,therearethreesubstantialargumentstosup-porttheliftingofthemoratorium:

First, the idea thatvengeance (oftencalled ‘justice’)hasnoplace in the law isnonsensical.Thelawismadebyandforhumanbeings,andthestateassumestheroleofretributionsothatvigilantesdonottaketothestreets.Thelawaskstobemorepatient,moremethodicalthanwewouldotherwisebe.Itdoesnotaskustobesaints,ortofindinourheartsforgivenessfortheunforgivable.

Second,menwhomurderchildrenhaveseveredtheirtiestocivilizedhumanityanddeclared totalwaron thecountry - theyhaveclearly signaled their intenttofightwithoutregardtoanyhumanitariancodeofjustwar.Alifededicatedtobringingunfathomablepaintootherscannothaveunlimitedinherentvalue,un-dermostmoralframeworks,simplybecauseit’sgeneticmakeupishuman.

Third,ourprisonsystemhasrepeatedlyshownithaslittlecapacitytoneutralizeterrorists.MaulanaAbdulAzizwagedanarmedwaragainst thestate fromLalMasjidandwasagaindeliveringsermonsfromthesamemosquewithinayear.MumtazQadri,allegedly,convincedatleastoneguardtocarryoutamurderfromwithinhiscell.175inmateswereviolentlyjailbrokenbytheTalibaninDIKhanin2012.Whileitistruethatthethreatofdeathisunlikelytodeterterrorists,execu-tionisatleastareliableformofneutralization.

Thatsaid,allPakistanisshouldbewaryofthewantonwayinwhichcapitalpunish-menthascomerushingintofillthevoidofnationalloss.

Evenifweconsiderthatthestatewascorrectinaccedingtothedemandofitspeople, their furywas aimed at terrorists. Executionswerenot only resumed,theyweresteppedup tonewheights.Pakistanhasexecuted345peopleasofJanuary24,2016,thehighestnumberonrecord.Accordingtodatacollectedby

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theHumanRightsCommissionofPakistan(HRCP),ofthe195peopleexecutedasofJuly31,aminoritywereterrorists:-between22and42dependinghowbroadly“terrorism”isdefined.

Whatwassupposedlyanarrowandfocusedeffortagainstterrorismseemstobeacoverforbroadandprofoundchanges.Thisisaterrifyingprospect.Weneedonlylookatrecenthistoryandtheglobal“waronterror”tounderstandhowfarevenademocraticgovernmentcanoverreachwhenitspeoplearefrightenedandwoundedandangry.

Pakistan’s legal system has infamously little in theway of safeguards, particu-larly for thepoorerandmorevulnerablemembersof itspopulation:underageandmentallydisabledprisonershavebeenconvictedofandexecutedforcapitalcrimes. Incidentsof confessionsextractedunder tortureand falsifiedevidencearereportedlyrampant.Thevastmajorityofdefendentshavenoaccesstocom-petentlegalcounsel,anddueprocessisatheoreticalidealratherthanareason-ableexpectation.

Finally,thesheerpaceofconvictionsandexecutionsshouldhorrifyanyone,prooranticapitalpunishment,whobelievesatallinfairtrials.TheideathatPakistan’slumberinglegalsystemcouldconvictandexecuteover300peoplethefirstyearwhilemaintaininganystandardsofdueprocessisabsurd.Another8,000remainondeathrow,almostthricethenumberofthemuchlargerUnitedStates,whichisitselfnostrangertocapitalpunishment.

Inademocracy,wethepeoplearecomplicit inthefunctioningofthestate,in-cludingthemachineryofdeath.Itisnotathingtobetrifledwith,tobeflippedoninamomentofrageandsorrow.Ifwewishtopreservecapitalpunishmentinournation,thisisourcollectiveright.Butwithitcomesanintenseresponsibilitytobeawareofexactlywhoweareexecuting,andexactlywhy.Withit,too,comesaresponsibilitytoholdourstateaccountableforthismostprofoundofpunish-ments.Toexecuteamanmay,sometimes,beaharshnecessity.Toexecuteamanwithoutdueprocessismurder,andstainsallourhandswithblood.

ItmakesforapoortributetothechildrenofAPS.

Zaair Hussain is a columnist and a writer for hire, and lives in Lahore. He can be reached at [email protected].

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PArT 2: mIlITAry coUrTs2.1 Introduction

ThesecondpointintheNAP,andoursec-ond theme, is the establishment of themilitarycourtstotryterroristsunderAnti-TerrorismAct(ATA)1997inPakistan.In thefirstphase,ninemilitarycourtswereestablished, three inKhyberPukh-tunkhwa(KP),threeinPunjab,twoinSindhandoneinBaluchistan.1Atthemo-ment11militarycourtsarefunctional inPakistan,withthelasttwoinstatedinKarachi,Sindh,onAugust26,2015byChiefofArmyStaff(COAS).2TheMinistryofInteriorandNarcoticsControlpresentedareportinNationalAssemblyinJanuary,2016.Accordingtothatreport148caseshavebeentransferredtothesespecialcourts.3Thereportalsoconfirms11courts.

Militarycourtshavebeengivenlegalcoverthroughaconstitutionalamendmentwhichwasopposedbymajorpoliticalpartiesbecauseofvictimizationinthepast.An All Parties’ Conference (APC)was called to create a consensus,whichwasreachedafteradiscussionandassurancesthatpoliticians,traders,mediaetc.willnotbetriedinmilitarycourts.4

PrimeMinisterNawazSharifstatedthatthecourtswillonlytryhardcoreterror-ists.“SpecialcourtsarepartoftheNationalActionPlanandaremeanttoprovidean extraordinary solution for an extraordinary problem. All institutions wouldhavetocarefullyscrutinizecasestobesentforprosecutioninthespecialmilitarytribunals.”5

TheFederalInteriorMinisterChaudhryNisarhasmirroredthePM’sstatements,statingthatonlyterroristswillbetriedinmilitarycourts.6Healsotriedtodissi-

1StaffReporter.(2015,January10).Ninemilitarycourtssetup.RetrievedFebruary27,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1156104.2AFP.(2015,August26).ArmyChiefApprovesMoreMilitaryCourts.RetrievedFebruary24,2016,fromhttp://newsweekpakistan.com/army-chief-approves-more-military-courts/.3QuestionsandOralAnswers,28thsessionoftheNationalAssembly.(2016,January15).RetrievedMarch15,2016,fromhttp://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/ques-tions/1452850149_459.pdf.4Khalti,S.(2015,January01).MilitaryCourts:OldFears,NewHopes.RetrievedFebruary24,2016,fromhttp://pique.pk/military-courts-old-fears-new-hopes/.5StaffReporter.(2014,December31).Militarycourtswilltryonlyhardcoreterrorists:Nawaz.RetrievedFebruary24,2016,fromhttp://www.dailytimes.com.pk/national/31-Dec-2014/military-courts-will-try-only-hardcore-terrorists-nawaz.6WebDesk.(2015,January03).Armydidnotputanypressureoverformationofmilitarycourts:Nisar-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedFebruary24,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/sto-

mIlITAry coUrTsNAP POINT 2: Special trial courtsunderthesupervisionofArmy.Thedurationof thesecourtswouldbetwoyears.

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patetheimpressionthattheestablishmentofmilitarycourtsmeansthattheex-istingjudicialsystemofthecountryisnotdeliveringjustice.Pakistanneedssomeextraordinarymeasurestodealwithterrorism;establishmentofmilitarycourtsistheneedofthetime,hesaid.

PleaseseeSection9.2.1:PendingCasesinPakistan’sCourts.

The21st constitutionalamendmentwaspassedbyboth theNationalAssemblyandtheSenateonJanuary6,2015,providingconstitutionalcovertotheestab-lishmentofmilitarycourts.7

DuringarecentmeetingtoreviewimplementationofNAPinIslamabad,itwasapprovedtoextendthescopeofmilitarycourtstoGilgitBaltistan(GB).GBandAzad Jammuand Kashmir (AJK) councilswill also adopt the 21st constitutionalamendmenttofacilitatetheformationofmilitarycourts.8However,thisremainspending.

Analystsandpundits in thecountrywerequickto label the21st Amendment a “softcoup”,andlabeledtheestablishmentofmilitarycourtsastacitacceptanceofthefailureofthejusticesysteminPakistan,particularlywhenitcametotryingallegedterrorists.Militarycourtshavealsobeencalleda“paralleljudicialsystem”.

ry/816609/army-did-not-put-any-pressure-over-formation-of-military-courts-nisar/.7Rasheed,P.(n.d.).Constitution(Twenty-firstAmendment)Act,2015.RetrievedFebruary24,2016,fromhttp://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1420547178_142.pdf.8Haider,M.(2015,January13).GovtextendsscopeofmilitarycourtstoGilgit-Baltistan,AJK.Re-trievedFebruary24,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1156747.

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2.2 ARTICLE: Military Courts: Old Fears, New Hopes – A History of Military Courts by Sher Ali Khalti9

Despitebitterexperienceslinkedwithmilitarycourtsofthepastthesecourtsarethenecessityofthedaytodeliverspeedyjusticetoterrorists

ItwasafreezingcolddayofthelastweekofDecember1970.Ayoungboywassittinginfrontofamajor,acolonelandasessionjudgeinaspecialmilitarycourt.ThecourtwassetupinAdiyalaJailofRawalpindi,rightthereintheroomofthesuperintendentofthejail.ThecrimeoftheyoungboywasthathehadmadeaspeechagainstMartialLawAdministratorGeneralYahyaKhanatLalKurtiBazaarofRawalpindi.Therewasnosignofrepentanceonhisfaceandhedidnotpleadformercy.Hewasawardedasentenceofsixyears’rigorousimprisonmentbythemilitarycourt.

Itmaycomeasasurpriseformanypeoplethathewasnoneelsethanthesit-tinginformationministerPervaizRashid.Nooneknew,astimepassed,thatonedayhewouldhimselfjustifyhissentenceandexpressconfidenceinthemilitarycourts thatpunishedhimfor“speakingthetruth.”Yes this is thesamePervaizRashid,whoafter45yearsofawardofpunishmenthaspresentedadraftintheassemblyaboutaconstitutionalamendment.Thisamendmentwillpavewayfortheestablishmentofmilitarycourtsalloverthecountry.

Theonlydifference,statedbysupportersof the intendedmove, is thatatthattimethemilitarycourtstargeteddemocraticstruggleandtookawaytherightoffreespeechfrompeoplebutthistimethesearebeingestablishedtodealwiththemenaceofterrorism.Itisalsosaidthatthelacunaeinthecriminaljusticesystemandthereluctanceofwitnesses,lawyersetc.toappearagainstterroristsincourtshavehelpedtheaccused.Thelifeofjudgeshearingterrorismcasesandpunishingterroristsisalsoatstake.

Militarycourtshavealwaysbeencontroversial.Theywereestablishedforthefirsttimein1953whenfirstmartiallawwasimposedinLahoretocurbtheriotsagainstQadianis.DeathsentenceswereawardedtoMaulanaMaudoodiofJamaat-e-Is-lami,MaulanaAbdulSattarNiaziofJamiatUlma-e-Islam(JUI)andothers.Thesesentenceswerecriticizedandcondemnedallovertheworldandthemartiallawadministratorhadtochangethemtolifeimprisonments.

In1958,thiswasGeneralAyubKhanwhoestablishedmilitarycourts.Manypro-

9Khalti,S.A.(January1,2015).MilitaryCourts:OldFears,NewHopes.RetrievedMarch23,2016fromhttp://pique.pk/military-courts-old-fears-new-hopes/.Reproducedwithpermissionfromoriginalauthor.Piqueisnowdefunctandattemptstocontactitsstaffwereunsuccessful.

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gressivesandleftistswerehangedontheordersofthesecourts.Nationalistswerealsotakentogallowsastheyhadcontinuedstrugglefortheirrights.SardarNau-rozKhanandhissiblingswereawardeddeathsentencebymilitarycourts.WhilethedeathsentenceofSardarNaurozKhanwasconvertedintolifeimprisonmentviewinghisoldage,hissonsandnephewswerenotsparedandhanged.NawabAkabarKhanBugtiwasalsoawarded life imprisonment.Hisonly crimewas toraisevoiceinthefavourofBalochpeople.TheinhabitantsofEastPakistan,SindhandSarhad(nowKPK)provinceswerealsothevictimsofmilitarycourts.

In1969GeneralYahyafollowedthefootstepsofhispredecessorsandestablishedmilitary courts.Workers of Awami National Party, Pakistan People’s Party andAwamiLeauge,andcommunistsweretriedbymilitarycourts.Thousandsofwork-ersofAwami Leaguesweregiven sentence in1972by these courts.However,thesemilitarycourtswereabolishedundertheordersofJusticeHamood-ur-Reh-manwhowastaskedwithlookingintoreasonsbehindseparationofEastPakistanandcompilingareportonthebasisofthesefindings.

In1979,GeneralZiacameintopowerbythevirtueofanothermartiallaw.Mili-tarycourtsweresetupalloverthecountry.Thepurposebehindthismovewasthat to crushmillionsofpeoplewhoweredemanding fundamental rights andstrivingforrestorationoftheconstitutionof1973.SentenceswereawardedonalargescaleinSindhinZia’sregimebyspecialmilitarycourts.Thousandsofwork-ersofMovementforRestorationofDemocracy(MRD)includingwomenhadtofacethewrathofZia.

ThesolutiontoKarachiunrestandlawlessnesswasalsosoughtthroughthees-tablishmentofmilitarycourtsduringthelastregimeofNawazSharif.In1999,theSupremeCourtofPakistan(SCP)underChiefJusticeAjmalMiansuspendedthesemilitarycourts.TheSCPdeclared therewasnospace forparallel courts in theconstitutionofPakistan.

NowNawazSharifisonceagaininpowerandmilitarycourtsarebeingestablishedthroughanamendment in the constitution.Almost all thepolitical partiesareagainstmilitarycourtsastheyhavebeenhauntedbytheseinthepast.Theydonotwanttobevictimizedonceagain.AnAllParties’Conference(APC)wascalledtodiscusstheissueandallthepoliticalpartiespresentthereexpressedtheircon-cerns.Aftersometimestheywereconvincedandassuredthatpoliticians,traders,mediaetcwillnotbetriedinmilitarycourts.

ChaudhryNisarhasrepeatedlystatedthatmilitarycourtswillonlyholdtrialsofterroristsandcountry’sjudicialsystemwillcontinuetofunction.Hehasalsotriedtodispeltheimpressionthattheestablishmentofmilitarycourtsmeansthattheexistingjudicialsystemofthecountryisnotdeliveringjustice.“Pakistanispass-ingthroughanextraordinarysituationandthissituationdemandsextraordinary

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measures,”Nisarsaid.

HefurtherexplainedinapressconferencethatPakistanArmy,policeandsecurityagencieswouldpresentterroristsbeforespecialcourtswheretheywouldgetanopportunitytodefendthemselves.“Thespecialcourtsheadedbyarmyofficerswillalsoworkunderlaws,rulesandregulations,”heexplainedinabidtodispelfearsthatthesecourtswillwitchhuntpeoplejustforhavingadifferentview.

Havingdiscussedthehistoryofmilitarycourtsindetailsonecomestothesitua-tionongroundandtheconcernsofthosewhoarelikelytobeaffected.Thelatestsituationisthat(tillthefilingofthisreport)thegovernmenthasintroducedtwobillsintheNationalAssemblybyvisualizing21stamendmenttotheConstitutionofPakistan.OneisrelatedtoPakistanArmyAct,1952,forspeedytrialofterroristsmainly inthewakeofaterroristsattackonArmyPublicSchool,Peshawar.AnypersonwhoisorclaimsorisknowntobelongtoaterroristgroupororganizationusingnameofreligionorsectandraisesarmyorwageswaragainstPakistanorattacks thearmed forces and lawenforcementagenciesor attacks any civil ormilitaryinstallationsorkidnappingsofanypersonforransomorcausesdeathtoanypersonor injuryshallbepunishedunderamendedPakistanArmyAct.Themilitarycourtswouldbeestablishedandhaveatenureoftwoyears.

SenatorTajHaidar,seniorPPPleader,expressinghisconcernsontheestablish-mentofmilitarycourtssaid:“theirhistoryisnotgoodatall.Thereisnoneedofparallelcourts.Civiliancourtswillbeweakenedinthepresenceofmilitarycourts.As civilian courts get weakened democracy also gets weekend.” Taj adds thatArmyalsogotweakenedwhenparallelarmedforcesofmilitantswereraisedbytheestablishment.Thesemilitantsspreadhavocinthecountryandtodaynooneissafefromthebarbarismoftheterrorists.

TajsaysTalibanweregivenanopportunitytoorganizethemselveswhilethene-gotiationswerebeingdonebetweenthemandgovernment.“Talibanorganizedandweaponizedthemselvesduringthetimespacegiventotheminthenameofnegations.ActuallyTalibanisacorpsofestablishment.ButwhentheyattackedArmyPublic School, Peshawar, the establishment decided that they should behandledstrictlyasitwashardtocontrolthemlikeinthepast.”

TajquestionsthatiftheintelligenceagenciesknowwhentheTalibanaregoingtoattackatarget,thenwhytheydonotarrestthemintime.Ifpeoplefromintelli-genceagenciescanbeenteredinTalibangroupstokeepaneyeontheiractivities,thenstrictactioncanalsobedoneagainst them.“Extremistshave theirpoliti-calwingsalsolikePTI.Talibanareorganizedandconcealedthemselvesinmanycores,”heasserts.

General(retired)HameedGulhasatotallydifferentopinion.HetoldPiquethat

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“militarycourtsareademandoftimeandjustice.Ourciviliancourtshavefailedtoprovidejustice.Judgesareafraidofgivingverdictagainstterrorists.TherearemanyflawsinourlawwhichisoldandcarvedduringtheAnglo-Saxonage.”Hesaysjudiciaryreleasesterroristsduetoinsufficientevidenceandnonappearanceofwitnesses.“Whenaterroristwillcometoamilitarycourthewillbepunishedwithinshortspanoftime.Theterroristwillbeprovidedaccesstocivilianslawyerssothathecandefendhimself,”headds.

Respondingaquestion,formerISIchiefsaidthatamajororacolonelwillhearacaseand it iswrong tosay thatnomilitaryofficerknows the law.“Lawsaretaughtduringour training.”He rejects the claimof TajHaider thatdemocracywillbeweakenedduetotheestablishmentofthesecourts.“Democracywillbestrengthenedifjusticeisdone.Militarycourtsarebeingsetupontherequestofdemocraticgovernment.Thesearenotbeingimposedbyanyone,”headds.

Whenaskedaboutthedefinitionofterrorismandaterrorist,hesaysthereexist-edconfusion.EventheUN,whichheldaconventiononthissubjectin2003,failedtoreachaconsensusontheexactdefinitionofterrorism.

Hesays95percentof thekillersarereleaseddueto loopholes in law.Hesays“judgessurrenderasterroriststhreatenthem.Butanarmyofficerdoesnotcomeunderanypressureasheplayswithdangerallthetime.Itisapartofhistraining.Iwouldagainsaythatsettingupofmilitarycourtsistheonlywaytocrushterror-ism.’’

Syed Nisar Safdar, Advocate Lahore High Court condemns military courts outrightly.Hesaysitwouldberidiculousifsomeonesaysthatjudgessurrenderastheyarethreatened.“Ifjudgesareprovidedthesamesecurityandenvironmentasprovidedtoarmyofficerstheycangiveexcellentjudgments.Militarymustonlysecurebordersandshouldnotinterveneinthecivilianjudicialsystem.Establish-mentofmilitarycourtsisactuallyasheerviolationofhumanrights,”saidSafdarsaid.

Hequestionsthathowcanamilitaryofficerhearcasesrelatedwithlawwithouthavinganyexperienceofunderstandingandpracticinglaw.“Canlawyerssecurecountry’sborders?Iftheanswerisnothenhowcanamilitaryofficehearacaseandgiveaverdict”hequestions.Safdarsays theattackonArmyPublicSchoolisnotafailureofjudiciary.“Itisafailureofarmyandintelligenceagencies,’’hecomments.

BabarGhauri,central leaderofMQM,tellsPiquethatthe“governmenthasas-suredthatonlytheterroristswillbetriedinmilitarycourtsandnopoliticalleaderorothercivilianwouldbetriedinthesespecialcourts.Hesuggeststhatthemili-taryandthelawenforcersshallkeepaneyeonmadrassaswhichinhisopinionare

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thebreedinggroundsofterroristsandextremists.

“Wehad reservations on the establishment ofmilitary courts due to our pastexperienceswiththem.However,weacceptedtheminthebestinterestofthecountry,”Mr.Ghaurisaid.

Sher Ali Khalti is a columist and writer at The News International. He can be reached at [email protected].

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2.3 Number of Cases and Outcomes

UpuntilJanuary24,2016,40terrorsuspectshavebeentriedinmilitarycourts.Ofthese,36weresentencedtodeath,andtheremaining4wereimprisonedforlife.10ComprehensivedetailsoftheconvictssentencedinmilitarycourtscanbefoundinAnnexIV:MilitaryCourtVerdicts.

Graph 2.1: Military Court Verdicts11

2.4 Controversies and Criticism

Theestablishmentofmilitarycourtshasalsocomeunderseverecriticism.Humanrightsorganizationshavebeenconcernedaboutwhethertheprisonersarepro-videddueprocess.ThiswasbackedbyUSStateDepartmentSpokespersonJenPsakiwhosaidPakistanhastobecarefulwhiletryingcivilianterrorismsuspectsinmilitarycourtsandassurethattheywillbeprovideddueprocessofjustice.12

2.4.1HumanRightsWatch

HumanRightsWatch’sDeputyDirectorAsiaDivision,PhelimKinesaid,“Pakistan’sPrimeMinister,NawazSharif,claimstohaveasilverbullettoridthecountryofterrorism:militarycourts.Aconstitutionalamendmentwas signed into lawonJanuary7,2015permittingmilitarycourtstoprosecuteterrorismsuspects.Theamendmentjustifiestheuseofmilitarycourtsasameans“topermanentlywipeoutanderadicateterrorists fromPakistan”.NawazSharif’shyperbolehasbeennolessextravagant,describingmilitarycourtsastheantidoteto“overcome60

10Mukhtar,I.(2016,January09).Militarycourtsconvicted40terroristssofar.RetrievedJanuary19,2016,fromhttp://nation.com.pk/national/09-Jan-2016/military-courts-convicted-40-terror-ists-so-far.11PleaseseeAnnexIV.12Iqbal,A.(2015,January09).Militarycourts:UScallsforensuringdueprocess.RetrievedJanuary19,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1155812.

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yearsofunrest”.Althoughtheconstitutionalamendmentstipulatesatwo-yeartimelimitontheiruse,itposesalong-termthreattolegaldueprocessandruleoflaw.”13

Additionally,many claim that theestablishmentofmilitary courts is indicatingthatthecountry’scourtshavefailedtoprovidejustice.Militarycourtshavealsobeencalledaparallelsystemtotheexistingjudiciary.Oddly,onejustificationof-feredfortheexistenceofthemilitarycourtsisspeedytrialofterrorsuspects,aswellasshunningperceivedambiguitiesandshortcomingsofthecriminaljusticesysteminPakistan.Thecountry’sciviliancourtshaveawell-earnedreputationforprosecutionsunderminedby corruption, violence against prosecutionandwit-nesses,andglacialservicedelivery.

2.4.2SupremeCourt’sVerdictonMilitaryCourts

RightsactivistAsmaJehangirfiledanapplicationonbehalfoftheSupremeCourtBarAssociation(SCBA)againsttheexecutionofthefirstsixconvictsofthemilitarycourts, inApril,2015.14,15Thiswasoneofthefifteenpetitionstakenupbytheapexcourtregardingthelegalityofthe21stconstitutionalamendment.

“Militarycourtsviolatethearticle10oftheConstitutionwhichgivestherighttoopenandduetrialtoitscitizens”saidKamranMurtaza,presidentoftheSCBA.HefurthersaidthathewouldappealagainsttheSupremeCourt’sdecisionasit“violatesfundamentalconstitutionalrightsofthepeople.”16

OnAugust5,2015,theSupremeCourtupheldtheestablishmentofthemilitarycourts. The apex court reasoned that themilitary courtswere authorized andlegalizedbythesupremeauthority in the land: theparliament.PrimeMinisterNawazSharif’sSpecialAssistantforLawAshtarAusafAlicalledthedecision“an-otherstrikeagainstterror”,labellingitasuccessforPakistan.

“TheEuropeanUnion,theUnitedStatesandotherdemocraciesneedtounder-standthatweneedtomakedecisionsaccordingtoourcircumstances...Andweknowbesthowtoridourselvesofterrorists,”hesaid.

13Kine,P.(2015,January17).Aremilitarycourtsthebestwaytofightterror?RetrievedFebruary24,2016,fromhttps://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/17/are-military-courts-best-way-fight-terror.14StaffReporter.(2015,August06).Sixjudgesdeclare21stAmendment,militarycourtsillegal.RetrievedFebruary24,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/119863215Iqbal,N.(2015,April05).MilitarycourtsgetSupremeCourtnod.RetrievedFebruary24,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1198533. 16Shams,S.(2015,August07).Pakistan’smilitarycourts-asolutionoraproblem?RetrievedFebruary27,2016,fromhttp://www.dw.com/en/pakistans-military-courts-a-solution-or-a-prob-lem/a-18633959.

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2.5 Military Courts around the World

2.5.1MilitaryTribunalsinUnitedStates

TheArmyPublicSchoolincidentinPakistanissometimesreferredtoasthe9/11ofPakistan.Whileacrudecomparison,itdoesillustratethefactthattheincidentmarkedmajorpolicyshiftsinthecountry,muchlikeitdidintheUS.WhiletheAmerican stanceon thedeathpenalty is driven in-part by themajorityof thepublicfavoringthepunishmentforacrimesuchasmurder,17itshistoryofmilitarycourtsandordersisaseparatematteraltogether.

Post9/11,PresidentGeorgeW.Bushsignedanewmilitaryorderinthewaronterror,intendedtodetainnon-citizensaccusedofterrorism.TheSecretaryofDe-fensewasgiventhepowertoestablishmilitarytribunalstotrytheaccusedwithin,orevenoutsideoftheUnitedStates,andwoulddeterminetherulesandproce-dures,differentfromregularcourtsoflaw,toensureafullandfairtrial.Threetosevenmilitaryofficerswouldbecommissionedtoactasbothjudgeandjury,andnotallelementsofthenormaldueprocessweretobeaffordedtotheaccused.18

Inthewarof1812,aBritishspywastriedbyamilitarycommissionconstitutedbyGeneralAndrew.CommitteesofWar,afancynameformilitarytribunals,wereutilizedduringtheMexican-AmericanWar(1846-48).TheUnionalsoleveragedmilitarytribunalsduringandaftertheAmericanCivilWar.Afterthe1862Dako-taWar,thirty-eightindividualswereexecutedafterbeingsentencedbymilitarycourts.TheallegedLincolnconspiratorswerelikewiseattemptedbymilitarycom-missioninthespringandsummerof1865.Postthe Spanish–AmericanWar,mili-tarytribunalswereusedinThePhilippines.AtribunalwasalsosetupbyPresidentFranklinD.RooseveltduringWWIItoattempteightGermancitizensaccusedforespionageandsabotageintheUnitedStates.16

2.5.2MilitaryCourtsinUnitedKingdom(TheMilitaryCourtService)

MilitarycourtsalsoexistintheUnitedKingdomintheformoftheMilitaryCourtServiceorMCS,grantingcriminal courtadministration to theRoyalNavy (RN),ArmyandRoyalAirForce(RAF)intheCourtMartial,SummaryAppealCourt(SAC)andServiceCivilianCourt(SCC).TheMCSisheadquarteredinUpavon,Wiltshire,andtherearefivepermanentlymannedMCCsintheUK.However,thecourtsare

17Gallup.(n.d.).DeathPenalty:GallupHistoricalTrends.RetrievedFebruary24,2016,fromhttp://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx.18ConstitutionalRightsFoundation.(n.d.).AmericaRespondstoTerrorism:MilitaryTribunals.RetrievedFebruary24,2016,fromhttp://www.crf-usa.org/america-responds-to-terrorism/mili-tary-tribunals.html.

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“portable”andcanholdproceedingsanywhereintheworld.Theirfunctionistodeliveracriminalcourtserviceforthethreebranchesofthearmedservices.

2.6 Conclusion

Again,thegovernmentconsidersmilitarycourtstobeasuccess,despitethecriti-cismtheyareaparalleljudicialsystem,unequivocallystatingthatthecriminaljus-ticesysteminPakistanhasfailed,andallegationsofadistinctlackofdueprocess.ThefirsthalfoftheyearwasmarkedbysignificantblowbackandSupremeCourtproceedings.However,inthesecondhalfoftheyear,theverdictspickeduppace.However,despite13months, the fact that the “speedy trial” courtshaveonlymanagedtohandout40verdictsestablishesthatperhapsthesecourtsarenotalltheyaremadeouttobe.Thelackofverdictsalsoworksagainstthegovernmentandmilitary’s rhetoric that these courts serveaspartof thedeterrentagainstextremismandmilitancy.

Atpresent,welloveroneyearhaspassedsincetheestablishmentofthemilitarycourts.However,withjustfortyconvictions,thepromisesof“speedytrials”seemto have fallen short. Themilitary courts, under the constitutional amendmentthatlegalizedthem,haveanotheryear,whichisduetoexpireonJanuary7,2017.Thiswilllikelyberenewedforanothertwoyearsbytheparliament.

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2.7 OPINION: Military Courts by Ahmer Bilal Soofi

Whileaddressingtheupperhouseoftheparliamenton31December2014,PrimeMinisterNawazSharifstatedthatPakistanisinastateofwar.On16January2015,onemonthaftertheArmyPublicSchool(APS)Peshawarattack,theChiefofArmyStaffGeneralRaheelSharifreaffirmedthisfact.ThatPakistanisinastateofwarisanirrefutablefactsupportedbyaseriesofstatementsmadebyGovernmentof-ficialsandpoliticians,pressreleasesbytheISPR,hostilestatementsbynon-stateactorsandincidentsandstatementsinvolvingtheTTPbetween2011and2015.

Inspiteof theauraofcounter-terrorismandmilitaryoperations, thenecessityandefficacyofmilitarycourtshasbeenasubjectofmuchdebate.Themostsignif-icantallegationshavebeenleveledfromthedomestic,internationalandhumanrightsperspectives.Werethesecourtsreallynecessary?Arethesemilitarycourtsthepanaceafortheproblemsarisingoutofadeeplyflawedcriminaljusticesys-tem?Havethemilitarycourtshelpedincounteringterrorism?Theseareallvalidquestionsmeritingasubstantiveresponse.

Thepassageofthe21stConstitutionalAmendmentestablishedafirmlegalbasisformilitarycourts,astheyweresetupinaccordancewiththeruleoflaw.Stretch-ingover900pages, theSupremeCourt’sdetailedverdict furtherstrengthenedthe case fornecessity and legalityof thesemilitary courts. Inparagraphs121-145ofthepluralityopinion,theSupremeCourtdeemedthecreationofmilitarycourtsanecessaryandappropriateresponsetodefendPakistanagainstinternalthreatsofwarfromnon-stateactors.Significantly,itcharacterizedtheexistingsit-uationaslike’,asaconsequenceofwhichthedutyoftheFederation,underArti-cle148(3)oftheConstitution,todefendtheprovincesagainstexternalaggressionandinternaldisorder,throughtheArmedForces,wastriggered.

Addressingtheissueofnecessity,theprimaryraisond’etreformilitarycourtswasdispensationofspeedyjustice.TheStateofPakistanisboundbyitsinternationallegalobligations,underbindingUNSecurityCouncilResolutions1373and1267,tocounterterrorism.TheAnti-TerrorismCourts(ATC)inPakistanhavebeenun-able,forarangeofreasons,tofulfilltheState’sobligationswithregardtocoun-teringterrorism.AcquittalsbytheATCsareinternationallyviewedasaninabilityoftheStatetofulfillitsobligations.Inlightofthis,questioningthenecessityofmilitarycourtsisillogical.However,theestablishmentofthemilitarycourtsinnowayabsolvestheGovernmentofitsresponsibilitytoreformtheineffectivecrim-inaljusticesystem.

JusticeUmarAtaBandialextensivelyreferredtothedirectrelevanceandappli-cabilityofInternationalHumanitarianLaw(IHL)tothemilitarycourts.Thejudg-

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mentoftheSupremeCourtisamuch-neededstepintheprocessofclarifyingthedistinctionbetweenthelawofpeaceandthelawofconflict.WhentheTTPhascommittedseveralwarcrimesagainsttheStateofPakistan, includingtargetingciviliansandcivilianobjects,suicidebombing,hostage-takingandkidnappingandkillingsuspectedspies,thereisnorequirementforatraditionaldeclarationofwartobemadeinorderforthelawofwartoapplyinourpresentcircumstances.Ad-ditionalclarificationofthisfactualsituationisalsonecessary–theparadigmaticshiftfrompeacetowarmustbereflected.

Themilitarycourtshavebeencriticized forviolatingdueprocess rights. In thiscontext, it ispertinenttoturntowardsanexaminationofPakistan’sobligationsundertheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR).Article14of the ICCPRrequires trialofpersonsbeforea ‘competent, impartialand inde-pendent tribunal’. Theprovisions ofArticle 14 are applicable to all courts andtribunals,whether civilianormilitary. Furthermore,General CommentNo. 32,issuedbytheHumanRightsCommittee,stipulates:“WhiletheCovenantdoesnotprohibitthetrialofciviliansinmilitaryorspecialcourts,itrequiresthatsuchtrialsareinfullconformitywiththerequirementsofArticle14andthatitsguaranteescannotbelimitedormodifiedbecauseofthemilitaryorspecialcharacterofthecourtconcerned”.

Thoselevelingsuchseriousaccusations,regardingviolationofdueprocessrightsbymilitarycourts,mustlooktowardsSections73-113,118,119,and126-129ofthePakistanArmyAct1952,andthe1954rules,whichdetailsinquiryprocedures,appointments,custody issues, liabilityofoffenders,etc.Moreover, themilitarycourtsoperateonthesamerulesofevidenceasordinarycourts,ascontainedintheQanun-e-ShahadatOrder1984.Alackofunderstandingregardinghowmili-tarycourtsfunctionshouldnotbecloakedasvalidcriticismfromahumanrightsperspective.

GeneralCommentNo.32furtherasserts:“Trialsofciviliansbymilitaryorspecialcourtsshouldbeexceptional,i.e.limitedtocaseswheretheStatepartycanshowthat resorting to such trials isnecessaryand justifiedbyobjectiveand seriousreasons,andwherewithregardtothespecificclassofindividualsandoffencesatissue,theregularciviliancourtsareunabletoundertakethetrials”.ThestateofwarPakistancurrentlyfinds itself in is anexceptional circumstanceand thefailureoftheATCsineffectivelycounteringterrorismallowsPakistantoresorttomilitarycourttrials.Moreover,therearelimitationsonthetypesofcasesthatcanbereferredtothemilitarycourts–infact,manyofthecasesreferredhavebeenrejectedforfallingoutwiththescopeofexceptionalcases.

The“specificclassofindividuals”referredtoinGeneralCommentNo.32istakenintoaccountunderthePakistanArmyAct1952.Section8(8)definesan“enemy”

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asallarmedmutineers,armedrebels;armedrioters,piratesandanypersoninarmsagainstwhomitisthedutyofanypersonsubjecttothisActtoact”.Thosefallingwithinthescopeoftheterm“enemy”havenotonlytakenuparmsagainsttheStatebuthavealsoactively,throughsocialmediaandtheirvideos,affirmedtheirdeclarationtowagewaragainsttheState.Itisthese“enemies”thatformthesubjectmatterofmilitarycourts.

Article10(9)oftheConstitution,delineatingsafeguardsastoarrestanddeten-tion,stipulates:“NothinginthisArticleshallapplytoanypersonwhoforthetimebeingisanenemyalien”.While,traditionally,theconceptofanenemyalienhasbeenapplied inaterritorialcontextapplicableonlyto foreigners, thetimehascometoexplorethepossibilityof“ideologicalenemyaliens”.ThisisparticularlysignificantinlightofArticle5oftheConstitution,whichidentifies“loyaltytotheState”asa“basicdutyofeverycitizen”whereasmilitantnon-stateactorshave,bytheirstatementsandactions,withdrawnthisloyaltytotheState.

Whetherornotmilitarycourtshavebeeneffectiveincounteringextremismandterrorismrequiresanunderstandingofcounter-terrorismapproachesandstrat-egies.Counter-terrorism,inordertosucceed,requiresamulti-facetedapproach.Militaryoperationsandmilitarycourts,whileanimportantpartofthatstrategy,cannotsucceedwithoutde-radicalizationofsociety.Eliminatingexistingterroristsiseffectivelyunderprocessbuttopreventtheradicalizationofprospectiveter-roristsisnotanobjectiveofthemilitarycourts,norcanitreasonablybeattachedtothem.

The trialof civiliansbymilitary tribunals isneithernewnoraPakistan-specificphenomenon.In2001,theUnitedStatesestablishedmilitarytribunalstoconducttrialsofnon-citizenssuspectedofterrorismintheUnitedStatesorabroad.Infact,theUnitedStateshadusedmilitarytribunalsduringtheUS-MexicanWarinthe19thcenturyandinthemid-20thcenturywhenaU-boatbroughteightGermansoldiersintoNewYork.Consequently,theestablishmentofmilitarycourtscannotbe challengedunderPakistan’sdomestic lawor its international legal commit-mentssolongastheprinciplesoffairtrialanddueprocess,particularlythosepre-scribedbyIHL,areobserved.Additionally,themilitarycourtsarenotapermanententity–theyaremerelyatime-boundmeasureundertheConstitution.

Ahmer Bilal Soofi is a former caretaker federal law minister, and a renowned law-yer. He can be reached at [email protected].

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PArT 3: ProscrIbeD orgAnIzATIons3.1 Introduction

Our third theme comprises of sever-alpoints in theNAP, specifically#3,#7,#13,#14and#6.This themedealswiththeissueofbannedoutfitsoperatingonPakistanisoil.

Thereisalsosignificantoverlapwiththefourththeme,counter-terrorism,andtheNAP points that constitute that theme.Specificallypoints#3,#11,#14and#6all overlap.

Banned outfits have been operating intheformoftargetkillings,suicidebomb-ings,sectarianviolence,hate-mongeringandproliferation,andhasbothphysicalandonlinepresenceinthecountry.

3.2 List of Proscribed Organizations in Pakistan

Pakistanhas formallydeclared212outfits asproscribedorganizations in June,2015.TheMinistryofForeignAffairsbanned171organizations,whiletheInteriorMinistrybanned61organizations.Thereisanoverlapof10organizationsbannedbybothministries.

Meanwhile,Jamaat-ud-Dawa(JuD)hasbeenputonthewatchlistbytheinteriorministry.1

1Ghiskori,Z.(2015,June28).212organisationsformallybannedbyPakistan-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch02,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/911295/212-organisations-formal-ly-banned-by-pakistan/.

ProscrIbeD orgAnIzA-TIonsNAP POINT 3:Militantoutfitsandarmedgangswillnotbeallowedtooperateinthecountry.

NAP POINT 7: Thedefunct outfitswillnotbeallowedtooperateun-deranyothername.

NAP POINT 11:Banonglorificationofterroristsandterroristorganisa-tions through print and electronicmedia.

NAP POINT 13: Communicationnetwork of terrorists will be dis-mantledcompletely.

NAP POINT 14:Concretemeasuresagainst promotion of terrorismthroughinternetandsocialmedia.

NAP POINT 6: All funding sourcesof terrorists and terrorist outfitswillbefrozen.

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Graph 3.1: Breakdown of Proscribed/Under Observation Organizations

3.2.1ProscribedbytheInteriorMinistry

AsofSeptember4,2015,61organizationshavebeenbannedinPakistan.12TheIslamicStatewasaddedtothelistasthe61stbannedorganizationinAugust2015bytheInteriorMinistry.3InteriorMinisterChaudharyNisaralsoconfirmedonDe-cember18,2015totheSenatethat61organizationshadbeenproscribed.4

2AcompletelistcanbefoundinAnnexIV.3NationalDesk.(2015,August27).PakistanofficiallybansDaesh.RetrievedMarch02,2016,fromhttp://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/7624-pakistan-officially-bans-daesh.4Alvi,M.(2015,December19).61outfitsbannedinPakistan,NisartellsSenate.RetrievedMarch02, 2016, from http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/82904-61-outfits-banned-in-Pakistan-Nisar-

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AsmaybeevidentfromthelistinAnnexIV.OnlyIShasbeenaddedtotheunderobservationorbannedlistssincetheenactmentofNAP.

Graph 3.2 Organizations Proscribed before and after NAP Implementation

Additionally,thislistdoesnotcontainnamesofseveralgroupsthathaveclaimedresponsibility for terror attacks in the country, reveals research conducted byCRSSinitsownAnnualSecurityReport.5ThesegroupsincludesplinterfactionsoftheTTPandcanbefoundinCRSSAnnualSecurityReport2016.5

3.2.2ProscribedbyForeignMinistry

TheMinistryofForeignAffairshasalsobanned171organizations.TenoftheseoverlapwiththelistfromtheMinistryofInterior.

tells-Senate.5Nafees,M.,Gul, I.,&Salahuddin, Z. (2016, February26).CRSSAnnual SecurityReport - 2015.RetrievedFebruary26,2016,fromhttp://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/CRSS-Annual-Secu-rity-Report-2015.pdf.

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3.2.3ProscribedunderUNSCR1267

OnDecember1,2005,Pakistanalsoenlistedtwoorganizations,AI-AkhtarTrust,andAI-RashidTrustundertheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolutionnumber1267.TheUNSCR1267wasadoptedunanimouslyonOctober15,1999anddealsprimarilywithTalibanactivitiesinAfghanistan.6Asamemberstate,Pakistanisre-quiredtocomply,asthisresolutionwasadoptedunderChapterVIIoftheUnitedNationsCharter.

ThiscannotbeviewedasastepintheimplementationoftheNationalActionPlan,asitoccurrednearlyadecadeprior.

3.2.4ProscribedatRequestofChina

In2013,BBCUrdu7reportedthatuponrequestfromChina,Pakistanalsobannedthreeadditionalorganizations:

1) EastTurkestanIslamicMovement(ETIM)

2) IslamicMovementofUzbekistan(IMU)

3) IslamicJihadUnion(IJU)8

Again,sincethisactioniswelloverayearbeforetheimplementationofNAP,itcannotbecountedtowardstheplan’sexecution.

3.2.5UnderObservation/WatchList

JuDhasbeenputon thewatch listby the InteriorMinistryasofDecember1,2005,anactionthatwasrenewed,forthefourthtime7,inJanuary2016.InNo-vember,2015,ForeignSecretaryAizazChaudharyalsoconfirmedthatinadditiontoJuD,theFilah-i-InsaniatFoundation(FIF)hadalsobeenputonthewatch-list.9

3.2.6ProscriptionControversies

Pakistanplannedtoban12additionalterrorgroupsinJanuary2015,includingJa-maat-ud-DawaandtheHaqqaniNetwork.Hadthisbecomeareality,thenumber

6UNSecurityCouncilResolution1267(1999).(1999,October15).RetrievedMarch02,2016,fromhttp://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/un/5110.htm.7Malik,S.(2013,October23).ThreeOrganizationsProscribedUponRequestfromChina(translat-ed).RetrievedMarch02,2016,fromhttp://www.bbc.com/urdu/pakistan/2013/10/131023_orga-nizations_banned_fz.shtml.8WebDesk.(2013,October23).Pakistanbansthreeextremistoutfits,onordersfromChina-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch02,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/621400/pakistan-bans-three-extremist-outfits-on-orders-from-china/.9Haider,M.(2015,November19).JUDandFIFnotbanned,foreignsecretarytellsSenatecommit-tee.RetrievedMarch05,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1220795.

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ofproscribedgroupsinPakistanwouldbe73.10Thislistappearedtobecontro-versialasitwastakendowndayslaterbeinguploaded.JuDandFiFremainedthesourceofcontroversy.ForeignSecretaryAizazChaudharyconfirmedtoaSenatecommitteeinNovember,2015thatthetwogroupshad,infact,notbeenbanned,butwerebeingcloselymonitored.7

The original list of 61was re-confirmed by the InteriorMinister in December,2015.3

Mr.QamarZamanKaira,PPPCentralInformationSecretary,claimedonJanuary24,2016thatthegovernmentofPakistanhaslostitscontrolovertheactivitiesofbannedoutfits.Thepassiveattitudeofinteriorministertowardlenientandslowexecutionof theNAPdepicts the inefficiencyofgovernmentofPakistan in thefaceofitscounterterrorismstrategies,hesaid.11

PleasealsoseeSection3.4foranargumentonwhysimplylabelinganorganiza-tionasproscribedisinsufficient,andabriefanalysisofwhatthetermimplies.

3.3 Measures against Proscribed Organizations

3.3.1EfficacyofProscription

TheNationalCounterTerrorismAuthority(NACTA)hasthemandatetomonitorbannedgroupsinthecountry.However,therearerepeatedclaimsthatthegov-ernmentisnotreleasingfundsfortheauthority.Themechanismformonitoringgroupsisalsounclear.FormerNACTAChiefHamidKhan,alongwithInteriorSec-retaryShahidKhan,whilebriefingaparliamentarycommitteeinJune2015,saidthattheimplementationofNAPalongbannedoutfitswasnotatthepaceitneed-edtobe.Theyalsosaidthattheactofbanningagroupwaslargelyineffective.12

TheInteriorMinister’sreporttotheNationalAssemblyalsohighlightsthatthereare8,195personsbeingmonitoredonthefourthschedule13,andanother2,052

10Ghiskori,Z.(2015,January15).Revealed:GovtdecidestobanHaqqaniNetwork,JuD-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch17,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/822087/revealed-govt-decides-to-ban-haqqani-network-jud/.11StaffReporter.(2016,January24).Govtblamedforignoringbannedgroups’activities.RetrievedMay02,2016,fromhttp://nation.com.pk/lahore/24-jan-2016/govt-blamed-for-ignoring-banned-groups-activities.12Khan,A.(2015,June29).NooutfitsbannedafterAPSmassacre,topcourttold-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch02,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/911569/no-outfits-banned-after-aps-massacre-top-court-told/.13ScheduleIVofATA1997dealswithpeoplewhoarenotdirectlyinvolvedinterrorismactivites,butwhoseaffiliationwithbannedoutfitsortheirpreviouscirminalrecordmakesthemsuspicious.

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havehadtheirmovementrestricted.16Itisunclear,however,thatmuchlikethelistofproscribedorganizations,whetherthesenumberswereineffectbeforetheNAP,orafter.

3.3.2ProscribedandWatchLists

TheMinistryofInteriorbelievesthatmostproscribedorganizationsdonothaveradical annexes and theministry does not intend to take action against suchgroups. Itwouldbeillogicalto instantaneouslyactagainstallbannedoutfits, itsaid.14UndertheNationalActionPlan,onlyoneorganization,theIslamicState,hasbeenaddedtotheproscribedlist,2whiletwoothers,Jamaat-us-Dawa(JuD)andFilah-i-InsaniatFoundation(FIF)havebeenaddedtothewatchlist.7

3.3.3CommunicationSystems-MobileSIMs

UnderNAP, the government began themobile SIM verification process in thecountry.According to the latestfigures releasedby thePakistanTelecommuni-cationAuthority’s(PTA)AnnualReport2015,98.3millionSIMshadbeenblockedbytheauthoritiesundertheBiometricVerificationSystem(BVS),outofthe215.4millionSIMsverifiedintotal.TheblockedSIMSalsocontained26.7millionactiveSIMs. Inaddition, re-verificationofSIMshasreducedthenumberof totalsub-scribersto114.7million,a60.7%penetration.

Theyarekeptundersurveillancebythepolicetoremovethepossibilityoftheirinvolvementinanyterrorismactivityinfuture.Aspartoftheprocess,thepeoplearerequiredtoprovidefreshpicturestothelocalpolicestationeverymonthandinformthelaw-enforcersbeforeleavingthejurisdictionoftheirpolicestations.Theyareregularlycheckandmonitoredbypoliceandintelli-genceofficials.14Khan,I.A.(2015,January11).Govttoactagainst‘violentbannedoutfits’only.RetrievedMarch02,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1156321.

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Graph 3.3 SIM Re-Verification Statistics (inmillions)

Ostensibly,theideaisthatsinceSIMsareconnectedtotheNationalDatabaseandRegisterationAuthority’s(NADRA)uniqueIDnumbersforeachcitizens,anyillicitusecanandshouldbetracked.However,inordertoensurethatinnocentsarenotprosecuted,bothregisterationandverificationofSIMsisunderway.

BetweenDecember2014andJanuary2016,mobileservicehasalsobeenshutdownonsevenseparatedaysoversixeventsto“preventuntowardsincidents”.Thissteptreatssymptoms,nottherootcause,andisproventohavelittleefficacy.

Mobileserviceshavebeensuspendedonthefollowingdatesduringthisperiod:

1. March23,2015.PakistanDayParade.15

2. August14,2015.IndependenceDay.16

15(2015,March23).Mobile,internetservicessuspendedforparade.RetrievedMarch05,2016,fromhttp://nation.com.pk/islamabad/23-Mar-2015/mobile-internet-services-suspended-for-pa-rade.16(2015,August13).CellularservicessuspendedinIslamabadaheadofIndependenceDay.RetrievedMarch05,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/937276/cellular-services-suspend-ed-in-islamabad-ahead-of-independence-day/.

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3. September6,2015.DefenceDay(Islamabad).17

4. October23and24,2015.Youm-e-Ashura.18

5. Novermber27,2015.AbdulAzizsermon,formerclericRedMosque(G-6,G-7,Islamabad).19

6. December 18, 2015. Red Mosque administration protest (Islamabad,Rawalpindi).20

3.3.4CommunicationSystems–PrintandElectronicMedia

NearlyayearintotheimplementationofNAP,inNovember2015,thePakistanElectronicMediaRegulatoryAuthority(PEMRA)orderedablackoutofallcover-agepertainingtoproscribedactivities,afactthatinofitselfshowstheimpunitywithwhichsaidorganizationscontinuedtooperateandrecievecoverage.21Tele-visionchannelsclaimthattheystrictlybananysuchcoveragenow.

Thereisnoregulatoryauthorityforprintmedia.TheAllPakistanNewspaperSo-cietyactsasade-factoallianceofnewspapers. Inshort, there isnocheckandbalanceoverthecoverageorglorificationofterrorgroupsoractivitiesincertainprintoutlets.SupremeCourtChiefJusticeJawwadS.KhawajaobservedthatPEM-RAandAPNShadyetnotimplementedthecodeofconduct.22

3.3.5CommunicationSystems–Online

Pakistanhasmorethan21.6millionbroadbandsubscribersattheendofNovem-ber, 2015, as compared to only 3.8million at the endof FY 2013-14, accordingtothelatestfiguresreleasedbythePakistanTelecommunicationAuthority’s(PTA)AnnualReport2015.23Coupledwiththeintroductionof3G/4Gservices,Pakistanis

17(2015,September03).Nocellphoneserviceon6th.RetrievedMarch05,2016,fromhttp://na-tion.com.pk/islamabad/03-Sep-2015/no-cell-phone-service-on-6th.18WebDesk.(2015,October20).Mobileservicestobesuspendedin68districtsonMuharram9,10.RetrievedMarch05,2016,fromhttp://nation.com.pk/national/20-Oct-2015/mobile-services-to-be-suspended-in-68-districts-on-muharram-9-10.19Ali,K.(2015,November28).Cellphoneservice‘suspended’.RetrievedMarch05,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1222836.20Rana,S.(2015,December18).CellularservicesrestoredaftertemporarysuspensioninpartsofIslamabad.RetrievedMarch06,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/1012238/cellular-ser-vices-suspended-in-parts-of-islamabad/.21AFP.(2015,November03).PEMRAordersblackoutofproscribedgroups-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch02,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/984060/media-coverage-pemra-or-ders-blackout-of-proscribed-groups/.22(2015,August20).SCenforcesmediacodeofconductforthwith.RetrievedMarch10,2016,fromhttp://www.thenews.com.pk/print/14175-sc-enforces-media-code-of-conduct-forthwith23PTA.(n.d.).PakistanTelecommunicationAuthority-AnnualReport2015.RetrievedMarch24,2016,fromhttp://www.pta.gov.pk/annual-reports/ptaannrep2014-15.pdf.

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experiencingmassivegrowthinthetelecommunicationsfield.Naturally,thiscomeswithitsownsetofchallengesundertheNAP.

Graph 3.4 Broadband Users in Pakistan 2014-2015 (inmillions)

Accordingtothemilitary intelligenceservice,Twitterhasbecomeaweaponofchoicefortheterrorists.HizbutTahriristhekeybannedoutfitinPakistanwhichhas been advancing its extremist agenda via the internet. The terror facilita-torsusedwordsfromArabicandEnglish languagesforcodedmessagesontheblockedaccounts.TheuseofTwitterwasespeciallyhighlightedduringtheattackonBadaberAirBaseinSeptember,2015,whentheInter-ServicesPublicRelationsseemedtobeinacompetitionwiththeattackersforinformationsharingonthepopularsocialmediaoutlet.24

ItwasrevealedbytheInteriorMinisterChaudharyNisar,duringtheJanuary15,2016,28thsessionof theNationalAssembly, that933URLsand10websitesofproscribedorganizationshadbeenblockedbytheMinistryofInformationTech-

24BBC.(2015,September18).GunmenattackPakistanairforcebaseinPeshawar-BBCNews.RetrievedMarch02,2016,fromhttp://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34287385.

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nology.25

FreedomHouse’sFreedomontheNetreport,conductedin60countries,exam-ined the civil liberty, freedomand censorship trends in Pakistanover thepastyear.Scoring“NotFree”forInternetFreedom,2015marksthefourthconsecutiveyearthatPakistan joins thehostofnationswhichsharethesameworstscore,withpoliciesthatcurtailfreedomandcivilliberties.26

Severallawstohaltterrorismcanalsobeenexploitedagainstinternetusers.TheProtectionofPakistanAct(PoPA),supposedlyisformulationofaproblematicPa-kistanProtectionOrdinanceineffectduringthepreviouscoverageperiod,passedinJuly2014.Thoughitincludedsomeamendments,criticssaiditfailedtoaddressconcernsexpressedbylawyersandcivilsocietygroups,whosaidlanguagecrimi-nalizingunspecifiedcybercrimesasactsofterrorwasvagueandopentoabuse.27

TheproposedCyberCrimeBill2015isunderstrongcriticismbyhumanrightac-tivists, politicians, IT specialists and civil society experts label it a violationofArticle19of theConstitutionofPakistanthatprovides freedomofspeechandexpressiontothepeopleofPakistanandincludesfreedomofpress.MemberoftheCabinetCommitteeforIT,MNAforMQMAliRazaAbidiandMNAforPTIDr.ArifAlviraisedtheirvoicesonthefloorofthehouseaskingthespeakertosendthebillbacktocommitteeforreviewingitsflawedsectionsasthisbillisagainstthebasicrightsofthepeopleofPakistan.28

Inthepast,inordertodealwithcyber-crimes,TheElectronicTransactionOrdi-nance2002andtheElectronicCrimeAct2004were introduced.PreventionofElectronicCrimesOrdinance2007wasanotherefforttocombatcyber-crimes. 29

ThePakistanElectronicCrimeBill(PECB)waspresentedinJanuary2015tocon-testdigitalvulnerabilities.Theparliamentarypanelaccepteditwithoutconsider-inganyobjectionsorseekingoutsidereviewofthelegislation.30Thismodifiedbill

25QuestionsandOralAnswers,28thsessionoftheNationalAssembly.(2016,January15).RetrievedMarch15,2016,fromhttp://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/ques-tions/1452850149_459.pdf.26(2015,October28).FreedomontheNet2015:Pakistan,TheStateofInsecurity.RetrievedMay05,2016,fromhttp://digitalrightsfoundation.pk/fotn2015pakistan/.27FreedomHouse.RetrievedMay05,2016,fromhttps://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/resources/FOTN%202015_Pakistan.pdf.28Warriach,S.(2015,May28).CyberCrimeBill2015:MorepowertoPakistanTele-communicationAuthority.RetrievedMay05,2016,fromhttp://www.newslens.pk/cy-ber-crime-bill-2015-more-power-to-pakistan-telecommunication-authority/.29Mohiuddin,Z.(2006,January24).CyberLawsinPakistan:ASituationalAnalysisandtheWayForward.RetrievedMarch15,2016,fromhttp://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/ijc/articles/10/5.pdf.30Khan,A.(2015,April16).NAcommitteeapprovescontroversialCyberCrimeBill-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch02,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/870919/na-committee-ap-

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isapplicabletotheentireregionsofPakistan.31

PleasealsoseeSection3.6foranin-depthanalysisofthePECB.

3.3.6Terrorfinancing-Sources

Terrorfinancing remainsa significanthurdle toovercome forPakistan. FormerNACTAChiefHamidKhan,alongwithInteriorSecretaryShahidKhan,whilebrief-ingaparliamentarycommitteeinJune2015,statedthatlabelinganorganizationasproscribedalonewas ineffective,asthisdidnothingto impedethefinancialsupplylinesofthesegroups.12

InPakistan,DeobandiandAhl-e-Hadithclericsannuallyreceive100millioninfor-eignfunding,claimedaleakedmissivein2008,jointlyreleasedwiththousandsofothersbyWikiLeaks.32FederalMinisterforInter-provincialCoordination(IPC)RiazHussainPirzadalet itslip inJanuary2015,thattheSaudigovernmentwasdestabilizingtheMuslimworld,includingPakistan,byextensivelyfundinggroupstopropagateitsreligiousideology.33EventheInteriorMinisteracceptedthatsem-inariesinPakistan,severalrunbytheseproscribedorganizations,werereceivingforeignfunding.34

Additionally,ResearchandAnalysisWing(RAW),thepremierIndianintelligenceagancy,and itsassociates inAfghanistanarealsosuspectedof terrorfinancinginPakistan.ForeignSecretaryAizazAhmadChaudhryclaimedinMay2015thatRAWisinvolvedinvariousterroractivitiesinPakistan.35TheBBCreleasedadoc-umentaryinJune,2015,claimingthattheclandestineIndianagencyhadfundedhundredsofmilitantsinPakistan.36InOctober,2015,PrimeMinisterNawazSharifshareddossierscontainingproofofIndianinvolvementinterroractivitiesinPa-kistanwithboththeUnitedNationsSecretaryGeneralBanKiMoon,andUnitedStatesSecretaryofStateJohnKerry.37

proves-controversial-cyber-crime-bill/.31BoloBhi.(2015,April).Government’sProposedAndModifiedCybercrimeBill2015.RetrievedMarch02,2016,fromhttp://bolobhi.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/PECA2015.pdf.32Cable08LAHORE302_a:ExtremistRecruitmentOnTheRiseInSouthernPunjab.(n.d.).RetrievedMarch02,2016,fromhttps://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08LAHORE302_a.html.33Haider,M.(2015,January20).FederalministeraccusesSaudigovtofdestabilisingMuslimworld.RetrievedMarch02,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1158244.34Khan,I.(2015,January13).Only23seminariesreceivingforeignfunding:minister.RetrievedMay02,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1160627.35Haider,M.(2015,May14).RAWinvolvedinterroristactivitiesacrossPakistan:Foreignsecretary.RetrievedMarch02,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1181908.36Bennett-Jones,O.(2015,June24).Pakistan’sMQM‘receivedIndianfunding’-BBCNews.Re-trievedMarch02,2016,fromhttp://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33148880.37APP.(2015,October22).EvidenceofIndia’sterrorsponsorshipsharedwithUS-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch02,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/977223/three-dossiers-evi-

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Someother sourcesof terrorfinancing includeabduction, charities,drugsandarmstrafficking,smuggling,robbery,andkidnappingforpayment.38AnimalhidesarealsoasourceofterrorfinancinginPunjabandSindhandBalochistan.Billionsofrupeesfromthehidesareearnedeveryyear.39

3.3.7TerrorFinancing-Steps

TotraceandhaltterrorfundinginPakistan,asubcommitteewasinstitutedundertheNAPimplementationcommittees.

Theprovincialauthoritieshavebeendirectedtoobservetheundertakingsofradi-caloutfits,whichareforbiddenfromcollectinganimalhidesandtotakelegitimateactionagainsttheproscribedorganizationsworkingundernewidentities.Atleast40radicalorganizationswerebarredfromcollectinganimalhidesanddonationsonEid-ul-AzhabytheMinistryofInterior.TheMinistryhadenforcedanationalproscriptiononZakat and Fitranacollectionbyradicalgroupsin Ramazan.25

Inanattempttocontrolterrorfunding,thePunjabgovernmentdetainedvariousproscribedorganizations’membersinJuly2015,forillicitlyaccumulatingcapitalfromthecommunity.40

Forillicitterrorfinancing,thefollowingorganisationshavebeenbookedbythegovernmentofPunjab,emboldenedbytheAnti-MoneyLounderingBill (Amen-dement)2014.

• Al-RasheedTrust(MaymarTrust)

• Al-RehmatTrustinMultan

• AnsarulUmmah,

• Sipa-i-Sahaba

• Tehreek-i-Ghulbai-i-IslaminBahawalpur

• Jaish-e-MuhammadinGujranwala41

Thefederalgovernmentalsodecidedtoadoptstrictmeasuresagainstthesup-

dence-of-indias-terror-sponsorship-shared-with-us/.38Javed,A.(2013,September27).Strictcheckonterror-financingkeytoendterrorism.RetrievedFebruary24,2016,fromhttp://nation.com.pk/lahore/27-Sep-2013/strict-check-on-terror-financ-ing-key-to-end-terrorism.39Hussain,A.(2015,September24).MQMamong293partiespermittedtocollectanimalhidesonEid.RetrievedMarch05,2016,fromhttp://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2015/09/24/city/karachi/mqm-among-293-parties-permitted-to-collect-animal-hides-on-eid/.40Iqbal,N.(2015,June30).Bannedoutfitscollectingfundsbooked,PunjabtellsSC.RetrievedMarch02,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1197226.41Iqbal,N.(2015,July30).Bannedoutfitscollectingfundsbooked,PunjabtellsSC.RetrievedMay05,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1197226.

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portersofactivistsofAl-RasheedTrustandrestofthedeclaredbannedoutfits.42

Mr.Haroon-ur-Rasheedwasdeclared tobe the shareholderof aKhyberPakh-tunkhwa-basedregisteredNGOnamed‘Baraan’,whichwasactiveacrossBannu,TankandD.I.Khan.Heappealedforbailincourtagainsttheallegationoffraudinbusiness.However,todealwiththesubjectofactivitiesofNGOswasthepriorityfor thecourt rather thanconsidering thebailpetitionatfirst. InteriorMinisterChaudhryNisarassertedthatallNGOsinPakistanwouldbefunctionalonlyafterthesecurityclearanceandre-registration.43UnderthesupervisionofJusticeJaw-wadS.Khawaja,thethree-judgebenchwasestablished.ThebenchhasenquiredthethoroughdetailsofillicitactivitiesoftheoperationalNGOsfromthefederalandprovincialgovernmentandpostponedthenexthearingofthecaseuntilJuly22.Thecourtwas informedabouttheproscribedoutfits inPunjab i.e.RehmatTrust,Al-Rasheedtrust,AnsariaandSipah-e-Sahaba.Duringthehearing,JusticeJawwadS.Khawajaunderlinedthat,“Nothinghasbeendonebyalltheinstitu-tionsofthecountry.Whathastobedone,itseemsasifSChastodoitnow.”44

InSindh,amemberofSipa-i-Sahaba(SSP)ZaheerAhmedaliasPiyalawasarrestedbyRangers.45Moreover,theLahoreCounter-TerrorismDepartment(CTD)impris-onedthreeSSPsuspectsfromPunjabUniversity.46

SincethecommencementofNAPandZarb-e-AzboperationandNAPinPunjab,KPandBalochistan,thelawenforcementagencieshavebeenchallengedbythecoalescingofvariousbannedoutfitslikeLashkar-e-Jhangvi(LeJ)andJaish-e-Mu-hammad(JeM).ThebannedoutfitshavebeenfoundactiveunderthecoverofnewnameslikeAhl-e-Sunnat-Waljamaat(ASWJ)whichisanewformoftheSSP,LeJandLashkar-e-Taiba(LeT).47

MilitantsofJeMwereimplicatedofPatahnkotterrorattackinIndia.Pakistanpo-licesuccessfullydetained12JeMmilitantsandsealeditsofficesinMuzafargarh,

42Khan,I.(2015,December19).ISamong61bannedoutfits,ministertellsSenate.RetrievedMay05,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1227402.43Iqbal,N.(2015,June24).SCseeksdetailsaboutNGOs’sourceoffunding.RetrievedMay05,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1190102.44Khan,A.(2015,July03).NAPisabigjoke,devisedtodeceivemasses,saysJusticeKhawaja.RetrievedMay05,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1192080.45SouthAsianTerrorismPortal.RetrievedMay05,2016,fromhttp://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/SSP_tl2015.htm.46Gobal,I.(2015,December14).TwoPUfacultymembers,studentarrestedforHizbutTahrirlinks:CTD.RetrievedMay05,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1226297.47Arain,T.(2016,January25).Sindhprovincehasbecomethehavenforterrorgroups.RetrievedMay05,2016,fromhttp://pakteahouse.net/2016/01/25/sindh-province-has-become-the-haven-for-terror-groups/.

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MultanandBahawalpur.48, 49TheCounterTerrorismDepartmentandpolicear-restedanother14militantsofbannedoutfitsbuttheidentitieshavebeenkeptconfidential.50

Themilitarymanagementaskedthefederalandprovincialadministrationstoac-tivatespecialcourtssetupundertheProtectionofPakistanAct(PPA),2014,andadoptpropermeasurestohaltterroristsfunding.51Thisisyettobeimplemented.

ThefinancialcrimescircleoftheFIAtargetedtheradicalgroupsentangledinthehundi/hawalabusiness.52ItwasrevealedbytheInteriorMinisterChaudharyNi-sar,duringtheJanuary15,2016,28thsessionoftheNationalAssembly,that214caseshavebeen registered, 322arrestsmadeand356.56million rupeeshavebeen recovered in thehundi/hawala investigation.24Further, itwas shared137arrestshadbeenmadeinmoneylaunderingcases,andthat67SuspiciousTrans-actionReports(STR)hadbeenreceivedbytheFinancialMonitoringUnit(FMU),ofwhich15hadbeenprocessedand52remainedunderinvestigation.

48(2016,January13).Pathankotattackprobe:Pakistanarrests12Jaish-e-Mohammedterrorists.RetrievedMay05,2016,fromhttp://www.firstpost.com/india/pathankot-attack-investigation-pa-kistan-arrests-twelve-jaish-e-mohammed-terrorists-2582334.html.49Editorial.(2016,January16).CrackdownonJeM.RetrievedMay05,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1232812.50(2016,January15).SeminaryrunbyJaish-e-MohammadinSialkotsealed.RetrievedMay05,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1233073.51Ghumman,K.(2015,September11).Militaryasksgovttochoketerrorfinancing.RetrievedFeb-ruary/March,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1206209.52Hawala,alsoknownasHundi,isanalternativeremittancechannelthatexistsoutsideoftradi-tionalbankingsystems.OnedefinitionfromInterpolisthatHawalais“moneytransferwithoutmoneymovement.”TransactionsbetweenHawalabrokersaredonewithoutpromissorynotesbecausethesystemisheavilybasedontrust.Thesystemisusedbyradicaloutfitsandmoneylaunderestobypassapapertrail.

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Graph 3.5 Hawala/Hundi Crackdown

TheStateBankofPakistanhasannouncedafineofRs1.2billionifanybankvi-olatestheprescribedregulationsinAnti-MoneyLaunderingandCombatingtheFinancingofTerrorismAct(AML/CFT).53Inrecentyears,nearlyabillionrupeesin126accountsofmilitantoutfitshavebeenconfiscatedbytheStateBankofPaki-stan(SBP).54TheamountofRs3.5millionfromeightdifferentbankaccountshasbeenseizedbytheMinistryofInteriorundertheAnti-TerrorismAct.55Thedatesoftheseactions,however,falloutsideoftheNAPimplementationsperiod.

53Imran,K.A.(2016,January6).Bankspunishedforviolatinganti-terrorfinancingrules.RetrievedMarch02,2016,fromhttp://nation.com.pk/national/2016-01-07/banks-punished-for-violating-an-ti-terror-financing-rules.54APP.(2016,February01).182seminariessealedunderNAP.RetrievedFebruary01,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1236704.55Haider,M.(2016,January07).121accountsblockedtocurbterrorfinancing:SBP.RetrievedMarch02,2016,fromhttp://www.thenews.com.pk/print/87070-121-accounts-blocked-to-curb-terror-financing-SBP.

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3.4 OPINION: What does the term “proscribed” solve? by Zeeshan Salahuddin

ThewordproscribedhasbecomeapartofthenationalvocabularyofPakistan.Despiteitsextendedusage,fewunderstandwhatthetermactuallymeans.Com-monsensedictatesthatcertainactionsshouldfollowtheproscriptiondecision;freezing assets, monitoring communication networks, closely observing mem-bers, disallowing public gatherings or rallies, and discontinuing all operations.Thereexistsnospecific,agreed-uponmechanismafterbanninganyorganization,andactionstakenareatthebehestoftheInteriorMinistrywithnosenseofcon-sistency.FormerNACTAChiefHamidKhan,alongwithInteriorSecretaryShahidKhan,whilebriefingaparliamentarycommitteeinJune2015,saidthattheimple-mentationofNAPalongbannedoutfitswasnotatthepaceitneededtobe.Theyalsosaidthattheactofbanningagroupwaslargelyineffective.12

In fact, of the60bannedorganizations, all proscribedbefore theAPS tragedy,nearly allwere operating in the country unimpeded. The assets of these pro-scribedorganizations,someonthelistfor13years,werefinallyfrozeninJanuary,2015.56 “Theassetsofall thebannedoutfitshavebeen frozen,”ForeignOfficespokespersonTasneemAslamsaidinherweeklypressbriefing.Nearlyayearintothe implementationofNAP, inNovember 2015, thePakistan ElectronicMediaRegulatoryAuthority (PEMRA)orderedablackoutofall coveragepertaining toproscribedactivities,afactthatinof itselfshowstheimpunitywithwhichsaidorganizationscontinuedtooperate.57

Threeadditionalfactors,amongmanyothers,impedethenecessarystepstobetakentodealwithproscribedgroups.

First,thereissignificantoppositionfromwithinthegovernment.Asanexample,despiteJuDbeingaddedtothewatchlist,MinisterforDefenceProductionRanaTanveerHussainraisedobjections,statingthatitwasacharityorganization,andnotengagedinanyterroractivities.

Second,therearemassivecommunicationgapswithinthesystem,asexemplifiedbytherefusalofInspectorGeneralofIslamabadPolicetodisallowralliesofpro-scribedorganizations,statingthathehadnotbeencommunicatedanyformallistofbannedorganizations.

56WebDesk.(2015,January22).Assetsofallbannedoutfits,includingJamaatudDawa,frozen:FO-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedFebruary27,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/825732/assets-of-all-banned-outfits-inlcuding-jamaatud-dawa-frozen-fo/.57AFP.(2015,November03).PEMRAordersblackoutofproscribedgroups-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedFebruary27,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/984060/media-coverage-pem-ra-orders-blackout-of-proscribed-groups/.

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Third,severalorganizations,post-proscription,simplyreformunderanearum-brella and continueoperating. In January, 2015, itwas reported thatup to23bannedorganizationswereoperatinginthecountryunderdifferentnames.Thegovernment,historically,hashadsomedifficultytrackingreformedgroups.

Thegovernmentneedstoseriouslyre-evaluateitsstrategyondealingwithpro-scribedoutfits.Anagreedupon setof stepsneed tobe implementedwithoutprejudiceorbias.Thesympathizersneedtobebroughttotask,withinthegov-ernmentandwithout,andpoliticalpointscoringorpressuretacticsneedtotakeabackseattostabilityandsecurity.

Zeeshan Salahuddin is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Research and Security Studies. He can be reached at [email protected] and @zeesalahuddin.

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3.5 OPINION: Messages of Terror by Faisal Ali Raja58

Astheargumentinfavourofbanningglorificationofterroristsinelectronicandprintmediagainstraction,terrororganisationsareadoptingdifferenttraditionalmeansofmessagecirculationandpropagandadissemination.

Differentbannedorganisationsarefocusingonorthodoxmeansofmessagecom-munication—pamphletdistribution,door-to-doorpubliccontact,proclamationthrough loudspeakersandemployingstudentsofreligiousseminariesfor infor-mationpropagation.

This clearly indicates thatas theelectronicmasscommunicationspace shrinksfordifferentproscribedgroups,theyhaveresortedtotraditionalmethodsofap-proachingthepeopleandcontactingthemasses.

Recently,DaeshorIsisortheIslamicState(IS)announcedfourpolicyobjectivesofitsagendainanunconventionalmessage.First,itdeclaredwaragainstanatheist,un-IslamicandwesternisedPakistanigovernment.Second,itvowedtostruggleagainstthejudiciaryandlocaladministrationthatprotectpoliciesofsuchagov-ernment.Third,itdeclaredthecurrenteducationalsystemasimmoral(whosoev-ergetsadegreefromanyschoolorcollegewillbeconsideredanenemyoftheIslamicState).

Lastly,DaeshrejectsfemaleeducationinPakistananddenouncesanyeffortofthepresentgovernmenttoprovidewesterneducationtoPakistanigirls.Suchmes-sageswerecontainedinpamphletsspottedinTaunsaSharif,DistrictDeraGhaziKhan,containingappealsforfinancialcontributionandsupportaswell.

Similarly,theTTPhasdistributedpamphletsamonglocalresidentsindistrictsad-joiningthetri-borderareatointimidatethepopulation.LastmonththeTTPsentmessages,throughhandwrittenphotocopiedpamphlets,tothepeopleofWan-nar,inthelocalityofTaunsaSharif,tosociallyboycottthosewhowerefacilitatinggovernmentoperationsagainstthedefunctorganisation.ItvowedtoretaliateifanyinformationregardinganyTalibanoperatororworkerwasgiventothepoliceoranyothergovernmentdepartment.

In Bahawalpur, the administration has cracked down heavily onwall chalking,SMSandpamphletdistribution.Asaresult,defunctorganisationshaveresortedtopaidhumanmessengerstoconveythemessagetothelocalsthroughdifferentmeans.Ifthedistanceisshortandthepopulationislocatednearby,themessen-

58Raja,F.A.(October24,2015).MessagesofTerror.RetrievedMarch23,2016fromhttp://www.thenews.com.pk/print/69485-messages-of-terror.Reproducedwithpermissionfromoriginalauthor,andpublisherTheNews.

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gersusebicyclesormotorbikesfortransportation.However,ifthepopulationissparselydisplacedandislocatedatfar-offplacesthenmotorcarsorpublictrans-portarereadilyemployedbythesemessengersforinformationcommunication.

Apartfromthis,madressahstudentshavealsobeenusedtosendmessagestothelocalpopulation.Thesestudentsbelongtoaparticularsectandcertainideo-logicalleaningsarebeingexploitedforsuchpractices.ThisrapidshiftofchangingthemethodofinformationtransmissionisakintothemechanismbeingusedbytheTalibanindifferentdistrictsofAfghanistanwheretheyfocusonhumanmes-sengers.

Allproscribedorganisations,especially thosewhoespouse the takfiri ideology,relyexcessivelyonhuman-to-humancontact.Manycounterterrorismexpertsbe-lievethatathree-tiercommunicationnetworkexists inmosttransnational ter-rororganisations.Thetoptierincludespolicymakerswhocommunicatethroughelectronicmessaging,especiallycreatinganemailaddressandcomposingamailwithout forwarding and then sending eachmember thepassword for login toreadthemail.

The second tier is operational where members meet at specified places likemosques,bazaarsorcafesetc.SometimetheyalsoexchangecomputergadgetslikeUSBsattheseplacestoseeinstructionsandoperationalplansindetail.Thelasttieristacticalandexecutespolicydecisionsthroughactionslikewallchalking,loudspeakerannouncements,pamphletdistributionandcommunicatingthreatstothelocalresidents.

Whilemonitoringsectarianactivitiesunder theNationalActionPlan, thecom-parativeanalysisofanti-hatematerialcampaignindicatesthat44FIRswereregis-teredin2014ascomparedto206casesagainsthatematerialusersandproducersinthecurrentyearindifferentpolicestationsofPunjab.Ithighlightsenhancedgovernmentactionin2015ascomparedtothepreviousyear.

Similarly,atotalnumberof86 incidentsofwallchalkingbydifferentterroror-ganisationswerereportedin2014ascomparedto165in2015.Thetotalcasesregisteredagainstwallchalkingwere29in2014ascomparedto121inthecur-rentyear.Thishasfurtherpushedtheseorganisationstowardsmoreconventionalsourcesofmasscontact.

Oneofthereasonsoftherapidchangingpatternofcommunicationdissemina-tionpivotsaroundpublicalienationduringpolicesearchandsweepoperationsindifferentareasandlocalitiesoftheprovince.

SofarthePunjabPolicehasconducted12,123searchoperationsin13,918local-ities,apprehending66,276personsandregisteringcasesagainst3,676culprits.

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Thisindicatesthatnearly95percentofthesuspectsarereleasedafterinitialin-quirywhichcausesresentmentamongalargesectionofthepopulation.Thesepeoplecanthenbeemployedbydifferentterroristorganisationsforcontactingthepublicthroughunconventionalmethodsofmessagepublication.

Acriticalanalysisoftheseoperationsrevealsthatthehighestnumberofsuchac-tivitiesisseenintheGujranwalaregion(936)followedbySargodha(406),Lahore(394),Sahiwal(307),Faisalabad(306),Multan(296),Bahawalpur(280),Sheikh-upura (220), Rawalpindi (167) and DG Khan (90). The brutal tactics employedduringsearchandsweepoperationsshould,therefore,becurbedtoreducein-stancesofpublicalienation.

Inordertodefeatterrorismweneedtominimiseaccessofeveryterrororgani-sationtoallmeansofcommunicationfacilities.Thevacuumshouldbefilledwithcounter-narrativestargetingthebrutaltacticsusedbythesegroups.Theintelli-genceagenciesshouldexploreallpossiblehumancontactsintheirareasofoper-ationforintelligence-ledactions.

Perhapsweneedtoestablishsmall intelligenceunitsatthestreetormohallahleveltoobfuscatetheseunconventionaltacticsofterrororganisations.Long-termsuccesswilldependonhowwellwepolicecyberspaceandbringthemediaundercomprehensiverestrictionsregardingterrorreporting.

Faisal Ali Raja is in the police service of Pakistan. He can be reached at [email protected].

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3.6 OPINION: The National Action Plan and Cybercrime by Madiha Latif

TheNationalActionPlan(NAP)wasintroducedinJanuary2015totackletheriseofterrorisminPakistan,aswellastoaddresstheongoingoffensiveinNorthWest-ernregionofthecountry.Point5and11oftheNationalActionPlanaretargetedtowards countering hate speech and extremistmaterial, andputting a banonterrorists’ presenceonline. To achieve these aims, theMinistryof InformationTechnology(MoITT)revisedanexistingversionofaproposedcybercrimebill,re-placingitwithaversionpurportedlyalignedwithNAP.The“PreventionofElec-tronicCrimesBill2015”thoughintroducedtodealwithcybercrimesandtackleterrorismonline,thebillactuallyseekstoregulatecitizens’speech,andaccesstocontentandinformationonline,breachingbasiccivillibertiesandrights,withoutanyeffectivecountermeasurestocyberterrorism.

Pakistan currently doesn’t have any cybercrime law. Theonly lawever on thebookswasa2007OrdinancecalledPECO-PakistanElectronicCrimesOrdinance,whichlapsedin2009.Sections36and37oftheElectronicTransactionsOrdinancehavebeenusedtochargeandprosecutepeople.Onanad-hocbasis,theFeder-al InvestigationAgency’s (FIA)wing,NationalResponseCentre forCyberCrime(NR3C)dealswithcybercrimes.TheFIA,createdin1974,isa“counterintelligenceandsecurityagency”,thatdealswithoperationsregardingterrorism,espionage,federalcrimes,fascismandsmuggling.Cybercrime,accordingtoFIA’swing,NR3C,isacrimecommittedviaacomputer,digitaldeviceornetwork,facilitatedthroughtheInternet.AccordingtoFIA’stheCyberCrimeUnit,theperiodbetween2013and2014showedanincreaseincybercrimes.Therearenumerouscasesinwhichindividualswere chargedwith cyber stalking, cyberblackmail, etc, despite thelackofacybercrimelawinPakistan.Butwhatisimportanttonotehereisthatthesecasesarenotrelatedtoterrorism.

Onecouldarguethatcyberterrorism-aspertheNAPdefinition-canbepros-ecutedanddealtwithundertheAntiTerrorismAct1997-specificallySection8-butsection8tooonlydealswithapartofcyberterrorism-thespreadingofhatespeechandviolenceagainstminorities. Itdoesnotcater tocyber terrorismasunderstoodthroughtheelementsprovidedbytheSEARCCT(mentionedbelow).

Globally,cyberterrorismdealswithattacksoninfrastructure;Itisnotsimplythepresenceofterroristorganizationsonline,whichiswhattheNationalActionPlanandthecurrentproposedbilladdress.

Onewayofunderstandcyberterrorism,assuggestedbytheSoutheastAsiaRe-gionalCentreforCounterTerrorism(SEARCCT)istoidentifyifthecrimefallswith-inthefollowingelements:

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1. Cyberattackispoliticallymotivated,andleadstodeathorbodilyinjury

2. Cyberattackcausesfearand/orphysicalharmthroughcybertechniques

3. Attackisagainstcriticalinformationinfrastructuressuchasfinancial,en-ergy,transportationandgovernmentoperations.

4. Itisanessentialservicethathasbeenattackedanddisrupted;non-essen-tialserviceattacksarenotconsideredterrorism

5. Monetarygainisnotprimarymotive.

Cyberterrorismformsasmallpartofthebill.Section10,istheonlysectionre-latedtocyberterrorism,anddoesnotadequatelyaddresstheissuesofcyber-at-tacks,cyberwarfareoreventerrorism.Itisnotclearlydefined,andiscenteredaroundhatespeech,extremistmaterialandterroristpresenceonline.Notcyberterrorismor acts andattacks that impact infrastructureor systemsofnationalconcern.PECBfailstoincorporateanyoftheabove,NAPfailstoaddtheseacts.

Inordertocountercyberterrorism,itisimperativethatthegovernmentunder-standwhatitmeans,andhowitoccurs.Thestateneedstobeawareofthemech-anisms,thekindsofattacks,andhowtobeprotectedfromacyberattack.

Aneffectivemeasuretocountercyberterrorismispreventingattacksbyputtinginplaceacybersecurityinfrastructure.CountriesliketheUnitedStates,workinconjunctionwithacademia,ITexperts,specialistsandothersuchstakeholderstodevelopbettersecuritysystemsandknowledge.Securityinfrastructureneedstobedevelopedandimplemented,whichincludestheuseoffirewalls,encryptionand intrusion detection systems. Research and development needs to encour-aged,alongwithawarenessanddigitalsecuritytrainings.

TheNationalActionPlan,andtheproposedbilldonotincorporateanyofthesenecessarymeasures.Instead,theNAPentirelyfocusesoncounteringspeechandmaterialonlineandthatisnottheglobaldefinitionofcyberterrorism.Section9oftheproposedbillfallsinlinewithpoint11oftheNAP,believingittobeanef-fectivemeansofcounteringterrorism.Thisreflectstheconfusionregardingwhatcyber terrorismactually is; it also reflects themisconception that if content isremovedonline,itwillceasetoexist.Thisisnotthecase;thereisnofoolproofwayofremovingcontentonlinecompletely.Whatspecificallyneedstobepointedout isthatregulationofcontentalsodoesnotpreventcyberterrorism; itdoesnotchangethemindset,norunderminesthe“cause”behindtheattacks.Whatitdoes,however,ispossiblyerasesthecontentfromeasyaccess,andmasksitsexistence.Thisisnotaviablesolution.

Theotherdimensionofbothattacksoncriticalinfrastructureorthepostingthespreading of content is identifying perpetrators is a long and difficult process.

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Therearemanywaysofmaskingone’sidentityonline,andmakingservicesavail-ablethatwouldalterIPaddresses,makingisdifficulttoaccuratelyidentifyper-petrators.Attemptstotrackperpetratorsalsoraisesprivacyconcerns,whichisafurtherviolationofcivilliberties.

NAPfocusesentirelyonspeech,contentandinformationonsocialmediumsthatcitizensusetocriticizeorcommentontheactionsoftheGovernment.Thecur-rentdefinitionofcyberterrorismundertheNAP is inadequate,alongwiththemeasuresproposedtocombatit.Thestateseemsnottounderstandthecomplex-itiessurroundingcyberterrorism,totheextentthatitisquestionablewhetheritevenunderstandsthemeredefinitionofit,andthedistinctionofcyberterrorismandcybercrimes?

Thisattempttooverlapcybercrimeandcyberterrorismisextremelydangerous.Cyberterrorismrequiresonetohavepremeditated,politicalmotivationtospreadfearorcauseseveredisruption;groupingcyberterrorismwithcybercrimewithonlyallowforcivilianstobechargedwithterrorism,andnotactuallycatertotheissueofcyberterrorismitself.Distinctionbetweenacrimeandaterroristactionisimportant,andneedstobedealtwithseparately.

Itisrecommendedthatfocusbeplacedoncybersecuritypolicies,dataprotec-tionlaws,withanindepthcyberterrorismpolicyafterconsultationswithexpertsandstakeholders inthefields. It is important, forthedevelopmentofeffectivecountermeasures,tounderstandthedistinctionbetweencybercrimeandterror-ism,andtheimportanceofcybersecurity.Eachneedstobeexplored,understoodand dealt with separately, through in depth research and information sharingbetween organizations, government and academia. Procedures and guidelinesneedstobeputinplace,withclearlydefinedsafeguardsandprotections,inordertoprotectcivillibertiesandrights.

Madiha Latif has a BA in political science, economics and global studies and is currently pursuing a law degree. She can be reached at [email protected].

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PArT 4: coUnTer-TerrorIsm4.1 Introduction

Our fourth theme comprises of sev-eralpointsintheNAP,specifically#4,#8, and #15. This theme deals withthe issueofcounterterrorismeffortsinPakistan.

Thereisalsosignificantoverlapwiththethirdtheme,bannedoutfits,andthe NAP points that constitute thattheme. Specifically points #3, #11,#14and#6alloverlap.Theoverlap-ping points have been addressed inthepreviouschapter,andwillnotbereproducedforthischapter.

Counterterrorism is one of the cen-tral issues that theNAP ismeant totackleanddismantle. Severalpoints related to counterterrorism, in itsoverlapwithbannedoutfits,hasbeenaddressedbythepreviouschapter,specificallyter-rorfinancing,cyber-crime,mobileSIMs,andprintandelectronicmedia.

Thegovernmentbanneddisplayofweaponsandvisibilityofarmedmilitias.TheMinistryofInteriorandNarcoticsControlpresentedareportinNationalAssem-blyinJanuary,2016.Accordingtothatreport2,159terroristswerekilledwhile1,724hadbeenarrested.1

1QuestionsandOralAnswers,28thsessionoftheNationalAssembly.(2016,January15).RetrievedMarch15,2016,fromhttp://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/ques-tions/1452850149_459.pdf.

coUnTerTerrorIsmNAP POINT 3: Militant outfits andarmedgangswillnotbeallowedtoop-erateinthecountry.

NAP POINT 4:NACTA,theanti-terror-isminstitutionwillbestrengthened.

NAP POINT 8: Establishing and de-ployingadedicatedcounter-terrorismforce.

NAP POINT 15:Noroomwillbeleftfortheextremisminanypartofthecoun-try.

NAP POINT 11:Banonglorificationofterrorists and terrorist organisationsthroughprintandelectronicmedia.

NAP POINT 14: Concrete measuresagainstpromotionofterrorismthroughinternetandsocialmedia.

NAP POINT 6: All funding sources ofterrorists and terrorist outfits will befrozen.

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Graph 4.1 Terrorists Killed and Arrested since NAP Implementation

ThePunjab InformationofTemporaryResidentsOrdinance led to thearrestof890 people in 561 separate cases. The Security of Vulnerable Establishments’Ordinance listed 58 cases and 47 peoplewere detained under this ordinance.500,212weaponshavebeenretrievedunderthede-weaponizationinitiative.

Withoutadoubt,thesecuritysituationinthecountryhasimproveddramaticallysince theenactmentof theNAP.Data collectedbyCRSS in itsAnnual SecurityReport2015revealsamarkeddeclineincasualtiesfromviolence;fromalossof7,611personsin2014,thenumberdroppedto4,653personsthisyear,adropofmorethan40%.TheFederallyAdministeredTribalAreas(FATA)toppedtherestofthecountryintermsoffatalities,denotingatrendthatbeganinJune2014withthelaunchofthemilitaryoperationZarb-e-AzbinNorthWaziristan.ThenumberoffatalitiesinthelargestPunjabprovince,however,registeredaslightincreasewith328deathsfromvariousformsofviolence.2

2Nafees,M.,Gul,I.,&Salahuddin,Z.(2016,February26).CRSSAnnualSecurityReport-2015.RetrievedFebruary26,2016,fromhttp://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/CRSS-Annual-Se-curity-Report-2015.pdf.

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Graph 4.2 Comparative Regional Analysis of Violence-Related Deaths in Paki-stan - 2014 vs. 2015

4.2 National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)

4.2.1OverviewofNACTA

National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) was formed in 2009, aimed tohelpcurbterrorisminthecountry. Itwasmeanttobethepremierintelligenceagency fordeploymentof specialweapons lawenforcement forcesconductingoperationsthatfelloutsidetheambit,scopeorjurisdictionofconventionallawenforcement.TheNACTAwasdesignedtoassessdifficultsituations,toconfrontarmedconflicts,togoupagainstmilitantsuspectsandtoconductarmedcoun-terterrorism operations. It is required to formulate a counterterrorismplan toachieveshort,mediumandlongtermobjectivesandformulateactionplansfortheirexecution.

ItisheadquarteredinIslamabad.ThepreviousCoordinatorofNACTAwasHamid

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AliKhanwhoresignedinAugust2015,andtheMinistryofInteriorappointedLt.Cdr.(retd)IhsanGhaniasthenewNationalCoordinatorNACTA.3

Initiallynothingmorethananideaonpaperfrominception,NACTA’spowerwasgreatlyenhancedinMarch2013,undertheNACTA2013Act.4However,theagen-cyremainslargelydefunct.Atthetimeofwritingthisreport,themainpageofthewebsite,undertheThreatAlertssection,says:“Currentlynothreatalerts”.5 Theremainderofthewebsiteismostlybarebones.NACTA’scompleteboardhasyettomeetoncesincetheenactmentofNAP.MostrecentlyinJanuary,2016,theSenatesoughtRs.2billiontoreactivateNACTA.6

4.2.2FunctionsofNACTA

Thefederalorgan’sfunctions,asavailableonitsownwebsite,areasfollows:

a) Toreceiveandcollatedataorinformationorintelligence,anddisseminateandcoordinatebetweenallrelevantstakeholderstoformulatethreatas-sessmentswithperiodical reviewstobepresentedtotheFederalGov-ernmentformakingadequateandtimelyeffortstocounterterrorismandextremism;

b) To coordinate and prepare comprehensive National counter terrorismandcounterextremismstrategies,andreviewthemonperiodicalbasis;

c) TodevelopactionplansagainstterrorismandextremismandreporttotheFederalGovernmentabout implementationof theseplansonperi-odicalbasis;

d) Tocarryoutresearchontopicsrelevanttoterrorismandextremismandtoprepareandcirculatedocuments;

e) TocarryoutliaisonwithInternationalentitiesforfacilitatingcooperationinareasrelatingtoterrorismandextremism;

f) ToreviewrelevantlawsandsuggestamendmentstotheFederalGovern-ment;and

g) ToappointcommitteesofexpertsfromGovernmentandNGOsfordelib-erationsinareasrelatedtothemandateandfunctionoftheAuthority.

3Ghiskori,Z.(2015,August20).IhsanGhanibestpickforhandlingaffairsofNACTA-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedFebruary05,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/942034/improving-nap-ihsan-ghani-best-pick-for-handling-affairs-of-nacta/.4ActNo.XIXof2013:AnActtoEstablishANationalCounterTerrorismAuthorityinPakistan.(2013,March26).RetrievedFebruary15,2016,fromhttp://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/docu-ments/1364795170_139.pdf.5NACTAWebsite-MainPage.(n.d.).RetrievedMarch02,2016,fromhttp://nacta.gov.pk/.6Mukhtar,I.(2016,January12).SenateseeksRs2bmoreforNactareactivation.RetrievedJanuary13,2016,fromhttp://nation.com.pk/islamabad/12-Jan-2016/senate-seeks-rs2b-more-for-nac-ta-reactivation.

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4.2.3Progresson/byNACTA

RevampingofthelatentNACTAwasinitiatedbythePrimeMinisteronDecember28,2014.Inordertoachieveintendedresults,thePMstressedonsoundcoordi-nationbetweentheprovincialandfederalgovernmentsandthelawenforcementagencies.However,progressonthiswaslargelyglacialandhasnotbornemuchfruit.Thebulkofthedirectcounterterrorismoperationsinthecountryhavebeencarriedoutbythemilitary,withassortedraidsbypoliceforcesinvariousprovinc-es.

This angst is notwithout reason. Thirteenmonths into the implementationofNAP,thegovernmentremainslargelyindifferenttoNACTA,anddespiterepeat-edrequeststothepremier,andamandatethatrequiresquarterlycoordinationmeetings,notasinglesit-downhasoccurredsofar.NACTA,despitehavingthemostpowerfulboardofdirectorshasnotmetevenoncesincetheimplementa-tionofNAP.

Even the InteriorMinister’s report to theNational Assembly,when answeringquestionsofprogressonNACTA,statedthefollowing:“Budgetreleased,JointIn-vestigationDirectoratebeingestablished,strengtheninginprogress,issuesbeinglookedinto”.1Itisunfortunatethatvaguelanguagesuchas“issuesbeinglookedinto”and“strengthening inprogress” isthebestthegovernmentcancomeupwith,nearlythirteenmonthsintotheimplementationoftheNAP.ItillustratesthelackofseriousnessinvolvedinNACTAreactivation.

TheonlyotherreferencestoNACTAinthereportpresentedmentionthatNACTAworkedwiththeIttehad-e-Tanzeemat-e-MadarisPakistan(ITMP)tocreateaUni-formRegistrationandDataFormfortheregistrationofseminaries,andshareditwithrelevantstakeholdersforinput.1Inaseparatequestion,theInteriorMinistercontinuedtoinsistthatNACTA“beingtheprimeagencyinthecounterterrorismrealmiscoordinatingandmonitoringalltheendeavorsexercisedbyvariouscon-cernedagenciesandadministrativeunitsofthecountry.Throughmeetingoffieldexperts,professionalsandrepresentatives,NACTAiscontemplatingunifiedpoli-ciesandextendingrecommendationstoeffectivelyrespondtothevariousshadesofterrorismspectrum.”1Thisishighlysuspect,asNACTAhasnobudgetorstruc-turetospeakof.

4.2.4Obstacles

Insufficientfinancialresourcesandlackofgovernmentinitiativesarecausingde-laysintheactivationofNACTAandexecutionoftheNAP.ProvisionforNACTAwasreducedtoRs.92millionin2014-15budgetwhichwasRs.95millionin2013-14.TheMinistryofInteriorwaspoisedtoreceiveRs.1billionfromtheMinistryof

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FinanceinJanuary2015,buttherequiredamountisstillpending.7

In2014,IslamabadHighCourtplacedthechargeofNACTAunderthePrimeMinis-terbuttheobscurityoverthelegalstatushascauseddelayintheimplementationofNAP.8ItyetremainsunderthecontroloftheInteriorMinisterwhoisunabletoprovideitwiththesufficientresourcesandskilledstaff.LackofclarityoverthelegalstatusofNACTAremainedaproblemuntilNovember2015.

MinistryofInteriorSecretaryShahidKhandeclaredinJune,2015thatprogressonNAPleavesalottobedesired.Inthesamemeeting,NationalCoordinatorNACTAHamidKhansaidthegovernmenthadbeenunabletocollectexactdataonsemi-naries,thatmoreneededtobedonetoclampdownonterrorfinanciers,andthatrefugeeregistrationwasamajortask.HewasalsoquicktoaggrandizeoverSIMregistrationandtheongoingoperationinKarachi.9

ThisurgencytoclaimvictoryandresponsibilityhasalsobackfiredandhurtNACTAintherecentpast.Forexample,areportwassenttothegovernmentbyNACTAinApril 2015. It claimed that the StateBankof Pakistan (SBP) has confiscated120accountsofbannedoutfits.TheaggregateofmoneyfrozenintheendwasRs10.3billion.However,uponfurtherscrutiny,itwasrevealedthatthisamountwasseizedoverthecourseofadecadeandnearlynoprogresshadbeenmadesincetheenactmentoftheNAP.10

4.3 CPEC Security

TheChina-PakistanEconomicCorridor(CPEC)projectwiththeinvestmentof$46billionissaidtobeagamechangerthatcouldstimulatethegrowthofbothstatesandleadtothedevelopmentoftheentireregion.However,therearemanysecu-rityintimidationslinkedtotheCPECproject.Earlier,underthesupportoftheEastTurkestanIslamicMovement(ETIM),UighurmilitantsfromtheXinjiangprovinceinWesternChinahavetargetedinhabitantsofChina,whereastheTehrik-e-Tali-banPakistan(TTP)andothermilitantorganizationsinPakistanhavebeentarget-ingitscitizens.7Sher,F.(2015,January20).InteriorministrytogetRsonebillionanytimesoon|BusinessRecord-er.RetrievedMarch02,2016,fromhttp://www.brecorder.com/top-stories/0/1143668/.8APP.(2014,July09).IHCordersplacementofNACTAunderPMSecretariat-TheExpressTri-bune.RetrievedFebruary27,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/733175/ihc-orders-place-ment-of-nacta-under-pm-secretariat/.9Khan,A.(2015,June02).Freshrevelations:Anti-terrorplanfailstoachievegoals-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedJanuary18,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/895997/fresh-revelations-anti-terror-plan-fails-to-achieve-goals/.10Husain,K.(2015,April10).Nacta’sclaimfailsscrutiny.RetrievedFebruary21,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1174993.

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ThemilitaryclaimsthatPakistan’ssecurityforceshavedismantledtheETIMwithOperationZarb-e-AzbsinceJune2014.ChinesePresidentXiJinpingvisitedPaki-staninApril2015andacknowledgedthismilitaryinitiative.HepraisedthePaki-stanimilitary’seffortsandlabeleditasolidsteptowardthepeaceandstabilityoftheregion.HepromisedtostandbyPakistaninallitsactivitiesagainstterrorism.

LaterinNovember2015,PakistanandChinaagreedonafour-layersecurityplanmeantfortheoverthreethousandkilometerlongtraderoute,connectingXinji-angprovincetoGwadarseaport.SincetheciviliangovernmenthasassignedthetaskofprotectingtheChinesetoPakistanArmyandNavy,thechiefofarmystaff(COAS) assured to protect Chineseworking in Pakistan. About 32,000 securitypersonnelwillprovidesecurityto14,321Chineseworkerswhohavebeenwork-ingin210differentprojectsacrossthePakistan.Overthreethousandpolicemen,740Askarisecurityguards,4,100privatesecurityguards,and900Rangers,wouldsafeguarddifferentprojectsrelatedtotheCPEC.11

TheCPECisalsoamajorsourceofconcernforBalochnationalistswhoclaimthatit infringes upon their identity and rights. Since theBaloch ethnics have beenignored by the government in last decade, the Baloch natives are nowof theopinionthatundertheumbrellaoftheeconomicdevelopmentandprosperity,CPECwillturnthemintoaminoritywithintheirownland.Thereisatrustdeficit,insecurityanddisappointmentwithintheBalochcommunity.Theyarescaredtobemarginalizedbycertaindemographicchanges thatCPECprojectcould lead.Therefore,theBalochcommunitydeclaredthattheyarenotagainsttheexecu-tionoftheCPECprojectonlyifthegovernmentendorsessomelegislationinfa-vourofprotectingtherightsofBalochethnicsintheregion.Thissentimentisnotuniversal,assomehavetakenuparmsagainstthestateinstead.

TheBalochhavefeltsuppressedandignoredbythefederalgovernmentofPaki-stansince1948.Todealwiththeirgrievances,itisimportantforthegovernmenttospecificallyensuretheirprosperityundertheCPECproject.

11Ghiskori,Z.(2015,November01).Economiccorridor:Pakistan,Chinaagreeonfour-layersecuri-ty-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedFebruary22,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/983033/economic-corridor-pakistan-china-agree-on-four-layer-security/.

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Graph 4.3 CPEC Security Personnel Deployment Breakdown

Morethan500Chinesesecuritypersonnelwerehiredaimedatcapacitybuild-ingofthespecialforcesandlocalpoliceforsafeguardingsensitiveroutes.Paki-stanMarinesandthebordersecurityforceswerealsotaskedwithsecuringtheroutes linkedtoCPECprojects.TheCPECProjectDirectorMajorGeneral (retd)ZahirShahassertedthatthepeopleofChinaareimmenselysatisfiedwiththese-curitymeasuresadoptedbybothcountries.However,recentconversationswiththeChineserevealsignifantconcernsrelatedtomatersofsecurities.MinistryofInteriordeclaredthatBalochistanwouldbemoresecureaftertheestablishmentof new securitypolicy as 1,000 Leviespersonnel and sixwingsof the Frontier

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Corpscomprisingof5,700personnel,and3,000policeconstableswouldbeem-ployedforthesecurityofsensitiveroutes.Themilitaryestablishedaspecialse-curityforceofninebattalionswitheachspecialdivisiontobecommandedbyaservingMajorGeneral.

4.4 Special Anti-Terrorism Force / Pakistan Special Services Group

Inadditiontothemilitary-runZarb-e-Azboperation,theSpecialServicesGroup(SSG) is involved in extensive counter-terrorism operations and asymmetricalwarfareinPakistan.

4.4.1HistoricalBackground

SSGisalsoknownastheBlackStorks,anamederivedfromtheiruniquehead-dress.Theyarespecialistcounterterrorismoperatives,trainedinnon-traditionalandasymmetricalwarfare.TheSSGwaslistedasthebestSpecialForcesgroupintheworldinMay2015,aheadofUSNavySEALsandtheBritishSpecialAirServicegroup.12Theauthorityofthearticletostakethisclaim,however, isamatterofdebate.

4.4.2StructuralOrganization

PakistaniSpecialForceshave7divisions:

• 1stCommandoYaldrumBattalion

• 2ndCommandoRahbarBattalion

• 3rdCommandoPowindahsBattalion

• 4thCommandoYalgharBattalion

• 5thCommandoZilzaalBattalion

• 6thCommandoAlSamsaamBattalion

• 7thCommandoBabrumBattalion

DivisionsarecontrolledbyLieutenantColonels.Eachdivisioncomprises700meninfourcompanies,witheachcompanyfurtherdividedintosubdivisionsandtheninto10-manteams.

12 Hirst, T. (2015,March 13). The 9most elite special forces in theworld. RetrievedMarch 19,2016, from http://www.businessinsider.com.au/the-most-elite-special-forces-in-the-world-2015-5#1-the-special-services-group-ssg-in-pakistan-is-better-known-in-the-country-as-the-black-storks-due-to-the-commandos-unique-headgear-training-reportedly-includes-a-36-mile-march-in-12-hours-and-a-five-mile-run-in-20-minutes-in-full-gear-13.

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Itincludestwoautonomouscommandocompanies:

• MusaCompany-SpecializesinAmphibiousOperations

• ZarrarCompany-SpecializesinCounterterrorism

TrainedbyZarrarCompany,theRangersAnti-TerroristCompanyhasbeenactivesinceearly2004.TheParamilitaryRangersareprimarily taskedwith theurbanpacificationoperationinKarachi.

Insharpcontrast,NACTAhasnosuchforceat itsdisposal,andanalysisrevealsthatevencoordinationwithrelevantauthoritiesisscantatbest.

4.5 Case Study: Punjab

Punjabisaninterestingcasestudybecauseitdepictsapotentialhavenformis-creants and the criminal element. Since the implementationofNAP,extensiveoperationshavebeenconductedinallpartsofthecountry.InFATAandKP,Oper-ationZarb-e-AzbhasbeenineffectsinceJune,2014.13InBalochistan,insurgentmollificationandreconciliationeffortsareunderway.InSindh,specificallyKara-chi,themostviolentdistrictinPakistan,anurbanpacificationoperationisbeingconductedbytheparamilitaryRangers.Punjabremainslargelyuntouched,inpartfueledbythetenuouspactbetweenthecivilandmilitaryleaderships,andinpartbecausePunjabhas reportedmuch lower levelsof violence in the last severalyears.2

However, this pattern cannot hold for long, as militants and extremism havespreadtoeverycornerofthecountry.Soonerorlater,aneventwillprecipitatetheextensionofcounterterrorismoperationsinPunjab.

4.5.1Punjab-Terrorism

Oneofthemostsignificantandtragicdevelopmentsin2015wasthemurderofthePunjabHomeMinisterShujaKhanzadainasuicideattackinAugust,2015.Thelawenforcementagenciesand InspectorGeneralofPunjabpresentedareporttheChiefMinisterofPunjab,MianShahbazSharif,claimingthattheattackwasthereactionto thekillingof thechiefofLashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)Malik Ishaq,amonthprior.14

13Sherazi,Z.S.(2014,June15).Zarb-e-Azboperation:120suspectedmilitantskilledinNWa-ziristan.RetrievedFebruary12,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1112909/zarb-e-azb-op-eration-120-suspected-militants-killed-in-n-waziristan.14BBC.(2015,August16).PunjabministerShujaKhanzadakilledinPakistanblast-BBCNews.RetrievedMarch23,2016,fromhttp://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33952413.

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Punjabistheonlyprovinceinthecountrythatsawanupsurgeinnumberoffa-talitiesfromviolenceduringlasttwoyears.However,itaccountsforamere4%ofallviolence-relatednationalfatalities,despiteaccountingfornearly2/3rdofthepopulation.Outof17,958persons(includingmilitants)thatwerethevictimsofviolenceinthecountryduringlastthreeyears,755personswerefromPunjab.

4.5.2Punjab–MeasuresAgainstTerrorism

Ofthe7,372policemendeployedatpolicestations inLahore,around10%dis-chargetheiroperationalduties.Therestarecalleddailyforspecialassignments,such as VIP detail, or foreign visits etc.15 The citizen to police ratio should bearound200to1,anditcurrentlyhoversat2,000to1.AninitiativewasalsotakenbythePunjabpoliceteaminOctober2015toscrutinizefakeappointmentsinthepolicedepartment.Theteamhasdismissedatleast136officerswhowerehiredonthebasisoffakeappointmentletters.TheyhavealsobeenbookedundertheAnti-TerrorismAct.16

In order to curtail the threat of terrorism, Punjab government has introducedPunjabArmsOrdinanceandWallChalkingOrdinance2015.17UndertheMainte-nanceofPublicOrderOrdinance, issuedbythePunjabgovernment,thedecla-rationsinfavorofterroristsandcriticismofthegovernment’scounter-terrorismactionswouldbeconsideredcrimes.ThePunjabgovernmenthasalsopropagatedanordinance,whichprohibitstheglorificationofmilitantsandtheirorganizationsinthemediaoratanyotherforum.

PunjabgovernmenthasalsoissuedtheArmsOrdinance2015againstillegalarms.Thisordinanceprohibitstheopendisplayofarmsandbansthecarryingofanyarmamentsacrosstheprovincialboundaries.SomesignificantamendmentshavebeenmadetoSection13ofthePunjabArmsOrdinance1965tocertifysafetyofthecitizens.Sternconsequencesi.e.2-14yearsimprisonmentandfinehavebeenlevieduponviolationoftheordinance.

The InteriorMinister, inhisbriefingto theNationalAssembly in January2016,claimedthatactionhadbeentakenagainst1,132hardcoreelementsinPunjab,anadditional405werebookedunderScheduleIVoftheAnti-TerrorismAct.78firebrandspeakersand649“facilitators”hadbeenarrestedforatotalof825ar-rested.1Thesearevagueindicators,difficulttodistinguishfromoneanother.

15Chaudhary,A.(2015,November23).‘Unofficial’VIPdutiescreatedearthofpoliceforceforLahore.RetrievedMarch02,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1221679.16Manan,A.(2015,October29).Punjabpolicelookingintopossibleextremistinfiltration-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch12,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/981139/emerg-ing-scandal-punjab-police-looking-into-possible-extremist-infiltration/.17Hanif,I.(2015,January10).Punjabpromulgatestwomoreordinances.RetrievedMarch17,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1156072.

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Punjab government also proposed a pilot project for 200 youth-soft loans. Itwouldaimatskilldevelopmentthroughtechnicaltrainings.

Graph 4.4 Action Taken Against Criminal Elements

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4.6 OPINION: Ensuring against re-emergence of proscribed organiza-tions by Farhan Zahid

Agendaitemnumber7ofNationalActionPlan(NAP)aimstoensurethatnopro-scribedorganizationwouldbeallowedtooperateundernewnames,ashasbeenthecaseinthepast.PerhapsthepointwasincludedkeepinginviewofGeneralPer-vezMusharraf’sJanuary12,2002speechinwhichheproscribedIslamistterroristgroupsallegedlyinvolvedinDecember13,2001attackontheIndianParliament.Thegroupslaterre-emergedwithnewnamesandidentitiesandresumedtheirac-tivities.There-surfacingissueholdskeyimportanceasnoproscribedorganizationshouldbeabletoresumeitsactivitiesundertheguise.TheNAP,despiteachievingsuccessinsomeareas,needstoreinvigorateitsoverallstrategyassomereligio-po-liticalorganizationsarestillfreelyoperatinginthecountry.

ASWJ and LeJ

MostimportanttomentionhereisthecaseofAhle-e-SunnatwalJamaat(AWSJ)thenewnameofproscribedSipah-e-Sahaba(theparentorganizationofviolentlysectarianLashkar-e-Jhangvi(LeJ)).ItisquiteinterestingtonotethatinthePunjabprovince,theAWSJanditssisterconcernshavebeentakentotaskbytheprovin-ciallawenforcementagenciesandscoresofitsworkersarenowbehindthebars.However,theyhavebeengivenafreehandtooperate inKarachiwhereitwasseencollectingsacrificialhides,andZakatandFatraonbothEids,revealingtheinherentinconsistencesinNAPenforcement.LeJ’sfounderMalikIshaqwaskilledin a police encounter inMuzaffargarh district of Punjab, clearly showcasing thePunjabgovernment’sresolvetoannihilateLeJ.TheprovincialgovernmentsufferedmassivelywhenitsLawMinisterShujaKhanzadawaskilledinasuicideattackonAugust17,2015athisresidenceinAttockdistrict18,likelyanactofretaliationforthekillingofIshaq.AnotherkeymemberofLeJ,HaroonBhatti,waskilledinapoliceencounteronOctober2015afterhisarrestinDubaiandbeingshiftedtoLahore19.

The security apparatus inKarachi, specifically theRangers, are inundatedwiththemilitantwingsofpoliticalpartiessuchasthesecular/urbanMuttahidaQua-miMovement (MQM).Limitedseriousactionhasbeenreportedto thwart thegrowthofAWSJintheoutskirts(Pashtundominatedareas)ofKarachiwhereitspresenceisnowfeltconsiderably.Thisalsorevealsadireneedtoreformthepo-liceandequipthemwithenoughincentivesandamendedlawstobeabletose-curethelifeandpropertyofKarachi’scitizens.

18(2015,August17).PunjabhomeministerShujaKhanzadakilledinterrorattack.RetrievedMarch06,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1200807(accessedon16/12/15).19Nizami,Y.(2015,December12).NationalActionPlan.RetrievedMarch06,2016,fromhttp://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2015/12/12/features/national-action-plan-2/(accessedon15/12/15).

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AWSJalsoparticipatedinrecentlocalbodieselectionsinKarachiasPakistanRah-e-HaqParty(PRHP)andmanagedtobagnineseatswhereas40candidatesbackedbyPRHPwonintheirrespectiveconstituencies20,onceagainhighlightingthefree-domitenjoystooperateinthefinancialcapitalofPakistan.

JeM

ManyofthepreviouslybannedIslamistterroristorganizationscontinueoperatingwithnewlyadoptednames.Jaish-e-Mohammad(JeM)wasproscribedonJanuary14,2002butlaterre-emergedasKhudam-ul-Islam(KuI).JeM’sreincarnationwasbannedonNovember15200321.RaufAsgharthebrotherofJeMleaderMasoodAzhartookovertheorganizationin2007whileAzharremainedelusiveandoffoftheradar22.Heresurfacedin2014wherehetelephonicallyaddressedalargegatheringofhissupporters23.

LeT

Lashkar-e-Taiba(LeT)’scaseispeculiarasitremainslargelyuntouched.LeTcur-rentlyoperatesundertheumbrellaofJamaatudDawa(JuD).Falah-e-InsaniyatFoundation(FIF)thecharitywingofJuDandLeTcontinuedtooperateinallmajorcitiesofPakistan.TheambulanceservicesofFIFareavailableoutsideallgovern-menthospitalsinthecountry.InareplytoSenateofPakistantheInteriorMinisterhasrefusedtobanJuDasheclaimednoevidenceagainstthecharityorganizationhas been sharedby theUnitedNations.Nonetheless the activities of the saidorganizationisbeingobservedunderSection11-DoftheAnti-TerroristActand,incaseofanyevidenceestablishingaconnectionwithLeT,thegovernmentmayapplySection11-BoftheAnti-TerrorismAct(ATA)toproscribetheorganization24.

Presence of IS

AfterrefusingtoacceptthepresenceofIslamicState(ISakaISIS/ISILakaDa’esh)theMinistryofInteriorfinallyincludeditinitsofficiallistofproscribedorganiza-tions.Initiallythelistwasremovedforsomemonthsfromtheofficialwebsiteof

20(2015,December7).ASWJaffiliatequietlyswipesnineseatsinKarachi.RetrievedMarch06,2016,fromhttp://www.thenews.com.pk/print/82811-I-am-facing-pressure-to-favour-Dr-Asim-spe-cial-prosecutor(accessedon14/12/15).21Ibid22SouthAsiaTerrorismPortal.Jaish-e-Mohammad.RetrievedMarch06,2016,fromhttp://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.satp.org%2Fsatporgtp%2Fcountries%2Fin-dia%2Fstates%2Fjandk%2Fterrorist_outfits%2Fjaish_e_mohammad_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm&date=2010-12-04(accessedon15/12/15).23Hussain,Z.(2014,February2).ThereturnofMasoodAzhar.RetrievedMarch06,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1084328(accessedon14/12/15).24(2015,July8).JuDunlikelytobebanned,NisartellsSenate.RetrievedMarch06,2016,fromhttp://nation.com.pk/editors-picks/08-Jul-2015/jud-unlikely-to-be-banned-nisar-tells-senate.

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NationalCounterTerrorismAuthority (NACTA)butfinallypresentedbefore theSenatebytheStateMinisterof InteriorafterenlistingDa’esh inmid-December201525.

Proscribed organizations’ list

Asmentionedearlier, a controversy regarding thebanon JuD/FIF remained ininternationalmediathelistofproscribedorganizationwasremovedforsomepe-riodof time. The controversywas related to the status and activities of theseorganizationsasPakistan,undertheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution(UNSCR)1267,hastoabidebytheproceduresadoptedintheresolutiondemand-ingcompletebanonactivitiesandfreezingoffinancialassets.JuDandFIFalongwithTaliban,Harkat-ul-Mujahideen(HuM),UmmaTameer-e-Nau,Jamaat-ud-Da-wa(JuD),AlAkhtarTrust,AlRashidTrust,Harkat-ul-JihadIslami,Falah-i-InsaniyatFoundation(FIF),HajiKhairullahHaji IsrarMoneyExchange,RoshanMoneyEx-changeandRahatLtdarelistedinUNSCR1267.26

Red Mosque

Another thornymatter regarding the re-emergenceof bannedorganizations istheuncheckedactivitiesofRedMosque(LalMasjid)chiefclericAbdulAzizintheheartofIslamabad.AzizhasopenlyannouncedplansforrestartingthecampaigntoenforceShariainPakistan.Despitenotbeingthestate-approvedprayerleaderof themosque27, the firebrand cleric is hell-bent on resuming his activities. Inspiteofregistrationofcasesagainsthim,includingnon-bailableoffenses,nose-riousactionhasbeentakenagainsttheclericandhecontinuestooperateunhin-deredinthenation’scapitalfromtherelativesafetyofthemosque.

RedMosquecleric’slinkswithISarenosecretasfemalestudentsofRedMosqueaffiliated Jamia Hafsa seminary have pledged allegiance to IS and its self-pro-claimedCaliphAbuBakral-Baghdadiearlierthisyear.TheclericisalsosuspectedtohavelinkswithTashfeenMalik28,thefemaleinvolvedintherecentshootingsin

25Khan,I.(2015,December19).ISamong61bannedoutfits,ministertellsSenate.RetrievedMarch06,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1227402/is-among-61-banned-outfits-minis-ter-tells-senate(accessedon19/12/15)26Hussain,K.(2015,March9).Wranglingpersistsinlistingterrorgroups.RetrievedMarch06,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1168347(accessedon18/12/15).27Abbasi,O.andGishkori,Z.(2015,November13).SecuritybeefedupinIslamabadasLalMasjidclericvowstorestart‘ShariaLaw’campaign.RetrievedMarch06,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/990764/security-deployed-as-lal-masjid-cleric-vows-to-restart-campaign-in-islamabad/ (accessedon19/12/15).28Hussain,I.(2015,December4).ISISloyalistwomaninSanBernardinomassacreislinkedtoPa-kistan’smostnotoriousradicalclericandmosqueknownascenterforfundamentalists.RetrievedMarch06,2016,fromhttp://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3346618/ISIS-loyalist-wom-an-San-Bernardino-massacre-linked-Pakistan-s-notorious-radical-cleric-mosque-known-center-fun-

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SanBernardino,California.TheleveloftheirrelationswiththemosqueremainsuncertainasTashfeenMalikalsostudiedatAl-Hudaseminaryforwomen,anoth-erpossiblesourceofherradicalization.

Conclusion

TheNAPappearstohaveyieldedmixedresults.Itseemsthatselectjihadiorga-nizationshavebeentargetedwhereassomeothershaveeitherresurfacedundernewnamesorcontinuetooperatefreely inthecountry.TheNAPagendaitemnumber7hasbeenostensibly implementedinPunjabasfarassomeorganiza-tions are concerned. In Sindh, especially in Karachi, limited serious action hasbeenreportedagainstthesameorganizations.Itispertinentthatprovincialunitsgoafterallterrorgroupsandorganizations.TheimplementationofNAPmustbeuniformandconsistentandnon-selective.

Dr. Farhan Zahid is a senior police officer with a PhD in counterterrorism studies. He is author of the book “The Roots Of Violent Islamic Activism In South Asia”. He can be reached at [email protected].

damentalists.html(accessedon15/12/15).

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PArT 5: secTArI-AnIsm5.1 Introduction

Our fifth theme studies sectarianismandthestate’sattemptstocurb it. Itis an amalgamationof several pointsintheNAP,specifically#5,#8and#18,andalsocoversminoritiesrights.

There is some overlap with Part 3:ProscribedOrganizations,andPart4:Counterterrorism.Minorityrightsandgovernmentaction isalsocovered inthissection.

TheMinistryofInteriorandNarcoticsControlpresentedareportintheNationalAssemblyinJanuary,2016.Accordingtothatreportcaseshavebeenregisteredregardinghatespeechandthemisuseofthe loudspeaker,andthousandshavebeenarrested. Whilepositive,theseactionscontinuetotargetthesymptomsofreligioushatredandsectarianism,anddolittletotargettheideologythatfuelssuchamindset.1

5.2 Minorities in Pakistan

During2012-2015Christiansfacedarangeofatrocities,includingsexualassaults,harassmentandforcedconversionsinsomepartsofthecountry,and14Chris-tians were charged under the blasphemy laws. In 40 attacks on the Christiancommunity,sevenchurchesweretargeted.Ahmedisconstantlyfacehumiliation,threatstolifeandproperty.Constitutionalizedanti-Ahmadilawsespeciallyfacili-tatethis,andatleastsixAhmediplacesofworshiphavecomeunderattackduringthesameperiod.

Hindusremainatargetofabduction,forcedmarriages,rapeofgirlsandkidnap-pings.Curriculumtaughtinschoolspaintsthemastheenemy,tyingthemcloselywiththestate’santagonisticnarrativeonIndia.Theminoritythatfacestheworst

1QuestionsandOralAnswers,28thsessionoftheNationalAssembly.(2016,January15).RetrievedMarch15,2016,fromhttp://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/ques-tions/1452850149_459.pdf.

secTArIAnIsmNAP POINT 5: Strict action againsttheliterature,newspapersandmaga-zinespromotinghatred,decapitation,extremism, sectarianism and intoler-ance.

NAP POINT 9:Endtoreligiousextrem-ism and protection ofminoritieswillbeensured.

NAP POINT 18: Action against ele-mentsspreadingsectarianism.

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ofattacks is theShiacommunity. Inthe lastthreeyears,eventhoughminoritycasualtieshavereducedbymorethanhalf,violenceagainstShiashasrisen.TheIsmailis,aShiasub-sect,werealsotargetedintheSafooraGothattackinKarachi,leaving46dead.2

5.2.1PopulationofDifferentSectsofIslaminPakistan

Sunniand Shiaarethemajorsects in Islam. Ismalisareasub-categoryofShiaIslamandBrelvi,DebondiandAhle-HaditharesubcategoriesofSunniIslam.3

Sect Population

Brelvi 50%

Deobandi 20%

Shia 18%

AhleHadith 4%

Ismaili 2%

Others 2%

5.2.2Lawspertainingtominorities

ThesearesomeofthelawspertainingtominoritiesinPakistan:

• ChristianMarriageAct1832

• HinduWidowsRe-MarriageAct1856

• SindhHinduHeirsReliefAct1866

• ChristianMarriageAct1872

• HinduDispositionofPropertyAct1916

• HinduInheritance(RemovalofDisabilities)Act1928

• HinduLawofInheritance(Amendment)Act1929

• HinduGainsofLearningAct1930

• ParisMarriageandDivorceAct19364

• HinduWomen’sRightstoPropertyAct1937

• HinduMarriageDisabilitiesRemovalAct1946

• HinduMarriedWomen’sRighttoSeparateResidenceandMaintenanceAct1946

2Mehmood,R.,&Akbar,S.H.(2016).StateofReligiousFreedominPakistan.RetrievedMarch25,2015,fromhttp://jinnah-institute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Minority-Report-2016.pdf.3OxfordIslamicStudies.(n.d.).Pakistan,Islamin.RetrievedMarch24,2016,fromhttp://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1809?_hi=1.4PleaseseeAnnexVI:Lawspertainingtominorities

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• ProtectionofCommunalPropertiesofminoritiesOrdinance2001

• ProtectionofCommunalPropertiesofMinoritiesCommunitiesRules2003

5.2.3ViolenceagainstMinorities

ReligiousminoritiesinPakistanhavefacedthebruntofviolenceinthecountry,andthestateresponsehasbeentraditionallyweak.DatacollectedbytheCenterforResearchandSecurityStudiesshowsthatsectarianviolenceclaimedabout1,340lives(andleftsome1,940injured)duringthelastthreeyears.TheprovinceofSindhhadthehighestnumberofsectarianfatalities(569),followedbyBalu-chistan(359),KP(215),FATA(109),andPunjab(79).Thecapitalofthecountry,Islamabad,alsosufferedninefatalities.Baluchistanfacedthehighestnumberofinjuredpeopleinsectarianviolence(608).5

Non-MuslimsconstituteaboutthreepercentofPakistan’sestimatedpopulationof200million.Some20percentoftherestareShiaMuslims.Prominentamongthenon-MuslimminoritygroupsareChristians(2.5million),Hindus(1million),andAhmadis(3million),thusaccountingforabout3.7%ofPakistan’spopulation.6

Adownwardtrend,asobservedinallotherformsofviolence,isevidentinsec-tarianviolenceaswell.Morethana50%dropinfatalitiesinsectarianviolenceisvisiblein2015whencomparedwiththosein2013.

Majorcausesincludeincitementbyreligiousleaders,particularlythroughmisuseoftheloudspeakersduringsermons,institutionalizedandconstitutionalizedha-tredanddiscrimination,biasedcurriculum,andabuseofcontroversiallaws.

Theblasphemylawsinparticularcanbesystematicallyabusedtotargetminori-tiesandincitereligioushatred.Someprogresstorevisittheselawswasmadein2015.First,thedeathsentenceforMumtazQadri,themanwhokilledPunjab’ssittingGovernorSalmanTaseeronwhatheviewedasblasphemousconduct,wasupheldbyacourt.7InMay,2015,apieceoflegislationwasintroducedcallingforseverepenalties formisuseof theblasphemy laws.8 Ina statementby theSu-premeCourtinOctober,2015,JusticeAsifSaeedKhosaremarkedthatcriticismof5Nafees,M.,Gul,I.,&Salahuddin,Z.(2016,February26).CRSSAnnualSecurityReport-2015.RetrievedFebruary26,2016,fromhttp://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/CRSS-Annual-Se-curity-Report-2015.pdf.6EuropeExternalPolicyAdvisors.(n.d.).StatusofReligiousMinoritiesInPakistan.RetrievedFebru-ary17,2016,fromhttp://www.eepa.be/wcm/dmdocuments/EP_Hearing_Pakistan/Fact_Sheet_Minorities_in_Pakistan.pdf.7Malik,M.Z.(2015,March09).DeathsentenceupheldforkillerofPakistanigovernoroverblas-phemylaw.RetrievedMarch16,2016,fromhttp://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-blasphe-my-idUSKBN0M50LT20150309.8Lodge,C.(2015,June01).World.RetrievedFebruary24,2016,fromhttp://www.christiantoday.com/article/pakistan.new.legislation.could.stop.misuse.of.blasphemy.laws/55131.htm.

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blasphemylawswasnotblasphemyinofitself,thusopeningthedoorsforapublicdebateontheissue.9Attheendofthe13-monthauditperiod,aboyinKhanqahcutoffhisownhandafterhewasmarkedablasphemerbythelocalcleric.Theclerichassincebeenarrestedandchargeshavebeenfiledagainsthim.10

Graph 5.1 Violence against Minorities – 2013-2015

Sectarian Violence Fatalities - 2013 - 2015

Region 2013 2014 2015

Dead Injured Dead Injured Dead Injured

Sindh 161 129 230 67 178 131

Balochistan 240 424 86 153 33 31

KP 123 195 60 104 32 63

FATA 63 200 15 31 31 76

Punjab 28 113 23 24 28 99

ISB 1 0 6 98 2 1

9Haider,I.(2015,October05).Criticisingblasphemylawdoesnotamounttoblasphemy:JusticeKhosa.RetrievedMarch26,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1211047.10Gillani,W.,&Nordland,R.(2016,January18).Boy’sResponsetoBlasphemyChargeUnnervesManyinPakistan.RetrievedJanuary19,2016,fromhttp://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/19/world/asia/boys-response-to-blasphemy-charge-unnerves-many-in-pakistan.html.

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GB 0 0 0 1 0 0

Total 616 1061 420 478 304 401

5.2.4SupremeCourtJudgment

InJune2014,theSupremeCourtofPakistanhighlightedthestate’sfailuretopro-tectreligiousminoritiesandtheirplaceofworships.Thecourtfounda“lackofawarenessaboutminorityrights”amonglaw-enforcementagenciesandhadob-servedthatassaultsagainstreligiousminoritiescouldbecreditedtothefailurebythestatetotakesatisfactorypreventivemeasures.11

Thesepreventativemeasures includedesigning school curriculums topromotereligioustoleranceandcohesion,constitutinganationalcouncilfortheprotectionofminoritiestoframepolicyrecommendationsforsafeguardingandprotectingrightsofreligiousminorities,constitutingaspecialpoliceforcetoprotectplacesofworshipofreligiousminorities,andensuringthataction,includingregistrationofcriminalcases,ispromptlytakentobringtojusticetoperpetratorswhoabusetherightsofreligiousminorities.12

5.3 Government Progress against Spreading Hatred/Sectarianism

Asstatedabove,theMinistryofInteriorandNarcoticsControlpresentedatheNa-tinalAssemblyinJanuary,2016.Accordingtothatreport2,337caseshavebeenregisteredonhatespeech,coupledwiththearrestsofsome2,195individuals. 73shopshavealsobeensealed.Regardingmisuseofloudspeakerstospreadhatredandsectarianism,9,164caseshavebeenregisteredimplicating9,340individualsand2,542piecesofequipmenthavebeenconfiscatedaswell.13

PakistaniPrimeMinisterNawazSharifinhisaddresstotheHinducommunityataDiwalieventinKarachisaid,“IamthePrimeMinisterofallPakistanis,whethertheyareHindu,Muslim,Sikh,Christian,Parsi,oranyotherreligion.Iwillstandbyvictimsofviolenceandensureperpetratorsarebroughtto justice,evenwhere

11Omer,R.(2015,November24).Minoritymatters.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1221823.12USStateDepartment.(2014,July28).2013ReportonInternationalReligiousFreedom-BureauofDemocracy,HumanRights,AndLabor.RetrievedMarch27,2016,fromhttp://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2013/sca/222339.htm.13QuestionsandOralAnswers,28thsessionoftheNationalAssembly.(2016,January15).RetrievedMarch15,2016,fromhttp://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/ques-tions/1452850149_459.pdf.

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theperpetratorsareMuslim.”14

Mr.LalChand,Member,NationalAssembly,proposedandmovedtheNationalCommissionforMinorityRightsAct,2015.15TheproposedactliststhefunctionsandpowersoftheCommissionasfollows:

(1)TheCommissionshallperformalloranyofthefollowingfunctions,namely;

(a) EvaluatetheprogressanddevelopmentofMinorities;(b) Monitortheworkingof.hesafeguardsprovidedintheConstitu- tionofPakistanandinlawsenactedbyParliament;(c) Make recommendations to effective implementation of safe- guardsoftheprotectionoftheinterestsofMinorities(d) Inquireandinvestigateintospecificcomplaintsregardingdepri- vationofrightsandsafeguardsoftheMinoritiesandtakeupsuch matterswiththeappropriateauthorities(e) Causestudiestobeundertakenintoproblemsarisingoutofany discriminationagainstlvlinoritiesandrecommendmeitsuresfor theirremoval:(f) Conduclstudies,researchandanalysisontheissuesrelatingto socioeconomic and educational development of Minorities;(S) Suggestappropriatemd’asureswithrespecttoanyMinoritytobe undertakenbytheGovernment;(h) Make periodical or special reports to the Government on any matterpertaining toMinoritiesand inparlicular thedifficulties confrontedbythem,(i) AnyothermatterwhichmaybereferredtoitbytheGovernment, and(j) Reviewtheexistinglawsorthatmaybeenactedinfulureinthe best interest of religiousminorities and send its recommenda- tionstoParliament.

(2)TheGovernmentshallcausetherecommendationsrefenedtoinclause(c)ofsub-section(1)tobelaidbeforeParliamentalongwithamemorandumexplainingtheactiontakenorproposedtobetakenonlherecommendationsandtherea-sonsforthenon-acceptance,ifany,ofsuchrecommendations.

(3)TheCommissionshall,whileperformlnganyof the functionsmentioned insub-clauses(a),(b)and(d)ofsub-section(1),haveallthepowersofacivilcourt

14Omer,R.(2015,Novermber24).Minoritymatters.RetrievedMay11,2016,fromhttp://epaper.dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=24_11_2015_008_003.15SectionoftheNationalAssembly.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1450170084_274.pdf.

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tryingasuitand,inparticular,inrespectofthefollowingmatters,namely.

(a) Summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person from anypartof lslamicRepublicof Pakistanandexamininghimon oath;(b) Requiringthediscoveryandproductionofanydocument;(c) Receivingevidenceofaffidavits;(d) Requisilioninganypublicrecordorcopythereoffromanycourt ofoffice;(e) Issuing comrnissions for theexaminationofwitness anddocu- ments;andanyothermatterwhichmaybeprescribed.

TheSindhgovernmentannouncedonJanuary19,2016,thatitisplanningtoleg-islateabillafterwhichgovernmentwillissueuniformFridaysermonstomosquestocurbextremismandpromotesectarianharmonyintheprovince.

AbdulQayyumSoomro,theadvisertotheSindhchiefministeronreligiousaffairssaidthat“Oneofourkeyobjectivesistopromotesectarianharmony”.16, 17, 18

5.4 The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII)

TheCIIismentionedherebecauseitisinauniquepositiontoaltertheframeworkthat drives radical ideology in Pakistan, andworkwith the state to introduce/amendlawsthatcanhelpcreatesustainablestability,andprotectminorityrights.

5.4.1CII:ABriefHistory

TheCIIisaconstitutionaladvisorybodyonIslamicinjunctions.ItwasinauguratedastheAdvisoryCouncilofIslamicIdeologyonAugust1,1962underGeneralAyubKhantoserveasanadvisorybody.Ithasgonethroughsomeminorchangesovertheyear,but itsprimary functionstays thesame.TheCIIalsoenjoys immenselegislativeandpolicypower,despitebeingcomprisedofnolawmakers.

The1973ConstitutionunderArticles228-31gavetheCIIthetaskofidentifyinglawscontrarytoIslamandrecommendingamendmentstobringthosemorein

16Rehman,K.(2016,January19).SindhmosquestohaveuniformFridaysermon.RetrievedMarch09,2016,fromhttp://www.thenews.com.pk/print/92045-Sindh-mosques-to-have-uniform-Friday-sermon.17StaffReporter.(2016,May19).SindhplanstoregulateFridaysermon.RetrievedMarch09,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1233902/sindh-plans-to-regulate-friday-sermon.18Khan,N.(2016,January23).Sindhsecuressupportofanothergroupforsermons.RetrievedMarch09,2016,fromhttp://www.thefrontierpost.com/article/370714/sindh-secures-support-of-another-group-for-sermons/.

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linewithIslamicprinciples.TheCIIwasalsousedbyGeneralZia-ul-Haqtolegiti-mizeandpasscontroversiallegislationliketheHudoodOrdinance.

5.4.2CII:RoleandFunctions

Asidefromtheabove,thecouncil’scurrentfunctionsincluderecommendinglawstotheparliamentandprovincialassembliesthatconformtotheQuranandSun-nah,makingrecommendationstoconveycurrentlawstofitinwithIslamicinjunc-tions and advising theparliament, provincial assemblies, or other governmentfunctionariesonproposedlawsandwhethertheyareinaccordancewithIslamicinjunctionsornot.

5.4.3Controversies

TheCIIisacontroversialbodybytheverynatureofitsfunctions.Underthelead-ershipofDr.KhalidMasood(ChairmanCII2004–2010),theCIIsupportedsomeprogressivereforms,includingwomen’srights.However,sincethen,theCIIhasbeenatthecenterofquestionablerecommendationsandideology.

Mostrecently,ittermedapieceoflegislationbanningchildmarriagesasun-Is-lamic19,resultingincountry-wideprotestsaskingfortheabolishmentoftheCII.20

19Tharoor,I.(2016,January15).BillbanningchildmarriagefailsinPakistanafterit’sdeemed‘un-Islamic’.RetrievedJanuary18,2016,fromhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world-views/wp/2016/01/15/bill-banning-child-marriage-fails-in-pakistan-after-its-deemed-un-islamic/.20Correspondent.(2016,January20).Oneforthewomen:CivilsocietydemandsCentretoabolishCII-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch25,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/1030606/one-for-the-women-civil-society-demands-centre-to-abolish-cii/.

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5.5 How NAP Changed Pakistan in a Year by Dr. Ehsan Sadiq

For decades Pakistan’s response to terrorism and sectarianismwas limited tointroducing more stringent laws and raising small anti-terrorism unit withinpolice. Thefirstmajor attempt to tackle thewhole spectrumof terrorismwasbyMusharafgovernment. In2002undergrowing internationalobligationsandpressure.FollowingdeadliestwaveofterrorisminPakistan’shistory,NACTAwasestablished in2009 to shapeandspearheadcounter terrorismresponse-albeititremainedanonstarter.MuchtrumpetedNationalInternalSecurityPolicy,an-nounced in 2014,was yet another attempt to holistically dealwith thewholegambitofterrorism.However,thetragedyofkillingof122childrenofArmyPublicSchoolbyterroriston16December2014,whichpromptedanationalconsensus,inshapeofaNationalActionPlan,onwhatwasrequiredtobedonetocount-er themenaceof terrorism,nowdevouringnation’s children. NationalActionPlan(NAP)consistingof20agreedmeasuresaimedtoaddressallforms,sourcesandmanifestationsofterrorisminPakistan.InviewofthechequeredhistoryofcounterterrorismitwasbutnaturalformanytofeelskepticalontheprospectsofsuccessoftheNAP.However,miraculouslyasitmayseem,NAPhassucceededinturningapageforbetterinhistoryofPakistan.ThiswriteupsummarizessomeachievementsunderNAPandliststhereasonsforsuccessfulimpactofNAP.TheobservationsmadeoutheregenerallyincontextofPunjab’sBahawalpurregion,thebiggestadministrativedivisionoftheprovinceandhometomanysectarianoutfitsandknownterrorists.

NAPrevivedtheconfidenceinthepoliticalexecutivesaswellascivilianlawen-forcementagencies in their capacity to takeon themilitants and terroristsontheirown.Onecouldseecivilianownershipandfootprintsinmanycounterter-rorismoperationscarriedoutinPunjabincludingtheeliminationoftopLeJlead-ership.Inparticular,reinforcedCTDinPunjab(SindhandKPKtoo)isnowamuchmoreeffectiveandspecializedunit.Withinductionofspeciallytrained500cor-porals,establishmentofpurposebuiltandspecificallymandatedpolicestationsatregionalHqsandtakingupinvestigationofallrealterrorismcases;CTDPunjabisplayingaleadroleincounterterrorismefforts.

Moreoverwithpoliticalownership thereand intelligencesupport forthcoming,thepolice,whichonce lookedevasiveand subdued to face the sectarianmili-tants,ismoreconfidentlyconductinglocaloperations.PolicecapacityhasbeenfurtherstrengthenedbyinductionofarmytrainedQuickResponseForce(QRF)intheirranks.InBahawalpurregionalone,around300policeofficersweretrainedbyarmyauthorities inamonth longcrispandcondensedtrainingcourse. Thetraining,whichfocusedonweaponhandling,closecombatandsearchandraidoperations-traditionallyweakareasofpolice,hadatransformationaleffectonthe

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outlook,self-confidenceandmotivationoftrainedofficials.TheQRFunitshaveplayedaneffectiveroleinpolicecombingandsearchoperationsaswellasclosecombatandprotectionfunctions.

Ayearbackitwashardforpoliceofficerstoimaginethattheycansoeffectivelytakeactionagainst,anotherwiseinnocuous(notwithstandingtheirnuisanceandprovocativenature),violationsoflawsregulatingloudspeakers,orwallchalking.However,thestrengtheningoflegalframeworkwithitswidenedscope,enhancedpenaltiesforviolatorsandprovisionforsummarytrialprocedures,madearealdifference.Particularly, thepromulgationofPunjab SoundSystem (Regulation)Ordinance,thePunjabProhibitionofExpressingMaterialonWalls, Informationon Temporary Residences Ordinance, Security of Vulnerable Establishments,andamendmentsinArmsOrdinanceempoweredthepolicetotakepromptandmeaningfulactionagainsttheviolatorsandrestoreasenseoforderinthesociety.ThepoliceinBahawalpurRegionregistered1917casesforArmsOrdinancevio-lations,419casesagainstmisuseofsoundsystem,128casesforfailingtoinformabouttemporaryresidencesbystrangers,101casesagainsthatematerialand54casesagainstwallchalking.Althoughthejudiciarymoreproactivelytriedthesecaseswithbetterconvictionratiobutthenumberofundertrialcases,registeredundertheselaws,isstillsignificantlyhigh.

Greater levelof coordinationand collaborationamongpolice,district adminis-trationandintelligenceagenciesononehandandpolice,prosecutionandcourtsontheotherhandisensuredbetterresultsunderNAP.Inparticular,theforumofApexCommitteesatnational,provincialandregionallevel-whichbroughttogeth-erthepolitical,military,intelligenceandpoliceleadership-facilitatedcontinuousmonitoring,effectivecoordinationandtwowaycommunicationbetweenpoliticaldecisionmakersandoperationalcommand.Similarly,regularmonthlymeetingsatLahoreHighCourtbetweentheATAjudgesandseniorpoliceofficershelpedclearyearslongbackloginATAcourts.LesserknownfactisthattheATAcourtsalsodecided57casesofrealterrorism.

Creationofcertaininstitutionalmechanismsatlocallevel,suchasDistrictIntel-ligence Committees and District Security Committees helped creating greaterownershipoftheactionstakenbythepolice.Thisensuredsustainability,trans-parencyandfairnessofpoliceactionsagainstsectarian/militantelements.Thisalsodeflectedvariousextraneouspressuresonpolicetosoftpaddleoroverlookactivitiesoftheseelements.Everyoneknewthatneitherthepolicediditalonenorcanitundoonitsown.

A veryusefulmechanismwasprovided,underAntiTerrorismAct1997, to tagandmonitorallthoseelementswhocould,inanyway,beassociatedwithterror-ism.Anelaborateprocedure,forbringingsuchelementsonthesocalledFourth

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SchedulersList,was laidunderSection11EEof theAct. Thepersonsbornonthislistwereboundtoreportalltheirmovementsoutoftheirareaofresidencetothelocalpolice.However,overtimetheintentofgeographicallyandsociallyisolatingtheseelementswaslostsightofandformostthemitwasabusinessasusual.ManycontinuedwithrunningMadaris,holdingralliesandevencontestingelections,whilesomeotherswereevenoptedasmembersofDistrictPeaceCom-mittees-meanttomaintainsectarianharmonyandpeace-bythedistrictadmin-istration.Thestigmaticeffectthatthelawintendedtocreate,throughinclusionofaperson in the list (ofFourthSchedulers),was, therefore,not there.UnderNAPstrongactionagainst208existingFourthSchedulerswastakenintheregion;includingunseatingthemfrommembershipofPeacecommittees/managementofMadaris,restrictingtheirsocialactivitiesanddetainingthemunderrelevantprovisionsofATA(i.e.11EE(4)and11EEE)aswellasMaintenanceofPublicOr-der(MPO)Ordinance.Moreover81newindividualswhohadshownanykindofsympathy,supportorassociationwithanybannedorganization,terroristgroup,causeoractivityandtherebycouldfallintheambitofprovisionsSection11EEofATAwereaddedtoFourthSchedulersList.Thisservedasastrongdisincentiveandde-motivatingfactorforothersuchindividuals.

Apartfromactionagainstindividuals,NAPalsoenabledpolicetocarryoutathor-oughmappingofallthe1876Madaris,collectdetailedinformationoneachaspectoftheirworkingandgeotagthemtoacentralizeddatabase.CTDhascompletedataonteachers,students,curriculumandfunding.Such ingress toallcatego-riesofMadarisisunprecedentedandrare.Atleast10Madarisweresubjectedtocompletesearchoperation.ThemythofMadarisasuntouchableentitiesandnogoareaswas,thus,broken.

ImplementationofNationalActionPlanalsohelpedthepoliceleadershiptoar-ticulate and communicate political, social and organizational constraints facedby thepolice todeliver. It alsohelped inhighlighting thebottlenecks in crimi-naljusticeprocessasawhole.TherealvalueofimplementingNAP,thatitonceagainunderlinedtheneedforstrengtheningthepolice’senforcementcapacity,incentivizingtransformationfromwithin,andmostofall,redefiningpoliceroleinimprovingthequalityofoverallgovernance.

NAPsuccessshouldbedefinedbeyond itsoriginalscopeassmallenforcementmeasuressuchasstrictbanonunauthorizeduseofsoundsystemandwallchalk-inghadarippleeffectonoverallenvironmentwhich isresistanttoanykindofregulation.For instancethedistrictadministrationfeltmuchmoreconfident intakingactionagainstroadencroachments,spuriousdrugsellersandadulteratedfood.Thepoliceandcourtswereabletomorefirmlydealwithhithertodefiantandunrulylawyers.Measuresagainsthatespeech,wallchalking,soundsystemandfourthschedulersalsocontributedinrelativelymorepeacefulconductofMo-

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haramandlocalbodieselections.

MediaRolehasbeenlargelypositive.Itdesistedfrompastpracticeofglorifyingterrorists,spreadinginsecurityandbeingunnecessarilycriticalofthelawenforce-mentagencies. Itshowedgreatsenseofresponsibility,whenasuicidebomberexplodedhimselfduringatourofZimbabweancricketteamthisyear.

MostimportantlyNAPhasmadepeoplefeelthestateestablishingitswrit-afterdecadesofanarchicchaos.Itvividlyshowsthatifthereisaclarityofpurpose,politicalwillandownership,intelligencesupport,enablinglegalandinstitutionalframework, andoperational autonomy; thepolice canoptimallyperformevenagainstheavyoddsandformidablechallenges.Policecanactalonebutshouldnotbeseenactingalone-thestateshouldbeatitsback.ItisthereforeonlylogicaltosuggestthatitishightimetostartworkingonthelastpointofNAPi.e.reformingthecriminaljusticesystem.

Dr. Ehsan Sadiq is a Deputy Inspector General of Police/Regional Police Officer Bahawalpur Region, and a police and security analyst.

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PArT 6: locAl conFlIcTs6.1 Introduction

TheNAPalsoattempts toaddresslocal conflicts in the FederallyAd-ministered Tribal Areas (FATA)(#12), Karachi (#16), and Baloch-istan (#17). The FATA conflict isbeing addressed partly by drivingout themilitants underOperationZarb-e-Azb, and partly throughmuch-neededpotential reforms intheregion.

TheMinistryofInteriorandNarcoticsControlpresentedareportintheNationalAssemblyinJanuary,2016.Accordingtothisreport,acommitteeonFATAreformshasbeenconstituted,surrenderofandreconciliationwithBaloch insurgents isunderway,anurbanpacificationoperation inKarachihascreateda significantdeclineinmurderandviolence(particularlytargetkillings),andthousandsofter-roristshavebeenarrestedorkilled.1

6.2 FATA Reforms

6.2.1HistoricalBackgroundofFATA

FATAisgeographicallylocatedalongtheDurandline,withKPonitseasternbor-der. The semi-autonomous region is comprised of seven agencies — Bajaur,Mohmand,Khyber,Orakzai,Kurram,NorthWaziristanandSouthWaziristan.

The Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), an archaic, draconian piece of legisla-tion, servesas themanifestationofgovernmentwrit in theFederallyAdminis-teredTribalAreas(FATA)ofPakistan,datingbacktotheBritishcolonialperiodinpre-partitionIndia.The“excludedareas”astheywerecalledbysection91ofthecolonialconstitutionallawofGovernmentofIndiaActarestilltheexcludedareasfromtherealmofdevelopment,investment,andmoderncivilization.FATAhasno

1 QuestionsandOralAnswers,28thsessionoftheNationalAssembly.(2016,January15).RetrievedMarch15,2016,fromhttp://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/ques-tions/1452850149_459.pdf.

locAl conFlIcTsNAP POINT 12:Administrativeanddevel-opmentreformsinFATAwithimmediatefocusonrepatriationofIDPs.

NAP POINT 16:OngoingoperationinKa-rachiwillbetakentoitslogicalend.

NAP POINT 17:Balochistangovernmenttobe fully empowered for political rec-onciliationwith complete ownership byallstakeholders.

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networkofthestateinstitutionsinthemodernsense.Almostsevendecadesafterindependence,tribalPashtunsremainsubjecttotheapplicationofthisludicrous,inhumanesetofregulations.

Article247oftheconstitutionstates:“SubjecttotheConstitution,theexecutiveauthorityoftheFederationshallextendtotheFederallyAdministeredTribalAr-easandprovinceshallextendtotheProvinciallyAdministeredTribalAreas”.NW-FP’sprovincialgovernorexercisesexecutiveauthorityinFATAasthepresident’srepresentative.TheoveralladministrativeandpoliticalcontrolofFATAfallsundertheFederalMinistryofStatesandFrontierRegions(SAFRON).

6.2.2FCRversus1973Constitution

Pakistan’sconstitutionaffordsfundamentalhumanrights,includingequalcitizen-ry,toallPakistanisunderarticles8-28.However,underarticle247theseprovi-sionsarenullandvoidforFATA.Noactoftheparliamentextendstotheseareasunlessthepresidentdirectsso.Infact,evenlawmakerselectedfromtheregioncanlegislateforanypartofthecountry,exceptforFATA.TheFCRdiscriminatesboth incivilandcriminalmatters,classifiescitizens,doesnotrequireproof forconvictionora civil decree,andgivesno rightofdefensebya counselor,orarightofappeal. Inshort,theConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistanasawhole,forallpracticalpurposes,isaredundantandtautologicaldocumentasfarasitsapplicationinFATAisconcerned.Consequently,thepeopleofFATAhaveneitherany‘humanrights’norcantheyclaimanyotherstatus,privilege,positionconferreduponothercitizensofPakistanbytheconstitution.

PleaseseeSection6.6foradetailedargumentonFATAreforms.

6.2.3CurrentStatus:FATAReforms

FATAReformsCommittee,thelatestinalineofmany,wasformedinMay2014,priortotheenactmentofNAP,toframestrategicobjectivesforthevolatiletribalareas.Thiscommitteereleaseditsreportafterthoroughdeliberation.2Butunfor-tunatelythereportdidn’tcomeupwithanysuggestionsonFATAreforms.

AnothercommitteewasformedbythePrimeMinister,almostayearaftertheAPSattack,inNovember,2015.3Themovewasseenbymanyasameanstoappease

2Ali,Z.(2014,March20).AnothercommissionformedonFatareforms.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1107498.3Manan,A.(2015,November09).Govtformshigh-poweredpanelonFATAreforms-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/987775/notification-is-

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FATA lawmakers forwithdrawalof their candidateagainstSardarAyazSadiq,amerefivedaysbeforetheelectionoftheNationalAssemblyspeaker.ThereportpresentedtotheNationalAssemblydetailsnoprogressonFATAreforms,exceptthatthecommitteehasbeenformed,SpecialAdvisortothePrimeMinisterSartajAzizhasbeenappointedasthehead,andconsultationsareunderway.1Thecom-mitteewasmeanttodeliberateoverthreecoreissues:

1. extendingthejurisdictionofthesuperiorcourtstoFATA;

2. shiftingthelegislativepowersforthetribalareasfromthehandsofthepresidentandgovernorKPtotheparliament,andtotheBalochistan/KPAssemblies;and

3. decidingifFATAshouldbemadepartofmainstreamKPoroftheProvin-ciallyAdministeredTribalAreas(PATA)inKPorifitshouldbegiventhestatusofaprovinceofPakistan.

Thusfar,thecommitteehasofferednothingsubstantial.

AFATATribunalwasre-formedbythegovernmentinMay2015,totakeupcasesdispensedbyadministrators.TheprevioustribunalhadexpiredinJanuary,2015.4 Thisisanad-hocmeasurethatdoeslittletohelpthepeopleofFATA,andhasverylimitedpowerstoaffectchange.

6.3 FATA: Operation Zarb-e-Azb

OperationZarb-e-Azb is a jointmilitary offensive beingconductedbythe Paki-stanArmedForces againstvarious militantgroups,includingthe Tehreek-i-TalibanPakistan (TTP), the IslamicMovementofUzbekistan (IMU), the EastTurkestanIslamicMovement(ETIM), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi(LeJ), al-Qaeda(AQ), Jundallah and the HaqqaniNetwork.Theoperationwas launchedon June14,2014 in NorthWaziristan,buthas sinceexpanded to includeurbanpacificationoperations intheportcityofKarachiinSindhprovince.Theoperationhas30,000soldiersonthefrontlines,andwaslaunchedfollowingthebreakdownofnegotiationswithextremistelementsandabrazenattackonKarachiairport.5

sued-govt-forms-high-powered-panel-on-fata-reforms/.4BureauReport.(2015,March28).‘Muchawaited’FataTribunalformed.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1184671.5Salahuddin,Z.(2014,April24).CounteringInsurgency.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/08/29/pakistan-countering-insurgency.

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6.3.1Progress

OnJune13,2015,thePakistanimilitaryreportedprogressovertheoperationinthecourseofayear.DirectorGeneraloftheInterServicesPublicRelations(ISPR)AsimSaleemBajwareportedthat2,763militantshadbeenkilledsofar,includ-ing218terroristcommandersin9,000intelligencebasedoperations(IBOs).6Theupdatealsolisted837hideoutsdestroyed,253tonsofexplosivesrecovered,and18,087weaponsseized.347officersandsoldiershadalsosacrificedtheirlivedintheoperation.Thisaccountsforthefirstyearoftheoperation.Thereportpre-sented intheNationalAssembly inJanuary,2016claims2,159terroristskilled,andanother1,724arrestedoverthecourseofthefirstyearoftheNAP.1

Graph 6.1 Progress against Militancy and Armed Combatants

ThisgoesontoshowthatthelawenforcementagenciesinPakistanareparticu-larlyadeptatkillingtheextremistthreat.However,thisasymmetricalwarfareisnotsustainableasitdoesnothingtoeliminatetheradicalideologythatformstherootofthisconflict.Pakistanneedssignificantpolicychangesandlawreformsto

6ISPR.(2015,June13).ISPRPressRelease-NoPR170/2015-ISPR.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttps://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2015/6/13.

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ensuretherelativepeaceacquiredismaintainedinthelongrun.

PleaseseeSection6.7foradetaileddiscussiononthefutureofNAPinFATAandKP.

6.3.2InternallyDisplacedPersons

PleaseseeSection8.3.3:IDPs–RehabilitationPlans.

6.4: Karachi Operation

6.4.1ViolenceinKarachi

DatacollectedbytheCenterforResearchandSecurityStudies(CRSS)showsthatdespitetheviolenceinFATA,Karachiremainedthemostviolentandvolatiledis-trictinPakistanthelastseveralyearsrunning.Karachilost5,063personstovio-lenceinthelastthreeyears.However,thelevelofviolencehasreducedbynearly78%inSindh,whileKarachiwitnesseda48%dropinthefatalitiesfromdifferentformsofviolenceintheyear2015.7

7Nafees,M.,Gul,I.,&Salahuddin,Z.(2016,February26).CRSSAnnualSecurityReport-2015.RetrievedFebruary26,2016,fromhttp://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/CRSS-Annual-Se-curity-Report-2015.pdf.

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Graph 6.2 Violence in Karachi – 2013 – 2015

6.4.2Ranger’sDeploymentinKarachi

RangersareaparamilitaryforceundercontroloftheMinistryofInterior,andtheirprimarytaskistoguard,defendandsecurebordersinpeacetimeaswellaswartime,provideandmaintainsecurityinwarzonesandareasofconflict,andmain-tainlawandorderwhichincludesprovidingassistancetothe police.

TheRangersKarachioperationwasinauguratedbyPrimeMinisterNawazSharifonSeptember5,2013,toridthecityofcrime,politicalmilitancyandviolence.8 Twoyearslater,theRangersannouncedthecompletionofphaseone,withthesecondphasetocommencefromAugust14,2015.9

TheRangersoperationinKarachicontinuesatthetimeofwritingthisreport.

6.4.3ShiftinFocussinceNAP

Anewsenseofurgencywasobserved in January,2015,whenthePMcalleda

8Tunio,H.(2013,September04).Karachilawandorder:Rangerstolaunchoperationintwodays-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/600064/kara-chi-law-and-order-rangers-to-launch-operation-in-two-days/.9Khan,F.(2015,August10).FirststageofKarachisecurityoperationcomplete:Rangers-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/935314/fist-stage-of-karachi-security-operation-complete-rangers/.

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highlevelmeetingonthelawandordersituationinKarachi.10Therewasaclearshift inmandate,as justoveramonth later,politicalmilitancy,a long-standingsourceofextremeviolence in thecitywas targeted inKarachi.Rangers raidedtheheadquartersofMuttahidaQaumiMovement(MQM),arrestingabscondersandrecoveringbanned,unlicensedweaponry.11ThusbothsourcesofviolenceinKarachi,religiousmilitancyandpoliticalmilitancy,weretargeted.

6.4.4OutcomesofKarachiOperation

IntheJanuary,2016reporttotheNationalAssembly,itwassharedthatasignif-icantdeclineinviolence,militancyandcrimewasobservedinKarachi.1 Accord-ingtothereport,targetkillingwasdownby53%,robberiesdownby30%,andextortiondownby56%.69,179criminalshadbeenarrested,whichinclude890terrorists,676proclaimedoffenders,10,426absconders,124kidnappers,545ex-tortionists,and1,834murderers.Thereportalsoclaimedthat16,304weaponshadbeenrecovered.

10Khan,F.(2015,August10).PMsummonshigh-levelmeetingonlawandordersituationinKarachitomorrow-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/829573/pm-summons-high-level-meeting-on-law-and-order-situation-in-karachi-tomorrow/11Salahuddin,Z.(2015,April15).ANewTurnforPakistan’sFightAgainstMilitancy.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/15/a-new-turn-for-pakistans-fight-against-militancy/.

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Graph 6.4 Karachi Operation Outcomes - Milestones

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Graph 6.3 Karachi Operation Outcomes - Arrested

Thisdata isbackedbyfindings from theCenter forResearchandSecurityStudies,althoughthefiguresdiffersomewhat.7

PleaseseeSection6.8foradetaileddiscussiononKarachi.

6.5: Baluchistan Insurgency

6.5.1BaluchistanNationalistMovement

Balochnationalisminitscontemporaryformbegannearlyacenturyagointhe1920s in theformof theAnjuman-e-Ittehad-e-Balochan(AIB -OrganizationforUnityoftheBaloch).ThemovementclaimsthattheBalochpeopleareanation,andemphasizesethnicloyaltyoverreligiousloyalty;anideathatiscontrarytotheideologybehindPakistan’s creation.Theirdemandshave ranged fromcultural,

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economicandpoliticalreforms,topoliticalautonomy,tooutrightsecessionfromPa-kistan.ThemovementissecularandheavilyinfluencedbyleftistMarxistideology.12

6.5.2BalochInsurgentGroups

Theongoing insurgency isnot thefirstof its kind. In fact, thecurrent conflict,startedin2003,isthefifthofitskind.13TheinsurgentsinPakistanarefragmentedintoseveralgroups,mainlytheBalochLiberationArmy(BLA),theBalochRepubli-canArmy(BRA),theBalochLiberationFront(BLF)andtheLashkar-e-Balochistan(LeB-Baluchistan’sarmy).Whilethisfragmentationisreflectiveofthetribalna-tureofBalochnationalists,theirdemandsaredeeplyrootedinBalochnationalistideology.

6.5.3MissingPersons

Missingpersons isagenerictermusedinPakistantorefertotheostensiblyhun-dredsofpersonsin Pakistan whohavedisappeared inconflictzones.

Thenumberofmissingpersons isacontested issue,withahugegulfbetweentheclaimsbyBalochactivists,humanrightsbodiesandthestatisticsofthegov-ernment.MamaQadeer’sVoiceforBalochMissingPersons(VBMP)hasalwaysclaimed the highest toll at 21,000+14. This is abnormally different fromofficialnumbers, as theCommissionof InquiryonEnforcedDisappearances (CIED) in-formedtheSupremeCourtthat982missingpersonshadbeentracedinthelastfouryears.15AccordingtoCIED’sreport,1,273casesofenforceddisappearancesarestillunresolved,withonly122ofthembelongingtoBalochistan.Meanwhile,DefenceofHumanRights,anNGOthattracesmissingpeople,putsthenumberat5,149fromalloverPakistan.16

Missingpersonsremainathornyissueforauthoritiestonavigate.Withoutaprop-erresolutionoftheproblem,reconciliationeffortswillbehamperedinBalochistan.

12Breseeg,T.M.(2004).Balochnationalism:Itsoriginanddevelopment.Karachi:RoyalBookCompany.13BBC.(2014,February22).Balochistan:TheuntoldstoryofPakistan’sotherwar-BBCNews.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26272897.14Correspondent.(2015,April17).Raisinghisvoice:21,000missinginBalochistan,saysMamaQa-deer-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/871142/raising-his-voice-21000-missing-in-balochistan-says-mama-qadeer/.15Malik,H.(2015,February22).Enforceddisappearances:Upto982missingpersonstracedinthepastfouryears-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/842656/enforced-disappearances-up-to-982-missing-persons-traced-in-the-past-four-years/.16Iqbal,N.(2015,January14).SCseeksreportonnumberofmissingpersons.RetrievedMarch2,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1156658.

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PleasealsoseeSection4.3:CPECSecurity.

6.5.4ReconciliationEfforts

ThegovernmentcurrentlybelievesthatreconciliationandaddressinggrievancesisthebestwaytoappeasetheBalochnationalistsandtoendtheconflictintheprovince.ThereportpresentedtothelawmakersintheNationalAssemblybytheInteriorMinisterChaudharyNisarisfairlyvague.Verbatim,itstatesthat“surren-derandreconciliation/rehabilitationofabsconders/outlawsinprogress”.1 Theex-actfigureforinsurgentswhohavesurrenderedvariesfromsourcetosource,butitwasreportedthat625insurgentslaiddowntheirarmsinthelastsixmonths.17

According to another report, some 1,025 militants, belonging to various pro-scribedoutfits,have surrenderedbefore theprovincial governmentduring thepastyear.18

InApril2015,BalochistanChiefMinisterDr.AbdulMalikalsosaidthatarecon-ciliationstrategyhadbeendevisedtohelpmainstreamBalochnationalists.19ThePrimeMinisteralsovisitedBalochistaninAugustandlauncheda“PeacefulBaloch-istanPlan”tobringangryBalochsbackintothefold.20AfterameetinginOctoberbetweentheCMandthePM,theCMannouncedthathewouldholdatribalcoun-cil tomeetexiled leadersandpersuadethemto jointhepoliticalmainstream.21 BalochistanMinisterNawabSanaullahZehrihadalsomettheKhanofKalat22 inLondonearlierinAugust,2015aspartofthereconciliationpolicy.23

PleaseseeSection6.9foradetaileddiscussiononBalochistan.

17Correspondent.(2016,February08).Balochistanreconciliation:625insurgentssurrenderedinsixmonths-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/sto-ry/1042338/balochistan-reconciliation-625-insurgents-surrendered-in-six-months/.18(2016,April26).1,025militantssurrenderedinBalochistanduringpastyear.RetrievedMarch06,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1254551.19Khan,A.(2015,April26).ReconciliationplandrawnupforestrangedBalochleaders:CM-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch06,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/876111/reconcilia-tion-plan-drawn-up-for-estranged-baloch-leaders-cm/.20Shahid,S.(2015,August07).Planfor‘peacefulBalochistan’approved.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1198912.21Ali,S.(2015,October08).SharifintensifieseffortstoreconcilewithexiledBalochleaders.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://nation.com.pk/national/08-Oct-2015/sharif-intensifies-ef-forts-to-reconcile-with-exiled-baloch-leaders.22CurrentKhan-e-Kalat,MirAghaSulimanDaud,wentintoself-exileintheUnitedKingdomaftertheassassinationofNawabAkbarBugtiin2006anddecidedtofromagovernmentinexileofBalochistan.23Shah,S.A.(2015,August15).ZehrimeetsKhanofKalatinLondon.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1200640.

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6.6 ARTICLE: FATA Reforms: the Political Economy by Imtiaz Gul24

DowntheRabbitHole

InDecember 2006, at the height ofGeneral (retd) PervezMusharraf’s contro-versialcareeras thePresidentofPakistan,a largemeetingwasconvened.Theattendees includedofficials from FATA, FATA Secretariat (including the PoliticalAgents),SAFRON,andthethenNWFPGoverner,aswellasanumberofFATAelitessuchasministersandclerics,andacontingentofthemilitaryestablishment.ThePresident’s intentwastoputalltheFATAstakeholdersinoneroom,anddeter-minethefutureofFATA.Fornearlythreedays,fieryspeeches,ambitiousplansandreformproposalsbouncedbackandforthbetweenthepoliticalandmilitaryelite,theonlycommonthreadbeinguniversalpraiseforMusharraffortakingtheinitiative.

However,theenthusiasmgavewaytocautiononthethirdday,whenparticipantsuniversallyadmonishedMusharraftonottinkerwiththeexistingsystem,lesthewas prepared to face catastrophic consequences. Despite days of deliberationanddiscussion,thegrouprose,undecided,perhapstomeetanotherday.OneofthePoliticalAgents(PAs)recountedtheseproceedingstomeattheParliamentar-ian’sLodgesinIslamabad.HewasnotparticularlythrilledaboutfuturemovementonthestatusofFATAeither,andperhapsunderstandablyso.Militaryofficials,hesaid,disfavoredanychangesintheviewoftheongoing“religiousinsurgency”.

Themilitary’sstakeinFATAalsocametolightin2009,whena27-memberCom-mittee on Constitutional Reforms deliberated extensively and climaxed withamendments to 105 articles of the federal constitution. However, not one oftheseappliedtoPartXII:Miscellaneous–ChapterIII:TribalAreas.Specifically,Ar-ticle246-whichgeographicallydefines“TribalAreas”,“ProvinciallyAdministeredTribalAreas”and“FederallyAdministeredTribalAreas”-andarticle247-whichgives the President sweeping powers, and excludes these areas fromany par-liamentarylegislation,orlegaljurisdictionfromtheSupremeCourtoranyHighCourt-weresimplymissingfromthesuggestedlist.

RepresentativesfromtheAwamiNationalParty(ANP)andPakistanPeople’sPar-ty(PPP)toldmeinbackgroundinterviewsthatthemilitaryopposedanydiscus-siononFATA.Jameat-e-Ulema-e-IslamFazl-ur-Rehman(JUI-F)membersremainedvaguewhenaskedaboutFATA.Nearlyeveryoneagreedontheneedforreforms,butnonehadanysolutions,andmostblamedtheGHQ.Militaryofficials,includ-ingGeneralTariqKhan,thethenInspectorGeneraloftheFrontierCorps,toldmetheparliamentarians“askedusforouropinionandwetoldthemthatthetiming

24Articlere-printedwithauthor’spermission.

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wasnotright”.But,heunderscored,themilitaryleftittothewilloftheparlia-mentarianstodowhatevertheywantedwithFATA.

Thenetresultwasthattherewasnotevenan“expressionofintentwithregardstochangesinFATA”inthe18thAmendment,passedonApril10,2010.However,tosolelyblamethemilitary’smanipulationoftheFATAreformagendawouldbefeigningobliviousnesstothepoliticaleconomyoftheregion.Thisrabbitholegoesthedeeperthemoreyoutraverseit.

AMatterofRegulations

Inordertounderstandthepoliticaleconomyoftheregion,itisimportanttofirsttakealookatthehistoryandnatureofFATA’scurrentstatus,aswellastheFron-tierCrimesRegulation(FCR).

Historically,FATAhasalwayspresentedacomplexsetofjudicialandadministra-tiveproblems.TheFCR,formedin1901,wasanevolutionoftheMurderousOut-ragesRegulationof1867,whichgaveBritishrulers,historicallyunabletoestab-lish theirwrit in the tribal region,powers toprosecute individuals forheinouscrimes,suchasmurder.In1947,PakistannotonlyadoptedtheFCR,butaddedtheclausethatwouldallowforanindividual’sarrestwithoutevenspecifyingthecrime.Sincethen,theFCRisalmostuniversallyseenasasystemofoppression,outdated,ill-advised,anddraconic.Overtime,theregulationhasbeenamendedseveraltimes,butnevertothebenefitofthepeopleofFATA.

TheFCRcontains64sections,mostofthemill-intended,butthemostdetrimentalonesaresections21-30,32,34and40.Sections21-30,alsoknownastheCol-lectiveResponsibilityclause,allowatribetobepunishedfortheactionsofonemember.Section34allowsforhomesandpropertyofthetribesmentobede-molished,if,forinstance,thestatewishestoacquirethatland.Section32allowsforentiresettlementstobeburnedtotheground.Section40,perhapsthemostabusedofall,allowstheadministrationtodetainaperson,potentiallyforyears,onmeresuspicion,andwithoutproof.ThisalsoimpliesthatthereisnoprovisionfortheaccusedtoappealandprovehisinnocenceundertheFCR.

TheFCRisalsocreditedwiththeriseofmilitancyinPakistan.ProfessorIjazKhanofPeshawarUniversitybelievesthatasatooltoimposeruleoflawandimproveservicedeliveryinthejusticesector,theFCRonlybecameweakerthanitalreadywasafter9/11.WhentheTalibanfledAfghanistan,theycametoFATAbecausetherewasalreadyasecurityvacuumduetopoorgovernance, lackofdevelop-ment,withno judicialoradministrative systemworking for thewelfareof thepeople,illiteracy,andanti-stateangst,allofwhichhelpedthemilitantsmakethisregiontheirsafehaven.

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TheFCRisalsocompletelysilentonwomen,andaffordsthemnorights.

Understandably,thecontinuationoftheFCRandthelackofprogressonthesta-tusofFATAonlywidenedthegulfbetweenthecitizensofFATAandthefederation.

FATA is theonly region inPakistanwhere theparliament cannot legislate, andtheapexcourtscannotadjudicate.TheareaisadministeredbytheGovernor(asarepresentativeof thepresident)of theKhyberPukhtunkhwaprovince,underthesupervisionofSAFRONinIslamabad.Oddly,the12membersintheNationalAssemblyand8intheSenatefromFATAcanvoteandlegislateonbillsinanypartof thecountry,but theconstituents they represent.Theyhaveno technicalorpoliticalpowerunderarticle247oftheconstitution.TherealpowerbelongswiththePoliticalAgents.

PoliticallyEconomical

JohnDalberg-Acton,theEnglishCatholichistorian,writerandpoliticianoncesaid,“Powertendstocorrupt,andabsolutepowercorruptsabsolutely.” InPakistan,nowhereisthismoreevidentthantheroleofthePAs.PoliticalAgentsarea)thesymbolofthestate’sauthority,b)thetribalpeople’sadvocate,andc)theliaisonbetweenthepeopleandthegovernment.ThePAservesinthreeofficialcapaci-ties,a)thetitularoffice,b)districtmagistrate,andc)sessionsjudge.Hecanevenimposecurfew,rejectbail,andholdsomeoneinconfinementindefinitely.

Nearuniversally, thePA role is viewedascorruptofficialsenjoyingunchecked,boundlesspower.Facilitatedandpoweredbytheroughly35,000orsoMaliks(ti-tle-holders/representativesoftribes),theFCRisoftenusedasafulcrumtoexactpoliticalvengeance.TheeliteandrichcaneasilyleveragetheFCRasamechanismtoescapepunishment(avoteofconfidencefromfourMalikscanpreventdeten-tion),andasatooltoeliminatecompetition,punishenemies,orcleartheplayingfield.Itiseasytoseehowthisoppressiveandunjustsystemcanbeexploitedbythosewithresourcesandpower,andabhorredbyyouthandthelowestrungsofthesocio-economicstrata.

TheanecdoteatthetopsuggeststhatthemilitaryestablishmentisadamantlyandhistoricallyopposedtochangesinthestatusofFATA.TheypresentaformidableblockadeagainstprogressonFCRreforms.The35,000orsoMaliksinFATA,andtheelite,includingtheministers,thebusinessmenandotheraffluentinfluentialsthatenjoyalifeofluxuryandprivilegewithoutconsequence,alsoopposereformsin theregion.Finally, theFATASecretariatandSAFRONareakeystakeholders.TheSecretariatunderthegovernor,includingthesevenPoliticalAgents,andtheirrespectivestaffs(essentiallyasmatteringofsuper-empoweredbureaucratsinIs-lamabadandPeshawar),haveahugemonetarystakeinthestatusquo.ThemostpowerfulandvocalofthesehailfromKhyberandBajaurAgencies,Bannu(North

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Waziristan)andD.I.Khan(SouthWaziristan).

CurrentProgress

TheattemptatFATAreforms isnotnew.ThemeetingwithMusharraf in2006,andtheconstitutional reforms in2009,are just twoexamples. In2010,elevenreformsintheFCRwereproposedbythePoliticalPartiesJointCommitteeonFATAReforms.Thesewerechidedforbeinginvariablychainedtogovernmentinterests.InAugust2011,thethenPresidentAsifAliZardaripassedaPresidentialOrdertoamendtheFCR.Althoughminimalinitsscope,it isstillrecognizedasthemostpracticalandsignificantchangeintheregulationsinceitsinception.

Years later, inMay2014,weatCRSShadanotheropportunity todiscussFATA,thistimethrougha20-episodeseriesofTVshowsand60radioshows-involv-ing about 50notables such as FATAMPs, businessmen, civil societymembers,andrepresentativesfrommainstreampoliticalparties.Ironically,allthesediscus-sions yieldeda fragmentedpicture;mostof theyouth - students, civil society,andyoungerparliamentariansvociferouslyadvocatedfortheabolitionofFATA’scurrentstatus.Mostoftheparliamentariansandbusinessmen,however,pleadedforaphased,incrementalchangetothestatusofFATAthroughextensionofthewritofthePeshawarHighCourtandthelocalgovernmentelections.EvensomeoftheofficialswespoketoalsoarguedthattouchingFATAinexistingcircumstanc-eswasadangerousproposition.Thismirrorsthepoliticaleconomydichotomyintheprevioussections.

Mostrecently,inSeptember2015,nearlythreemonthsaftertheFATAReformsCommission’sreport,sourcesindicatethata“step-by-stepprocedureformerg-ingtribalareasintosettleddistricts”isunderway.Toprecipitatethis,BajaurandMohmandAgenciesfromFATAwillbemergedintoPATA.Theestimatedtimeforthistransitionis8-10months,anditwillserveasasteppingstoneforotherareastobebroughtintothenationalfold.Onthe9th,the22ndConstitutionalAmend-mentBillwaspresentedintheNationalAssemblybyFATAlawmakers,proposingamendmentstoArticles246/247tograntfullcitizenshiprightstothetribesmen,extendthereachofapexcourtstotheregion,andthemergerofFATAintoKP.

TheWayForward

Moong Qabail,theseriesofmediaprogramsCRSSconductedonFATAreforms,broughtfortharangeofsuggestedsolutionsandideasonhowtomanagethiscentury-oldproblem.Theseriespublicallyandempiricallyconfirmedthesenti-mentthatthepeopleofFATAholdFCRresponsiblefortheillsbeingsuffered,andthat itwastime itwasrepealed, reformed,orabolishedaltogether.Thestatusquosimplycannotcontinue.ThepeopleinFATAmayholdthegreenpassport,buttheConstitution’sArticle247andtheFCRdeprivesthemoffundamentalhuman

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rightsandcivilliberties,eventhoughtheyareaffordedtocitizensinallotherpartsofthecountry.TheseFederally“Alienated”TribalAreasaredeniedtheirrighttolife,security,justiceandexpression.

TheabolishmentoftheFCRpresentsthreeoptionsforthestatusofFATA.FATAcouldbemergedintoKP,becomeitsownprovince,orFATAcouldrunwithitsownGovernorwithCentralCouncil,aswellasagencyandtehsilcouncils.The22ndCon-stitutionalAmendmentproposesthefirstofthese.Failingthis,aplethoraofis-suesneedtobemanaged.Theseincludetheinfluenceofthepoliticalagents,theseparationofadministrationand judiciary, theFATAcouncil,holding localbodyelections,representationofwomen,development,educationandhealthfacilitiesandtheinfluenceofthegovernmentwithintheambitofthejudiciary.

As it stands, two things seemtobehappening simultaneously: thegingerfirststepofmergingtwoagenciesintoPATA,anddoingawaywithFCRaltogether,andmergingFATAintotheKP.Botharegoodnewsforapeoplesubjugatedbyoveracenturyofbadgovernance,archaicpolicies,anddatedregulations,butitmustbesaidthatneitherisofficialorexpectedsoon.MostoftheolderFATAMPsbelievein a gradual shift from the current status tomainstreamingof FATA.However,thepulloftheforcesofstatusquoissimplymuchstrongerthanthosewhofavorcomprehensive reform,wherebythe lawof the landcouldbeextendedto theFATAanditcouldbethusmainstreamed.Toturnthetide,aseriesofmechanismswillneedtobedeployedtohelpmitigatethepowerfulpoliticaleconomythatsovehementlyresistsanyattemptatchange.

Imtiaz Gul is a noted media analyst and author of several books. He is also the Executive Director at CRSS. He can be reached at [email protected].

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6.7 OPINION: NAP has to go a long way in KP/FATA by Shiraz Paracha

ThePakistanTehreek-e-Insaf(PTI)ledbyImranKhanhasbeenleadingacoalitiongovernment in theKhyberPakhtunkhwaProvinceof Pakistan for thepast twoyearsandahalf.

Thecricketer-turned-politicianclaimshisparty’sgovernmenthastransformedtheprovincialpoliceintothebestpoliceforceofthecountrybutitidhardtoprovethatclaimifonelooksatthelaw&ordersituationandthecrimerateintheprov-ince.

Justtwodaysbeforetheturnoftheyear,thecarnageinMardan,thesecondlarg-estcityofKhyberPakhtunkhwa,wasastarkreminderthatalotmoreneedstobedonebytheprovincialgovernmentbeforeitclaimsthatsituationisbacktonor-malintheprovince.Atleast26peoplewerekilledwhenasuicidebomberblewhimselfupattheofficeofNationalDatabaseandRegistrationAuthority(NADRA)inthecity.Another52werewounded.

Itwas thefirstmajorattack in theprovincesince thedastardlygunandbombattackattheAmyPublicSchoolinPeshawarinwhichnearly150people,mostoftheminnocentstudents,weremoweddownbyagroupofterroristsassociatedwiththeTehreik-e-TalibanPakistan.ItwastheattackwhichsentshockwavesnotonlythroughoutPakistanbutacrosstheworld.

ObserverssayhadsecurityguardbeennotpostedattheNADRAofficegateandhewouldnothavestoppedtheattackerfromgettingintotheoffice,thefatalitiescouldhavecrossedthe200marksastheNADRAofficewaspackedwithscoresofpeoplelookingfortheirnationalidentitycards.

QuestionsarebeingaskedthathowcouldthebombermanagetocometotheofficeoftheNADRAridingonmotorbikewithoutbeingnoticed.

Theattackisallthemoreshockingforithastakenplaceinanareawhichisthebirthplaceof2500-year-oldancientGhandharaCivilization.

MonkstrainedatBuddhistschoolsofMardanregionwouldtraveltopresentdayJapan,KoreaandChinatospreadBuddha’smessageofpeaceandtranquility.

Nearly90yearsago, fromhere,KhanAbdulGhafarKhanalsoknownasBachaKhan,hadlaunchedanon-violentmovementfortheindependenceofIndiafromthecolonialrulefromthesameregion.

Unfortunately,thisentireregionwasturnedintoabastionofTalibanandextrem-

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istsoverpastfewdecades.

ManypeoplesuspectthatextremismspreadinthePakhtunregionontheprod-dingofthepowerfulestablishmentwhichpamperedextremistsgroupstoachieveforeignpolicyobjectivesinAfghanistanandIndia.

Dubbedas“military-mullah”alliance,thethistwo-waycooperationandcoordina-tioncontinueduntiltheAPSdeadlyattackon16December2014.

Followingthattragedy,Pakistanipoliticalandmilitaryleadershipagreedonacom-prehensivestrategyintheshapeofNationalActionPlan(NAP)tofightterrorism.

ThegovernmentclaimstheNAPisbeingsuccessfullyimplementedbutthatclaimisbeingwidelydisputed.

Itistruethatoverthepastoneyearcoordinationamongintelligenceagencieshasimproved,aspecialcounterterrorismforcehasbeenestablishedinKhyberPakh-tunkhwa,but,targetkillings,kidnappingsandradicalizationofpeoplecontinuesintheprovince.

Governmentsourcessaythenumberofterroristattackshasbeenfallenduetothesuccessfulcrackdownof the lawenforcement forces’successfulandbettercoordinationamongvarioussecurityagencies.

Officialsoffederalandprovincialagenciesregularlymeet;exchangeinformationandplancounterterrorismaction.

Nonetheless,manyofficersadmitthatmutualtrustamongvariousagenciesoverinformationsharingisstillachallenge.

TheKPKpolicearebelievedtobeusedasPRtoolbythePTIgovernmentthoughinrealitythereiswidespreaddissatisfactionamongrankandfileofthepoliceforce.

Officersandconstablesfeelthattheirsacrificesarenotdulyacknowledged.

The Police have been pushed into awar forwhich they are neither properlytrainednorbeingequipped.ThePolicearenottrainedtofightterrorism.

Theprovincialgovernmentissaidtobenotsupportingthepoliceforcetheyde-servedtobebackedup.

Themoraleoftheforcecannotberaisedjustbyonlyannouncingfinancialcom-pensationforthosewholaydowntheirlivesorgetinjuredinthelineofduty.

Policeofficersexpectthatprovincialministerswouldstandshouldertoshoulder

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withthePoliceinthefightonterror.

NasirDurrani,theprovincialpolicechief,isacompetentofficer.

Mr.Durranihasbeentryinghislevelbesttomaketheforceworthofitsnamebutbuthehastogoalongwaytogotoachievethisobjectives.

Thereisadiscontentintherankandfileoftheofficersthroughouttheprovince,

Manycivilianofficersdeputedinthepoliceforcearenothappyeither.

There isaclear-cutdivisionamongcivilbureaucracyoverpromotions,postingsandtransfersintheprovince.

Itisunrealistictoexpectgoodperformancefromademoralizedforce.

Duetolackofappreciationandencouragement,civilservantsandpoliceofficersarejustdoingtheirroutinework.Thislackofinterestisnegativelyaffectingprog-ressintheimplementationoftheNAP.

InNovember2015,Isawhundredsandthousandsofhighlychargedpro-TalibanpeopleinthefuneralofareligiousfigureinAkoraKhattak,asmalltownjustsixkilometerseastofNowsheraCantonment.

Theseradicalizedpeopleweredrawnfromalloverprovince,FATAaswellasAf-ghanistantopayhomagetotheirteacherandspiritualleader,MaulanaSherAliShah.

ThedeceasedwasacolleagueofMaulanaSami-ul-Haq,who isknowntohavecontactsbothwiththemilitaryandmilitants.

NewconstructionisunderwayntheHaq’ssprawlingatDarulUloomHaqaniaorseminaryinAkoraKhattakwhichhasservedasaalmamaterforsevera;lTalibanleaders.

Moreandmoreyoungpeoplearegettingthemselvesenrolledwiththeseminary.Topgovernmentleadersarealsoamongthevisitors.

Justmilitary and police operations cannotwipe out terrorism. The places likeDarulUloomHaqanianeedtobeturnedintobastionoflove,peaceandhumanity.Untilthathappens,noNationalActionPlanwillwork.

Shiraz Paracha is an analyst, commentator, journalism professor, and his areas of interest include Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, Russia and China. He can be reached at [email protected].

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6.8 OPINION: Karachi’s Woes by Amir Zia

TheongoingoperationinKarachiremainsakeycomponentofthe20-pointNa-tionalActionPlan(NAP)withoutwhichPakistancannothopetoachieveadecisivevictoryinitswaragainstextremismandterrorism.

TheNAPdeclarationsaysthattheKarachiOperationwillbetakento“itslogicalconclusion.”Butmorethan twoyearsafter theparamilitaryRangerswereem-poweredtogoaftercriminalsandterrorists responsible forpoliticallyandreli-giously-motivatedkillings,extortion,kidnappingsforransomandterrorism,thismuchtrumpetedcampaign--launchedinSeptember2013--isnowhereclosetoits“logicalconclusion.”

Yes, theoperationbrought“targeted-killings” sharplydown in this restiveportcity.SindhPolicefiguressaythat986peoplewerekilledin2015comparedtothehighsofaround1,925in2014.In2013–thedeadliestinrecentyears–morethan2,500peoplehadbeenkilled,mostlyintit-for-tatkillingsamongcriminal-cum-po-liticalmafiasandvarioussectarianandreligiousgroups,whilein2012suchkill-ingswerealittleover2,000.

Thecrackdownalsohelpedendthereignofterrorofvariouspolitical,ethnicandcriminalmafiasinmanyvolatilepartsofthecity.Extortion,whichwaswidespreadandforcedshopkeepersandtraderstostageaseriesofunprecedentedlock-outsoftheirbusinessesin2009&2010onwards,witnessedasharpdecline.

Kidnappingforransomcases,whichpeakedto283in2013,fellto115in2014asaresultofthearrestsandkillingsofanumberofkidnappersin“encounters.”Andin2015,only25kidnappingforransomincidentswerereported,accordingtothefigurescompiledbytheCitizen-PoliceLiaisonCommittee,whichspecializesinre-solvingsuchcaseswiththehelpofthelawenforcementagencies.

TheHumanRightsCommissionofPakistan(HRCP)inits2015reportonKarachialsohighlightedthedecliningtrendintheincidentsoforganizedviolenceandter-rorism.TheHRCPfiguresshowalmosta50percentdropinthenumberofbombexplosionsinKarachiin2015.

Butdespitesuccesses,therearelegitimateconcernsaboutthesustainabilityofthesegains.

The ongoing tussle between the Sindh and the federal governments over theoperationalautonomyforparamilitaryRangers isnottheonly factortriggeringuncertainty.Thereareanumberofotherfundamentalissues,whichifremainun-resolvedwillnotjustobstructtheKarachiOperationfromachievingitsobjectives,

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buthurtthecountry’soveralleffortinthewaragainstterrorismandextremism.Therefore,thesuccessofKarachiOperationremainspivotalifthegovernmentisseriousinestablishingtheruleoflawandbringingpeaceinthecountry.

Toachievethisgoal,ourpoliticians–bothatthefederalandprovinciallevel–mustshowpoliticalwill,maturityandconsistency.Theyalsoneedtoriseabovetheirnarrowselfandpoliticalinterestsandsincerelyworktobreakthetiesbetweencrimeandpoliticswhichhasbeenthrivinghereforthepastseveraldecades.

However,theforemostandimmediatechallengethatthreatenstowipe-outthegainsofKarachiOperation stems from the lackof consensus amongkey stakeholdersregardingitstargets,directionandmethods.

ThePakistanPeoples’Party-led(PPP)SindhGovernmentistryingtocliptheop-erationalautonomyofRangersandnarrowdowntheambitoftheirassignmentafterraidsonprovincialgovernmentofficesandarrestof“itsownmen.”

The arrest of former federalministerDrAsimHussain – a close friend of PPPCo-ChairpersonAsifAliZardari–ontheallegedchargesofcorruptionandassist-ingterroriststriggeredfearsamongmanySindhGovernmentstalwartsandpar-ty’scentralleadersthattheycouldalsobeamongthepossibletargets.Therefore,thePPPaimstoblunttheoperationandrestrictitsfocusmainlytothebannedsectarianandreligiousgroupsortheotherpoliticalforces,includingtheMuttahi-daQaumiMovement(MQM).

However,theargumentofthelawenforcementagenciesmakessensethatwith-outchokingfinancesandapprehendingsupporters,abettorsandpatronsofcrim-inalsandterrorists,theirjobwillonlybehalfdone.

AlthoughthefederalgovernmenthassupportedtheRangers inthistussle,thefrictionbetweenSindhgovernmentandthesecurityestablishmentisabadnewsinPakistan’sfightagainstterrorism.

ThePPP,otheroppositionpartiesand the rightsgroupsmightbe raisingsomelegitimateconcernsabout theallegedhigh-handedactionsof theRangers,buttheyshouldbeaddressedwithoutcompromisingtheoperationalautonomyandindependenceoftheRangers.

TheauthoritiesshouldconsidersettingupanindependentmonitoringcommitteetoaddresscomplaintsorgrievancesabouttheconductoftheOperation.Thepro-posedCommitteecancompriseofretiredjudgesandcivilsocietymembersandworkintandemwithanin-housewatch-dogofthesecurityestablishment.

ThePPPandtheotherpoliticalforcesshouldrealizethatthereisanoverwhelm-

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ingsupportfortheoperationamongthemasses.Anyattemptstoderailitwouldonlycreatecomplicationsandunintendedconsequences.Therefore,thepoliticalforcesshouldsupporttheoperationinitspresentformandrefrainfromchangingrulesofthegametosaveaselectfew.

Besides,thecivilianleadershipmustfocusonthefollowinginitiativesiftheywanttoseeKarachiOperationasuccessandachievethegoalssetintheNAP.

Firstly,thegovernmentneedstomoveonawar-footingtoimplementthelongoverduepolicereforms.Thesereformsmustincludegrantingthepoliceforceacompleteoperationalautonomyandindependence.TheyshouldalsoputanendtopoliticalinterferenceinthePoliceDepartment,establishamerit-basedrecruit-mentprocess,ensuremoderntrainingandguaranteetransparencyinalltransfersandpostings.

Secondly,sweepingjudicialreformshavealsobeenpendingforalongtime.TheNAP declaration calls for upgrading the judiciary. This includes increasing thenumber of judge and courts, establishing a protection program forwitnesses,prosecutorsandjudgesandcapacity-buildingandtrainingofprosecutorsandin-vestigators.

Thirdly,thegovernmentshouldalsofocusonabolishingthebreedinggroundsofcrimeandterrorism.Thiscanbedoneonlythroughinvestmentoneducationandsocial,economicandinfra-structureupliftanddevelopment.

Sadly,civilianauthoritiesfarepoorlyonthesethreefronts.Themedia,thecivilsocietyandvariousstakeholdersshouldcreateawarenessandbuildpressureonthefederalandprovincialgovernmentstoinitiatemeasuresonthesethreekeyfrontsasarrestsandkillingsofcriminalsandterroristscanonlyworktoanextent.Therealchallenge in themid- to long-term is toeliminatethose factorswhichbreedcriminalsandterrorists.KarachiOperationcanonlybesuccessfuliftheau-thoritiestakeaholisticapproachandalongwiththeuseofforce,focusonreformsanddevelopmentaswell.

Amir Zia is a senior journalist, who has worked for some leading national and international media organizations in a career spanning over two decades. He can be reached at [email protected].

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6.9 OPINION: The Balochistan Saga by Shahzada Zulfiqar

Thegovernmenthassucceededincontrollingterrorismtoaconsiderableextentin Baluchistan, particularly in areas affectedby theBaluch separatist violence,withtheimplementationoftheNationalActionPlan(NAP).

HoweverithasnotyettakenanytangiblestepstoinitiatedialoguewiththeBa-lochseparatistslivinginexile.

InthefirstapexcommitteemeetingheldinQuettainFebruarylast,aroadmapwasdrawnfortheimplementationofNAP.

Themeeting,chairedbythePrimeMinisterNawazSharifandattendedbyArmyChiefGeneralRaheelSharifalongwithheadsofsecurityagencies,formulatedapolicytoimplementtheNAPbyusingcarrotandstickpolicy.

Under thispolicy, themilitarywasallowedto launch intelligencebasedopera-tionsandatthesametimetheprovincialgovernmentisdirectedtostartreconcil-iationeffortswithBalochseparatistleaders.

Theapexcommitteealsoapprovedageneralamnestyschemeunderwhichmon-etarybenefits,employmentopportunitiesandsecurityforthosewhoarewillingtosurrenderhavebeenannounced.

Underthispolicy,halfamilliontotwomillionrupeesweretobeawardedtothefighters ranging fromanordinaryfighter to a local commanderwho laydowntheirarms.

Thepolicywasaimedatluringthemilitantstoabandonfightinginreturnformon-etarybenefitsandsecurityassurances.

Ithasalsobeendecidedthateffortswouldbemadetoseekdeportationoftheseparatistsleaderslivinginexileinthewesterncountriesaswellasconfiscationoftheirallmoveableandimmovablepropertiesinordertochokethefinancingtotheirbannedorganizations.

BesidesfederalagencieslikeFIA,CustomsandNAB,Policehavealsobeendirect-edtoprobefinancialsourcesoftheseparatistandinsurgentgroups.

ThepeopleprovidingmoneytotheseinsurgentsthroughHawalaunderthegarbofmoneyexchangebusinessarebeing interrogatedwhile revenue recordsarebeingcheckedatthetehsil leveltoobtainthepropertydetailsoftheinsurgentleaders.However,nobreakthroughhasbeenachievedonthiscount,sofar.

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Thepro-governmenttribalChieftainslikeNawabSanaullahZahri,NawabChagaizMarri–sonandsuccessoroftheseparatistleaderNawabKhairBuxMurri--andSardarSarfarazDombki--thegrandsonofNawabAkbarBugti--playedactiveroleintryingtopersuadetheoutlawedcomradestolaydownarms.

Aroundsixhundredfightersbesidessixcommandersofthebannedorganizationshaveso far surrendered fromAwaran, Lahri,DeraBugtiandKohlu ina specialceremonies.

There are some suspicions among general public about genuineness of thesesurrenderingpeopleamidstreportsthatthetribesloyaltopro-governmenttrib-alnotableswereincludedinthelistof‘surrendering’insurgentsforthesakeofmonetarybenefits.

Ontheotherhand.majorseparatistelementsrejectedthegeneralamnestyofferandvowedtocontinuefightingtillindependence.

The Baloch nationalist groups, however, believe that such amnesty schemesaimedatwinningloyaltiesthroughmoneyinsteadofaddressinggenuineissueswouldnotyieldanypositiveresultinthelongrun.

Intheanti-insurgentsoperation,threenephews,abrotherandabrother-in-lawoftopfugitiveDrAllahNazarbesidesanumberofcolleagueswerekilledinAwaran.

Initially,therewerereportsthatDr.Nazar,whoheadsseparatistBalochLiberationFront,wasalsokilled,but lateravideowasreleasedpurportedlyshowinghimalive.

Some 204 suspected terrorists of banned organizations including TTP and LEJwerealsokilledand29injuredin1935operationsduringlastoneyearwhile9176werearrestedbesidesrecoveringof3290weapons.Nofigureisavailableaboutthecausalityofforcesintheseoperations.

EightlawswereproposedtoreformtheCriminalJusticeSystemandtwoofthemhavebeenapprovedbytheprovincialassemblywhilerestarepending.

Inordertocurbhatespeech,13peoplewerearrestedwhile1200booksand284hatematerialwereconfiscated.

HowevernoactionhasbeentakenagainstMadarisfuellingsectarianhatred.

116casesofsectarianmilitantsarependingincourtswhile54caseshavebeenreferredtoSpecialTrial(military)courts.

ThesecurityforcesarecreditedwithkillingoftopmilitantsofLashkar-e-Jhangvi

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likeUsmanSaifullahandMahmoodKurdaliasWadeed,themastermindsofdead-lysuicideattacks,killingsofhundredsofShiaMuslimsinBalochistanandSindh.

AfterthekillingofLeJleaderMalikIshaqalongwithhiswholetophierarchyinpo-liceencounterinPunjab,therewasgeneralexpectationsthattheircounterpartsinBaluchistanwouldalsobebroughttojustice.

AnimportantcommanderofAl-Qaeda’sUmarLateefwaskilledinAugust2015inChaghiareaborderingAfghanistanwhilehiswifeTayyabawhoissaidtobeheadofthewomenwingofthebannedorganizationwasarrested.

Hisbrother,identifiedasBilal,however,managedtoescapeintoAfghanistan.

Aprovincial governmentdelegationcomprisingministersandparliamentarianscumtribaleldersoftheNationalPartyinRamadanpaidavisittoKhanofKalatMirSulemanDaudlivinginexileinLondon.

NawabSanaullahZahri,thenewlyappointedChiefMinisterandprovincialheadofPML(N),hasalsovisitedLondontomeetKhanSuleman.

Although government and its ministers have been claiming success, but bothmeetingsremainedinconclusive.

Khan went abroad to fight a legal battle in the International Court of JusticeagainstPakistanfor its failuretoabidebythe instrumentofaccessionreachedbetweenQuaid-e-AzamandMirAhmadyarKhan, the lastKhanof theprincelystateofKalat.

AfterkillingofNawabAkbarBugtiinamilitaryoperation,KhanofKalathadcon-venedatribalJirgainKalatinSeptember2006thathadgivenhimthemandatetoseekjusticefromICJ.

The outgoing ChiefMinister Dr. AbdulMalik Balochmet Brahamdagh Bugti inSwitzerlandandisbelievedtohaveconveyedsomeofhisdemandstothemilitaryestablishment.

NoBalochpartyexceptNationalPartyofDr.MalikBalochisinthefavourofmak-ingGwaderportoperationalandconstructionofCPECunlessreservationsofBa-lochpopulationthatitisbeingturnedintominorityduetothesemegaprojectsareremoved.

Anothermajor issueBalochpopulationisconfrontedwith istheregistrationofAfghanrefugeesinmillionsasPakistaninationalsinNADRArecordbesidesvoters’lists.

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DrMalikandotherBalochpartiesopposedholdingofcensusin2016inthepres-enceofAfghanrefugeeswhoareestimatedtobetwoandanhalfmillioninBa-lochistan.

Themilitaryhighupsinapexcommitteemeetingshaveassuredprovincialgovern-menttoapprisetheirtopbrassaswellasfederalgovernmentaboutitsreserva-tionsandapprehensionsthroughtheirchannel.

PashtoonbasedpoliticalpartiesparticularlyPKMAP,however,rejectthesereser-vationsandopposetheproposalofprovincialgovernmentinthisregard.

AlthoughHomedepartmentclaimstohavetakensternactionagainsttheprivatemilitias,butmanypeopledoubtit.

Thesearmedgroupsarebelievedtohavebeengiveninthecontrolofpro-govern-menttribalnotables.

TheofficialsclaimthatgovernmenthasenoughevidencethatShafiqMengal,whoheadsagovernment-backedprivatemilitia,harborsthehardcoreelementsfrombannedsectarianorganizationsandTTPwhoalsoinvolvedinkillingofeightLevymen.

ThereligiousminoritiesparticularlyHindushavebeenpersecutedbythesemili-tiasduringthepast15yearslonginsurgency.

Hindu traders in restivedistricts particularly Khuzdar, Kalat andMastungwerebeingforcedtopayBhathatotheseprivatemilitias.ConsequentlyhundredsofHindufamilieshavemigratedtoIndiaortoneighboringSindhprovince.

Theactivistsofthesemilitiashavebeeninvolvedincrimeslikehighwayrobbery,rape,carsnatching/liftingandabductionforransom.

AccordingtoareportoftheHomeDepartment,2441seminarieshavebeenreg-isteredwhile518haveyettoberegistered.

Some143,446students including5,862foreignershavebeenenrolled in theseMadaris.

Still,itisbelieved,aroundathousandMadarissituatedinthefarflungareasoftheprovincehaveyettoberegistered.

Dozensof facebookaccounts, tweetersandwebsiteshavebeenblockedwhichwerebeingusedforpropagandainfavourofseparatistsoragainstthestateandsecurityagencies.

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Shazada Zulfiqar is a veteran journalist from Balochistan who reports for AFP. He can be reached at [email protected].

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PArT 7: semInArIes7.1 Introduction

Oursevenththemelooksatthecontrover-sial topic of seminaries or madrassas, asaddressedbythe10thpointintheNationalActionPlan(NAP).

A full 13months into the NAP, and the government has yet to decide on anagreed-uponprocessfordatacollectionandregistrationofseminaries.Regula-tionandreformcanonlyhappenfurtherdownthelineoncetheinitialregistra-tionisstreamlinedandPakistaniauthoritieshaveabettersenseofthenumberandscopeofseminariesoperatinginthecountry.Atotalof182seminarieshavealsobeenclosedduringthisperiod.1

7.2 Seminaries in Pakistan

7.2.1NumberofSeminaries

NACTA’s former National Coordinator’s statement about Pakistan’s inability todeterminetheexactnumberofseminaries isnotwithoutmerit.Thereinexistsoneofthebiggestissueswithseminaryregulation,becausetheauthoritiesareunclearastohowmanymadrassasoperateinthecountry.AccordingtotheMin-istryofReligiousAffairsandInterfaithHarmony,whichhappenstoworkinclosecoordinationwithIttehad-e-Tanzeemat-e-MadarisPakistan(ITMP)2,claimsthereare26,131madrassasinitsrecord.Thebreakdownis14,768madrassasinPunjab,7,118inSindh,2,704inBalochistan,1,354inKPand187inIslamabad.Unregis-teredmadrassasareadifferentstoryaltogether,astheMinistryofReligiousAf-fairsclaimsthereare4,135unregisteredmadrassasinKP,2,411inPunjab,1,406inSindh.266inBalochistan,and31inIslamabad.3Theprimaryreasonforlackofregistrationcomplianceofthesemadrassas isdifferenceswiththegovernmentovercurriculumandbeliefs.

1QuestionsandOralAnswers,28thsessionoftheNationalAssembly.(2016,January15).RetrievedMarch15,2016,fromhttp://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/ques-tions/1452850149_459.pdf.2ITMPisanumbrellaorganizationofmadrassasorseminaries.Thisisoneofthetwobodiesthatkeepstracksofthenumberofseminaries,theotherbeingtheMinistryofReligiousAffairs.3Ghiskori,Z.(2015,January25).Reformingmadrassas:Therevolutionwithin-TheExpressTri-bune.RetrievedMarch23,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/825216/the-revolution-within/

semInArIesNAP POINT 10:Registrationandregulationofreligiousseminaries.

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However,ITMPitselfcounts35,377registeredseminariesalone,schoolingsome3.5millionchildren.Thisnumberisbrokendowninto13,000registeredmadras-sasoperatinginBalochistan,16,000inPunjab,3,136inKhyber-Pakhtunkhwa(K-P),2,800inSindhand401inIslamabad.5

ThisconfusionwasonlyexacerbatedinOctober2015,whentheNationalInternalSecurityPolicy(NISP)2014-2018wasinstituted.Subsequently26,000madrassaswere found registeredand15,000 left tobe registered. InKP26%of seminar-iesareallegedlynot registered.Punjabhas6,000 registered seminariesoutof12,000,Sindhhas6,503registeredseminariesover9,590intotal.Islamabadhas446registeredseminariesover633intotal.Theroundednatureofthesefiguresisespeciallycurious.

Tostatetheobvious,themechanismfortheregistrationanddocumentationofseminariesisthefirststep.Regulationandreformoftheseinstitutionscomesatalaterstage.Itisalsoimportanttounderstandwhy3.5millionchildreninPakistanattendseminaries,andthehistoryofseminaryreform.

7.2.2GovernmentProgress

InJune2015,theformerNationalCoordinatorofNACTAHamidAliKhandeclaredthatthegovernmentfailedtodeterminetheexactnumberofreligiousseminariesincountry.4TheMinistryofInteriorandNarcoticsControlpresentedareportintheNationalAssemblyinJanuary,2016.Accordingtothatreportauniformregis-trationanddataformhadbeendevelopedjointlybyNACTAandtheITMPandhasbeendispatchedtotheconcernedprovincialandfederalsecurityinstitutionsforseekingtheiropinion.Further,thereportassertsthat182madrassashavebeenshutdown,167inSindh,13intheKhyberPukhtunkhwaand2inPunjab.2

4Khan,A.(2015,June02).Freshrevelations:Anti-terrorplanfailstoachievegoals-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch23,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/895997/fresh-revelations-anti-terror-plan-fails-to-achieve-goals/.

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Graph 7.1 Number of Seminaries closed by the Government

Inordertoexpandlearningsysteminseminaries,anIslamicEducationCommis-sionwassetupby theMinister forReligiousAffairsand InterfaithHarmony inAugust 2015.5 For the appropriate executionof theNAP, the government alsoconductedameetingwiththeleadersofreligiousmadrassasofdifferentsectsinSeptember2015.Thehighlightsofthemeetingareasfollows:

• PrimeMinisterrequestedofficialstosupporttheregistrationandregula-tionofseminaries.

• A consensus among the governments and clergywasmaintained overseminariesreform.

5Ali,K.(2015,August13).Educationcommissionproposedtoreformseminaries.RetrievedMarch23,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1200180.

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• Interiorminister articulated that the government will formulate some strategicplansforthefundingcomingfromoverseas.

• ThepresenceofChiefofarmystaff(COAS)inmeetingwasappreciated.• Religiousscholarscriticizedgovernmentforitsscrutinysystemofmadras-

sasanddeclaredthatthereisnodifferencebetweenmadrassasandfor-maleducationinstitutes.6

Thegovernmentanddelegatesofseminariesmutuallydecidedthattheseminar-ieswouldmaintaintheirfinancialdealingsviabanks.TheseminariesdecidedtoincludemodernsubjectsintheirsyllabuscomprisingofO/Alevel.Acommitteewasestablishedunderthecontrolofinteriorminister.ThecommitteecompriseofeducationministriesoffederalandprovinciallevelandITMPforregistrationofseminaries.7

Inorder tocontrol thefinancial transactionsof seminaries, thegovernmentofPunjabhasdecidedtopropagateanordinance.AdraftoftheProposedCharitiesAct2015wassetupinthisregard,8whichrequiresalltransactionstobeconduct-edthroughabank.9

Geo-taggingofmadrassaswascarriedoutinSeptember2015undertheumbrel-laoftheNAP.Mappingofmadrassashasbeencompleted inPunjab, IslamabadCapitalTerritory,andAzadKashmir.10SindhHomeSecretarystatedthatatotalof3,662madrassaswereincludedfromSindhingeo-tagging.6,503seminarieshavebeenfoundregisteredoutof9,590.Thenumberofstudentsenrolledinunregis-teredseminariesinSindhaloneis517,695.11

6Abrar,M.(2015,September08).Witharmychiefontable,PMbringsclergyonboard.RetrievedMarch23,2016,fromhttp://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2015/09/08/national/with-army-chief-on-table-pm-brings-clergy-on-board/.7Mukhtar,I.(2015,September08).Madrassasagreeonfundsthroughbanks.RetrievedMarch23,2016,fromhttp://nation.com.pk/editors-picks/08-Sep-2015/madrasas-agree-on-funds-thru-banks.8TheNews.(2015,September18).Punjabtobringlawforregulatingfundingofseminaries,NGOs.RetrievedMarch23,2016,fromhttp://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-39733-Punjab-to-bring-law-for-regulating-funding-of-seminaries-NGOs.9Hanif,I.(2015,September09).Punjabdraftsbilloncharitiessurveillance.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1205820.10Ghumman,K.(2015,April10).30seminariesclosed,saysminister.RetrievedFebruary23,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1199516.11StaffReport.(2015,September10).Country’sone-thirdmadrassasnowunderradar.RetrievedFebruary23,2016,fromhttp://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2015/09/10/national/countrys-one-third-madrassas-now-under-radar/.

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7.3 Understanding Seminaries

7.3.1SchoolsofThought

InPakistan,therearespecificallyfivetypesofseminaries12:

Name Sub-sect PlaceDate of es-

tablishment

Wafaq-ul-Madaris-al-Salafia Ahl-e-Hadith Faisalabad 1955

Wafaq-ul-MadansPakistan Shia Lahore 1959

Wafaq-ul-Madaaris Deobandi Multan 1959

Tanzeem-ul-Madaaris Barelvi Lahore 1960

Rabta-tul-Madaaris-al-Islamia Jamaat-e-Islami Lahore 1983

Eachoftheseoffersaschoolofthoughtthatvariesalongafewkeyparameters.i.e. they are not homogenous. However, data suggests that those that attendseminariesinPakistanprimarilydothatforeconomicreasons,notreligiousones.

7.3.2ABriefHistory

Initially,madrassaswerecentersofeducation,both religiousandsecular.Theyearnedthetitleof“trustinstitutions”overtime,astheyprovidedsocialservicestopoor families, suchas food, shelter, clothingand freeeducation. Itmustbestatedthatpartofthereasonforriseinseminaryeducationandhousingwasthestate’sfailuretoaddressbasicneedsforthepopulation.Parents,whomadelessthantwodollarsperday,startedseeingmadrassasasabeaconofhope,awaytohelpthefamilysurvive,wheretheirchildrencouldlearntoread,write,andalsobeclothed,fedandhavearoofovertheirheads.

Thisisthecentralargumentuponwhichreststheseverebacklashfromthereli-giousright,wheneverthestateofPakistanattemptstoregulateseminaries.How-ever,aswitheverythingelse,thescopeandscaleofmadrassasalsomorphedovertime.

Overthecourseoftime,fundingbecameanissue,asmadrassasexpanded.Therewasovert involvementofvariousMuslimstates inthefinancialbackingofreli-giousseminaries.AWikileakscablesuggeststhatanestimated$100millionmadeitswayannuallyfromGulfStatestoseminariesinPakistan.Ostensibly,thisistosupportcontinuedreligiouseducationandsocialservices.Butanalystshavelong

12Shabir,G.,Abbasi,S.M.,&Khan,A.(2012).PakistanJournalofSocialSciences,32(1),2012thser.,147-156.RetrievedMarch23,2016,fromhttp://www.bzu.edu.pk/PJSS/Vol32No12012/Fi-nal_PJSS-32-1-11.pdf.

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suspectedmilitancyties.

7.3.3MilitantConnection?

The idea thatmadrassasare“incubatorsofviolentextremism” tookholdafter9/11, and the US also pressured General Pervaiz Musharraf to do somethingabouttheschools.Whileseveralreports,includingtheAnnualStatusofEduca-tionReportPakistan,claimthatthereisnoconnectionbetweenseminariesandmilitancy,severalfactsworkagainstthisnotion.

Themost overt and public display of the strength of madrassas was the RedMosquestandoffin2007,wherearmedstudentsengagedinahostileandbloodystandoffwithstateauthorities for severaldays.Further,both theNAPand theNISPcallforregistration,regulationandreformofmadrassas,atacitacceptancethatthereliesaproblem.

FurtheraBrookings Instituteresearch in2010claimedthat82%ofstudents inDeobandiseminariesseetheTalibanasrolemodels.AnotherBrookingsInstitutereportclaimsthattherealproblemliesinahandfulofhardlineseminaries.13Fi-nally,thegovernmenthasdisclosedthatnearly80workingseminariesinPakistanaregettingforeignmonetaryaiduptorupeesthreehundredmillion.14

7.4 History of Seminary Reforms

Previously,manymadrassaswereregisteredunder theSocietiesAct1860.Lat-erin1994,theregistrationofmadrasaswasprohibitedintheregimeofBenazirBhutto.“ModelDeeniMadrassaOrdinance”wasissuedfollowingtheMusharrafregimein2001,post9/11,butitwasrejectedbytheoverarchingbodyforthefiveschoolsofthought.“MadrassaRegulatoryOrdinance”wasissuedbythegovern-mentnextandbanonmadrassa’s registrationwas raisedultimatelyunder thenotificationNo#40/30/99/P11-20.11

Allthingsconsidered,thisisnotthefirsttimePakistanhasattemptedtoregisterseminaries,andthebacklashisnothingnew.

13Winthrop,R.,&Graff,C.(2010,June).BeyondMadrasas:AssessingTheLinksBetweenEducationAndMilitancyInPakistan.RetrievedFebruary23,2016,fromhttp://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/6/pakistan-education-winthrop/06_pakistan_education_winthrop.pdf.14Ghiskori,Z.(2015,January29).Year2013-14:80seminariesreceivedRs300minforeignaid-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedFebruary23,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/829407/year-2013-14-80-seminaries-received-rs300m-in-foreign-aid/.

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7.5 Funding / Financing of Seminaries

AhandfulofPakistan’smadrassashavebeenexploitedbyinternalandexternalactorsfortheirownregional,religiousorregulatoryinterests.

Toreviewthe implementationoftheNAP,ameetingwasorganized inJanuary,2015.TheobjectofdiscussioninmeetingwasthescrutinyofforeignfundingforreligiousseminariesexplicitlycomingfromMiddleEasterncountries.15Thegov-ernmenthasdisclosedthatnearly80workingseminariesinPakistanaregettingforeignmonetaryaiduptorupeesthreehundredmillion.13

MinisterofState forFederalEducation,ProfessionalTraining, InteriorandNar-coticsControlBaleeghurRahmanclaimedthat12madrassasinKPweregettingforeignaid. Likewise, twomadrassas inSindhandnine inBalochistan receivedforeignfunding.Accordingtotheinformationprovidedbytheprovincialgovern-mentsbyJanuary31,2015,thereareatotalof23religiousseminariesreceivingforeignfunding.16

Muslimcountrieshadbeenprovidingfinancialsupporttonearly234madrassasintheprovinceofBalochistanuntilFebruary2015.17InMarch,147seminariesofPunjabwerereportedinvolvedinreceivingforeignfinancialfunding.18

UpuntilDecember2015,only23religiousseminarieswerereportedasreceiv-ingforeignfunding intheprovincesofKP,SindhandBalochistan.TheprovinceofPunjabwasexcludedupon thedenialof InspectorGeneralofPunjabPolice(IGP).19

Thefinancingsystemofmadrassasaddedtothetroublesomenessofproposedreforms.Thecountryhasalargeshadoweconomy,andthemadrassasarejustapartofit.Theyfunctionthroughcashcouriers,charityseekinginitiatives,rathermaking transactions throughbanks.TheFinancialMonitoringUnit (FMU) isanentityauthorizedwiththescrutinyofmoneylaunderingandterrorfinancing.

15Ghumman,K.(2015,January14).Govtpondersoverissueofmadressahfinancing.RetrievedMarch23,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1156907.16Khan,I.A.(2015,January31).Only23seminariesreceivingforeignfunding:Minister.RetrievedMarch23,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1160627.17Ghiskori,Z.(2015,February20).234madrassasinBalochistanreceiveforeigncash:Official-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch23,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/841298/counter-ing-extremism-in-balochistan-234-madrassas-receive-foreign-cash-official/.18Haider,I.(2015,March04).IGPreportreveals147foreign-fundedseminariesinPunjab.Re-trievedFebruary16,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1167339.19Bhatti,M.W.(2015,December09).RangershavetoseekSindhCM’snodbeforepoliticalarrests.RetrievedMarch23,2016,fromhttp://www.thenews.com.pk/print/80719-Rangers-have-to-seek-Sindh-CMs-nod-before-political-arrests.

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Pleaseseesection3.3.7TerrorFinancing–Steps.

7.6 Obstacles

TheInternationalCrisisGroup(ICG)presentedareportinthisrespectcalledUn-fulfilledPromises.Thereportindicatedthattheintoleranceandreligiouspreju-diceinPakistanisbecauseofthegovernment’sreluctancetoactincontradictionofitspoliticalassociatesamongthereligiousgroups.20Thispoliticizationandpo-liticalaffiliationofseminariesisanotherreasonwhythestateisoftencompelledtodelayorsuspendattemptsatreforms.

ThegovernmentofPakistanfailedtoprohibittheadmissionofforeignstudentstothemadrassasofDeobandisectinFebruary2015.21Itmayalsobedifficulttotakethematterseriouslywhenprominentpoliticiansfromthemostpopulatedprovincehousingthelargestnumberofunregulatedandunregisteredseminariesbelieveswholeheartedlythatthere iszeroconnectionbetweenseminariesandmilitancy.22

InMarch2015,formerCouncilofIslamicIdeology(CII)chairmanDr.KhalidMasudfoundmistrustamongreligiousseminariesandthegovernmentastheforemostproblemtoseminariesreforms.23

7.7 Conclution

Government reluctance, pressure from the religious right, and internal blamegamingalsodelayandderailtheprocess,whichseemsespeciallyimpededsinceAugust2015.ThefactthatAbdulAziz,responsiblefortheRedMosquestandoffin2007,heads27madrassasinPunjabwith5,000studentsunderhissupervisionisindicativeofgovernmentineptitudeonthisfront.Therealsoexistsnotimelinefortheregistrationprocess,andthespecificrolesbetweentheInteriorandReligious

20ICG.(2004,January16).UnfulfilledPromises:Pakistan’sFailuretoTackleExtremism.RetrievedFebruary23,2016,fromhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/073-un-fulfilled-promises-pakistans-failure-to-tackle-extremism.aspx.21Ali,K.(2015,February15).Seminariesopposegovtmovetobanforeignstudents.RetrievedFebruary17,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1163707.22APP.(2015,April25).NomilitancyinPunjabseminaries:RanaSanaullah.RetrievedMarch23,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1202771.23NewsDesk.(2015,March24).Mainstreamingmadrassas:Callforregistrationofseminarieswitheducationdepartments-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch23,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/858401/mainstreaming-madrassas-call-for-registration-of-seminaries-with-education-de-partments/.

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AffairsMinistryareunclear.Pakistanhasnotevenbeguntoaddresstheinclusionofsciences,Englishandothersubjectsintheseminarycurriculum.

All things considered, the registration, regulation and reform of madrassas istreatingthesymptoms.Therootcause isthe inabilityforthePakistanigovern-menttoprovidefreeeducation,accesstobasicsocialservices,andemploymentopportunitiesupongraduation.Theseminaryproblemislargeenoughnowthatitneedstobedealtwithproperly,butuntiltherootcauseisaddressed,thisprob-lemwillonlycontinuetoexacerbate.

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PArT 8: reFUgees AnD IDPs8.1 Introduction

OureighththemefocusesondisplacedpersonsinPakistan,bothfromAfghani-stanandinternally.Thiscorrespondstopoints#12and#19intheNAP.

Altogether Pakistan accounts for be-tween 5-6 million forcibly displacedpersons, both refugees and internallydisplaced.

8.2 Refugees

8.2.1Refugees-Numbers

TheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugeesestimates1,554,910regis-teredAfghanrefugeesinPakistan.1Thisisstilltheworld’slargestrefugeepopu-lationandthevalidityofthisfigureislinkedwiththeProofofRegistrationCard(PRC),anidentitydocument issuedbytheNationalDataRegistrationAuthority(NADRA).Since2002,some3.8millionAfghanrefugeeshavereturnedto theirhomecountry.Additionally,some58,211repatriatedbacktoAfghanistanin2015.

Thisfiguredoes notaccountforunregisteredAfghanrefugeesinthecountry.TheUNHCRbelievesthatanyotherAfghancitizenslivinginPakistan–allthosenotinpossessionofPRCs–are in factmigrantsandnotrefugees.ThisdefinitionalsemanticcanaffecttreatmentofAfghansonPakistanisoil.

AccordingtotheUNHCR,refugeesarepeopleoutsidetheircountryoforiginbe-causeoffearedpersecution,conflict,violence,orothercircumstancesthathaveseriouslydisturbedpublicorder,andwho,asaresult,require‘internationalpro-tection’.2Refugeesareforcedtofleetosavetheirlivesorpreservetheirfreedom.Ontheotherhand,migrantisawide-rangingtermthatcoverspeoplewhomovetoaforeigncountryforacertainlengthoftime-nottobeconfusedwithshort-

1UNHCR.(2016,January01).UNHCRPakistanFactSheet-December2015.RetrievedMarch03,2016,fromhttp://www.unhcr.org/5000210e9.pdf.2UNHCR.(2016,March16).‘Refugees’and‘Migrants’-FrequentlyAskedQuestions(FAQs).Re-trievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://www.unhcr.org/56e95c676.html.

reFUgees AnD IDPsNAP Point 12: Administrative anddevelopment reforms in FATA withimmediate focus on repatriation ofIDPs.

NAP Point 19:Formulationofacom-prehensive policy to deal with theissueofAfghan refugees,beginningwithregistrationofallrefugees.

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termvisitorssuchastouristsandtraders.Peoplemigrateforavarietyofreasons.

Migrantschoosetomovenotbecauseofadirectthreatofpersecutionordeath,butmainlytoimprovetheirlivesbyfindingwork,orinsomecasesforeducation,familyreunion,orotherreasons.Unlikerefugeeswhocannotsafelyreturnhome,migrantsfacenosuchimpedimenttoreturn.Iftheychoosetoreturnhome,theywillcontinuetoreceivetheprotectionoftheirgovernment.

Itisestimatedthatsomewherebetween1-2millionunregisteredAfghansliveinthecountry.3

Inaddition,thereareafewhundredSomalirefugeesinthecountry.1

8.2.2Refugees–RegionalDistribution

Asof2012,85%oftherefugeesarePashtuns,whiletheremaining15%compriseUzbeks, Tajiks andother ethnic groups. KhyberPakhtunkhwahosts the largestAfghan Refugees population (62.1%), followed by Balochistan (30.3%), Punjab(4.2%),Sindh(4.2%),Islamabad(2%)andAzadKashmir(0.4%).4

Theregistrationprocesswasinitiatedin2006andthePRCshavebeenextendedsixtimesoverthelastseveralyears.ThelastvalidityofPRCswasuntilDecember2015.OnJanuary12,2016,thisdatewasextendedtoJune30,20165,althoughrights-basedgroupssuchasHumanRightsWatchhaveurgedthegovernmenttoextendthistoDecember31,2017.6BearinmindthatinSeptember2015,Paki-stanhadconfirmedtoUNHCRthatthePRCswouldbeextendedbytwoyears,notsixmonths.7Themostdesirablesolutionfordealingwithrefugeesis,inorderofpreference:a)repatriation,b)assimilation,c)resettlementtoanothercountry.

3Rehman,Z.(2016,January05).WithnodecisiononAfghanrefugees,onlyaletterstandsbetweenthemandjail.RetrievedMarch03,2016,fromhttp://www.thenews.com.pk/print/86367-With-no-decision-on-Afghan-refugeesonly-a-letter-stands-between-them-and-jail.4UNHCR.(2011,November30).RegisteredAfghanPopulationinPakistan-2010-2011.RetrievedDe-cember28,2015,fromhttp://unhcrpk.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Registered-Afghan-Popu-lation-in-Pakistan.pdf.5Ali,Z.(2016,January14).PMgrantssix-monthextensiontoAfghanrefugees.RetrievedMarch24,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1232892/pm-grants-six-month-extension-to-afghan-refugees.6HumanRightsWatch.(2016,January16).Pakistan:ExtendAfghanRefugeeStatusThrough2017.RetrievedJanuary25,2016,fromhttps://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/16/pakistan-extend-af-ghan-refugee-status-through-2017.7Shahid,S.(2015,September10).Afghanrefugees’PoRcardstobeextendedtill2017.RetrievedMarch03,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1206055.

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Graph 8.1 Number of Afghan Refugees and Regional Distribution

8.2.3Refugees–CurrentStatus

AtripartitecommissionincludingAfghanistan,PakistanandtheUNHCRwassetupinearly2015.Sofar,thecommissionhasheldtwomeetings,firstinIslamabad(March 2015) and the second in Kabul (August 2015).Oneof the aims of thecommission is toexploreoptions forvoluntary returnofAfghanrefugees fromPakistan.8

TheMinistryofInteriorandNarcoticsControlpresentedareportintheNationalAssemblyinJanuary,2016.Accordingtothatreport21registrationcentershave

8UNHCR.(2015,August22).Afghanistan,Pakistan,UNHCRwelcomenewpoliciesonAfghanrefu-geesinPakistanandreturneestoAfghanistan.RetrievedMarch17,2016,fromhttp://www.unhcr.org/55dddc4a6.html.

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beenestablishedbyNADRA for registrationofundocumentedmigrants.9How-ever,theInteriorMinistersaid,actualregistrationandrepatriationisyettocom-mence.Ofthe21centers,3areinPunjab,1inSindh,12inKhyberPukhtunkhwa,and5inBalochistan.

Itmustbestatedthatthesecentersexistinnameonly,andwerenotoperationalduringthereviewperiodofthisreport.

Graph 8.2 Locations of Registration Centers by NADRA

8.2.4Refugees–Controversies

SincetheatrociousAPSattack,Pakistanchanged itspolicy towardstheAfghanrefugeeslivinginPakistan.DubiousorsuspectCNICswereblocked,resultingin100,000losingtheirPakistaninationalityinMay,2015.10

9QuestionsandOralAnswers,28thsessionoftheNationalAssembly.(2016,January15).RetrievedMarch15,2016,fromhttp://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/ques-tions/1452850149_459.pdf.10Tahir,Z.(2015,May29).100,000Pakistanislosenationalityforbeing‘suspectaliens’.Retrieved

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ThelevelofindecisionregardingAfghanrefugeesandmigrantsreachedsuchanimpasse in January2016, that theMinistryofStatesandFrontierRegions (SA-FRON)issuedacirculartolawenforcementagenciesnottoharassAfghanswithexpiredPRCs.2 Thisdebaclewasfinally concludedwhen sixdays laterPakistanrenewingthePRCsforsixmonths.4

8.2.5Refugees-Worldwide

UNHCRestimates19.5millionrefugeesworldwideattheendof2014.Ofthese,14.4millionareundertheUNHCRmandate.Theremaining5.1millionareregisteredwithanotherUNagency,theUnitedNationsReliefandWorksAgency(UNRWA).11

Graph 8.3 Refugees Worldwide

March16,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1184905.11UNHCR.(n.d.).UNHCR:TheUNRefugeeAgency-UnitedKingdom.RetrievedMarch17,2016,fromhttp://www.unhcr.org.uk/about-us/key-facts-and-figures.html

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SurpassingAfghanistan,Syrianowhasthelargestrefugee/migrantpopulationintheworld:ashocking4,812,851peopledisplacedbywarandstrife.12Turkeyhosts2,715,789,Lebanon1,067,785,andJordan636,040,amongothers.

ThethirdcountrywiththelargestoriginatingrefugeepopulationisSomalia.

8.3 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

8.3.1IDPs-Numbers

Attheendof2015,193,708IDPsregisteredfamilies(1,162,248individuals)wereinternallydisplaced inandoffcamps in theKPprovinceand theFederallyAd-ministeredTribalAreas(FATA).1 However,theInternalDisplacementMonitoringCenterestimatesroughly1.8millionIDPsinPakistan,significantlyhigherthantheregisteredindividualswithUNHCR.UNDPestimatesthemtobearound2millionpeople,from310,729families.13Interestingly,inthebriefinggiventotheNationalAssembly in January,2016,despitebeingapartofNAP,therewasnomentionofIDPrehabilitation.This indicatesthelackofgovernmentresolveandprioritywhenitcomestoIDPs.8

Graph 8.4 Discrepancies in Exact Number of IDPs

12UNHCR.(n.d.).UNHCRSyriaRegionalRefugeeResponse.RetrievedMarch17,2016,fromhttp://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php.13FATASecretariat.(2015,April06).FATASustainableReturnandRehabilitationStrategy.RetrievedMarch 17, 2016, from http://www.pk.undp.org/content/pakistan/en/home/library/crisis_preven-tion_and_recovery/fata-sustainable-return-and-rehabilitation-strategy-.html.

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8.3.2IDPs-Causes

Theprimarycausesofdisplacementincludeinsurgency,counter-insurgencyandother relatedviolence. In June,2014,Pakistan launchedOperationZarb-e-Azb,designedtorootoutmilitancypermanentlyfromtheFederallyAdministeredTrib-alAreasandadjoiningregions.Thishascontributedgreatlytothedisplacedper-sonscrisis.Historyeffectivelyrepeateditself,asasimilaroperationin2009hadalsodisplacedsome3.4millionpeople.

Othercausesincludenaturaldisasterssuchasfloodsandearthquakes.

8.3.3IDPs–RehabilitationPlans

“Youknowwellthatthe2016istheyearoffinalisingtheZarb-i-AzboperationandrehabilitationofIDPs,”saidFinanceMinisterIshaqDarinearlyDecember.HealsoannouncedthatachunkoftheRs.40billioncollectedintaxeswouldbeusedtorehabilitateIDPs.14

The FATA Secretariat launched the FATA Sustainable Return and RehabilitationStrategyinApril,2015.12Thisisaverycomprehensive,wellthought-outplan.Theimplementationof this strategy is the real challenge for theSecretariat.Reha-bilitationformallybeganinMarch2015,asthemilitarygainedcontroloftownswithintheoperationalareas.Fourphaseswereintendedtoseethereturnofdis-placedpersons:

• March2015-July2015

• August2015-November2015

• December2015-March2016

• April2016-November2016

TheFATARehabilitation&ReconstructionUnit (RRU)conducted the surveys inKhyberandSouthWaziristanAgencies,andlaunchedaninitiativetorebuildde-stroyedhomes.Thearmyisalsoinvolvedinextensivereconstructionprojectsintheregion,buttheexactscopeandscaleisunclear.

AccordingtoajointreportbyWorldFoodProgram(WFP),FoodandAgriculturalOrganization(FAO),theInternationalRescueOrganization(IRO)andtheFoodSe-curityCluster,incollaborationwithFataSecretariat,75,000familieshadbeenre-habilitated.15Afewdayslater,anISPRpressreleaseonDecember19,2015stated

14Husnain,K.(2015,December02).Rs40bnfreshtaxestobespentonIDPs’rehabilitation:Dar.RetrievedMarch17,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1223712.15Usman,M.(2015,December10).75,000IDPfamiliesrehabilitated,saysreport-TheEx-pressTribune.RetrievedMarch18,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/1007253/safe-re-

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that291,827familieshadbeendisplacedasaresultoftheconflict,but108,503(38%)hadreturnedtotheirhomes.16

8.3.4IDPs–Controversies

Thisdoesimplythat62%ofthefamiliesarestilldisplaced,andiftheirprotesta-tionsareanyindication,thesystemneedssignificantoverhaulandoversight.InOctober2015,tribaleldersstagedaprotestinPeshawar,demandingearlyreha-bilitation.17InJanuary,shortlyfollowingtheFinanceMinister’sstatementsonre-habilitation,NorthWaziristanIDPsstagedaprotest,claimingthattheyhadbeengiven reliefmoney foronly2of the19months theyhadbeendisplaced.18Yetanotherprotestfollowedtwoweekslater,onJanuary19,2016.19ThisisthetailendofdozensofprotestssinceJanuary2015.20

8.3.5IDPs-Worldwide

EstimatedfiguresforIDPswereabout38.2millionwhowereforciblyuprootedwithin their own country. This includes 7.6million IDPs from the Syrian ArabRepublic, 3.5million from Iraq, 805,000 fromAfghanistan, 155,000 fromMali,611,000fromtheCentralAfricanRepublic,200,000fromSouthSudan,and85,000fromYemen.10

8.4 Refugees - Worldwide

OnJune18,2015,UNHCRrevealedthatthetotalworldwiderefugee(includingIDPs)populationwashigherthanthat inWorldWar II.Putanotherway, that’soneinevery120peopleworldwide.Putyetanotherway,that’sroughlytheequiv-alentoftheentirepopulationoftheUnitedKingdom,orItalyorSouthAfricabeingpushedoutoftheirhomes.Thisfigureincludesinternallydisplacedpersonsaswell.

turn-75000-idp-families-rehabilitated-says-report/.16ISPR.(2015,December19).PressReleaseNoPR390/2015-ISPR.RetrievedMarch17,2016,fromhttps://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2015/12/19.17BureauReport.(2015,October27).ProtestingIDPsdemandearlyrehabilitation.RetrievedApril03,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1215686.18Correspondent.(2016,January07).Showmethemoney:NWAIDPsdemandarrearsfromgovt-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch17,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/1023233/show-me-the-money-nwa-idps-demand-arrears-from-govt/.19Correspondent.(2016,January19).Never-endingordeal:IDPsdemandgovtspeeduprepatria-tion-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch23,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/1029984/never-ending-ordeal-idps-demand-govt-speed-up-repatriation/.20Shah,S.(2015,January27).BaraIDPsendprotestasreturnplanannounced.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://www.thenews.com.pk/print/20754-bara-idps-end-protest-as-return-plan-an-nounced.

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Graph 8.5 Refugees Worldwide in the Last Decade (in millions)

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8.5 OPINION: IDPs, Refugees and The National Action Plan by Imtiaz Gul

The20-pointNationalActionPlan(NAP)oncounter-terrorismpromisesadminis-trativeanddevelopmentreformsinFATAwithimmediatefocusonrepatriationofIDPs(point12)andFormulationofacomprehensivepolicytodealwiththeissueofAfghanrefugees,beginningwithregistrationofallrefugees(point19).

BoththerefugeesandtheIDPs-foundplaceintheNAPbecausethecivilianandmilitaryauthoritiesviewedthemaspartofPakistan’ssecuritycrisisaswellasasourceofshelterandsupportforterroristnetworks.Regardlessoftheveracityorcorrectnessoftheseclaimsandapprehensions,thedisplacedpopulations–bothlocalsandforeign–,particularlythosenotdocumented,dorepresentoperation-alandmanagementhazards.Theycaneasilyserveasconduits–offeringshelterandsupportforallthosenon-stateactorswhoareinvolvedincross-borderter-rorism.

Thatiswhythedouble“R”i.eresettlementoftheIDPsandrepatriationofAfghanrefugees,continuetoremainanessentialpartoftheconversationonthenationalsecurity.

Status of IDPs

InSeptember2014,theMinistryofForeignAffairsdirectedvariousgovernmentdepartmentsparticularlytheDisasterManagementAuthoriestoreplacethetermInternallyDisplacedPersons(IDPs)with“TemporarilyDislocated/DisplacedPer-sons.Theministrywasoftheopinionthattheterm‘IDP’isusedonlyforpeopledisplacedduetowaroroccupationoftheirarea21.

Bymid-December2015,accordingtoanISPRstatement,nearly40percentoftheInternallyDisplacedPersons(IDPs)hadreturnedtotheirhomes.22

DuringabriefingtoChiefofArmyStaff(COAS)Gen.RaheelSharif,theformationcommanderofNorthWaziristaninformedthataround291,827familieswerein-ternallydisplacedduetotheZarb-e-Azboperation.Nearly108,503familieshadreturnedtotheirhomesbymid-December.

Therepatriationprocess,carriedoutunderthesupervisionoftheFATADisasterManagementAuthority,PakistaniArmyandthegovernment,startedoffinMarch

21Ali,Z.(2014,September13).CallIDPstemporarilydislocatedpersons,govtagenciestold.Re-trievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1131711.22(2015,December19).40%IDPsreturnedtoNorthWaziristan,COAStold.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://nation.com.pk/national/19-Dec-2015/40-idps-returned-to-north-waziristan-coas-told.

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2015,– shortlyafterareas inOrakzaiAgency,SouthWaziristan,KhyberAgency,KurramAgencyandNorthWaziristanwerede-notified.23

About350areaswerede-notifiedbetween2011and2015,”accordingtoofficialdocumentswhichclaimedthatabout40areasofNorthWaziristanhadalsobeencleared.24

Accordingtoofficialdocuments, the IDPsfromKhyberAgency,KurramAgency,OrakzaiAgencyandFrontierRegions(FR)Tanktotalabout54864families.ThenumberofdisplacedfamiliesfromNorthandSouthWaziristanagenciesstoodataround70,000families(490,000persons).25

Outof203,181IDPfamilies,200,734hadbeenliving inhostcommunities,andnearly99%oftheIDPshavebeenputtingupinandaroundPeshawar,DIKhan,Hangu, Khyber, Kohat, Kurram, Nowshera, Tank and Bannu. IDPs from KhyberAgencyarestayinginJalozaicampinNowshera.

IDPs Resettlement Problems

Returnof IDPs (orTDPs)howeverappears tobea formidable challenge.Back-ground interactionwithofficialsofvariousdepartments lookingaftertheTDPsreveals that displacedpeoplewill not be able to return to their nativehomesinyear2016,claimingtheciviladministrationlackedthecapacitytoreconstructthedamaged infrastructure.Only20officialsofTribalElectricSupplyCompany(Tesco)areavailabletorestoretheelectricitysysteminNorthWaziristan,whereelectricitypolesandtransmissionlineshavebeenblownupbymilitantsorweredamagedduetomilitaryoperation.26

The army together with the political administration, have been surveying thecleared regions and conducting damage assessments allowing locals to returninsmallbatchesafterduedocumentation.Theprocess,however,hasbeenex-tremelyslow.Inadequatefinancialresources,anddelaysinreleaseoffundsfortherepairofthedamagedinfrastructure,includingprivatehomes,standoutasamajorhurdles.

“Whythedisplacedpersonsarenotinvitedtostarttravellingtotheirnativevil-lageswhen95percentoftheareaisclaimedtohavebeencleared?Shouldthey

23(2016,October08).IDPsreturningasareasgetdenotified.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/969227/idps-returning-as-areas-get-denotified/.24Ibid25Khattak,I.(2015,December23).SlowrehabworkdelayingTDPsreturntohomes.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://nation.com.pk/islamabad/23-Dec-2015/slow-rehab-work-delaying-tdps-re-turn-to-homes.26Ibid

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waitforthecompensationmoney?”Mr.NazirKhan(MNAfromNorthWaziristan)questioned,accordingtoThe Nation.27

“Theycanbegiventheamountwhentheyreturntohomes,”theMNAsuggested.Mr.KhansaidthatMiraliBazaarhasbeenrazedtothegroundandnewbuildingswerecurrentlybeingconstructed. “Ownersof shops thathavebeen razedwillnotgettheownershipofthenewconstructions.Instead,newbidderswillgettheownership?”thelawmakeraskedandexpressedhisdeepconcernthatthiscouldleadtoalotofunrestamongstthelocals.ButaSAFRONofficial,whospokeonconditionofanonymity,offeredaconflictingaccountandsaidthataccordingtotribalcustoms,theroadsandbazaarsarepropertyofthestatethatcanbegiventoanybodyonthewillofthestate(politicaladministration),thepapersaid.

Thismeansnon-agreementonthemode,timingandleveloffinancialassistanceremainseriouschallenges.Yet,theFederalMinisterforSAFRONLtGen(ret.)Ab-dulQadirBaloch informed theNationalAssembly that the complete returnofIDPswillbeensuredinDecember2016.

Anotherbigobstacleforvoluntaryreturnandrevivalofnormallifeisthemissingwillofrelevantstakeholdersforpolitical reforms intheFederallyAdministeredTribalAreas(FATA).ThespecialstatusunderthedraconianFrontier Crimes Reg-ulations (FCR)continuestoblotandblocksocio-politicaldevelopmentoftheseregions.

Theabolitionofthisstatus,observersagree,iscrucialtosustaingainsinthe

counter-insurgency, Zarb-e-Azboperation.While theoperationhasestablishedthestatewritinmostpartsofFATA,itcannotbeexpectedtoheralddemocraticgovernancestructures.OperationZarb-e-Azbcertainlyprovidesthemuch-need-edopportunityforpoliticalreformsandintegrationoftribalareasforwhichthefederalgovernmentshallhavetogarnerthesupportwithinthenationalparlia-ment.

Afghan Refugees

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates thattherearecurrently1.5millionregisteredAfghanrefugeesinPakistan.Thevalid-ityofthisfigureislinkedwiththe“ProofofRegistrationCard(PoRC),”anidenti-tydocument issuedby theNationalDataRegistrationAuthority (NADRA).28ThePoRCsissuedtoAfghanrefugees,havemeanwhilebeenextendedfromDecem-ber31,2015toDecember31,2017.

27ibid28CRSS,(2015,November10).RemarksbyUNHCRofficialatPak-AfghanCivilSocietyTrack1.5/2Meeting.RetrievedMay06,2016.crss.com.pk.

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Currently,some32%oftherefugeeslivein54existingcamps,whiletherest68%resideinurbanareas.AUNHCRresearchcarriedoutin2010-11throughwhichal-most1millionrefugeesweresurveyedfoundoutthatoutofthelegalAfghanref-ugees,23%areeconomicallyactive.Outofthis23%some85%aremale.Amongsttheseeconomicallyactiverefugees,55%aredailywageworkers,about22%havebusinessesorareself-employedandabout19%aresalaried.

ItisimportanttounderstandthatanyotherAfghancitizenslivinginPakistan–allthosenotinpossessionof“ProofofRegistrationCards”-areinfactmigrants and not refugees.ThoughallAfghansinthisothercategoryhaveaccesstoUNHCR,yettheirrefugeestatusisdeterminediftheyqualifyacertaincriterion.

UNHCRdoesnotprovidedirectfinancialsupporttothegovernmentofPakistanfortheneedsoftheAfghanrefugees,yet it implementscertainprojectswhichcontributetoimprovinglivesofhostcommunitiesinPakistan.

According to António Guterres, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCRthroughitsRefugeesAffectedandHostingAreas(RAHA)initiative,hascompletedover300projectsindifferentdistrictsofKhyber-PakhtunkhwaandBalochistanatacostof$175million.Henotedthatmorethan10.6millionpeople,includingAf-ghanrefugeesandPakistaninationals,havebenefittedfromtheseprojectssincethelaunchofRAHAinitiativein2009.29

RAHAhasbeenfacilitatinghostandrefugeecommunities inhealth,education,infrastructure,andlivelihoodsectorsandthekeyobjectiveofitsprogrammeswastocreatecohesionbetweenAfghanrefugeesandtheirhostcommunities,theUNcommissionersaid.

TodealwiththecrisisforAfghanrefugeesintheaftermathoftheattackontheArmyPublicSchool(APS),Peshawar(16December2014),atripartitecommissionincludingAfghanistan,PakistanandtheUNHCRwassetupinearly2015.UntilDe-cember2015,thecommissionhasheldtwomeetings,firstinIslamabad(March2015)andthesecondinKabul(August2015).OneoftheaimsofthecommissionistoexploreoptionsforvoluntaryreturnofAfghanrefugeesfromPakistan.

Themechanism also calls upon full protection of Afghan refugees in Pakistanunderinternationallaw.Duringthetwomeetings,PakistaniandAfghangovern-mentsagreedtodevisespecificcountryplanstoresolvethiscrisisandeventuallymergingbothplansintooneunifiedframework–acomprehensiveapproachtoaddressthischallengebycombiningforcesandefforts.

29(2015,November12).Over56,000registeredAfghanrefugeesrepatriatedfromPakistan:UN-HCR.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/990102/over-56000-registered-af-ghan-refugees-repatriated-from-pakistan-unhcr/.

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ThoughPakistanisnotasignatoryofthe1951UNConventiononRefugees,yetitispartofseveralrelatedinternationalframeworks.Forinstance,Pakistanispartofthe“Solution Strategy of Afghan Refugees”,aframeworkendorsedbyAfghan-istan,Iran,UNHCRandPakistan.Thestrategyexploresvariouswaysandpossibil-itiestoincreasedurablesolutionsforAfghanrefugees.

Voluntary Return

Since2002,UNHCRhasfacilitatedvoluntaryreturnofalmost4millionrefugeestoAfghanistan.Theorganizationprovidessupportintheformofcash(uponarrivalinAfghanistanUNHCRcashcentres),ensuringsafetyofreturningrefugeesaswellasthepossibilityofcarryingcertainhouseholditemswithoutcustomdutiesintoAfghanistan.Thecashsupportprovidedis$200perpersonfortheAfghanrefu-gees,whichmeansareturningfamilyof6Afghanrefugeesisentitledto$1200uponarrivalinAfghanistan.

In2015alone,theUNagencyfacilitatedtherepatriationofover56,000registeredAfghanrefugeesfromPakistantoAfghanistan,makingitthelongestrunningvol-untaryreturnprogramme.

Afghan Refugees

Despiteall thegoodworkofUNHCRandthePakistanigovernment,Afghanref-ugeescontinuetoremainonthereceivingend.Manyof themhavetoendurestricterscrutinyoftheircredentials,snap-checksbythepoliceaswellaspara-mil-itaryforces,orawitchhuntfollowingabigterroristorcriminalincident.

Additionally,thePakistaniauthoritiessimplyraisedthebaronAfghanrefugeeswhentheywerementionedintheNAP,andbyimplicationsingledoutasoneofthereasonfor insecurityandcrime inPakistan.Thisbrought inanewwaveofharassmentformanyrefugees.

Nolongtermsolutionisinsightparticularlyinviewofthefactthatnearly60%oftheregisteredAfghanrefugeesinPakistanareundertheageof24years.ThismeansthatmostofthemwerebornandraisedinPakistanandhavelimitedlinksinAfghanistan.Thisrepresentsabigchallenge-asmostyoungAfghanrefugeesarereluctanttogobacktoacountrytowhichtheyhavelimitedornoconnection.

OneofthepossiblesolutionsforthePakistanigovernmentcouldbetograntciti-zenshiptothoserefugeeswhoareborninPakistan;ordeviseaPermanentResi-dencescheme.Whilebroadpoliticalconsensuswouldberequiredtogetherwithaclearimplementinglegislation,thismovewouldperhapsmitigatetheburdenonthegovernmentaswellastheUNHCR,allowingfulllegalintegrationofabigchunkoftheAfghanpopulationthathasbeenlivinginPakistanforthemostpartoftheir

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lifeandconsiderittheirhome.

Conclusion

Pakistan’sNational Action Plan identifiedAfghan refugees among the possiblesourcesof insecurity,andresolvednotonlytoworkfortheirreturntoAfghan-istanbutalso toexpedite repatriationandrehabilitationof the IDPs.However,workonthegrounddoesnotmatchthesenseofurgencyreflectedinNAP.Thegovernmentof Pakistan keeps reiterating to ensure the “honourable returnofAfghan refugees to their homeland”buthardlyoffers anydurable solution forAfghansbornandraisedhere.Itcouldhavefollowedexamplesofseveralothercountrieswhere“naturalization”orlegalassimilationofimmigrantsconstituteacorehumanrightsprinciple.

Similarly,returnofIDPstoFATAregions,andrevivalofnormallifelargelydependsonwhetherthoseareascanbemainstreamedtopavewayforextensionofnor-malgovernancestructuresandthefundamentalrights–asavailabletocitizensinotherpartsofthecountry.NoneofthesestepsarevisibleasofJanuary2016–andtheabsenceoflong-termsolutionsfailstoreflecttheurgencythatNAPhadexpressedonthesetwochallengingissues.

BoththeseissueswillcontinuetohauntthestateofPakistanuntilthetimethatthegovernmenttakesconcretestepswhichtrulyimplementtheNationalActionPlan-inletterandspirit.

Imtiaz Gul is a noted media analyst and author of several books. He is also the Executive Director at CRSS. He can be reached at [email protected].

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PArT 9: crImInAl coUrTs9.1 Introduction

Our ninth and final theme exploresthefinalpointintheNAP,reformsinthe criminal courts system to facili-tatebetterimplementationofruleoflawandspeedieraccesstojustice.

OneofbiggestcriticismsofPakistan’sfightagainstterrorismisitsinabilitytopros-ecuteandconvictterrorsuspects.Onesolution,coveredinchaptertwoofthisreport,istheparalleljudicialsystemofthemilitarycourts.Buteventhemilitarycourtshavemanagedtoprocessonly40casesoverthecourseof13months.1

Thusfar,theonlyprogressreportedbytheInteriorMinisterChaudharyNisar,inabriefingtotheNationalAssemblyonNAPprogressinJanuary2016states:“Prov-incestosubmitproposalsuponrevampingcriminaljustice.”2However,amonthprior,PrimeMinisterNawazSharifalsocreatedtheLawReformCommittee.3

9.2 The Criminal Procedure Code of Pakistan

CodeofCriminalProcedure,themostcomprehensivebillonproceedingsofcrim-inalcourtsinPakistan,containsalltheproceduresandprovisionswhicharenec-essarytoregulatetheworkingofcriminallawcourtsinthecountry.AllcriminalcourtsworkunderthisactandithasacentralroleinthePakistanlegalsystem.

CriminallawinPakistanandtheproceduralcodesthatarefollowed,areverydif-ferentintheirapplicationfromthecriminallawthatisfollowedinthedevelopedworld.Pakistan’scriminal justicesystemneedstobeunderstoodinthecontextofthesocietyandtheregion’shistory.MostofthecriminallawsinPakistanwereintroducedbytheBritishEmpire.TheCodeofCriminalProcedure(Vof1898)andthePenalCode(XLof1860)bothofwhichwereimplementedinthecolonyare

1Mukhtar,I.(2016,January09).Militarycourtsconvicted40terroristssofar.RetrievedJanuary19,2016,fromhttp://nation.com.pk/national/09-Jan-2016/military-courts-convicted-40-terror-ists-so-far.2QuestionsandOralAnswers,28thsessionoftheNationalAssembly.(2016,January15).RetrievedMarch15,2016,fromhttp://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/ques-tions/1452850149_459.pdf.3(2015,December01).PMsetsupcommitteeforlegalreforms.RetrievedMay2,2016,fromhttp://www.thenews.com.pk/print/77981-pm-sets-up-committee-for-legal-reforms.

crImInAl coUrTsNAP Point 20: Reforms in criminalcourts system to strengthen the an-ti-terrorism institutions including pro-vincialCIDs.

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stillbyandlargetheprescribedstatutesfollowedbythecourtsforcriminalcasesinPakistan.

TheshortfallsofPPCandCrPCaredire.Radicalchangesarerequiredforrevamp-ingof theexistingcriminal justicesystemofPakistan.4Despite thegrowingur-gencyofreform,Pakistan’spolice,andindeedthewholecriminaljusticesystem,stilllargelyfunctionsonthemandateof“maintainingpublicorder”ratherthanundertakingcontemporarycrime.5 Inananalytical studyof thecriminal justicesysteminPakistan,SardarHamzaAlisays:“Ourcriminaljusticesystemisnotde-liveringduetomultipleailmentsthatrangefromreportingofcrimetothepo-lice,mal-practicesduringthecourseofinvestigation,preparationofreportundersection173ofCr.P.C.bytheI.O.,submissionofchallaninthecourtbythePublicProsecutorwithoutapplicationofhisindependentmindowingtohistiedhandsandsubsequentlytrialatthemercyofthedefensecounsel.Eachstephasmanyslipsandshortsatenforcement,judicialprocessandcorrectionstages.”

9.2.1PendingCasesinPakistan’sCourts

InareporttotheNationalAssemblyinJanuary,2015,itwasrevealedthatthereareover1.7millioncasespendingintheapexandlowerscourtsaroundthecoun-try.6Thesefiguresarefrom2013,andwillhaveonlyincreasedwithtime.

4Hamza,S.A.(2015).AnAnalyticalStudyofCriminalJusticeSystemofPakistan.JournalofPoliticalStudies,22(1),2015thser.,17-42.RetrievedMarch03,2016,fromhttp://pu.edu.pk/images/jour-nal/pols/pdf-files/2-SARDARALIHAMZA_22_2015.pdf.5InternationalCrisisGroup.(2010,December06).ReformingPakistan’sCriminalJusticeSystem.RetrievedJanuary27,2016,fromhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/paki-stan/196ReformingPakistansCriminalJusticeSystem.pdf.6Khattak,I.(2015,January15).1.7mcasespendingwithSC,lowercourts,NAtold.RetrievedMarch24,2016,fromhttp://nation.com.pk/national/15-Jan-2015/1-7m-cases-pending-with-sc-lower-courts-na-told.

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Graph 9.1 Pending Cases in Pakistan’s Courts

9.3 Progress on Legal Reforms

Whileseveralbillsandamendmentshavebeenpresentedandpassedinthefed-eralandprovincialassemblies,astructuraloverhaulissorelymissing.Tothisend,onDecember1,2015,nearlyafullyearaftertheAPSattacks,thePrimeMinister’sCommitteeonLegalReformswasfinallyformed.3TheTermsofReferenceforthecommitteeareasfollows:

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1) Toprocess the lawreformproposalscontained in themanifestoof thePML-N2013.

2) ToconsiderthelawreformproposalsmadebytheLawandJusticeCom-missionofPakistanandotherrelevantinstitutionsandcommitteesofanyotherpersons.

3) Topreparedraftlegislativebillsforreforms.4) Tosharethedraftlegislativebillswiththerelevantstakeholders.5) Toputup thedraft legislativebills for approvalof theprimeminister/

cabinet.6) Initiateandfollowupthelegislativeprocessforenactmentofthedraft

legislativeproposals.7) Tocreateawarenessandacceptabilityforthelawreforms.

OneofthebiggestchangesisthetimeatwhichaFirstInformationReport(FIR)islodgedincriminalcases.Ahighlyexploitativemechanism,theFIRisoftentreatedasafinalversionofevents.Theproposedchangesmandatethatthereportbecreatedonlyaftertheinvestigationhasbeenconcluded.Thisalone,couldbeamassivechangeforthelegalsysteminPakistan.6

The committeewill also look intoallowingNADRA toprocessnon-contentioussuccession/inheritancecases;privatizeinordinatedelaysstemmingfromissuanceandreceiptofcourtsummonsincivilcases;introductionoftimelineswithmile-stonesaswellaspenalties/costsfornon-compliance;creationofaLegalServiceofPakistan,anideaslab/incubationgroundforalllevelsoflegalservice;andin-troducingcostsoflitigation.Itisapositivestep,butunfortunately,thecommitteehasbeenlargelysilent.

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9.4 OPINION: CRPC Reforms: The Way Forward by Yawar Ali Khan

Infamousforitsegregioushumanrightsviolations,confidenceinPakistan’scrim-inaljusticesystemhasbeenlittletononeoverthepastfewdecades.Toappearreform-driven, the Pakistan government, in its National Action Plan 2025, hasundertakentoprotectfundamentalrightsbystrengtheningthejudicialsystem;reviewingrulesandregulationsandreinforcingformalandinformalchannelsofdisputeresolutionwiththefocusonensuringequalapplicationoflawandorderonallsegmentsofsociety.

Surprisingly,theNationalActionPlanisaccurateinidentifyingwheretheshort-falls in thesystemlie; ithighlightsaccessto justice,needforspeedytrialsandconsistencywithconstitutionalprotectionssuchasdueprocessasthekeyareasoffocus.,However,regardlessofhownobletheNationalActionPlanmakesthegovernment’sintentionstoreformappear,thequestionremains;doesthegov-ernmentreallyhavethepoliticalwilltobecomeahumanrightsobservantstateor isthis justanotherploytodistractthemassesbygivingthemaglimmerofhope.Wehaveheardthesepromisesofactionbeforeandyethereweareinasystemwhich,onaregularbasis,goesoutofthewaytofloutbasictenantsofjusticeandtheruleoflaw.Theplancertainlyquestionsthestate’svestedinteresttoensurethat it retains itsGSPPlusstatusandthat it is in linewith itsGlobalGoals(moreparticularly,GlobalGoal16whichaimsforpeace,justiceandstronginstitutions).GivingChapter1oftheConstitutionofPakistanacursoryreadgivesanordinarycitizenhopeastotheplethoraofrightstheypossessbuttheruleofdayisfarfromit.TherealityofthecriminaljusticesysteminPakistaniscurrentlypredicatedonprotectingitsnationalsecurityinterestswhichdoesnotallowforanyprotectionoffundamentalrightsorimplementationofGlobalGoals.Thelawscontainedwithintheanti-terrorlegislationandthePakistanProtectionActhasle-gallythrownthecountrybackintothedarkageswheretheKingreignedsupremeandcoulddowithitssubjectsashewilled.

There are innumerable examplesof these loopholes in the lawwhich glorifiestheconceptofhumanrightswhilesimultaneouslystrippingcitizensofallrights.SowhiletheConstitutionpromisestoprotect itscitizensfromillegaldetentionandsecurityofperson,itlegitimizespolicedetentiononsomethingasill-definedas“sufficientcause”inthesamebreath.Nowwhere“policing”inPakistanwasalreadymarredwithabuseofpower, theConstitutionhas legalized this abusewithoutcorrespondingprotectionsforthedetained.Evenifwelookatsomethingassimpleasconfessionsbeforeapoliceofficer,whicharegenerallyinadmissibleincourtperPakistan’s lawsofevidence, inpractice theyareadmissiblewheretheyleadtoadiscovery,whichgivesthepolicethepowertoextractaconfessionusingtorturewithindemnity.

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What’sworseisthatbecauseofinherentbiasinthesystem,theburdenofproofisinevitablyonthedefendanttoprovehisinnocence.Nolongerareweinasystemwhichupholdsthenotionofinnocentuntilprovenguilty.Theguiltoftheaccusedisalreadyestablishedandunlessprovenotherwise,it’sofftothegallows.

Theselaws,ratherthanincreasethesecurityofthestatehaveactivelyraisedthelikelihoodofgreaterabusesbythegovernmentwithoutgivingthecitizensanyprotectionagainstit.

Infact,sodeterminedisPakistantodepriveitscitizensofanyprotectionswhat-soever,thatevenafterhavingratifiedinternationalconventionssuchastheIn-ternationalCovenantonCivilPoliticalRightsandtheConventionagainstTortureandOtherCruel,InhumanorDegradingTreatmentorPunishment,therearenoreportingmechanisms for citizens topursue claimsagainst thegovernmentorenforcetheveryrightstheselawsareratifiedtoprotect.Theseconventionswillnotmeananythingunlessthegovernmentpassestherelevantenablinglegisla-tion.Theydo,however,fallundertheapparentploysplayedbythegovernmenttoappeartobeupholdinghumanrightsinthepubliceye.

Theinabilitytoadministerisfurthervalidatedandrecognizedwhenthegovern-mentandtheSupremeCourtgiveintomilitarycourtsimplyingthesystem’sownineffectivenessandfailure.Thesecourts,whichhavebeengivena2yearman-date,arearesultofthe21stamendment.Proceedingsconductedbythesecourtsareheldinsecret,withouttransparencyandwithnowaytogaugethemeasureofitssuccessorfailure.Moreover,thereisnocertaintythatbytheendofthesetwoyears the sunset clausewill be invokedand these courtswill bewrappedup.Forthesakeofargument,evenifmilitarycourtsareashortstoptogivetheregularcriminaljusticesystemachancetobereformed,weneedtomeasurethechangesinthecriminaljusticesystemoverthepastyeartoseewhatheadwaywehavemade.However,ifthelawsthatgovernthecriminaljusticesystemaretobelookedat i.e.thePakistanPenalCode,TheCriminalProceduralCode,EvidenceAct,nomaterialchangeshavebeenmade.Overthecourseofthelastyear,Paki-stanhasliftedthemoratoriumonthedeathpenaltyandhasexecutedover350individualsoutwhichonlyaround60areundertheAnti-TerrorLegislation.Whenthestateisexactingtheultimatepunishmentofdeath,itisunderamuchstricterobligation to ensure protection of human rights. Despite that and despite thepromisesunderinternationallaw,Pakistanhasknowinglyexecutedjuvenilesandthementallyillandbythelooksofthesetrends,thegovernmentisn’tplanningonstoppinganytimesoon.

InorderforPakistantoevenmeettheminimumstandardforprotectinghumanrights,certainreformsneedtotakeplacewithspeedandaggression.Moreim-portantly,theyneedtofocusononeofthebiggestproblemsofthecriminaljus-

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tice systemwithin the law; inconsistency. Simply looking back at inadmissibleconfessionsbeforethepolice,neglectfulpracticehasinfactledtopolicetorture,proventobecounterproductiveandhasbecomethenewunlawfulnormofthepolice.Furthermore,newlawsarecontinuouslypassedwithoutrepealingtheoldones.AccordingtoIqbalHaider,aformerLawMinister,“Nobodyinthelawminis-tryorthejudiciarycanclaimtoknowwhatthevalidlawsofthelandare”,provingthatthispracticeleadstocontradiction,furtherinconsistencyandresultsintherebeingmultiplelawsinthebook.

Alongwith fundamental reforms in lawmaking,protectionshouldbeprovidedtowitnesses,prosecutorsandjudgeswhendealingwithhighprofilecases.Sub-stantialchangestothePPC,CRPCandtheEvidenceActshouldbemadetoensurerespectofhumanrightsalongwitheffectiveexecutionofenablinglegislationonPakistanInternationalobligationsundertheICCPRandCAT.

Pakistan,atthispointisnowherenearimplementingthechangeithasenvisionedinitsNationalActionPlanandthegovernmentandthenationneedstorealisethatthesereformswillnothappenovernightbutthestateisresponsibletoiden-tifyandrectifythisproblemPreviously,thegovernmenthasshownabsolutelynopoliticalwillinchangingtheselaws;asmallexampleofthisistheanti-torturelawthegovernmenthasbeentryingtopassforover2years.WiththeNationalActionPlan,nowisthetimeforthegovernmenttostartscrutinizingthefundamentalflawswithin the lawand start taking actual steps in attempting to reform thecriminaljusticesystem.Mostimportantly,thesereformsneedtobecarriedoutinaneffectiveandtransparentwaywithagreaterneedtoadministerconsistency.Thelastthingthiscountryneedsismoretoothlessreforms.

Yawar Ali Khan is a lawyer with a special interest in human rights. He received his LLM from the University of Maastricht, Netherlands. He can be reached at [email protected].

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PArT 10: conclUsIon10.1: OPINION: HAS THE POST-JIHAD MOMENT ARRIVED? by Raza Rumi

Is Pakistan’s security calculus changing?

PrimeMinisterNawazSharifhadwonthe2013generalelections,promisingreviv-aloftheeconomyandanendtothechronicenergycrisis.Hehadalsopromisedtochartanewpathontheforeignpolicyfront.

Asaresult,Pakistanhasturnedanewchapterinitsforeignpolicy;ithasjoinedtheShanghaiCooperationOrganizationasafull-member,thusbecomingpartofCentral andSouthAsiannations’ group. It hasentered intoenergy connectivi-ty agreementswithQatar, Turkmenistan,Afghanistan andRussia. PakistanhasdeepeneditstieswithChinatobecomeatradeandtransithubforregionaltradethrough the ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor(CPEC) framework, under Presi-dentXiJinPing’sOneBelt,OneRoad(OBOR)initiative.UndertheCPECbanner,new infrastructure development and energy production projects worth about$46billionoverthenextdecadetorevivePakistan’seconomy.

PakistanwasalreadypartoftheTurkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India(TAPI)gaspipelineproject.UnderthisprojectnaturalgasfromTurkmenistanwillbede-liveredtoenergydeficienteconomiesofPakistanandIndia.InDecember2015,leadersofallfourcountrieslaidfoundationsoftheprojectandworkfinallycom-menced.

Early signs of policy shifts?

It all sounds goodbut for these infrastructure andenergyproductionprojectstomaterialize,Pakistanneedstoneutralizeaswellaseliminateallthoseradicalgroups,whichitoncenurtured,orissympatheticto.

One promising sign to that effect came in January 2015; in an interviewwithChristianAmanpourofCNN,Lt.GenAsimBajwa,headoftheISPR,underscoredthat“…wehavetogoagainstthephenomenonofterrorism,againstallterrorists,andtheirabettors.”1

ItistooearlytomakeanyconclusiveassessmentofthatcommitmentbutitBa-jwa’sstatementdidindicatesomerethinkwithinthemilitary’scalculusofsecuritypolicy.Hisboss,GeneralRaheelSharif, thearmychief, too,hadmadeasimilarstatementinNovember2014;inareferencetotheOperationZarbeAzb,amilitary1StaffReporter.(2015,January20).InsulttoquestionPakistanarmy’scompetence,DGISPRtellsCNN.RetrievedMarch26,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1158235.

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actionlaunchedagainstterroristhideoutsinNorthWaziristaninJunethatyear,Sharifhadsaid:“Iwouldliketoopenlysaythatthis–operation-isagainstallhuesandcolors,anditiswithoutanydiscrimination,whetheritisHaqqaninetworkorTTPoranything.”2

Amonthlater,terroristsstruckattheArmyPublicSchool(APS)inPeshawar,andkillednearly145studentsandteachersinoneofthedeadliestattacksever.TheAPSattackonDecember16,and thesubsequentmilitaristic responsestrength-enedtheresolveofthearmyandthePML-Ngovernmenttofinallyaddressterror-ismanditsrootcauses.StatisticsshowthattheincidenceofterrorismandrelatedattackshasdecreasedduetoOperationZarb-e-Azb.

In 2013,therewere574terrorincidents,includingimprovisedexplosivedevices(IEDs)blasts,suicidehitsandmissileattacks.In2014,thenumbercamedownto388,andin2015,itfurtherdeclinedto218.Inshort,terrorincidentsreducedbymorethan50%acrossthecountry,reflectingconsiderable improvement inthesecuritysituation,duetowhich,fromthelastsevenyears,2015hasbeenrelative-lythemostpeacefulyearinPakistan.

Regional pulls on Pakistan

Theyear2015alsowitnessedtheemergenceofIslamicState(IS)orDaeshandincreasingevidenceofitsinroadsintoAfghanistan.3OriginatingfromtheMiddleEast,DaeshisaforceagainstwhichChina,Russia,U.S.andPakistanarealigned.JihadisfromotherterroristgroupsintheAf-PakregionarejoiningDaeshdueto,orasaresultof,itsglobalappeal.ThisisaconcernforPakistanandotherregionalstateswhoseekstabilityforbothAfghanistanandintheregion.

Concurrently,IranianinfluenceisgrowingnotjustintheMiddleEastandAfghan-istanbutglobally.AfterasuccessfulnucleardealwhicheasedsanctionsasTeh-ranrolledbackpartsofitsnuclearprogram,IranhasemergedaskeyactorwiththecapacitytostabilizeordestabilizetheMiddleEast,CentralAsiaandGulfre-gion.IranandSaudiArabiaarearch-rivals.Theirproxybattles,revolvingaroundsectarian identities,haveplayedacrossMuslimscountries,withPakistanalsoabattlegroundfromthe1980sonwards.IranianandSaudigovernmentsprovidedfinancialresourcesandarmstotheirrespectiveproxygroupsinPakistan.ThesegroupsfoughtamongstthemselveswhilethePakistanistatewitnessedthemay-hem.Since1990ssuchproxybattlesbecamemorepronouncedandcomplicated.

2StaffReporter.(2014,November20).Armytargetingallmilitantswithoutdiscrimination:GeneralRaheel.RetrievedMarch26,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/794198/army-to-ensure-ter-rorists-are-unable-to-reestablish-their-base-in-pakistan-coas-tells-us-senators/.3Boghani,P.(2015,November17).ISISisinAfghanistan,ButWhoAreTheyReally?.RetrievedMarch26,2016,fromhttp://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/isis-is-in-afghanistan-but-who-are-they-really/.

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WithgrowingSaudi-Irantensionsin2015overYemen,Pakistanhasbeenwisetoavoid4takingsidesandinsteadhassoughttoreducetensionsbetweentherivalMuslimstatesinordertomitigateturmoilintheregion.

The China Factor

AfterpayinganunimaginablyheavycostPakistanhasrealizedthatsectarianismmustbereinedin.Thisisarealizationaidedbyexternalfactorstoo.Amongtheworldpowers,Chinadoesn’twish5toseeviolentgroupsoperatingandfreelyre-cruitingforjihadthatcanalsodestabilizeitsMuslim-majorityXinjiangregionthatbordersPakistan.Moreover,itistheonlyworldpowerwitharealleverageoverPakistan’s powerfulmilitary due to decades spanning, comprehensive defenceandsecuritycooperation,includinginthenuclearrealm.ChinaisPakistan’slarg-estsupplierofdefenceequipment.ItcantactfullyprodthearmyandPakistan’ssecurityapparatustode-linkitselffromjihadigroupsandworktowardssqueezingspacefortheminthesociety.

Meanwhile,Pakistan’srelationshipwithRussiahasalsodevelopedfurtherinre-cent years. Like China,Moscow can also be a key influence on Pakistan army.MoscowisincentivizingPakistanbyofferingdefense,economicandscientificco-operation6asIndiagetsclosertoUS.PakistanisalsowaryofUSleavingtheregionanddiminishingeconomic andmilitary aid in the coming years. The increasedfootprintofChinaandRussiaintheregion,particularlythesuccessfulimplemen-tationofCPEC,willensure thatPakistanmaintains its importanceboth for thestabilizationofAfghanistan,andasaregionalcounter-weighttoIndia.

India policy and Afghanistan

TheQuadrilateralCoordinationGroup(QCG)comprising,Afghanistan,China,Pa-kistanandtheUnitedStates,haveheldthreeroundsoftalkstochalkoutaroad-mapforcommencingapeaceprocessinAfghanistan.ItisexpectedthatPakistanwillwielditsinfluenceovertheTalibaninsurgencytopushthemforcommencingpeacetalkswithAfghangovernment.Earlier in2015,another initiativetermedas theMurreeprocess collapsedwhen it transpired that leaderof the Talibanmovement,MullahOmarwasdead.Afteran internalstruggleoversuccession,

4Panda,A.(2016,January22).WhyIsPakistanInterestedinBrokeringPeaceBetweenIranandSaudiArabia?.RetrievedMarch26,2016,fromhttp://thediplomat.com/2016/01/why-is-paki-stan-interested-in-brokering-peace-between-iran-and-saudi-arabia/.5Zhou,Z.(2015,October2).China’sDesperateBattleAgainstSeparatistTerrorism.RetrievedMarch26,2016,fromhttp://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/10/02/chinas-desperate-bat-tle-against-separatist-terrorism/.6Rana,S.(2015,November21).PakistanandRussiausherinneweraofcooperation.RetrievedMarch26,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/995578/trade-and-defence-ties-pakistan-and-russia-usher-in-new-era-of-cooperation/.

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itappearsTalibanhavealsodividedintovariousfactions.PakistanhascalledforincludingasmanyTalibangroupsinthepeacetalksaspossible.

TheDecember2015visitofPrimeMinisterModiofIndiatoLahoreformeetinghisPakistanicounterpartwasorchestratedasasurprisevisit.ItsparkedthehopethatreviveddialoguebetweenIndiaandPakistanwillgainmomentum.Inrecentyears,tensionsbetweennuclear-armedneighboursandrivalshaveescalateddan-gerously.However,inDecember2015,thishigh-levelengagementbetweenbothsidesledtoimprovementinrelations.DuringtheIndianExternalAffairsMinister,ShushmaSuraj’svisittoIslamabad,toattendHeartofAsiaConference,PakistanandIndiaannouncedcommencementofacomprehensivedialoguetoaddressallcontentiousissues.DuringPMModi’svisit,bothpremiersannouncedthattheirforeignsectarieswouldmeetinmid-JanuaryandtherespectiveNationalSecurityAdvisors(NSAs)afterthat.

OnthesidelinesoftheClimateChangeSummitinParis,PrimeMinistersofIndiaandPakistanhadabriefconversation.Aweeklater,bothgovernmentsannouncedthattheirforeignsectariesandNSAshadmet inBangkoktodiscusspeaceandsecurity issues.Sincethen,bothNSAs,AjitDovalof IndiaandNasserJanjuaofPakistan,havemaintainedcontact.AftertheterroristattackonIndianairbaseinPathankot,bothNSAsexchangedvitalinformation.Indiashareditsinitialinforma-tionandleadstoPakistanthroughtheNSAmechanism.

InJanuary2016,asprawlingairbaseinPathankotcameunderafourdaylongat-tackfromgunmen.ThisincidenttookplaceaweekafterPMModi’sbriefstop-overinLahore.IndiablamedPakistan-basedJaish-e-Muhammad(JeM)ofcarryingouttheattack.Pakistan,actingoninformationprovidedbyIndia,conductedraidsonJeMcentersanddetaineditsleaderMasoodAzhar.Ontheotherhand,SyedSala-huddin,leaderofUnitedJihadCouncil,agroupactiveinIndiancontrolled-Kash-mirandalsoreceivingsupportfromPakistaninthepast,claimedresponsibilityforthePathankotattack.Theforeignsecretaryleveltalkswerepostponed.

Tominimize the significance of India-centric jihadi groups it is necessary thatIslamabadandNewDelhimakeprogressonbilateralrelations,whichdemandsaneweraofdétente. In recentweeks,Pakistanand Indiahave resumed theirhigh-levelengagements.Itishopedthatdespiteattemptsbyterroristgroupstoderailtalks–likethePathankotairbaseattackinIndia–dialoguewillcontinue.

Tackling violent extremism

PakistanisecurityforcesannouncedinJuly2015,thekilling7ofMalikIshaq,leader

7BBC.(2016,July29).MalikIshaq:PakistanSunnimilitantchiefkilledbypolice.RetrievedMarch26,fromhttp://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33699133.

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ofananti-ShiteterroristgroupnamedLashkar-e-Jhangvi(LeJ).Hewasshotdeadalongwithothertopleaders(11membersintotal)inapoliceencounter.LeJwasinfamousforcommittingsomeoftheworstsectarianattacksinPakistan,andtheeliminationofitstopcommandeffectivelyledtotheweakening,ifnotdismantle-ment,oftheLeJnetworknationwide.

Moreover,Pakistan’ssecurityapparatushasalsocapturednotablecommandersandmembersoftheterroristoutfitTehreek-e-TalibanPakistan(TTP).Thesecom-manders,whofledNorthWaziristanandtookrefugeinvariousurbancenters,in-cludeamongothers,AqalNawab,TTPcommanderforSwat,HafizSanaullahaliasQariZarar,NoorMuhammadandHabibGulofMohmandarea.ThesearrestsalsosignificantlyweakenedtheTTPanditsorganisationinsidePakistan.

InanotherfirstinPakistan’shistory,2015sawthearrestsandchargingofclericswithhatespeechcases.Hundredshavebeenroundedupforincitingpeopletovi-olenceatpublicgatheringsinthecountry.InKasur,aprayerleaderwassentenced tofiveyears’ imprisonmentfordeliveringahatespeechand incitingpeopletoviolenceagainstaparticularsect. InOctober2015,MuftiKifayatullah,aseniorleaderofanIslamistparty,JamiatUlema-i-IslamFazl(JUI-F),wasalsoarrestedfordeliveringahatespeechbytheCounter-TerrorismDepartmentofPunjab.

Theregulationofmadrassas(religiousseminaries)hasbeenslowdespitebeingacriticalcomponentoftheNAP.Withover22,000registeredmadrassahsandanenrollmentofnearly1.5millionstudents,reformingandregulatingallreligiousseminaries inthecountry isaherculeantask. InDecember2015,however,theInteriorMinister told theNationalAssembly that thegovernmenthas reachedanagreementwithclericsonregistrationofseminariesandcommencementofreforms.

Thegovernmentof the southernSindhprovincehas takennewsteps to regu-lateseminaries.InFebruary,2015,itannouncedthatnewmosquesandseminar-ieswillonlybeestablishedafterobtainingpermissionfromHomeDepartment.8 In January, 2016, Sindh government announced to table a new lawwhichwillonlyallow‘Governmentapproved’Fridaysermoninallmosquesoftheprovince.Sindhadministrationbelievesthiswillbeasteptowards‘maintainingsectarianharmony’intheprovince.9

Is strategic thinking changing?

TheslowbutdiscernabletransformationinthePakistanimilitary’sstrategicthink-

8Ayub,I.(2015,February22).Sindhmakespriorpermitmustfornewseminaries,mosques.Re-trievedMarch26,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1165140.9StaffReporter.(2016,January19).SindhplanstoregulateFridaysermon.RetrievedMarch26,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1233902.

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ingisalsoreflectedinthespeechesofitstwocommanders:formerchief,GeneralAshfaqPervezKayani,andthecurrentchief,GeneralRaheelSharif.InhisIndepen-denceDayspeechin2012,whichalsocametobeadefiningspeechfortheeradi-cationofmilitancyandextremismfromPakistan,GeneralKayaniunderscoredthecentralityofIslamtoPakistan.HestressedthatPakistanwascreatedtoestablishanIslamicwelfarestate.HealsosaidIslamandPakistanareinseparableandPaki-stanwasmadeinthenameofIslam.

Incontrast,GeneralSharif’sspeechestohiscommandersin2014 and 2015 es-chewed references to the religious ideologyof Pakistan.General Sharif under-scoredthenationalunityandhighlightedthearmyasrepresentativeofallfourprovinces,andasymbolofnationalism.

Pakistanarmy’smediaarm,theInter-ServicesPublicRelations(ISPR),too,is in-volved in unusual, counter-terror and counter-extremismmedia campaigns in-cludingfundingoffilmsanchoredintheaforementionedthemes.It,forinstance,respondedtothethehorrificAPSattack,withaninspiringsongcarryingames-sageofconvictionandresilienceinthefaceofterrorism.OntheeveofthefirstanniversaryoftheAPSattack,theISPRreleasedamusicaltributetocommemo-rateover130slainchildren,essentiallyamessagefromchildrentoextremistsandthatradicalizationneedstobechallengedthroughknowledgeandeducationforthegreatergood.Significantly,inbothsongs,referencestoIslamicteachingsandscriptureswereabsent.

ThetenuousrestorationofpeaceandstabilityinKarachi,thefinancialcapitalofPakistanisalsoencouraging.Violencehasreducedby70-80%sincethelaunchofRangers-ledparamilitaryoperationinthecity.SecurityforceshavetargetedTTPandAl-QaidaelementsalongwithcriminalnetworksinKarachi.Operationagainstviolentwingsofpoliticalpartiesandthereligiousextremistscontinues,whilethesecurityapparatuscracksdownon‘terrorfinancing’networks.Thecivilsocietyandpoliticalpartieshaveprovidedbroadsupporttothesemeasures.Thereareissuesofhumanrightsabusesandotherchargesofpoliticalbiasbutoverallthepublicopinionisfirmlybehindthemilitaryaction.

Challenges

a)Civil-militaryfissures

Foranypeaceprocesstobesuccessful ithastohavethesupportofPakistan’smilitary,withtheciviliansprincipallyandfirmlyincontrolbutcurrently,thecivil-ianandmilitaryleadershipdespitetherhetoricarenotonthesamepage10with

10NDTV.(2015,September7).PakistanArmyChiefRaheelSharifWarnsIndiaof‘UnbearableCost’ofWar.RetrievedMarch26,2016,fromhttp://www.ndtv.com/india-news/pakistan-army-chief-ra-

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respecttothenecessityofengagementwithIndia.Thecivil-militarydivergencesonIndiahavedeepenedovertheyears.Bothdon’treallyseeeyetoeyeevenontheimplementationoftheNationalActionPlan.

Pakistan’scivilian leadershipneedstoaddressthis loomingdifferenceforprog-resstomaterializeinthepeaceprocess.Butexactlyhowwillciviliansmovefor-wardremainstobeseen.Itisnotevencleariftheyhavegarneredenoughpublicsupport11todrivethisprocess.

b)ReligiousSeminaries

Despitepronouncement,successivegovernmentshavefailedtoinitiatereformsto regularize and regulate seminaries. They are seen as theprimary sourceofindoctrination.Sourcesoftheirfundingarealsonotentirelytransparent.Thegov-ernmenthassofarfailedinreformingthemadariscurricula.Norhasitbeenabletosubjectthemtofinancialauditsandoversight.

Thegovernmentneeds to regulate seminaries andmosque complexes inPaki-stan.Registeringandstreamliningfinancialsourcesofseminariesandmosquesisanimperative.Anymosquesandseminaries,foundtohavelinkswithterroristnetworksshouldbedealtwithironhandandindiscriminately.

Untilseminariesarenotbroughtundercontrol,extremistviolencewillcontinuetoflourish.Thestatemustaimtoachieveeliminationofphysicalmilitantinfra-structure,recruitmentbasesandrecruiters,curtailradicalseminaries,andsuffo-catefundingstreamsthatsupportradicalelementsandmilitantviolence.

c)Youth

Socio-economicmarginalizationofyouthrepresentsanotherchallenge.Present-ly,over60percentofPakistan’spopulation isundertheageof25.Thisyouthbulgeand the lackof socio-economicopportunities for it standsoutbothasathreataswellasanopportunity.Failureof thestatetodeliveressentialpublicservicestotheteemingmillionsofyouthenablesmilitantoutfitstomakeinroadsandrecruityouth.12

heel-sharif-warns-india-of-unbearable-cost-of-war-1214940.11Shahid,S.(2015,December31).Pakistan,Indiacan’tliveasenemies,saysPM.RetrievedMarch26,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1229802.12Yusuf,M.(2014,November).RadicalismAmongYouthInPakistan:HumanDevelopmentGoneWrong?NationalHumanDevelopmentReport.RetrievedMarch27,2016,fromhttp://nhdr.undp.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Moeed-Yusuf-Youth-Radicalisation.pdf.

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d)Balochistan

TacklingBalochistan,thearea-wiselargestprovinceofPakistanborderingIranandAfghanistan,isanotherchallenge.Theprovincehasbeenaffectedbyaformida-bleinsurgencysince2007.Atleastfourseparatistgroups—theBalochRepublicanArmy,BalochLiberationArmy,BalochistanLiberationTigers,andUnitedBalochArmy—operate against the state. Theyhave targetedmilitary andparamilitarypersonnelandinstallations,andsettlersfromotherprovinces.Inrecentyearsfed-eralgovernmenthasinvestmentinlaw-enforcementagenciesofBalochistanandhavealsoprovidedresourcesforeconomicupliftoftheregion.

Since2013,Balochistangovernment,andmilitarycommandershaveworkedintandemtobringstability intheprovincebuthumanrightsviolationshavealsotaken place further angering the local population. Government has expressedwillingnesstocommencedialoguewiththerebelgroups.StabilityandpeaceinBaluchistanisvitalforPakistantosuccessfullyimplementplansbeingmadeun-derCPEC.Balochistanisalsohometothedeep-seaportofGwadar,whichisthestartingpointofCPECinPakistan.

e)IndianStrategy

Duetocontinuedtensionsandbilateralmistrust,PakistanmilitarystillconsidersIndiaasanexistentialthreat.GeneralSharifhaswarnedIndiaofan‘unbearablecost’ ifwaroccurs.ThemilitaryalsocontinuestoconsiderKashmirasthecoredisputebetweenbothstates.Thus,India-centricjihadigroupsremainactiveandtheyhavebeenmakinginroadsinPakistan’smainstreampoliticssincethemilitarybelieves,bymainstreamingthem,itcanneutralizethem,butwillitsucceed?

f)JusticeSystem

Pakistan’soutdatedcriminaljusticesystem–theBritisheraCrPC1860-requiresanurgentreform.Massivependency,long-drawnandexpensivelitigationresultinextremely lowconvictionrates.Federalgovernmentshouldsupportcapacitybuilding,and reformofallorgansof thecriminal justicesystem including judi-ciary,police,andprosecution.Prosecutionservicesandthepoliceneedstoberevampedandprovidedresources.

g)Economy-OrientedNationalSecurityPolicy

Concurrently,fromamilitaristicnationalsecuritystrategy,Pakistanismovingto-wardsaneconomy-orientednationalsecuritypolicy.TheCPECframework,energyengagementwithRussiaandcommencementofTAPIgaspipelineareindicatorsofthenewpolicyfocus.Thisfocus,forthefirsttime,disengagesPakistanfrom

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usingjihadigroupsasforeignpolicytoolsintheregion.Thisisacriticalshift,andmustbeseentoitslogicalconclusion.

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10.2: OPINION: Recommendations on the Path Forward by Zeeshan Salahuddin

TheagendaitemsontheNationalActionPlan(NAP)areneithernewnornovel.MultipleversionsoftheseideashadexistedforquitesometimebutNAP,forthefirsttime,consolidatedthemallintoacomprehensivedocument.Themaindiffer-encethistimeisthestrong,across-the-boardpoliticalwillthatdrovethischange,undoubtedly fueledand reinforcedbya strongmilitarypush.However, shouldthispoliticalwillfail,falterorfade,Pakistancanslipbackintothestarkviolenceofthepastfifteenyears.

Second,thereseemstobeaconcertedeffortbythegovernmenttobringallpar-ties on-board, and especially to appease the religious hardlinerswith politicalmuscle.Whilethesearegoodmeasuresforbuildingconfidenceandpresentingaunitedfrontinthefaceofanunrelentingenemy,thecounterterrorismnarra-tivenecessitatesrelentlessfocusandcompletestateownership.TherulingpartyPMLN,forbetterorworse,istheexecutivebranch,withallthepowersandpriv-ilegesthatcomewiththatterritory,anditneedstotakecommendofthecoun-terterrorcampaignandthedevelopmentofthealternatenarrativerootedintheConstitutionofPakistan.

Third,themilitaryisastable,well-oiledinstitutioninPakistanwithalong-stand-inghistoryoffrictionwithciviliancounterparts.Ithas,andcontinuesto;renderinvaluablesacrificesforpeaceanderadicationofterrorism.However,militaryin-tervention is a surgical, short-term solution toeliminate thephysical presenceoftheenemyandamanifestationofthehardpowerof thestate.Themilitaryisnota long-termpeacekeepingforcethatcanbedeployedinpopulationcen-tersinperpetuity.Terrorismhastobefoughtbythegovernmentdirectly,andthenextstepsneedtorevolvearoundstrengtheningandcapacitatingcivilianlawen-forcementagencies,unitsanddepartments,aswellaslegislativereformstocloseloopholesinthelegalsystem.Westilldiscernhugedeficitasfarasthesoftpowerofthestate–commitmenttoruleof law,educationandskills’development,aswellasconsciouslaw-basedeffortsagainstradicalandcriminalnon-stateactors–areconcerned.

Fourth,afullthirteenmonthsintotheimplementationofNAP,thecoordinatedoperationagainstthebannedoutfitJaish-e-Mohammad(JeM)inJanuary(follow-ing theoutfit’s alleged involvement in theattackon thePathankotAirBase inIndia),showsthehighlyselectivenatureofactionstakenagainstproscribedor-ganizations.Additionalresearchalsorevealsthataddinganorganization’snametoalistofbannedoutfitsaccomplisheslittleotherthantosimplymakeacatchyheadlineforone24-hournewscycle.Thegovernmentneedstobeunrelenting,uncompromisingandunbiasedinitsimplementationofallstipulationswithinthe

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NAP.

Fifth,thegovernmentneedstoimmediatelyandurgentlyconductadetailedcen-susofthecountry.Wehavebeenextrapolatingondatafromthelastcensusnear-ly twodecadesago.Anentiregenerationhasgrownup in the interimandthecountryurgentlyneedsafreshdatabaseforfutureplanning.

Sixth,symptomatictreatmentofissuesiscounter-productive.Blockingwebsites,shuttingdownmobileservice,roundingupAfghanrefugeesenmasse,blockingmillions of SIMs inter alia are all steps that arguably provide temporary relief.Thestateneedstosomberlyconsiderlong-termsolutionsforriddingsocietyofintolerance,extremismandradicalization.Thiswilltakeconcertedeffortstotar-getandeliminatetheideologicalpresenceoftheextremistnarrative,notjustthephysicalhideoutsandfightingmilitants.

Seventh,inanycounterinsurgencyeffort,oneofthemostimportant,pivotalandvitaltoolatthestate’sdisposalisfootintelligencedowntoindividualstreetsandneighborhoods.Footintelligenceformsthecornerstoneofcounter-terrorismop-erationsandefforts,andcannotbeimplementedwithoutempoweringandinstat-inglocalgovernmentmechanisms.

The following policy recommendations are not exhaustive but may hopefullyserveasarecommendedstartingpointinaverylongfightahead.

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10.3: Individual Policy Recommendations by Zeeshan Salahuddin and Imtiaz Gul

10.3.1LegislativeReformsandLegalRecommendations

1. Legislativereformsareneededtoimprovetheailingandextremelytardycriminaljusticesystem.ArestructuredcriminaljusticesystemiscriticaltorealizeNAPgoals.SpecificallytheCriminalProcedureCode(CrPC),thePe-nalCodeandtheEvidenceActneedtoberevampedandcontemporized.

2. SpecificallywithintheEvidenceAct,thefocusneedstoshiftfromwitnesstestimonytoforensicevidence.

3. Judges, lawyers, witnesses and prosecutors need to be provided fool-proofsecuritytomitigatethe“revolvingdoor”natureofcourtsforhard-enedcriminalsandmilitants.

4. TheapplicationoflegalrulestovariousregionsofPakistanisunclear.Theinteriorministrymustclarifythelegalconveyerbeltthatdictatesinter-ventionintermsofregularlawenforcement,anti-terrorismoperations,ornon-internationalarmedconflict.Thisalsorequires,forthelongterm,gradualeliminationofaberrationssuchasFCR,PATARegulations,In-Aid-ofCivil-PowerAct(FATA),andalignmentofmultipleanti-terrorlegislationsuchasAntiTerrorAct(1997)andPakistanProtectionAct.

5. Boththeciviliangovernmentandthemilitaryestablishmentmuststandbehindallthoseresponsibleforlawenforcementandmilitantpacificationmust.A“stateofwar”doesnotinanywaywarrantacarte blanche,thesecurityapparatusthereforeshouldremainsubjecttostrictaccountabili-tyinordertoavoidhumanrights’violations.

10.3.2Kineticvs.IdeologicalWarfare

1. Thereisaclearandpresentneedtogobeyondphysicaleliminationofex-tremists.Thestateneedstodraftalong-termplanthattargetstheideo-logicalrootsofthisconflict.Thisplanneedstobehelmedbycivilianlawenforcementanddrivenbytheconsciousrealizationthatupholdingtheruleoflawisthekeytofightingandneutralizingnon-statecriminalandterroristelements.

2. KineticoperationshavereducedterrorisminPakistantoagreatextent,butmilitary intervention inpopulation centers is neitherdesirablenorsustainable. The stateneeds to reinforce, equip and capacitate civilian

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lawenforcementagencies(see10.3.3CivilianLawEnforcementRecom-mendationsbelow).

3. Additionally,oncetheseareashavebeencleared,mollifiedorpacified,whatisthegovernment’splanwhenitishandedthereinsback?Howwillitensurethecontinuedsafetyandsecurityofresidentsoncethemilitaryexits?

4. Thegovernmentmuststopopen-endedpolicyplanningandexecution.Themilitarycourtshavebeengivenatwo-yeartermwhichexpiresinJan-uary2017andtheIDPshavebeengivenatimeframeforrehabilitation.However,mostoftheotherNAPpointsareopen-ended.Thisdoesnothelp intime-boundplanning and conclusiveexecution.Actions againstterror and crime as well as against religious extremism require to beclearlydefinedandtime-lined.

5. TheprogressoneachindividualitemintheNAPseemspiecemealandad hoc;thereseemstobenocentralimplementationplanforwhichstepsneedstobetaken,why,whenandinwhatorder.Thismustchange.

6. The solution to an underperforming police force is not parallel count-er-terrorismforces.Thereneedstobeacentralcivilian-controlled,civil-ian-ledlawenforcementagencyattheprovinciallevel.Allothersneedtobeabsorbedintothisstructure.

10.3.3CivilianLawEnforcementRecommendations

1. Counterterrorismoperationsacrossthecountryarecurrentlythedomainof themilitary, and for good reason.However, stepsmustbe taken todramaticallyincreaseboththecoordinationwithandtheparticipationofcivilianlawenforcementofficialsandunitsintheseefforts.

2. Thecivilianlawenforcementagencieshavetotakecontrolofthesitua-tioninthepopulationcenters.Communitypolicingisnotthejobofthemilitary,RangersortheFC.Thefactthattheyhavetokeepthepeaceisaclearindicationofthefailureofthecivilianstructures.

3. De-politicizationofthepolice,asexemplifiedbytheKPgovernment, isabsolutelyparamount.Thepolicechiefneedstobeappointedonmerit,andhemusthaveutmostoperationalautonomy-appointments,trans-fers,decisionsinkeylawenforcement-withoutfearoforfavourtothegovernmentorpoliticalparty.

4. Allanti-terrorframeworkssuchasNISP,NAP,NACTA,POPA,ATA,needtobeconsolidatedintoonecohesivestructurethatisthenmandatedand

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pursuedrelentlessly.

5. ThepoliceacrossPakistanshouldhaveauniformedservicestructureandbegovernedbyanationallaw.Additionally,respectiveprovincialpoliceforcesshouldbeadaptedaccordingtolocalconditions.

6. “Thanaculture”i.e.high-handednessofpoliceofficialsatthepolicesta-tions needs to be ruthlessly dismantled through ccountability mecha-nisms.

7. Effectivecounter-terrorismwouldrequirevariouscivilianandmilitaryin-telligenceagenciestoworkinunisonratherthanworkatcross-purposesinanefforttooutdooneanother.

8. NACTAremainsastillbornbaby,andneedstobefunded,empoweredandcapacitated.Eitherthat,ordismantle itandacceptthatperhapsthis isnottheidealtimeorcircumstancesforsuchanentity.

10.3.4HateSpeechandProscribedOutfitsRecommendations

1. Pakistanneedsmorecomprehensive lawstocontrolandpunishcrimessuchashatespeech, incitementtoviolence,andmisuseof laws inthenameofreligion.Strictlawenforcementandcontinuousmonitoringofallinstancesofhatemongering,beitincorporatemeetingoratthepulpit,holdthekeytodeterpotentialoffenders.

2. Theseminaryregistrationandmechanismtomonitortheiractivitiesandsourceoffinancinghasstillalongwaytogo.Thisprocessneedstotakeintoaccountthefacttherearesignificantsocialandeconomicreasons,inadditiontoreligiousones,thatforceparentstosendtheirchildrentotheseinstitutions.

3. Allfundingforanyreligiousinstitution,beitalibrary,mosqueorsemi-nary,needstobehandledthroughbankswithapropertrail.Hundi/Ha-walaneedstobesystematicallydismantled.

4. Seminariesmustalsoincludeworldlyeducationincludingotherlanguag-es,sciences,humanitiesandarts,inadditionaltoreligioustraining.Thecurriculamustbestate-approved.Violatorsofanyof these regulationsneedtobearrestedbylocalpolice,andtrialedbylocalprosecutorsandcourts.

5. Well-documentedinstancesofhatred,bigotry,andextremistvaluesmustbescrubbedfromallcurricula inbothpublicandprivatesectorinstitu-tions,andreplacedwithmessagesoftolerance,acceptance,andrespect-fulcoexistence.

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6. TheFourthScheduleneedstobeupdatedregularlyandimplementedinletterandspiritforanyandallproscribedorganizationsandoutfits.

7. Proscribedorganizations lists shouldbeexpanded tocontainnamesofallprominentfigureswithinsaidorganizations,beregularlyupdatedanddisseminatedtoalllawenforcementagenciesandunits.

10.3.5Local/RegionalConflictsRecommendations

1. FATA’sissues,especiallyFCRanditsstatusrequirestobedealtwithonanemergencyfooting.SpecificallytheBritishcolonialeraFCRneedstobereplacedwithCrPCandPC(which,aswehavementionedearlier,them-selvesneedreform).

2. Karachi’slawenforcementagenciesneedtoberevamped,retrained,re-equipped and re-capitated tomanage the sprawling urbanmetropoliswithoutaidfrommilitaryorparamilitaryunits.Politicalmilitancyneedstobesystematicallydismantled,andfutureoccurrencesdeterredthroughstringentlegislativemeasures,ifneeded.

3. ThestateneedstomainstreamialoguewithBalochistanandcontinuevig-orouslyaddressinggrievancesoftheBalochpeople.

4. Relationswith India need to normalize through amore pragmatic ap-proachbecausethatholdskeytorelationswithAfghanistantoo.

5. IndianStudiesdepartmentsneedtobeestablishedatbothpublicandpri-vatesectorinstitutions.Despiteanearly70yearhistoryofpaintingIndiaasthearch-nemesis,therearenodedicatedIndianStudiesdepartmentsanywhereinPakistan.

6. PakistanneedstodoitsutmosttostabilizeAfghanistan,andinvolvema-jorstakeholders(US,India,China,Russia,Iran)intheprocess.WithoutastableAfghanistan,therecanbenostabilityintheregion.

7. Finally, the national security policy needs to have economic underpin-nings.ThroughtheChinaPakistanEconomicCorridor,BeijinghasgivenPakistanatangible,economic,sustainablereasonforstabilizingthecoun-try,andtoactivelypursuelong-termpeace.Thestatemustcapitalizeonthis game-changing opportunity and leverage it to drive Pakistan’s so-cio-economicdevelopmentinthecomingdecades.

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AnneX I: eXecUTIons

# NameDate of Hanging

City of hang-ing

Charges and Year

1 AqeelAhmad 12/19/14 Faisalabad AttackonGHQ

2 ArshadMahmud 12/19/14 FaisalabadAttackonGen.Musharraf

3 GhulamSarwar 12/21/14 FaisalabadAttackonMusharrafconvoy

4 RashidMehmood 12/21/14 FaisalabadAttackonMusharrafconvoy

5 ZubairAhmed 12/21/14 FaisalabadAttackonMusharrafconvoy

6 AkhlaqAhmad 12/21/14 FaisalabadAttackonMusharrafconvoy

7 NiazMohammad 12/31/14 PeshawarAttackonGen.Musharraf

8 GhulamShabbir 01/07/15 MultanMurderedDSP+1[2000]

9 AhmedAli 01/07/15 MultanMurdered3civilians[1998]

10 KhalidMahmud 01/09/15 RawalpindiAttackonGen.Musharraf

11 ZulfikarAli 01/13/15 Rawalpindi AttackonUSconsulate

12 BehramKhan 01/13/15 Karachi Murderofanadvocate

13 M.ShahidHaneef 01/13/15 SukkurMurderofadef.min.official

14 MohammadTalha 01/13/15 SukkurMurderofadef.min.official

15 KhaleelAhmad 01/13/15 SukkurMurderofadef.min.official

16 MushtaqAhmad 01/13/15 Faisalabad AttackonMusharraf

17 NawazishAli 01/13/15 Faisalabad AttackonMusharraf

18 ArifZahid 01/15/15 Lahore Murderedthreecops

19 SaeedAwan 01/15/15 Karachi MurderedDSP/son

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20 IkramulHaq 01/17/15 LahoreMurderedImambargahguard

21 Attaullah 02/03/15 KarachiMurderedaShiadoctor

22 MuhammadAzam 02/03/15 KarachiMurderedaShiadoctor

23 FayyazAhmed 02/13/15 MirpurAJKMurderedadvocate’sson

24 MuhammadRiaz 02/13/15 MirpurAJKMurderedadvocate’sson

25MuhammadSid-dique

03/12/15TobaTekSingh

Murderedthreemen

26 MuhammadAkhtar 03/13/15 FaisalabadMurderedfather-in-lawofrapevictim

27 MuhammadSajid 03/13/15 Faisalabad Murderedwoman

28 ZafarIqbal 03/17/15 MultanRaped/Murderedminor

29 MuhammadFaisal 03/17/15 KarachiMurderedduringrobbery

30 MuhammadAfzal 03/17/15 KarachiMurderedduringrobbery

31 MuhammadNawaz 03/17/15 FaisalabadMurderedtworela-tives

32 M.NadeemZaman 03/17/15 RawalpindiMurderedfourfamilymembers[1998]

33 MuhammadJaved 03/17/15 RawalpindiMurderedfemalecous-ins

34 MuhammadIqbal 03/17/15 GujranwalaMurderedoverfamilydispute

35 MuhammadRiaz 03/17/15 JhangMurderedoverfamilydispute[1995]

36 MuhammadSharif 03/17/15 JhangMurderedduringrobbery

37 MubashirAli 03/17/15 JhangMurderedduringrobbery

38 RabNawaz 03/17/15 Mianwali Murderedwoman

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39 ZafarIqbal 03/17/15 MianwaliMurderedownfather[2003]

40 GhulamM. 03/18/15 JhangMurderedbrother-in-law

41 ZakirHussain 03/18/15 JhangMurderedoverperson-aldispute

42 AsadKhan 03/18/15 Attock Murderedfive

43 TahirShabir 03/18/15 Lahore Murder

44 ShafaqatAli 03/18/15 FaisalabadMurderedtwobroth-ers[1998]

45 MuhammadSyed 03/18/15 FaisalabadMurderedtwobroth-ers[1998]

46 ShaukatAli 03/18/15 Rawalpindi Murder

47 M.Shabbir 03/18/15 Rawalpindi Murder

48 RabNawaz 03/18/15 Rawalpindi Murder

49 TalibHussain 03/18/15 Rawalpindi Murder

50 AhmedNawaz 03/18/15 Mianwali Murder

51 AbdulSattarKhan 03/19/15 Mianwali Murder[1992]

52 GhulamM. 03/19/15 RawalpindiMurderedtworela-tives[1996]

53 M.Asghar 03/19/15 RawalpindiMurderedtworela-tives[1996]

54 GulistanZaman 03/19/15 RawalpindiMurderedcivilian[1998]

55 M.Nasrullah 03/24/15 MultanMurderedoverfamilydispute[1994]

56 AyubBashir 03/25/15 Lahore Murder

57 ShahbazAli 03/25/15 SahiwalMurdered7-year-oldboy[1998]

58 JalalMurejo 03/25/15 SukkurMurderedcousin[1997]

59 AbdulRazzaq 03/25/15 SukkurMurdered7thgradestudent[2001]

60 GhulamYaseen 03/25/15 BahawalpurMurderedandrapedwoman[2001]

61 MohammadKhan 03/25/15 Mianwali Murder

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62 MuhammadAfzal 03/26/15 FaisalabadMurderedoveroldrivalry[1995]

63 AkramulHaq 03/31/15 AttockMurdered/Kinapped3-yearoldgirl

64 M.Ameen 03/31/15 Adiala Murder[1998]

65 HussainShah 03/31/15 MianwaliMurderedtwobroth-ers[2000]

66 MuhammadRiaz 03/31/15 Sargodha Murderedtwomen

67 JafaraliasKali 04/07/15 sahiwal Murderedtwosiblings

68 TayyabGhulamNabi 04/07/15 Lahore Murder[2002]

69 AmirHamza 04/08/15 Machh Murder[1995]

70 Sikandar 04/08/15 Bahawalpur Murder

71 HamidMehmood 04/09/15 LahoreMurderedjuvenileforransom

72 RajaMushtaq 04/09/15 Rawalpindi Murderedtwocivilians

73 LonayKhan 04/14/15 Bahawalpur Murder

74 Ejaz 04/16/15 Gujranwala Murder[1995]

75 AbdulJabbar 04/16/15 Gujranwala Murder[2001]

76 ZafarIqbal 04/16/15 FaisalabadMurderandRobbery[2005]

77 Qaiser 04/16/15 Rawalpindi Murder

78 Majid 04/16/15 Rawalpindi Murderedsixpeople

79 ManzoorVasli 04/18/15 VehariMurderedpolicecon-stable[2001]

80 AllahRakha 04/21/15 Lahore Murder[1996]

81 GhulamNabi 04/21/15 Lahore Murder

82 MohammadAzam 04/21/15 FaisalabadMurderedsevenin-laws[2004]

83 NizamDin 04/21/15 FaisalabadMurderedthreepeo-ple[1998]

84 MohammadHusain 04/21/15 FaisalabadMurderedthreepeo-ple[1998]

85 Nauman 04/21/15 Sialkot Rape[1999]

86 Saleem 04/21/15 Sialkot Rape[1999]

87 ZafarUllah 04/21/15 Gujranwala Murderedfour

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88 LatifMehdi 04/21/15 Gujranwala Murderedfour

89 InayatUllah 04/21/15 Gujranwala Murderedseven

90 LiaquatAli 04/21/15 Sahiwal Murder[1998]

91 RajaRaees 04/21/15 Rawalpindi Murderedthree[1998]

92 SultanaliasRaja 04/21/15 Multan Murder[2000]

93 AzharMahmood 04/21/15 Gujrat Murder[1995]

94 RiazAhmad 04/21/15 Quetta Murder[2004]

95 MohammadRizwan 04/22/15 LahoreMurderedsixpeople[2006]

96 MoazzamKhan 04/22/15 Lahore Murder[1995]

97ZahidHussainCho-han

04/22/15 SahiwalMurderedpolicecon-stable[2001]

98 MohammadNazeer 04/22/15 Bahawalpur Murder[2001]

99 MuhammadHanif 04/23/15 Sahiwal Murder[2006]

100 GulMohammad 04/23/15 Sargodha Murder[1999]

101 MunirHusain 04/28/15 VehariMurderednephew/niece[2000]

102 AbdulGhafoor 04/29/15 VehariMurderedandraped8-year-old[1991]

103 ZulfiqarAli 05/06/15 Lahore Murderedtwo[1998]

104 SaulatMirza 05/12/15 Machh Murderedthree[1997]

105 AhmedKhan 05/17/15 Lahore Murder[2008]

106 Zulfiqar 05/20/15 FaisalabadMurderedtaxidriver[2000]

107 MuhammadMusa 05/20/15 Machh Murder[2005]

108 AijazaliasJajji 05/21/15 Gujranwala Murder[1998]

109 ShaukatMasih 05/21/15 Faisalabad Murder[2000]

110 Abbas 05/21/15 Multan Murder[1996]

111 Ehsaan 05/23/15 Lahore Murder

112 Arshad 05/23/15 Lahore Murderedtwo[1991]

113 AbdulGhaffar 05/23/15 Multan 114 MuhammadWazir 05/23/15 Sahiwal Murder

115 ShakilAnees 05/26/15 Lahore Murder[1998]

116 SherAli 05/26/15 Lahore Murderedtwo[2001]

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117 IftikharAhmad 05/26/15 Faisalabad Murderedthree[2001]

118 AsifZaib 05/26/15 Faisalabad Murder[1998]

119 Ishaq 05/26/15 Sahiwal Murder

120 MohammadNawaz 05/26/15 Gujranwala Murder

121 RanaFaryad 05/26/15 Multan Murder

122 MohammadAfzal 05/26/15 Jhelum

123 AmjadAli 05/26/15 SargodhaMurderedniece,wit-nesses;rapedniece

124 NoorAhmad 05/26/15TobaTekSingh

Murderedsixfamilymembers

125 SardarIbrahim 05/26/15 Machh Murder[2003]

126 AbdulKhaliq 05/27/15 Lahore Murder

127 Shehzad 05/27/15 Lahore Murder

128 MuhammadKhan 05/27/15 MachhMurderedbrother/nephew[2004]

129 Sanaullah 05/27/15 VehariMurdered/kidnappedminor

130 AbdulSattar 05/27/15 Vehari Murdered/rapedgirl

131 NaseerAhmad 05/27/15 Gujrat Murder[2002]

132 FaisalMahmood 05/27/15 Gujrat Murder[2000]

133 ShahsawarBaloch 05/28/15 HyderabadHijackedaPIAplane[1998]

134 SabirBaloch 05/28/15 HyderabadHijackedaPIAplane[1998]

135 ShabbirBaloch 05/28/15 KarachiHijackedaPIAplane[1998]

136 MehmoodAli 05/28/15 KarachiMurderedminor[2002]

137 MalikKhurram 05/28/15 Haripur Murder

138 MuhammadAfseer 05/28/15 Attock Murder[1998]

139 MuhammadAshraf 05/28/15 Sahiwal Murderedtwo[2000]

140 AmeerAbdullah 05/28/15 Sargodha Murder[2002]

141 MuradAli 05/30/15 Sargodha 142 MuhammadKhan 06/02/15 Sargodha Murderedtwo[2002]

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143 KhizerHayat 06/02/15 Mianwali Murder[1998]

144 MuhammadSarwar 06/02/15 SahiwalMurderedwoman[1993]

145 ChanZeb 06/02/15 Attock Murderedtwo

146 AbdulRehman 06/02/15 Adiala 147 JavedaliasJeeda 06/03/15 Lahore Murderedtwo[1987]

148 ShamsulHaq 06/04/15 Lahore Murder[1999]

149 FatehMuhammad 06/04/15 Mianwali Murderedtwo[1999]

150 Sanaullah 06/09/15 Sialkot 151 MohammadAbid 06/09/15 Faisalabad 152 NawazaliasKaka 06/09/15 Sahiwal 153 AbidMaqsood 06/09/15 Sialkot 154 AftabBahadurMasih 06/10/15 KotLakhpat Murderedthree[1992]

155 TariqaliasTara 06/10/15 KotLakhpat Murder[1995]

156 Name unknown 06/10/15 Faisalabad Murderedfive

157 ShahidShafiq 06/11/15 Faisalabad Murder[1996]

158 GulMuhammad 06/11/15 Haripur Murder

159 KhizerHayat 06/15/15 Multan 160 Mukhtar 06/16/15 Lahore Murder[2004]

161 JawedSultan 06/16/15 Rawalpindi Murder[1990]

162 MuhammadRafiq 06/16/15 Rawalpindi Murder[1990]

163 IkramHussain 06/16/15 Rawalpindi Murder[1990]

164 AllahDitta 06/16/15 FaisalabadMurderedwoman[1999]

165 MohammadYounas 06/16/15 Faisalabad Murderedthree[2000]

166 Ashraf 06/16/15 GujranwalaMurdered/raped12-year-oldgirl[1999]

167 Basharat 06/16/15 Sialkot Murderedthree[1999]

168 GhulamRasool 06/16/15 Bahawalpur Murderedthree

169 AsgharAli 06/16/15 BahawalpurMurderednephew[2000]

170 AbdurRauf 06/16/15 Jhelum Murder

171 Name unknown 06/16/15DeraGhaziKhan

Murder

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172 NabeelAhmed 06/17/15 Faisalabad Murder[2000]

173 MuhammadSaleem 06/17/15 Faisalabad Murder[1998]

174 MuhammadRashid 06/17/15 Faisalabad Murder

175 MohammadAslam 06/17/15 Mianwali 176 Fayaz 06/17/15 Sahiwal Murder

177 Qaiser 06/17/15 Sahiwal Murder

178 MuhammadIqbal 06/17/15 Gujrat Murder

179 FarooqBabar 07/26/15 Multan Murder1988

180 KarimNawaz 07/26/15 Multan Murder[1999]

181 QariShamsulIslam 07/27/15 Peshawar 182 AkhtarHussain 07/28/15 Multan 183 Karim 07/28/15 Attock 184 MuhammadSafdar 07/29/15 Attock Murderedtwo[2003]

185 AftabAhmed 07/29/15 Attock Murder[1998]

186 MohammadUsman 07/29/15 Attock Murder[1998]

187 MohammadTufail 07/29/15 Kasur Murderedtwo[2001]

188 MohammadNawaz 07/29/15 Sargodha Murder[2002]

189 NayyarAbbas 07/29/15 Multan Murder[1996]

190 GulfamaliasGullu 07/29/15 Gujrat Murder[2001]

191 AhmadDin 07/29/15 Jhang Murder

192 MuhammadTariq 07/30/15 Sargodha Murder[2000]

193 MuhammadArshad 07/30/15 Rawalpindi Murder[2002]

194 JahandadKhan 07/30/15 Rawalpindi Murder[2002]

195 IsrarAhmad 07/30/15 Bahawalpur Murder[2002]

196 SamarJohn 07/31/15 Lahore Murder/kidnapping

197 NadeemShehzad 07/31/15 Lahore Murder/kidnapping

198 RiazYousuf 07/31/15 LahoreMurderedwoman/her4kids[1999]

199 ZafarIqbal 07/31/15 Rawalpindi Murder

200 MohammadAshraf 07/31/15 Rawalpindi Murder

201 ShafqatHussain 08/04/15 Karachi Murder/kidnapping

202 LaghirMaseeh 08/04/15 Sialkot Murder/kidnapping

203 GhulamRasool 08/04/15 Gujrat Murder[2000]

THE NAP TRACKER


204 AmanullahKhan 08/05/15 Mianwali Murderedthree[2006]

205 M.RiazKhan 08/05/15 Mianwali Murderedthree[2006]

206 M.MumtazKhan 08/05/15 Mianwali Murderedthree[2006]

207 WaqaraliasMithu 08/05/15 Gujranwala Murderedfive[2000]

208 TariqIlahi 08/06/15 Gujranwala Murder[2001]

209 Inamullah 08/06/15 Lahore Murder[1996]

210 ShafaqataliasAshfaq 08/06/15 Lahore Murder

211 GhulamShabbir 08/08/15 Multan Murder[2000]

212 AbdulQayyum 08/18/15 Sahiwal Murderedthree[1999]

213 AmjadAli 08/19/15 Gujranwala Murder[1998]

214 BashirAhmad 08/20/15 Gujranwala Murder[1999]

215 ZulfiqaraliasNanna 08/25/15 BahawalpurMurderedfourpolice-men[1997]

216 ShahidMehmood 08/26/15 Karachi Murderedtwo[1998]

217 TajammalAbbas 08/26/15 Bahwalpur Murder/rape[2004]

218 MaqboolHussain 08/27/15 MultanMurderedsixpeople[1996]

219 MohammadAshraf 09/01/15 Sahiwal Murder[1994]

220 JummaKhan 09/01/15 Bahawalpur Murder[2000]

221 ZahoorHussain 09/02/15 Jhelum Murderedthree[1992]

222 ArshadMehmood 09/02/15 Jhelum Murder[2005]

223 AjmalaliasPathar 09/02/15 Bahawalpur Murder[2001]

224 MuhammadKhan 09/03/15 Bahawalpur Murder[1995]

225 MuhammadBoota 09/03/15 Bahawalpur Murder[2003]

226 FaqeerMuhammad 09/03/15 Bahawalpur Murder[2004]

227 MaqboolaliasQulli 09/03/15 Kasur Murder/kidnapping

228 MohammadSadiq 09/05/15 Sahiwal Murder[1999]

229 MuhabatAli 09/09/15 Vehari Murder[2001]

230 MuhammadBashir 09/09/15 Vehari Murder[2001]

231 MubashirHassan 09/09/15 Adiala Murder[1999]

232 AslamSial 09/09/15 Bahawalpur Murder[1992]

233 TanzilAhmad 09/10/15 Lahore Murder[2005]

234 AsifaliasAchoo 09/10/15 Vehari Murder[1998]

THE NAP TRACKER


235 MuhammadKhalid 09/10/15 Faisalabad Murder[1999]

236 AbdulShakoor 09/10/15 Bahawalpur Murder[2001]

237 AllahDitta 09/16/15 Lahore Murder

238 HajiShabbir 09/16/15 Haripur Murder[1996]

239 MuhammadAshfaq 09/16/15 Faisalabad Murder[1999]

240 Imran 09/22/15 Lahore Murder

241 AnsarIqbal 09/29/15 Sargodha Murder[1994]

242 MuhammadAnwar 09/29/15 Gujranwala Murder[2002]

243 Mushtaqs/oNawaz 09/30/15 Lahore Murder[2002]

244 MuhammadIkhlaq 10/01/15 Faisalabad Murderedtwo[2001]

245 ShaukatAli 10/01/15 Faisalabad Murderedtwo[2001]

246 MuhammadAkram 10/03/15 Sahiwal Murderedthree[2002]

247 Idrees 10/06/15 Lahore Murder[1997]

248 MuhammadAnees 10/10/15 Bahawalpur Murder[1997]

249 MohammadAzam 10/13/15 GujratMurderedfather-in-law[1999]

250 MohammadAslam 10/13/15 GujratMurderedfather-in-law[2000]

251GhulamQadir/Haid-er

10/13/15 BahawalpurMurderofrelatives[2002]

252 GhulamSarwar 10/13/15 BahawalpurMurderofrelatives[2003]

253ThanedaraliasThe-noo

10/13/15 BahawalpurMurderedwife/father-in-law[2001]

254 MohammadAkram 10/13/15 Sialkot Murder[2000]

255 MohammadAshraf 10/13/15 Attock Murder

256 Akrams/oWaleed 10/13/15 Multan Murder[1992]

257 MohammadShafeeq 10/13/15 MultanMurderedduringtheft[1992]

258 RanaM.Aslam 10/14/15DeraGhaziKhan

Murderedwife[1996]

259 GhulamMustafa 10/14/15 FaisalabadMurderedwoman[2001]

260 Younas 10/14/15 Gujrat Murder[2002]

THE NAP TRACKER


261 Suleman 10/14/15 GujratMurder/kidnapping[1998]

262 Shafiq 10/14/15 GujratMurder/kidnapping[1998]

263 MohammadHassan 10/15/15 Bahawalpur Murderedtwo[2005]

264 Zaman 10/15/15 MultanMurderedPunjabCM[1993]

265 Zareen 10/15/15 Rawalpindi Murderedtwo

266 RabNawaz 10/15/15 Rawalpindi Murder

267 GhulamAkbar 10/15/15DeraGhaziKhan

Murder[1996]

268 HazoorBaksh 10/15/15DeraGhaziKhan

Murder[1996]

269 AbdulSami 10/15/15 Lahore Murder

270 AnwarShamim 10/15/15 Lahore Murder

271 IdreesAli 10/17/15 Sialkot Murder[2001]

272 KhalilAhmad 10/20/15 Lahore Murder[2002]

273 Nadeem 10/20/15 Lahore Murder[1999]

274 AmjadAli 10/20/15 Attock Murderedtwo[2002]

275 MuhammadBashir 10/20/15 Attock Murder[1998]

276 AleeqShah 10/20/15 Attock Murder[2001]

277 MohammadFarooq 10/20/15 Sargodha Murder[2003]

278 Mustafa 10/20/15 Bahawalpur Murderedsix[2000]

279 MohammadAkram 10/20/15 Faisalabad Murder[2000]

280 MohammadSaeed 10/20/15 Faisalabad Murder[2003]

281 KhalilAhmad 10/20/15 Kasur Murder[2003]

282 Munirs/oNazir 10/21/15 Lahore Murder

283 AsfarAli 10/21/15 Mianwali Murder

284 Fiaz 10/21/15 Bahawalpur Murderedson-in-law

285 Saif 10/21/15DeraGhaziKahn

Murderedtwo

286 QamaruzZamanJatt 10/21/15TobaTekSingh

Murder

THE NAP TRACKER


287 AbdulMajeed 10/27/15DeraIsmailKhan

Murderedtwo[2002]

288 MohammadAzam 10/27/15 Bahawalpur Murderedtwo[1999]

289 ImtiazHussain 11/02/15 Sahiwal Murder

290 Ikram 11/03/15 Kasur Murder[1998]

291 NisarAhmed 11/03/15 Gujrat Murderedtwo[2000]

292 GhazanfarIqbal 11/03/15 Gujrat Murderedtwo[2000]

293 MohammadAnnar 11/03/15 Gujrat Murderedtwo[2000]

294 MuhammadRana 11/03/15 Gujrat Murder

295 MohammadIrshad 11/04/15 Bahawalpur Murder[1999]

296MuhammadNa-deem

11/12/15 Bahawalpur Murder[1997]

297 KhadimHussain 11/18/15 Bahawalpur Murder[2003]

298 MuhammadYounas 11/29/15 Lahore Murder[2001]

299 AbdusSalam 12/02/15 Kohat APSAttack[2014]

300 HazratAli 12/02/15 Kohat APSAttack[2014]

301 MujeeburRehman 12/02/15 Kohat APSAttack[2014]

302 SabeelYahya 12/02/15 Kohat APSAttack[2014]

303 PervezKhan 12/10/15 Attock Murder[2000]

304 Rustam 12/10/15 Attock Murder[2003]

305 MuhammadIshaq 12/10/15 Jhelum Murder[2006]

306 M.AkramRahi 12/12/15 Faisalabad Murder[1996]

307 MansoorAhmed 12/12/15 Lahore Murder[2009]

308 ZafarIqbal 12/13/15 Sialkot Murder[1996]

309 Khalid 12/13/15 Sialkot Murder[1996]

310 ManzoorHussain 12/16/15 Multan Murder[2003]

311 MuhammadTahir 12/16/15 Multan Murder[2003]

312 AzizUrRehman 12/16/15 Bahawalpur Murder[2002]

313 AkhtarAli 12/16/15 Bahawalpur Murder[2002]

314 MuhammadAzam 12/16/15 Gujrat Murder[2004]

315 IftikharAhmed 12/16/15 Gujrat Murder[2004]

316 Nadeem 12/16/15 Sialkot Murder[2001]

THE NAP TRACKER


317 MuhammadIqbal 12/16/15DeraGhaziKhan

Murder[2004]

318 ZahidMahmood 12/16/15DeraGhaziKhan

Murder[2005]

319 MukhtarAhmed 12/16/15 Gujrat Murder[2004]

320 MuhammadIshaq 12/17/15 Faisalabad Murder[1992]

321 LiaqatHussain 12/17/15 Faisalabad Murder[1992]

322 Ahmad 12/17/15DeraGhaziKhan

Murder[1999]

323 MuzharHussain 12/18/15 Rawalpindi Murder

324 Dilawer 12/18/15 Rawalpindi Murder

325 MuhammadAnwar 12/18/15 Vehari Murder[1993]

326 SarfarazArif 12/18/15 Vehari Murder[1996]

327 NaveedAhmed 12/18/15 Attock Murder[2002]

328 ZahoorAhmed 12/20/15 Lahore Murder[2002]

329 MukhdoomGujjar 12/20/15 Lahore Murder[2003]

330 NoorSaeed 12/30/15 Kohat Terrorism

331 MuradKhan 12/30/15 Kohat Terrorism

332 InayatullahKhan 12/30/15 Kohat Terrorism

333 Israruddin 12/30/15 Kohat Terrorism

334 SirajulHaq 12/30/15 Kohat Terrorism

335 AbdulRashid 01/12/16 Bahawalpur Murder[2004]

336 SardarAli 01/12/16TobaTekSingh

Murder[1993]

338 RizwanKiyani 01/12/16 Rawalpindi Murder[1995]

341 AllahDitta 01/13/16 Jhang Murder[1999]

337 SajidHameed 01/14/16 Sialkot Murder[2003]

340 MuhammadSultan 01/16/16 Attock Murder[2007]

339 GhulamJilani 01/19/16 Mianwali Murder[2004]

342 AnwarKhan 01/20/16 Sahiwal Murder[1993]

343 HakimKhan 01/20/16 Jhelum Murder[2004]

344 NoorKhan 01/20/16 Sahiwal Murder[2003]

345 MuhammadAkram 01/20/16 Sahiwal Murder[1999]

THE NAP TRACKER


AnneX II: The TwenTy PoInTs In The nATIonAl AcTIon PlAn

1. Implementationofdeathsentenceofthoseconvictedincasesofterror-ism.

2. SpecialtrialcourtsunderthesupervisionofArmy.Thedurationofthesecourtswouldbetwoyears.

3. Militantoutfitsandarmedgangswillnotbeallowed tooperate in thecountry.

4. NACTA,theanti-terrorisminstitutionwillbestrengthened.

5. Strictactionagainsttheliterature,newspapersandmagazinespromotinghatred,decapitation,extremism,sectarianismandintolerance.

6. Allfundingsourcesofterroristsandterroristoutfitswillbefrozen.

7. Thedefunctoutfitswillnotbeallowedtooperateunderanyothername.

8. Establishinganddeployingadedicatedcounter-terrorismforce.

9. Endtoreligiousextremismandprotectionofminoritieswillbeensured.

10. Registrationandregulationofreligiousseminaries.

11. Banonglorificationofterroristsandterroristorganisationsthroughprintandelectronicmedia.

12. AdministrativeanddevelopmentreformsinFATAwith immediatefocusonrepatriationofIDPs.

13. Communicationnetworkofterroristswillbedismantledcompletely.

14. Concretemeasuresagainstpromotionofterrorismthroughinternetandsocialmedia.

15. Noroomwillbeleftfortheextremisminanypartofthecountry.

16. OngoingoperationinKarachiwillbetakentoitslogicalend.

17. Balochistangovernmenttobefullyempoweredforpoliticalreconciliationwithcompleteownershipbyallstakeholders.

18. Actionagainstelementsspreadingsectarianism.

19. FormulationofacomprehensivepolicytodealwiththeissueofAfghanrefugees,beginningwithregistrationofallrefugees.

20. Reformsincriminalcourtssystemtostrengthentheanti-terrorisminsti-tutionsincludingprovincialCIDs.1

1NACTA.20PointsoftheNationalActionPlan.RetrievedMarch02,2016,fromhttp://www.nacta.gov.pk/NAPPoints20.htm.

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AnneX III: DeATh PenAlTy oFFenses1. Murder–Section301ofPakistanPenalCode(PPC)

2. Aggravatedmurder–Sec302ofPakistanPenalCode(PPC)

3. Robberyresultingindeath–Sec396ofPPC

4. Bearingfalsewitnessintendingorknowingtheaccusedmaybeconvictedofacapitaloffence,ifaninnocentpersonisconvictedandexecutedasaresult–Sec194ofPPC

5. Actstostriketerrororcreateasenseoffearandinsecurity…resultingindeath

6. Haraabah–Sec15oftheOffencesAgainstProperty(EnforcementofHu-dood)Ordinance,1979

7. Ascheduledoffencelikelytocreateterrorordisruptsectarianharmony–Sec7oftheAnti-TerrorismAct,1997

8. Hijacking–Sec402-B,CofPPC

9. Sabotageoftherailwaysystem–Sec127oftheRailways(Amended)Act,1995

10. Rape–Sec6oftheOffenceofZinaOrdinance(EnforcementofHadood),1979

11. Gangrape–Sec10(4)oftheOffenceofZinaOrdinance(EnforcementofHadood),1979

12. Strippingawoman’sclothes–Sec354-AofPPC

13. Abductiontosubjectsomeonetounnaturallust–Sec12oftheOffenceofZinaOrdinance(EnforcementofHudood),1979

14. Kidnappingorabductionofminor–Sec364-AofPPC

15. Kidnappingforransomorextortion–Sec365-AofPPC

16. Importing,exportingintoandfromPakistandangerousdrugs–Sec13oftheDangerousDrugsAct,1930

17. Importing,exportinginter-provinciallyormanufacturingdrugs–Sec14oftheDangerousDrugsAct,1930

18. Drugsmuggling–Sec9oftheControlofNarcoticsSubstancesAct,1997

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19. Adultery–Sec5oftheOffenceofZinaOrdinance(EnforcementofHa-dood),1979

20. Hightreason–Sec2oftheHighTreasonAct,1973

21.WagingorabettingwaragainstPakistan–Sec121ofPPC

22.Mutinyandsubordination–Sec31ofthePakistanArmyAct,1952

23. Abetmentofmutiny–Sec132ofPPC

24. Giving up military passwords, intentionally using unassigned militarypasswords–Sec26ofthePakistanArmyAct

25. Offencesinrelationtoenemy,treachery,mutiny,andcowardice–Sec24ofthePakistanArmyAct,1952

26. Armstrading–Sec13-A(1)ofthePakistanArms(Amendment)Ordinance,1996

27. Blasphemy–295-CofPPC1

1Deathpenaltyoffences.(2015,November26).RetrievedFebruary16,2016,fromhttp://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/death-penalty-offences/.

THE NAP TRACKER


AnneX IV: mIlITAry coUrT VerDIcTs1. NoorSaeed-sentencedtodeath

2. HaiderAli-sentencedtodeath

3. MuradKhan-sentencedtodeath

4. InayatUllah-sentencedtodeath

5. IsrarudDin-sentencedtodeath

6. QariZahir-sentencedtodeath

7. Abbass-sentencedtolifeimprisonment1

8. HazratAli-sentencedtodeath

9. MujeeburRehman-sentencedtodeath

10. Sabeel-sentencedtodeath

11. AbdusSalam-sentencedtodeath

12. TajMuhammad-sentencedtodeath

13. AteequrRehman-sentencedtodeath

14. Kifayatullah-sentencedtolifeimprisonment

15. MuhammadFarhan-sentencedtodeath2

16. SaidZamanKhan-sentencedtodeath

17. ObaidUllah-sentencedtodeath

18. Mehmood-sentencedtodeath

19. ZubairMuhammad-sentencedtodeath

20. RabNawaz-sentencedtodeath

21. MuhammadSohail-sentencedtodeath

22. MuhammadImran-sentencedtodeath

23. AslamKhan-sentencedtodeath

24. JameelurRehman-sentencedtodeath

25. JamshedRaza-sentencedtolifeimprisonment3

1 (2015,April02).Militarycourtsannouncedeathsentencesofsixconvicts.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1173472/.2 (2015,August13).Armychiefapprovesdeathsentencesof7terrorists:ISPR.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1200269.3 (2015,September21).COASconfirmsdeathpenaltytonine‘hardcore’terrorists.RetrievedMay

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26. MuhammadSabirShah-sentencedtodeath

27. HafizMuhammadUsman-sentencedtodeath

28. AsadAli-sentencedtodeath

29. Tahir-sentencedtodeath

30. FatehKhan-sentencedtodeath

31. AmeenShah-sentencedtolifeimprisonment4

32. MuhammadGhauri-sentencedtodeath

33. AbdulQayyum-sentencedtodeath

34. MuhammadImran-sentencedtodeath

35. AksanMehboob-sentencedtodeath

36. AdbulRaufGujjar-sentencedtodeath

37. MuhammadHashim-sentencedtodeath

38. Sulaman-sentencedtodeath

39. ShafqatFarooqi-sentencedtodeath

40. MuhammadFarhan-sentencedtodeath5

06,2016,fromhttp://arynews.tv/en/coas-confirms-death-penalty-to-nine-hard-core-terrorists/.4 Yousaf,K.(2015,September3).Terrortrial:Militarycourtscondemnfiveterroriststodeath.Re-trievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/949809/terror-trial-military-courts-con-demn-five-terrorists-to-death/.5 Syed,B.(2016,January16).Armychiefratifiesdeathsentenceofnineterrorconvicts.RetrievedMay06,2016,http://www.dawn.com/news/1230185.

THE NAP TRACKER


AnneX V: ProscrIbeD orgAnIzATIons by The InTerIor mInIsTry # Organization Proscription Date

1. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi(LeJ)August15,2001

2. Sepah-e-MuhammadPakistan(SMP)August15,2001

3. Jaish-e-Muhammad(JeM)January22,2002

4. Lakhar-e-Taeba(LeT)January22,2002

5. Sepah-e-SahabaPakistan(SSP)January22,2002

6. Tehreek-e-JaafriaPakistan(TJP)January22,2002

7. Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammad(TNSM)January22,2002

8. Tehreek-e-IslamiJanuary14,2002

9. AIQaedaMarch18,2003

10.Millet-e-IslamiPakistan(Ex-SSP)November15,2003

11. Khuddam-ul-Islam(ExJeM)November15,2003

12. IslamiTehreekPakistan(Ex-TJP)November15,2003

13. Jamiat-ul-AnsarNovember20,2003

14. Jamiat-ul-FurqanNovember20,2003

15. HizbutTehrirNovember20,2003

16. Khair-un-NasInternationalTrustNovember29,2004

17. BalochistanLiberationArmy(BLA)April12,2006

18. IslamicStudentsMovementofPakistanAugust30,2006

19. Lashkar-e-IslamAugust22,2008

20. Ansar-ul-IslamAugust22,2008

THE NAP TRACKER


21. HajiNamdarGroupAugust22,2008

22. Tehreek-e-TalibanPakistan(TTP)August25,2008

23. BalochistanRepublicanArmy(BRA)October2,2010

24. BalochistanLiberationFront(BLF)October2,2010

25. Laskhar-e-Balochistan(LeB)October2,2010

26. BalochistanLiberationUnitedFront(BLUF)October2,2010

27. BalochistanMusllaDefaTanzeem(BMDT)October2,2010

28. ShiaTulabaActionCommitteeApril16,2011

29.MarkazSabeelOrganizationsApril16,2011

30. TanzeemNaujawana-e-AhleSunnat(TNA)April16,2011

31. PeoplesAmanCommitteeApril16,2011

32. AhleSunnatWalJamaat(ASWJ)(exSSP)February15,2012

33. AIHarmainFoundation(AHF)March6,2012

34. RabitaTrust(BT)March6,2012

35. Anjuman-e-ImamiaGilgitBaltistanApril24,2012

36.MuslimStudentsOrganization(MSO)April24,2012

37. TanzeemAhl-e-SunnatWalJamaat,GilgitBaltistanSeptember7,2012

38. BalochistanBunyadParastArmySeptember7,2012

39. TehreekNafaz-e-AmanSeptember7,2012

40. TahafuzHadudullahSeptember7,2012

41. BalochisanWajaLiberationArmySeptember7,2012

42. BalochRepublicanPartyAzadSeptember7,2012

43. BalochistanUnitedArmySeptember7,2012

THE NAP TRACKER


44. IslamMujahidinSeptember7,2012

45. Jaish-e-Islam(JI)September7,2012

46. BalochistanNationalLiberationArmySeptember7,2012

47. Khana-e-HikmatGilgitBaltistanMarch13,2013

48. Tehrik-e-TalibanSwat(TTS)March15,2013

49. Tehrik-e-TalibanMohmand(TTM)March15,2013

50. TariqGeedarGroup(TGG)March15,2013

51. AbdullahAzamBrigadeMarch15,2013

52. EastTurkmenistanIslamicMovement(ETIM)March15,2013

53. IslamicMovementofUzbekistan(IMU)March15,2013

54. IslamicJehadUnion(IJU)March15,2013

55. 313BrigadeMarch15,2013

56. Tehrik-e-TalibanBajaur(TTB)March15,2013

57. AmarbilMaroofWaNahiAnilMunkirMarch15,2013

58. BalochStudentsOrganizationsAzad(BSO-A)March15,2013

59. UnitedBalochArmy(UBA)March15,2013

60. JeaySindhMuttahidaMahaz(JSMM)March15,2013

61. IslamicState(IS)August27,2015

THE NAP TRACKER


ANNEX VI: LAWS PERTAINING TO MINORITIESHindu Disposition of Property Act 1916

AnActtoremovecertainexistingdisabilitiesinrespectofthepowerofdisposi-tionofpropertybyHindus,forthebenefitofpersonsnotinexistenceatthedateofsuchdisposition.SubjecttothelimitationsandprovisionsspecifiedinthisAct,nodispositionofpropertybyaHindu,whetherbytransferintervivosbywill,shallbe invalidby reasononly thatanyperson forwhosebenefit itmayhavebeenmadewasnotinexistenceatthedateofsuchdisposition.12

Hindu Gains of Learning Act 1930

AnActtoremovedoubtastotherightsofamemberofaHinduundividedfamilyinpropertyacquiredbyhimbymeansofhislearning.InthisAct,unlessthereisanythingrepugnantinthesubjectorcontext,”acquirer”meansamemberofaHinduundividedfamily,whoacquiredgainsoflearning;“gainsoflearning”meansallacquisitionsofpropertymadesubstantiallybymeansoflearning,whethersuchacquisitionsbemadebeforeorafterthecommencementofthisActandwhethersuchacquisitionsbetheordinaryortheextraordinaryresultofsuchlearning;and“learning”meanseducation,whetherelementary,technical,scientific,specialorgeneral,andtrainingofeverykindwhichisusuallyintendedtoenableapersontopursueanytrade,industry,professionoravocationinlife.3

Hindu Inheritance (Removal of Disabilities) Act 1928

AnActtoamendtheHinduLawrelatingtoexclusionfrominheritanceofcertainclassesofheirs,andtoremovecertaindoubts.NotwithstandinganyruleofHinduLaworcustomtothecontrary,nopersongovernedbytheHinduLaw,otherthanapersonwhoisandhasbeenfrombirthalunaticoridiot,shallbeexcludedfrominheritanceorfromanyrightorshareinjoint-familypropertybyreasononlyofanydisease,deformityorphysicalormentaldefect.45

1THEHINDUDISPOSITIONOFPROPERTYACT,1916.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://punjab-laws.gov.pk/laws/64a.html.2TheHinduDispositionofPropertyAct,1916.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://pakistancode.gov.pk/english/UY2FqaJw2-apaUY2Fqa-apic-sg-jjjjjjjjjjjjj-con-2718.3 THEHINDUGAINSOFLEARNINGACT,1930.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://www.irispun-jab.gov.pk/chartsShowing.aspx?lnk=http://202.166.162.26:8929/Items/Law/THE%20HINDU%20GAINS%20OF%20LEARNING%20ACT,%201930.pdf4THEHINDUINHERITANCE(REMOVALOFDISABILITIES)ACT,1928.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://punjablaws.gov.pk/laws/139a.html.5THEHINDUINHERITANCE(REMOVALOFDISABILITIES)ACT(1928).RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://displacementsolutions.org/wp-content/uploads/THE-HINDU-INHERITANCE-REMOV-AL-OF-DISABILITIES-ACT-1928.pdf.

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Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act 1929

AnActtoaltertheorderinwhichcertainheirsofaHindumaledyingintestateareentitledtosucceedtohisestate.6

Hindu Marriage Disabilities Removal Act 1946

AnActtoremovecertaindisabilitiesanddoubtsunderHinduLawinrespectofmarriagesbetweenHindus.

Hindu Married Women’s Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act 1946

AnActtogiveHindumarriedwomenarighttoseparateresidenceandmainte-nanceundercertaincircumstances.7

Hindu Widows Re-Marriage Act 1856

TheHinduWidows’RemarriageActXVof1856waspassedwhichenabledwid-owstomarryagain.AnActtoremovealllegalobstaclestothemarriageofHinduWidows.8

Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act 1937

AnacttoamendtheHinduLawtogivebetterrightstowomeninrespectofprop-erty.9

Sindh Hindu Heirs Relief Act 1866

Anacttolimittheliabilityofason,grandsonorheirofdeceasedHinduforthedebtsofhisancestor,andtheliabilityofthesecondhusbandofHinduwidowforthedebtsofherdeceasedhusband,andotherwisetoamendthelawofdebtorandcreditor.10

(PDF2002)Protection of Communal Properties of Minorities Communities Rules 2003

6THEHINDULAWOFINHERITANCE(AMENDMENT)ACT,1929.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://punjablaws.gov.pk/laws/141a.html.7THEHINDUMARRIEDWOMEN’SRIGHTTOSEPARATERESIDENCEANDMAINTENANCEACT,1946.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://pakistancode.gov.pk/english/UY2FqaJw2-apaUY2Fqa-cJed-sg-jjjjjjjjjjjjj-con-2254.8HinduWidowsRe-marriageAct,1856.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://pakistancode.gov.pk/english/UY2FqaJw1-apaUY2Fqa-apc%3D-sg-jjjjjjjjjjjjj.9THEHINDUWOMEN’SRIGHTSTOPROPERTYACT,1937.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://pa-kistancode.gov.pk/english/UY2FqaJw2-apaUY2Fqa-b5%20V-sg-jjjjjjjjjjjjj-con-1535.10SINDACTNo.VIIOF1866.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://sindhlaws.gov.pk/setup/publica-tions/PUB-14-000090.pdf.

THE NAP TRACKER


Anypersonintendingtopurchase,sellortransferanypropertyshallapplytotheGovernment,forthegrantofN.O.C.,givingallrelevantdetailofparticularsandinformation.SuchpersonshallalsoprovideanyotherinformationordocumentsasmayberequiredbytheGovernmentforprocessingofhisapplication.Here,“Government”meanstheFederalGovernmentintheMinistryofMinorities,Cul-ture,Sports,TourismandYouthAffairs.

Protection of Communal Properties of minorities Ordinance 2001

Itistoprotectthepropertiesofminoritycommunitiesmeantfortheircommunaluse.11Itprovidesforbanonsaleortransferofminoritycommunities’properties.“Property”inthisordinancemeansplacesofworship,monasteries,seminaries,vicarages,dharamshalas,goashalas,burialplaces,communitycentres,aswellassocialwelfare,educational,healthandrecreational institutionsmeantforcom-munaluseofminoritycommunities.Alsoincludessidebuildings,vacantplaces,lands,residentialplacesorofficesannexedtosaidproperties.12

Christian Marriage Act 1872

AnAct to consolidateandamend the law relating to the solemnizationof themarriageofpersonsprofessingtheChristianreligion.13

Paris Marriage and Divorce Act 1936

AnActtoamendthelawrelatingtomarriageanddivorceamongParsis.1415

11PROTECTIONOFCOMMUNALPROPERTIESOFMINORITIESORDINANCE,2002.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://pakistancode.gov.pk/english/UY2FqaJw2-apaUY2Fqa-apaUY2Frb-Z4=-sg-jjjjjjjjjjjjj-con-9739.12ProtectionofCommunalPropertiesofMinoritiesOrdinance,2001(No.5of2002).RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=63797&p_classification=01.05.13CHRISTIANMARRIAGEACT,1872.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://www.punjabcode.pun-jab.gov.pk/public/dr/CHRISTIAN%20MARRIAGE%20ACT,%201872.doc.pdf.14ACTNO.:IIIOF1936.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://www.clcbd.org/law/171.html.15AnActtoamendthelawrelatingtomarriageanddivorceamongParsis.RetrievedMay06,2016,fromhttp://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/pdf_part.php?id=168.

About CRSS

The Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) is an independent, non-profit, and non-partisan advocacy, program implementation and research organization based in Islamabad. It seeks to promote an informed discourse on crucial socio-political, economic and security issues confronting Pakistan. It strives to realize its goals through a vast array of activities including widely disseminated analyses on national and regional security issues, counter-terrorism and counter-extremism advocacy and conflict monitoring.

Center for Research & Security Studies

Islamabad office:House # 36-B,St # 30, F-8/1, IslamabadTel: +92-51-8314801-03Fax: +92-51-8314804Email: [email protected]. www.crss.pk

Peshawar Office:Flat # 306, 3rd Floor,Badshah Tower, Bara Road,Peshawar CanttTel: 091-5252310 091-5252311

Quetta office:Plot # 06, Flat F1,Commercial Area,Farooq plaza,Jinnah Town, Quetta.Tel: 081-2863741

The NAP Tracker is an attempt to empirically deconstruct the government progress on National Action Plan (NAP), and try and determine if it is sufficient, comprehensive and most importantly, effective. The report also calls upon a range of experts, columnists and researchers to weigh in on the various themes related to the NAP.

Center for Research & Security Studies, IslamabadHouse # 36-B, St # 30, Sector F-8/1, IslamabadTel: 92-51-831 4801-03, Fax: 92-51-831 4804

E-mail: [email protected], Web: www.crss.pk

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