hierarchy domination nature bookchin's historical social theory

8/3/2019 Hierarchy Domination Nature Bookchin's Historical Social Theory

1/32

10.1177/1086026602250217 ARTICLEORGANIZATION &ENVIRONMENT/March2003White/HIERARCHY,DOMINATION,NATURE

HIERARCHY, DOMINATION, NATURE

Considering Bookchins Critical Social Theory

DAMIAN FINBAR WHITE Goldsmiths College, University of London

Theworkof Murray Bookchinstands as one ofthe most ambitious attemptsin recent timesto produce a post-Marxist criticalsocialtheory that places ecologicalconcerns at itscore. Thisarticle argues that this richly elaborated theory has highlighted the distinct limitations of high modernist formulations of historical materialism and liberalism. However, it is alsomaintained that Bookchinsorganic society thesis and his theorising about social hierar-chy, social domination, and the domination of nature ultimately suffer from significant theoretical and empirical inconsistencies. Bringing Bookchins more valuable insightsinto dialogue with the recent interface between historical-geographical materialismand poststructuralism, a dynamic, discontinuous view of eco-social relations is recom-mended that recognises that human societies are always involved in the production, repro-duction, and enframing of disruptive, active, and generative natures. How forms of socialdomination relate to these processes is viewedas complex, contingent,and spatially andhis-torically varied.

Keywords: Bookchin; social ecology; production of nature; David Harvey; historical geo-graphical materialism

BOOKCHIN AND CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY

The work of Murray Bookchin has stimulated a series of wide-ranging debatesover the past two decades. From environmental ethics (Albrecht, 1998; Eckersley,1989, 1992; Fox, 1989; Light, 1993) to debates in democratic and utopian theory(Clark, 1986, 1998; Gundersen, 1998; Luke, 1999) and from concerns about thefuture of libertarian thought (Marshall, 1992; Watson, 1996) to debates about therelationship between ecological thought and feminism (Cochrane, 1998; Salleh,1996, 1997), Bookchins provocative interventions have inspired a variety of criti-cal assessments. With a few notable exceptions (see Best, 1998; Light, 1993;Mellor, 1992; Rudy, 1998), however, surprisingly little detailed attention has beengiven to Bookchins overall effectiveness as a social theorist. There are good rea-sons to believe that this constitutes an oversight that needs to be corrected.

Bookchin pioneered a form of urban-ecological critique that reoriented criti-calsocial theory to place at centrestage the reified anddehumanized forms of mod-

ernurbanism(seeBookchin,1965,1974,1987)and theenvironmentallyhazardousdynamics of a grow or die capitalist economy (see Bookchin, 1962, 1971a,1980c, 1982). It is little exaggeration to say that perhaps more than any other post-war thinker, these prescient demands anticipated the central agenda of contempo-

Organization & Environment , Vol. 16 No. 1, March 2003 34-65DOI: 10.1177/1086026602250217 2003 Sage Publications

34

Authors Note: Theauthor would liketo thankTedBenton,Geoff Robinson,SarahFriel,and the twoanonymous reviewers for Organi-zation & Environment for feedback and encouragement on earlier versions of this article.


2/32

raryeco-leftist social theory. Perhaps the most interesting and provocative aspect of hiswork is theseries of conceptual andexplanatoryrevisions he hassought to maketo critical socialtheory.Significantly anticipating recentfeminist and post-Marxist

critiques of economic reductionism (e.g., Bourdieu, 1977; Fraser, 1997; Giddens,1981; Laclau& Mouffe, 1985),Bookchin hasmaintained a focus on theemergenceand consolidation of social hierarchy and social domination that gives rise to a farmore profound explanation of humanitys estrangement from itself and from thenatural world than that offered by historical materialism. His work has gone onfrom this to pose a further challenge to what William Leiss (1972) has identified asone of the most crucial concepts in the intellectual biology of the modern Westthe idea of the mastery or domination of nature (p. 12). Via a bold sequential reor-dering of the Frankfurt schools engagement with this issue, Bookchin has con-tested theview that theantagonism between society andnature is historicallyinevi-table.Rather, it is maintained that thevery idea that humanity must dominate naturehas its roots in an earlier moment of social domination itself (Bookchin, 1965a,1982, 1990b).

There is no doubt that the result of this inquiry is that Bookchin offers a bold andimpressive example of historically informed grand social theorising. Richly elabo-rated, subtly executed, and containing numerous stimulating digressions, we arepresented with a narrative of epic proportions and considerable ambition. But doesthe end result hang together?

The aim of this article is to grapple with this question. We begin by demonstrat-ing how Bookchins theory of social ecology develops through a critique of Marx-ism and liberalism. Bookchins reconstructed position is then outlined and criti-cally interrogated. 1

Although the virtues of Bookchins social theory are noted, I argue that prob-lems immediately emerge with his crucial thesis of the organic society. The con-sistency of Bookchins depiction of early humanity found in The Ecology of Free-dom (Bookchin, 1991) and Remaking Society (Bookchin, 1990b), the extent towhich it is adequately backed up by anthropological evidence, and the broadercoherence of his arguments are critically scrutinized. I also examine whetherBookchins social hierarchy thesis is theoretically coherent. In the final part of the article, I argue that Bookchins more salvageable insights, particularly hismorequalified positiondevelopedin recent works, needto be drawn intodialoguewith the increasingly rich dialogue that has opened up of late between historical-geographical-materialism andpoststructuralism (Braun & Castree, 1998;Castree,1995, 2002; Harvey, 1996, 2000; Lefebvre,1991; Peet & Watts, 1996; Smith,1984,1996, 1998; Soja, 1989, Swyngedouw, 1999).

As such, thecentral contribution this article seeks to make to current scholarshipon Bookchin is threefold. It seeks to advance a discussion of his work that movesbeyond therather personalisedandvitriolic assessments that have come to predom-

inate of late. Second, it argues for a critical social theory of the environment thatpays as much attention to space and geographical variations as to time and histori-cal change. Finally, this article seeks to move discussions of social ecology beyondthe increasingly problematic terrain of radical ecology. As a result, this article con-tributes to an ongoing revisionistproject that is attempting to think thecontoursof acritical social theory of the environment beyond radical ecologism (see White,2002, in press).

White / HIERARCHY, DOMINATION, NATURE 35


3/32

Marxism and Bourgeois Sociology

In many respects, Bookchins social theory has developed through a critical

engagement with liberalism and Marxism. Although Bookchin emerged out of aMarxist tradition (see Bookchin, 1999) and his work has persistently maintainedsympathies with Marxs analysis of capitalism, from the mid-1960s onwards, hiswritings nevertheless take a distinctly critical turn away from the mainstream of Marxist theory. The task identified though is not to abandon Marxism or annul itbut to transcend it dialectically (Bookchin, 1971b, p. 199).

Bookchins earlier essays from the 1960s are particularly concerned with thesociological and political limitations of Marxism-Leninism (e.g., Bookchin,1971a, 1971b). 2 Yet they are still informed by an underlying commitment to theseminal insights (Bookchin, 1971b, p. 232) of historical materialism. It is only inlater essays (Bookchin, 1980a, 1980c, 1982, 1990b) that we can find a more funda-mental critique being posed against Marxs own thinking and the Marxist traditionmore broadly for absorbing some of the most questionable tenets of Enlighten-ment thought (Bookchin, 1980a, p. 195).

Three key moments in Bookchins Frankfurt style critique of Marx (and histori-cal materialism more generally) can be isolated (Bookchin, 1980a, 1980b, 1982).First, Bookchin argues that a central failing of Marx is the manner in which he con-verges with Enlightenment thought in adopting a scientistic conception of socialreality. What follows from this is that Marx objectifies the revolutionary project,divesting it of all ethical goals and content. Social reality and its trajectory areexplained in terms that remove human visions, cultural influences, and ethicalissues from the social process as the focus turns to objective laws acting behindhuman wills (Bookchin, 1980a, p. 198). According to Bookchin, in sidelining nor-mative issues, Marx is left without a credible normative criterion to judge historicaldevelopment.

A secondrelated momentof reductionis identified with theconceptualisationof man as homo faber . Distinguishing man from other animals simply to the extentthat human beings work on nature to produce their means of subsistence is seen asensuring that Marx essentially ends up dealing with manas a force in theproduc-tive process. Citing Marxs declaration in The German Ideology that menarewhatthey produce andhow they produce (Bookchin, 1980a,p. 203), Bookchinsuggeststhat this provides a stunningly impoverished view of humanity. Rather than viewhumanity in classic Aristotelian terms as zoon politikon , a being possessed of voli-tion and ethical purpose that attains fulfillment in the polis , for Marx, men aremerely the personification of economic categories, the bearers of particular classinterests. Humanity is thus reduced to an instrument of production (Bookchin,1980a, p. 203). More generally, this adherence to a metaphysics of labour simplyensures that Marxs social theory provides a technologically and economically

reductionist view that is blind to the importance of culture, ideology, and otherrealms of human experience beyond the production processes.Perhaps the central and most damning criticism that Bookchin has made of his-

toricalmaterialism, though, is thesuggestionthat Marxultimately reduces domina-tion to the status of a natural fact. It is the conquest of a stingy nature that Marxcelebrates (andlaterthat Adorno and Horkheimer,1979, lamented) that is neverthe-less viewed as the central and unavoidable feature of historical development.Noting the remarkable convergence that can be found here between Marxism andliberal ideology, Bookchin (1980a) argues that domination is annexed to libera-

36 ORGANIZATION & ENVIRONMENT / March 2003


4/32

tion asa preconditionfor socialemancipation(p. 200). Bookchin claimsthatMarxsees nature as simply an object for mankind, purely a matter of utility (p. 202),andprogress is simplyreduced to themaximisationof theforces ofproduction.

According to Bookchin (1980a), the consequence of this incrediblyreductionist framework (p. 203) is a determinist and Eurocentric view of historicchange in historicalmaterialism. For Marx, class society remains unavoidable aslong as the mode of production fails to provide the material abundance necessaryfor human emancipation. Consequently, Bookchin (1982, citing Horkheimer inThe Eclipse of Reason ) notes that socialism now involves not only the subjugationof external nature (human and nonhuman) but internal human nature as well.Revealing Victorian arrogance at its worst (p. 87), Bookchin argues we can alsofind in Marx a complete disregard forthe non-Europeananda patentneglect ofthevital pre-history that the non-Western world had elaborated over millennia of development (p. 87). Thus, the anomaly emerges of capitalisms greatest critic inThe Grundrisse , heralding the great civilising influence of capital (p. 202) as itspreads elsewherearound the world. 3 It is theunderlying idea, though, that societymust dominate nature, an ideology that is seen as embraced byMarx andthe liberalpolitical economists but found as far back as Aristotles seeming conflictbetween the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom, that is seen as need-ingserious scrutiny: Bookchin argues that this idea hasbeen used ideologically to

justify domination in virtually every aspect of life (p. 10).

From Social Classes and the State toSocial Hierarchy and Social Domination

Itisin TheEcology of Freedom (Bookchin, 1982, 1991) in which we canfind themostcomprehensive elaboration of Bookchins alternative position.Here,breakingfrom both Marxist and anarchist orthodoxies, and denoting Bookchins debt toWeber, it is argued that the analytic primacy of both social class and the statenow needs to be superseded in critical socialtheory by theconceptsof socialhierar-chy and social domination. The concept of hierarchy is introduced by Bookchin(1982) as cultural, traditional and psychological systems of obedience and com-mand, not merely . . . economic or political systems (p. 4).

Bookchin argues that the concept of social hierarchy includes Marxs defini-tion of class but goes beyond it. In addressing complex systems of command andobedience in which elites enjoy varying degrees of control over their subordi-nateswithoutnecessarily exploiting themin an economic fashionthesecatego-ries areseen as expanding our critical horizons. Bookchin (1982) argues that this isthecase insofar as they aspire to address some fairly fundamental failings of Marx-ism and critical theory, notably the failure to recognise that hierarchy and domina-tion could easily continue to exist in a classless or stateless society:

I refer to the domination of the young by the old, of women by men, of one ethnicgroup by another, of masses by bureaucrats who profess to speak in their highersocialinterest, of countrysideby town, andin a more subtlepsychologicalsense,of body by mind, of spirit by a shallow instrumental rationality and of nature bysociety and technology. (p. 4)

More broadly, such categories are seen as important for historical inquirybecause it is argued there are good reasons to believe that forms of socialhierarchyand domination preceded class societies. A credible exploration of the roots of the



5/32

idea that humanity must dominate nature must explore the very roots of domina-tion. Yet to do this, we need to go well beyond the horizons and understandingofferedby Dialectic of Enlightenment (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1979). Returning to

the historical roots of these pathologies in early human society will reveal that thevery concept that humanity must dominate nature has its origins in the dominationof human by human.

Bookchins (1982) essential historical thesis then, articulated in The Ecology of Freedom , can be summarised in the following fashion. The notion that humanity isdestined to dominate nature is by no means a universal feature of human culture.Indeed, if anything, this notion is almost completely alien to the outlook of so-called primitive or pre-literate societies (p. 43). As Bookchin states,

I cannot emphasise too strongly that the concept emerged very gradually from abroader social development: the increased domination of human by human. Thebreakdown of primordial equality into hierarchical systems of inequality, the dis-integration of early kinship groups in social classes, the dissolution of tribal com-

munities into the city, and finally the usurpation of social administration by thestatenot only altered social life but the attitude of people towards each other,humanitysvisionof itself, andultimatelyits attitude to thenaturalworld.(p. 43)

Theabstractphilosophical thesisof thedomination ofnaturethatcanbe found inthe Dialectic of Enlightenment (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1979) is rendered concreteand inverted by Bookchin. And so, to consolidate this maneuver, we are providedwith a counternarrative of historical development, which provides us with an alter-native account of humanity at the dawn of civilisation.

The Outlook of Organic Society

Organic society is a term used by Bookchin (1982) to refer to a spontaneously

formed, non-coerciveand egalitarian societya natural society in the verydefinitesense that it emerged from innate human needs for consociation, interdependenceand care (p. 5). The termis used in TheEcology of Freedom , and later in RemakingSociety (Bookchin, 1990b), to refer to his own alternative account of early humancommunities. In a fashion similar to the concept of primitive communism foundin Engelss work, it is argued that we can point to a moment in the development of preliterate humanity, in whichhumanrelations weremarked by intensesocial soli-darityinternally andwith thenatural world(p. 44). Thegreater evidencewe find isof an outlook toward life that visualised people, things and relations in terms of their uniqueness rather than their superiorityor inferiority (p. 44).

In basicstructural terms, organic society ispresentedin The Ecology of Freedomas existing in a fairly integrated and unified form and based on kinship ties, agegroups, and a sexual division of labour. Complete parity, a high sense of internal

unity, and an egalitarianoutlook marksocial relations. Certain definingsocial prac-tises are also seen as characteristic of this form of society, notably the practise of usufruct (the freedom of individuals to appropriate resources by virtue of the factthey are using them), the irreducible minimum (the unalienable right of eachmember of thecommunity to food, shelter, and accommodation), and theequalityof unequals(equal treatmentdespiteunequal abilities). We alsofind herean avoid-ance of cohesion in dealing with intercommunity affairs and a commitment to anethics of complementarity rather than one of command and obedience. Thus,despite the physical limitations of organic society, Bookchin (1982) argues that it



6/32

nevertheless functioned unconsciously with an implicit commitment to freedom(p. 143).

Regarding the relationship between organic society and the natural world, we

are told their outlook was distinctly ecological (Bookchin, 1982, p. 5). Becausepeople in pre-literate cultures viewed themselves not as the lords of creation . . .but as part of the natural world. They were neither above nature nor below it butwithin it (Bookchin, 1982, p. 5).

A view of interhuman relations as devoid of hierarchy and a view of humanitysrelationship with nature as being marked by a deeply embedded co-operativespirit (Bookchin, 1982, p. 48)pervade The Ecology of Freedom . This richlyarticu-lated unity in diversity is seen as shattering, though with the incipientemergenceof social hierarchies.

The Emergence of Hierarchy

The breakdown of the primal unity of organic society, and the emergence of social hierarchy and social domination, unfolds at two levels in The Ecology of Freedom atthe material and thesubjective. Materially, it is argued that theinstitu-tions of organic society are gradually shattered and then reworked as we see theemergence of gerontocracies, patriocentric relations, priest castes, and warriorsocieties. It is these developments that provide the raw material for the later emer-gence of class relations and city and state formations.

The Ecology of Freedom eschews a strictly linear account of this development.Rather, we are provided with a highly elaborate dialectical and processual accountthat explores this development from numerous standpoints, returning to build onthese overlapping pictures.

Moments of incipient hierarchy surface and then shade back into the egalitarianframework of organic society. In dealing with initial points of tension, whetheridentified as emerging from the sexual division of labour, the elders, the rise of thewarrior, or the emergence of surplus, it is argued that early organic society persis-tently reworked its institutions to ensure themaintenance of a unity in difference.Nevertheless, it is to basic biological facts, and the differences that emerge fromthese, that Bookchin turns to, to locate the origins of social hierarchy.

Incipient, potentially hierarchical elites gradually evolve through gerontocracyand the emergence of patriarchal values. Each phase of their evolution shades intothe succeeding one, until the first firm shoots of hierarchy emerge and consolidate.As bands begin to increase in size and number, as they differentiate into clans andtribes and make war, a third moment of incipient hierarchy is identified as youngwarriors begin to enjoy a sociopolitical eminence. The warrior slowly emerges asthe big man of the community, sharing civil power with the elders and shaman.Andso theprimordial balance that assigned complementary economic functions to

both sexes on the basis of parity slowly tips towards the male, favouring his socialpre-eminence (Bookchin, 1982, p. 78).The subjective level of Bookchins (1982) account of historical development

pays considerableattention to what he refers to as theemergence of epistemologiesof rule. This is understood as theshift from animismwhich is viewedas typical of organic societyto the emergence of a repressive sensibility and body of valueswhich allows the whole realm of experience to be understood along lines of com-mand and obedience (p. 90). This development presents a crucial element in fos-tering patriarchal, class, and antiecologicalrelations anda psychic apparatusrootedin guilt, renunciation, and a repressive rationality.



7/32

The move away from an animistic sensibility (which conceptualises externalnatureat theveryoutsetas a mutualisticcommunityand is informed by an episte-mology that tends to unify ratherthan divide) (Bookchin, 1982, pp.98-99)is identi-

fied as a critical moment. As a communicative and participatory relationship tonature is increasingly ceded to manipulative reason, we see theemergence of a par-ticular form of generalisation and classification, which are used not to achievewholeness but to produce a diverse antagonism in the objective and subjectiverealms (Bookchin, 1982, p. 112). Although Bookchin (1982) recognises that theemergence of such processes may have been necessary to allow the individual todiscover hisor heruniqueness and identity, it is argued we shouldnotassumethat ithadto manifest itselfin the socially explosiveformthat it did(p. 97). Other possi-bilities and epistemologies may have favoured a more relaxed opening of theself . . . have been ignored in favour of values centred on mastery and control (p. 112).

Thus, reason appears in human societiesbut in an involuted and contradic-tory form (Bookchin, 1982, p. 100). It is argued though that this (initially) fictivemanipulation of nature has its roots in the real manipulation of humanity thoughshamanand priest cults. It is not thediscipline of work butthe discipline of rule thatis seen as demanding the repression of internal nature. This repression thenextends outward to externalnature as a mere objectof rule and later of exploitation(Bookchin, 1982, p. 8).

So, a legacy of domination emerges through the manipulation of primordialinstitutions and sensibilities. This is supplemented with a hierarchical mentalitythat justifies toil, guilt, and sacrifice. For Bookchin (1982), this ensures the visionof social and natural diversity was altered from an organismic sensibility that seesdifferent phenomenaas unityin diversity intoa hierarchical mentality that ranksthemost minuscule phenomena into mutually antagonistic pyramids of inferior andsuperior (p. 8).

A Legacy of Domination and a Legacy of Freedom

It is this curse of domination thena curse that ever since its inception has pro-foundly infused virtually every human achievement, from art to technics, socialinstitutions to the most intimate aspect of our daily lives, that is seen as needing tobe exposed.

Bookchins critical message, however, is not simply to reiterate Webers,Adornos, or Horkheimers gloomy analysis of the extent to which domination hasseeped into the human project. Rather, drawing inspiration from Kropotkin (1986)and Mumford (1961), it is argued we need to recover the countermovement to thisdevelopment, the subterranean legacy of freedom that can be unearthed from thegrim rise of social hierarchy. 4 As hierarchy institutionalises subjugation, the ambi-

guity of civilisation emergesyet this very development is itself presented asever pregnant with alternative possibilities and potentialities.The recovery of this legacy of freedom could be seen as the defining feature of

Bookchins historical writings. In The Ecology of Freedom , this legacy is againtraced at the material and subjective levels. Within the realm of ideas, numerouspoints areseen as marking significant eruptions from the dominant path. Bookchinargues that with the rise of the city and most notably the polis, for a moment the dis-appearance of the blood group is ceded to the potentiality of a fuller development,aswe see the emergingideaof the citizen. With the spreadof Roman law, wesee the



8/32

emerging idea of a universal humanitas developing (even if this may well haveremained little more than a political strategy developed for fiscal and ideologicalreasons).In peasant andfolk utopias, we seethe preservation of imagesof a bounte-

ousnature, an image that will survivethrough medieval times to informingthe earlycommunistutopias. It is Christianhistoricism,with itspromise of an early utopisticfuture, that is given a central place in informing radical messianic activism anddemands for the immediateestablishment of a heavenly city on Earth. This, in turn,is seen as feeding into the great chiliastic movements that are to sweep through themedieval world in the 14th century.

Instances of libertarian resistance to the legacy of domination are foundthroughouthuman historyfrom theearliestslave rebellions of the ancient alluvialcivilisations,up to theincipient currents of Quakers, Seekers, Anabaptists, andoth-ers that are to play such a vital role, giving rise to the dawn of the revolutionary era.In Bookchins other historical writings, however, we can see this legacy of freedombeing explored from other vantage points and a similar resistance emerging towardoverlyeconomistichistorical explanations. The Limitsof the City (Bookchin,1974)and From Urbanization to Cities (Bookchin, 1995a), following Weberian andPolanyian themes, suggest (contra Marxian orthodoxy) that early cities may wellhave formed to meet cultural rather than strictly economic or defensive needs(Bookchin, 1995a,p. 32). Moreover,it is argued, we canpoint to moments in whichtherelationship between town andcountryside wasnot markedby domination but acertain ecological and social balance and a thriving civic sphere. Focusing here onthe critical role of the Athenian polis with the emergence of politics, and the sur-vival of the civic virtues and notions of active citizenship in the Renaissance city-states, it is argued such historical forms (although imperfect) nevertheless suggestalternative possibilities existed. Although the dominant path of European develop-ment may have been marked by the degeneration of politics to statecraft, and thedevelopment of centralised oligarchic institutions, we can recovercivic republican,confederalist, and municipalist moments and identify numerous grassroots forcesthat attempted to resist centralisation, marketisation, and the legacy of domination.Suchalternativesmaywellhave opened up newpossibilities if allowed to flourish. 5

CRITIQUE OF BOOKCHINS CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY

Considering Bookchins Historical Social Theory

To break into this historical narrative at thedawn of capitalism and modernity, itneeds to be asked is this account of historical development compelling? DoesBookchin provide us with a deeperinsight into thehistorical rootsof ourcontempo-rary social and environmental dislocations?

Although Bookchin has over recent times demonstrated some awareness of thepitfalls of constructing metanarratives, in a period marked by a substantial degreeof incredulity toward all grand narratives or the project of writing universal his-tory (e.g., Lyotard, 1984), the project he defends has become deeply unfashion-able. 6 What could be the minimal conditions necessary to convince us that this pro-

ject had some plausibility?It would seem that at the very least, a viable historical social theory aspiring to

this degree of historical sweep would need to be intellectually and logically coher -ent, theoretically sound, and richly steeped in the empirical and qualitative litera-



9/32

ture to even begin to convince. Does Bookchins historical social theory as formu-lated in the keynote texts of social ecology acquit itself here?

One immediate reaction to this historical social theory could well begin by sim-

ply declaring the starting point to be inadequate. Thus, critics could well argue thathis reading of Marx is insubstantial and essentially polemical, that it deals with thebroader tradition in a far too generic fashion.

There is no doubt that the question of Bookchins relationship to Marxs ownwork and to Marxism more generally is a complex matter. Although I have notedearlier that Bookchin has never sought to hide his debt to Marx, and indeed essayssuch as Listen Marxist! (Bookchin, 1971b) at times use Marx against Marxism,Bookchin has a tendency nevertheless to read Marx simply as a mixture of scien-tific structuralist and technological determinist. In essays such as Marxism asBourgeoisSociology (Bookchin,1980a), thisclearly doesensure that insights thatcould emerge from a more sympathetic engagement are perhaps unnecessarilyforeclosed. Insights offered by the younger humanist Marx of the Manuscripts areclearly dismissed far too quickly. 7 Moreover, the weight of detailed historicalscholarship on Marx that has sought to recover his ecological credentials throughattention to the 1844 Manuscripts (Benton, 1993) and the theory of metabolic rift(Burkett, 1999; Foster, 1999, 2000; Foster & Burkett, 2000) at the very least sug-gests a more rounded reading of Marx on this issue is perhaps overdue. Interest-ingly enough, Bookchins (1999, pp. 243-298) more recent work denotes a distinctsoftening of his attitude to Marx at least. 8

It would seem equally important to recognise that many elements of Bookchinscritique of Marxism (more generally) are enlightening. They do touch on weak-nesses that have run through many formulations of historical materialism (particu-larly of themore orthodox or vulgarkind)as well as thedisastrous politicalpracticeof political Marxism. His observations are remarkably prescient of recent debates.For example, a concern with the potential for reductionism involved in conceptual-ising the human subject principally as homo faber, and the lack of clarity and con-cern with normative issues that has defined many currents of Marxism, can hardlybe dismissed as entirely misconceived. Bookchins highlighting of theEurocentricism of historical materialism clearly raises a vexatious issue that con-temporary critical social theory has hardly begun to address. 9 The long-standingissue of therole that culture, ideas, andthe causalefficacyof non-class-basedformsof socialdominationhaveplayed on historical development would seem as salient adiscussion as ever. 10 Perhaps most striking, though, is how contemporary debateson the relationsbetween Marxism andenvironmentalquestions havecentred on thevery issues Bookchin drew into focus nearly four decades agothe role of instrumentalism, technological optimism/determinism, and the conquest of nature (see Benton, 1989, 1992, 1996; Burkett, 1999; Eckersley, 1992; Foster,1999, 2000; Grundmann, 1991a, 1991b; Harvey, 1996; Salleh, 1997). It is interest-

ingto note, forexample, that Bookchins general assertionof a ratherbizarre mirrorimage that can be found between thevulgarMarxist view of history and liberal ide-ology has been noted most recently by Harvey (1996, p. 13).

A glib dismissal of Bookchins social theory then informed by some notion of the infallibility of historical materialism would seem entirely inadequate. Yet is hisown resolution of the difficult issues that he raises convincing? To consider thisissue further, it is perhaps useful to begin by returning to the whole issue of organicsociety.



10/32

Organic Society 1: Vagaries and Inconsistencies

Speculation over thenature of early humanity hasclearly playeda central role

in the history of social and political theory and in the development of Westernthought. Raising critical questions regarding the origins and naturalness of inequality, genderdivision, andthe state,evenin the20th century, this topichaspre-occupied numerous Marxist, feminist, and libertarian philosophers, social theo-rists, and social anthropologists. Over more recent decades, critical political issuesrelating to the rights of indigenous peoples and reevaluations of the relative mer-its of contemporary Western lifestyles, perspectives, and ideologies have giventhese debates a renewed edge.

It would also have to be recognised, however, that significant shifts in socialanthropology over recent decades (mirroring the broader critique of philosophicalhumanism that has emerged in social theory) have equally raised doubts about theviability of this whole enterprise. Whether due to increasing awareness of thedoubtful evidence that informed many 19th-century Eurocentric speculationsabout the primitive, poststructuralist suspicions that historical anthropologicalenquiry rarely surmounts an orientalist gaze or doubts about the possibility of saying anything credible about a composite human subject over such vast timeframes, the notion that we can begin our discussion in social theory in this fashionhas equally become highly contentious. Yet if we bracket for the moment suchmetatheoretical issues, even within its own terms of reference, problems can befound with Bookchins organic society thesis.

One immediate problem that arises is that it is difficult to avoid being struck bythe sheer vagueness and imprecision that seem to linger around this whole enter-prise. So although organic society is not presented as a hypothetical state of nature but postulated as a historical actuality, as Mary Mellor (1992, p. 124) hasnoted, it is never made very clear by Bookchin when or where this early form of human association actually existed. At points in The Ecology of Freedom , one canfind references to an early Neolithic village society and get the impression thatorganic society consequently can be located at a crossover moment when hunter-gatherers first began to settle down into a horticultural society. Elsewhere, in otherwritings, one can gain the distinct impression that this society stretched well up tothe emergence of the early cities. 11

Bookchins narrative does seem further problematic by the manner in which hisexposition swings rather dramatically between a reflexive voice, which appearsto accept he is embarking on a highly speculative exercise, to a much more confi-dent tone, which at times seems to virtually claim a Gods eye view. Thus, oneencounters persistent examples of a carefully qualified and tentative insight beingquickly reworked into a substantiveproposition a few sentenceslater, where a spec-ulation on preliterate practises, values, or institutions is then suddenly trans-

formed into an implausibly detailed account of how things really were back then. 12 Given the time scales that are being dealt with here, and the manner inwhich these speculationsareoften unsupported by evidence or supportedby one ortwo case studies, it is difficult to avoid an immediate sense that a certain creativeembellishing is going on.

Additional problems emerge when it becomes evident that Bookchins ownunderstanding of what he has demonstrated does, at times, seem at odds with theactual narrative he provides. For example, as we have seen, one of the boldest



11/32

claims that Bookchinmakes of hisaccount of historical developmentis that it radi-cally reverses central features of historical materialism. Thus, Marx and Engels,Adorno and Horkheimer, are all chastised for their Victorian image of stingy

nature andthe view that freedom from material want necessitated thedominationof nature. Indeed, at various points, Bookchin (1990b) has emphatically rejectedthe view that forms of domination . . . have their sources in economic conditionsand needs (p. 45). On the contrary, we are told the idea of domination initiallyarose from withinsocietiesas part of thedevelopmentof socialhierarchies, whicharenot necessarily economicallymotivated at all(p. 46).However, an implicit rec-ognition of the role that material factors played in the development of hierarchy,andeven a certain sense that thedevelopment of hierarchy is inevitable, can also beunearthed from Bookchins work.

For example, to return to the emergence of social hierarchy, it is argued at onepoint that that its roots are found in the tensions and ambiguities produced by age.So we are told, Physically the old were the most infirm, dependent and often themost vulnerable members of the community in periods of difficulty. It is they whowere expected to give up their lives in times of want (Bookchin, 1990b, p. 53). Inthe tension between vulnerability and being the repositories of a communitys wis-dom, theelderlymay have been more disposed to enhance their status (Bookchin,1990b, p. 53). Elsewhere, we are told in a matter of fact manner

that age-hierarchies would appear is often merely a matter of time; the socialisa-tion process, with its need for careful instruction, growing knowledge, and anincreasing reservoir of experience virtually guarantees that elders would earn a

justifiable degree of respect and, in precarious situations, seeka certain amount of social power. (Bookchin, 1990b, p. 60)

This account does have certain plausibility to it (if we accept the prior assump-tion of a preexisting egalitarian era). What is striking, though, is that (despite pro-testation to the contrary) material factors (i.e., times of want and the emergenceof precarious situations) would nevertheless appear to play a decisive role in theemergence of hierarchy.

Moreover, although Bookchin complains about determinist features of histori-cal materialism, we can also find elements of his own position that come close tonaturalising hierarchy. Forexample, at certain pointshierarchy is seen as workedout of basic biological facts. Such a claim clearly sails close to determinism if interpreted crudely. To give Bookchin his due, his narrative here is usually moresubtle and complex, stressing openness, change, and contingency. At other times,though, it appears that hierarchy is almost postulated as a part of the human condi-tion. Thus, we are told, The violation of organic society is latent within organicsociety itself. The primal unity of the early community, both internally and withnature, is weakened merely by the elaboration of the communitys social lifeitsecological differentiation (Bookchin, 1982, p. 80). And here it would appear thatthe rise of social hierarchy is almost a product of the natural development of sociallife.

Indeed, if we review Bookchins writings as a whole, we can indeed find a per-sistent vacillation over the question of whether the initial emergence of social hier-archy was inevitable. Whencritiquing Marxism, Bookchin stresses the open-endedpossibilities of historical development. Thus, in The Ecology of Freedom , whenconsidering whether our ascent into civilisation necessitated the domination of human by human as a precondition for the domination of human by nature, it is



12/32

argued, History might well have followed quite different paths of development(Bookchin, 1982, p. 66). At other times, though, and particularly in later writings,we are told the exact opposite:

Paradoxically, in its emergence out of barbarismindeed, out of simplyanimalityhumanity may have had to depend upon priests, chieftains, and per-hapsstate-likeformationsto overcome parochialism, lackof individuality, kinshipbonds, gerontocracies, andpatriarchies. Thegroundworkformakinga civilizatoryprocess possible . . . may have required what we would regard today as unaccept-able institutions of social control but that at an earlier time may have been impor-tant in launching a rational social development. (Bookchin, 1995b, pp. xvi-xvii)

As a provisional judgment,then, it could well be argued that Bookchins accountof historical development is perhaps not as radical a reversal of Marx and Engelsposition as first appears. Nor does it appear as consistent as he would have usbelieve. 13

Organic Society 2: Methodological Issues

More substantial difficulties with organic society can be found at the method-ological level. One central problem here would seem to be that evidence forBookchins speculations is not drawn in the main from paleo-anthropologicalresearch but rather from 20th-century ethnographic studies of tribal societies andhistorical accounts of European encounters with thenon-European. Thus, his spec-ulation on gender differentiation in organic society is informed by ElizabethThomass studies of the Bantu. Discussions of animism make reference to EdwardB. Tylorsobservation of the practisesof Native Americans. Various otheraccountsof the ecological embeddedness of humanity at the dawn of civilisation draw fromDorothy Lees studies of the Hopi and Wintu tribes.

Now, this practise is justified in The Ecology of Freedom on the basis that

the cultural facts of dress, technics, and environment that link prehistoric peopleswith existing primitives is so striking that it is difficult to believe that Siberianmammoth hunters of yesteryear . . . were so dissimilar from the Arcticsealhuntersof de Poncins day. (Bookchin, 1982, p. 57)

Yet reservations could immediately be voiced here given that the implicit (andhighlyquestionable) assumption underlying this is that tribalpeoplehave lived in apermanently static state, without change or social development. Given thegrowingrecognition among social anthropologists that many supposedly isolated small-scale societies have been part of wider, often global systems of exchange for manymillennia, such an approach would seem to be increasinglyproblematic (see Ellen,

1986, p. 9).More generally, establishingthe exactnature of human-nature relationsamong tribal people would seem further complicated by the fact that as the histori-cal geographer Ian Simmons (1996) has noted, The ethnographic picture is ratherspottyon this particular topic so it does not seem possible to givea complete picturefor all groups even for near-recent times, let alone the past (p. 66).

Indeed, if we turn to the anthropological record, problems with Bookchinsaccount of organic society would seem to become even more entrenched. Notably,there would now seem to be growing paleo-anthropological evidence that earlyhumans were involved in substantive reshaping of their natural environment, evento the point where they produced substantive environmental degradation. 14 Thus,



13/32

although Bookchin (1982) in The Ecology of Freedom may claim that Neolithicartefacts seem to reflect a communion of humanity and nature that patentlyexpressed the communion of humans with each other: a solidarity of the commu-

nity with the world of life that articulated an intense solidarity within the commu-nity itself (p. 61), elsewhere we can find substantive evidence that points directlyto the contrary. 15

It could also be noted that even if we accepted the notion that anthropologicaldata on more recent tribal societies provide a legitimate basis for speculationabout early humanity, these studies would similarly seem to suggest that the devel-opmentof early human societieswasprobably markedby much more complex andvariable social patterns, practises, and institutions than are found in the compositeaccount provided in The Ecology of Freedom . Thus, concerning Bookchins (1982)claim that relations in organic society were distinctly ecological (p. 5), it couldsimply be noted here that the anthropological evidence on tribal people andhunter-gatherers hardly lends unqualified support to such a generalisation. 16 Theclaim that organic society was strikingly non-domineering not only in its institu-tionalised structure but in its very language (Bookchin, 1990b, p. 47) similarlycould meet any numberof contrary examples from small-scale societies, 17 as couldthe related claim of an egalitarian sexual division of labour, 18 and so on.

There would seem to be substantive reasons, then, to doubt thewhole account of organic society found in The Ecology of Freedom and Remaking Society . By theearly 1990s, it increasingly appeared that Bookchin himself had become less andless comfortable with many aspects of this period of his work. Initially respondingtocertain currents in deep ecology, committedto what Bookchin (1991)now saw asatavistic celebrations of a mythic Neolithicand Pleistocene (p. xxx), 19 the secondedition of The Ecology of Freedom provided a new introduction that qualified andrevised many earlier commitments. Now ceding to the anthropological evidencethat early humanitys relationswith thenaturalworld maywellhavebeen much lessharmonious than previously presumed and warning against romanticising earlyhumanitys interconnectednesswith nature, one can find an uncomfortable attemptto hang on to certain elements of his own organic society thesis. Thus, we are told,ashumanitybegan to emerge from firstnature, possibly in thePleistoceneand cer-tainly in thePalaeolithic,their relationsto animals as otherwas largelycomplemen-tary (p. xlvii).

By the mid to late 1990s, however (Bookchin, 1995c, 1995d, 1999), it was nolonger clear that even these revised commitments were still held. Appalled by thegrowth of avowed primitivist and even anti-civilisationalist currents in Ameri-can anarchistcircles,Bookchin (1995c) appeared increasinglyconcernedsimply torefute those who would seek to substitute mythic notions of a pristine and primi-tive past that probably never existed (p. 122). 20 Although never actually renounc-ing his own past then, it has become increasingly difficult to ascertain what exactly

is left of Bookchins theory of organic society.

After Ecological Romanticism

Perhaps it is time here to put this search for the primitive, once again, in a his-torical perspective.

By the late 19th century, Adam Kuper had noted that within European anthro-pology, the broad characteristics of primeval human communities had been settledwith a remarkable degree of agreement. Thus, it was widely believed that primi-tive society was an organic whole, ordered on the basis of kinship relations that



14/32

then split into exogamous, corporate descent groups. The original religion waswidely believed to be animism, and it was further thought that primeval socialforms were preserved in the languages and in the ceremonies of contemporary

primitive peoples. Remarking on the contemporary relevance of this series of assumptions, Kuper (1988) has argued, Hardly any anthropologist today wouldacceptthat this classic account of primitivesociety canbe sustained (p.8). Indeed,we are told,

On the contrary, the orthodox modern view is that there never was such a thing asprimitivesociety. Certainly, no suchthingcan be reconstructednow. There is noteven a sensible way in which one can specify what a primitive society is. Theterm implies some historicpoint of reference. It presumably defines a type of soci-etyancestral to more advanced forms,on theanalogy of an evolutionary history of some natural species. But human societies cannot be traced back to a single point of origin,and there is no wayof reconstitutingprehistoric social forms, classifyingthem, andaligning them in a true time series. Thereare no fossils of social organi-sation. Even if some very ancient social order could be reconstructed, one could notgeneralise it . If it is usefulto applyevolutionary theoryto socialhistory, then it mustdirectattention to variation, to adaptation,to all sorts of local circumstancesand so to diversification. And it does seem likely that early human societies wereindeed rather diverse . Surviving hunter-gatherers certainly do not conform to asingle organisational type. Since ecological variations constrain social organisa-tion, especially where technology is simple, there must have been considerabledifferences in social structure between the earliest human societies. (p. 8)

Part of the problem with Bookchins position (and indeed his more recent eco-anarchist critics, e.g., Watson, 1996) is that the attempt to locate a moment of eco-logical harmony in the distant past (no matter how qualified or nuanced) wouldseem to simply entail a degree of excessive universalism or singularity that cannotbe supportedby the highly variegated and ultimately patchy anthropologicalrecord(Philips & Mighall, 2000).More broadly, a basic problem with theattempt to definecertain societies or social practises as more organic than others in social ecologyis that this inevitably entails a slide toward naturalistic reductionism. Indeed, theterm organic society by definition constitutes a failure to recognise, as Benton(1994) has emphasised, that human beings simply do not have a natural modeof relationsto nature. We haveno singleinstinctive prescribed mode of life but a rangeof indefinitely variable material cultures (p. 43). As Kuper (1988) has noted,surrounding this whole debate, not to put too fine a point upon it, the history of primitive society is thehistoryof an illusion.It isourphlogiston,our ether(p. 8).

Social Hierarchy/Social Domination

To move on from the organic society issue then, how plausible is the rest of Bookchins social hierarchythesis? The concept of social hierarchyclearly denotesthe most striking and interesting conceptual innovation that can be found in socialecology, delineating Bookchins position fromthepreoccupationsof classicalcriti-caltheory. If we consider this issue at thesynchronic level forthe moment, onecon-siderable advantage of this demand to place hierarchy at the centre of criticalsocial theory is that it clearly opens up the possibility of examining multilayeredforms of domination, exclusion, and silencing that are not simply reducible toepiphenomena of classrelations. Moreover, Bookchins claim that it is likely formsof social hierarchybasedon generontocracies, patriarchies,priest cults, andwarrior



15/32

groups probably provided the precursors to the latter development of class andproto-state structures would seem reasonably uncontroversial (see Giddens, 1981;Mann, 1986). An issue that does need further examination though is that it is not

clear that the complexities that play out in the relationships between social hierar-chy and social domination are fully theorised by Bookchin.

For example, as numerous critics have observed (Eckersley, 1992; Fox, 1989;Kovel, 1998), there is clearly a range of social relations that are in certain senseshierarchical yet do not self-evidently contribute to social domination. Temporaryquasi-hierarchical relations based on the acceptance of certain forms of authoritysuch as parent-child relations (Kovel, 1998) can be socially enabling. Student-teacher relationships (Eckersley, 1992) also invariably contain elements of hierar-chy and if freely chosen can be enabling. Indeed, one could think of a range of sociallystratified relationsthat areemergent fromfunctionallydifferentiated socialroles and that are hierarchical in a certain sense but that also alleviate social domi-nation. In this lattercategory, it could well be argued that any socially complex andpolitically pluralistic society seeking to avail itself of the gains of high technologyis going to be markedby certain forms of social stratification through task differen-tiation. As long as these hierarchies are open and subject to democratic recruit-ment, rotation, and control, and influence in one sphere of social life is not allowedto cumulate in other spheres (Waltzer, 1985), it is simply not given that such rela-tions necessarily contribute to social domination. Indeed, contra certain currents of libertarianism, it clearly needs to be recognised that certain democratically con-trolled representative structures or socially differentiated roles might actuallyrelieve social domination. Conversely, one could imagine certain nonhierarchicalsocieties (perhaps most strikingly the kind of neo-primitivist fantasies advocatedby someeco-anarchists) thatwouldsurely exacerbate social domination of humansby nature and perhaps through the tyranny of structurelessness (Freeman, 1970)further facilitate domination of some humans by others.

It would seem important, then, for a credible critical social theory to be able todistinguish more carefully between coercive and oppressive social-stratifiedsocialrelationsand representativepolitical formswhich clearly give rise to social domi-nationand such relations based on legitimate authority or democratic author-ity, which perhaps do not. 21 What can we make though of the further diachroniclink that Bookchin has sought to forge: between social hierarchy, social domina-tion, and the idea of dominating nature?

Social Hierarchy, Social Domination, and the Idea of the Dominating of Nature by Humans

Any credible modern critical social theory is going to address the links betweenthe domination of humans and the domination of nature. It should be remembered,

though, that Bookchin formulates this relationshipin a very specific manner. In pri-marilyseeking to explain theroot causesof thedivision between natureand society,Bookchin elaborates these links not in a general fashion but rather as a historicalthesis. As Bookchin (1990b) himself has been keen to stress,

As a historical statement it declares in no uncertain terms, that the domination of human by human preceded thenotion of dominating nature. Indeed, human domi-nation of human gave rise to the very idea of dominating nature. In emphasisingthathuman domination precedes the notion of dominating nature, I have carefullyavoided the use of a slippery verb that is very much in use today: namely that the



16/32

domination of nature involves the domination of humans by humans. I find theuseof this verb particularly repellent because it confuses theorder in whichdomi-nationemerged in theworld and hence, theextent to which it must be eliminated if

we are to achieve a free society. Men did not think of dominating nature until theyhadalready begun to dominatethe young,women andeventuallyeachother.(p. 44)

It would seem evident, though, that the historical sequence Bookchin (1995b)defends is simply not very convincing. Bookchins starting point here that thedomination of nature first arose within society aspart ofits institutionalisation intogerontocracies . . . not in any endeavour to control natureor natural forces (p. 142)would appear completely untenable. The whole strength of this claim is clearlydependenton therosy image ofa singularorganic society that we canfindin hisear-lier work. Now, given (a) the criticisms of this that have been offered above, (b) thecautionary wordsofferedby Kuper aboutrecognising thehugespatial variation thatwas very likely a central feature of the relationship between human societies andtheir natures, and (c) the manner in which Bookchin himself later retreats from this

position, this claim would seem to fall apart. Indeed, if we follow the view of thelater Bookchin (1995c), who states, In the band and tribe societies of pre-history,humanity was almost completely at the mercy of uncontrollable natural forces (p. 122), such an assertion would seem to suggest that if anything, central elementsof the basic Marxian thesis are more convincing as an existential statement of thehuman condition. That is, as Marx argues in Volume 3 of Capital , the associatedproducers need to

rationally regulate their interchanges with nature, bring it under their commoncontrol, instead of being ruled by it as by the blindforces of nature; and achievingthis with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to,and most worthy of, their human nature. (as cited in Smith, 1996, pp. 48-49)

Bookchins ecocentric critics have flagged a second line of argument that needsto be considered here. Fox (1989, p. 15) and Eckersley (1992) have argued thatBookchin does not fully recognise that there is not a straightforward relationshipbetween hierarchical forms of social organisation and the actual domination of nature. Thus, Fox hasargued that historical examplescanbe offered of hierarchicalsocieties (e.g., ancient Egypt) that had relatively benign relations with nature.Equally, Eckersley has argued that it is possible to conceptualise a relativelynonhierarchical society that is nevertheless extremely exploitative ecologically. 22

These arguments do suggest that great care clearly does need to be taken inattempts to discern simple one-to-one formulations of the relationship betweenhierarchical social forms and environmentally hazardous outcomes (formulationsincidentally that Bookchin, 1990a, has denied he ever makes). Bookchin (1990a)has responded to this critique though by arguing that it ignores

the fact that my writings focus on the idea of dominating nature not on the actualdomination of nature. . . . I am not concerned exclusively with whether a givensociety (be it hierarchical or egalitarian) actually damages the eco-community inwhich it is located; I am also concerned with whether it ideologically identifiedhuman progress with the idea of dominating nature. (p. 202)

This response is interesting because it does actually highlight a further difficultythat emerges from adopting this theoretical approach.



17/32

Dominant Ideologies and Actual Relations With Nature

A significant problem with the overwhelming attention given in social ecology

to the idea that human beings must dominate nature is that it is assumed that inuncovering this moment, theultimate rootsof the society/nature divisionare laidbare. Havingrootedthe emergence of theidea that humansmust dominate natureinthe emergenceof social hierarchy, Bookchins narrative essentially concentrates onoutlining the rise of various social hierarchies and countermovements of resistanceto this. Along the way, attention is paid to the emergence of epistemologies of ruleand various ideological currents that offer either a benign or malign view of nature(see Bookchin,1982, 1987, 1990b,1995a). Onepositiveaspectof this endeavour isthat Bookchins historical writings provide us with an impressive intellectual his -tory of ideas and a socialhistory of resistance. As an attempt to constructa libertar-ian historical narrative to counter crudely determinist forms of historical material-ism, Bookchins work is certainly rousing and suggestive that things could havebeenother. 23 However, as forprovidinghistorical insight intosocial-ecological pro-cesses, the discussion tends to remain trapped at the cognitive level.

Insufficient attempt is made to integrate theoretical reflection with what isknown about the historical geography and environmental history of material prac-tices (cf. Harvey, 1996, p. 183). Andvery littleconsideration is given to thefact thatconcentrating on ideologies and cosmologies of nature alone can provide only apartial guide to understanding the actuality of socioenvironmental dynamics(Samways, 1996).

Part of the problem with the approach adopted in Bookchins social ecology isthat it remains far from clear that exploring the genealogy of an idea through vari-ous classic texts and religious/ideological currents establishes that people or socialinstitutions actually acted on such dominant ideologies. As Roy Ellen (1986) hasnoted, Ideologies often diverge markedly from what actually happens in practise(p. 10). Also, as Anderson (1969) noted, although religion and beliefs may stressharmonious relationswith nature, this does notprevent people from being involvedin wholesale ecosystem damage due to pure economic necessity, in explicit, self admitted violation of their norms and knowledge of final effects. Bookchinssocial theory is limited in that he provides very few examples of how the historicalgrowth of the ideology that humanity must dominate nature actually affectedmaterial practices. This relationship is never really demonstrated with reference tostudies of historical societies and their environmental conditions and contexts.Indeed, beyond organic society and its fall, one can find a marked tendency inBookchins subsequentwritings to present the keypoints in historical developmentthat he subsequently lingers on: ancient Greece and Rome, the city-state period of the Middle Ages, and an early agrarian capitalist period, as basically environmen-tally benign. Often using the term organic societies to refer to these societies as

well, it is modern capitalism that is basically presented as the great source of eco-logical evil (Bookchin, 1982, 1987, 1990b, 1995a).Now, it would be difficult to deny that the emergence and spread of capitalism

and modernity have marked a quantitative and qualitative change in the scope anddepth of human transformationsof thenatural world (Harvey, 2000; McNeil, 2000;Moore, 2000). However, what Bookchins historical social theory fails to fully inte-grate is thesubstantive evidence that hasemerged over recentdecades that suggeststhat beyond small-scale societies, precapitalist societies were also involved in sub-stantive nature-transforming practises. For example, the modern disciplines of his-



18/32

torical geography and environmental history now provide copious examples of precapitalist societiessometimes marked by the espousal of benign ideologies of naturethat have nevertheless experienced substantive self-generated ecological

problems (see Bilsky, 1980; Crumley, 1993; Goudie, 1986; Harvey, 1996; Hughes,2002; Hughes& Thirgood, 1983; Philips & Mighall, 2000; Samways, 1996; Turneret al., 1990; Worster, 1988).

Thus, Hughes and Thirgood (1983) made a powerful case for suggesting thatenvironmental deterioration was at least one contributing factor in the decline of classical Greek and Roman civilisations. This was despite the fact that their tradi-tional religions taught them to stand in awe of nature and interfere as little as possi-ble in natural processes (p. 206). Rather than stressing ideological factors produc-ing this occurrence, though, stress is simply placed on their lack of ecologicalinsight that due to the advance of research in modern times, we take for granted(p. 207). On similar lines, Bilsky (1980) and more recently Hoffman (2001) in areview of recent literature on social ecological relations in medieval Europearguedthatmedieval Europeans did causelarge scale ecological change and environmen-taldestruction,sometimeswith intent, sometimesunaware(Hoffman,2001,p. 148).Elsewhere, David Harvey (1996) has noted of Chinese civilisation,

The Chinese may have ecologically sensitive traditions of Tao, Buddhism, andConfucianism (traditions of thought which have played an important role in pro-moting an ecological consciousness in the west) but the historical geography of deforestation, landdegradation, river erosion,and floodingin China containsnot afew environmental events which would be regarded as catastrophes by modern-day standards. (p. 188; but also see Perdue, 1987).

Indeed, Samways (1996), surveying a range of precapitalist social formations,has argued that it is plausible to see many of the difficulties experienced by manyprecapitalist societies as having more to do with the unintended consequences of

action, which probably plagued such societies, than with the pernicious effects of the idea that human beings must dominate nature.

Now, none of these examples necessarily undermines the validity or indeed theimportance of attempts to investigate relations between social domination, ideolo-gies, and socially and ecologically problematic transformations of nature throughhistory. Harvey (1996), Worster (1985, 1988), Cronon (1983, 1991), OConnor(1998), and Davis (1998), for example, have all made important strides in develop-ing this idea. Moreover, Harveys assertion that societies tend to create ecologicalconditions and environmental niches for themselves which are not only conduciveto their own survival but [are] also manifestations and instanciations in natureof their particular social relations(p. 183)providesan especially suggestive develop-ment of this line of thought. As Harvey notes,a particular setof socialrelations (andforms of social domination) can purposefully affect ecologicaltransformations thatthen require the reproduction of these social relations to sustain them. He offersDonald Worsters (1985) Rivers of Empire , which demonstrates how large-scalecorporate interests sought to ensure their own reproduction through the construc-tion of megadams irrigating the American West in the late 19th century, therebysidelining plans for more decentralised, communitarian irrigation schemes.Harveys analysis also suggests that contradictions in social relations can createsocial contradictions in the land and within ecosystem projects themselves. Thisapproach offers an important means of exploring the links between social domina-



19/32

tion and environmentally problematic outcomes. Such ideas converge with recentresearch projects by Benton (1989), Davis (1998), Fitzsimmons and Goodman(1998), and Foster (2000), who have all demonstrated how particular social rela-

tions produce specific natures that can generate crisis tendencies in the agriculturalpractises andagro-food networks they produce. Nor does this literature necessarilyundermine the view that (all things considered) societies defined by purely instru-mental and antagonistic views of social ecological processes are perhaps morelikely to embark on short-sighted, hubristic, or reckless socioenvironmental trans-formation.

What this literature does suggest, however, is that given the huge historical timeframes we are dealing with and the variety of socioecological relations that haveexisted in different societies, eco-social theory should demonstrate a certain wari-ness to the kind of absolutist plenary claims, teleological formulae, orsuperhistorical generalisations that are something of a defining feature of Bookchins work. Moreover, this literature also suggests that some of theproblemsthat emerge in hissocial theoryarenot incidental buta product of broader problemsin the theoretical framework he deploys.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Social Histories and Social Ecologies

Three weaknesses can be identified as central to Bookchins critical social the-ory as presently formulated. First, although Bookchin provides a valuable critiqueof determinist versions of historical materialism, his own radical humanist recon-structionbends thesticktoo far in a voluntaristdirection. Human beingsmake his-tory in Bookchins historical social theory, and history is an all-embracing pro-cess. There is little sense, though, in his historical writings in that they do so not in

conditions of their own choosing. In short, in social ecology there is too muchagency, too little structure. Too little attention is paid in social ecology to thesedimented social-structural forms that merge around and embed human action,creating a complex seriesof constraints andenablements that resolve themselves incomplex and discontinuous ways.

Second, although Bookchins social theory offers a well-grounded critique of economic reductionism and productive forces determinism, in shifting attention soradicallyaway from how human societieswork on nature through labour to surviveto processes of social institutionalisation and the ideologies that emerge thereof,insufficient attention is paid to the continued material dynamics between societyand nature. Weber is indeed an important figure for critical social theory. Yet theembrace of Weber as an antidote to vulgar materialism results in a degree of ideal-ism in Bookchins theory that (ironically) fails to present nature itself as anactive, continuousagent or presence in historical development (Worster, 1988;but also see Cronon, 1991; Haraway, 1991; Latour, 1993; OConnor, 1998). 24

Third (and relatedly), the radical historicism that underpins social ecology doestend to ensure that the importance of geography and spatial variation in historicaldevelopment is ignored. As Harvey (1996)and Soja (1989, 1996) have complainedof critical theorymore generally, thetemporalis notonly prioritised but utterly sub-sumes the spatial in social ecology. Consequently, despite Bookchins (1982,1995b)evident interest in dialectics in nature, in hisactual socialtheory, thedialec-



20/32

tical interplay between human societies and equally active material conditions dis-tributed in space, time, andculture (what Soja referred to as thegeo-historicaldia-lectic) remains undeveloped.

Domination, Liberation, and the Production, Reproduction, and Enframing of Active Nature(s)

So,wheredoes this leaveus?Perhapsa central themethat emerges from this crit-ical review is that there aremajor problems forcritical social theoristswho attemptto understand the complex relationships that have occurred between human societ-ies, social ideologies, and their natures using a linear, social evolutionary, grandnarrative. In many respects, the direction of the argument developed here leans tothe conclusion that the quest between Bookchin and the Frankfurt school to estab-lish the foundational moment for which came first, social domination or the ideaof dominating nature, is basically an unhelpful way to think about this issue.

If we reject that the whole of human history can be squeezed into a tale of eitherEden and the fall or its Hobbesian reversal and accept the likelihood that eco-social relationsamong earlyhuman societieswere probablyhighly diverse(yetalsoconcede that within this diversity, as Marx and the later Bookchin (1995a, 1995b,1995c, 1995d) argue, that it is reasonable to assume that all human societies havehad to bring their relations with their natures under conscious, rational control tosurvive), this locating of the origins where it all went wrong seems problematicgiven that it seems unlikely there wasevera momentwhen itall went right. Theo-retical reflection informed by recent developments in social anthropology, histori-cal geography, and environmental history suggests the need to recognise dyna-mism, discontinuity, and diversity in eco-social relations and that in all likelihood,all societieshave had their shareof ecologically baseddifficulties (Harvey, 1996,p. 189).

As a broad organising rubric for thinking about the metabolism between humansocieties and the ecological conditions of their existence, an approach that recog-nises that human societies have always been involved (at one spatial scale oranother) in the social production and reproduction of their natures (to use NeilSmiths [1984, 1996, 1998] helpful phrase) has much to commend it. Followingthis, Bentons (1989) suggestionprovides a useful supplement to thisobservation:

What is required is the recognition that each form of social/economic life has itsownspecific modeand dynamics of interrelations withits ownspecific contextualconditions, resource materials, energy sources and naturally mediatedunintendedconsequences (forms of waste, pollution :etc. (p. 77)

Combining the insights of historical geographical materialists such as Smith,Benton, Harvey, and Castree with recent developments in environmental historyand historical geography allows us to recognise that human societies have alwayshad a dynamic relationship to their natures organised through labour and technol-ogy (a point that resonates with the work of the later Bookchin, 1999). This rela-tionship has taken on spatially-temporallyspecific forms in specific societies. Thisdynamic discontinuous view of eco-social relations clearly could usefully drawfurther insights from selectaspects of social ecology. That is, it would seem vital toconsider how multiple forms of socialdomination (e.g., class, race, gender, sexual -ity, bureaucraticpower) as well as possibilities foremancipation flow through these



21/32

practises in complex and often continent fashions. However, contra social ecology,a discontinuous view would also have to stress that human intervention in naturecannot be labeled more or less organic in any ideal sense. A critique of current

processes of production, reproduction, and enframing of nature cannot take as itsstarting point a more natural or organic relationship to the environment fromwhich capitalism is viewed as a departure, as social ecology has sought to argue.Rather, as Braun and Castree (1998, p. 36) contended, it would seem increasinglyevident that sucha critiquecan onlyproceed relationally, considering thedifferentsocio-economic and cultural logics organising natures production and the socialandecological effects these give rise to (Castree & Braun, 2001, p. 36). Followingthis, thecritical question that shouldpreoccupycritical social theory is nothow canwe save a singular, undifferentiated, universal nature, but how are plural naturesbeing transformed, by which actors, for whose benefit, and with what social andecological consequences (Castree & Braun, 2001; Katz, 1998; Smith, 1998)?

Is a focussimplyon themetabolism ofsociety with naturesufficientfor explana-tory social theory? It is here that Bookchins warnings of how a one-sidedmaterial-ism can underplay the more cognitive, cultural, and symbolic aspects of socioenvironmental relationsequally deserve to be heeded. Rather than getstuck ina historicist concern with locating the source of the idea that human beings shoulddominate nature, a framework that pays attentionto how complex forms of domina-tion flow through the symbolic ordering or enframing of society and nature wouldseemmoreuseful. 25 Such an emphasis highlights how it is not simplyan instrumen-talistframing of nature that cancontributeto socialdomination. In certain contexts,it would seem increasingly evident that the attempt by some social groups toimpose their own specifically articulated noninstrumental view of nature onother groups can equally result in forms of social domination. 26 Recent work influ-enced by poststructuralist concerns with the significatory realm can usefully sup-plement historical geographical materialist insights here. McNaughten and Urry(1998), Darier (1999), and Braun and Castree (1998), for example, have broughthome the importance of attending to the processes that ensure that particularnatures triumph over others, of how the tourist gaze of particular social groupscan ensure that whole landscapes of others are reshaped and transformedsome-times in socially and environmentally problematic ways. More basically still,Haraway (1991) has noted how a further source of social domination that emergesin human societies arises from the capacity to define what is nature and what isunnatural.

Finally, a credible critical social theory clearly needs to abandon the idealistview of nature as simply an inert background to the human story. Nature may wellbe discursively enframed and symbolically represented. The division between thesocial and the natural may well be drawn and redrawn at different points in time(Haraway, 1991; Latour, 1993; Swyngedouw, 1999). 27 However, as both environ-

mental historians such as Donald Worster (1988) and actor network theorists suchas Bruno Latour (1993) have sought to argue of late, the various natures in whichhuman societies are constantly producing, reproducing, and enframing haveagency of their own (Worster, 1988).They arepossessed of their own causalpowersand processes (Benton, 1989; Soper, 1995). That is, human societies are alwaysinvolved with disruptive, active and generative natures (Massey, Allen, & Sarre,1999, p. 287) that are always in a state of dynamic change and transformation(Botkin, 1990). These systems can resist, problematise, and sometimes surprise us(Haraway, 1991; Latour, 1993). 28



22/32

Deconstructing the Domination of Nature Thesis

What though of the deeper, normative questions that clearly lurk behind this

whole discussion? Are we just left embracing a more nuanced version of the domi-nation of nature thesis?

Bookchins social theory may have many faults, but he surely is correct toargue that in the more bold interpretations of the domination of nature thesis (forexample, when filtered through Leninist, Stalinist, or modern-day contrarian orneo-liberal ideologies), one can find a breathtaking reductionism, a utilitarian logicof instrumentalism, and a commitment to quasi-thesis statements in which the roleof God hasnow been simply ceded to that of man. Horkheimers warning that thedomination of nature pursued as an actual project can simply ensure a dialecticalreversal whereby man makes himself a tool of the very same nature he subju-gates (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1979, p. 91) is apposite. Ecofeminists (e.g., Mer-chant, 1980; Plumwood, 1993; Salleh, 1997) have convincinglyargued that certainhigh-enlightenmentarticulationsof thisproject thatviewed nature as feminineor aswoman simply entrenched patriarchal ideologies. Abundantevidencehas alsobeenoffered of how domination of nature as other, entangled with imperialist dis-courses, hasproved a usefulideologicaltool to support projects to dominate groupsthat European societies viewed as more natural (Gilroy, 2001; Haraway, 1991;Harvey, 1996; Merchant, 1980).

These areall important insights.Yet if a critique of thedomination of nature the-sis is not advanced in highly nuanced terms, it can simply collapse into a series of countergeneralisations aboutthe value of enlightenment,modernity, and the ideaof progress more generally. They are every bit as sweeping and problematic as theirtargets and every bit as capable of collapsing into a regressive ideology as the ideasthey oppose.

Part of the problem here would seem to lie once again with the particular inter-pretationgivento thedomination of naturethesis in Dialectic of Enlightenment andThe Ecology of Freedom . In replacing a focus on the capitalist production of naturewith the domination of nature understood as a broader existential struggle betweenhumanity and nature, there are good reasons for feeling that despite all theirinsights, both Adorno and Horkheimer (1979) and Bookchin (1982) end up with asocialtheory that becomes superhistoricalin itssweep. It loses any sense of thehis-torical specificity, complexity, and ambiguity of the domination of nature thesis. Atendency to view thedomination of naturein monolithic terms from theperspectiveof thepresent ignores its changing concrete role in actionduring differentperiods(Leiss, 1972, p. 176). For example, as William Leiss (1972) has observed,

Beginning in the seventeenth century the idea of the mastery of nature spurred anattack upon outmoded scientific and philosophical dogma and help to initiate aqualitative change both in the understanding of nature and in the possibilities forthe satisfaction of human needs: this was its specific ideological function at thetime. The lasting positive aspect of its service was (as formulated so well byBacon) to break the tyrannical hold of despair over the consciousness of humantechnological possibilities and to encourage the conviction that man could funda-mentally alter the material conditions of existence. Its negative dimensionssowell disguised by Baconwere its exclusive focus on modern science and tech-nology as the designated instruments for the mastery of nature and its ability tomask the connections between their development on the one hand and the persis-tence of social conflict and political domination on the other. (p. 177)



23/32

Failingsof genderaside, this quotationclearly does draw outthe historical ambi-guities of thedomination of nature thesis. In the20th century, such an ideology fun-neled through postwar corporate-military-industrial capitalism in the West or Sta-

linism in the East (and more recently still, contemporary neo-liberalism);ideologies of thedomination of nature have taken on far more hubristicandaggres-sive forms. Frequently, they have been transformed into sterile, mystifyingdogma (Leiss, 1972, p. 178). Yet it is surely correct that we must, once again, pre-serve positive elements within the outlines of a new formulation (Leiss, 1972,p. 193). It is interesting to note that Bookchins later work (notably, Bookchin,1995c, p. 214) seems much closer to Leisss view, yet the tensions between his ear-lier and later positions remain unresolved.

We need to move beyond thedomination of naturedebate, then, but without col-lapsing into ecological romanticism. One wayforward here maywell be to developHenri Lefebvres (1991) distinction between domination and appropriation. Toinsist (contra ecological romanticism) that all human societies have been involvedin thedynamicappropriation of their natures (that is,in bringing their relationswithnature intoconsciousrationalcontrol to survive)and thathuman societiesappropri-ate nature through processes of production, reproduction, and symbolic enframingis quite a different proposition from being committed to the theistic 29 andsuperhistorical ideology that it is thedestiny of human beings to dominate natureper se. Although these two notions have often been collapsed together by a numberof thinkers, there are grounds for feeling that they now need to be clearly dis-aggregated and that we need to think of social-ecological relations in their full his-torical and geographical complexity. Recognising this (and thinking of the society-nature metabolism as a processes of co-constitution) allows us to recognise thatchanges in social relations could possibly result in qualitatively different modes of producing, reproducing,and enframingnature. That is,it raiseshope that perhaps atsome point in the future we could fashion modes of appropriation without domina-tion. And here, through all the twists and turns, we are perhaps not so far away fromthe underlying intent of Bookchins social ecology.

NOTES

1. Bookchins writings, developed over the course of some five decades, are indeedvoluminous.Thecriteria for selection usedin thisarticle followBookchins ownassessmentof hismostimportant texts.Thus, I give centralattention to theexpositionof hissocial theorythat can befound in The Ecology of Freedom , thework described by Bookchin (1991) as hiskeystone text (p.xvi). Attention is alsogiventhough to further works suchas UrbanizationWithout Cities , Remaking Society , and The Philosophy of Social Ecology that he has main-tained are necessarysupplements for gaininga comprehensivestatement of social ecology(Bookchin, 1991, p. xvi) and that provide the most systematic accounts of his social theory.Finally, though attention is given to a series of recent texts, notably, Re-Enchanting Human-

ity and Anarchism, Marxism, and the Future of the Left , these are marked by a remarkableautocritique of his previous work.

2. Perhaps most notable of these writings is Listen Marxist! (Bookchin, 1971b). Thisessay initially emerged as a pamphletdirectedat critiquing the growing influence of variouscurrents of Marxism, particularly Marxist-Leninist currents such as the Progressive LabourParty on Students for a Democratic Society. In political intention then, this engagementclearly is orientated to strengthening the claims of an alternative left-libertarian position.Despite these specific conditions of production, though, one can find a brilliant critique of the sociologicalweaknesses of vulgar Marxism in this text and a sharp critique of thepoliti-cal failings of Leninism. Among other things, Listen Marxist! significantly predates the



24/32

latter work of Gorz, Laclau, and Mouffe in critiquing the fetishisation of the proletariat inanera whenthe workingclassno longer constitute a majorityof thepopulation and haveseentheir strategic positionbeing eroded by newtechnologies.Thebroader inability of the Marx-

ist left during this period to grapple with the profound processes of social decompositionaffecting class relations, the patriarchal family, and issues surrounding race, sexuality, andecology (Bookchin, 1971b, p. 209) is also examined. In addition, there is also an enduringcritique of Leninist forms of political organisation. The revolutionary party for Bookchin(1971b) is an entity that structures itself along the very hierarchical lines . . . [of] the societyit professes to oppose (p. 196); reduces its members to poker-faced, programmed autom -ata; and adopts an utterly instrumental and manipulative engagement with politics.

3. Forexample, attention is drawn to Marxs TheFutureResultsof British Rule in India ,which Bookchin(1982) suggests virtually celebrates the utter destruction of all Indian waysof life under the Raj as unquestioningly progressive.

4. This wholeaccount of humanhistoryas a legacy of freedom versus a legacy of domi-nation would seem to been in debt to Kropotkins observation that throughout the wholehistory of civilisation twoopposed tendencies have beenin conflict; theRoman tradition andthe republican; the imperial tradition and the federalist tradition; the authoritarian and the

libertarian (as cited in Macauley, 1995, p. 23, footnote 51).5. As Bookchin (1995a) notes,

Whether the European continent necessarily would have been changed from aloose confederation of towns, cities, baronies, duchies, and the all presiding, if ineffectual,Holy Roman Empire intoa clearly articulatedgroup of nation-states isa problem in divination, not in social analysis. How Europe could have devel-opedwhether towards conf

hierarchy domination nature bookchin's historical social theory

Documents