initiative for policy dialogue working paper...
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Initiative for Policy Dialogue Working Paper Series
October 2008
Flying Geese and Waddling Ducks: The Different Capabilities of East Asia
and Latin America to ‘Demand-Adapt’ and ‘Supply-Upgrade’ Jose Gabriel Palma
Industrial Policy
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FLYING GEESE AND WADDLING DUCKS: THE DIFFERENT CAPABILITIES OF EAST ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA TO “DEMAND-ADAPT” AND “SUPPLY-UPGRADE” THEIR EXPORT PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY
José Gabriel Palma1 University of Cambridge
1
“The world of foreign trade is one of change. It makes a great difference to the trade of different countries, and to the impact of trade on them, whether they are capable of changing with the world. [...] Capacity to transform is capacity to react to change, originating at home or abroad, by adapting the structure of foreign trade to the new
situation in an economic fashion.”
-- C. Kindleberger
“[...] the obsession with competitiveness is not only wrong but dangerous, skewing domestic policies and threatening the international economic system.”
-- P. Krugman
Introduction
During the 1992 US presidential campaign President Bush's head economic adviser
was questioned about the decline in the technological content of US’s exports; he
replied that he saw no problem in it as there was no difference between exporting
micro-chips or potato-chips. This paper investigates whether this is really the case,
especially for developing countries (DCs). Are there major economic consequences
for the growth path of DCs (especially for its pace, nature and sustainability) from an
export orientation based on one or the other type of product? In particular, what are
the consequences in terms of the long-term productivity growth potential of the export
sector itself, for the capacity of exports to induce productivity growth in the rest of the
economy, for institution building, and for the welfare gains from specialization (e.g.,
issues related to the terms of trade)? Do DCs have a choice in this matter? And are
regional dynamics, particularly the role of the regional power, an important component
of the likelihood of DCs exporting one or the other type of product?
The general issue of “potato-chips versus micro-chips” will be analyzed
through the examination of the diverse export and growth performances of Latin
America (LA) and East Asia (EA) since 1960. As mentioned in the abstract, in this
chapter I argue that their experiences support at least four hypotheses. First, that
2
growth is a “product specific” phenomenon. Second, that the role played in it by
exports relates at least as much to what a country exports as to how much it exports –
i.e., that the capacity of exports to generate and sustain (trade-induced) GDP growth is
related not only to the volume but also to the composition of exports. Third, that the
capacity of an economy continuously to shift resources towards more “growth-
enhancing” export activities is related to the effectiveness of the state to implement
appropriate trade and industrial policies; and that this effectiveness is associated not
just with the ability of the state to create rents, but (much more importantly) to its
capacity to compel the corporate sector to invest them in productive capacity
diversification – i.e., continuously to shift resources towards products that would help
to supply-upgrade along the so-called “learning curve”, and demand-adapt a country’s
export productive capacity to an ever-changing international demand. And fourth, that
regional dynamics have played a significant role in growth, export diversification and
gains from specialization, especially due to the specific type of leadership that Japan
has exerted in East Asia (as opposed to that shown by the US in the Americas).
Economic growth: regional diversities
One of the main stylized facts of the world economy since the beginning of
‘globalization’ and economic reforms is the different economic performances of LA
and EA. Figure 8.1 highlights this remarkable phenomenon.
3
Figure 8.1
● GDP pc=gross domestic product per capita. Mex/China=GDP per capita of Mexico as a multiple of that of China. 3-year moving averages.
If between 1960 and 1980 Brazil practically doubled the gap between its GDP
pc and that of India, between 1980 and 2006 it was India’s turn to more than half this
gap. At the same time, while before 1980 Brazil was closing its income pc gap vis-à-
vis the countries of the OECD in a similar fashion to Korea, after 1980 only Korea was
able to continue to do this. And in terms of Mexico and China, the GDP pc of the
former as a multiple of that of latter collapsed between 1980 and 2006 from a factor of
28 to one of just 4.2
4
The primary objective of this chapter is to discuss some trade issues related to
these remarkable asymmetries and their regional dimensions.
East Asian versus Latin American development strategies
Differences between LA’s and EA’s trade and industrial policies have been well
documented. The primary benefit of these policies for EA (and now for India and
Vietnam) was that EA was able to increase simultaneously its shares of exports and of
manufactures in GDP. By contrast, LA, which throughout the first half of the 20th
century had been the region with the largest share of exports in GDP, between 1950
and the first oil crisis of the 1970s experienced a near-halving of this share. This
decline followed both a weakened demand for primary commodities in OECD markets
since the Korean War and trade and industrial policies characterized by strong anti-
export bias. As a result, and despite a strong growth performance in some countries
until 1980, particularly in Brazil and Mexico, the rapid increase in the share of
manufactures in GDP resulting from import-substituting industrialization (ISI) came at
the expense of exports.3
Although LA’s growth strategy during ISI had left the region vulnerable to
external shocks, especially due to continuous current account deficits and growing
foreign debt, nothing had prepared the region for the one unnecessarily created by Paul
Volker following his appointment to the Fed in 1979. In fact, the consequences for LA
of Volker’s “macho-monetarism” were of a magnitude not felt in the region since
1929.4 And as had happened in the 1930s, a massive and long-lasting external shock
(that found LA in an extremely vulnerable position) not only brought about the need
for a sudden and very painful internal and external macroeconomic adjustment, but
5
also laid the foundations for a radical and widespread change in the economic
paradigm of the region. In this case, it was characterized by an extreme move towards
trade and financial liberalization, wholesale privatization and market deregulation,
along the lines experimented with in Chile since 1973. Therefore, the key element to
understanding these reforms, particularly the purely ideological and remarkably rigid
and unimaginative way in which they were implemented throughout the region, is that
they were mostly carried out as a result of perceived economic weaknesses – i.e., an
attitude of ‘throwing in the towel’ vis-à-vis the previous growth strategy of state-led
ISI. In fact, the economic discourse ended up as a compass whose 'magnetic north'
was simply the mechanical reversal of as many aspects as possible of the previous
development strategy.5 The mere idea that alternatives could exist met with a mixture
of amusement and contempt.6 This helps to explain the remarkable differences with
which the reforms were implemented in LA, as distinct from EA.
As I have argued elsewhere (Palma, 2004a), it is not that EA did not implement
its economic reforms partly out of necessity (and also because of mounting external
political pressure from the US to do so); but its economic weaknesses were very
different in nature and intensity. Since the 1960s, EA integrated into the world
economy in a different way to LA. Instead of accepting their traditional, path-
dependent comparative advantages (i.e., based on traditional resource endowment,
subject to decreasing returns), East Asian countries acquired a more flexible and
growth-enhancing set of comparative advantages mainly by following a ‘flying-geese’
pattern of production and upgrading.7 This was achieved through increased export
penetration of OECD markets for manufactured goods, within a process of the
regionalization of production led by Japan (see especially Figure 8.6 below). Their
extraordinary success was based on several factors. On the external front, the fast rate
6
of expansion of international trade in these goods, and OECD (especially US) market
openness were key.8 Internally, it was due to several factors such as the ability to
build a structure of property rights and incentives, an institutional capability and a
political settlement that allowed them to produce globally competitive manufactures;
an ability to upgrade exports continuously through the ”flying geese” path;9 to their
ability to generate the high levels of investment and saving required for this upgrading;
and their achieving an effective coordination of this investment through different
forms of industrial and trade policies, which succeeded in simultaneously insulating
domestic markets and outwardly orienting tradable production.
However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, problems emerged for many East
Asian economies. First, in part due to the increased standardization of inputs to the
electronics industry, some of their most important exports faced rapidly falling prices.
In response, the corporate sectors massively expanded their productive capacity,
attempting to turn falling prices to their advantage via increased market shares.10 An
obvious casualty was profitability; consequently, the composition of the finance for
investment had to move away from profits towards (domestic and foreign) debt.11 The
increasing need for access to finance was one of the key domestic pressures behind the
drive towards financial liberalization.
Another problem was that in the same period, China became a formidable
competitor in many markets crucial to the second-tier East Asian NICs, affecting
profitability and contributing to an increased need for external finance. At the same
time, the second-tier NICs reached a point where further upgrading of exports to
higher value-added products was becoming increasingly difficult. In particular, it
became more and more complicated to break away from a “sub-contracting” type of
industrialization. So (as India and Vietnam would do later), in a far more pragmatic
7
way than in LA, East Asian countries increasingly looked towards trade and financial
liberalization, and economic deregulation in general, not as a way of changing but of
strengthening their existing ambitious growth strategy.
The capacity to ‘demand-adapt’ a country’s export profile to a rapidly changing
OECD import-demand structure.
The rapidly evolving structure of demand in world markets is a well-known
characteristic of international trade, especially since the Second World War. This
phenomenon raises the issue of the need for a more flexible approach to the concept of
comparative advantages within an export-led growth strategy; i.e., from the point of
view of gains from specialization the key issue becomes how to develop the capability
continuously to adapt one’s export productive capacity to the ever-changing patterns of
international demand.
Since the introduction of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis in the 1950s,12 and the
related research at ECLAC in the 1960s,13 DCs have fretted over the changing nature
of international demand, and in particular about the declining purchasing power of
unprocessed primary commodities exports resulting from their low income and price
elasticities of demand. Figure 8.2 shows the remarkable changes in the structure of
OECD demand for imports until 2000 (i.e., before the cyclical upturn for commodities
following 9/11) and its anti-unprocessed-primary-commodity bias (except for the
erratically changing fortunes of oil).
8
Figure 8.2
● Prim Com=primary commodities (SITC groups 0, 1, 2 and 4); Mf by Mat=Manufactures goods classified chiefly by materials (SITC group 6); fuels=Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials (SITC group 3); Chemicals=Chemicals and related products (SITC group 5); Misc+oth=Miscellaneous manufactured articles and commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere (SITC groups 8 and 9); and Machinery=machinery and transport equipment (SITC group 7).
Note: The Trade-CAN program was originally developed by Ousmene Mandeng at ECLAC in the 1980s; it has been updated periodically by ECLAC and the World Bank. The data source is the UN Com-trade on-line database (which starts in 1963). Unless otherwise stated, this program is the source of all trade statistics quoted in this paper, and all export-groups quoted will correspond to the SITC classification, Version 2, at a 4-digit level.
● Source: Trade-CAN (2005).
Figure 8.2 shows the most important characteristic of the structure of OECD
imports between 1963 and 2000: the collapse of the share of non-oil primary
commodities (SITC groups 0, 1, 2 and 4). In fact, even including oil unprocessed
commodities lost about three quarters of their share in OECD imports during this 37-
year period, falling from 41% of the total in 1963 to just 10.6% in 2000 (left-hand
panel); and excluding oil from both the numerator and denominator, they fell from
46% to 11.5%, respectively (right-hand panel).14 However, primary products with a
higher level of manufacturing value added (e.g., SITC group 6) maintained their share
9
in OECD imports at a relatively stable level (about 15% of the total). By contrast,
imports of machinery and transport equipment (SITC group 7) more than doubled their
OECD import-share during this period (from 18.4% to 41%).
Quite apart from supply-side issues discussed below (such as the different long-
term productivity growth potentials that exports of manufactures and unprocessed
commodities may have), to insert oneself into the international division of labour
through exporting products characterized by slow-growing (or even declining) markets
does not augur well for long-term welfare gains from international specialization. In
fact, during the second half of the 20th century, the terms of trade of non-oil exporting
LA fell (cyclically) by half from its Korean War peak, reaching before the 9/11 crisis a
level even below that of the post-1929 crash. What Latin American policy-makers and
their economic advisors seem to forget these days is that, from the point of view of
demand, exports are just an indirect way of producing imports; and by exporting low-
income and low-price elasticity of demand products, declining terms of trade makes
(the indirect production of) those imports ever more expensive. In fact, in a Ricardian
sense, the region’s increased export efficiency may sometimes even act as an ‘own-
goal’ because although increased competitiveness may help GDP-growth, if it is done
too much at the expense of the terms of trade, it may seriously harm the purchasing
power of that GDP growth – i.e., in extreme cases output growth may be outweighed
by deteriorating terms of trade.15
As if the problem of the (cyclical) long-term declining level of LA’s non-fuel
terms of trade was not serious enough, the instability of these terms of trade adds a
further uncertainty to the region’s economic life. In fact, the average (absolute)
percentage variation of LA’s non-oil terms of trade reached 6.7% per annum during
the 84-year period between 1920 and 2006. To give an indication of the magnitude of
10
this instability problem (and assuming an average share of exports in national income
of one third, with everything else constant), a country facing this amount of instability
in its export markets will have its national income changing randomly by an average of
2.2% per annum for this reason alone!
However, demand dynamics in international markets is a more complex issue
than just a generic one between unprocessed commodities or manufactures. There is
also a significant diversity within manufactures in this respect.
FIGURE 8.3
● Industries are grouped on the basis of their R&D intensity. Cars=road vehicles, engines and their non-electrical parts; medium R&D*=excludes vehicles and engines.
● Source: Trade-CAN (2005), using the OECD classification for product content of R&D.
11
Figure 8.3 illustrates that the rapid growth of OECD demand for manufactures
is concentrated in just two types of product: one requiring intense R&D and one of
moderately intense R&D (road vehicles, including their engines and non-electrical
parts). These two groups had a sector-share increase between 1963 and 2000 of 317%
and 160%, respectively. Sector shares of other manufactured products with a medium
content of R&D increased by only 14% during this 37-year period, while that of
manufactured products with a low content of R&D actually declined by 23%. In turn,
the market-share of resource-based products collapsed by 71%! Figure 8.3 also
reveals the remarkable correlation between demand dynamism and technology content
of OECD imports. Therefore, the degree of dynamism of OECD demand for imports
of a product could also be understood as a proxy for the technology content of that
product (see Figure 8.10 below).
Given the fact that OECD demand for imports is a rapidly moving target, one
of the key differences between LA and EA during this period was that while EA was
able to develop its skills at keeping an eye on this moving target (and kept shifting
resources accordingly), LA continued aiming as though at a fixed target (increased
competitiveness in non-demand-dynamic products; see Figures 8.4, 8.9 and 8.10
below). In fact, one could argue that the real comparative advantage acquired by EA
during this period was not on a set of products, but on learning how to develop a
flexible export productive capacity.16
Writing at the beginning of the period studied in this paper, Kindleberger
(1962, p. 10; see introductory quotation) predicted this rapidly changing structure of
world trade, and prescribed developing “the capacity of changing with the world” as a
necessary skill for maximizing gains from trade. Figure 8.4 presents a statistical
indicator for a country’s capacity to react to changes in world demand via a “demand-
12
adaptability index”.17 This index is constructed using the ratio of a country’s or
region’s market share in “demand-dynamic” sectors (adjusted by the weight of
demand-dynamic sectors in all sectors of OECD imports), to that of its market share in
“demand-sluggish” sectors (adjusted by these sectors’ share in OECD imports). A
value of 1 for this index at the end year of a period indicates that during the preceding
years a country was able to “track” changes in demand in OECD markets – i.e., it was
able to ‘demand-adapt’ its export structure to reflect the changing structure of OECD
imports.18
Figure 8.4
● Excludes oil. M=imports; Jap=Japan; N-1=first-tier NICs (Korea, Singapore and Taiwan; Hong Kong has been excluded due to its transformation into a financial centre); N-2=second-tier NICs (Malaysia and Thailand); LA*=LA (excluding Mexico and Brazil); Bra=Brazil; SA=South Asia (India and Pakistan); S-SA*=Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa); ZA=South Africa.
Note: The index for Mexico is not included in the graph due to the distorting effect of its ‘maquila’ exports, which in trade statistics are measured in terms of gross value of production (i.e., including imported inputs); ‘maquila’ exports accounted for about half its manufacturing exports, but almost 80% of the value of output was made from imported inputs (see Palma, 2005a). The share of imported inputs is also very high in the rest of manufacturing exports (see Capdevielle, 2005; and Moreno-Brid, 2005).
13
Figure 8.4 shows LA’s tendency to under-invest in productive capacity
diversification in its export sector; this could hardly be passively blamed merely on the
fact that the region happens to be rich in natural resources. Abundance of natural
resources could hardly be considered a sufficient condition for lack of investment
efforts in product-diversification and upgrading. That is, a rich resource endowment
could not be blamed in itself (as the resource-curse hypothesis seeks to do) for a
country ending up being a waddling-duck rather than a dynamic goose.19
One obvious way for primary commodity rich countries to improve their
‘demand-adaptability’ is to increase the degree of processing of these commodities, as
the Scandinavian and some East Asian countries (especially Malaysia) have shown.
Another is the upgrading of their domestic productive capacity in terms of the inputs
needed for their commodity production.20 Both paths (up- and down-stream) would
lead to export products that are more “demand dynamic” in world markets. Yet
another path is the targeting of high-value low-volume commodity niches, taking
advantage of the hyper-segmentation of markets that characterizes the current process
of globalization.21 The process of export upgrading (both up- and downstream) is the
subject of the next section of this paper.
The capacity to “supply-upgrade” a country’s export profile
Upgrading resource-based exports
Increasing the degree of manufacturing value of resource-based exports allows
14
resource-rich countries to attain an export structure characterized not just by stronger
demand in international markets, but also by products with higher long-term
productivity growth potentials. Figure 8.5 shows the contrast between Finland and
Malaysia on the one hand, and Brazil and Chile on the other, in timber-based export
products.
Figure 8.5: Finland, Malaysia, Chile and Brazil: vertical integration in the processed-timber industry
● w-chip=wood-chips; pulp=pulp and waste paper; w-maf=wood manufactures; furnit=furniture; w-mach=paper mill and pulp mill machinery. Finland also managed a substantial share in OECD imports of paper and paperboards (not included in the graph), reaching in 2000 a market share in OECD markets of 14% (in that year, the respective market shares for Brazil and Chile were just 0.6% and 0.1%).
The differences in long-term productivity growth potentials characteristic of
15
processed and unprocessed timber are well known. There are also substantial
differences in their demand-dynamics in OECD import markets: while the sector-share
in total OECD imports of wood-chips fell by 54% and that of pulp by 71% between
1963 and 2000, those of wood manufactures increased by 74% and of furniture by
400% during this period.
As Figure 8.5 shows, Finland’s high market shares in OECD imports of the
more technologically advanced timber-based products were acquired gradually as they
moved along the value-added learning curve of the industry. A large part of Finland's
timber-based exports in the 1960s consisted simply (as in Brazil and Chile) of wood-
chips and pulp. However, by the 1970s Finland had all but stopped exporting wood-
chips, had substantially cut its exports of pulp, and was using these raw materials as
inputs for increased production and export of paper and paperboards, wood
manufactures, and furniture. Also, by then Finland’s market shares in OECD markets
for machinery for the paper mill and pulp mill industries had exceeded 8% – a
substantial achievement for such a small country.22
Figure 8.5 also reveals large disparities in export upgrading in the processed-
timber industry between LA and EA. In the 1960s, neither had a processed-timber
export industry. In the 1970s, while Chile and Brazil continued to export basic timber
products, Malaysia had already added some wood manufactures, aided by the
successful implementation of an industrial policy restricting exports of unprocessed
timber. By 2000, Brazil’s and Chile's exports still consisted entirely of products at the
lower end of processing, while Malaysia's exports of processed-timber products
consisted almost entirely of wood manufactures and furniture.23
The upgrading in the timber-based industry is, of course, a complex
phenomenon, full of investment indivisibilities, high-entry costs, huge economies of
16
scale, intricate financial engineering, specific skills, technological complexities and
environmental issues. Even the relatively simple operation of upgrading from wood-
chip to ‘MDF’ requires considerable investments and skilful institutional
arrangements.24 Basically, one could easily end up in the business of transforming
high quality timber into worthless furniture. As a result, many advise DCs not to
tackle these market failures in the export-upgrading business (those that tend to keep
them trapped in their traditional comparative advantages), and to try to make the best
of their sub-optimal growth path. It would be wiser to be risk averse in this matter of
‘acquiring’ more growth-enhancing comparative advantages. For example, some may
remember the World Bank reports and academic publications of the late 1950s and
early 1960s that were intrigued by Japanese corporations transforming world-class
steel and other high-quality inputs into sub-standard cars, which could be sold only to
captive domestic customers or exported at highly-subsidized prices.25 Korean
corporations followed suit in the 1970s, and the ‘usual suspects’ again wondered about
what could be the rationale for building low or negative value-added production lines
that used profits from captive markets to subsidize unprofitable exports? Who would
voluntarily choose to buy a 1970s’ Korean car, unless it was a home-customer with no
choice, or an international one only able to afford a massively subsidized product? But
in fact, it did not take all that long for the Japanese and Korean car industry to turn the
tables completely on their competitors.26
Asymmetries in the dynamics of international demand for iron, steel and metal-
working machinery are similar to those of the timber industry: while the sector shares
in total OECD imports of iron ores and concentrates fell in value by 82% between
1977 and 2000, those of metal-working machinery significantly improved their relative
position in OECD imports. However, in 2000 Chile exported only iron ores and
17
Brazil’s market share in OECD imports of iron ores was 15 times larger than its share
in processed iron and steel. As mentioned above, this can hardly be justified simply by
LA’s natural resource abundance or US protectionist policies. Korea, by contrast,
soon transformed the initial exports of iron ores into steel; then developed further into
exporting metal-working machinery. Taiwan, in turn, had by the 1980s also already
developed a significant export industry of metal-working machinery.
Although it is well known that as many countries which have tried this type of
product-upgrading and demand adaptation have failed as have succeeded, the fact is
that EA has developed the habit of succeeding while post-reform LA has stopped
trying. Not surprisingly, when FDI decides to get involved in this type of value-chain
it tends to invest in resource-extraction in LA and resource-processing in EA.27
In fact, post-reform LA has not only invested very little in productive capacity
diversification in order to move up the ‘technology ladder’ in terms of the processing
of exports, but in several cases the movement has actually been in the opposite
direction. Post-1973 Chile, for example, not only abandoned its previous ‘pro-
industrialization’ agenda, but even ended up severely reducing the share of domestic
value added in its copper exports, with the proportion of refined copper in total exports
being drastically reduced in favor of the far more primitive copper ‘concentrates’ (see
below).
Supply-upgrading in resource-poor countries: the flying-geese phenomenon
The Japanese economist Akamatsu coined the phrase ‘flying geese’ to characterize the
East Asian supply-upgrading industrialization model (Akamatsu 1962). The analysis
that follows will characterize two very distinct components of this flying-geese
18
phenomenon, not distinguished properly by Akamatsu and often confused in the
literature: what I have called here the “sequential movements” and the “parallel
movements” along the learning curve. Although each process is characterized by a
very different dynamic, both have a crucial common element in that nearly all products
involved are demand-dynamic from the point of view of world trade. What is
characteristic of the first (and better known) component of this ‘flying-geese’ process
of industrialization, that which ‘moves sequentially along the learning curve’, is the
involvement of products that Japan can no longer competitively produce and export
and, therefore, allows its productive capacity to be transferred to the geese that are
following them. For Japan, these products are either too labour-intensive to be
produced competitively at Japanese wages, or they have already exhausted their
productivity growth potentials (Figure 8.6, left panel).
Figure 8.6
● Panel A=percentage of exports in the respective countries in Japan’s 10 export sectors with most rapidly declining market shares between 1963 and 2000 (SITC groups 843, 851, 037, 034, 894, 899, 666, 842, 761 and 762; for a detailed analysis of these products, see Palma, 1998). Panel B=the
19
same for Japan’s 20 major export sectors in 1995 (SITC groups 781, 752, 764, 784, 776, 759, 778, 713, 763, 894, 782, 785, 751, 772, 749, 898, 874, 882, 728 and 736). MA+Th and M&T=Malaysia and Thailand; and Ko=Korea.
In the “sequential-movement” component, export productive capacity of products that
tend not to be very high up the ‘learning curve’ is successively transferred from Japan
to the first-tier NICs, and then from these countries to the second-tier NICs, then to
China, Vietnam, and so on. The crucial issue here is that when productive capacity is
transferred to the geese that are following them, these substitute the exports of the
more advanced goose in world markets, creating a sequence of ‘inverted U-paths’ – a
phenomenon widely acknowledged in the traditional flying-geese literature.
The second (and usually ignored) component of the flying-geese phenomenon,
that of “moving in parallel” along the learning curve (Figure 8.6, right panel), reflects
a different regional dynamic. This relates to products in which Japan does not
relinquish its productive capacity easily and often vigorously fights back against the
challenge of other Asian countries. Japan’s reluctance to ‘concede’ is due either to the
fact that these products still have substantial productivity growth potential left in them
and/or because they are among the products with the highest demand-dynamics in
world trade.28
As Figure 8.6 indicates, Japan’s share of exports in these 20 sectors eventually
began to decline under the competitive pressure of the other East Asian geese; even in
these extremely demand-dynamic markets, there is limited space for market entry. So,
here we find not ‘inverted U-paths’, but parallel trajectories; the crucial issue here is
that as this process involves products that are much higher up in the ‘learning curve’.
These are products in which Japan is reluctant to give up, and East Asian countries
20
(with lags in time associated to their relative level of development) attempt to compete
with Japan (rather than substitute its exports, as in the ‘inverted-U’ case).
One of the first casualties of EA’s moving ‘in parallel’ along the learning curve
was the US; this was due to the fact that this pattern of “imitation-with-a-lag” leads to
an incremental East Asian market-share (see right-hand panel of Figure 8.7). This is
not the case with the other component of flying-geese industrialization, the ‘sequential’
movement in less attractive export products, as EA’s aggregate market share hardly
increased as productive capacity was systematically moved from one country to the
other.
Figure 8.7
● LA-M=Latin America, excluding Mexico; East Asia=combined market shares of Japan, the NICs-1, NICs-2 and China in Japan’s 20 major export sectors in 1995. (For a list of these export sectors see
21
Figure 6.)
The contrast between EA and the Americas in both components of the East
Asian ‘flying-geese’ pattern of industrialization is remarkable. On the one hand, in
terms of Japan’s declining sectors, the US and non-Mexico-LA maintain remarkably
low and stable market shares for most of the period (left-hand panel in Figure 8.7).
Yet, on the other, during this period the US lost half its market share in OECD imports
in the second (more growth-enhancing) group of products (right-hand panel in Figure
8.7). In turn, LA (excluding ‘maquila’ Mexico) is on a completely different
productive-capacity planet as far as these products are concerned.
However, to test whether or not there is a ‘flying-geese’ phenomenon in the
Americas one should compare LA’s exports with those of the US, not just with those
of Japan. Figure 8.8 does that vis-à-vis the US’s 20 major and most ‘dynamic’ export
sectors.29
Figure 8.8
22
● X=exports. US’s 20 major export sectors in 1995 were: SITC groups 792, 752, 784, 759, 781, 776, 874, 714, 764, 713, 931, 541, 778, 898, 772, 598, 749, 222, 322 and 892. US’s 20 most ‘dynamic’ export sectors (i.e., those which had the fastest increase in market shares) 1963-2000: SITC groups 246, 785, 034, 289, 112, 035, 061, 323, 014, 634, 036, 659, 248, 001, 871, 072, 223, 247, 287, and 291 (to avoid spurious growth rates in the calculation of US’s 20 most ‘dynamic’ export-sectors, a ‘filter’ was used to include only those export sectors that had an export-share of at least 0.3% of the total in 1963).
Within LA, Brazil was the only country that had a slow but steady increase of
the share of its exports in the US’s ‘top-20’ sectors (right-hand panel in Figure 8.8),
reaching 22% of its exports in 2000; however, more than one fifth of this increased
share is made up by a single product, and a primary commodity at that: soybeans! The
rest of ‘non-maquila’ LA had no significant amount of export-shares in these products
(though Argentina was also rapidly increasing its soybean exports towards the end of
this period).
One could hardly characterize this as a regional flying-geese pattern of
industrialization and upgrading, one in which exports follow either a sequential or a
parallel path between the US and LA. Of the US’s 20 most dynamic export sectors
(left-hand panel in Figure 8.8), 16 are primary commodities and fuels. Not
surprisingly, the combined sector-share of these 20 sectors in all OECD imports fell
steadily from 10.4% in 1963 to just 4.4% in 2000. Contrast this with Japan's 20 most
dynamic export sectors, which doubled their sector-share over the same period.
Moreover, as the right panel of Figure 8.8 shows, in the US’s 20 most dynamic export
sectors the “goose leader”, the US, flies in reverse: i.e., trying to penetrate markets that
are being relinquished by supposed geese-following Latin American countries! That
is, it is in the 20 sectors in which the US had the highest increase in OECD market
shares that one of the most bizarre aspects of the US’s regional influence emerges. The
US was increasing its export-shares in (rather unattractive, mostly primary) products in
23
which LA was already reducing its export-share. Rather than an East Asian flying-
geese pattern of succession, the (more magical realist) Americas present a scenario in
which the leader follows the followers…30
Figure 8.9, which compares the changes in the overall levels of competitiveness
and the capacity to move into ‘high-tech’ products in the regions studied here,
illustrates several related issues.31
Figure 8.9
● ‘High-tech’ products=products with high content of R&D. X=exports and M=imports. Chi=China; Latin America*=Latin America, excluding Brazil and ‘maquila’ Mexico and Central America; Tw=Taiwan.
● Vertical axis: percentage of exports with high content of R&D in 1963 (first observation) and in 2000 (second observation). Horizontal axis: percentage of all exports (with or without high content of R&D) in which the respective country or region gained market shares in OECD imports between 1963 and 1971 (first observation), and between 1990 and 2000 (second observation).
24
First, Figure 8.9 shows that in 1963 neither LA nor the first- and second-tier
NICs and China exported ‘high-tech’ products. However, secondly, it also indicates
that East and South East Asian countries were already competitive in the (non-high-
tech) products that they exported at the time (products that were rather similar in
nature to those exported by LA). Third, it shows that among Latin American countries
during the 1960s, only Brazil and Mexico (not included in the graph) were relatively
competitive in their exports and were gaining market shares in a significant proportion
of them (58% of exports in both countries); i.e., LA’s ISI-anti-export-bias affected
more intensively the export-competitiveness of the small and medium-sized countries
(including Argentina). Fourth, it shows that during the 1990s (after trade
liberalization) LA was able massively to increase its competitiveness in OECD
markets – in several cases, from less than 20% to about 80% of their exports. Fifth,
even though during the 1990s LA reached East Asian levels of export-competitiveness,
it did so only in its traditional-type exports.32 If international demand had not
discriminated in such an extreme form against commodities, and if these products had
had the same long-term productivity growth potential and growth-enhancing ‘pulling’
effect as those higher up in the ‘value-chain’, this remarkable increase in
competitiveness would have been an unqualified regional success. Unfortunately, this
was clearly not the case. Finally, Figure 8.9 also illustrates East Asian countries’
remarkable capacity to ‘reinvent’ themselves, by diversifying their export productive
capacity towards ‘high-tech’ products; further, they did so while retaining most of their
former extremely high levels of export-competitiveness.
Overall export-trajectories between the 1960s and 1990s
Finally, one could compare export profiles between the 1960s and the 1990s not just
25
by looking at the capacity to move into ‘high-tech’ products (Figure 8.9), but also into
‘demand-dynamic’ products in general, whether ‘high-tech’ or not (Figure 8.10).
Figure 8.10
● Excludes oil. X=exports; M=imports. Br=Brazil; Ch=China; EU=European Union; LA*=LA (excluding Brazil; maquila Mexico and Central America); Mal=Malaysia; N-1=Korea, Singapore and Taiwan; SSA=Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa); Thai=Thailand; Viet=Vietnam.
● First observation: export profile of country or region 1963-1971. Second observation: that between 1990 and 2000. Vertical axis: percentage of exports of a country or region of products that became ‘demand-dynamic’ in OECD imports (i.e., products that increased their share in OECD imports during respective periods due, for example, to their higher income elasticity). Horizontal axis: percentage of exports in which the respective country or region gained market shares in OECD imports during the relevant period. Therefore, if an observation is in Quadrant 1 this indicates an ‘uncompetitive’ country (i.e., less than half its exports have gained market shares) exporting ‘non-demand-dynamic’ products (i.e., less than half its exports are ‘demand-dynamic’ products); if it is in quadrant 2, it shows a ‘competitive’ country exporting ‘non-demand-dynamic’ products; if in quadrant 3, a ‘competitive’ country exporting ‘demand-dynamic’ products; and in quadrant 4, an ‘uncompetitive’ country exporting ‘demand-dynamic’ products.
Notes: i) Data for Taiwan correspond to those reported in the second edition of the Trade-CAN software; this edition includes data only until 1995. The third edition (used for all other countries) does not provide data for Taiwan; ii) The first observation for Vietnam corresponds to the period 1973-1984 (i.e., from the date when US combat troops left Vietnam until the beginning of economic reform; Trần Văn Thọ, et al. 2000); the second observation is for the 1990s; and iii) See Appendix 2 for a more formal definition of the four quadrants.
Figure 8.10 illustrates that the remarkable increase in export-competitiveness in
26
LA between the 1960s and the 1990s (i.e., the rapid movement from quadrants 1 to 2),
was not accompanied by an improvement in the ‘quality’ of its exports. Figure 8.9 has
shown that LA’s improved export-competitiveness did not include many high-tech
products; Figure 8.10 indicates that it did not include many other demand-dynamic
products either. In EA, in contrast, it indicates an intriguing aspect of the flying-geese
pattern of industrialization and exports: the different trajectories of young-
industrializers (second-tier NICs and China), to those of middle-aged ones (first-tier
NICs) and of more ‘mature’ ones (Japan). Basically, the rapid movement into
demand-dynamic products of the second-tier NICs and China – their sharp movement
from quadrants 2 to 3 – eats away some degree of export-competitiveness in the first-
tier NICs. This process is more acute with Japan (and the EU) because the aggregate
competitive pressure of all NICs and China (in addition to other domestic economic
problems) has driven these countries from quadrants 3 to 4. With the exception of the
US (primarily during the Clinton years, and in part due to the composition of its
exports discussed above), the overall pattern that emerges in Figure 8.10 is one of a
clear anti-clockwise trajectory.
For LA and other countries moving into quadrant 2, the crucial trade- and
industrial-policy issue next is whether there are endogenous market forces that would
lead them in an upwards movement from quadrants 2 to 3. Or whether there are
market failures that would lead them to get trapped in being ever more competitive in
products that tend to be ever more marginalized (in value terms) from world markets
(except for temporary cyclical periods such as those that benefited many commodities,
such as oil, after the 9/11 crisis). In fact, especially in commodity markets, excessive
competitive struggle for market shares by DCs often leads to a self-defeating fallacy of
composition problems.33
27
So far, there is little (if any) evidence of “upward endogenous forces” at work
that would help bring a country from 2 to 3. Countries in quadrant 2 seem to need an
exogenous push such as the trade and industrial policies that characterized the
movement from 2 to 3 in most East Asian countries. However, for these policies to be
implemented effectively, what is needed is the type of institutional arrangements that
allowed them to be effective in EA. These include a strong state, capable not only of
devising trade and industrial policies to generate rents that would create incentives to
the transfer of resources towards demand-dynamic export products, but also capable of
making sure that these rents are used effectively. That is, a state not only able of
generating rents, but also one capable of imposing conditionalities in order to
‘discipline’ the capitalist élite to use them productively. Furthermore, for these
policies to succeed it is also necessary to have a state capable of withstanding
clientelist pressures from “intermediate classes”.34
If these policies and the institutional arrangements necessary for their success
are not implemented, the potential GDP-growth-enhancing effect of further increases
in export-competitiveness in LA would continue to be restricted by the generally low
productivity growth potential of unprocessed commodity exports (sometimes after an
initial one-off boost), and by their modest positive externalities and spill-over effects
and low capacity to induce productivity growth in the rest of the economy in general.
Furthermore, lack of an upward movement from 2 to 3 could also seriously affect the
welfare gains from trade specialization in terms of the purchasing power of exports.35
Existing evidence for LA indicates that the (not so) invisible hand of globalized
markets are only creating incentives leading towards further penetration into quadrant
2. There is little evidence that market incentives, the domestic structure of property
rights and institutional arrangements, or domestic political settlements are helping the
28
region to move upwards in the direction of quadrant 3. One example is Chile, the most
successful country in post-reform LA (at least for the period between the 1982 debt
crisis and the 1997 East Asian financial crisis), whose export trajectory is a horizontal
(in fact, slightly downward) movement from quadrant 1 to 2, increasing the share of
competitive exports from 12% to 79%, while actually decreasing the share of exports
of demand-dynamic products from 12% to 6%. The performance of its copper export
industry is a good example of this peculiar combination of increased competitiveness
with no ‘upward push’; in fact, while rapidly gaining market share, Chile was actually
reducing the average share of manufacturing value added in its copper exports. As a
result, the proportion of refined copper (i.e., with more than 99% metal content) has
fallen from 97% of total copper exports in 1973 to just about half, in favor of the far
less processed form of copper ‘concentrates’ (with less than one-third metal content).36
There is ample evidence that the sharp slowdown in Chile’s growth since the end of
the 1990s is partly due to this under-investment in upward productive diversification.37
Finally, the analysis of the past 40 years of international trade clearly shows
that LA’s long-delayed transition towards quadrant 3 can expect little (if any) pulling
help from the US (as East Asian countries had from their ‘leading-goose’).38
A simple test for the different capabilities of EA and LA to use exports effectively
as an engine of growth
LA’s economic performance since the beginning of trade and financial liberalization,
and the switching back of the engine of growth to the export sector, has been
characterized by dynamic exports and sluggish growth in the rest of the economy.
Figure 8.11 shows the average growth of GDP and exports since 1980, as well as the
29
conditional expectation for this relationship.
Figure 8.11
● EA*=NICs-1 and NICs-2; LA*=Latin America (excluding Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela); dLA=interactive dummy for Latin American countries; mena=North Africa and the Middle East; oecd=average of 15 high-income OECD countries; SA*=South Asia (excluding India); S-S A*=Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa). Br=Brazil; Mx=Mexico; and ZA=South Africa.
● Source: Constructed by the author using data from WDI (2007).
Note: The regression line is obtained from a cross-country regression in which GDP growth is the dependent variable and export growth squared is the explanatory one; the sample consists of all countries for which the WDI reports data for both variables during this period (94). It is important to emphasize here that the aim of this regression is simply to represent a cross-sectional description of cross-country GDP-growth differences, categorized by export-growth performance. Therefore, this regression should not be interpreted as ‘predictive’, because as is well-known there are a number of difficulties with a regression of this type estimated from a single cross-section, especially regarding the homogeneity restrictions that are required to hold. This regression passes all the relevant diagnostic tests. The R2 is 54% and the ‘t’ statistic of the explanatory variable is 10.1. The ‘t’ statistics are based on ‘White’s heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors’. For a discussion of the econometrics of cross-section regressions, see Pesaran, et al. (2000).
In most of LA, as in many other DCs, economic reform has certainly succeeded in
shifting the ‘engine of growth’ towards the export sector. However, for any engine to
be effective, the power it generates must be properly harnessed. Asian countries seem
30
to have mastered this process rather well, while those in LA (especially Brazil and
Mexico, formerly the most dynamic economies of the region) and in Sub-Saharan
Africa (including South Africa) remain far from doing so. Figure 8.12 shows the
degree to which the performance of the export engine seems to be region-specific, and
the remarkable underperformance of LA.
Figure 8.12
● EA=East and South-East Asia; LA=Latin America; dLA=interactive dummy for Latin American countries; SA=South Asia; S-S A=Sub-Saharan Africa; and S-S A*=Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa). Ar=Argentina; B=Bangladesh; Br=Brazil; Ch=Chile; Co=Colombia; Ec=Ecuador; H=Hong-Kong; In=India; Ko=Korea; M=Malaysia; Mx=Mexico; Pa=Paraguay; Pe=Peru; Pk=Pakistan; Th=Thailand; Tw=Taiwan; Ur=Uruguay; and VN=Vietnam; and ZA=South Africa. Vietnam’s export growth is 14.7%. With the LA dummy the R2 of the regression increases to 58% and the ‘t’ statistic of the explanatory variable to 10.8; the ‘t’ of the dummy is 3. The ‘t’ statistics are based on ‘White’s heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors’.
Note: The WDI database does not provide information for Taiwan. Data for this country have been obtained from The Republic of China Yearbook of Statistics.
As is clear from the graph, the Latin American export-engine tends to perform badly
31
compared to those of EA and South Asia in terms of its capacity to be associated with
GDP growth in the rest of the economy. In fact, it performs poorly in relative terms
even when compared with that of other commodity-exporting countries. Basically,
during this period Sub-Saharan countries achieved disappointing growth rates on both
exports and GDP, while Asian countries managed dynamic growth on both fronts;
whereas Latin American countries (and especially Brazil and Mexico), while able to
engineer a rapid expansion of exports, were unable to pull the rest of the economy
along with it. So, in statistical terms, as GDP growth in Latin American countries is
located below their conditional expectations consistently enough, the interactive
dummy for the region ends up being negative and highly significant.
The underperforming of the Latin American export-engine after economic
reform is a relatively stable phenomenon throughout the post-1980 period. In Brazil,
for example, while between 1950 and 1980 the growth of the previous engine
(manufacturing) and overall GDP were very similar (8.8% and 7.3% per year,
respectively), since Lula was first elected, the asymmetry between the growth of the
new engine (exports) and GDP during this period (2002-2007) could hardly be greater
(13.3% and 3.5% respectively; see http://www.eclac.org).
Mexico is the country with the largest gap between actual GDP-growth and the
conditional expectation of this growth in the whole sample, making it an extreme
example of export-led failure. During these two and a half decades, a remarkably
dynamic growth of exports (9.2% per year) was associated with an extremely poor
growth performance (2.6%).39 Further, as population grew at over 1.6%, per capita
GDP growth stood at just under 1% per year.40 Figure 8.13 shows more clearly this
phenomenon of booming exports with little GDP-growth “tracking”.
32
Figure 8.13
● Log scales. Exports do not include oil; 1980 prices. For the convenience of the graph, before transforming the data into logs the original data were first made into a 3-year moving average and then into index-numbers with 1981 as a base year (equal to 20.09; the natural logarithm of this number is 3).
● Sources: 1950-2004 from Palma (2005a); 2005-2010: estimates and forecasts of the Economist Intelligence Unit.
The Mexican economy’s remarkable inability to harness the power generated by its
dynamic export expansion seems to be its most important economic failure since the
end of the ISI-period and the beginning of neo-liberal economic reforms. As Figure
8.13 shows, the long-lasting close relationship between exports and GDP growth, built
during ISI, disappeared after the 1982 debt crisis, when the sharp acceleration in the
rate of growth of exports became associated with a sharp decline in rate of growth of
GDP – not exactly the Promised Land of the Washington Consensus. In fact, the ratio
of export growth to that of GDP more than trebled.
33
As the regression line above has indicated, in LA exports are faltering as an
engine of growth not because of their lack of own growth, market penetration or
competitiveness, but because of their poor ‘GDP-tracking’ properties. This is likely to
be associated, at least in part, with the lack of ‘quality’ of its export composition (i.e.,
in terms of the idiom of Figure 8.10 above, with the region’s inability to move from
quadrants 2 to 3; and in the case of Mexico, with the lack of ‘deepening’ of its maquila
exports). Orthodox and unimaginative monetary, fiscal and exchange-rate policies
have not helped either. However, as Figure 8.12 indicated, this is also a region-
specific phenomenon, likely to be the result of the rigid way in which economic
reforms were implemented in the region. For example, if one adds to the above
regression a variable for the ‘quality’ of exports (as in Figure 8.10), other variables to
account for factor accumulation (population growth and investment) and others to
account for ‘production frontier shifters’ (such as manufacturing), LA again ends up as
the region with the largest negative gap between actual GDP growth and the
conditional expectation of that growth.
Ironically, while during the ISI period the main obstacle in LA to the
sustainability of growth was an almost obsessive concentration of policy incentives
and resources in (non-export) manufacturing, leading to a neglect of exports (hindering
growth via a balance of payments constraint), in the post-1980 period the region did
exactly the same but the other way around. Though LA certainly succeeded in
becoming competitive in world markets for its traditional export products, this effort
seems to have had little overall growth effects. Lack of growth-enhancing policies,
institutions capable of implementing them, adequate structures of property rights and
incentives and macro-stability also matter in this. Product diversification, high levels
of investment and adequate institutions seem to be the conditions that have helped
34
Asian countries successfully take advantage of new ‘growth spaces’ in a globalized
world.
In sum, export-led growth when based on unprocessed primary commodities or
‘thin’ maquila exports has proved to be a poor engine of growth. The main lesson
from post-reform LA is that if middle-income DCs want to insist on this export
orientation (or if there is little they can do about it in the short-term), policy makers
and the capitalist élite of these countries should think about this model only as an
“growth-enabling” export-strategy, not as an “export-led” growth strategy. That is, a
fast rate of growth of (unprocessed) commodity exports can at best be expected to
provide foreign exchange to enable a more dynamic rate of growth in the rest of the
economy; i.e., to increase the rate of growth of GDP that is sustainable from the point
of view of the balance of payment. However, for this growth to actually take place
there is still the need for a proper ‘engine’ to be activated somewhere else in the
economy. That is, parallel to commodity exports there is the need for other sectors or
activities to play the role of “production frontier shifters”, able to set in motion
processes of cumulative causation – characterized by their positive feedback loops into
the system, capable of generating a momentum of change which is self-perpetuating
(as in the Veblen/Myrdal or Young/Kaldor manner). Not much evidence from LA to
indicate that unprocessed primary commodities or ‘maquila’ exports can play such
role!
Conclusions
Ultimately, the effectiveness of exports as an engine of growth depends on the capacity
of exports to improve both productivity growth and labour absorption not only in the
35
export sector but in the overall economy. On the purchasing power of income side
there is the additional issue of the terms of trade, as these are the vital link between
real GDP growth and real command-GDP growth.
In post-reform LA (with the sole exception of Chile – and only during a
specific period that covers about half its post-reform years), the main stylized fact
regarding GDP growth is that even in those countries successful in rapidly accelerating
the rate of growth of exports, especially Mexico and Brazil, the rate of growth of
output has been particularly disappointing. Of course, for those countries that have not
even been able to improve export-competitiveness, the post-reform economic situation
has usually proved much worse.
For LA and many other DCs the key strategic trade-policy issue is how to
invest effectively in product-diversification in order to re-direct export growth from
quadrants 2 to 3. Of course, the design of these policies is sometimes difficult and
their practical implementation is always so, due to institutional, technological,
financial and other constraints. The movement from 2 to 3 relates not only to the
critical supply-side differences between concentrating exports in basic unprocessed
primary commodities rather than in products higher up in the value-chain, but also to
the rather obvious fact that if for a DC exports are to be the engine of growth in an
export-led strategy, it is better to be attached to a locomotive (world demand) with
effective pulling-power (demand-growth). This could prove, for example, the
difference between international trade being a positive- or zero-sum game vis-à-vis
competitors.
Export-led growth in post-reform LA has been, at best, a mixed blessing.
Although ‘maquila’ exports have absorbed a significant amount of labour, they have
been characterized by little or no productivity growth, and associated with little or no
36
productivity growth in the rest of the economy. In turn, in the few cases of rapid
productivity growth in unprocessed commodity exports (e.g., some mining and
agricultural products), there is evidence that this has been more a ‘one-off’ type of
phenomenon than a process that could be sustained over time. Moreover, this
productivity growth has had little ‘pulling’ effect on productivity-growth in the rest of
the economy. And from the point of view of command-GDP-growth, at least until the
cyclical upswing in commodity terms of trade that started with 9/11, when exports
were adjusted by the price of imports, the capacity of export-growth to add to the
purchasing power of GDP proved equally disappointing.
Using Krugman’s terminology, post-reform LA may be a paradigmatic case in
which the single-minded emphasis on improved export competitiveness has led policy
makers and their economic advisers to forget that what really matters from the point of
view of income in export-led economies are the purchasing power gains arising from
specialization. And as Krugman emphasizes, single-minded emphasis on export
competitiveness is a very dangerous obsession that tends to skew domestic economic
policies.41
That is not to say that in open economies ‘competitiveness’ does not matter; but
when the terms of trade are so unstable and downwardly-mobile, “competitive-gains”
can mean something very different from “welfare-gains”. Therefore, being able to
enhance international competitiveness in a given product, even when both the domestic
and the international prices are “right”, does not per se justify the continuous
concentration of resources in that specific export product in the long run. In fact, one
should never forget that when Korea took the decision to ‘re-invent’ its export sector in
the early 1960s, it certainly had no ‘competitiveness’ problem with its world class silk
or its excellent quality seaweed (the country’s main export products at the time).
37
LA’s underinvestment in export-product diversification in a world of rapidly-
changing demand has led the region from being a major player in major products to
being a major player in relatively marginal products.42 In fact, it has not even sought
‘niches’ in segmented commodity markets that have emerged from the dissemination
of the new technological paradigm (characterized by a ‘knowledge-society’ with
flexible production techniques). This underinvestment in part reflects the region’s
(path-dependent) obsession with traditional products that are often less and less
attractive from the point of view of international demand, in which further
‘competitive’ gains can only be achieved by ever increasing mass production, more
and more optimal routines, greater and greater degrees of standardization, and larger
and larger economies of scale.43 However, this underinvestment also reflects the fact
that every time private investment in the region manages to rise above 15% of GDP
the capitalist élite begins to experience feelings of vertigo. As a result, LA ends up
being like a football team that plays better and better in a league that gets continuously
relegated to lower and lower divisions, while EA seems to be a member of a league
continually promoted to higher and higher divisions. In fact, in a Ricardian sense,
LA’s increased export competitiveness has sometimes acted as an ‘own-goal’ because
its standard of living has sometimes actually declined when domestic output growth
has been outweighed by deteriorating terms of trade.
The obsession with increased competitiveness in existing export products has
led LA to keep shooting at a fixed target, even though world demand is a rapidly
moving one. In contrast, EA, aided by its own efforts in institution-building,
investment, savings, education, etc., as well as by Japanese regional leadership, has
been increasingly successful in learning how to hit a moving target. Further, as the
data have shown, international demand-adaptation and supply-upgrading are closely
38
related phenomena; therefore, predicting the trajectory of this moving target does not
seem to be such a difficult task, despite the rapidly changing technological paradigm.
Unfortunately, the capacity of the state to ‘discipline’ the capitalist élite in order to be
able effectively to implement an appropriate set of strategic trade and industrial
policies is another matter – and one in which LA does not seem to have learnt how to
acquire much comparative advantage!
One of the characteristics of a great deal of the trade literature, even in some of
its ‘new-trade’ brand, is that it has been slow to acknowledge this type of problem.
For example, when ‘new-trade’ theorists criticize traditional neo-classical trade theory,
they do so only in relation to issues such as the fact that it has ignored the possibility
that a given set of “right” prices could still generate multiple equilibria due to
uncertainties in the economic system (where decisions are taken in a decentralized
way); or because it ignores the possibility of the emergence of several types of
inefficiency in the social learning process, which in turn could produce inefficient
economic outcomes. These could occur, for example, because the information
structure is determined by the nature and the extent of these uncertainties, the degree
of communication among agents, the pay-off relevance of the decisions to be taken and
the actual range of choices faced by the agents. In other words, in these types of
criticism of the neo-classical trade theory, ‘new trade’ theory has often tried to
identify, and give due relevance to, issues such as the social learning process and the
macro-institutional framework of the export sector. It has put emphasis on the actual
context in which agents are supposed to learn, and on how this learning is very much
determined by the institutional context. Further, it has endogenised the learning
process to a (supposedly exogenous) institutional context, and discussed how in this
way different export paths could arise. However, the concept of an “optimal” export
39
path, even though more relative, is still determined by how to maximize an export
performance given present resource endowments and a set of contemporary (more or
less) “right” prices. But it is not at all obvious how the given set of prices will signal
medium- and long-term changes in the pattern of international demand and
technological change, nor how these prices, or the supposedly ‘exogenous’ domestic
institutional setting, can provide an incentive for diversification of exports towards a
flexible pattern compatible with inter-temporal maximization of gains from
specialization. In a sense, this new literature returns to the same traditional issue of
how to achieve the maximum degree of ‘competitiveness’ given some existing
domestic endowments and current external constraints (now including market failures),
but with a much richer way of understanding the dynamics of how this could (or could
not) be achieved.
An alternative approach to international trade in DCs should promote the idea
that once agents and institutions have learnt how to deal effectively in the ‘real’
international markets, there is still a need for some vigorous agency (e.g., active trade
and industrial policies) steering the economy towards a flexible export productive
capacity, which can maximize returns from (often acquired) comparative advantages
in a world with constantly changing demand patterns and rapid technological change.
In this way, a country could attempt to maximize the trade-induced output-growth
potentials it gets from an export-led growth strategy as well as welfare gains from
international trade. As Stiglitz has repeatedly demonstrated, markets do not necessarily
lead to these sorts of efficient outcomes by themselves.44
There are obviously many other trade-related issues that cannot be discussed
here, such as the crucial one of exhaustible resources (even for resource-rich
countries); the optimal taxation policy (“royalties”) towards the extraction of non-
40
renewal export-resources; FDI’s anti-Latin American bias in the local processing of
resources; the upgrading and “anchoring” of maquila production lines; the perennial
lack of innovative Schumpeterian spirit of the Latin American oligarchy; and, in
particular, the question of why the region’s capitalist élite seem to get altitude sickness
every time private investment climbs to about 15% of GDP.
In sum, the remarkable asymmetries in terms of gains from specialization
between LA and EA (evident, for example, in the negative and significant Latin
American dummy in Figure 8.12 above) inevitably lead to a question asked in the
spirit of Sugar Kowalczyk (Marilyn Monroe’s character in Some Like It Hot): why is it
that in trade-related issues Latin American countries always seem to end up with the
wrong end of the lollipop? There can be little doubt that at least one important part of
the answer is that the Latin American capitalist élite can ‘afford’ to be so risk-averse in
terms of demand-adaptation and supply-upgrading in their trade-related business
because they are as effective now (after economic reforms) as they were before in
creating structures of property rights and incentives from which lavishly large income
streams (rents) can be generated in the domestic economy. After all, according to the
World Bank statistics, the median income share of the top 10% of income earners in
LA is currently above 45% (and increasing), while in Malaysia and Thailand it is 35%,
in India 31%, and in Korea only 25%!45
In other words, in post-reform LA the capitalist élite can ‘afford’ to be so risk-
averse in their trade-related business because they have managed to create a political-
institutional settlement in which a new distributional coalition has succeeded in
imposing a new structure of property rights and incentives that have allowed them, and
their populist allies, extravagant forms of predatory capitalism, un-productive rent-
seeking and the economic emasculation of the state.46 And in terms of their populist
41
allies, one question that begs an answer is why democratic forces in the region were so
prepared to accept such a strait-jacketed type of institutionality in exchange for the
return to democracy – the democratic forces in Chile seemed to believe that they could
only defeat Pinochet in his 1988-plebiscite if they implicitly agreed that their electoral
motto would be “Liberté, Inégalité, Passivité”.47 Another, of course, is why almost
immediately after the return to democracy did these formerly progressive groups
decide to become the new standard-bearers of the neo-liberal orthodoxy?48
So, it seems that in their trade-related business the Latin American capitalist
élite can perfectively well ‘afford’ not to make the required investment efforts for
adaptation and upgrading, not to be Schumpeterian-innovative, or to take the required
risks, because they can count on the fact that their (not very puritanical) share of
domestic income will be so plentiful that it will compensate for their (not very
Calvinistic) attitude towards trade-related issues. In fact, if one compares the above-
mentioned share of national income appropriated by the top 10% with the share of
private investment in GDP, LA appears even more as an outlier: while in LA the
income-share of the top decile is approximately three times the GDP-share of private
investment, in India this ratio is less than 1.5, in Malaysia and Thailand is only slightly
above one, and in Korea these shares of income and investment are roughly the same.
Perhaps this is what really makes the discreet charm of the Latin American bourgeoisie
so unique!
42
Appendix 1
A demand-adaptability index vis-à-vis (a changing) OECD structure of imports.
One set of statistics that can be constructed using the data provided by the Trade-CAN
software is a ‘demand-adaptability index’ of a country to the (changing) structure of
imports of the OECD (see Figure 8.4 and footnote 14 above). This index can give an
insight into a country’s capacity to react to changes in OECD demand for imports.
The ‘demand-adaptability index’ jA of a country ‘j’ to the structure of OECD
imports is defined here as ndd i
ndij
i
dijj aaA . The numerator
di
dija is the country's
market share in demand-dynamic sectors (‘d’), adjusted by the weight of demand-
dynamic sectors in OECD imports; and the denominator ndi
ndija is the country's
market share in non-dynamic sectors (‘nd’), also adjusted by the share of these sectors
in OECD imports. Therefore, j
ijij S
sa ; where
i
ijij M
Ms
is the country ‘j’
share ‘s’ in OECD imports (‘M’) of product ‘i’ (for either ‘d’ or ‘nd’ products), and
S M sj ji
ij is the country’s total share ‘S’ in OECD imports (‘M’) – this, in turn, is
the sum of the market shares for different products ‘i’ of country ‘j’. Finally, demand-
dynamic products (‘di’) are those import products that increase their shares in OECD
imports between two points in time (such that 0 idi ss ). In turn, non-dynamic
products are those that decrease their shares in total imports during this period
( 0 indi ss ).
43
Appendix 2
The four quadrants of Figure 8.10
For the export profile of a country to be located in Quadrant 1 during a given period of
time – i.e., for it to be classified as an ‘uncompetitive’ country exporting ‘non-demand-
dynamic’ products during this period (e.g., LA in the 1960s) – its export profile should
be characterized by both [Mi/M (fy) < Mi/M (by)], and [Mij/Mi (fy) < Mij/Mi (by)]; where
‘fy’ is final year and ‘by’ is base year of this period (note that data for all years in the
Trade-CAN software are 3-year moving averages). For an export profile to be in
‘Quadrant 2’ – i.e., a ‘competitive’ country exporting ‘non-demand-dynamic’ products
(e.g., LA in the 1990s) – this profile should be characterized by [M
t
i/M (fy) < Mi/M (by)]
and [Mij/Mi (fy) > Mij/Mi (by)]. For it to be in ‘Quadrant 3’ – a ‘competitive’ country
exporting ‘demand-dynamic’ products (e.g., EA in the 1990s) – the conditions [Mi/M
(fy) > Mi/M (by)], and [Mij/Mi (fy) > Mij/Mi (by)] should apply. Finally, to be in ‘Quadran
4’ – and be an ‘uncompetitive’ country exporting ‘demand-dynamic’ products (e.g.,
Japan and the European Union in the 1990s) – a country’s export profile should be
characterized by [Mi/M (fY) > Mi/M (by)] and [Mij/Mi (fy) < Mij/Mi (by)].
44
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47
1 I would like to thank Alice Amsden, Stephanie Blankenburg, Mario Cimoli, Mushtaq Khan, José Luis Fiori, Daniel Hahn, Michael Hobday, Richard Kozul-Wright, Carlos Lopes, Carlota Perez, Annalisa Primi, Bob Sutcliffe, Fiona Tregenna and especially Giovanni Dosi and Julie McKay for helpful observations. Also, participants at seminars in Bangkok, Bilbao, New Delhi, Kuala Lumpur, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago and Sydney made constructive comments on this paper and on two previous drafts (Palma, 1998 and 2006). The usual caveats apply. 2 If the rates of growth of GDP pc of the last five years in both countries were to continue, China would only need another 18 years to catch up with Mexico. 3 See Ffrench-Davis, Muñoz and Palma (1994) and Palma (2004). For an overview of Latin American economic development throughout the 20th century, see Ocampo (2004). 4 For example, the combination of the Fed trebling nominal rates and recession in the North led to a 33 percentage-point increase in the real rate of interest paid by LA for its foreign debt (i.e., when LIBOR is deflated by LA’s non-oil export-prices, this rate increased from minus 11.2% to 22.1%; see Palma, 2004). See also Diaz-Alejandro (1984), Marcel and Palma (1988) and Ocampo (2004). 5 The new economic discourse went as far as transforming almost anything previously considered as virtue into vice, and vice-versa. This attitude was best summarized by Gustavo Franco, President of the Central Bank during the years of economic reform (leading up to the 1999 financial crisis): “[Our real task] is to undo forty years of stupidity (‘besteira’) […].” (Veja 15-11-1996) 6 Franco again: “[In Brazil today] the alternative is to be neo-liberal or neo-idiotic (neo-burros).” 7 See, for example, McKay (2002) and Palma (1998). 8 With the exception of post-NAFTA Mexico, this openness was clearly not extended to LA, and especially not to Brazil. 9 This also led to remarkably positive interaction between increases in productivity and wages, particularly in the first-tier NICs (Newly Industrializing Countries). 10 The price of memory chips (per MB of RAM), for example, fell by about four-fifths in 1996 alone, partly resulting from excess supply due to massive expansion of Taiwanese production. Korea was particularly affected. 11 This was reflected in rising debt/equity ratios, which, particularly in Korea, reached vertiginous heights. 12 See Ocampo and Parra (2004), and Palma (2008a). 13 See Blankenburg, Palma and Tregenna (2008). 14 This long-term trend has been reversed since 9/11, the Iraq war and the rise of China and India, at least in oil and in some minerals and agricultural products. As has so often happened in the past, many policy-makers and analysts have incorporated a bit too quickly into their analysis the assumption that this post-9/11 cyclical recovery is a permanent state of affairs. 15 See Krugman (1994). 16 Paraphrasing Canon’s ad, EA’s attitude towards exports could be summarized as “if anybody can, we can!” 17 See Appendix 1. 18 In 2000, for example, 54% of OECD imports were in sectors that had been “demand-dynamic” between 1980 and 2000; so an index of 1 for a country in 2000 means that its own market shares in OECD imports in 2000 had the same structure (54%/46%). 19 For a critique of the ‘resource curse’ literature, see DiJohn (2008). For a detailed study of how one particularly successful commodity exporter (Botswana) managed to avoid this supposed ‘curse’, see Tregenna (2006). 20 On the literature on ‘technology-gap’ and evolutionary theory, see Cimoli (1994); Dosi et al. (1988)
48
and (1990); Freeman and Soete (1997); Hobday (2003); and Teece (1996). 21 One example of this would be organic agriculture (see Perez, 2008). 22 Sweden had a similar capacity to supply-upgrade its timber exports, as well as the production of inputs for its commodity-extracting industries (see Walker, 2003). 23 Taiwan presents a similar success story of upgrading in the timber-processing industry, but this country had to import the required inputs. 24 On the technological issues involved, see especially Perez (2003). 25 In fact, the first car that Toyata exported to the US (the ‘Toyopet’) was such a flop that it had to be withdrawn from the market (it was described at the time as just “four wheels and an ashtray”). As Chang reminds us, “many [inside and outside Japan] argued at the time that Toyota should have stuck to its original business of making simple textile machinery. […] Today, Japanese cars are considered as ‘natural’ as Scottish salmon or French wine.” (2007). 26 On the distinction between “allocative”, “Schumpeterian” and “growth” efficiencies, see Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990) and the chapter by Cimoli, Dosi, Nelson and Stiglitz in this book. 27 See especially Amsden (2001). 28 Sometimes Japan ends up only relinquishing its productive capacity in some inputs of a given product, a process that leads to a regional integration of production lines. 29 In this context, ‘the most dynamic sectors’ means the sectors in which the US had the highest increase in OECD market shares. 30 Not surprisingly, in a series of new trade agreements between the US and Latin American countries, a primary concern of the US has been the opening up of the economies of Latin American countries to its exports of primary commodity (particularly agricultural products). 31 The main limitation of traditional trade statistics (such as those available in the UN Com-trade online database and the Trade-CAN software) is that they refer to gross value of exports and not to their value added. As mentioned above, this problem is particularly important in the study of the so-called ‘maquila’ industry (or purely assembly-type export-operations) of Mexico and some parts of Central America; in fact, the use of these data would distort the comparative regional analysis attempted below. As a result, there is little option but again to exclude Mexico in most of the following comparative analysis, and to analyze Mexico’s peculiar export-led growth experience properly separately (see Palma 2005a). 32 The partial exception is Brazil, which increased its share of exports in ‘high-tech’ products from 0.3% in 1963 to 3.8% in 1985 and 9.4% in 2000. However, two thirds of those exports in 2000 consisted only of only one (though rather notable) product: aircrafts (SITC group 792). In fact, in that year no other ‘high-tech’ product reached 1% of total exports. 33 For an analysis of the fallacy of composition issue, see Mayer (2003). 34 See especially Kahn (2000). 35 On the issue of the different “qualities of specializations”, see Cimoli and Correa (2005). 36 On this subject, see especially Lagos (2000). On the issue of Chile’s and other Latin American countries’ “premature” de-industrialization since economic reform, see Palma (2005b). 37 See especially Moguillansky (1999). 38 Further, the proliferation of the above-mentioned trade agreements between countries of the region and the US (such as those signed by Chile in 2003, and by some Central American countries in 2004), especially due to their asymmetric nature (see, for example, Stiglitz, 2003, and Bhagwati, 2003), would probably make the transition from quadrant 2 to 3 even less likely, unless one considers (against all evidence – see Palma, 2005a) that maquila-type exports are the panacea. 39 One of the most remarkable features of Mexico’s poor growth performance is that it took place in a context of both a massive inflow of FDI (well over US$ 200 billion during this period; see Palma, 2005a) and practically unrestricted market access to the US – the first two items on most DCs’ growth
49
agenda! 40 This extremely slow rate of per capita GDP growth contrasts with that achieved by Mexico during its previous politically “populist”, financially “repressed”, and economically “distorted” four decades (1940-81). During those years, Mexico (with a much faster rate of population growth) achieved a rate of GDP per capita growth of 3.5% per annum. There is little doubt that at the time of its 1982 financial crisis, Mexico needed major political, economic and institutional re-engineering; however, the chosen path does not seem to have been the most effective. In fact, if before 1980 Mexico doubled its income per capita every 20 years, at the current pace it would take more than 70 years to do the same! 41 See especially 1997, chapters 1 and 2. 42 In 1963, 57% of LA’s exports were products included in the OECD list of 20 major import products of the time; by 2000, less than 7% of its exports consisted of products that made the then (new) OECD ‘top 20’ list. Meanwhile the first- and second-tier NICs and China moved in the opposite direction, with respective shares of 6% and 64%, 8% and 50%, and 8% and 32%, respectively. 43 In 2000, for example, for all of Chile’s remarkable export growth and (horizontal) diversification, two thirds of its exports still consisted of products that belonged to the 1963 list of ‘top-20’ OECD imports, while only 2.6% of its exports appeared in the 2000 ‘top-20’ list. 44 See, for example (2002), and the introduction to this book by Dosi, Cimoli and Stiglitz. 45 For a comparative regional analysis of income distribution, see Palma (2003). 46 For example, the processes of privatization of public assets in the region compete in their degrees of corruption with those of post-communist Russia. At the same time, the post-reform institutional environment has created a situation in which large corporations in the real and financial sectors can exploit their monopoly power freely, and can count on unlimited bail-outs from governments when things go wrong. In this institutional environment capital can also rent-seek freely from downwardly-flexible labour markets, and can be assured that their capital flight will not only be free of regulation but will also be highly exchange-rate-subsidized (for example, foreign asset holdings by Argentinean residents at the time of the 2001 crisis amounted to about $ 100 billion; this figure was 25% higher than the whole increase in foreign debt since the first election of Menem in 1989). 47 The Latin American economic élite’s capacity to transform particularly unequal forms of income distribution achieved during repressive regimes into permanent features of society has become legendary. 48 For an analysis of these issues, see Palma (2008b).