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Aalborg University, Copenhagen
Global Refugee Studies
Department of Culture and Global Studies
FORCED EVICTIONS AND RESETTLEMENT IN PHNOM PENH:
A case for Internally Displaced Persons
Photo: Dey Krahom after evictions Source: The Phnom Penh Post 2015
Master Thesis
August 2016
10th Semester
Ana-Maria Cioraru & Elizabeth d’Amboise
Supervisor Bjørn Møller
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the local NGOs we interviewed in Phnom Penh: LICADHO, STT and
Equitable Cambodia. We are grateful for their time and for the opportunity they offered us of
gaining first-hand knowledge on the important issues they work towards. We would also like
to thank Kevin Knight for his willingness to share his knowledge and experiences with us
while visiting the Blue Tent Village in Oudong. Lastly, we thank our supervisor Bjørn Møller
for his tactful supervision.
Table of contents
Abbreviations
Abstract
1. Introduction ………………………………………………………………………… 1
2. Methodology ………………………………………………………………………. 3
3. History of Cambodia ……………………………………………………………... . 8
4. An evolution of land ownership in Cambodia …………………………………. …. 13
5. Cambodia’s international instruments ………………………………………….. … 20
6. Cambodia’s economic development ……………………………………………… 22
6.1 Actors at play …………………………………………………………………. 23
6.2 Development of Phnom Penh ……………………………………………….... 25
7. Urban poor settlements ………………………………………………………….. . 28
8. Phnom Penh’s future: satellite cities …………………………………………….. . 34
9. Development through modernization ……………………………………………… 37
10. Development-induced displacement …………………………………………….... 39
10.1 Ethics of development-induced displacement ……………………………. 41
11. Displacement through forced evictions ………………………………………….. . 44
12. Evictions and resettlement in Phnom Penh …………………………………….. … 47
13. Internally displaced persons ………………………………………………………. 58
14. Conclusions ………………………………………………………………………... 68
Annex 1: Interview guide topics.
Annex 2: Consent form LICADHO
Annex 3: Consent form STT
Annex 4: Consent form Equitable Cambodia
Annex 5: Cernea’s Impoverishment risks and reconstruction model: 8 risk factors:
Bibliography
Abbreviations
ADHOC – Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association
ASEAN – Association of South East Nations of Asia
PPCC – Phnom Penh City Centre
CGDK – Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CPK – Communist Party of Kampuchea
CPP – Cambodian People’s Party
CSO – Civil Society Organization
DID – Development Induced Displacement
ELC – Economic Land Concessions
FDA – Foreign Direct Assistance
FIDH – International Federation for Human Rights
FMO – Forced Migration Online
FUNCIPEC – National United Front of an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative
Cambodia
ICESCR – International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
IDI – Inclusive Development International
IDMC – Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP – Internally Displaced Persons
IHL – International Humanitarian Law
INGO – International Non-Governmental Organization
KPNLF – The Khmer People’s National Liberation Front
KPRP – Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party
LICADHO – League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights
MLMUPC – Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction
MOI – Ministry of Interior
MoEYS – Ministry of Educations, Youth and Sport
MPP – Municipality of Phnom Penh
MSF – Medecines Sans Frontieres
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
NPRS – National Poverty Reduction Strategy
NRC – Norwegian Refugee Council
OCIC – Overseas Cambodia Investment Corporation
ODA – Official Development Assistance
OHCHR – Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PRK – People’s Republic of Kampuchea
SLC – Social Land Concession
SNC – Supreme National Council
STT – Sahmakum Teang Tnaut
UN – United Nations
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHR – United Nations Human Rights
UNICEF – United Nations’ Children’s Fund
UNTAC – United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
USAID – United States Agency for International Development
Abstract
The following thesis examines forced evictions due to development and resettlement in
Phnom Penh, Cambodia and tries to understand if there is scope for the victims of forced
evictions to be labeled internally displaced persons (Dips). Development-induced
displacement fails to receive the same attention as violence or conflict-induced displacement.
Furthermore, when assistance providers recognize the need for better monitoring of Dips by
including development-induced displacement on their agenda- large and small scale, it is
commonly the larger-scale projects that take precedent. A gap remains in addressing the
needs of the victims of small-scale development such as the projects unfolding in Phnom
Penh. Numerous development projects have displaced thousands of families. Their victims,
often fall through the cracks of assistance and one of the potential causes for this, we believe
to be the conceptual ambiguities. Forcefully evicted Cambodians are not covered by a
comprehensive label such as that of Dips which is internationally recognized and confers a
certain degree of legitimacy to their case. Among the negative consequences of development
in Phnom Penh are human rights violations in the form of forced evictions and inadequate
compensation and resettlement.
Using qualitative and inductive research approaches, we analyze if there is potential of
labeling these people as Dips. We analyze some of the benefits which might come by doing
so. We conclude that there is a double advantage in using this label for the forcefully evicted
of Phnom Penh. On One hand it will raise awareness, internationally, about their grievances
and needs of assistance. On the other hand it will confer international NGOs and donor
agencies leverage to put pressure on the Royal Government to assume responsibility over
upholding human rights.
Keywords: Cambodia, forced evictions, resettlement, development, development-induced
displacement, internal displacement, Dips
1. Introduction
Cambodia is a country that has only recently emerged from a long period of conflict and was
largely in need of rebuilding both structurally and socially. With significant contribution from
foreign partners and donors, Cambodia has been on a path of rebuilding itself since the early
1990’s. Today, the country is enjoying certain levels of political stability and economic
prosperity, however this has come at a high cost.
Since the 1990s, Cambodia, specifically Phnom Penh, has been transformed by rapid
development, which is a result of a shift towards a market-driven economy. Phnom Penh has
been subjected to urban development and beautification over the past two decades, which has
been criticized to marginalize the poor. Urban development and beautification have been
happening against the backdrop of equally rapid urbanization. In the aftermath of
consecutive civil wars but also as a result of a booming economy, the urban population of
Phnom Penh grew substantially1 and so did the pressure on the demand for land. However
with little regulation and high levels of corruption2embedded in all levels of governance
urban development projects have been happening at a high price of everyday Cambodians.
Many urban renewal projects over the past decade have been at the forefront of human rights
groups, as they have been benefiting the wealthy elite at the cost of a majority of the poor.
In this paper we aim to look at one specific negative consequence of Cambodia's economic
prosperity: displacement due to development. Development projects in Phnom Penh have
been displacing thousands of people and in the process they are violating many human rights,
not least of which is by forced evictions. This trend is only expected to continue as Phnom
Penh continues to gain status and remains one of the most open markets in Asia with private
investment largely driving Phnom Penh’s urban development.
1 The 1990s saw a wave of growth which brought Phnom Penh’s population to more than a million people for the first time since the 1970s. Currently Phnom Penh is the most populous city in Cambodia, with a population of approximately 1.5 million people (Khemro, 2006)2According to Transparency International, an organization that works to stop corruption and promote transparency and accountability across all sectors of society, Cambodia ranks 150 out of 168 as of 2015 in terms of corruption perceptions index (Transparency International, 2016)
1
While not all resettlements are involuntary, OHRCR mentions the cases of Angkpeat
Meancheay where the resettlement “was voluntary in all respects” (OHRCR 2012: 4) the
problem still persists that a large number of families and individuals are victims of forced
evictions and resettlement with an overwhelming estimate of 11% of Phnom Penh’s
population having been evicted since 1990 as of 2012 (Tudehope, 2012). Forced evictions
and resettlement in Phnom Penh has continuously been contested by many NGOs and Ingo’s
for the human rights and social impacts they have had on those being displaced due to
development projects. Despite the general outcry, little has been done in the way of
improving the situation of the people who continue to fall victims of arbitrary evictions.
With this prospect in mind we aim to analyze one potential solution; categorizing people
affected by forced evictions as internally displaced persons (Dips). It is this premise that lead
to the formulation of our research question:
“Should displacement due to development be considered internal displacement: A look into
the case of forced evictions and resettlement in Phnom Penh”.
By answering this question, we aim to add arguments to an already existing debate revolving
around the need to improve monitoring and accounting of Dips worldwide which in turn,
would improve humanitarian and development assistance targeted at Dips. Several studies on
development-induced displacement and IDPs focus on large - scale projects such as dams,
railways, or mines as seen in China, India, Bangladesh and several African countries
(Terminski, 2013). However, little attention has been paid to small-scale projects such as
those of urban development and beautification efforts, as is the case in Phnom Penh. We
believe there is a twofold benefit, which would come from categorizing people displaced by
development through forced evictions as IDPs. Firstly, displacement due to small-scale
development would add scope to academics working towards shedding light on the global
trend of internal displacement. Secondly, in the long run, this could lead to the creation of
better channels of humanitarian and development assistance of the forcefully evicted.
In answering our question we cover four main topics. The first refers to empirical data, which
helps frame the context of the property system in Cambodia. Secondly, we recount the pace
and track of development in Cambodia and Phnom Penh. Thirdly, we look into the
potentiality of considering those forcibly evicted from Phnom Penh as IDPs. Here, we
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parallel the condition of those forcefully evicted and resettled on the outskirts of Phnom Penh
with the category of IDPs. Lastly, we aim to highlight some of the benefits, which come with
categorizing forcefully evicted persons in Phnom Penh as IDPs.
2. Methodology
The aim of our research for this thesis was to gather data regarding forced evictions in Phnom
Penh and to add arguments to an already existing debate about why people displaced by
development projects through forced evictions should be made more visible by labeling them
as IDPs. In doing so we conducted fieldwork in Phnom Penh, Cambodia for six weeks during
the months of March and April 2016.
It should be noted that we started out with a different research topic. We had originally set
out to look into how effective development aid is within the field of reconstructing the
education system in a post conflict Cambodia. I (Elise) had been living and working in
Cambodia for about one year prior to starting this research. I was working as the Program
Coordinator for a small NGO called Cambodian Arts and Scholarship Foundation that
supports and empowers poor and at-risk Cambodian girls and women through education. My
involvement in working for this organization dedicated to empowering girls through
education dates back to 2013. My work with this organization had compelled me to further
look into and understand the education system in Cambodia. My (Ana) interest stood mostly
in understanding the ins and outs of development aid efficiency. Knowing that Cambodia is a
receiver of significant sums of development aid and being somewhat familiar with the
destructive impact of past regimes on the education system of the country convinced me to
accept the challenge of undertaking research in Cambodia. However, due to some setbacks in
carrying out this field work - mainly related to landing interviews, and one of the largest
national holidays inconveniently falling during two full weeks of our stay and consequently
closing all schools, we methodically chose to change our topic mid-field work. We decided to
look into an equally interesting and important issue facing Cambodia today: forced evictions
to make room for development projects. As a result of changing our topic mid way through,
the timing of our fieldwork was significantly cut short which affected some of the decisions
we made along the way.
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In writing our paper we applied an inductive method, a research strategy whereby the
researcher collects data without premise of a theory. As opposed to a deductive approach,
where the purpose of the researcher is to test a theory by applying the data gathered to see if
it fits accordingly. An inductive approach allows the researcher to analyze data and explore
various theories or explanations for an observed phenomenon (Bhattacherjee, 2012).
Our study is based on qualitative research, which is commonly used when the observer or
researcher attempts to interpret phenomenon in their natural setting (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003).
We adhere to the practice of qualitative research as defined by Strauss and Corbin who define
it as: “[...] any type of research that produces findings not arrived at by statistical
procedures or other means of quantification” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998 in Ritchie & Lewis,
2003)
In order to collect the necessary data we have engaged methods specific to qualitative
research. We analyzed a variety of written sources such as academic articles, national and
international reports, national policies, and international treaties. As a means of crediting the
information gathered from these sources, we conducted interviews with representatives of
major NGOs working directly on issues relating to urban slums, forced evictions and
resettlement, and human rights (specifically housing rights) in Phnom Penh. Furthermore,
spending time in Cambodia -six weeks for Ana-Maria and a year for Elise - allowed us the
opportunity to be non-participant observers which granted us a certain level of understanding
of Khmer culture and society.
Cambodia’s official language is Khmer, however due to the large number of foreign NGOs
working in all sectors, English is widely used and as such, many official documents are
published in English and Khmer. When consulting and analyzing official documents we used
the English version, while bearing in mind that the Khmer version remains the prevailing one.
While in Cambodia carrying out our research we wanted to talk to and conduct interviews
with Khmer people who have been forcibly evicted and resettled but there were a few barriers
that made us reevaluate carrying this through. Early into our fieldwork on our second topic,
we were offered an opportunity to visit a resettlement site outside Phnom Penh through one
of the many contacts Elise had made by virtue of living in Cambodia for a year prior to this
research. The resettlement site was in Oudong and known as the ‘Blue Tent Village’. The
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people living in this village were evicted from Dey Krahom, one of the most controversial
evictions of the past decade. We spent half a day in this community speaking to Kevin
Knight, a Canadian national and his Cambodian wife. Together they have been living in this
village and working towards rebuilding the community through an NGO they founded
together called Manna4life. Kevin had personally witnessed the forceful eviction of the Dey
Krahorm community in 2009 and upon seeing the destruction of the community’s homes, he
set out to help re-establish this community in Oudong, where they were resettled.
Visiting this site and speaking with Kevin and his wife were a cornerstone for our research as
it provided us with insight into forced evictions and resettlement in Phnom Penh, specifically
as it relates to the lives of those affected. We spoke with Kevin extensively and were both
moved by his experience, but moreover by the experiences of the Cambodians he has set out
to help. This experience, specifically seeing the impacts of resettlement first hand is what
compelled us to take a qualitative approach to this research. After our visit, we were
interested in carrying out our own interviews with people affected by evictions and
resettlement at either this site or others.
Upon careful consideration and evaluation of the pros and cons of carrying out interviews
directly with people who had been evicted from Phnom Penh, we decided against it for a
series of reasons. The reasoning behind our decision stood in the fact that we acknowledged
we were limited by the amount of time we had at hand. The logistics of conducting
ethnographic research within a relevant number of resettlement sites and urban settlements in
Phnom Penh would require us to build a network of contacts and gatekeepers to facilitate our
access into the communities which includes Khmer translators. We also weighed the
importance of investing enough time to build a relation of trust with potential interviewees.
For this reason, we switched our focus towards conducting interviews with NGOs. We
reasoned that NGOs have an expertise-based view on the situation of human rights and forced
evictions in Phnom Penh. We were also aware that a number of NGOs in Phnom Penh had
conducted both qualitative and quantitative research among communities living in poor urban
settlements and resettlement sites. Their monitoring activity, spanning over the many years of
controversial disputes would provide us with valuable insight into the situation of our target
group.
5
We contacted seven of the leading NGOs working in the field of human rights as they relate
to land and housing issues in Phnom Penh and landed interviews with the top three most
widely acknowledged NGOs working on these issues: Cambodian League for the Promotion
and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO)3, Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (STT)4, and Equitable
Cambodia.5
Based on our visit at the Blue Tent Village we created an interview guide. Our interview
guide combined elements of informal and semi-structured interviews. Informal interviews are
commonly characterized by a minimal control over responses, allowing respondents to
express themselves in their own terms and at their own pace (Russell, 2006). Semi-structured
interviews differ in that they rely on an interview guide: this type of interview is
recommended in situations where the interviewers are only allowed one chance to speak to
their informants. We found these two methods particularly useful considering the fact that we
allowed approximately one hour and a half for each interview (Russell, 2006). We decided to
mix the two methods of interviewing mostly because while we were interested in covering
certain topics, we also wanted to allow the NGO representatives to have a certain level of
control over how the interview went so as to provide us with as much information as
possible. Therefore, throughout the interviews we adjusted our questions accordingly,
keeping in mind the topics which we wanted to have covered by the end of our fieldwork.
These topics are attached at the end of this paper as Annex 1.
The people we spoke to had been working for these organizations between one and five
years. Each NGO interview had two representatives and in two of the interviews there was a
foreign and Khmer person present. All of the interviews were conducted in English.
Throughout the interviews one of us would take extensive notes while the other one led the
interview. With permission of our interviewees, we recorded each interview. We attached
their signed consent forms as Annexes 2, 3, and 4. We would like to note that we lost two of
our three interview recordings and as a result, we relied on the bank of notes we took during
3 LICADHO is a national human rights organization active in Cambodia. It is at the forefront of efforts to protect civil, political, economic and social rights of Cambodians4 STT works to support the poor and raise awareness about urban issues, specifically works to help urban inhabitants enjoy adequate housing within a developing city5 Equitable Cambodia has committed to transforming the national development model into one that respects, protects and fulfills the human rights of Cambodians.
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the interviews. We use single quotations as our in-text citations of these interviews to indicate
a secondary level of quotation.
Living in Phnom Penh helped us conduct non-participatory observations which allowed to
obtain a wider spectrum of information. For example, we were able to explore various aspects
of social reality in Phnom Penh and even though many of our observations were not directly
used in our analysis, it provided us with a deeper understanding of the political and social
dynamics at play in Phnom Penh. As Flick describes:
“Observing is an everyday skill, which is methodologically systematized and applied in
qualitative research. Practically all the senses – seeing, hearing, feeling and smelling –
are integrated into observations” (Flick, 2009: 222)
We are aware of the fact that observations can bring about certain limitations. For example,
given the subjectivity of such methodological technique we both might have interpreted
interactions differently. Furthermore, we acknowledge that our different experiences within
Cambodia will have influenced our perceptions in a distinct manner.
There is always potential for bias in research but acknowledging its presence can help limit
its influence. Within this thesis, there is a certain bias in the shape of previous knowledge
about forced evictions, violations of human rights, and high levels of corruption within
Cambodian institutions. Aside from the bias on our side, there is scope for it within our
interviews. We conducted interviews solely with NGOs active in the field of defending
human rights, advocating on behalf of people affected by forced evictions or at risk of being
forcefully evicted. As such we were aware that there was potentiality for exaggerated or
subjective responses. However, noticing similarities between the responses of our
respondents we believe this possibility to be a limited one. Another source of bias can be
found in the literature consulted. When using NGO reports and quantitative reports, there is
little prospect for us of validating the results.
In order to minimize the bias’, we made sure to familiarize ourselves with the background of
the NGOs and the work they conduct in the field. Furthermore, we used the interviews
mainly as a way to backup the information collected from written sources. We also consulted
national policies, existing laws and media coverage of on-going land conflicts, as well as
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government official declarations and public appearances, which were covered in English. We
did so as a means of making up for the fact that we did not conduct interviews with officials
or state institutions.
Last but not least, we analyze our collected data through the lens of modernization theory of
development, which aims to highlight the forces at play within the historical and cultural
context of Cambodia. To better understand the situation of forced evictions and resettlement
of Cambodians6, we draw on Vigh’s theory of crisis as context to emphasize the need for
sustainable solutions for assistance.
3. History of Cambodia
In the following section we would like to bring about some of the most important aspects of
Cambodia's recent history. It is not our purpose to discuss this extensively as there are several
works that take upon this task7. However we will draw upon the most notable events in the
country’s history that we feel are important in setting the scene for our paper’s discussion.
The history of Cambodia can be traced back to the Bronze age, but in this recounting, we will
only go as far back as when the French Protectorate over Cambodia was established in 1863.
For almost ninety years, the country remained a French colony, gaining its independence in
1953 under King Norodom Sihanouk (Chandler, 1979: 411). The time between independence
and 1970 came to be regarded as The Golden Ages, despite the fact that throughout these
years the country saw severe inequalities in wealth and power (Strangio, 2014a).
In 1970, a coup brought the monarchy to an end. A group of United States sympathizing
officials under the leadership of General Lon Nol and Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak, ousted
6 We refer to Cambodians affected by forced evictions and resettlement quite loosely. We acknowledge the fact that there are other minorities, mostly Vietnamese, among those evicted. We do not have information on the number or size of the minority groups, which is why we chose to generalize.7 David Chandler’s A History of Cambodia is a first in depth historiography of Cambodia, documenting the evolution of the country from the Angkorian Empire until the 20th century (Chandler, 1983). Ben Kiernan wrote a number of books and articles that cover Pol Pot’s rise to power. His book Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979 is a comprehensive analysis of the years when the Khmer Rouge were in control of Cambodia (Kiernan, 2008). David Ayres in his book Anatomy of a Crisis: Education, Development and the State in Cambodia 1953-1998, discusses in depth issues of culture, politics and history in the context of the many successive regimes of Cambodia (Ayres, 2000) Grant Curtis analyzed some of the developments that took place in Cambodia after the departure of UNTAC in his book Cambodia Reborn? The transition to Democracy and Development (Curtis, 1998) and Sebastian Strangio’s Hun Sen’s Cambodia lays forth a thorough critical overview of the current state of affairs in Cambodia (Strangio, 2014a).
8
King Sihanouk from power and proclaimed Cambodia a Republic. Under the rule of Lon Nol
the country experienced five years of political and economic turmoil and it is during this time
that many villagers joined the ranks of the Khmer Rouge, who, by 1974 were in control of
three quarters of the country (Strangio, 2014a).
The Khmer Rouge, as they were to be called by Prince Sihanouk and the international media,
were an underground extreme communist group. The group evolved from a communist party
formed in the early 1950s out of a nationalistic struggle and ambition for independence from
the French. They had formed under the supervision of Vietnamese communists, and bore the
name the Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP). The party had gained support from
its early inception, recruiting in the first three years after its foundation one thousand
members: mainly rural, Buddhist pro-Vietnamese and moderate. However throughout the late
1950s and 1960s they evolved into a party led by urban, radical, anti-Vietnamese, French
educated young communists (Kiernan, 2008). In 1962, Pol Pot took over the leadership of the
group and soon after adopted the name of Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK). During
the 1960s and during the Lon Nol rule, they waged civil wars that led to a complete takeover
of the entire country in 1975 (Kiernan, 2008). Under the leadership of Pol Pot, the Khmer
Rouge embarked on what was to be perhaps the darkest age of Cambodian history. Their
mission was to bring Cambodia back to ‘Year Zero’; they renamed the country Democratic
Kampuchea and embarked on a mission to create an all-agrarian society. To achieve this
ideology, money was abolished, cities were almost entirely emptied, and people were forced
to live in communes working on rice fields (Törhönen, 2001). An estimated 1.7 million
people, approximately 21% of Cambodia’s population at the time, died due to starvation,
illness, exhaustion through forced labor and the regime’s attempt to purge the educated class
(Montvilaite, 2014). Furthermore, to achieve their ideology, the regime’s practices destroyed
the very fabric of Cambodia’s social life. Before the Khmer Rouge, Cambodians’ identity
was closely linked to family, religion, and class. The Khmer Rouge tried to undermine these
aspects by challenging the traditional ideas of family and society through deportation,
execution, and collectivization of work and living arrangements (Mam, 1999).
The Khmer Rouge were driven out in 1979 by the Vietnamese who established the People’s
Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), granting Hun Sen the prime minister. Throughout the next
decade Cambodia continued to be swept by armed conflicts as the Western supported
Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) waged guerilla war on the Phnom
Penh government supported by Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and other socialist states (Curtis,
9
1998). The years between 1979 and 1993 came to be regarded as the years of the Cambodia -
Vietnam War. The two main involved actors were the PRK and the CGDK however the
conflict was further fueled by the political interests of outside powers, within the context of
the Cold War; such as the Soviet Union, U.S. and China. As opposed to the Vietnamese
supported PRK, the CGDK was formed through an alliance of the ousted Khmer Rouge and
two smaller parties: French acronym for the National United Front of an Independent,
Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCIPEC) - a royalist party, led by Prince
Norodom Sihanouk and the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF). CGDK
used a narrative of fighting the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia to justify the attacks
against the PRK. In doing so it gained the support of China, the U.S, various Western
countries, and some ASEAN8 countries (Curtis, 1998; Sokkhoeurn, 2010). China intended to
continue its policy of attrition against the Vietnamese government and therefore was
unwilling to support measures to reduce the power of the Khmer Rouge and continued to
provide them with weapons. This kept the Khmer Rouge active on the military and political
scene, as part of the CGDK alliance. The U.S supported the coalition mainly because it
served its own interests in the confrontation with the Soviet Union over expanding their
sphere of influence (Narine, 2002; Sokkhoeurn, 2010), Given this outside support, the Khmer
Rouge, remained a strong guerrilla force, which, even though unable to topple Phnom Penh’s
government, remained an obstacle for conflict resolution (Narine, 2002). In late 1980s
together with the fall of the Soviet Union, and the changes it brought about in the world
political scene, the United Nations, saw an opportunity to bring an end to the long lasting
conflicts in Cambodia.
Initiated by diplomatic efforts from the United Nations, France and Indonesia, informal
meetings were organized beginning in 1988, between Hun Sen and Prince Sihanouk. These
meetings were a cornerstone for the internationalization of the Cambodian conflict. In 1989
an International Conference on Cambodia was held in Paris, where the four Cambodian
factions met with the Permanent Members of the Security Council and thirteen other
countries9. Although not immediately conclusive, the Conference did set forth the 8 ASEAN (acronym for the Association of Southeast Nations of Asia) is a political and economic organization, mainly promoting political stability and economic growth among its members. It currently comprises of ten members: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia and Vietnam (Breene, 2016)9 The countries participating in the Paris Conference on Cambodia were: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, the People’s Republic of China, the French Republic, the Republic of India, the Republic of Indonesia, Japan, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the
10
establishment of a UN led peacekeeping operation (Curtis, 1998). Following this meeting, the
four Cambodian political factions agreed in 1990 to create a so-called Supreme National
Council (SNC) to represent the state in the period between the ceasefire and the forthcoming
elections. In 1991 the Paris Conference was reconvened and in the presence of the United
Nations Secretary General, the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the
Cambodian Conflict, also known as the Paris Agreements were signed by the four factions
active in Cambodia and other participating countries (Curtis, 1998). These Agreements called
for the creation of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which
were charged with a mandate to revivify peace and assist Cambodia in attaining a democracy
through free elections. During this transition the sovereign authority of Cambodia was vested
into the SNC comprising of twelve representatives of the four factions, with Prince Sihanouk
as president (Strangio, 2014a). The Paris Agreements also called for an international support
program to rehabilitate the country especially infrastructure, institutionally and human capital
wise (Curtis, 1998)
In 1993, the first democratic election in the history of the country was organized. The
election did not end up with any of the parties winning a majority. As such the newly formed
Royal Government of Cambodia was a coalition government between the two parties which
received most seats: FUNCIPEC and Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). Norodom Sihanouk
was reinstated as monarch and two prime ministers were elected: Hun Sen from CPP and
Prince Norodom Rinariddh from FUNCIPEC. A new Constitution was adopted in 1993 as
well and with the signing of it came the end of UNTAC’s mandate (Curtis, 1998)
After the creation of the new Royal Government of Cambodia and the re-establishment of the
Kingdom of Cambodia, which was meant to bring about peace and a reconstruction of the
state, the political situation of Cambodia remained unsettled. There continued to be conflicts
between the two main parties which formed the government coalition, FUNCIPEC and CPP,
as well as between factions of the Khmer Rouge which remained active in large parts of the
country (Curtis, 1998). In 1998 the Khmer Rouge gave up all power and Cambodia was able
to gain control over its entire territory (Törhönen, 2001). Furthermore, the tensions between
FUNCIPEC and CPP culminated with a coup led by second Prime Minister Hun Sen against
first Prime Minister Rinariddh, in 1997. The take-over by Hun Sen was a testament of the
power he enjoyed of Cambodia’s institutions and spoke of the failure to establish a
democratic state as envisioned by UNTAC (Ayres, 2000).
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
11
This succession of regime changes in the political scene brought about numerous
consequences on the lives of the Cambodian people. Among the most severe consequences of
the succession of events presented above is the uprooting of hundreds of thousands of people,
who were forced to leave their land and in the context of ever changing policies to never be
able to return to their home.
In the early 1970s, the civil war between Lon Nol’s regime and the Khmer Rouge, as well as
the American bombings on the eastern side of the country forced many farmers to leave their
fields behind and flee to the cities (CCHR, 2013). In addition to these numbers an
approximate 500,000 people fled the country and sought refuge abroad (Curtis, 1998). The
civil war that followed the ousting of the Khmer Rouge created another 300,000 refugees and
an approximate of 190,000 internally displaced (Williams, 2000).
In early 1990s the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) started a
project to repatriate and reintegrate displaced Cambodians. Given these circumstances and
considering the fact that vast areas of the country were covered by landmines, many of the
people who returned were opting to settle in the cities instead, where there were significantly
less conflicts – the Khmer Rouge had mounted attacks on the villages but not in the cities
(Curtis, 1998)
All in all, over the past century and a half, Cambodia went from a traditional feudal system,
to a French colonial administration, to a constitutional monarchy, to a republic, to an agrarian
socialist country, to a Vietnamese client, to an independent state, to a UN transitional
authority and finally to a supposedly democratic kingdom today (Springer, 2013). Each of
these new regimes brought with it its own system of ownership and land policies.
In understanding the current, complex land situation of Cambodia it is important to look back
at the changes in the property system of Cambodia over the past fifty years. For this reason
we will briefly present them in the following section.
4. An evolution of land ownership in Cambodia
We would like to begin by noting that, according to observers, Cambodia boasts an advanced
legal framework for land administration, management and distribution. The current legal
framework was put in place after many years of civil war and after the extreme socialist
12
regime of the Khmer Rouge destroyed all private property in late 1970s. The distribution of
land in early 1990s was considered to be relatively egalitarian. However in recent years,
corruption, lack of transparency in implementing existing legal tools and a lack of
accountability of both the government and purchasers of land have given rise to high
inequality to the advantage of the rich and well connected Cambodians. The top 10% own
64% of the land in Cambodia and the top 1% own an estimated 20%-30% (Hughes, 2008).
Before the establishment of the French Protectorate, Cambodia functioned under a feudal
system where most people lived in the countryside, off of rice farms (Boreak, 2000). The
sovereign power was considered to be the owner of all land and the traditional way of
appropriating land in Khmer culture was “by the plough” (Diepart, 2015). This meant that as
long as a plot of land was not being used by anyone else, farmers were allowed to clear, settle
and farm it as they wished (Cooper, 2002). This was particularly efficient given the fact that
Cambodia’s population was relatively small at the time and people could move from one area
to another and assume ownership (Boreak, 2000). Ownership here is to be understood as the
customary practice of occupying a plot of land, which was recognized by village chiefs as
being the proprietor. Households would negotiate their place within the community socially,
based on a “form of trust linked to the moral obligations between a patron and a client”
(Diepart, 2015; 6).
When the French Protectorate was established, Cambodia transitioned from a feudal system
to a colonial one. In 1884 the French initiated a system of private ownership. They created a
Land Law, introduced land titles and a department of cadastre that tried to modernize land
rights from possession rights to ownership rights. However there was resistance on behalf of
the Cambodian people who continued to practice the traditional appropriation ”by the
plough” in part due to the fact that under the new system they were required to pay taxes.
Furthermore, due to people’s resistance the land law was promulgated almost 30 years later,
in 1912 (Diepart, 2015). By 1930 vast areas of rice fields were registered, as private property,
however there were still areas that remained unoccupied and people were free to clear, settle
and cultivate them (Boreak, 2000). The introduction of ownership within the French legal
framework came about in 1920 together with the adoption of the Civil Code, which
introduced a definition of ownership as being “the law that permits the use of properties of
one’s own without any prohibitions by the law”(Peng, Phallack & Menzel, 2012).
13
One of the main issues that came with the adoption of a Western system of ownership was
landlessness caused by an inability of the people to pay the required monetary taxes. Farmers
traditionally practiced a rain-fed system of production which did not provide them with
enough product to sell and make profit in order to pay taxes for the land they owned. As a
result they would turn to moneylenders. By taking out loans, many peasants became indebted
and in numerous cases even landless as they would have to sell their land to pay off their
debts (Boreak, 2000).
After Cambodia gained its independence, the system of ownership introduced by the French
remained in effect. However, means of appropriation through occupancy and possession,
characteristic of the times before the establishment of the French Protectorate were also still
practiced (Diepart, 2015). Between 1925 and 1975 just 10% of landowners had been issued
with ownership titles (Un & So, 2011). The existence of these two means of appropriation in
parallel, created land disputes. People who remained outside the modern system of property
were exploited by powerful government and military officials who would issue ownership
titles to themselves for land that had been cleared by peasants (Diepart, 2015).
The situation took a drastic turn after 1975, when the Khmer Rouge took over. All previous
land registers were lost and ownership rights were annulled as all property now belonged to
“Angkar”, or “the organization” (CCHR, 2013). The abolishing of private property rights
did not stop at destroying land registers. Private property was seen as a threat to the regime.
Families and kinship were regarded as private property and as such were destroyed. Families
were not allowed to produce their own food or benefit from the product of their own work.
Forced marriages, separation of families and collectivization in all aspects of life were just a
few of the ways in which the regime tried to achieve its goal (Mam, 1999).
When the PRK was established in 1979 under the Vietnamese, little change was made. They
maintained a land collectivization policy, but a less strict one compared to that of the former
Democratic Kampuchea. Individual families were allowed to have a plot of land for
residential purposes. Claims for such plots were made through occupancy (Un & So, 2011).
Furthermore, in the countryside, the PRK initiated a new type of collective called
“KromSamaki”. The collective units comprised of 10-15 families who were given a plot of
land, equipment, and animals to work this land collectively (Diepart, 2015). By 1989, when
Cambodia began a transition from socialism to a market economy these collectives were split
into private plots between individual families with the knowledge and approval of local
14
authorities (Un & So, 2011). Ordinary people had rights of use and succession over pieces of
land given to them by the state but they would not be allowed by law to sell, purchase, or
loan money for the purpose of purchasing land (Peng, Phallack & Menzel, 2012).
After the departure of the Vietnamese, the re-establishment of a private property system in
Cambodia happened with the issuance of Sub-Decree number 25 in 1989. This new land
reform granted ownership rights for residential land-plots of maximum 2,000 square meters,
possession rights for cultivated plots of land of maximum 5 hectares and concession rights for
plantation plots of more than 5 hectares. Since the records of ownership from before 1975
were lost, the distribution of land in early 1990s was made based on the size of families and
households (Engvall & Kokko, 2007). Land rights established through this new reform, were
available to Khmer citizens only, under condition that they used and cultivated their land
continuously for at least one year prior to the promulgation of the new policy (Supreme
National Economic Council, 2007). With this new policy, an attempt was made to establish a
program for land use and possession registration by creating a Department of Land Titles.
However, the Department could not cope with the 4.5 million applications of land titles it
received in the first two years after its establishment and became permanently backlogged.
Because of this, most of the land that was distributed to families between 1989 and 1992 was
not properly documented (Engvall & Kokko, 2007)
To further efforts at reforming the land rights system, in 1992 a Land Law was passed. To
begin with, it denied the rights to ownership of those who claimed land they presumably
owned before 1979 (State of Cambodia, 1992: Art.1). Furthermore, it established three
requirements for one to obtain ownership through possession. Firstly, one must have been in
possession of the plot of land for a minimum of five years, secondly one needed to submit a
written application to local authorities (Supreme National Economic Council, 2007) and
lastly, according to Art. 65, one would have paid taxes regularly (State of Cambodia, 1992:
Art. 65). The possibility to apply for ownership based on possession, coupled with a lack of
proper documentation to prove ownership is considered by some to be one of the weaknesses
of the 1992 Land Law and is thought to have given the elite a ’carte blanche’ to land
grabbing, especially in Phnom Penh where land prices went up quickly as a consequence of
switching to a free market economy at the beginning of the 1990s (Engvall & Kokko, 2007).
Furthermore, during the years of the Khmer Rouge most of the urban property owners were
either killed or died and as such, most of the land and buildings remained vacant. Until 1989
people would occupy property on a first come, first serve basis (Khemro & Payne, 2004).
15
Those who knew how to navigate the requirements of the newly established system were
quick in securing prime land and properties for themselves to the disadvantage of the poorer
people who lacked both the knowledge and the access to information. Moreover, in the early
1990s several socio-economic changes such as refugee repatriation, urbanization, population
growth, rural-urban migration as a response to economic growth led to an escalation in the
demand for land and property, particularly in Phnom Penh because of the opportunities the
city offered in terms of finding jobs. High demand led to an increase in land value and
property and this affected the poor people who arrived in urban centers and in Phnom Penh at
later stages. Finding vacant land and property or affordable formal housing was very difficult.
Therefore many people settled where they could find housing at a low price, in what came to
be regarded initially as informal settlements and more recently as illegal settlements (Engvall
& Kokko, 2007).
In response to the increasing number of land disputes across the country, a new Land Law
was adopted in 2001, followed by several sub-decrees and multi-donor projects meant to help
implement these new land reform efforts. The 2001 Land Law is the backbone of today’s
land administration, management and distribution. It establishes five categories of land:
monastery land, private land, indigenous community land, state public land and state private
land (Peng, Phallack & Menzel, 2012). All land belongs to the State and it only ceases to do
so when it is legally privatized. According to this law, privatization is only allowed to land
that is not of public interest (Diepart, 2015). What is of particular interest in understanding
the situation of the people living in urban poor settlements is the difference between state
public land and state private land. State public land is property which belongs to the State,
can only be used for public purposes and is inalienable therefore cannot be sold. It includes
forests, courses of water, natural lakes, administrative buildings, schools, roads, parks,
railways, airports and other specifically public uses (Kingdom of Cambodia, 2001: Art. 15-
16). State private land is property belonging to the private property of the State and public
legal institutions which can be transferred, distributed and can be subject to transactions
according to the law (Kingdom of Cambodia, 2001: Art. 17). However there is no public
information available regarding demarcation between state public land and state private land
and as such the government can more freely manipulate the system to the disadvantage of the
common people (STT Interview, 2016)
The new law removed the possibility of temporary possession as a means of acquiring land.
This means that only people who had been living on uncontested land – as long as it is not
16
public state land – were allowed to continue to use the land which they settled on until he/she
completed the required five years in order to apply for a definitive ownership title (Kingdom
of Cambodia, 2001: Art. 31). Any request for land for whose possession began after the
issuance of the law was deemed invalid. Therefore people who took possession of land after
this law was passed are considered illegal occupants (ADHOC, 2013).
However, in order to give landless people the possibility to obtain a plot of land, the
government put in place a system of Social Land Concessions (SLCs). These Social Land
Concessions open up the possibility for poor households to apply for land for residence or
subsistence farming as long as the plot is state private land (Supreme National Economic
Council, 2007). They are offered this land for free and people can achieve permanent
ownership after 5 years of possession (ADHOC, 2013). Furthermore, to regulate this
provision, the Sub-Decree no.19 on Social Land Concessions was issued in 2003. It sets out
the standards and requirements an applicant needs to fulfill in order to qualify for receiving
land (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2003). It provides for two types of SLC: local and
national concessions. The national social land concession is designed to answer the needs of
resettlement whereas the local social land concession is designed to answer needs of new
families and other landless people, attempting to prevent irregular settlement (World Bank,
2008). Once a plot of land is distributed, one must within three months build a shelter on the
plot, effectively reside on the plot for a minimum of six months each year and cultivate it
within twelve months of receipt. The new occupant is entitled, after five years of occupancy,
to apply for permanent ownership (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2003: Art.18). Local
NGOs have reported that criteria set forth by the Sub-Decree have not been fully respected
however, especially when it comes to consulting the local communities. This has led to
disputes as in some cases transferred land turned out to be already registered as indigenous
people's collective land (ADHOC, 2013)
Apart from the provisions on SLC the 2001 Land Law also sets procedures and conditions for
granting Economic Land Concessions (ELC) on state private land. These were further
implemented through sub-decrees, most important of which is the 2005 Sub-Decree 146 on
Economic Land Concessions (ADHOC, 2013). An important aspect of granting ELC is that it
can only be granted on state private land. State public land can be leased if it loses its public
use and is reclassified. Furthermore, the lessee must, prior to receiving the concession,
complete a Social and Environmental Impact Assessment, must provide resettlement
solutions and must consult with the local community (ADHOC, 2013). Uneven distributions
17
of land for SLC and ELC have been routinely reported. By the end of 2011 a significant 1.7
million hectares were distributed for ELC owned by approximately 200 rich investors
whereas only 6,000 hectares were made available for 1614 poor households for SLC (Müller,
2012). Perhaps as a result of acknowledging these inefficiencies of land distribution, prime
Minister Hun Sen issued the Directive 001 in 2012 in Measures to Strengthen and Enhance
the Effectiveness of Management of Economic Land Concessions which sets rules of re-
evaluating already made Economic Land Concessions and rules for granting of new ones.
Under its rules, land has been taken back from already granted ELC, reclassified and
redistributed. However these measures have been criticized by local NGOs. While in 2013
the number of allocated ELC decreased it has been noted that the government reclassified and
re-distributed land mainly in the countryside and this has been done during election time. The
ruling party CPP draws its support from among the people living in the countryside and
conducting this re-distribution of land at such time leads observers to believe that the
implementation of this policy was done more for political gains than for answering the needs
of landless Cambodians (ADHOC, 2013).
To add to the above-mentioned legal tools, the 1993 Constitution recognizes the right of
individuals to own property. Art. 44 of Cambodia’s Constitution speaks about this right and
provides for protection against arbitrary deprivation of property, unless this is done in public
interest:
“All persons, individually or collectively, shall have the right to ownership. Only
Khmer legal entities and citizens of Khmer nationality shall have the right to own
land. Legal private ownership shall be protected by law. The right to confiscate
properties from any person shall be exercised only in public interest as provided for
under the law and shall require fair and just compensation in advance” (Kingdom of
Cambodia, 199: Art. 44)
Despite Cambodia’s advanced legal framework for land administration, management and
distribution, land disputes are still commonplace and while efforts to effectively register and
title land have improved, land tenure insecurity across the country remains high (USAID,
2010).
Several academics and NGOs, both local and international have worked on analyzing the
causes of land conflicts in Cambodia. Engvall and Kokko believe that implementation of the
existing land law will be more effective if the government issues further sub-decrees to
18
ensure fair and just resolution of conflicts, register and manage land across the country. They
also take note of the call for legal tools to manage and administer land, which would help
regulate the pace of rapid economic development happening in Cambodia, and we would add,
the rapid economic growth happening especially in Phnom Penh (Engvall & Kokko, 2007).
Springer, however, believes that the land conflicts in Cambodia are an outcome of a divide
between the juridical-cadastral system and the understandings of landholding, which lay on a
traditional notion of customary agreement and occupation. In other words, he argues that with
the refashioning of the economic systems through a market-based model and the introduction
of a land reform, the forceful evictions of individuals who appropriated parcels of land
through customary occupation, though generally described as illegal are in fact conducted
within the written articles of the law (Springer, 2013). We believe the current situation of
forced evictions is influenced by a complex network of all these factors and there is need to
sustainably address the needs of the people affected by these evictions.
Apart from the national legislation in place, meant to safeguard Cambodian’s right to
property and ownership, as well as to protect them against arbitrary eviction, Cambodia is a
signatory to several international conventions and adhered to international agreements to
protect human rights. In an effort to put Cambodia’s controversial land disputes, forced
evictions and resettlements into context we would like to touch upon the international legal
obligations and commitments currently in place as they relate to land issues and
displacement.
5. Cambodia’s international instruments
We would like to acknowledge first of all that there is no explicit right to land codified in
international human rights treaties, except for indigenous people10 and women11, however the
accomplishment of many basic human rights is closely dependent on security of tenure.
The Cambodian Government has ratified thirteen international Human Rights instruments
and the Royal Government of Cambodia has incorporated the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights into its Constitution (FIDH, 2007). The General Assembly of the United
Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948 and the 10 International Labor Organization, Convention 169, Indigenous and Tribal Conventions11 Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) - Article 14.2 (h)
19
Kingdom of Cambodia incorporated this Declaration into its Constitution (1993) in article 31,
by stating that:
“The Kingdom of Cambodia shall recognize and respect human rights as stipulated in
the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
covenants and conventions related to human rights, women's rights and children's
rights.” (Kingdom of Cambodia, 1993: Art. 31)
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) in article 25.1 recognizes that: “Everyone
has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care […]” (UN, 1948) Moreover, the
1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) further
recognizes in article 11.1 the right to an adequate standard of living, which includes the right
to adequate housing (UN-Habitat & OHCHR, 2016). The right to adequate housing is
recognized as a branch to the right to an adequate standard of living.
The right to adequate housing particularly acknowledges freedoms and entitlements which
include: the protection against forced evictions and the arbitrary destruction and demolition
of one’s home; the right to be free from arbitrary interference with one’s home, privacy and
family; the right to choose one’s residence, to determine where to live and to freedom of
movement; as well as the entitlements of the security of tenure; housing, land and property
restitution; equal and non-discriminatory access to adequate housing; and participation in
housing-related decision-making at the national and community levels (UN-Habitat &
OHCHR, 2016)
Adequate housing in accordance to these rights is more than just four walls and a roof; there
are many elements that constitute what ‘adequate housing’ means and it requires more than
the basic structure of a shelter. For example, the minimum requirements for housing to be
adequate are: security of tenure; availability of services, materials, facilities and
infrastructure; affordability, habitability, accessibility, location, and cultural adequacy (UN-
Habitat & OHCHR, 2016). Another key element of the right to adequate housing is the
protection against forced evictions, which is defined as:
“The permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families
and/or communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the
20
provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection” (UN-
Habitat & OHCHR, 2016: 4).
An important thing to understand is the link between the right to adequate housing and other
human rights. The right to adequate housing (or lack thereof) has the potential of affecting the
enjoyment of many other human rights such as the right to work, health, social security, vote,
privacy, or education. The prospects of earning a living are typically largely impaired when
someone has been (forcibly) relocated from a place where opportunities are bountiful to a
place where opportunities and services are lacking.
While Cambodia has adopted these international human rights laws into their national law,
they remain largely cosmetic and unbinding. According to LICADHO, one of the leading
organizations working to fight and protect human rights abuses across Cambodia, human
rights abuses in Cambodia remain widespread due to a weak rule of law, and a corrupt
judiciary system which favors the rich and powerful (LICADHO, 2016). It has been
referenced time and again, even during our three interviews with NGOs, that Cambodia is a
land of impunity and this speaks for itself when one takes a closer look at the scale and scope
of human rights abuses taking place in Cambodia. Sebastian Strangio notes that“the rich and
powerful remained a law unto themselves” when speaking about Cambodia's persistent
failure to live up to its international human rights obligations (Strangio, 2014a: 244). He goes
on to state that this is something that Cambodians have known for as long as they could
remember:
“Business people seized land and evicted the inhabitants. Forests and natural
resources were sold to Chinese and Vietnamese firms for massive sums. A man like
Chhouk Bundith could shoot three young women and then brazenly flout the authority
of courts that had never been free from political control. The human rights groups
had their own name for all of this. They called it ‘impunity.’ But the word was so
frequently deployed, and so bleached of cultural and historical context, that it soon
lost much of its force” (Strangio, 2014a: 244)
21
6. Cambodia’s economic development
As a whole, Cambodia has experienced a great deal of sustained economic growth at an
average rate of 7% each year for 14 consecutive years until 2008 (Guimbert, 2011).
Cambodia’s gross domestic product grew by nearly 10 percent per year between 1998 and
2007- it was the sixth fastest growth rate in the world (Paling, 2012). Despite its growth, one
out of every two Cambodians was living in poverty, according to the World Bank in 2004. By
2011, this figure had dropped to one in five and today about two out of every ten Cambodians
are living in poverty (World Bank, 2014). In just two decades Cambodia’s per capita income
has nearly quadrupled and as of 2014 Cambodia was on the verge of being accepted into what
Sebastian Strangio, the author of Hun Sen’s Cambodia, calls the “World Bank’s club of
‘lower middle-income’ countries” (Strangio, 2014a: 137). In fact as of July 1st of this year,
Cambodia achieved this goal and its economic status has officially moved up a rung from the
low-income bracket to the lower-middle income bracket (McGrath &Kimsay, 2016) This
acceptance into the World Bank’s club is a feat for Hun Sen, Cambodia’s Prime Minister, as
it was his personal goal to transform Cambodia from a low-income country to a middle-
income country by 2030, and to a high-income country by 2050 (Vannarith, 2015).
Cambodia’s rise and boom in economic development is a remarkable accomplishment,
considering its history according to Strangio, who states that “Hun Sen’s Cambodia has come
full circle, from battlefield to marketplace; today it is one of the most open economies in
Asia” (Strangio, 2014a: 137). When one considers the state of Cambodia following the end of
the civil war in the late 1990’s and the near collapsed condition of infrastructure and
economic indicators (resembling pre-1970 levels), it is a feat to see where Cambodia is today
(Strangio, 2014a).
In a national context, Phnom Penh is wealthy, however it remains significantly poorer than
other Southeast Asian capital cities in the region. There still remains the challenge of a
development process that benefits few, while undermining the livability of the city for many;
a trend that is not sustainable according to Tudehope (Tudehope, 2012). Strangio points out
that while there has been a large area of promoted growth and openness in the visible sectors
of the economy, large profitable sectors remain off the books and out of the reach of effective
regulation (Strangio, 2014a). This poses a problem to the development of the country because
there remains a large inequitable distribution of benefits of economic growth. Cambodia’s
wealth is strategically concentrated in relatively few hands and economic development
22
presides over poverty reduction. The gap between the rich and the poor remains amongst the
widest in Asia (Strangio, 2014a: 139).
Hun Sen’s desire to transform Cambodia from a low-income country to a middle and high-
income country (Vannarith, 2015) sheds some light onto Phnom Penh’s rapid boom in urban
and economic development over the past few decades. After a very turbulent history,
resulting in political and social paralysis, Cambodia has enjoyed a period of high economic
growth and stability under the Cambodian People’s Party ruled by Hun Sen (Bower, 2013).
This growth and prosperity comes at a price however, while Cambodia is reaping the benefits
of economic development, the Cambodian people are suffering the ramifications by doing
this at a high cost; many Cambodians have suffered from land grabs, forced relocation and
economic disenfranchisement as a result of high economic development (Bower, 2013).
Ernest Bower, in an article published by the Center for Strategic & International Studies
poses the question whether: “Cambodians are sacrificing good governance and freedom to
pay for economic success?”(Bower, 2013). He goes on to suggest that the evidence would
suggest so; as violent land grabs, extrajudicial killings, crackdowns on activist, and
corruption have persisted alongside Cambodia’s impressive economic prosperity (Bower,
2013).
6.1 Actors at play
There are a few different stakeholders at play when it comes to Phnom Penh and
development and often times these relationships can be controversial; the major stakeholders
include: The Royal Government of Cambodia, development partners, Civil Society
Organizations (CSO), the private sector and the informal sector (Tudehope, 2012). The
underdevelopment of the public sector, a reliance on ODA (Official Development
Assistance), and a weakness of the regulatory framework brings to question the influence of
the private sector and the position of the public’s best interest when it comes to decision
making and the fate of Phnom Penh (Tudehope, 2012).
As the overarching authority, the Royal Government of Cambodia's role in the development
of Phnom Penh is a crucial one. Theoretically speaking, the administration is structured into
three levels of government, the highest level being the Central Government, then the
intermediate municipality and lastly, the local districts and communes, however the Central
Government retains the majority of decision making power. There has been much effort in
23
the form of donor funding for ‘good governance’ policies and decentralization, and while it
can be said that there has been some progress in the capacity building of urban ministries, the
influence of private sector actors on urban development remains strong (Tudehope, 2012).
High on the reform agenda of the Royal Government of Cambodia and Development
Partners, has been the reduction of the dominance of the Central Government through the
umbrella of decentralization and deconcentration from the highest level of authority to the
lower levels of government. However, the reforms have been slow and as a result, Municipal
and Local Governments remain for the most part, politically and economically subservient to
the Central Government (Tudehope, 2012).
In the land sector of the Government, a key area in terms of urban development is the
Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning, and Construction (MLMUPC), which is the
governing body responsible for land use, urban planning, construction projects, and with the
collaboration of the Ministry of Interior (MOI), also responsible for the resolution of conflicts
over land that is unregistered. State property management falls under the Ministry of
Economics and Finance, which undermines the authority of the Municipality of Phnom Penh
(MPP) over land in the municipal area. This speaks to the fact that in Cambodia, the
influences of powerful well-connected individuals often override procedure. Add this to the
fact that the private sector has become increasingly prominent within Phnom Penh’s
development sector following the state of stability after the 1997 coup and it is no surprise
that there is significant overlap between business elite and politicians when it comes to the
development sector, often resembling high levels of opacity (Tudehope, 2012). In recent
years, there has been a trend of private sector actors closely tied to Government actors
becoming increasingly dominant in urban development; giving rise to a nexus of developers,
politicians, and the well-connected driving urban change and development in Phnom Penh
(Tudehope, 2012).
Sebastian Strangio has termed this method of governing “Hunsenomics,” which is the result
of two decades of Hun Sen’s “blend of old-style patronage, elite charity, and predatory
market economics” (Strangio, 2014a: 135). He goes on to explain that since Cambodia’s
transition to the free market in 1989, Hun Sen has succeeded in forming a stable pact among
Cambodia’s ruling elites, but otherwise has done very little to strategically tackle the
challenges of development and poverty (Strangio, 2014a: 135). This inevitably gives rise to
questions of stewardship and the development process in Phnom Penh. It can be said that the
24
interests and needs of the private sector have become domineering to the wider long-term
interest of the city as a whole (Tudehope, 2012).
6.2 Development of Phnom Penh
After the strategic and forced eviction of Phnom Penh by the Khmer Rouge in 1975, and
three decades of conflict and instability, the city of Phnom Penh was in despair. Years of
conflict took a major toll on the city’s urban infrastructure. As a result, Phnom Penh,
Cambodia as a whole was in need of a major rehabilitation process. After the mass
elimination of Cambodia’s population, specifically the educated classes, Cambodia had low
capacity to rebuild itself or administer the city’s reconstruction and management process;
UNTAC was created for these purposes, and part of its mission included the provision of
administrative and electoral support, law and order, and civil administrative and
reconstruction. (Tudehope, 2012). After the initial stage of rebuilding basic services and
infrastructure, there was a boom in urban development, beautification, and rapid growth
within the city centre.
Decades of conflict and the destruction of basic services and infrastructure resulted in large
amounts of Official Development Assistance and Foreign Direct Assistance (FDA)
contributing significantly to the progress of the rehabilitation of urban services and
infrastructure in Phnom Penh. However large challenges still remain in the viability of urban
development (Tudehope, 2012). A few of these challenges, according to a report published by
STT in A Review of the Development Paradigm in Phnom Penh, include: the rapidity of
growth, the increasing economic and spatial inequality, a lack of affordable housing, a
persistently weak tenure and titling system for the informal settlements, the weak regulatory
framework, the predominance of private developer-driven urban change, and the poorly
coordinated development of the periphery (Tudehope, 2012).
"Due to the city's geographical location, at the confluence of three rivers: Tonle Mekong,
Tonle Sap and Tonle Bassac, the city's economy revolved around trade for a long time. In
recent years however less emphasis has been on trade. Rather, more focus has been on what
Sylvia Nam calls an “economy of space” a building boom (Nam, 2011). In a quest to bring
Phnom Penh within the ranks of the neighboring capital cities, foreign investors-mainly from
China, South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia-started backing the Cambodian
Government’s plans for development (Nam, 2011). However, this happens in a city that only
25
recently issued a master plan and is widely disregarded, leading to countless controversial
projects unfolding throughout the city leading to the displacement of thousands of the most
vulnerable inhabitants, the urban poor.
To say that Phnom Penh has been under the thralls of rapid urbanization and economic
development would be an understatement. In fact, Phnom Penh’s boom in development poses
a challenge to the city to keep pace (Tudehope, 2012). As one of the NGO representatives we
interviewed explained, in Cambodia there are different plans for development across the
country: in the country-side it is the agro-industry that is taking over, in Sihanoukville and
Siem Reap, it is tourism but in Phnom Penh it is all of the above (LICADHO Interview
2016). This can be explained by what Sylvia Nam calls ”primacy city”, where primacy is a
trait found especially in Asian countries where urban culture is centeredaround the capital
city. Therefore, Phnom Penh stands as an icon of the entire country’s development (Nam,
2011). The unfolding urban development however poses a threat to thousands of Phnom
Penh’s inhabitants that live in precarious conditions in the city’s slums.
Political stability and high levels of economic growth have subsequently pushed up land
values and prompted a frenzied grab for inner-city real estate (Strangio, 2014a). There is a
high demand for affordable housing in Phnom Penh as a result of the concentration of low
skilled workers moving to the city for jobs such as garment workers or construction workers
(Tudehope, 2012). However the private sector does not contribute to the creation of low-
income housing options or adequate plots for families to build their own housing on.
Therefore, this falls into the hands of the rental market and informal sector, which provides
nearly all low income housing options in Phnom Penh (Tudehope, 2012). Urban space is
more and more contested as the city continues to develop and the informal sector is
constantly in competition with the private sector for the same space. This can result in grave
consequences when large scale commercial and residential developments aimed solely at
high income earners further compounds the housing crisis by actively removing a part of the
informal housing supply (Tudehope, 2012). Since 1999, an estimated 150,000 people have
been displaced (nearly 11 percent of Phnom Penh’s population in 2012) as a result of the
eviction of informal settlement sites around Phnom Penh. Over the past 15 years, the
Municipality of Phnom Penh has engaged in an extensive ‘demolition and eviction program’
of informal settlements (Tudehope, 2012).
26
This is no surprise when considering the path Phnom Penh has been taking. Sebastian
Strangio perhaps sums it up best by saying: “Just like Bangkok and Jakarta in the 1970s,
Phnom Penh is marching along the path toward a clean, sanitized modernity” (Strangio,
2014a: 158). He quotes Hun Sen saying: “ ‘I am so proud that from bare hands and ghost city
we have come this far’ “ (Strangio, 2014a: 158). He goes on to state that while many of the
city’s developments can be attributed to positive ones, its growth and development has been
unplanned and chaotic:
“[...] The result of a system of economic incentives that marries the maximum of
rapacity with the minimum of regulation. The profit motive reigns supreme, to the
detriment of the old, the jerry-rigged, and the informal. City officials often refer to the
urban poor and their settlements with the Khmer word ‘anatepadei’, meaning
“anarchy.” The word fills official statements and crops up in the speeches of
municipal officials, who denounce “slums” (samnang anatepadei, “anarchic
constructions”) as “illegal settlements standing between Phnom Penh and its modern,
developed future. (Strangio, 2014a: 158)
Following the wave of evictions of informal settlements across the city of Phnom Penh over
the past decade, 54 resettlement sites now exist on the outskirts of the city, or in what
Strangio likes to call the “dumping grounds for the displaced” (Strangio, 2014a: 154). These
resettlement sites are plagued by poor infrastructure; often lacking proper sanitation and
access to clean drinking water, they also often lack the most basic of social services. What is
more is that few of these resettlement sites are actually in the city at all: on average they are
about 20 kilometers away in what Strangio calls a “semi rural no-man’s-land,” out of reach
from basic urban amenities and services (Strangio, 2014a: 154). Furthermore, these relocation
sites are growing further and further away from Phnom over time (STT, 2012).
Over the past two decades, with economic liberalization and a boom in urban development
and construction, Phnom Penh is a transformed cityscape. It is a city caught in the midst of
constant change and development where buildings rise and fall at the hands of unregulated
planning codes and cheap construction labor. Phnom Penh has physically and socially been
transformed by urban land evictions and modern developments, which have systematically
replaced the city’s informal city settlements with the features of a rising middle class
(Strangio, 2014a).
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The rapid urban development and regeneration of Phnom Penh along with the lack of a
regulatory planning framework brings to question Phnom Penh’s future. Perhaps Marcus
Tudehope, in A Tale of Two Cities, a Review of the Development Paradigm in Phnom Penh,
best explains the development challenge facing Phnom Penh today:
“In the legacy of the city’s history and the current challenges it faces, Phnom Penh
essentially stands at a crossroads. Ahead is the continuation of a “planned”
development of the city … To either side is the new “unplanned” approach, a path
that already seems to be the favored choice, in which a laissez faire attitude to
development sees the city becoming increasingly similar to Bangkok and other Asian
mega cities with unbridled construction, few planning restrictions, sporadic and
uncoordinated infrastructure provision, rising gentrification, major traffic issues and
tiny pockets of usable open space.” (Tudehope, 2012: 1)
7. Urban poor settlements
Urban poor settlements are not a new phenomenon in Phnom Penh. About 20% of Phnom
Penh’s population in the early 1970’s was reported to be living in slum like conditions (Kry
Beng Hong et al in Khemro, 2000). The informal settlements we see today in Phnom Penh
started to take shape in the 1980s (STT, 2014).
By the end of the Khmer Rouge rule, an estimated 82.000 houses out of 122.000 that existed
in Phnom Penh before 1975 had been destroyed or deteriorated gravely. There was no
electricity in private homes until 1983 and no water connections until early 1990s. Once the
Khmer Rouge were ousted by the Vietnamese, people started to return to their previous
homes but the newly established PRK was regulating the movement of the people. During the
1980s, under the Vietnamese socialist regime people were discouraged from moving to the
city. Government officials and their relatives were the ones allowed to settle in Phnom Penh
first and were offered formal housing by the state (Khemro, 2000). The houses in best
condition were occupied by Vietnamese and Cambodian soldiers, Cambodian state servants,
and Vietnamese advisors, leaving the common people to take whatever was left available
(Gottesman in Rabe, 2009). Furthermore, many people returning to Phnom Penh occupied
land and property on a first-come first served basis, based on a criteria of social rank and by
the time former residents of Phnom Penh arrived to their homes, they found the properties
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already occupied by new residents (Rabe, 2009). Additionally, in many cases, people able to
navigate the system appropriated houses and land, which they eventually sold or rented,
leaving little vacant options to people who arrived at later stages, many of who were IDPs
and refugees. Unable to find affordable property, people settled in informal settlements. As
rural-urban migration increased, a feature of modernization, so did the size and number of
urban poor settlements. In following years, during late 1980s and early 1990s, the pressure on
land and property increased as employees of the international NGOs with offices in Phnom
Penh arrived in the capital city.
Khemro also notes that before the 1993 elections, authorities allowed and encouraged
squatters to settle in Phnom Penh, as part of the pre-election propaganda. People were
promised recognition of ownership for the land they occupied. He also speaks of a public
announcement made by Hun Sen in 1996, who broadcasted to the media a message for people
living in the poor settlements, advising them not to leave the urban lands they occupied
unless each family receives thousands of US dollars as compensation (Khemro, 2000). This is
seen as a green light given to many Cambodians to migrate to the city and as a catalyst for the
growing number of urban slums that were formed during the 1990s and early 2000.
According to Khemro, in 1994 there were 187 urban poor settlements in Phnom Penh. In
2003, according to OHCHR this number had risen to 569 poor settlements and according to
an STT survey conducted in 2013 there were 466 urban poor settlements (OHCHR, 2014 &
STT, 2014). On one hand we can see an initial increase in number since early 1990s, which
can be justified by the fact that Phnom Penh stands at the centre of the country’s economic
growth. On the other hand, there has been a decrease in the number of poor settlements in
Phnom Penh. It is unclear whether this decrease happened due to upgrading of sites or
relocation.
One of our interviewees, representing STT, described an urban poor settlement to be a
settlement that consists of a minimum of 10 households, that lacks basic infrastructure, roads,
sewage systems, and in which people’s livelihoods are dependent on informal jobs such as
tuk-tuk drivers, garbage collectors and vendors (STT Interview 2016). Urban poor
settlements are commonly located on state land depending on how economical and
convenient the location is for finding jobs and for providing natural produce. These
settlements are commonly formed near to the city centre, near markets, along waterways and
lakes (Fallavier, 2003). Most of the urban poor do not have tenure security because their
29
dwellings are: built on public land; or constructed on private land not belonging to the owner;
or built on shared title land; and/or constructed without occupancy or construction permits; or
rented in slums without formal renting contracts (UNICEF, 2014)
Those occupying state public land are seen as a hindrance in the way of urban development
plans. The 2003 - 2005 National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS) acknowledged that
urban development has been mainly thought of as a physical modernization and expansion of
the city by building modern infrastructure, housing facilities, commercial buildings, schools,
government offices etc. These facilities however are bound to help the better-off sectors of
the city’s population and not the urban poor who are commonly characterized as disorderly
and anarchic (Kingdom of Cambodia, 2002). The 2003-2005 NPRS speaks of a prevalent
bias among the middle class population towards the urban poor:
“Both the authorities and the better off city dwellers tend to blame the poor for their
wretched conditions and stigmatize the poor as socially undesirable, criminally
inclined, even mentally defective.” (Kingdom of Cambodia, 2002: 85)
During our research we have focused on the major cases of poor settlements which have been
at the forefront of land disputes and resulted in forced evictions: Dey Krahom, Borei Keila
and Boeung Kak Lake. These are the communities within which the organizations we
interviewed conduct monitoring activities.
Dey Krahom: was a site located in a central area of Phnom Penh between the so-called
‘White Building’ and the 1963 Olympic Village. Originally an empty field, it was populated
by returnees and refugees in the 1980s and 1990s. The area was targeted for development by
authorities and was valued at around $80 million USD. In 2005, the private developer 7NG
offered residents a relocation option, 20km outside Phnom Penh in Damnak Trawyong where
they would get temporary land titles and after five years the right to apply for permanent
ownership. The relocation site turned out to be unfit and lacking basic infrastructure
(OHCHR, 2012). Others were offered monetary compensation, which was well below market
value and differed from one family to another. A number of families refused either option and
remained on the site hoping for a better alternative. In 2007 a campaign of harassment and
intimidation began where road blockages were put in place to stop the supply of the local
vendors, on occasions armed military police attempted eviction by force. In 2009 at six in the
morning law enforcement officers entered the community with bulldozers and tore down the
houses of the remaining 150 house owners and 250 renters (Goad, 2012). 91 families were
30
offered a home at the relocation site and additional $190 USD as compensation. The removal
of the last families was done without prior notice and without consultation. Some of the
residents were yet to finalize negotiations regarding solution for the eviction (Brady &
Pheaktra, 2009). A number of families were forced to set up camp in Oudong; a field that is
still regarded as the “Blue Tent Community” due to the colors of the tarpaulins used for the
tents. They were eventually given small plots of barren land on which residents had to build
their own houses with pieces of wood and palm leaves for roofs (Titharra, 2011).
Borei Keila was a settlement in the centre of Phnom Penh, consisting of three eight story
buildings consisting of a gymnasium, offices, restaurants and landscaped grounds (Goad,
2012). It had been a gift of the Chinese people to Cambodia and served various functions
since its inauguration in 1966. Initially it accommodated athletes for the GANEFO Games,
during Lon Nol it was used as a training area for Government Forces. The Khmer Rouge used
it as a medical centre and later on to house Ministry officials. In the 1980s staff of the
Ministry of Interior used the site to house police officers. When repatriation of refugees began
after 1991, hundreds of families moved to Borei Keila, many of them relatives of the police
families already living there. Following the 1993 elections the site was transferred to the
Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MoEYS), the gymnasium was passed on to a
Cambodian TV studio and the administration buildings and conference rooms were taken
over by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. Many of the families that had settled there
continued to live in the apartments and were soon joined by many new rural migrants. As the
number of new arrivals increased, makeshift houses were built around the apartment blocks.
Despite the establishment of a committee to regulate settlement in the area, no residency
criteria was made clear and the settlement increased further. The different waves of settlement
led to the creation of a community formed by initial inhabitants of the apartment, that were
given an apartment in the 1980s, police officers and their families who settled there in the
1990s, refugees and rural migrants (Rabe, 2009). Eviction notices started coming in from
early 1990s. In 1996 a forced eviction removed 56 families from the site. Consequent eviction
notices were halted occasionally by protests and demonstrations and were at times caught up
in election politics. In 2003 however a private company, Phanimex, was awarded the rights to
develop the site and a sharing deal was agreed upon. According to this deal the company
committed to building low-income housing for the families living on the site, on two hectares
of the concession while a remaining 2.6 hectares of the concession would be commercially
developed by the private investor (Rabe, 2009).
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The deal seemed promising, however several issues ensued: the company awarded this
concession is reported to be owned by a well-connected businesswoman, with ties to the CPP
ruling party; no public bidding was held to select the developer; the community raised
complaints about the fact that consultation was not sought from the Borei Keila residents;
complaints emerged about the community committee members having been bought to give
their approval for the company’s proposal; appointees on behalf of the community had been
offered personal benefits such as jobs within Phanimex in exchange for withholding
information from their members (Rabe, 2009).
The company agreed to building ten community six storey buildings for the 1,776 families
living on the site however, in 2012, without explanation the company announced that the last
two buildings will no longer serve the housing of Borei Keila residents. Furthermore the
MoEYS sold the remaining 9.5 hectares of the initial site to the company in exchange for land
that Phanimex owned outside Phnom Penh, turning the sharing projects into a controversial
land swap deal. In 2007 three of the promised buildings were finished and a number of 394
families moved into their new homes. In 2009, 31 families affected by HIV were evicted to an
improper resettlement site outside Phnom Penh. These families were among the residents who
had eligible claim to residence in the settlement due to their long-term residence (Rabe,
2009). Waves of forced evictions continued since. At the beginning of 2016 another 154
families were the last to be offered compensation, which amounted to either: an apartment on
site for 35 families, $5,000 USD or a plot of land 45 kilometers away from Phnom Penh for
85 families, and lastly, $3,000 USD for 34 families. The government did not recognize any
claim to compensation of a remaining 29 families. These solutions were declined by most of
residents and from among those who accepted, reports suggested they did so because they felt
they had no other choice (Kimsay& Wright, 2016).
Boeung Kak Lake (BKK) was one of the seven natural lakes of Phnom Penh that served as a
recreational green space in the city centre (Phnom Penh Post, 2008). The first fishermen
settled here in the 1960s, on the western bank and in 1985, 70 families were relocated here
from a previous residence that was developed into an amusement park (Kry, 2014). After the
defeat of the Khmer Rouge by the Vietnamese, refugees, fishermen and railway workers
return on the banks of the lake. The population increased after 1993, with the arrival of new
waves of refugees (Phnom Penh Post, 2008). In 1997 the area was privatized and in 2007 was
leased for $79 million USD to the Cambodian private developer Shukaku Inc. with
connections to a CPP senator. In line with the government’s modernization vision, the 99 year
32
lease was meant to make way for an ambitious development scheme which includes the
building of a commercial and residential area called “The New City of the East”, one of the
five satellite city development projects approved as part of MPP’s city beautification plan
(Kry, 2014 & Say, 2010).
The case draw international coverage for many reasons among which the fact that the plot
was sold at a price of 0.6$ per square meter when prime land in Phnom Penh sells at a price
of $700-$1000 per square meter (Hughes, 2008). The selloff led to the displacement of
approximately 4200 families living on the side of the lake, some of whom have had legitimate
claim to ownership of the land under the 2001 Land Law (Human Rights Watch, 2008 &
Nam, 2011). Furthermore, the area occupied by the lake used to belong to the municipality
and according to legal definitions it was classified as state public land, therefore land which
cannot be sold. In 2008 the Council of Ministers reclassified the lake from state public land
to state private land (Hughes, 2008 and Phnom Penh Post, 2008). The forced eviction of
people living around BKK is one of the most salient examples of forced eviction in the name
of development. In 2008, the company started pumping sand in the lake despite the fact that
many families were still not offered compensation or alternative solution. The filling of the
lake increased flooding in the area and shortly, 500 families were forced to accept the
resettlement offer in Damnak Trawyoeng, a site 20 km away from Phnom Penh, out of fear
that a later relocation offer would be even further away from the city (Kry, 2014). Others,
who did not qualify for compensation or relocation, being considered renters lost everything
altogether and were not offered any alternative (Mgbako, Gao, Joynes and Cave, 2010).
It is important to mention that there are a few examples of good practice of eviction and
resettlement practices in Cambodia. A recurrent example of voluntary eviction is the case of
the community of Akphiwat Meanchey, resettled between 1997-1999. The Municipality of
Phnom Penh engaged with the community leaders and consulted upon the chosen site for
resettlement, allowing them to visit it and prepare better living conditions (Whyte &
Channyda, 2009 & Goad, 2012). This good practice example did not lead to an improved
resettlement policy in Cambodia. It is rather a “forgotten high point in resettlement history
for Phnom Penh” (Goad, 2012: 11). However, since then, the MPP, the Cambodian
government and many of the private companies investing in development projects across
Phnom Penh drew heavy criticism from human rights organizations concerned with the
repeated violation of human rights related to forced evictions in Phnom Penh.
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8. Phnom Penh’s future: satellite cities
By 2020, the face of Phnom Penh could be drastically changed with rapid large-scale
development projects, specifically those of multi-million dollar ‘satellite city’ projects.
Satellite cities are springing up in Cambodia’s growing capital as a new wealthy and middle
class emerge in one of Asia’s poorest countries that has faced decades of conflict and war.
Over the past 20 years, Phnom Penh has been changing both physically and socially by urban
developments that have been systematically replacing informal city slums with the rising
Cambodian middle and wealthy class features: malls, hotels, gated communities, and villas
(Strangio, 2014b). One of the most apparent examples of this changing landscape is Koh
Pitch, or otherwise known as Diamond Island, a small island located at the merging point of
where the Mekong and Bassac Rivers meet. Back in 2004, this island was home to around
300 families who made their living farming and selling vegetables in the city’s markets. Now
the island is a sprawling city within a city, comprised of Western-style entertainment and
housing complexes. The 300 farming families were offered compensation to leave and if
refused, they were evicted (Strangio, 2014b).
Koh Pitch was bought by Overseas Cambodia Investment Corporation (OCIC), a firm
controlled by Canadia Bank with ties to Hun Sen’s family. OCIC’s vision of the island was to
develop it into ‘Diamond Island City.’ In Sebastian Strangio’s words, Diamond Island was
created as: a paradise for the wealthy with a driving range called the ‘Elite Golf Club,’ a
water park, wedding reception halls, and luxury condominiums, with future plans to include a
gem-shaped observation tower and a forest of high-rise apartments. In one of the luxury
developments on Diamond Island called ‘Elite Town,’ modern townhouses go for between
$232,000 to $1.08 million US dollars. The townhouses are on streets named after famous
American universities: Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Stanford, and Berkeley (Strangio, 2014b).
Grand Phnom Penh International City is another satellite city, built on reclaimed wetlands in
the north of the city, and Strangio describes the once wetlands, as being metamorphosed into
a paradise for the wealthy and a monument to a new mode of Cambodian middle-class living.
Once the development is finished by 2020, it will include 4,500 houses, half-a-dozen
residential apartment towers, a gold club, which includes an 18-hole course, a water park, an
34
international grade school and state-of-the-art hospital. As one sales-executive describes the
development:
“It’s like a luxury city… we have the best facilities. We have villas, we have flats, we
have shop houses… We have public hardens. And it’s not as crowded as Phnom Penh.”
(Strangio, 2014b).
According to one realtor, CBRE, seven satellite city projects are schedule for completion in
Phnom Penh over the next 10 to 15 years, which would cover nearly 8,000 hectares, or about
12 percent of the city’s total land area. These sprawling cities within a city points to the
direction Phnom Penh is heading in. Strangio quotes one city official back in 2005 in a
magazine article as describing the urban ideal as: “a city with no smoke and no sound”
(Strangio, 2014b).
Satellite cities and the lifestyle they offer are a clear juxtaposition to what the majority of
Cambodians face daily. Not only that, but the way in which they are being built and
propagated goes against the sustainability of the city as a whole. Urban planners have pointed
out that these mega-projects have been poorly planned and coordinated against the backdrop
of the city as a whole (Strangio, 2014b). Each city is a development in and of itself; it is its
own well-planned island. Outside of these mega-cities lies the real Phnom Penh with its
potholed streets. The developments of these mega-cities, according to Frederic Mauret, a
French urban planner who has helped the Municipality of Phnom Penh, only focus on their
individual development, while turning a blind eye to the development of a city as a whole.
There are many consequences of carrying out these isolated and disjointed development
projects without proper planning such as traffic jams, flooding and other environmental
effects (Strangio, 2014b).
The urban development and growth in Phnom Penh, specifically these mega-projects, is
driven in a large part by private sector investments- mostly from Asian countries. In 2005, a
2020 Master Plan for Phnom Penh was drafted with the help of French urban planning
consultants, however the plan was never implemented and in its absence, projects such as
these satellite cities are often announced by senior government officials, such as Prime
Minister, Hun Sen, before they are even approved by city officials (Strangio, 2014b). With
35
such little regulation- and such big incentives as far as capital- these development projects
undermine the social and environmental impacts they have on Phnom Penh.
Nowhere is this last point more apparent than in the case of BKK or Boung Kak Lake.
Boeung Kak was once a large lake in the northern part of Phnom Penh, home to hundreds of
families living around its banks and living in stilted houses surrounding its waters making a
living off of its marine waters. Now the once lake stands as a massive expanse of sand which
was filled in to create a foundation for the $1.5 billion dollar development project which will
transform the lake into the Phnom Penh City Center (PPCC) or a capital within the capital.
Shukaku Inc. is the name of the company leasing the lake with an elaborate plan to transform
the lake into a ‘modern, sustainable commercial and leisure hub with world class facilities
purpose-built for both local and overseas business and investors.’ (PPCC, 2016) It is no
wonder that Shukaku has ties to the government- a CPP Senator Lao Meng Khin (Dara &
Danaparamita, 2015). The lease of BKK was negotiated in private with no input from the
people who it would be affecting most- the 4,000 families residing on the edges of the lake
for many years prior: many had called the lake home since the 1980’s (Strangio, 2014b).
The only thing standing in the way of Shukaku Inc’s development plans were the 4,000
families residing on the shores of the lake. This was ‘solved’ by cutting water and electricity
supplies to the residents of the lake and granting evictions notices. When people refused to
leave, they started pumping sand and water into the lake, letting the mud and rising waters
flood people's homes and do the eviction for them. The strategic and forced eviction of BBK
residents was the largest displacement of people since the Khmer Rouge forcibly emptied
Phnom Penh in 1975 (Strangio, 2014b).
These satellite cities and mega projects often end up displacing thousands of families,
through improper procedures and without offering adequate compensation or alternative
solutions. The national legislation of Cambodia acknowledges the need of dispossession
when done for the benefit of the public interest. This needs to be done against fair and just
compensation (Royal Government of Cambodia, 1993). However, the cases presented above
show that development in Phnom Penh has been done largely for the benefit of an elite
minority, rather than for the majority most in need of development’s advantages.
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9. Development through modernization
In order to assess the relationship between economic growth and the violation of the
fundamental human rights in Cambodia as it relates to forced evictions and development-
induced displacement, it is useful to look at the current situation in the context of
development theory. We reason that the level of commitment to certain development theories
influence the transition of a society towards an improvement in the quality of life.
Furthermore, the way states commit economic resources to development is also greatly
determined by their inclination towards specific development theories (Matunhu, 2011). We
understand development within a theoretical context as an all-encompassing concept
consisting of social, political, cultural and economical aspects and we will look at how
adherence to the modernization theory of development explains Cambodia’s current
controversial forced evictions and displacement associated with them.
The origins of modernization theory generally traces back to the post Second World War
period, in the 1950s and 1960s. It is characterized by three events: the rise of the U.S. as a
world power, the disintegration of European colonies giving birth to many nation-states
across Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the spread of the Soviet Union’s influence. These
three events led to a search for a development model to promote economic growth and
political independence in developing countries (Tipps, 1973 & Reyes, 2001). Some of the
main assumptions of modernization theory refer to it being (a) a westernizing process;
European or American models of social and economic change are transferred to non-western,
underdeveloped societies (b) a transformative process; in order for a society to become
modern, its traditional structures and values must be replaced by a set of modern values, and
(c) it is a phased process, that takes place in stages (Reyes, 2001).
Departing from Wucherpfennig and Deutsch’s study on the relation between socio-economic
development and political democracy (Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, 2009) we intend to better
understand the context in which actions towards development in Cambodia are undertaken,
particularly those that might lead to displacement of the urban poor. It is not our aim to assess
to which degree the implementation of political democracy, as a modern structure, was
successful in Cambodia, even though the subject is worthy of thorough study on its own,
nonetheless, we find it relevant to mention that Cambodia committed to achieve democracy
37
in the aftermath of the Paris Agreements. This commitment is tied to that of respecting the
fundamental human rights of all people.
The Khmer Rouge, in achieving their ideology of bringing Cambodia back to the glory of its
Angkorian past, attempted to create an extreme form of an agrarian state. They had abolished
money, abolished all types of private property or possession, created collectivized labor
camps and banned religion (Strangio, 2014a). Aspects of economic life that had been
developed throughout history were destroyed. They viewed post-independence modernization
programs to be elitist, urban-centric and corrupt, which is why the cities were swiftly emptied
of its inhabitants. The regime purged an almost entire class of educated Cambodians,
perceived as a threat and removed all foreign influences (Sinanan, 2011). It is within this
context that we positdevelopment efforts in Cambodia were undertaken by external actors
largely from a modernization standpoint. In a bid to rebuild the country’s economical, social
and political structures external actors, such as UNTAC and foreign donors, attempted to
transfer western ideas of development into Cambodia. UNTAC had a clear idea of what it
desired to accomplish after the departure of the Transitional Authority and based on this
vision, UNTAC and Cambodia agreed on a series of principles upon which Cambodia’s
Constitution was to be drafted. These principles included the inviolability of the constitution
and a declaration of fundamental rights. Further to be included was a declaration that
Cambodia was sovereign, independent and neutral and a statement that Cambodia will follow
democracy based on the principle of pluralism(Ayres, 2000).
The UN Transitional Authority has often been criticized as having failed to take into account
at the time the traditional political culture in Cambodia, and conceptions of power perceived
in terms of “hierarchy and ranking, deference and command, hegemony and servitude”
(Ayres, 2000: 159). In doing so the UN did not succeed motivating political leaders in favor
of the formation of a modern developed state. The political climate that emerged in
Cambodia continued to reflect the traditional political culture characteristic of pre-colonial
Cambodia, as described above (Ayres, 2000). This speaks of a big divide that exists between
external perceptions of modern and developed and internal perceptions of these constructs.
It is within this context that economic development and growth has been promoted as part of
Hun Sen’s ambition to raise Cambodia to a lower-middle income country and bring Phnom
Penh among the ranks of the most powerful capital cities of the region. This ambition follows
38
the pattern of Rostow’s five stages of economic modernization, in that it seeks to gradually
advance on the economic ladder from traditional to modern.
Sinanan states that in the 1950s and 1960s, when modernization was in its inception as a
theoretical construct, economic growth was largely seen as a force through which countries
could assert themselves as competitive on the world stage (Sinanan, 2011). We can see this
trend in Cambodia nowadays, where the government is making efforts to bring Cambodia
within the ranks of economically successful ASEAN countries. One of the features of
economic growth is urban expansion/urbanization. According to modernization scholars,
urban expansion is a key feature of transitioning from a traditional (agrarian) society to a
modern (industrial) one and as such, for those countries pursuing to achieve the stages of
modernization, urbanization is a process to be encouraged (Bradshaw, 1987).
The economic development of Phnom Penh triggered an increase in rural to urban migration.
Many Cambodians have left their homes in the countryside to search for work in the booming
industries of Phnom Penh and Siem Reap. Opportunities for rural migrants usually consist of
low-skilled or informal jobs such as tuk-tuk drivers, garment workers, security guards, and
construction workers or laborers (Strangio, 2014a). While urban population in Phnom Penh is
growing fast, urban development picked up with considerable investment from the private
sector. However, these development projects have proved to pay little consideration to the
needs of the majority of poor Cambodians who more often than not end up paying the costs
of development.
Jolynna Sinanan argues that development puts great emphasis on the economic factor, around
which individuals’ lives are to be reorganized. She also argues that in Cambodia,
development is at times a source of social disruption (Sinanan, 2011). We see this as being
valid especially in the case of forced evictions, where development acts as a dismantling
force of the social and economical relationships of urban poor Cambodians.
10. Development induced displacement
Displacement by development occurs when people are excluded from the use of territory on
which they once relied due to development (Penz, Drydyk, Bose, 2011: 3) As it currently
stands, there is no precise data on the numbers of persons affected by development-induced
39
displacement (DID) throughout the world (FMO, 2011). Officially there are no institutions
committed to tracking overall development-induced displacement and resettlement on a
global or national level, unlike that of refugees and IDPs (FMO, 2011). Yet studies have
shown that despite not being officially recognized as refugees or internally displaced persons,
those who suffer from displacement due to development are often impacted in a very similar
manner to refugees and IDPs. Displacement often goes hand-in-hand with corruption, and use
or threat of violent forced evictions which have grave consequences such as homelessness,
landlessness, loss of livelihoods, food insecurity, deterioration in physical and mental health,
breakdown of social networks and kinships, economic and cultural marginalization, and loss
of education (IDI, 2012).
It may be argued that the dominant view of development in the 1950s and 1960s was driven
by modernization theory, which saw development as “transforming traditional, simple, Third
World societies into modern, complex, Westernized ones’ (Robinson, 2003). In this light,
large-scale, capital-intensive development projects were accelerating the pace towards a
better and brighter future and if people were uprooted along the way, this was merely seen as
a necessary and inevitable evil. According to Robinson however, this perception has changed
in recent decades and a new development paradigm has been forming; one that ‘promotes
poverty reduction, environmental protection, social justice, and human rights’ (Robinson,
2003). In this light, development is regarded as both bearing benefits and imposing costs, of
which the greatest costs have been the involuntary displacement of millions of vulnerable
peoples across the globe (Robinson, 2003).
The last two decades have seen a dramatic increase in forced displacement by development
(Cernea, 2004). The displacement and resettlement of people and communities by large-scale
development projects is one of the most contested issues in the field of development today;
such projects, both publicly and privately funded, have been estimated to displace more than
15 million people a year worldwide (Oliver-Smith, 2009), making the scale and scope of
displacement by development significant.
The study of displacement due to development, according to Peter Penz, Jay Drydyk, and
Pablo Bose, is a complicated issue, as ‘development’ is quite an ambiguous term in and of
itself. They state in their book, “Displacement by Development: Ethics, Rights and
Responsibilities” that it can refer to a social goal; an ideal of well-being in which
governments, people, and international agencies aspire to, while also referring to complex
40
social and economic policies, practices, and changes that are meant to achieve such a goal
(Penz, Drydyk, Bose, 2011). Economic development policies and practices that promote
growth have typically been advocated for the development goal of reducing and eliminating
poverty. While it can be said that there have been many positive outcomes as a result of this,
development practices serving these goals have remained far from ideal (Penz, Drydyk, Bose,
2011). Development projects typically aimed at generating economic growth and thereby
improving the general welfare of the state, all too often result in permanently harming people
by displacing local populations, leaving them disempowered and destitute (Oliver-Smith,
2009).
As stated above, development can mean many different things, but generally it carries a
positive connotation to it (Robinson, 2003). While underdeveloped countries seek to become
more developed, this does not ensure that its development equally benefits those lives it sets
out to improve. More often than not, development projects costs many people their lives and
livelihoods by causing large-scale human suffering in the wake of its ‘development’.
Displacement by development deprives people of many things, many of which are
intrinsically fundamental to their very lives and livelihoods (Penz, Drydyk, Bose, 2011). The
experience of displacement often encompasses more than just the physical loss of something;
people who are displaced often lose power and agency over their own lives, resulting in the
loss of economic, social and cultural resources (Neef & Singer, 2015)
For these reasons displacement in the name of development embodies an intrinsic
contradiction in the context of development. There rests a juxtaposition where development
meant to do good, often ends up causing more harm than promoting the well being it set out
to create. According to Penz, Drydyk, and Bose, this paradox becomes: “the tension between
development as an ideal and development as an actual process- with which we are
confronted when development causes displacement” (Penz, Drydyk, Bose, 2011: 2).
10.1 Ethics of development induced displacement
What makes displacement by development so controversial is the fact that it often results in
people becoming more impoverished and worse off than they were before displacement. If
people and communities were properly and ethically displaced and relocated this issue might
not be so controversial, however, as it stands there remain major issues of social justice and
41
equity when it comes to the fundamental practices and consequences of involuntary and
forced displacement. What determines the extent of this unjust and the scale of people’s
deprivation is the methods in which they were uprooted and moreover, what they face in their
new location as far as resources and means to make a living. If people and communities must
be uprooted and displaced as a result of development projects (as it is an inevitable
consequence of development and will happen regardless), they should at the very least be
compensated adequately and left in equivalent, if not better, conditions than before
displacement. As Cernea puts it:
“The principal of the ‘greater good for the larger numbers,’ routinely invoked to
rationalize forced displacement, is, in fact, often abused and turned into an
unwarranted justification for tolerating ills that are avoidable” (Cernea, 2004: 2)
Instead, the trend is that people are inadequately compensated, if at all, and they are left
scattered, neglected, relocated to worse land, and provided with inferior or inadequate
infrastructure, and facilities; they end up in unlivable conditions and worse off than before
displacement (Penz, Drydky& Bose, 2011). The consequences of development’s uneven
divide of its costs and benefits leave some reaping the benefits, while others bearing the
pains, leaving the uprooted in a vulnerable positions resulting in many other human rights
being affected and/or violated.
Development will continue, as it is an inevitable phenomenon, however the consequences of
such development such as the relocation of large populations of people in the process of
development are avoidable. The inequitable distribution of development's gains and pains
should not be an inevitable phenomenon, nor is it ethically justifiable. Michael Cernea, a
sociologist at the World Bank and one of the leading scholars of development-induced
displacement and resettlement argues in Impoverishment Risks, Risk Management, and
Reconstruction: A Model for Population Displacement and Resettlement, that there should be
adherence to social justice, equity norms, and respect for civil rights and people’s
entitlements whenever development brings about risks and predictable tolls. By eliminating
some of the avoidable consequences of development, such as impoverishment, this can
increase the overall benefits of development. The challenge then becomes to organize risk
prevention and come up with safeguards to the consequences of displacement hazards and
socioeconomic effects. Of course it would be impossible to avoid and alleviate all risks and
fully prevent harm caused by development, but overall it should be feasible to decrease the
42
magnitude, scale and scope of the current day trends of involuntary displacement and its
consequences (Cernea, 2004).
Cernea claims that not only is it possible to redress the inequity caused by development, but it
is imperative on both economic and moral grounds. There should be safeguards in place that
ensure the socially responsible approach to resettlement, which would be guided by what he
calls an ‘equity compass,’ a tool used to counteract the lasting impoverishment and generate
economic benefits on both a local and national scale. The idea behind the equity compass is
to prevent the all too common trend of design projects being approved that lead to or cause
involuntary displacement in the process. The compass would guide those responsible of
approving projects in allocating project resources and preventing and mitigating the risks of
impoverishment. (Cernea, 2004)
This equity compass in theory would be a tool used to determine the ethics of a particular
project. An ethically justifiable project is one where the social impacts of those affected are
taken into consideration and mitigation efforts and enacted as a means of alleviating these
foreseen social impacts. Rather than simply going through with a project with a wide gap of
gains and losses, the losses would be recognized and acted upon so that the gap lessens and
the situation become more of a win-win instead of a win-lose.
Michael Cernea highlights the fact that being forcefully evicted from one’s land and habitat
carries heavy risk of becoming more impoverished than before displacement. As a result, the
trend is that there is a lack of adequate compensation of their lost assets, and there is little in
the way of effective assistance to re-establish their lives productively (Robinson, 2003). For
these reasons, Cernea has developed the ‘impoverishment risk and reconstruction’ model in
an effort to redress the chronic flaws and shortcomings in the policies and methodologies for
planning and financing resettlement. In doing so, he sets out a theoretical model and
framework for involuntary resettlement- impoverishment risks and reconstruction model for
resettling displaced populations- which highlights the inherent risks that cause populations to
end up more impoverished through displacement, as well as mitigation tactics that would
counter-eliminate these risks and consequences (Cernea, 2004). The model is intended to be
used not only explain what happens during forced displacements but also as act as a
theoretical tool for the explaining, diagnosing, predicting and finally, planning of projects
which would act as the guiding ‘compass’ needed for mitigating the effects of complex
resettlement situations due to development. The model was developed in the 1990s and it is
43
based on both empirical and theoretical findings; empirically, it is based on the accumulation
of factual evidence reported by resettlement studies over the last quarter century, and
theoretically, it is based on resettlement research over the same time period.
Based on empirical findings of resettlement research, the model identifies eight common
potential risk-pattern processes intrinsic to displacement that often lead to the rapid onset of
impoverishment. The eight risk factors are outlined in Annex no. 5 and refer to: landlessness,
joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, loss of access to common
property and services, social disarticulation.
11. Displacement through forced evictions
We argue that development-induced displacement in Cambodia should receive more attention
and be better monitored as internal displacement. In recent years numerous organizations and
academics have called for a better monitoring of internal displacement, particularly by
including those who have been displaced by development projects. As Elizabeth Rasmusson
arguments, one of the main impediments to an effective response to internal displacement
crises’ is the lack of information related to the number, location and demographics of those
displaced (Rasmusson, 2006).
In this next section we will briefly highlight the extent to which those displaced for
development through forced evictions in Phnom Penh, should fall under the category of IDPs
as development - induced displacement regardless of the size of the development project.
Rasmusson also argues that IDPs have certain vulnerabilities that require specific responses
by governments, civil society and international organizations. In order for these responses to
take effect there is need for proper identification and quantification of all categories of people
who fall under this label. She argues that this better data collection would lead to a better
understanding of the causes and effects of displacement which is a precondition for effective
advocacy and responses to the overall global internal displacement crisis. Cambodians
displaced through forced evictions are in need of more effective responses and assistance but
before this can take effect they firstly need to be identified as IDPs. Their situation mirrors
those of other categories of people displaced by conflict, or natural disasters, which merits
them worthy of this classification. We will elaborate on this point more extensively below.
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A forced eviction is defined as:
“The permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families or
communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of
and access to appropriate forms of legal or other protection” (UN-Habitat & UNHR,
2014)
During our interviews, we asked what makes an eviction forced. The general consensus was
that an eviction is considered forced when there is no consent or consultation. In one
interview it was stressed that there are many nuances as to what consent means. An eviction
is considered forced when consent is extorted through a means of coercion; especially when
police, military, or the courts are involved as a means of intimidate people through the misuse
of the state forces. An eviction is also considered forced when inadequate compensation is
offered and families and individuals feel obliged to settle because they have no other option.
When people settle for inadequate compensation they are doing so as a last resort, but the
compensation they receive does not allow for them to start a new life in a different location
outside Phnom Penh. Furthermore, cases of people being offered a plot of land as
compensation are also considered forced if that plot of land is barren and unfit for agriculture.
Last but not least if there is no proper consultation both pre and post eviction as to the process
of eviction and what will happen to them once they vacate their land, evictions are regarded
as a forced (LICADHO Interview, 2016).
Cambodia’s land policy provides for protection against forced evictions, however during the
past two decades practices of harassment, intimidation, coercion, and arrests of land activists
have proved these legal safeguard to be widely disregarded by authorities when it comes to
evictions. According to the existing policies forced evictions are illegal and people can be
resettled only as a last resort and if it is done in public interest, against a just compensation
and with prior consultation of the affected communities. Despite this, thousands of
Cambodians living in the urban slums of Phnom Penh have been evicted without their
consent and the consequences and social implications have been devastating to those
affected.
The most common arguments given by authorities to justify forced evictions in Phnom Penh
is that: a) people are living on state public land, b) on land which is of public interest, c) on
land which is for a government institution, or d) on land which is already registered as private
(OHCHR, 2012). Such is the case of the communities living in Dey Krahom and Borei Keila.
45
During our interview with STT we were told that to date there is no official demarcation in
Phnom Penh as to what is state public land and what is state private land and there is little
transparency as to what is privately owned (STT Interview, 2016), which give authorities and
in turn, the private elite, space to manipulate the system to their own liking and to take
advantage of the system. In the case of the Dey Krahom community, the Phnom Penh deputy
governor at the time had declared in an interview with Phnom Penh Post that ’the activities
of tearing down the homes at Dey Krahom is not an eviction but just an effort to clear the
area for development’ (Brady & Pheaktra, 2009). On a similar note, in 2014, in response to
an Amnesty International article entitled Amnesty International Slams Cambodian
Government for Forced Evictions of Poor People the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs released a statement in which it deplored the allegations and stated that ”there is
absolutely no unlawful and forcible evictions in Cambodia” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
2014). It went on to attribute these activities to a given responsibility of the Cambodian
government to “re-establish public and social order, such as in the case of turning the streets
into market places, living on the sidewalks and in the parks and illegally occupying state
land.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). In the statement, the spokesman states about Dey
Krahom that“[...] there is no forcible and unlawful eviction. For those people, they were
happy to live in the new place which was allocated by the government” (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 2014).
During our interviews we wanted to understand whether authorities support evictions of the
poor for an ideological reason, as was the case during the Khmer Rouge when political
opponents were oppressed, or whether they are done for financial gains. In doing so, we
asked the NGO representatives: who are the usual targets of evictions in Phnom Penh. The
interviewees stated that the land is targeted because it is valuable for investment and
development. At the same time however the urban poor, living on this land and in these
slums, are an easy target because they cannot survive within the daily system of corruption
embedded in every level of governance. They are less likely to be able to afford paying the
necessary bribes in order to obtain land ownership, or pay for the court to rule in their favor
(LICADHO Interview, 2016).
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12. Evictions and resettlement in Phnom Penh
Evictions and resettlement in Phnom Penh have become commonplace as a result of urban
development. With no official data available, it has been estimated that over 120,000 people
have been evicted from their homes in Phnom Penh since 1990 and many more continue to
face the risk of being displaced everyday (OHCHR, 2012).
As noted in the previous section, the Royal Government of Cambodia’s land policy vision is
to:
“administer, manage, utilize and distribute land in an equitable, transparent, and
sustainable manner in order to contribute to achieving national goals of poverty
alleviation, ensuring food security, natural resources and environmental protection,
and socio-economic development orienting towards market economy” (Sar, 2010:
11).
The Cambodian Government and in particular, the Ministry of Land Management, Urban
Planning and Construction, has developed an elaborate legal policy and institutional
framework which is targeted to implement the 2001 Land Law. The framework identifies
important safeguards to protect the land tenure, possession and ownership rights of
Cambodian citizens. It also protects against forced evictions, which are illegal under these
policies and resettlement should only be applied as a last resort with proper lawful
implementation and compensation provided (OHCHR, 2012).
In theory, this what the 2001 Land Law aims to accomplish, however when these legal
safeguards are not applied in practice, there can be grave consequences for the people it sets
out to protect in the first place. When this law in particular is not upheld, it goes against basic
notions of human rights, social justice, and sustainable development (OHCHR, 2012). The
implication of this is the aggravation of poverty to already marginalized groups of people.
In this next section we will elaborate on the situation of evictions and resettlement in Phnom
Penh and outline the implications this has on Cambodians by looking at reports and using our
47
own data collected which touches upon the social effects evictions have on people's lives and
livelihoods.
As outlined in a previous chapter, the issue of evictions and displacement in Phnom Penh
should be understood against the backdrop of rapid economic growth and chaotic urban
development which lacks any formal regulatory framework. One should also keep in mind
the deeply rooted and complex history of Cambodia as it pertains to evictions and
resettlement. Evictions and resettlement in Cambodia are not a new phenomenon, and in fact,
it has been taking place on a massive scale during the civil war period, the Khmer Rouge era,
and then following the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge when the Vietnamese took over.
Being uprooted and evicted from one's home and land can be a traumatic experience,
especially when the evictions are forced and uncivil. There are many lasting effects and
consequences this experience can have on people’s lives when legal safeguards are
disregarded as is and has been unfolding in Phnom Penh.
Data and statistics
There are no exact numbers or statistics on the extent of evictions in Cambodia to date. The
reason being that there is no official public data on this issue and as a result most of the data
that does exist mainly comes from non-government organizations active in the housing/land
sector (OHCHR, 2012). Amnesty International claimed in 2009 that at least 26 evictions
displaced about 27,000 people, while STT estimated in 2009 that over 120,000 Cambodians
in Phnom Penh had been evicted since 1990; this number has received wide support and
validity amongst the NGO community (OHCHR, 2012) (this is the most recent statistic we
can find but it should be noted that there have been more evictions taking place since this
number was recorded). Additionally, another challenge remains in the fact that the way in
which these numbers and estimates are recorded differs widely between different NGOs and
organizations reporting on the situation. Some organizations will estimate the number of
people displaced, while others will report on the number of families or communities evicted,
making it difficult to understand the true gravity of the issue when there is no proper standard
of reporting.
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OHCHR has undertaken a comprehensive study that measures the impacts of eviction and
resettlement in Cambodia and the human and socio-economic costs on people’s lives. The
study is based on first-hand testimonies and data collected from both individuals and
communities in resettlement sites in/around Phnom Penh and two other provinces in
Cambodia from 2009 to early 2010. The study outlines common trends and themes that occur
and the major elements that affect a majority of people who find themselves being uprooted
and resettled. Some of the themes outlines include: adequate housing, basic services and
infrastructure, security of tenure, livelihood and employment opportunities, food security,
health, education, civil matters and social and cultural inclusion. In the following section we
will elaborate on each of these issues and the specifics of how people's lives are affected by
eviction and resettlement.
As mentioned in the previous chapter there are eight specific components to the right to
adequate housing which governments are primarily responsible of ensuring its citizens and
those are: security of tenure, availability of services, materials, affordability, habitability,
accessibility, location, and cultural adequacy. According to the OHCHR report, five of these
components were often lacking and inadequate according to Cambodians interviewed, facing
resettlement (OHCHR, 2012).
The following section will go into detail regarding the common trends affecting resettlements
sites based on the OHCHR report. The Phnom Penh sites included in the study include:
Akphiwat Meanchey (relocated from roadside near Chinese Embassy), Andong (relocated
from Sambok Chab), Damnak Trayeung (relocated from Dey Krahorm), Tuol Sambo
(Relocated from Borei Keila), and Trapeang Anh-chanh (relocated from Sambok Chab).
(OHCHR, 2012).
Housing: electricity and water
One of the main problems at relocation sites is the lack of access to state-run electricity
services. Many who are forcibly evicted from their homes in urban settlements in Phnom
Penh end up being relocated to locations on the outskirts of Phnom Penh or even outside of
the city altogether, far from urban amenities and services, including electricity and water. As
a result, people forced to relocated end up living in communities beyond the city’s water and
electricity supply and therefore are forced to pay between 4 to 16 times more to private
49
suppliers than they would be paying were they living in the city and had access to state-run
services (Strangio, 2014a and Equitable Cambodia Interview, 2016). Cambodia’s state-run
electricity, Electricite Du Cambodge, is normally sold at 720 Riels per kilowatt or about
$0.17 USD per household. However, the service is limited to central urban areas and because
most of the relocation sites fall outside of the Electricite Du Cambodge service supply, if
families want electricity they must pay for privately owned services and generators at a much
higher cost, which many cannot afford (OHCHR, 2012).
The same case goes for water at many relocation sites on the periphery of Phnom Penh.
Water and sanitation are crucial to safe and adequate living standards, but the OHCHR report
found that there is a generally a lack of clean water, no drainage system or waste disposal
system, and no latrines in most resettlement sites around Phnom Penh. Like electricity, the
water supply is managed by private businessmen who have a monopoly over water
management in these areas and as a result, the price of water for most residents is too high
and more expensive than they can afford (OHCHR, 2012).
Security of tenure
One of the top priorities of resettled families is security of tenure. For individuals and
families who have been uprooted from their homes, being protected from involuntary
removal, expulsion from land or residence, and from harassment or threats is their main
concern (OHCHR, 2012). At all sites surveyed for this study, people’s top priority was
security of tenure, where they felt it most important to have a plot of land and housing where
they could settle with a peace of mind, engage in employment practices and plan for their
future (OHCHR, 2012). It is common for people in resettlement sites to be hesitant to
establish themselves and their lives in their new location because they did not officially
receive land in their new location following eviction. They are hesitant to do so because they
fear they will be evicted again. With a lack of security of tenure and lack of proper paperwork
granting them titles they feel insecure in their new locations. It is not uncommon that
communities who find themselves in a new resettlement site are not safe from evictions
because it has happened that communities are evicted a second time from their new locations.
Many people reported high levels of anxiety and stress around the issue of lack of tenure
security. Many feared a second eviction and people reported that one person had to
permanently stay at home at all times to ensure they did not miss an eviction notice or the
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granting of plots elsewhere, which could have happened at any time (OHCHR, 2012).
Security of tenure, or lack thereof, can also affect people’s livelihoods in terms of access to
jobs and employment opportunities. Some people reported having to lie about the location of
where they lived because they heard rumors and understand that companies such as garment
and construction companies do not want to hire people ‘from the tents.’ They say the
companies ‘don’t want these people from the tents to have a good income and want [them] to
stay here’ (OHCHR, 2012: 46).
Homelessness and landlessness
Forced evictions have the potential to make people homeless and landless. In a few cases,
communities were relocated to plots of land with no shelter or housing immediately
following eviction. In most cases though families became homeless as a result of selling their
land to pay for medical expenses or because either a bank or money lender confiscated their
land due to unpaid loans. Many families at resettlement sites fall victim to this cycle of debt
and lack of an ability to repay loans. Most families end up taking loans from various lending
institutions to improve their living situations such as housing, improving a small business or
to cover emergency medical treatments. Once they have been granted the loan, oftentimes
they are unable to repay them and their land is confiscated as a result, leaving them homeless
and landless (Equitable Cambodia Interview, 2016).
Livelihood and employment opportunities
One of the main components to adequate housing is location, as it is directly related to access
to employment options and other basic services. As mentioned in the above sections, most
resettlement sites in Phnom Penh are on average about 20 Kilometers outside the city and in
recent years have started to increase in distance. When resettlement sites are far from the city,
this drastically reduces employment opportunities and income. Most people pre-eviction
relied on access to the city to make a living and an income (Equitable Cambodia, STT, and
LICADHO Interviews, 2016).
According to the interview with Equitable Cambodia, people who are relocated are at a
disadvantage when it comes to employment opportunities. The two representatives we talked
to claimed that people in most resettlement sites in Phnom Penh are too far removed from
their main place of work. Most people pre-eviction made a living from informal work, which
51
relied on being in a location with lots of clientele, like a city. If people are relocated to
outside of the city, their options of making a living by being in proximity to a populated city
center significantly diminish (Equitable Cambodia Interview, 2016).
OHCHR has found that women are more at risk of losing jobs and sources of livelihood more
so than men due the nature and location of their jobs. The types of jobs that women had pre-
eviction often depended on a high number of customers available such as selling snacks or
food on the streets or from their homes. Other jobs such as scavenging were only possible in
a city landscape where there are more items to scavenge for. For these reasons, many people
find it necessary to return to Phnom Penh to find or continue their work. The lack of clientele,
access to markets and other limiting factors makes it very difficult for people to make a living
at most relocation sites post-eviction (OHCHR, 2012).
Returning to the city to find or continue work can be difficult because most resettlement sites
are far from the city, they have to pay a high transportation cost, which takes a large toll on
their income. Most men return to the city to work as tuk-tuk drivers, construction workers or
laborers, while women return to sell snacks, food-items, or collect scraps on the streets
(OHCHR, 2012). Overall, the resettlement sites are ‘un-survivable’ according to Equitable
Cambodia and so people are forced to return to Phnom Penh to find work to make a living
(Equitable Cambodia Interview, 2016).
Not only is it costly to commute from a resettlement site outside the city to the city for work
but it is timely as well. For these reasons it is not uncommon that people living in
resettlement sites leave the site for longer periods of time to stay closer to where they can
make a living and save time and money. Sometimes people leave for days, or weeks so they
can make an income. This trend is not uncommon and it leads to a larger trend where families
are often forced to split and become separated or dispersed in order to survive. Often,
children are left at site with an older sibling or sent to live with relatives in provinces or
elsewhere so the parents can try to make a living (OHCHR, 2012).
Food security
A lack in employment opportunities and income directly affects and contributes to food
security or lack thereof. It is common that people who are forced to resettle far from the city
52
where they once made a living, have difficulty finding work, which in turn affects their
income and their ability to afford food in their new location. The impact of forced evictions
and resettlement has serious consequences regarding food security, not only immediately
post-eviction but months and years later. It is common that people who are relocated have to
forego the quality and quantity of food they once enjoyed pre-eviction due to a loss of income
and access to food, leaving them at risk of malnutrition and deterioration of health (OHCHR,
2012).
Health
From a human rights perspective, health does not only mean access to standard health care,
though this is surely a major aspect, but it also includes a wide range of overall factors that
contribute to people leading a healthy lifestyle. Such factors include: access to medical
services, access to safe drinking water, adequate sanitation, access to adequate food, adequate
housing, healthy working conditions and safe and clean environmental conditions. These are
all important factors that contribute to people leading a healthy life and when they are
compromised such as when people are forced to relocate to locations severely lacking these
qualities then human rights are essentially being violated.
According to the World Health Organization, the right to health is an inclusive right and it
falls under the jurisdiction of The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
which is the body responsible for monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (OHCHR, 2008).
According to the OHCHR report, many families at resettlement sites reported a deterioration
of health post-eviction. Representatives from Center of Hope, LICADHO and M’lop Tapang,
all NGOs involved in the medical relief, both immediate and long term, of residents at
relocation sites have reported the most common health problems affecting people at sites are:
respiratory tract infections, gastro-intestinal illnesses, skin diseases, and illnesses related to
malnutrition and vitamin deficiency amongst children. Other cases of chronic diseases
include: blood pressure, diabetes, TB, and in the rainy season the most commonly reported
illnesses include: fever, cold, diarrhea, and dengue. (OHCHR, 2012).
53
All of these illnesses are a direct result of a lack of basic infrastructure at relocation sites such
as, clean and safe water, adequate sanitation, lack of adequate food and nutrition and lastly,
adequate housing. In one of the relocation sites in particular, Andong, the situation is
strikingly bad, and families have not seen any improvement in their health conditions since
their relocation in 2006. The main reason being that there is persistent unhygienic and
unsanitary conditions, including the lack of a functioning drainage and sewage system and
lack of adequate housing. As one NGO representative from Center of Hope and LICADHO,
after conducting a health assessment of the Damnak Trayeung resettlement site put it:
“When the sanitation and hygienic conditions fail to meet basic humanitarian
standards, the primary dangers and risks always fall on the health of the people who
are exposed to that environment. Communicable infectious disease outbreak is a
frequent outcomes in such situations.” (OHCHR, 2012: 60)
The impact of one’s environment on one’s physical health is directly related. When one is
exposed to the elements of extreme heat, rain, and flooding due to a lack of adequate housing,
along with a lack of safe drinking water, adequate sanitation, and food, these factors
combined makes for a dangerous situation. In many resettlement sites lacking basic needs and
infrastructure, people fall victims to their environment and their health is paying the cost,
their vulnerability increases and opportunistic diseases and the spread of infectious diseases
increases significantly as a result.
In all relocation sites studied, there was a health center in the vicinity of the community
however, most people interviewed reported that they did not use the centers due to the
adequacy of the health centers. Many people reported that the centers were only able to
distribute pills, give vaccinations, and treat minor ailments, most of which came at a cost.
According to nurses at one of the health centers, the support received from the operational
district, financial or otherwise, to treat 80 to 100 people monthly is not sufficient to address
the community's health needs. For serious illnesses people had to go to hospitals in the center
of Phnom Penh. As a result, many people turned to the services and aid of local NGOs who
fill in the gap and provide the bulk of services to resettled families (OHCHR, 2012).
54
Mental Health
Assessing the mental health of people who have been resettled due to eviction is difficult
according to OHCHR because mental health assessments are rarely a priority of relief
activities. As a result there has been little comprehensive assessment of mental health at the
various relocation sites in and around Phnom Penh. There has only one such assessment of
the residents evicted from Dey Krahorm made soon after their eviction in 2009 by The Centre
for Child and Adolescent Mental Health (OHCHR, 2012). Their assessment found that the
Dey Krahorm community suffered from significant levels of psychosomatic problems
directly resulting from their eviction. They also found that most people were suffering from
mild to moderate forms of depression, and anxiety disorders which resulted in psychological
symptoms and sleep disturbances.
It is worth noting again that Dey Krahorm was the community that was woken in the middle
of the night to a violent and brutal eviction carried out by law-enforcement agencies. Their
eviction was sudden as protracted negotiations aimed at finding a mutually agreeable
settlement between the long-term residents, the company carrying out the eviction in the
name of development, and the municipality was being discussed. The entire community was
demolished in a swift move made possible by bulldozers, tear gas, rubber bullets, batons, and
people equipped with sticks and axes ordered to demolish the houses. The residents were
forced to leave and thrown to the streets as they watched their homes being destroyed; if they
resisted and attempted to protect their property, they were beaten and forcibly removed.
When it was over, all that remained was a heaping pile of debris what used to be their home
and community (UNHCR, 2009).
The mental health assessment of the Dey Khrahorm residents suggested that the mental
health problems could be directly linked to basic needs not being met such as: food, shelter,
and water. What is more is concerns and worries about further displacement exacerbates
people's physical and mental health issues. (OHCHR, 2012). The assessment noted that
mental health could likely improve should these basic needs be met from the start, from
material needs for proper housing, to employment opportunities, to food security and physical
health. However, they noted that given the conditions in which people were relocated,
through a violent and traumatic eviction, they were likely prone to have long-term
55
psychological disturbances in addition to other commonly found health risks given their
situation. (OHCHR, 2012)
It is not easy to imagine that people in other resettlement sites are suffering from similar
stresses and anxieties that affect their mental health. From the survey conducted by OHCHR,
the study found strong evidence of major stress and psychosocial disorders amongst
Cambodians at all resettlement sites. People interviewed expressed feeling stressed due to the
difficulties in finding employment and securing a livable income, a lack of adequate food for
their children, a feeling of insecurity from a lack of land tenure and fear of being evicted
again, the stress of divided families, overcrowding, and the worry over increasing debts due
to food insecurity or a lack of income (OHCHR, 2012). During site visits at two of the
relocation sites - Andong and Trapeang Anhchanh - OHCHR representatives observed many
women drunk by noon and it is not uncommon that in these sites and others, one will find
people gambling or playing cards all day long. Domestic violence is a common occurrence at
resettlement sites as well though precise data is unavailable (OHCHR, 2012). Reason for
domestic violence increase can be attributed to various factors, but residents at sites pointed
to a lack of employment and food insecurity. Many women interviewed expressed that men
started to drink more as a result of a loss of income and the difficulties faced at the relocation
site. Tensions between husbands and wives grew more frequent and this caused families to
split: as one woman recounts:
“My husband always worked hard as a construction worker before the eviction and he
rarely went drinking. Since we have moved to this new place, he can only find
construction work once in a while. So he gets drunk almost every day without trying
to find work. I am so angry with him as I have to find food on my own and make a
living as best I can. When I shout at him, he beats me up. We often fight and we
haven’t spoken to each other in the past two weeks.” - Sivleng, 54 year old women
(OHCHR, 2012)
Education
Children’s education is another hurdle faced by many families when their lives are uprooted
by forced eviction and resettlement. Universal education is a right and all children should
have equal access to education. However, this right is jeopardized for various reasons when
56
children and families are relocated against their will to a new location. Oftentimes, children
end up dropping out of school altogether as a result of being uprooted.
According to the OHCHR survey, one of the main causes of dropout is due to an interruption
of children’s education due to eviction. If children do not have the option of staying with
relatives (and therefore being separated from their families) and continuing their schooling in
the city, they are forced to leave school and wait to be transferred to a new school at the
resettlement site. However, this process can take a while and often costs extra money, which
not all families can afford. Theoretically speaking, school should be free for children in
Cambodia and transferring schools is no different however, school is not free as children are
forced to pay bribes because government employees are paid so poorly that they demand
‘fees’ from the people who can least afford it. This is apparent at all levels of society from
doctors, to teachers, to police officers, to the court system. (Strangio, 2014a: 139) Parents
have been asked to pay anywhere between $2.50 to $20.00 from both the old and new school
by either staff at the school of origin or the new school. This is the price for primary and
secondary school, however high school transfers tend to be at a higher cost. High school
transfers tend to be more difficult because high schools are not always found close to
resettlement sites. One resident recounted that he was asked to pay $30.00 for the transfer of
his child to the location of his resettlement site, while he was also asked to pay $50.00 by the
previous school for the processing of the transfer (OHCHR, 2012).
It is common practice in Cambodia that children in public schools must pay their teachers
daily informal fees. This is well known to all Cambodians and parents and children who have
been uprooted paid daily fees to attend school pre-eviction. The difference with post-eviction
is the parent's income or lack thereof and many can no longer afford to send their children to
school given their post-eviction circumstances. Many parents post-eviction no longer have a
secure income and can not afford the necessary fees required to send their children to school
because they have lost their means of making a living. (OHCHR, 2012)
There is no official data available as to how many children have dropped out of school as a
result of eviction and resettlement, but many families interviewed reported that their children
had dropped out of school to help their families earn extra income as the family income is not
enough or sufficient to feed the family post-eviction (OHCHR, 2012).
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As mentioned in a previous section, the consequences of eviction and resettlement across the
globe pose inherent risks of impoverishment and hardship. As outlined above, this is no
different for the case of people being evicted from urban slums in Phnom Penh due to
development. While cases and individual situations are not black and white or inherently the
same, the overall trend points to people being forced into worse off situations and more
impoverished than before eviction. A large reason for this is the fact that many of their
human rights are not being upheld at the sites and locations where they are being forced to
resettle and they are pushed even further into a cycle of poverty in which they were already
exposed to prior to eviction. In most cases of resettlement sites in Phnom Penh, there is a lack
of basic infrastructure, either a lack of or inadequate: livelihood, housing, electricity, water,
health, education, and inadequate and poor sanitation.
13. Internally displaced persons
In the following section we will examine the case of Phnom Penh’s forced evicted and how
their situation mirrors that of IDPs. We will discuss the potential benefits of labeling the
forcibly displaced and resettled and how it might lead to positive outcomes.
In recent years, experiences of displacement have captured the attention of many in public
debates all across the globe. While the plight of refugees is one that usually draws the
media’s attention, there are millions of people worldwide who have fled due to similar
conditions as refugees, but remained within the borders of their own countries.
Internal displacement associated with conflict and violence account to almost double the
number of refugees in the world, an estimated 40.8 million IDPs were accounted for by the
end of 2015 worldwide (IDMC, 2016). The number of people who fled their homes and
ended up in a situation of displacement due to natural disasters is even higher, at an estimated
203.4 million recorded in the last eight years (IDMC, 2016). Despite these numbers, the total
headcount of displaced within their own countries is far from complete. There is a severe lack
of data concerning other groups of vulnerable persons displaced by other causes such as
development projects (IDMC, 2016). The concern for tackling the issue of internal
displacement as a consequence of events other than generalized violence and armed conflict
has been on the agenda of international organizations for a long time. It lost coverage in early
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2000s due to resource constraints, a lack of information and a desire of agencies to focus its
resources on fulfilling the ambition of covering conflict-induced displacement globally
(NRC, 2002).
It is therefore not difficult to see why internal displacement has become an increasingly
pressing issue affecting millions of people around the world. Throughout the years, many
academics and people involved in the field of internally displaced persons have called for
improved methods of monitoring and accounting for the various categories of internally
displaced, specifically for those displaced by development projects (see Kalin, 2001
&Egeland in IDMC, 2016).
Internationally, refugees benefit from a well-established Refugee Regime built around The
1951 Refugee Convention, the 1967 Protocol, and specific norms and institutions. These
institutions have mandate to regulate, monitor and manage the plight of refugees. A similar
international agreement for IDPs does not exist. Given the lack of a legal instrument to
protect and assist IDPs, the Representative of the Secretary General of UN, Francis Deng,
established a set of principles in 1998, The UN’s Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement. These principles are not internationally binding (Robinson, 2003) despite since
their drafting, a number of states have incorporated them in their national laws and policies
(Kälin, 2008). Moreover, despite not being legally binding the principles restate already
existing norms of human rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) (Deng, 2011).
According to the UN’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, internally displaced
persons are:
“Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their
homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid
the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human
rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an
internationally recognized State border.” (UN, 1998)
This definition establishes the two main differences between refugees and internally
displaced persons. First of all, they have not crossed an internationally recognized border,
which means they remain under the responsibility of their own government. Secondly, they
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might not be fleeing due to a well-founded fear of persecution. This is not to say that the only
difference between refugees and IDPs stands in the geographical aspect of their plight. As
Robinson argues, IDPs can include categories of people who have fled their homes in
situations similar to those of refugees, and had they crossed an internationally recognized
border, they might qualify for refugee status. However, Dips also includes a wider category
of people who are forced to move due to natural and human-made disasters, as well as
development-projects (Robinson, 2003).
Furthermore the definition of Dips presents some causes of displacement however, by using
the phrase “in particular” it presents itself as a non-exhaustive line of potential reasons why
people flee their homes and places of residence. Millions of persons forced to leave their
homes or places of habitual residence to make way for development projects are often not
considered Dips. This is the case despite the fact that, in an overwhelming number of cases
their suffering is just as severe as those fleeing due to armed conflict or natural disasters:
“…Most large forced dislocations of people do not occur in conditions of armed
conflict or genocide but in routine, everyday evictions to make way for development
projects.” (Rajagopal in Robinson, 2003: 1)
The UN’s definition of internally displaced persons does not per-se include groups of people
who are forced to leave their homes due to development projects, however, a mention is
made in Principle 6 which states that:“Every human being shall have the right to be protected
against being arbitrarily displaced from his or her home or place of habitual residence”
(UN, 1998: Principle 6.1). This prohibition applies also to those displaced in “case of large-
scale development projects, which are not justified by compelling and overriding public
interests.” (UN, 1998: Principle 6.2c). Even more, Principle 9 grants that “States are under a
particular obligation to protect against the displacement of indigenous peoples, minorities,
peasants, pastoralists, and other groups with a special dependence on and attachment to
their land.” (UN, 1998:Principle 9).
The Urn’s definition also highlights that people who suffer grievances of human rights due to
displacement have merit to be classified as Dips according to the Guiding Principles. As
covered in the prior section, thousands of Cambodian’s rights are being violated due not only
to the eviction process, but also as a result of the resettlement situation they find themselves
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in post-eviction. Human rights which are being violated in Phnom Penh both pre-eviction,
mid-eviction and post-eviction (at resettlement sites) include: the right to security of person,
the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law (Art. 6), the right to protection
against arbitrary interference with one’s privacy, family, and home (Art. 12), the right to own
property and protection against arbitrary deprivation of property (Art. 17), the right to
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family
including food, clothing, housing, and medical care and necessary social services (Art. 25),
and lastly, the right to education (Art. 26) (UN, 1948). While evictions and resettlement pose
a high potential of affecting these rights, we find that the most visible violation is that of the
right to an adequate standard of living. According to the LICADHO interview, in speaking
about basic standards of living they state that the:
‘State (Cambodia) will forcefully relocate people outside Phnom Penh, and worsen all
social and basic living standards; they (the evicted) are dropped on a rice field “like
cattle”- suffering from absence of everything’ (LICADHO Interview, 2016).
The lack of provision of an adequate standard of living affects most people immediately and
gravely. When people’s basic standards of living are not being met they find themselves
unable to survive as is the case in many resettlement sites in Phnom Penh (Equitable
Cambodia Interview, 2016). When there is a lack of a basic standard of living, this has a
ripple effect in that other standards are affected as a result; such as health, education, food
security, shelter, and access to employment as elaborated on in the previous section. There
are many NGOs, Ingo’s, and civil society movements working to shed light on the fact that
these rights are not being upheld in Phnom Penh. While their work in advocacy efforts are
paying off by bringing this issue to the international stage, they are not fully filling in the gap
of long-term needs of the people most affected. This point is touched upon by LICADHO in
their interview:
‘NGOs are involved in providing services but they have little capacity to deal with the
situation [...] MSF, and OXFAM GB have means of helping but they are reluctant in doing
so. Small religious groups are the ones saving them and ‘converting’ them in exchange for
rice. Which brings about other social issues to which people are being exposed t- (religious)
conversion in exchange for life/food’ (LICADHO Interview, 2016).
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In most cases of forced eviction and resettlement in Phnom Penh, people affected lack
potentiality of returning back to their former place of habitual residence. In only a few cases
people were offered compensation in the form of housing at their original location. For those
resettled outside Phnom Penh there is a dire need for long-term sustainable solutions, which
would require the hand of the Cambodian government to step in and fill this gap. However,
during our interviews with the NGOs we were repeatedly reminded of the fact that the
Cambodian government lacks willingness to address these issues, as there is no
accountability. As one of the representatives of LICADHO expressed:
‘Cambodia is a land of impunity and people know that. The government will do what
is pleases, redress of abuses don’t function, they (Cambodians affected) can’t go to
court because it is too corrupt. [...] Cambodia equals total impunity; why spend
money to do the right thing when you can get away with doing absolutely nothing?
They can get away with it, so why not? Why pay people (compensation) or treat
people fairly when you can get away with treating them unfairly. (There is) no
punishment. The International community shouts and condemns the situation of land
grabbing - write about it, report on it, and condemn it, but ultimately there is no will
to right the wrong (from the Government) and there is no accountability’
(LICADHO Interview, 2016)
The lack of a possibility of returning to one’s initial place of residence, as is the case for
many of the forcibly evicted from Phnom Penh, and the overwhelming evidence of a lack of
assistance to effectively rebuild their lives post-eviction point to the fact that these people
find themselves in a protracted situation. This post-eviction protraction parallels Vigh’s
theory of crisis as context. He states that crisis is commonly understood as a temporary
discontinuity in the flow of things. For most people, crisis is considered a passing
abnormality usually relating to traumatic events that break up the normality of their lives.
However for many people, such as the marginalized, crisis is not characterized as a temporary
episode of disorder with a specific rupture point in time with a clear beginning and end.
Rather, crisis is understood as a continual everyday phenomenon that goes from bad to worse.
In Vigh’s words: “For the structurally violated socially marginalized and poor, the world is
not characterized by balance, peace or prosperity but by the ever-present possibility of
conflict, poverty and disorder” (Vigh, 2008: 5)
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Many Cambodians forcibly evicted and resettled from their urban settlement homes end up in
worse off situations than before eviction. The resettlement sites they are relocated to on the
outskirts of Phnom Penh lack basic standards of living and they become much more
impoverished than before eviction. This trend mirrors Vigh’s theory of crisis as context. The
forced eviction may be seen as a singular chaotic event rupturing their everyday lives
however what is important to consider here is that most forced eviction cases in Phnom Penh
are targeting those already poor and marginalized. So rather than the forced eviction being
seen as a passing crisis, we see it as crisis as context, where their situation goes from bad to
worse as it is a continuous phenomenon in their everyday lives. In speaking of the potential
of protractedness of their (those evicted and resettled) worse off situation in our interview,
LICADHO states:
‘They cannot rebuild their life in their new site, (there’s) no source of livelihood. They
do come to terms with their situation but they are not able to rebuild their life. They
are evicted because they don’t have land titles and end up with no tenure safety where
they are relocated. After 5 years they should receive titles, but still no titles are
granted to them however. There are relocation sites where people should have
received their land titles in 2011 but still nothing. In all the chaos which is supposed
to benefit the few rich, there is no tenure safety’ (LICADHO Interview, 2016)
There remains a juxtaposition in that the very power or solution of changing a wrong (forced
evictions and resettlement) lies in the hands of the people who are creating that wrong- the
Cambodian government. This begs the question of what benefit would come of labeling those
forcibly evicted due to development in Phnom Penh as Dips, when even as Dips, they would
still fall under the responsibility of a government that created the very circumstances of their
displacement in the first place.
Drawing on Stepputat and Sorensen’s work on the relevance of using the label Dips, where
they argue that in certain circumstances, introducing the concept of Dips can confer
conceptual precision and stronger analytical agency, we argue that labeling forced evictees in
Phnom Penh as Dips would create an avenue for mobilizing resources and more effectively
addressing the needs of resettled Cambodians. Labels determine the extent to which
categories of people have access to particular privileges (Stepputat & Sorensen, 2001).
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Securing these entitlements requires acceptance of categorization from both individuals and
institutions involved (Brun, 2005).
While labeling those evicted and displaced in Phnom Penh as Dips may do little in the way of
changing their situation, it would still open up doors for their case if they fell under the
classification of Dips. According to Brun quoting Zetter, “a non-labeled solution cannot
exist: there is no escape from terms like ‘refugee’ and ‘IDP’ if we are going to assist people
forced to migrate from their homes” (Zetter in Brun, 2005). It seems that the point he is
making here speaks to the fact that by not labeling people as Dips only leaves room for the
likelihood of them falling between the cracks of assistance. By recognizing and identifying
Cambodians forced to resettle as Dips, this would render them eligible for a certain type of
humanitarian and development assistance provided by humanitarian aid organizations. With
no labeling system, there remains room for interpretation and as Zetter claims, “room for
normalization and romanticisation of the forced migration experience, which is in danger of
becoming viewed as normal in today's globalized world.” (Zetter in Brun, 2005)
Assistance for IDP’s is often weak due to the fact that there exists a limitation in that
sovereign governments hold the key to assistance; by acknowledging and recognizing that
there are Dips in need of assistance. While we recognize this and realize that labeling
Cambodians displaced due to forced evictions as Dips may fall flat and gain little benefit in
the way of the Government taking action, there still may be cause to label them as Dips. By
granting Cambodians (forcibly evicted and resettled) this label, it may lead to pressuring the
Cambodian government to effectively take responsibility of finding ways to prevent
displacement due to development from happening or ultimately to finding durable solutions
to meet consequences of such displacement. In turn, labeling might give those who were
forcefully evicted a leg up and advance their status as being in need of assistance rather than
let them fall in between the cracks and have their situation ‘normalized’ and accepted.
We draw on Stepputat and Sorensen’s work on Displaced People in the Central Peruvian
Andes and their analysis of how introducing the IDP category influenced the way different
agents involved (NGOs Ingo’s, displaced persons, local communities, the state) experienced
and came to identify themselves with the category of Dips. Ultimately they analyzed the
effects this label of Dips had on the field of humanitarian and development assistance. There
are several differences between the case analyzed by these researchers and ours, most
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prominently is the fact that theirs relies on a study case of the displacement of Peruvians due
to armed conflict, where ours covers forced evictions in the name of development in Phnom
Penh. Also, their study focused on a situation unfolding between 1980s and 1990s when the
concept of Dips was yet to be introduced internationally to describe the plight of people
within national borders. Therefore the introduction of this label in the Peruvian case brought
about institutional changes, which in turn influenced humanitarian and development
assistance. In Cambodia on the other hand, the label of IDP is as not as new as it was in Peru
when Stepputat and Sorensen conducted their analysis. However works on Dips in Cambodia
focus more on the plight of people during the Khmer Rouge era and the consequent civil wars
of the 1980s. When it comes to people who have been forcefully evicted due to development
projects however, there appears to be a gap that needs to be bridged. The World Bank
accounts for 154.926 Dips in Cambodia as of 2014, but there is no account as to what the
causes of displacement were (World Bank, 2016). It is unclear whether this number includes
those who have been victims of forced evictions or not.
We argue that a shift in analytical focus and better monitoring of forced displacement from
Phnom Penh through the label of Dips has the potential to bring about similar effects on
humanitarian and development assistance, as those met in the Peruvian case. The label of IDP
is not legally binding, however it is closely connected to humanitarian and development
assistance and therefore, it would help bring the cases of those forcefully evicted from Phnom
Penh closer to the sphere of international assistance. As Stepputat and Sorensen noticed in
Peru, the appropriation of this terminology helped NGOs and Ingo’s better identify the cause
of the affected people and in turn, engage techniques of assistance accordingly. This point is
better articulated below:
“Discussing how to move from an emergency situation towards a longer-term
development perspective, these NGOs clearly articulated a need for a strong concept
that could help them provide for, and stabilize the displaced population and have
them officially recognized as victims of the armed conflict” (Stepputat& Sorensen,
2001: 776)
In the current context of Phnom Penh, national officials often disregard forced evictions. On
several occasions high profile state representatives have publicly declared that forced
evictions do not happen in Phnom Penh, rather they claim what is unfolding is simply
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development. This happens despite numerous reports of NGOs and Ingo’s condemning the
evictions as bearing grave human rights violations. Without the coverage of a conceptual
framework such as that of the IDP label, people forced to leave their homes to make room for
development projects remain un-assisted upon relocation. There is little agency for donor
agencies to engage in strategies of assistance.
Furthermore, Stepputat and Sorensen describe the ascription of IDP label as a creation of an
identity. This identity could be used as a means of organizing people in need of assistance in
manageable structures. NGOs account for the people affected by evictions in different ways:
some use the family unit, while other use communities, individuals, or households. This
makes it difficult to grasp the scale and scope of the situation. It also makes the object of
assistance evasive and unclear, which affects assistance reaching those in need. As
highlighted by Stepputat and Sorensen:
“The evasiveness and instability of the object of assistance and organization and the
apparent fluidity and blurredness of their identity, presented practical as well as
analytical problems.” (Stepputat & Sorensen 2001: 778)
Even more, there appears to be little recognition of the situation of the forcefully evicted and
relocated. Poor urban settlers are often seen and depicted by state officials and certain
segments of society as being anarchic, mentally unstable, criminally inclined or socially
undesirable and this is commonly used as justification for evicting them. By labeling these
marginalized populations as Dips after relocation can bring their case as victims to the
attention of a broader public and even to the state itself. In turn it would facilitate recognition
of the fact that there is a gap in the level of protection offered by the state towards its citizens
and that there is a need of assistance. There is viable premise for bringing their situation to
the spotlight. One of our interviewees told us when we asked whether there is a difference in
the way forced evictions are perceived in Phnom Penh versus the countryside, that in Phnom
Penh, people are becoming more aware of their rights and the public is becoming more
sensitized as a result of repeated condemnation coming from NGOs and the civil society.
Even more, due to a higher presence of international organizations, main media outlets and
activists in Phnom Penh, the government and private investors are aware of their role in these
highly controversial cases (Equitable Cambodia Interview, 2016). This does not go to say that
they change their behavior or practice of development, but it does shed some light on the fact
66
that they are forced to react to the pressure and outcry from the international community
condemning them. This action and reaction proves that there is potential for more change and
influence if further pressure is applied. One avenue of this change could come from the
implications of labeling and recognizing the victims of forced resettlement as Dips. Given
the pressing character of internal displacement worldwide it is becoming increasingly
recognized that when governments do not fulfill their responsibility of protecting their
citizens, people in need of aid and protection are entitled to international protection
(UNHCR).
We acknowledge the fact that simply labeling a group of people as Dips will not immediately
improve their situation. One of the biggest hurdles in providing assistance to Dips stands in
the principle of sovereignty. Despite this, UNHCR recognizes that there has been a shift in
perception of Dips at an international level. There are several examples of effective
cooperation between states and international donor agencies in assisting Dips. There are also
examples of states that have incorporated legal tools in their national legislation to provide
protection to this category of vulnerable people such as The Kampala Convention in Uganda.
In The Global Challenge of Internal Displacement, Frances Deng, approaches the issue of
sovereignty not as a negative concept by which states remove themselves from international
scrutiny and in turn, cut themselves off from international involvement, but rather as a
positive concept where states accept the responsibility of protecting and upholding the
general welfare of its citizens. He explains that under normal circumstances, this is part of
each state’s responsibility: to protect its citizens, even if that means shifting responsibility to
the international community. If a state does not have the capacity or resources to uphold this
responsibility, they are expected to seek out or at the very least welcome international
assistance. However, if a state does not uphold its obligations and fails to welcome assistance
when clearly needed and as a result, large populations of its citizens suffer from human rights
violations, then they should at least expect the international community to show concern and
possibly even threaten intervention. Based on the particular scenario, this intervention could
have a wide spectrum from persuasive diplomatic intercession, to assertive political and
economic measures in the form of sanctions, to even coercive military interventions in
particularly extreme cases (Deng, 2001).
67
Deng goes on to explain that in dealing with sovereign governments, it is crucial to assure
that the issue or problem remains as an internal one, and therefore is of a sovereign state’s
responsibility. He believes that once this is established, a more positive, cordial, and
constructive dialogue around the interpretation of sovereignty and the supportive role of the
international community can emerge. He acknowledges that this example is far from reality;
often, internal conflicts are associated with a crisis of national identity, which have a large
potential of creating a divide between the marginalized population and their own government
(Deng, 2001). So rather than these populations being regarded as citizens in need of
protection and assistance, these people are seen as part of the enemy and in turn, neglected.
This is the case of poor Cambodians residing in urban slums on prime real estate in central
Phnom Penh. They are being targeted by their own government who ultimately regards their
very existence as problematic to their own agenda of development and prosperity through
urban renewal projects. As a result, the government forcibly evicts them in inhumane ways,
leaving them to peril in unfit resettlement sites where they are worse off and where their
standard rights are not being upheld or respected.
When an internal conflict or issue reaches this state and large populations of people suffer as
a result, it is understandable that they are in an extremely vulnerable situation. When people
are dispossessed by their own national authorities, their only means of protections becomes
outside assistance. This is the case of Cambodians affected by forced evictions and
resettlement in Phnom Penh; we believe that their only and last source of protection and
assistance has become the international community. The questions then becomes, according
to Deng, “how the international community can intercede to overcome the obstacles of
negative sovereignty and ensure access for the needy population” (Deng 2001: 145)
Evictions in Phnom Penh are frequently reported to trigger a wide spectrum of human rights
violations. The forced aspect of these evictions have attracted international attention for
decades, yet little has been achieved in the way of preventing them from further happening,
or for improving the situation of those resettled. We argue that labeling the forcibly displaced
as Dips has potential to bring about change. We recognize the pitfall in making this
argument, particularly the sovereignty principle which poses a threat to international
interference and assistance, however past decades have witnessed an increased cooperation
between states and donor agencies to provide protection and assistance to Dips. This
happened, partly, in the backdrop of international pressure. By labeling the forcefully evicted
68
as Dips, they would be internationally recognized as in need of protection. This carries the
potential of opening up more avenues for Dips; while the terminology might be vague and
unbinding, the term still holds merit as far as the implications it embodies. International
organizations, as well as donor agencies can better identify and explicitly recognize the issue
of forced displacement by using this label and in turn, they hold potential of change.
14. Conclusion
In the last two decades Cambodia has exhibited significant progress in rebuilding itself from
the perils of its past. From an economical and political standpoint Cambodia has achieved a
certain degree of stability, however the question remains as to whether a majority of its
citizens are enjoying the benefits of such progress.
A pressing issue facing Cambodia today is its capacity to uphold human rights, as it set out to
do in early 1990s. A recurrent topic of outcry from the international and national community
has been that of forced displacement and resettlement of already marginalized groups of
people to make room for development. In the context of rapid economic growth taking place
in Phnom Penh we identified the need to bring to light some of the consequences of
development on the lives of the urban poor.
Our focus has been on whether there is potentiality for identifying the forcefully evicted and
resettled as Dips based on the Urn’s definition of internal displacement and what benefits
might come in doing so. Corruption, lack of accountability, and impunity are three common
characteristics used to describe the contemporary State of Cambodia according to the NGOs
we interviewed. With the lack of willingness on behalf the Cambodian Government to
mitigate the issue of forced evictions and resettlement we acknowledge the important role of
the civil society, NGOs and Ingo’s in stepping in to fill this gap. This goes in line with the
unbinding understanding that when a state is not willing to take responsibility or lacks the
resources to do so, international assistance should be accepted.
People displaced by development projects are often not quantified or monitored, in part due
to conceptual ambiguities about what constitutes displacement. We argue that the extent to
which Cambodians are exposed to human rights violation before and during evictions, as well
69
as in their resettlement sites gives us scope to parallel their case with that of other categories
of Dips. Moreover, considering the cost-benefit analysis of these projects happening in
Cambodia, there is need to address the uneven gains and pains. To a large degree, many of
these developments are done for the benefit of a small elite and rising middle class, while the
majority of poor are paying the cost and ending up worse off with their right violated. This
does not have to be the case however, there could be development that benefits the majority if
laws and regulations were being upheld and implemented in the process.
We believe our premise to be deserving of further analysis, as there are shortcomings which
need to be addressed, such as the negative effect of labeling people as Dips. However, as we
argue there are potential benefits to labeling those forcefully evicted as Dips, which might
give way to awareness and understanding of the different contexts in which people are
forcefully displaced. In turn, this awareness and label has the potential of affecting policy-
makers, donors, and the international community in providing adequate humanitarian and
development assistance.
70
Annex 1: Interview guide topics.
● Urban poor settlements (definition) and criteria
● Usual targets of eviction and why
● Major players involved in evictions
● Process of eviction
○ What is considered a ‘forced eviction’
○ What happens to those evicted
○ What about compensation
● Relationship with government of Cambodia
○ Government's role in evictions and resettlement
○ Reasons for government's involvement (or lack thereof)
○ Awareness (or lack thereof) of evictees rights
● Perspective of those evicted and resettled
● Do they regard resettlement sites as being permanent or temporary
● Social impacts on people's lives as relating to:
○ Economic and jobs
○ Education
○ Housing and accommodation
○ Land tenure security
○ Health (mental and physical)
○ Water and sanitation
○ Food security
○ Livelihood and ability to make a living
● Prevalence of evictees returning from resettlement sites to Phnom Penh and why
1
2
3
4
Annex 5: Cernea’s Impoverishment risks and reconstruction model: 8 risk factors:
Landlessness: Expropriation of land removes the main foundation upon which people’s
productive systems, commercial activities, and livelihoods are constructed. This is the
principal form of de-capitalization and pauperization of displaced people, as they lose both
natural and man-made capital.
Joblessness: The risk of losing wage employment is very high both in urban and rural
displacements for those employed in enterprises, services, or agriculture. Yet, creating new
jobs is difficult and requires substantial investment. Unemployment or underemployment
among resettlers often endures long after physical relocation has been completed.
Homelessness: Loss of shelter tends to be only temporary for many resettlers; but for some,
homelessness or a worsening in their housing standards remains a lingering condition. In a
broader cultural sense, loss of a family’s individual home and the loss of a group’s cultural
space tend to result in alienation and status-deprivation. For refugees, homelessness and
“placelessness” are intrinsic by definition.
Marginalization: Marginalization occurs when families lose economic power and spiral on a
“downward mobility” path. Middle-income farm households do not become landless, they
become small landholders; small shopkeepers and craftsmen downsize and slip below
poverty thresholds. Many individuals cannot use their earlier acquired skills at the new
location; human capital is lost or rendered inactive or obsolete. Economic marginalization is
often accompanied by social and psychological marginalization expressed in a drop in social
status, in resettlers’ loss of confidence in society and in themselves, a feeling of injustice, and
deepened vulnerability. The coerciveness of displacement and the victimization of resettlers
tend to depreciate resettlers’ self-image, and they are often perceived by host communities as
a socially degrading stigma.
Food Insecurity: Forced uprooting increases the risk that people will fall into temporary or
chronic undernourishment, defined as calorie-protein intake levels below the minimum
necessary for normal growth and work.
Increased Morbidity and Mortality: Massive population displacement threatens to cause
serious declines in health levels. Displacement-induced social stress and psychological
trauma are sometimes accompanied by the outbreak of relocation-related illnesses,
particularly parasitic and vector-born diseases such as malaria and schistosomiasis. Unsafe
5
water supply and improvised sewage systems increase vulnerability to epidemics and chronic
diarrhea, dysentery, etc. The weakest segments of the demographic spectrum-infants,
children, and the elderly-are affected most strongly.
Loss of Access to Common Property and Services: For poor people, particularly for the
landless and asset less, loss of access to the common property assets that belonged to
relocated communities (pastures, forested lands, water bodies, burial grounds, quarries, etc.)
results in significant deterioration in income and livelihood levels. Typically, losses of
common property assets are not compensated by governments. These losses are compounded
by loss of access to some public services, such as school (Mathur 1998; Mahapatra 1999a,
1999b), losses that can be grouped within this category of risks.
Social Disarticulation: Forced displacement tears apart the existing social fabric. It
disperses and fragments communities, dismantles patterns of social organization and
interpersonal ties; kinship groups become scattered as well. Life-sustaining informal
networks of reciprocal help, local voluntary associations, and self-organized mutual service
are disrupted. This is a net loss of valuable “social capital,” that compounds the loss of
natural, physical, and human capital (discussed previously). The social capital lost through
social disarticulation is typically unperceived and uncompensated by the programs causing
it, and this real loss has long-term consequences. (Cernea, 2004: 18-25)
6
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