iran-iraq war and its effects on turkey

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Uluslararasr Hukuk ve PolitikaCilt:1. No: 4 ss 137-144,2005 @

The lran-Iraq War And lts Effects On Turkey

Evren ALTINKASAbstractOne of the most important t'actors that aft'ect the peace and the stabilitq in the MiddleEast is the struggle t'or heqemonq. Iraq approved twice that it is one of the most eft'ec'tive parameters of this struggle in the penod of 1980-1990. Iran, after 1979Revolution, tried to be the balancing plwer in the Middle East and even to spread theIslamic fundamentalism. This airn resulted as a harsh war between the two countries.I will trq to explain brieflu the reasons and results ot' the war and the et'fects of this waron Turkish foreign polictl and inner politics, which are still big problems. These effectscan be summarized as Kurdish nationalisrn, Islarnic fundamentalisrn and the econorn-ic problems.

Reasons of The WarWe can say that the basic reason of this war is the regional hegemony struggle ofthe 1970s. This struggle had begun when Britain stated in l968 that it will withdrawfrom the east of the Suez latest by the end of l97l. The desires of Iran to filt the gapof power in the region were completely against the Iraq's self-designed regionalrole. The invasion of three islands, which belonged to Sharjah and Ras Al KharimahEmirates before, by Iran, is the first step of the struggle. We must also add the viewof Ba'ath Party of lraq that Iran was a tool of the imperialists against the Arab unityunder the leadership of Shah. It is a known fact that Shah had always close relationswith lsrael and USA.'

After the withdrawal statement of Britain, USA under the load of the VietnamWar, started to use a "twin pillar policy" on the Middle East which puts the securityof the Gulf region on two bases. One of these bases would be lran with its militarypower, and the other Saudi Arabia with its political power. This was a great chancefor Iranian government. The policies of lran were aiming to put lraq out of theregional politics. This effort resulted in lraq USSR close relations and paved the wayto sign 1972 Friendship and Cooperation Treaty.I KermitRoosevelt. CounterCoup:TheStruggleForTheControlof lran(London: MccrawHill, 1979),p.35

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Evren ALTINKA$Ba'ath Party of lraq had the aim of protection of the Arab identity. lf the Arabidentity in the Gulf region would be protected, then lraq could become the leaderof the Arab world Only rival to Iraq was Iran, which served to USA and lsrael withher expansionist policy under the guidelines of the twin pillar policy.'So, lraq

protested the invasion of these three islands by Iran and put obstacles on the rightof pass of lran to Abadan oil refinery and Khorramshahr port.Border of Shatt-al-Arab is another reason for the struggle of both countries. Thetransportation on the river of Shatt-al-Arab has been done according to 1937 agree-ment between both countries, which approved the sovereignty of lraq on the riverand accepted a middle-line in front of Abadan as the border This border became aproblem between both countries after 197l.Kurds living in Iraq had the maior rights like education in their language, and a

certain extent of internal independence. But, there had been differences in theviews concerning the application of these rights Struggles between Ba'ath Partyand the KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party) began. Iran supported Kurds against thelraqi government. lran's aim was to come to a certain point of agreement aboutShatt-al-Arab issue. So, in 1975, both countries signed the Algiers Agreement lraqgave up its decisive policy on the river because of the huge problems it confrontedinside the country with the Kurds.

This rapprochement between both countries has come to an end with theIranian Revolution of 1979. (February 6, 1979) Iran, under the leadership ofKhomeini, became a fundamentalist country which tried to spread the lslamic fun-damentalism all around the Middle East. Ba'ath Party had a strong tradition ofviewing itself as the leader of the Arab world and the guide of pan-Arabism, Thischaracteristic of Ba'ath party makes rt always very suspicious about any anti Ba'athpolicy movements. So; lranian fundamental religious government under Khomeiniwas a big "reason" of Saddam's conspiracies.

Shi'ites in lraq supported Khomeini. As a reaction, Ba'ath Party arrested all theShi'iteLeaders in October 1979 ln Iate 1979 lran escalated its anti-Ba'athist campaign

by resuming its support for the lraqi Kurds; it also began providing moral and materialsupport to Shi'ite underground movements in Iraq; and last, the Iranian govern-ment initiated terrorist attacks on prominent officials, the most significant of whichwas the failed attempt to assassinate the Iraqi Deputy Premier, TariqAziz, on AprilI , t980.',

lran and Ba'ath Party regarded lslam as the Arabs'great cultural heritage; itnonetheless subordinates it to Arab nationalism. while Arab nationalism takesABSP, Revolutionary lraq, 1968-1973. The political report adopted bq the English Regional Congress olthe ABSPof haq, Baghdad, 1974,p.210Efraim Karsh, "Military Power and Foreign Policy Coals: The lran-lraq War Revisited ", lnternationalAffairs, Vol.64, No l, l9ii8 pp83-95 and Dilip H'ro The LonqestWar (London: Crafton Books, 1989),p.75

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The lran-lraq War And lts Effects On Turkegprecedence over tslam. In other words, the lraqi Ba'athists are opposed to thepoliticisation of religion. So; Iraq tried to prevent the spread of Iranian tslamicRevolution.n

lraq suppressed the Shi'ite underground organisations and expelled lraniancitizens in the domestic sphere. On the external level, lraq tried to organise a unit-ed Arab front to prevent the export of lranian revolution and launched a series ofverbal attacks on the lslamic regime and supported lranian separatist groups suchas the lranian Kurds and theArabs in Khuzestan'On September 17, l9BO, Saddamabrogated the 1975 Algiers Agreement. He said that "shatt-al-Arab River must haveits Iraqi-Arab identity restored.''The WarOn September 22, l9B0 Iraq invaded Iranian territories lraqis captured some vil-lages and the important port of Khorramshahr Iranians failed to launch any suc-cessful counter-offensives. Khuzestan was invaded by Iraqi forces. By 1982, lranianforces made gradual advances and even forced lraqi army to withdraw from the bor-der. lran invaded lraqi territory. Khomeini and other leaders wanted the removal ofSaddam and the payment of reparations to lran for the war damages in Khuzestan.In 1984, lraq acquired French-made Exocet missiles to launch attacks on Iranian oilfacilities in the Persian Gulf lran attacked tankers loaded with Arab oil, and claimedthat the profits from these tankers helped Iraq to buy new arms. As a response, Iraqattacked the lranian oil tankers. A Tanker War started.lranian military gains inside Iraq after l9B4 were a malor reason for increasedsuperpower involvement in the war. ln February 1986, lranian troops captured theport of Al Faw. By late l986; Iran launched several attacks to capture Basra. ln lateMay 1987, on Iraq's northern front a conflict was so intense. This was a joint effortby Iranian units and lraqi Kurdish rebels. They endangered Iraq's oil fields nearKirkuk and the northern oil pipeline to Turkey. So; the superpowers became moredirectly involved because they feared that the fall of Basra might lead to a pro-Iranian lslamic republic in largely shia-populated southern lraq.The superpowers were also concerned about the intensified tanker war. Duringl9B7,lran attacked 29 ships and lraq assaulted I 5 Kuwaiti ships were favourite tar-gets because Iran strongly objected to Kuwait's close relationship with the Baghdadregime. Kuwait turned to the superpowers, partly to protect oil exports but largelyto seek an end to the war through superpower intervention. Moscow leased 3tankers to Kuwait, and by June l987 USA had re-flagged 22 Kuwaiti tankers. Finally,direct attacks on the superpowers' ships drew them into the conflict.The intervention of the superpowers, especially the USA, resulted with the eco-nomic weakness of lran and reflected as the defeat of lranian forces in many fronts.The continued usage of chemical weapons and missiles attacks by lraq against the4 Jl,l Abdulghani,lraqand lran:The Years Q Crisis (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1984), p I8l5 Karsh. lbid, pp 87-88

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Evren ALTINKA$civilian areas coupled with the superpowers' support for the lraqi war efforts provedthat Iraq and its supporters had decided to spread the war at any price. lran accept-ed the cease-fire on August 20, 1988Turkey and The lran - Iraq WarThe outbreak of the Iran-lraq War on September 22, l9B0; immediately broughtTurkey face to face with unpleasant political and economic prospects, with the for-mer dominating as the war continued. Turkish national security was in jeopardy.First, the ongoing war could further radicalise the regime in Iran, and this might wellupset the regional equilibrium. ln such an event, the region would immediatelybecome receptive to Soviet influence. Second, the war could spill over the bordersof Iran and Iraq, involving the Arab countries around the Persian Gulf, and couldbecome a war between lran and the Arab world. ln such an event, especially whenif the superpowers were to become involved, Turkey could well be plunged into aMiddle East war despite its determination to stay out of one. Third, the war couldhave a negative effect on the demographic and ethnic structure of the region. Thiswould pose a threat to the security of Turkey's south-eastern areas close to its east-ern border An illustration of this occurred in May 1983 when the Iraqi centralgovernment weakened, and the Kurds, emboldened by this situation, infiltratedTurkish territory and terrorised the south-eastern villages.

Both warring parties shared their borders with Turkey, which provided them withtheir only overland access to Europe. Therefore Turkey's stance on the war mattereda great deal. Turkey declared itself neutral in the conflict. But, Ankara's relationswith Baghdad were better than her relations with Tehran. There are two reasons forthat. First, Turkey's Kurdish minority had been up in arms for the past many yearsin an area contiguous with the lraqi Kurdish region, and it had been co-operatingactively with Baghdad in counter-insurgency. Secondly, as a secular society since1924, Turkey had much in common with Ba'athist lraq, and shared Baghdad's fearof Islamic fundamentalism within its borders.uThe Kurdish ProblemFrom the Turkish perspective, the renewal of the Kurdish insurgency in south-east-ern Turkey is the single most detrimental by-product of the lran-lraq War.' Kurds inTurkey have always been under the control of central government and any pro-Kurdish movements were not allowed. The war resulted of lraq's loss of control ofits own border areas following the transfer of lraqi troops from Kurdish areas in thenorth to the Iranian front. Kurds had more space and freedom to operate againstTurkey. The name of the Kurdish terrorist organisation was PKK. (Workers Party ofKurdistan) PKK was attacking the civilian and military targets and running back tonorthern lraq. In countering the Kurdish problem, Iraq received enthusiastic co-6 Dilip, Hko, @.cit, p 81.7 Henri I Barkey, "The Silent Victor: Turkey's Role in the lran-traq War," in Efraim Karsh (ed.) The IranIraq War. Strategic and tulitical Imphcations (London: Macmillan,l989), p. l4l140


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The lran-lraq War And lts Effects On Turkeyoperation from Turkey, with which it had in 1978 concluded a secret accord allow-ing each side to pursue "subversive elements" up to 9 miles inside each other's ter-ritory. In May 1983 Turkish troops infiltrated lB miles into lraqi Kurdistan to destroythe bases of its Kurdish guerrillas in the KDP-occupied part Following this, TariqAziz visited Ankara to reinforce mutual security co-operation further. The outcomewas the signing of an agreement in October l9B4 permitting cross-border opera-tions up to 18 miles into each other's territory This permission given to the Turkisharmed forces was counter to Saddam's policy which rejected "the facilitation of thepresence of any foreign armies, bases or armed forces in the Arab homeland, underany pretext and guise and for any reasons."u

PKK and the insurrection of the Kurdish movement as a result of ongoing lran-Iraq War effected Turkey negatively The foundations of the regime were effectedand the Kurdish question has crept into the international discourse. The Kurdishissue had become an internal and external problem for Turkey. This problem stillcontinues as an obstacle to the Turkish political stabilitv.Islamic FundamentalismI must also note that the Shi'ite fundamentalism of the Khomeini regime was anobvious danger to the Turkish state, where nearly l0 million inhabitants are ofShi'ite origin.n And indeed, soon after his victory Khomeini stated that the Turkishregime rested on the force of bayonets and suggested that Turkey's leaders wereheaded for the same fate as the shah. Short after this statement, Turkish militaryintervened and the coup of September 12, 1980 happened in Turkey.

So; while Turkey maintained diplomatic relations with both Iran and lraq duringthe war, even providing lran with a commercial outlet to the West, Turkey saw lraq'sfinal victory as in its interest, that is, in containing the spread of Iran's revolution-ary impulse.'olran was following the Soviet model on the export of its revolution by improvingher relations with all the states and supporting the terrorist groups which aim to

destruct the regimes of those states. Iran attacked the traditions and the symbolsof the Turkish state during the war. (These symbols are mostly related to theMustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the secular Turkish republic) Tehran involvedin domestic politics of Turkey and protested the preventing of religious studentswho wore kerchiefs from attending university. In addition, the Khomeini regime pro-vided support to Cemalettin Kaplan, a fundamentalist anti-regime preacher incermany who had sizeable followers among Turkish workers in Europe."tJ Thomas Naff, Gaf &curity and the lran-lraq Ltlar, (Washington: National Defense University press,1985), p.146.t http://www.adherents com/larsecom/com shiite html 90"/o of the Shi'ite population in Turkey are ofAlawi origin, as the remaining l0 % are mainly Caferis.l0 Henri J Barkey, Reluctant Neighbour:Turkeg's Role In The Mrddle East. (Washington: US Institute of peacePress, 1996), p. ajI I Henri .1. Barkey, The Slent Wctor, p. 143.

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Evren ALTINKA$The lranian "model" became the basic reason for Turkish fundamental groups to

claim and struggle for an Islamic state. They used arms to fight against the Turkisharmed forces under the name of Hezbollah, IBDA-C etc. All of these organisations'statements show that the lranian Revolution and the insurgence of the Islamic iden-tity in the Middle East were the reasons of their existence. These statements alsoinclude that the lran-lraq War resulted with the defeat of lslamic Resistance to the"evil" lraq and USA. There is an increasing tendency in the Turkish society towardsthe re-birth of the lslamic Revolution.Economic SituationIn the beginning of l9B0; Turkey had many economic problems. By the introductionof new economic policies on January 24, 1980, Turkey left the import substitutionpolicy and used to get into export markets and an industry which could competewith international markets. But, Turkish industry had limited experience in export'ing. But, after the coup of September 12, l9B0; a full economic authority was givento new government.

Both lran and Iraq, as a result of their international isolation, were forced to relyon Turkey as a major source of needed commodities imported from Turkey itself orfrom the West. By showing no favour to either party, Turkey has become a maiortrading partner of both. lran and Iraq increasingly turned to Turkey to satisfy theirimport needs. They found Turkish products to be less expensive.

Throughout the l9BOs, the war with Iran gave lraq an incentive to co-operatefully with Turkey, including in the establishment of commercial exchanges betweenthe two countries. Turkey quickly became one of Baghdad's main customers. 60% ofthe oil consumed in Turkey was imported from lraq. When Turkey saw that "lraq wasthreatened with collapse under the battering of the lranian advance", the Turkishminister of State, Kamran lnan, publicly warned that "no less than 1,5 million Turksand Turkomans live in the northern regions of lraq." Inan, in effect, wanted to assertTurkey's pre-emptive right in the event that an Iranian advance let to the break-upof lraq.In l9B4-1985 Turkish-lranian trade amounted to 230 million $ making TurkeyIran's third most important commercial partner after West Germany and Japan.''lran balanced its trade with Turkey by selling 100.000 b/d of its oil to its neighbour.Despite the irritation caused by the lraqi strikes in May and June l9B5 againstTurkish-owned oil tankers carrying lranian oil, Ankara's relations with Iraq remainedcordial. Turkey and lraq had a strong interest in maintaining the military co-opera-tion in suppressing Kurdish insurgency In November l9B5 Turkey concluded a con-tractwith Iraq fora second oil pipelinewith an annual capacityof 7l million tones.(1.4 million b/d)

But, we must mention the negative effects of the war to the Turkish economy.Not only did the lraqi pipeline to the Turkish city Iskenderun stop functioning, thel2 More information about the trade relations between Turkey and Iran can be found at: htto://refer-ence allrefer com/countrv-euide-studv/iran/iran I I t html142


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The lran-lraq War And lts fffects On Turkeyoil tankers were no longer able to enter the Persian Gulf. When, as a consequence,Iran and lraq stopped shipping oil, Turkey's reserves went down at an alarmingrate.

Another disadvantage of the war was the increasing threat to the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline between Turkey and lraq This pipeline had stopped func-tioning at the beginning of the war. The bombing of it during the war would havemeant not only a slowdown or a halt of oil deliveries from lraq but the loss of tran-sit revenues from the pipeline, of which 690 kilometres passed through Turkey.The main reason of the favouring of Turkish goods by lran and lraq was the gen-erous credit terms Turkey offered to the both countries. But, by the time lraqisfound themselves increasingly unable to pay for their purchases By l9BB, Iraqidebts to Turkey had reached to 3 billion $. Iraq's inability to pay has become a

potential political problem for the Turkish government lraq even started to seeknew countries which provide better export credits than Turkey lran also had pay-ment problems The war could no longer provide as much benefit to Turkey as itused to.''The effects of this economic decline are one of the maior factors of the ongoinginstability in the Turkish economy Because of the payment problems of lraq andIran, Turkey got credits from western countries and the foreign debts of turkeyincreased to 65 billion in l9BB, from 20 bitlion dollars in l98O Effect of the oil trans-

port failures is another declining factor of the Turkish economy.The Strategic Importance of TurkeyAmerican-Turkish relations improved considerably in the aftermath of the IranianRevolution. USA provided all the possible support to the Turkish democraticregime, trying to prevent Turkey to fall under the effect of lslamic fundamentalismAfter the lranian advance on Iraqi territories, USA sent commissions to Turkeyabout the preparation of Turkish army to a rapid annexation of the oil-rich northernprovinces of Iraq (like Kirkuk) to prevent the oil from falling into the Islamic funda-mentalist lranian regime.'o Turkish authorities denied such scenarios.Following the lranian Revolution, Turkey felt that it had clearly become the mostpowerful Muslim nation in the region. After the end of the war, we can see anincreasing effect of Turkey in the region with the largest and strongest army andwith the secular model to the countries of the region comparing with the lran's fun-damenta list structure.ConclusionTo make a conclusion we can say that lran-lraq War, in general terms, had negativeeffects on Turkey The Kurdish nationalism was awakened and the Kurdish terroristsfound safe-havens for themselves in the destabilised northern regions of lraq. Thel3 Henri I. Barkey, The Slent Wctor, p. 140l4 Bruce Kuniholm. "Retrospect and Prospect: Forty Years Of US Middle East Policy", The Middle EastIournal Vol 41, No I , Winter 1987,pp7-25.

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use of military forces against these terrorists and the military operations made byTurkey to lraq during the war, made the international community suspicious aboutthe Kurdish issue.

The effect of lslamic fundamentalism in Turkey does not have as much impor-tance as the Kurdish nationalism. The only negative effect is the reflection ofIslamic Revolution as a model to fundamentalist Islamic terrorist groups in Turkeywhich aim to establish an Islamic state like Iran.

ln the economic area, we can see the negative effect of the delay of oil trans-portation and the non-payment of debts, on the Turkish economy. These resultedas a decline in Turkish export policies and as an increase on the amount of Turkishforeign debts.

We can see that being neutral and in the same time trying to gain the maximumadvantage does not work effectively as a foreign policy tool This neutrality hasturned into the internal catastrophes of Turkish economic and political policiestowards both sides.

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iran-iraq war and its effects on turkey

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