World Affairs Institute

ITALY'S DRANG NACH OSTENSource: Advocate of Peace through Justice, Vol. 88, No. 8 (AUGUST, 1926), pp. 469-471Published by: World Affairs InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20661342 .

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1926 WORLD PROBLEMS IN REVIEW 469

canceling of bonds. The total of national defense bonds issued should not be allowed to exceed its present amount of 49 mil liards. The aim should be to restore pub lic confidence in the bonds. The same or

ganization would also take charge of the

ordinary Treasury bonds (bonds up to one

year). There should be voluntary redemp tion of the short-term bonds maturing in

February and September, 1927. Opera tions for the repurchase of other short term Treasury bonds should be under taken.

For the time being, the committee con siders that the annual reduction of ad vances, provided for in the Eudget, should be limited to about one milliard. The

Treasury should be authorized by Parlia ment each year to issue bonds to the maxi mum of five milliards to provide a work

ing fund for meeting the variable pay ments at the end of the month and other occasional calls.

Rate for Stabilization

When it arrives at the methods to be followed for stabilizing the franc, the re

port lays down that the organ which un dertakes that task must have a large stock of foreign currency with which to prevent any further depreciation, and a large stock of francs to buy up any surplus foreign currency which is offered. The State can not undertake the task ; the proper organ is the Banque de France- The right mo

ment for the operation will be when the conditions previously indicated have been fulfilled. The rate for stabilization cannot be immediately decided on ; it must lie be tween the rate indicated by the cost of

living and that actually current in the ex

change market at the moment when the

operation is begun. It is desirable that it should be more favorable than the present rate.

The funds at the disposal of the Banque de France for the purpose of stabilization should consist primarily of its gold re

serve, and secondly of credits which it may obtain either directly or through the gov ernment. As there are objections to using the gold reserve, the funds actually en

gaged should be furnished (a) by long term credits obtained by the government, like the Morgan loan ; ( h ) by credits to be

obtained by the bank itself; (c) by private and commercial credits. The amount which the committee has in view for (a) and (&) is $200,000,000 (?40,000,000). This foreign assistance will only be ob tainable if France inspires the conviction that she is going to take all the necessary

measures to stabilize the franc and pay her debts. For this reason the Washington Agreement must be ratified and a definite settlement negotiated with Great Britain as soon as possible.

Three Phases o? Stabilization

The committee envisages three phases of stabilization :

(1) "Pre-stabilization," during which the rate of the franc would oscillate some what. During this period the limit of the advances by the Banque de France to the State mmt be definitely fixed at the ex

isting figure. If this were done, there would be no reason to limit the note issue. The gold reserve must be increased by the purchase of gold within the coun try at a rate somewhere near the chosen level.

(2) De facto stabilization, during which the Banque de France would buy and sell gold at a fixed rate. During this period complete freedom might be restored to capital.

(3) De jure stabilization. A final chapter is devoted to the econ

omic crisis which will inevitably follow stabilization. The committee foresees un

employment and a considerable fall in the national revenue, but points out that these consequences must be faced in any case sooner or later. It suggests a certain num ber of measures which might be taken by public authorities and private industries to remedy and alleviate the effects of the crisis.

ITALY'S DRANG NACH OSTEN

DTTBINGr the past few months the

southeastern part of Europe has been much agitated and disturbed by the trend of Italian policy. Premier Musso lini's triumphant tour of the Italian pos sessions in northern Africa, his frequent

martial declarations, and the recent rap prochement between Italy on the one hand

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470 ADVOCATE OF PEACE August

and Greece and Rumania on the other, al seem to lend color to the theory that Italy is preparing for a new conflict with Tur

key, in pursuance of a drang nach Osten

policy similar to that pursued by Germany before the World War.

Mussolini's Genoa Speech

One of the lastest outbursts of Premier

Mussolini's oratory has been a speech de

livered at Genoa on the occasion of his

recent visit to that city. Cheered wildly

by a crowd of over 100,000 he began his

speech by remarking that the cheers were, of course, not for him, the soldier, but for

the government which he led. Then he

continued :

Today no one dares dispute the fact that

popular acquiescence in the Fascist r?gime

is ever greater, constantly increasing, steadily

becoming more conscious. I have seen march

past me today people of every age and class.

To these the Fascist Government has as yet

given nothing which fits in with the mate

rialistic conception of life; on the contrary,

it ever places on their shoulders heavier du

ties and responsibilities. Why, then, do they

rally in ranks ever more serried around the

invincible symbol of victory. Because the

people of Italy are thirsting to be obedient,

thirsting for discipline, eager to be governed. After these four years of heavy toil, I see

that our assets far exceed our liabilities. I

see that discipline is today accepted by all

in a highly praiseworthy spirit. I see that

people are working hard, that co-operation

between the classes has been realized, and

that the Fascist State is born into the world and will survive. It was born yesterday, and

has buried the liberal democratic State.

We have placed arms in the hands of our

people, but arms alone do not win victory if

the men who hold them do not desire it des

perately and tenaciously. We have carried out reforms, some of which have been held

up as an example in many countries of Eu

rope, and we have enormously developed the economic strength of the nation.

But for what purpose is all this power created ? Premier Mussolini is rather too outspoken in his public utterance to leave that question in doubt. And each word of his seems to reverberate ominously through the whole Near East.

Bases of Turkish Fears

The well-informed Constantinople cor

respondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung, in a recent article, entitled "Mussolini's Shadow in the Near East," presents a vivid picture of these reverberations. Ac cording to him, Turkish public opinion has long been conscious of the shadow that has lain over Turkish-Italian relations. The tenacity with which Italy insisted at Lausanne on the possession of the tiny island of Castellorizo, lying barely two

marine miles from the Anatolian shore, and which terminates the chain of the Dodacanese Islands; the mystery sur

rounding the establishment of an Italian naval base on the island of Leros (one of the Dodacanese) ; the memorable pro gram address of Mussolini in March, 1924, in which, in quite a matter-of-fact way, he said that Italian influence must be directed towards the east, as expansion towards the west was impossible ; the not wholly adroit proposals to develop settlements in Adalia, in the former so-called Italian zone?all this and much else has impressed the Turks with a deep mistrust of Italian intentions in Anatolia.

Reactions in Athens

It may be noteworthy that the earliest warnings of Italian danger to Anatolia were circulated not in Turkish publicity channels, but that they came from a source not generally credited with friendliness toward Turkey. The anti-Italian press of Athens was the first to give alarm, espe cially the Embros, which published in August of 1925 a series of articles from the pen of the Athenian Deputy Sketos under the title "Anatolia in Danger."

Sketos carried the beginnings of Italian Mediterranean policy back to the year 1866 and represented the real originator to have been Bismarck, recalling the latter's letter to Mancini on this question. The chief Italian aim?the crowding out of France and the establishment of Italian suprem acy in the Mediterranean?could only, as pointed out by the deputy, be attained gradually, and the first step thereto would be control of the coast of Asia Minor. The Anatolian hinterland would for the time being be utilized for the settlement of Italy's surplus population. On the basis of special sources of information to which

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1926 WORLD PROBLEMS IN REVIEW 471

the Grecian Deputy had access, he indi cated Italy's anti-Anatolian preparations on the land, on the water, and in the air.

Greece and Turkey

It is one of those ironies of world his

tory that the Grecian danger against which

Turkey had been warned has now, thanks to Greece?i. e.f the abrupt change in her

foreign policy and her leaning toward

Italy?been given the force of reality; for Greece is and will remain an enemy of

Turkey, in the latter's opinion. Grecian aspirations may have somewhat

changed their course; they may, particu larly after the agreement with Italy, have been diverted from Anatolia?at least in

part?and have dwelt more on Thrace. Their intensity, however, has by no means declined since the day when over a million Grecian refugees poured back into Greece from Turkey and these exert enormous

political influences on the people and on the government, thanks to the strength of their organization. When P?ngalos set up his candidacy for President of the Repub lic, it happened, as he himself states, that he was urged thereto in the first instance

by the 300 refugee organizations, which, as is well known, are directed by a central

body. In addition, there exists a Mikrasiat?kon

Politikon entr?n (Political Center of Asia Minor), which is a party organization and whose program conforms to its name. "The intentions and ideas underlying the return of the Grecian refugees," according to a recent issue of the Vakit, in connec tion with the Greco-Italian rapproche

ment, "are not mere words. The refugees are maintaining a military organization and are training."

Greek Problems and Italian Influence

It thus becomes quite clear that the

misery of the majority of the refugees, recently certified to by no less an authority than the former Finance Minister Kofinas, in the Eleftheros Typos, as well as the

growing nostalgia for an abiding place where material success had attended them, in connection with the army's harbored idea of revenge, must provide a more pow erful impetus than does the Italian's colo nial dreams. It was the combination of these two elements which first opened Tur

key's eyes to the real Italian danger, to which such leading Turkish politicians and

publicists as the Deputy from Kars, Agha Aglon Achmed, the Deputy from Trebi zond, Nebi Zadeh Hamdi, and others have referred so pointedly.

Italy's past policy in the Balkans is, in the opinion of Turkish politicians, but an other link in the chain of Italian encir

cling and isolation tactics toward Turkey. Placed within the dimensions of world

politics, Agha Aglon Achmed, and he is

essentially supported by the above-noted statements of the Grecian deputy, sees a duel taking place in the Balkans between

Italy and France.

Fear, Not Logic, Controls Situation

Apparently it is a mark of our politi cally infirm time that such great disturb ances as were occasioned throughout the entire Near East by the announcement of

Italy's new colonial policy are not based on logic; they seem to be born out of a fear of the uncontrollable. As the entire Turkish press points out, a monstrous

thing, such as an unprovoked Italian in vasion of Anatolia would be, cannot be

comprehended, for the fact that Italy needs colonies and drew the short end in the distribution of German colonies is a

matter quite apart. Nevertheless, and this is characteristic, Turkish public opinion is not only ready to credit a policy of force of that sort to Fascist Italy and her

leader, but the Turkish Government has felt justified in entering recently upon special defensive preparations.

END OF THE MOSUL CONTROVERSY

WITH the signing, on June 5, of the

Anglo-Turkish treaty, the text of which is given in the International Docu ments section of this issue of the Advo cate or Peace, an end has been put at last to the so-called Mosul controversy. Eatified now by the parliaments of the countries concerned, this treaty really represents the formal ending of the war between Great Britain and Turkey, which

began in 1915 and the final conclusion of which has been retarded by various con troversies between the two countries,

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