ISSN 1037-2938

Copyright Commonwealth of Australia 1993

cept to the extent of the us88 permitted undcf~ the t Act 1968, no part of this publication may produced OT transmitted in any form or by any luding information storage and retrieval m, without the prior written consent of the Department of the Parliamentary Library, other than embers of the Australian Parliament in the couree of their official duties.

Published by the Department of the Parliamentary Library, 1993

This paper has been prepared for general distribution to Readers outside the Parliament are reminded that this is ralian Government document, but a paper prepared by the author and published by the Par Research Service to contribute to consideration of the issues by Senators and Members. The views expressed in this Paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Research Service and are not to be attributed to the Department of the Parliamentary Library.

mbers of the Australian Parliament.

koenkai

Kome i t o

yakuza

Japan C o m ~ u n i s t

local political support group

Clean Government

Liberal Democratic

Ministry of International Trade and Industry

erican Free Trade

upreme Commander for the Allied

arty of Japan

a n ~ s t e r ~

resulted in the

including new parties establishe politicians.

outcome of the election is of considerable importance to o t only is Japan our largest trading partner, but her economic an

ustralian policies. strategic roles in the sia-Pacific region i ~ p a c t si

The election represented change: both of eneration and of political style. It also represented continuity. To a considerable extent Japan's political dynamics will remain the same. The structures, forces and processes will only change slowly, although the new government is committed to the rapid introduction of electoral reform.

Japan is currently undergoing somethi seeks a new role befitting its economic

of an identity cr wer in the post-

orld. This can be se in the debates about the efense Forces and anese involvement in

peace keep in^ operations. It is also apparent in the continui about revision of the Constitution. At the same time as t

tates becomes less important str and culturally to Japan, China, economies of East and South-East

gically, economically, politically rea and the other burgeonin ia appear natural partners.

This paper examines aspects of the arty structures, electoral system to 'restructure' the

to the election, hich have precipitated the mov cal system, It looks at events lea

the campaign itself and the immediate outcome. the new government and the issues it faces are consi the paper deals with the implications of apan's future direction for

ustralia.

The newly ele coalition go~ernment not survive for long, because it appe o lack internal coh wever the r e a l i ~ m e n t of political forces which is now unde set to continue,

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

eform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Campai gn............................~.......... 13

esults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

ewGovernrnent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

7. Key Issues in Japanese olicy . . . . . .

8. Foreign Policy Issues and Japan's elations . . . . . . . . . . . . . with Australia

9. C o n c l u d i n ~ ~ e m a r ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ICES

F. G.

nese Politics and the 1993 July Election: Continuity an 1

outcome is obviously only is Japan a major

The notion of restructuring in Ja een extensively discussed in connection with the recent election, with explanations for the turn of events being sought variously in uncertainty about the economy, frustration over Japan's inability to respond to the changing international situation, impatience with the slow pace of electoral reform and refusal by the Japanese people to put up any longer with corruption.

This paper examines those aspects of party structures, the electoral system and societal influences which have given rise to moves for a 'restructuring' (risutora) of Japanese olitics and society. Events

p to the election and its immediate outcome are considered in ill. The paper also looks at possible future directions Japan

the implications for heralds a new

ators have been writing about the possible self- destruction of the LDP, generational changes and opposition coalitions since at least the mid-1970s. However, it has now become apparent that efforts to reform the political system cannot be separated from moves to reali political forces.

all of the pre-war political streams had reappeared,

lished again when its leaders were although generally under ne ames. The Japan Communist [JCP] was the first to be released from prison by t preme Commander for the

contains a list of the main Japanese political parties.

Japanese ~ o l i t i ~ and the 1993 July Election: Continuity and Change

replaced by the elected House of weakened through the designation

of the State' (Art. 41), while the Cabinet became accountable t iet (Art. 66(3)). The introduction of uni rsal adult suffrage in

December 1945 meant that for the first time i pan's history women were allowed to vote.

With the benefit of hindsight, an opportunity was lost to fundamentally reform the electoral system when SCAP converted the pre-war 3-5 member electorates into 4-15 member electorates instead of introducing single-member constituencies.

lthough the purge of 'undesirable personnel' (collaborators with the military) severely affected the two main conservative parties, they nevertheless emerged on top in the April 1946 general election. Until the Democratic Liberal Party (previously Japan Liberal Party) became the dominant party in 1952, there was a good deal o f t oil in Japanese politics. In part this disruption was due to the 19 and reforms, which meant that the parties had to reorganise their local power bases. However, the dissolution of large estates and the redistribution of land to tenant farmers ultimately operated to reduce rural radicalism and provide a bloc of conservative landholders.

arty at first benefite the form~tion of trade unions. The the General Council of Trade Unio

's policy in favour of

ay-December 1950 carried out the so-called 'Red Purge'

denoted both the Allied Military G o v e ~ ~ e n t and the person of its commander, General. Pouglas MacArthur.

adoption of the ons st it it ion, because of its objection

Japanese Politics and the 1993 July ~ l ~ t i o n : C ~ n t i ~ u i t y and Chang;e

and advocatin~ neutrality.

part from a brief period from May 1947 to 48, when Prime tayama7 headed a coalition government which was conservative Democratic Par (formerly the Japan

and People's Cooperative rty,8 the SDPJ has appeared incapable of forming the government in its o m right.

ctober 1955 the two wings of the DPJ reunited, partly under The following month the Liberal Party (the

ocratic Liberal Party) and the Democratic Party united era1 ~ e m o ~ ~ a t i ~ Party. This restructuring meant that

the SDPJ held roughly the number of seats held by the LDP in both houses of the Diet. pite the establishment of the Democratic Sociali 1960, following defections from the SDPJ t faction and some members of the centre faction; and the formation of the Clean Government (Korneito) as the political arm of the lay Buddhist organisation Soka Gakkai in 1964, lo this ratio of conservative-centrist to reformist

external pressure?

5

6

7

8

9

10

Actually, all parties except the JCP suffered from factionalism, which was also endemic in pre-war politics.

See Arima Sumisato and Imazu Hiroshi, 'The opposition parties: organization and policies,' Japan Quarterly 2 (1977), 151-152.

Personal names are given in ~ e s t e ~ rather than Japanese style, i.e., family name last.

The Japan Socialist Party was a minority partner in a short-lived coalition of the same parties which was headed by Democratic Party leader, Ashida Hitoshi, from March-October 1948.

In January 1957 the ~ o r k e r - ~ a r m e r Party, which had split from the Socialist Party in December 1948, rejoined the SDPJ.

Komeito actually originated with the formation of the Komei Political Federation in 1961, becomin i n d e ~ n d e n t of S movement.

political party in Nov akkai in 1970, but in

r 1964. It nominal1 ce is still closely re1

4 Japanese Politics and the 1993 July Election: Continuity and Change

cline in the rural

a, has pointed out, th in the consciousnes

livelihood of the peop At the same time, the became dominated by its left wing. From a peak of 166 House of Representatives seats in 1958, the SDPJ

90 seats in 1969, because its policies were seen by the s irrelevant to the problems of rapid urbanisation and

industrialisation. l3

Since then the SDP has revised its 196 programme quite ting the goal of ' revolution' and

reeognising the changed political realities in January 1986 the models of its German and French sister parties (

nd Epinay Stat ent), and embracin 'market principles' spite this the PJ faces continui hostility from the

and sections of the mass media (especially the Yomiuri S ~ j ~ ~ u n and Sankei imbun). The structural problems also remain. The SDPJ membership base is small. Its public sector union power base in rural Japan is significant, but does not compensate for its loss of support in the cities.

1 1 Japanese scholars frequently use the terms 'refomist', 'centrist' and 'conservative' to describe the political complexion of Japanese parties.

12 Hidaka Rokuro, 'Personal retrospective', in Democracy in Contemporary Japan, ed. Gavan McCormack and Yoshio Sugimoto (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1986), p. 231.

13 atsushita Muneyuki, r the Japan Socialist Party?' Japan ~ u a ~ ~ r l y 2 (1983), 156-159 atsushita Keiichi, 'Half democracy', Japan

, 1 (1984), 6-10.

14 Fukatsu Masumi ated image change', Japan ~ u a ~ e r l y , 'Doi Takako tackles the obstacles to power',

i Takako tackles the obstacles , who S ~ i ~ b u ~ editorial staff, also tudes

Japanese Politics and the 1993 July Election: Contin~ity and Chans

e time, various attempts

other factors enabled the LDP to maintain its supremacy fact that its leadership has been involved in one scandal

after another,18 while corruption within the party has been endemic, due in no small measure to competition its factionslg and the 'pork-barrelling' which takes place the strong central government and weak local governments -- both factors connected with identified weaknesse in the election system. LDP Prime Ministers have fallen over the Lockheed bribery case (197 ), the Recruit Cosmos shares for influence affair (1989) and the Kyowa Steel corporate kickbacks scandal (1991).

n the surface, the late gawa Kyubin scandal was no different from all the others. LD nemaru, chairman of the largest LDP factio owledged e ~ i ~ e ~ c e grise of Japanese politics, failed to report a Y 500 million ($A 7.25 million) 'donation' he had received from the now defunct parcel

firm Tokyo Sagawa Kyubin. M e n the matter came to light as a result of police investigations into foreign exchange violations by a firm linked to the Tokyo gangster (yakuza) syndicate Inagawa-kai,

anemaru made a written statement to the Public Prosecutors Office

16

17

18

19

See 'Komeito: searching for pasty reconstruction', Japan Quarterly (1981), 153-154.

See Ito Shigeru, 'Do or die for the Socialists', Japan Echo , 1 (1993), 29-30.

Chalmers Johnson, 'The tremor', New Republic, 9.8.1993, 24 refers to 'eighteen major political corruption scandals affecting virtually every member of the ruling party' since 1975 alone.

The factions have, in fact, developed' their own bureaucracies, which have had the effect of w ~ k e n i n g rather than s t ren~hening the party leadership. See Kitaoka Shin'ichi, 'The b u r ~ u c r a t i z ~ t i o n of Japanese

(1993), 33-39.

Japanese Politics and the 1993 July ~ l ~ t i o n : Continuity and Change

of circumstances.

more than a tonne

rented by his second sonoZo

There was, further, a general feeling abroad in Japan of the need for political change, In part, this was due to ~ ~ d e s p r e a d concern about the so-called 'bubble economy'. This is the term applied to the abnormal rise in share values and land prices after the September 19 in turn, fuelle and sent asset prices sky-rocketing (the bubble). m e n the Government tightened mo olicy to counter these effects, share prices tumbled and land v 1. Financial institutions, especially securities companies, suffered dramatic losses, although all business sectors have been. affected.22 Since 1991, the Japanese economy has been struggling to adjust to the measures, and recovery is still s first 'home made' recession, hence the deep scars.24

a Accord of 2 21 produced a dramatic appreciation of the

rapid growth in capital investment and e

overnment's financial liber e way This has bee

20

21

2

23

See Far Eastern Economic Review, 19.3.1992, 48-50; Japan Times WeeMy International Edition, 2-8.8.1993, 1,5. Kanemaru's 'bagman' even had to use a supermarket trolley to transport all the cash.

This was the name given to the G5 (finance ministers and central bank governors from Japan, USA, UEC, Germany and France) agreement allowing the United States to lead the dollar lower on foreign exchange markets.

ational Tax Administration Agency report shows that annual income of Japan's large corporations (those capitalised at Y 3 bill or more) has fallen for the th ecutive year. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS], FBIS- -168, 1.9.1993, 5-6. Earnings of major fimns are also expected to drop this financial year according to Cosmo Securities Economic Research Institute. FBIS-EM-93- 174, 10.9.1993, 13.

On this topic of Japanese

0ri0 ~ u r a k a ~ i , 'Afte and Industry No 4 (19

f the bubble economy', J o u ~ ~ 26; Ryuichiro Tachi, 'Looking

new Politics and the 1993 July Election: Continuity and Chan,e

troops.

Finally, there was public anger at the failure of Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa to assert control over the eiseikai faction power brokers, Shin Kanemaru, oboru Takeshita and Ichiro Ozawa, especially after their links with the yakuza and right-wing groups became known, and the blocking of the electoral reform bills before the Diet by LDP diehards. Even the resignation of Kanemaru, a t first from his party posts and then from the Diet, whereupon he was promptly arrested for tax evasion, failed to satisfy the critics.

26

The need for electoral reform has been identified as a key issue in Japanese politics and is, in fact, the one issue which unites (in a general sense, if not in detail) the present coalition partners.

Japan has a bicameral parliament (Diet), comprising the House of Councillors (Upper House) and House of epresentatives (Lower

ouse). Members of the former are elected for six-year terms (with If of the number being elected every three years while the Lower ouse members are elected for four-year terms. 15

House members are elected from 47 electorates based on prefectures and metropolitan areas, with the remainder elected under a proportional represe ation party-list system (followin electoral law in 198 from a single national constit

'Hondt method.

or elections to the House of ~epresentatives, Japan currently has I electorates which variously send between two and six members to

__

25 See Independent, 16.7.1993, 12.

26 Se wara ~ n d e ~ i n i n g Japanese politics', uarte

8 Japanese Politics and the 1993 July tion: Continuity and Change

not only need to

te in the same

competition.

lem with the multi-member electorate system thus stems that it has reinforced factional divisions within the LDP ser extent, in the SDPJ, and encouraged members to

compete against each other. This competition between candidates es individuals rather than parties and results in national

issues often being of secondary importance to local or sectional interests. The principal activity of Japanese politicians has been described as:

bestowing benefits on their constituents (jimoto rieki) in the form of personal favors and improved government services in their districts .28

The only real major focus of the competition between the various candidates from the same party is in spending to meet local expectations. In particular, lavish use of candidates' o w n funds (derived from political donations) -- as distinct from expenditure of government funds ~'por~-barrelling') -- is considered one of the leading causes of the prevailing 'money politics', which is why the various electoral reform proposals have consistently argued for the abolition of multi-member electorates.

Electorates vary greatly in terms of the number of voters -- Ehime 329 koku] has 146 528 voters per seat while Tokyo 11 has erall, the disparity between the value of urban and rural A, down from the previous ratio of ,383 followin

27 The only single-member electorate, ani-Shoto [northern Ryukyu Islands] was recently abolished.

28 Scott C. Flanagan, 'Mechanisms of social network influence in Japanese voting behavior', in Scott C. Flanagan et al, The Japanese Voter (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 429.

9 For the location o f t the stylised map at

and other, Japanese electorates, readers are referred to end of the Paper.

Japanese Politics and the 1993 July Election: Continuity and Chang?

ad crepancy uncon~tit

ase of rural gent

land to small owner-fa Japan Farmers' Union

purged pre-war politician^.^'

The traditional LDP power base as always been rural Japan and the prefecture capitals, where the local support groups (koenkai) have often been handed do from one generation of Diet member to

ups, in turn, ensured that 45% of new e last election (1990) were related to sitting or

In rural Japan the village association eliver bloc votes to conservative candidates?

30

31

32

33

34

The ratio has been at least as high as 4.4:1. Hyogo 5 [southwestern Honshu] with 81,000 voters per seat contrasting with the 360,000 voters from Chiba 4 [eastern Honshu]. See Bradley M. Richardson, 'The Japanese voter: comparing the explanatory variables in electoral decisions', in Flanagan et al, The Japanese Voter, p. 429.

See Joji Watanuki, 'Social structure and voting behavior', in Flanagan et al, The Japanese Voter, pp. 49-54.

tanuki, 'Social structure', pp. 54-57.

Mickihiro Ishibashi and Steven democracy in Japan', Asian Su

Second-generation Diet members and I, 4 (1992), 366-379.

See Scott C. Flanagan, 'Mechanisms of social network influence in Japanese voting behavior," in Flanagan et al, The Japanese Voter (

e way this is organised is tical ~ ~ a ~ i c s of J a ~ a n ~

taka Ike (Tokyo: ~ n i v e r s i t y of Tokyo

I tics and the 1993 July ~ l e ~ t i ~ n : G o n t i ~ u i t ~ and Ghana=

forced from office when he att

electorates and seats filled by proportional r e p r e ~ e n t a t i o n . ~ ~

r was e que

iyazawa Government oppo ed to electoral reform per se. as, how to maxirnise its o portunities. After all, many

political observers believed it could win 8040% of seats if its proposals for reform of Lower House elections were adopted,36 and would even emerge victorious if any of the various parallel single seat/list proposals (heiritsu) were adopted due to its organisational strength.

ical reform process was under way in the Diet when bin scandal broke.

soon as the bud rch, the attentio

for F/Y 1993 was passed by the Diet on 31 members turned to the reform proposals

had been circulating since the pr us year. On days later the package of four bills.

tabled a joint package of six bills dealing with the same matters.

The proposals of the two sides differed on penalties to be imposed for breaches. However, the most crucial difference was on reform

of the election system itself. The LDP proposed the creation of 500 single member electorates. The opposition proposal envisaged 200 single member electorates and 300 seats to be filled by proportional

debated extensively on the ollowing the interventiQn of

eform (established by

The two proposals we use of Representatives.

the private Council for Promotion of Political

35

36

See Eugene L. Wolfe 111, 'Japan's LDP considers electoral reform', Asian Survey I, 9 (1992), 773-786. Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka also unsuccessfully

attempted to introduce single-member constituencies.

In t e ~ a t i o n ~ ~di t ion , 3- Intelligence Unit, EIU

nese Politics and the 1993 July Election: Continuity and Change 11

iet set to rise on

t their intransigent ned to move agains

The LDP leadership s ly misjudged the mood in the Diet, including amongst secti their o w n party. On 18 June Prime

vernment lost a no confidence motion by 255 votes to 220 following the defection of 39 LDP members. Hours later he called a snap general election for 18 July.

That same evening, Takemura left the L

Lower House members le forming a new party called

following day, all 43 members of the faction led by

ss Club that he would not launch a new party before the necessary electoral reforms had taken place.37

Even before these defections, the LDP had been weakened, if not in in media perceptions, by the emergence of the Japan PI, launched before the recent political upheavals by the

pular former LDP inister of Finance and Governor of mamoto Prefecture, o Wosokawa.

Although all three parties were formed ostensibly to achieve electoral reform, there is some evidence, and a good deal of informed speculation by such seasoned political c iahe and Takao T ~ s h i k a w a , ~ ~ that the LD ere, in fact, engineered by

entators as ~ i s a ~ k i

ru and who are widely perceived as t behind ructuring' of Japanese politics.

a the protege of both former rime Minister akuei Tanaka, the

37 Japan Times eMy In tema tional Edition, 24-3 0.5.199 3.

tema tional Edition, 29.3 .-4.4.19 993), and the To~onto ~ l o ~ e a

1 nese Politics: and the 1993 July Election: Continuity and C h a n p

pute over the leadership of seikai faction after his mentor

intains that his up ng made him. a reformer.

id not even need to campaign in his electorate

awa had earlier expounded supporters and journalist

ctoral reform. to a circle tly urged Hata to also

become involved in this issue. For his part, Kanemaru revealed while under detention that his hidden fortune was to be used to fund his future dream (namely, a realignment of political forces).41 Furthermore, it was he w , while seeking the passage of consumption tax measures through th iet in 1988, first floated the idea of political 'restructuring' . 42

etropolitan Assembly elections held on a pointer to the likely outcome of the confirmed that it was a forc

seats against the LDP's 44 and ssful candidates were also linked to the

as the big loser, retaining tually picked up two additional seats, although

____

39

40

41

42

43

Reform Forum 21 was established on 18 December 1992 when Tsutomu Hata split from the dominant Keiseikai faction. It formed the nucleus of the Shinseito. For an indication of its position, see the interview with Hata in 'The message of Reform Forum 21', Japan Echo 1 (1993), 40-43.

See Eto Jun, 'Why I back Ozawa Ichiro', Japan Echo hi

See Japan Tfimes Weekly International Edition,

~ n d e ~ n d e n t, 19.6.1993.

Tokyo embly elections, because of the highly centralised nature of Jap ke on an added and tend to focus on national issues. In this instance, timing lent the bly election added interest.

nese Politics and the 1993 July Election: Continuity and Change 13

s still considerab less than the it held before the

The election cam

The media and wire services (Asahi S h ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , NHK, Kyodo News Service) were unanimous in predicting that the LDP would lose its

et. However, eve ikkei poll conducted ne showed that s e LDP had dropped

and that only 21.9% of respondents planned to .1% still supported an LDP-led coalition. And ata was the most popular choice for Prime

er LDP Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu and LDP Deputy Prime ~ i ~ i s t ~ r asaharu Gotada polled well.46

The LDP fought the campaign on the theme of stable single party rule. LDP Secretary-General ama said: 'I don't think Japan's political business will der a coalition of forces with different opinions o urity and foreign relations issues', while former LDP Foreign ter Michio Watanabe predicted that, in the event of an opposition victo , Japan would resemble Italy: 'The Cabinet will be changing all the time, the economy will be in disarray,

44 Analysis of voting patterns following the Lockheed scandal in 1976 showed that the main effect was on swin ng voters, not on the party faithful. The LDP share of the vote dropped to 42% in 1976, but had recovered to 45% in the 1979 House of Representatives election and averaged 47.3% in the four subsequent elections. See Shinsaku Kohei, Ichiro Miyake and Joji Watanuki, 'Issues and voting behavior', in Flanagan et al, The Japanese V o t q pp. 293-294 and Scott C. Flanagan, 'Media influences and voting behavior', in Flanagan et al, The Japanese Voter, pp. 326-327. The changes in attitude which are now evident suggest that there may be greater volatility in future.

uoted in the Agq 20.7.1993.

46 n Times Weekly In terna tional Edition, 5- 1 1.7.1 993, ucted at the same ti

s ~ ~ ~ o ~ i n g the LD?; see

~ h ~ ~ b u n poll f respondents

14: J a ~ n ~ Politics and the 1993 July E l ~ t i o n : ~ontinuity and Chan

or the op~osition parti

There was no united platform before the election because the coalition rmed afterwards. However, each of the parties did issue

campaign pledges which tended to be rather vague, as is usual in Japanese elections where issues often have little influence on voting beha~iour .~ ' The J P's platform was perhaps the most detailed, covering the followi

political ethics, political reform international contribution cons ti tu t ion diplomacy, defence economy, tax system agriculture policy environment e ducat ion, welfare

but even it was only specific as made to cost any of the

in a couple of instances, and no attempt proposed measures [see Appendix CIe5O

47

48

49

50

See Japan Times Weeklylntemational Edition, 12-18.7.1993; 15.7.1993.

SDPJ Chairman Sadao Yamahana, cited in Japan apinZes Edition, 12- 18.7.1 993.

kly In tema tional

See Shinsaku Kohei, Ichiro iyake and Joji behavior', in Flanagan et al, The Japanese Voter, pp. 267-296. The JABIS (1976 Japanese Election Study) found that only 'cultural politics issues' (role of Emperor, role of Japan Defense Force, right to strike) displayed fairly strong correlations with voting intentions.

tanuki, 'Issues and voti

ew Party Policy Division, 'Japan arty Policy Update Brief, 1993.

and the 1993 July Election: C ~ n t i ~ u i t y and Change 15

consumption tax was

io

VJhen the votes were counted it was o vious that, althou no longer had a majority in the of Representatives (it did not

1983 elections eith of the popular vote and the

. The fall of 11% in it rnance a t the previous election on 18

February 1990, along with the votes obtained by parties with their origins in departures from the LDP, suggested that Japanese voters

split in the LDP.' and the Japan

positions. As predicted by the polls, the big loser was t lost almost half its seats, while the big winner was the lost by both. the L P and SDPJ were evenly distributed throughout the country, altho the LDP's worst losses were in Hyogo [south Honshu], those of the SDPJ in

51

52

53

54

For a summary of the various positions, from a survey in the Nikkei Weeklv, 19.7.1993, see Appendix D.

Prime Minister Hosokawa recently expressed the view that the 'economy (was) on the verge of falling back ... due to the yen's recent sharp rise and the unusually cool summer'. See FBIS-E -93-171, 7.9.1993, 12.

The LDP ended up with only four seats less than before the election (after the defections), in a House where the to number of seats was reduced by one.

AsahiEveningNews; 19.7.1993,3. The LDP lost 2 seats in each of the following electorates: Chiba 1, Nagano 2, Aichi 1, Hyogo 1 and 3, Wakayama 2 and

. Overall, it gained 11 new seats. The SDPJ lost 2 seats in Iwate 1, Fukushima 1 and 2, Chiba 4, Tokyo 4, Tokushima and gained one new seat.

1 Japanese ~ o l i t i ~ and the 1993 July Election: Con tin uity and Chan,q

f course, the el 1 system meant t arate numbers e to be elected in different

r of votes received by a successful candidate was 34 782 in 1 electorate, w ile the Japan ~ o m m u n i ~ t P rty candidate kaido 1 polled 12 643 votes, but

ere required fo The smallest

seventh in the six-se . In the major cities, s were unsucc

election defeat, the L et Ministers called o by a group of younger hi Ota. Japan's media u

ct a new leader without factional influence. On awa accepted responsibility for the defe

P Chairman. The reformers eventually swung the previous Chief Cabinet Secretary, Uohei

hine backed former Foreign Minister and O ~ O ' S success in the ballot. Club, which defected from 1. Together with former intaro Ishihara, author of ('The Japan that can say

no'), Kono was one of the so-called 'Three Arrows' chosen to present a new reform-oriented image of the party during the election campaign.

55 Other prominent women to be elected were Makiko Tanaka, daughter of former (Niigata 3), TV news presenter Yuriko

nted Vice-Minister for Management and ndependent Sanae Takaichi (Nara), who captured the public

imagination with her unsuccessful pper House campaign last year. Of the 955 candidates, only 70 were wornen ( from the LDP and 68 from the opposition parties). Overall, 14 women were elected to the House of Representatives, a somewhat higher figure than in the recent past, although the number in the Upper House is greater (currently 37).

ister Kakuei Tana

6 he son of one of the founders of the Japan Liberal Party, from which

Japanese Politics and the 1993 July Election: C~ntinuity and Change 17

t

t ditch effort to delay the handover of th government in t Diet. demanded the right to appoint the peaker in accordance with

entary convention. The LDP's n Secretary-General, Uoshiro so pressed for an extension of the planned 10-day Diet session

to enable economic issues to be debated (an area in which the party

As the lar est party by far,

had overwhelming expertise). coalition,58

Both moves were opposed by the

The coalition partners, me nwhile, u n a n i ~ o u s l y settled o Chairman Morihiro Hosoka

preferred by the SDPJ and Hosokawa was also due to initial uncertainty about a possible link between the JNP, Sakigake and LD and his often-expressed preference to 'produce the play' (that is, direct efforts from behind the scenes). In the event, he was chosen as leader on 6 August by the secretaries-general of the coalition, in a procedure reminiscent of the 'pre-reform' LDP and scathingly attacked by new LDP Secretary- General K O ~ O . ~ ~

as their choice fo inister, a l t h o u ~ h the more experienc

kawa is directly desc ed from a long line of feudal from Higo (now amoto prefecture) [central

hu]. His maternal andfather, Prince Fumimaro

57 The JCP, of course, has always been 'anti-LDP,' but is opposed to joining any coalition.

58 FBI 3-149, 5.8.1993,

5

18 Japanese Politics and the 1993 July Election: ntinuity and Change

inet is a mixture of seasoned ca ntains none of the ine~perienc

with him. The three senior ini is tries of Finance, Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Defense gency, as well as the poten~ially crucial Ministry of Agriculture all went to former

although only the new Deputy Prim r, Tsutornu H ce Minister is a former senior public

he Minister for International Trade and ister for Finance,

ffairs -- the areas red the election -- as well as the 'ca and Transport, have been entrusted to the

can perhaps be seen as a shrewd move, intended to lock the SDPJ into the coalition.63 Three members of the cabinet are women, one of whom, Manae Kubota, is head of the influential

ough Hosokawa's choice of former ntre head, Yoko

blocked. Two members have been appointed from the private sector (Justice and Education) e

60 It was the first Konoe Cabinet which was responsible for the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, including the 'rape of Nanjing', although the Prime Minister himself sought to avoid war with the United States. See Le Monde Selection Hebdomadaire, 12.8.1993.

61 Independent, 29.6.1993, 10.

62 Prime Minister Hosokaw had apparently originally preferred Sony Corporation Chairman Akio Morita as Foreign Minister. See FBIS-EM-93-148, 4.8.1993, 5. Full lists of both Ministers and Vice-Ministers, indicating party affiliation, are given in Appendices F and 6.

63 It may also provide a convenient scapegoat in the event that political reform moves fail to live up to expectations.

1

of the coalition artners released on 29 July

Pass sweeping political reforms through the Diet by the end of the year introducing a single-seat [Le., single member] electoral system, strengthening punishment for corruption, and abolishing political donations by business concerns.

Make public Japan's wish to play a key role in securing peace and disarmament in the worl by preserving Japan's existing basic policies on diplomacy and defence.

ase economic policies on market-oriented forces and maintain coordination with forei taking r~sp~ns ib i l i ty for securing strict safety eo

64

65

66

Thi ents of both Rsiaweek and the ist, as well as other experienced commentators. It is also supported by the public demand for his latest book. See Asiaweek, 14.7.1993, 34-43; Economist, 11.9.1993, 23-24; Far Eastern Economic Review, 19.8.1993, 12; Asahai E v e n i n g ~ e w ~ 10-11.7.1993, 29.7.19~3.

xample, the view of the Tokyo co

In view of the importance of the transport industry and land in the 'iron triangle' of industry, bureaucracy and gov rnment, it may also be signi Shinseito V i ~ - ~ n i s ~ ~ have bee appointed to the Transport a

ncy portfolios (which have SDPJ Minis te~) .

Apart from the views contained in the book itself, Ozawa's ideas are also discussed in Ozawa Ichiro, 'My 1 (1993), 8-12 and AsahiEveni reported that there had bee

t to political reform', Japan Echo -11.7.1993. The publisher, Kodan

sales of more than 500,000 copies of the book in the first two -93-167, 31.8.1993, 8-9.

Japanese July ~ l ~ t ~ o n : Continuity and

d and cultural society and to serio

solving international economic friction e and pension measures to cope

and fisheries, as well as small and

cooperating in preserving the contributing to U.N.-led peace reforming the educational system by putting emphasis on the person and independence promoting measures to counter city worker problems such as housing, commuting and long working hours.

bal environment

The coalition government also agreed on the following basic policies:

to play a key role in securing world peac and disarmament by preserving Japan's existing basic policies on iplomacy and defence.

to maintain the Japan-U to peace and stability in

ecurity Treaty, thereby contributin

to secure safety in nuclear power generation an developing new energy sources.

to observe the Japan- orea Basic Treaty and cooperate for peaceful reunification of the Korean

these issues are cisely what infl

he coming months it will be revealed zawa has over the new government.

tics and the 1993 July ~ lec t iQn: CQn~inui ty and C h a n p 231

oskawa in his maiden speech to utions to the coun

due to a lack of appreciation nature of Japanls internal and e ternal economic situation, but rather to intra-coalition differences over the right approach and opposition by

of Finance to any income tax cuts.I1 However, he did ckle the trade surplus which is behind the rise in value

, adding, 'I intend to wor and improved market ac

inister Hosok wa is, of course, fully aware of the depressed state of the Japanese ~ o m e s t i ~ economy. He also knows that Japan's continuing prosperity depends on functioning multilateral trade arrangements. However, the current economic depression is also partly of Japan's making. For years Japan was able to rninirnise spending on defence (at least as a percentage of GNP) because of the

uclear umbrella, a situation criticised as being a 'free erican commentators. Simultaneously, it has amassed

e order of $125 billion which began with the

ith the rest of the world of ppreciation against the $

69 In the days after the election before the new Government took office, itehall) succeeded in having several controversial

outgoing LDP Cabinet, including approval of the e paper, approval of senior public service appointments and

retirements, new phone charges and agreement on the need for fiscal restraint.

70 SeeFBIS-E -93-175, 13.9.1993, 7.

'71 See, for example, ~ c Q n o ~ i s ~

939

l?olitics and the 19 July Election: Con tin uity and Change

ce is aimed a

made up in other ways), coupled with rate (likely to be opposed by some coalition partners).74

in the consumption t

The disparate coalition which now govern together by a single policy -- electoral

''Zy5 This was a1 o recently conceded by Chief Cabinet the public is far more interested in moves to stamp out and economic changes than in reform of the election system

sayoshi Takernur

Matters such as economic reform ar probably more urgent and important to citizens. But politi reform is essential if the country is to

domestic and international challenges it faces.76

ot only have some of the lon personal rivalries (for example, mist zawa) the potential to split the coalition, but decisions on a single candidate for each electorate and a unified party list after electoral reform will pose a further test. Political commentators are widely predicting that the lack of more common views on the issues the Government must tackle will lead to indecision (except perhaps on the political reform process, although already

-93-175,13.9.1993, Broadcasting Corporation, Summ FED797 S1/1-4; Sydney Morning measures, see FBIS-E -93-167, 31.8.1993, 12-13.

20.9.1993, 1.

75 A recent Kyodo News Service poll showed that only 19.4% of respondents were interested in this issue, whereas 54.5% were concerned about the elimination of corruption in politics, 30.1% wanted the social security system to be improved and 29.9% s o u ~ h t an economic stimulus. FBIS-E

kkei

Politics and the f cti~n: Con ti^ uity

exchange took place:

You mean that even fter electoral sy d, you will aim at

osokawa] I have not thought th

, on the other h nd, will very like close ranks around ono, its new, young (and also charismatic) reformist leader. In the

election, which political next year after passage

well be able again to present a united front. Already the signalled that it will make thi Gov example, questi the omeito and DS have opposed a joint electorateflist system as not reflecting 'the will of the people'.'' The coalition is committed to achieving passa electoral reform measures by the end of 1993, before administrative reform. ince the Chief Cabinet ecretary has already indicated that the Gov nment will tackle one ssue at a time, and given the differences in the coalition on the desirable amount of proportional represen ion to be introduced and on political donations, it will be v hard to adhere to this timetable with the LDP constantly t shift the debate to economic problems.

-93-154, 12.8.1993, 5. The two parties support a 300:ZOO split of electorate and proportional representation seats, while the rest of the coalition favours a 250:250 split.

78 i ~ v e n i n ~ ~ e w ~ 31.7.1993.

79 FBI -93-153~ 11.8.1993,

$0

4 ~ a ~ n ~ ~ ~ o l i July Election: Con tin uity

under new election

There are some ernergin areas of foreign policy which have the potenti to affect ~ u ~ t r a 1 i ~ ' s n

uring' was born out of the work a Chosakai) on Japan's role in as instrurnental in securing of a bill enabling the ti on^.^^ This opened up a nese Constitution: widescale debate on Artic

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based nd order, the Japanese people forever

renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding sea, and air forces, as well as

r be ~a in t a ined . The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

81

82

3

Economi.s;t; 11 9.1993, 23-24; FB Keigo Quchi, has also proposed coalition continued. See FBIS-E 76, 14.9.1993, 7.

-93-176, 14.9.1993, 7. DSP Chairman, new party be formed rather than the

Far Eastern Economic Review, 19.8.1993, 12. Ozawa has establishment of the coalition was 'not the final stage', but a step system based on two major parties. See FBIS-E -93-166, 30.8.1993, 8.

An earlier attempt to create a Peacekeeping Corps separate from the SDF was unsuccessful. On this issue, ge, 'Japan's participati

or predictable respons hihiko, 'Concluding the

~ o l i t i ~ and the 1 nti~~ity and Changzz 5

ity an

Japan be granted a permanent seat o currently serving a term as a no

inister ~ o s o k a w a has already indicated that, while he would welcome such a role for apan, his government will not make 'positive moves' to achieve this?

Both within the Mini try of Foreign Affairs is divided on the three issues of a perman ecurity Council involvement in UN peaceke operations, and an incr contribution to the UN budget. eets 12.45% of the UN

P, this is not re n of an expande ts allowed under last positions held by the he DSP Chairman

has called for an t when it comes up steadfastly resisted

PJ and to prevent a serious rift over this issue in the

d the coalition, opinion

t, but since contributions are 1 tal difference.

g role beyond the non ational Peace Cooper

expansion of the acti for review in 1994.

coalition, the Government has refused a parti~ipation in the I ran-~uwai t Observer

request for Japanese

rian G. Martin, The United tions Peace-Keeping Cooperation Law: a Turning Point for Japan? Issues Brief No 10 (Canberra: Parliamentary b e a r c h Service, 1992).

85 The present Co~ t i tu t ion was drafted in English in 10 days in February 1946 by the Government Section of the SCAP GHQ. As far back as 1954, the Japan Liberal Party drafted a revised constitution. Revision of the Constitution has since been considered at length by the Commission on the Constitution and the LDP's Policy Research Co ra, 'Ering Article 89 into line with reality', Japan Echo

-93-153, 11.8.1993,

tics and the 1993 July Election: Continuity and Chan

It is also the second lar

ernment is unlike alter Japanese-Au

to take any initiatives whic alian relations, even if only because

has repeatedly stated its policy of adhering to existing p owever, the fact that Japan is the most important ma

Australian a ~ i c u l t u r a l exports, accounting for some 20% by value, and possesses a highly protected agricultural sector, means that Australia

an even more important market for Australian minerals and energy exports .

rly affected by changes to this regime. Of course, J a

The cool summer this year, which has resulted in a signifi ks like forcing the Government to resort to trading import quota system.89 This is not

only likely to lead Japan to import a t least 500 000 tonnes of rice for the first time since 1984,90 but will also probably accelerate Japanese concessions in the Uruguay ound. Although this deve

by the Govern above) supports opening the rice market, Australian

look set to benefit. The Food Agency has indicated that

n t and, in fact, only the

88 For further i n f o ~ a t i o n on the relationship, see Tatsuo Akaneya, The Development of Postwar Japan-Australia tions and the Impact o f Declining Arnen'can Hepmony, Pacific Economic Papers No. 153 (Canberra: Australia- Japan Research Centre, Australian National University, 1987) -

89 For a discussion of Japanese food security policy, see Japanese Agricultural Policies: an O v e ~ ' e w , Bureau of A ~ c u l t u r ~ Economics Occasional Paper 98

stralian Government Publishing Service, 1987). Rice marketing is still subject to the 1942 Food Control Law.

,1993, 1. Of course, any re1 ently opposed by the fa

ation of the exisiting policy lobby, but also by all the

Japanese Politics and the 1993 July Election: Con tin uity and Change 7

of its requirements for

can contribute much to reinforcin the GATT system, which regional economic integration with

ts and rising economic friction between

Further,

sia through APEC, in building its foundation on the region's ars not to be taking an TA.92

nerated economic zone, tion unlike the EC and

These views were lso echoed in a speech by azut os hi Hasegawa, bassador to Australia, when he warned of the dangers of

regional bloc, inconsistent with the aims of GATT and investment interests of third countries'. , was an 'exemplary model of openly engaged

nomic cooperation'. For the same reason, Japan welcomed AFTA proposal.g3 Prime inister Hosokawa also

inister for Trade, of Japan's intention to work through APEC to achieve regional cooperation, a stance welcomed by the Australian Government.'*

enator Peter Cook,

91

92

93

94

Financial Review, 30.9.1993, 1; Sydney Morning Herald, 27.9.1993, 14.

Masatoshi Inouchi and Takashi Terada, A. Multilateral Free Trade Stake: the Challenp of APEC and the Roles of Japan. Working Paper Series 93- 12 (Sydney: Centre for Japanese Economic Studies, Macquarie University, 1993), p. 1.

Kazutoshi Hasegawa, A Prospect of Cooperation between Japan and Australia. Occasional Paper No. 1 (Sydney: Centre for Japanese Economic Studies, Macquarie University, 1992), pp. 18-20.

Mini~ter for Trade, 'Cook meets new Japanese Prime Minister', MT 73, 22 September 1993; ~epa r tmen t of Foreign Affai ' ~ o v ~ ~ m e n t Response to the &port of the Se

Trade on Japan's te Standing Committee on efence and Security in the

8 Ja ion^ Con tin uity

conservative politicians who, until recently, were active

likely b e t ~ e e n the public

the bureau~rats and policy committees ( ~ o k u ) ? ~ Real power in Japan conti

to reside with the Administra inisters (Departm ~ecretaries) of such key ~ in i§ t r i e s , and ~nternational Trade

s this formidable, professional cr of nee, which brought about the do

vernment in 1947 when it refused money for the budget.

more long-term importance i bate actually i

e debate about Japan's post-Col ted by the LDP when it w

power -- although it is also part of a wider intellectual current in le there is an undoubted st also economic and even cu Gormack has pointed out

(kokusaika) policy w ernment has been pursuing since the early

Japanese identity as it is d while it is increasingly apparent that a far-reachin

'restructuring' of Japan's place in the world is occurring, the success o r otherwise of this venture will depend on how the other half of the debate, namely, the internal challenge to the Japanese identity, develops.

Japan's destiny, at least from a trading point of view, undoubtedly lies in closer ties with the Asian mainland and the emerging

95 though such poli committees were a particular feature of the LDP, they also existed in the SDPJ, and will no doubt emerge in the parties which split from the LDP.

96 See Eugene B r o m , 'The debate over Japan's strategic future. Bilateralism versus regionalism', Asian 11, 6 (1993), 543-559.

van ~ c C o ~ a c ~ , ' usailia: ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ n ~ in the Conference p, Sai l and Plough:

n Japanese Identity', Canberra, r 1993.

2

ire to 'alleviate trade

ndicated, the economic bit as difficult as those

sed domestic savings and improvement in its international comp e t it iveness. lo*

ether this chan ed emphasis ill also manifest itself in political, strategic and cultural realignment^ is harder to predict.

e has been change at all. Eve nough to see the electoral

the probable consequences will be important. A which two more or less equal parties, albeit both

conservative, command popular support and where intra-party rivalries ut at the ballot box, may see greater emphasis being ting policies. Changed voting procedures and public

funding of election campaigns may also severely curtail Japan's 'money politics.'

98 For a discussion of this point from an economic perspective, see Asian Street Journal, 6.7.1993,

99 FBIS-E~-93-164, 26.8.1993, 4.

Ken Wang, 'Recent Japanese econorn China. Political nt in a changing world order', Asian S (1993), 625,

the start of the

kage is not all that

one hand, and

o give some ground on the issues of political donations and disclosure rules. It is unlikely to compro~ise on the more fundamental issues of electoral system, voting method and basis of proportional representation [see Apppendlx HI.

I t is only then that the real 'restructuring' of Japan will begin.

conse~at ive ruling

main opposit io~ p

ish name changed from ocialist Party 19

hinseito (Japan reform conserva party split from

omeito (Clean ~ o v e r n m e n t arty) political a

Gakkai

J reform conservative party split from LDP 199

JC apan Communist old style communists

supported by right-win

reform conserva party split from 1993

oeial Democrat centrist reform party

rade Union backed party ~ ~ e ~ b ~ r s h i p

te: is list omits some ouse of Councillors

QTO II-A

SKIMA

ISI IIK

AICHI

T O Y A ~ A

IBA

8

.

to

to

I 1 . i

iii>

es

cti

E

USDP S

S

Total:

EAT

3,17$,949 (4.8%)

(1.4%) 0 (7.3%)

arties standing at the two elections iffered, which explains the high 'Other parties' figure in 1980.

lower total vote in 7,28%, a post-war lo

is e~plained by the voter turnout

3 1 3

13 0 4 0 0 30

11 1

Last Election

re- lection

osts and Telecommunications Defence Agency

Agency Science and Technolo atsuki Eda (USDP)

ternational Trade and Industry

osts and Telecommunications

nagement and Coordination aido Development

ence and Technolo

awa Development

Eisei Ito (DSP)

lectoral system

oting method

asis of proportional representation

Corporate political donations

isclosure rules

50 seats chosen by pr.

otal:

two ballots - for (a) electorate candidate, (b) party list

nationwide list

total)

both electorate candidate and

and support groups

groups per politician

to parties to

time

disclosure ceiling

annually to parties

disclosure ceiling at Y 50,000 for parties and

billion

urce: ei