john carey the reelection debate in latin america

7/29/2019 John Carey the Reelection Debate in Latin America

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The Reelection Debate in Latin AmericaAuthor(s): John M. Carey

Reviewed work(s):Source: Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Spring, 2003), pp. 119-133Published by: Distributed by Wiley on behalf of the Center for Latin American Studies at the Universityof Miami

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Policy IssuesThe Reelection Debate in Latin America

John M.CareyABSTRACT

The debate over presidential eelectionreappearedn LatinAmer-ica in the lastdecade,andpromises o continue n theyearsahead.Argumentsnfavorcontendthat hepossibilityof immediate eelec-tion increasespoliticians'responsivenessto citizen demandsandallowsvotersthe freedom o retainpopular ncumbents.Argumentsagainstemphasizethe dangerof abuse of power by incumbentswho seek to prolongtheir tenure. This article llustrates he paral-lels between these arguments nd those madehistorically egardingthe issue. It also suggests that the means by which provisionstoallow reelection are adoptedcan providevaluablesignalsof theirconsequences.n each of three recent years, Latin America witnessed a politicalupheaval prominently involving presidential reelection. In 1999,

newly elected Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez convoked a con-stituent assembly that declared itself sovereign, displaced the sittingcongress, and drafted a new charter of government that extended thepresidential term from five to six years and allowed for consecutivereelection. In July 2000, President Chavez stood for reelection andrenewed his mandate, opening the possibility that he could govern foralmost 14 consecutive years if he is able to win again in 2006. In 2000,Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori stood for a third consecutive termand won a disputed contest, only to be subsequently unseated by a cor-ruption scandal sufficiently fantastic as to defy brief description, but suf-ficiently compelling and familiar that a summary here is unnecessary.The question of reelection also played a small but significant part inArgentina in December 2001. The Argentine Congress appointed SanLuisProvince governor Adolfo Rodriguez Saa as temporary replacementfor President Fernando de la Rua, who was resigning, on the under-standing that interim elections for a successor would be held in a fewmonths. Rodriguez, however, immediately began to alienate supportersand skeptics alike with a series of announcements-of cabinet appoint-ments to figures widely regarded as corrupt, of dubious monetary policydevices, and of his intention to stand as a candidate in the planned pres-idential elections. This last step helped induce Peronist copartisans to

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LATINAMERICAN OLITICSAND SOCIETY

abandon Rodriguez; they had selected him on the understanding that hewould not use the office as a platform from which to launch a presi-dential candidacy. Bereft of political and popular support, Rodriguezresigned a week later.Reelection was a footnote to the Argentine fiasco, but it wasabsolutely central to the regime crises in both Peru and Venezuela. Fuji-mori's bid for a third term was widely denounced inside and outsidePeru as a blatant usurpation of authority. Chavez's actions have raisedsimilar concerns about concentration of power and personalization ofthe presidency.Is presidential reelection a problem? These nearly simultaneousevents lend urgency to the question. Constitutional reforms just a fewyears earlier allowing reelection in Argentina (under standard, constitu-tional procedures for presidential succession) and Brazil suggest itsbroader relevance. This essay reviews the historical context in whichrestrictions on presidential reelection were first widely adopted, alongwith the recent wave of changes in these rules, and concludes by eval-uating the arguments both for and against reelection.

THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF"NO REE.ECTION"Concerns about presidential perpetuation in office are as old as presi-dentialism itself; they followed naturally from the preoccupation amongthe founders of America's many republics with maintaining political sta-bility in the absence of monarchy.In Philadelphia in 1787, delegates to the U.S. constitutional con-vention considered limiting presidents to a single six- or seven-yearterm (Madison 1787 [1966], 322-29, 356-61). The idea attracted sub-stantial support but criticism as well, most thoroughly articulated byAlexander Hamilton in Federalist 72 with a series of arguments stillechoing through present-day debates over presidential term limits.Hamilton elaborates the rationale behind the combination of a four-yearpresidential term and reelegibility for election.

Thefirst s necessaryto give the officerhimselfthe inclinationandthe resolution o act his partwell, and to the community ime andleisure o observethetendencyof hismeasures,and thenceto forman experimentalestimateof theirmerits.The last is necessarytoenablethepeople, when theysee reasonto approveof hisconduct,to continuehim in the station n orderto prolongthe utilityof histalentsandvirtues. Hamilton1789[1961],436)

Hamilton argued, in addition, against enshrining in the Constitutiona prohibition on returning successful and popular presidents to office,

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on the grounds both that this would impinge on voters' freedom andthat it would prevent stability in the executive branch. Given Hamilton'sinitial support for a monarchy-the most stable executive imaginable, inhis mind-his appeals to democratic principles with regard to presi-dential selection may have been somewhat disingenuous. They did, atany rate, carry the day.

Although the Constitution provided for a renewable presidency,however, those distrustfulof executive authority continued to advocatean informal norm that no president should serve more than two terms,citing as precedent George Washington's refusal to stand for reelectionin 1796. No incumbent challenged this informal rule until FranklinDelano Roosevelt ran for, and won, a third term in 1940, and then afourth in 1944, in the midst of World WarII. The U.S. Constitution wassubsequently amended in 1951 to prohibit any subsequent presidentserving more than two terms. The main rationale was to prevent the per-sonalization of the executive branch through its prolonged occupationby any individual.The idea of /No reeleccionismo! was emblazoned on LatinAmerica'spolitical consciousness most famously as the rallying cry of FranciscoMadero's campaign in 1910 to unseat Porfirio Diaz after 34 years inwhich Diaz dominated the Mexican executive. Controversy over presi-dential continuismo and over constitutional restrictions on reelection,however, has historical roots that go far deeper. Diaz's own campaignslogan as he challenged Benito Juarez in 1871 was "Effectivesuffrageand no reelection." Furtherback still, at the birth of the LatinAmericanrepublics, there were advocates both of limiting presidential terms andof extending them. Sim6n Bolivar enthusiastically endorsed both posi-tions at different times. Delivering a constitutional plan to the Venezue-lan Congress in 1819, he wrote,

Nothing s moreperilous hanto permitone citizento retainpowerfor an extendedperiod.The people become accustomed o obey-inghim,and he forms hehabitof commandinghem;herein ie theoriginsof usurpation ndtyranny.... Ourcitizensmustwithgoodreason earn o fear estthemagistratewho hasgovernedthemlongwill governthemforever. Quotedin Bierck1951,175)Seven years later,however, in delivering a constitutional plan to the Con-gress of the Republic of Bolivia, his position had changed completely.

ThePresident f the Republic,n ourConstitution,ecomesthe sunwhich, fixed in its orbit, mparts ife to the universe.Thissupremeauthoritymustbe perpetual, or in non-hierarchicalystems,morethan in others,a fixedpointis needed aboutwhichleadersand citi-zens,menandaffairs anrevolve. .. ForBolivia, hispoint s thelife-timepresidency presidenciaitalicia].Quoted n Bierck1951,598)

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The change in Bolivar's position with respect to presidential per-petuation was part of a broader change in his theory of constitutionaldesign. Whereas initially, for Venezuela, he advocated a concentrationof power in the executive and short terms, his presidencia vitalicia forBolivia was endowed with limited constitutional authority. As Bolivarput it, "his hands have been tied so that he can do no harm," on thepremise that constitutional limitations on presidential power could guar-antee stability while preventing tyranny (Bierck 1951, 599).In practice, Latin American prohibitions on presidential reelectionappear to have been motivated both by theory and by experiences ofindividual politicians who endeavored to entrench themselves inpower.1 All countries adopted prohibitions on immediate reelectionduring the nineteenth century, in most cases early in their national his-tories. Summoning the recent memories of Juan Manuel de Rosas's rulein Argentina during the 1830s and 1840s, Juan Bautista Alberdi suc-cessfully endorsed a ban on consecutive reelection in the 1853 charteras follows:

To allow reelection is to extend to twelve years the presidentialterm.Thepresidentalwayshasthe meansto securehis own reelec-tion, and only rarelywould refrain romdoing so. Any reelectionsows controversy,because it will be fought based upon actionstakenin the firstperiodin preparationorthe effort.(1915, 276)Peruvian constitutions prohibited reelection after independence in1822, with the brief exception of an 1826 charter, which established a

presidencia vitalicia for Bolivar himself but which lasted only 54 days.The Colombian Constitution of 1821 allowed one consecutive reelec-tion, but was replaced nine years later with a charter that prohibitedconsecutive reelection, as have all constitutions since. With the excep-tion of the period 1869-78, all Ecuadoran constitutions have bannedconsecutive reelection.Chilean presidents were allowed one consecutive reelection until1871, but not since. Costa Rica's early constitutions allowed two con-secutive terms. In 1857, however, President Juan Rafael Moraattemptedto change the rule to allow for a thirdperiod, and was ousted as a result.Both subsequent constitutions, 1869 and 1871, included prohibitions onconsecutive reelection. Cleto Gonzalez Viquez, who served two non-consecutive terms as president himself, described a fundamental distrustof continuismo among Costa Ricans by the late nineteenth century(Gonzalez Viquez 1958).The first republican constitution of Brazil, promulgated in 1891,replaced the emperor with a president as head of state and banned con-secutive reelection. In his account of the constituent assembly, Rui Bar-bosa, the constitution's principal intellectual author, reflected on the

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examples of two contemporary republics, France and the UnitedStates-neither of which imposed formal restrictions at the time-andthe relevance of their precedent for Brazil. Anticipating arguments byJuan Linz 60 years later in his rationale for deviating from the Frenchexample, Barbosa reasoned that parliamentarism would ensure theselection of executives only from among those with long and honorablepolitical careers-a model not relevant to Brazil's presidential system.With respect to the United States, Barbosa (1933, 161-65) cited theunwritten norm limiting presidential tenure, which he ascribed toGeorge Washington and believed was inviolable. On these grounds,then, Brazil's no reelection rule was regarded as consistent with thetheory that presidential power must be checked.CONTINUISMO AND REACTION IN THETWENT1IEH CENTURYAlthough constitutional restrictions on reelection were common, so alsowere efforts to avoid or overturn them. Juan Rafael Iglesias managed tosuspend the Costa Rican restrictions and win a second term in 1897. Inthe twentieth century, a number of South American presidents who roseto power on combinations of popular and military support disdainedconstitutional obstacles to their continued rule.

Augusto Leguia forced through amendments to the Peruvian Consti-tution that allowed his reelection to second and then third consecutiveterms in the 1920s. GetuflioVargaspursued a similar strategy in estab-lishing his Estado Novo in Brazil in the 1930s. In Bolivia, Victor PazEstenssoro attempted to prolong his 1960-64 presidency, securing a con-stitutional amendment to allow consecutive reelection from a congressdominated by his Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR),then win-ning the 1964 election. Splits in the MNR,however-most notably oppo-sition to Paz Estenssoro among organized labor-forced the president torely increasingly on the military to support his administration. Within afew months of his reelection, the generals dispensed with the civilianexecutive altogether, removing Paz Estenssoro in a coup.Restrictions on reelection were also abolished during the first pres-idency of Juan Domingo Per6n in Argentina. As late as 1948, Per6n him-self argued against presidential reelection as follows:Although t maywell be thateverythingdepends on men, historyshows us that they are not always evenhanded or honorable injudging heirown meritsandtaking ntoconsiderationhe commongood, subordinatinghis to personalor factional nterests.To mymind, reelection would be an enormous danger to the politicalfutureof the republicand a threat o publicservice.(CongresodeArgentina 948,17)

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By the next year, however, the president had evidently changed hismind; and he convened a constituent assembly that established reelec-tion without restrictions. His party's Consejo Superior appealed to thedemocratic principle of maximizing voter choice, arguing, "the prohibi-tion on reelection presents an offense to the Argentine citizen. ... It isas equally undemocratic to require a voter to vote for an unwantedchoice as to prevent a vote for the desired option" (Serrafero1997, 123).Peronist leaders in the assembly invoked Argentina'sparticularhistoricalcircumstances, which, they argued, required Per6n to continue in office.If the fortuneof thisArgentine nterprisedependson the constitu-tional possibilitythat General Per6n is reelected presidentof therepublicby the freevote of its citizens,thenwe shouldremovetheconstitutionalmpedimentthat is consistent with neitherpoliticalwisdom nor the historical ircumstancen which the country indsitself.(Sampay1949,289)

In all the cases reviewed here, disillusionment with the performanceof these presidencies and the upheaval with which they ended fueled areaction against continuismo and the reestablishment of constitutionalprohibitions on reelection. Meanwhile, the success of the PRI regimeand the Constitution of 1917 in bringing stability to Mexican politicswhile tempering personalism served as an endorsement for strong pro-hibitions on presidential reelection.Constitutional restrictions, then, were common throughout LatinAmerica from early on, although they were enforced with varyingdegrees of success. By the middle of the twentieth century, however, theprinciple of restricting reelection had gained widespread currencyand-during periods of civilian rule, at least-had become the norm inmost of LatinAmerica.

OPENINGANDORA'SOX?As the twentieth century drew to an end, the tide appeared to be turn-ing once more in favor of incumbent presidents. Longstanding prohibi-tions on immediate reelection were overturned in Peru (1993),Argentina (1994), Brazil (1996), and Venezuela (1999). Both the reformsand their chief proponents enjoyed substantial popular support, at leastinitially. In all four cases, the presidents who secured the reforms weresubsequently reelected by large margins.Before rushing to conclude that we are witnessing a definitive his-torical trend, however, we should look at the broader perspective.Restrictions on reelection have been relaxed in four of LatinAmerica'slargest countries; but during the same period, the Dominican Republic,Nicaragua, and Paraguay moved in the opposite direction, placing vari-

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Table 1. Rules on Presidential Reelection, as of 2001Two TwoConsecutive Consecutive

After One After Two Terms, Terms,No Interim Interim Then No Then OneReelection Term Terms Reelection Interim TermColombia Bolivia Panama Brazil ArgentinaCosta Rica Chile Venezuela PeruGuatemala DominicanHonduras RepublicMexico EcuadorParaguay El SalvadorNicaragua

Uruguay

ous sorts of restrictions on reelection where none had previouslyexisted. In Panama, moreover, voters rejected then-president ErnestoPerez Balladares's 1998 referendum to amend the constitution and allowconsecutive reelection by a margin of almost 2 to 1.Other countries made smalleradjustments o the restrictionsassociatedwith presidentialterms,with no clear patternvisible. Colombia in 1991 dis-allowed reelection after an intervening term out of office, which had pre-viously been permitted. Panama in 1994 increased the required "sittingout" period from one to two terms. Ecuador in 1998 allowed reelectionafterone intervening term, which it previously had not permitted.In Costa Rica, nonconsecutive reelection was prohibited by consti-tutional amendment in the 1970s, after the third presidency of JoseFigueres Ferrer.In 2000, former president Oscar Arias proposed remov-ing the lifetime prohibition and allowing nonconsecutive reelectiononce again. Opinion polls showed broad popular support for the idea,but critics labeled it as self-serving, given the source. Arias, in turn,complained that prominent politicians had originally approached himwith the idea and encouraged him privately, then betrayed him once hewent public, torpedoing the prospects for the reform.As this brief review of recent reforms suggests, there has been anoverall movement toward allowing reelection, but it is far from uniform.Table 1 shows its currentstatus. The details of provisions regulating pres-idential reelection, moreover, such as whether restrictions are permanentor interim, are potentially important, and warrantserious consideration.

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THE PROMISE OF REEECTION:DEMOCRACY AND LEADERSHIPWhat does immediate reelection mean for presidencies in LatinAmer-ica? In the most straightforward sense, eliminating restrictions allowsvoters an increased measure of discretion to retain a popular incumbentin office. This is an argument that reelection enhances choice, andtherefore the quality of democracy. In his influential work on presiden-tialism, Juan Linz (1994) suggests that one of the system's central flawsis that the no reelection rule prevents the retention of a competent andpopular chief executive, should a country be fortunate enough to havefound one. The point would appear to be ratified by the resoundingreelection victories won by presidents Carlos Menem in Argentina in1995 and Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil in 1998. Even their crit-ics, moreover, must acknowledge the extent of Fujimori's support inPeru in 1995 and Chavez's in Venezuela in 2000.

An even more powerful argument in favor of reelection is that itshould improve democratic responsiveness and accountability by align-ing the incentives of incumbent presidents more closely with those ofvoters. To realize this happy outcome, voters must reward politicianswho promise and deliver popular policies, such that presidents whoaspire to reelection will be more attentive to citizens' preferences thanthose who are constitutional lame ducks. Although these premises areregarded as practically axiomatic by many political scientists (particu-larly North Americans), however, the real situation invites skepticism.Research by Susan Stokes (2001) presents the puzzle that Latin Ameri-can presidents who flagrantly violated their own campaign promiseshave subsequently been rewarded at the polls-either personally, ifreelection is allowed, or through their parties-provided that theirpolicy switches yielded strong macroeconomic performance.Another argument occasionally offered in favor of reelection is thatlame duck status weakens presidents as leaders of their parties. Thelogic here is that legislators and other politicians will be less inclined tosupport an executive whose time remaining in office is limited. Thus,allowing reelection may enhance presidential ability to construct andsustain legislative coalitions and to bargain effectively with politicians atother levels of government. It is worth keeping in mind, however, thatpresidential strength is a double-edged sword, and executive domi-nance can undermine the broader goal of enhancing democracy withinparties. For example, in the months preceding the 2000 Venezuelanelections, the prospect that Chavez could hold the presidency for 12more years bolstered his personal influence in the Movimiento QuintaRepiblica (MVR), encouraging lower-level politicians to defer to hisedicts. When Chavez announced preferences for candidates to lower

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offices that contradicted nomination decisions the MVR'sexecutive com-mittee had already made, the committee scrambled to amend its list andratifythe presidential choices (El Universal2000). In Costa Rica, by con-trast,where presidential reelection is proscribed completely, incumbentpresidents exercise far more limited control over the fates of lower-levelpoliticians, contributing to parties' greater independence from presiden-tial control (Carey 1996).In short, there are a number of strong arguments for allowing pres-idential reelection, but the relative lack of experience with reelection indemocratic regimes in LatinAmerica makes it difficult to evaluate thevalidity of those arguments against hard evidence. The relationshipsamong citizen preferences, presidential performance, electoralresponses, and party politics in LatinAmerica are complex, and we areonly just beginning to understand them.

THE RISK: MORE CONTINUISMOThe argument against presidential reelection that continues to hold themost currency is simply that presidents will abuse the powers of theexecutive branch to ensure their own perpetuation in office. Each of thecountries that banned presidential reelection during the 1990s enduredextreme cases of such continuismo earlier in its recent history-underAlfredo Stroessner in Paraguay, various Somozas in Nicaragua, andJoaquin Balaguer in the Dominican Republic. Before the abrupt collapseof Fujimori'spresidency, Peru appeared to be moving along this path,and the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the president'sremoval in November 2000 should not obscure the danger of con-tinuismo that the case represented. It is worthwhile, therefore, to reviewin somewhat greater detail the issues surrounding Fujimori'sattempt tohold on to his office.

Fujimori'svery candidacy in 2000 violated the limit of two consec-utive terms embodied in the constitution he introduced in 1993. He jus-tified his third candidacy by declaring that his first term as president(1990-95) did not count, because it began under the previous constitu-tion (which allowed no consecutive reelection at all!). When a pluralityof Peru's Constitutional Tribunal objected to Fujimori's creative inter-pretation of his own charter, the president's compliant congressionalmajorityfired the offending judges.2During the 2000 campaign, Fujimori's supporters systematicallyintimidated opposition candidates and disrupted their campaign rallies;his administration used state resources to pressure the Peruvian mediato slant their campaign coverage; and the vote count harbored irregu-larities-particularly in the first round. Had it not been for the extraor-dinary leak of videotapes that exposed his administration's attempts to

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change the outcome of the congressional election retroactively by pur-chasing a compliant majority,Fujimorimight well have retained controlof the executive for another five years.3Peru's 2000 election must serve as a warning that presidential con-tinuismo by means of intimidation and fraud has not been relegateddecisively to the past. Yet continuismo is far from inevitable. The caseof Argentina's CarlosMenem suggests that the same political bargains bywhich presidents pursue their ambitions can strengthen the checks andbalances that limit presidential abuse of power.In his initial term, 1989-95, Menem successfully stacked the Argen-tine Supreme Courtwith compliant justices, who subsequently ratified anumber of constitutionally dubious expansions of presidential power.To secure legislative support for constitutional reform allowing reelec-tion, however, Menem acquiesced to opposition demands to restore thecourt to its original size, removing many of his cronies and thus restor-ing balance. One result was that Menem's attempt to interpret the "twoconsecutive term"clause favorably, as Fujimorihad, faced multiple insti-tutional obstacles. Many politicians in Menem's own Peronist Party(Par-tido Justicialista) preferred the president's rival, Eduardo Duhalde, astheir candidate.

Emboldened by the political opposition to the president's overtures,the Supreme Courtin March1999 ruled unanimously against appeals thatwould have allowed a third consecutive Menem candidacy. The court'saction, which was supported by a congressional majorityconsisting ofpro-Duhalde Peronists and all other parties, thus deterred Menem fromopenly pursuing the Peronist nomination. In short, the bargain Menemstruck in 1994 secured his first reelection, but the longer-term effect wasto restore the potential for judicial independence from the executive, bal-ancing power more evenly among the executive, the legislature, and thecourts than it had been earlier in the decade (Jones 1997).A final observation regarding institutional design has to do not withconsecutive reelection but with the rules governing eligibility for non-consecutive reelection and the potential problem associated with "punc-tuated" eligibility. In most cases in which reelection is limited, formerpresidents must sit out one term before they are eligible to run again.This opens up the possibility that an incumbent president prohibitedfrom immediate reelection may be privately inclined to undermine hisown party's immediate electoral success. If another politician from theincumbent's own party wins control of the executive-with all the pol-icymaking and patronage powers that entails-then the outgoing presi-dent will almost certainly be eclipsed as the party's leading figure. If theincumbent's party loses the next election, however, the outgoing presi-dent may retain prominence as leader of the opposition, along with anaura as the champion capable of winning a national election.

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Punctuated eligibility therefore presents potential problems in polit-ical parties. One is the garden-variety tension between former presi-dents angling to return to office and the current administration. InVenezuela, for example, where the 1961-99 Constitution allowed reelec-tion after two interim terms, President Jaime Luscinchi's term wasmarked by a struggle between his supporters and former presidentCarlos Andres Perez over control of the Acci6n Democratica organiza-tion and the party's next presidential nomination (Coppedge 1994,102-3). More interesting, from the perspective of constitutional design,is the possibility of moral hazard between parties and incumbent presi-dents under punctuated eligibility, whereby the incumbent's incentiveswith respect to his own party's electoral success may be compromisedby ambitions to regain the presidency in the future. It was widelybelieved, for example, that Menem failed to support his party's nomi-nee, Duhalde, in 1999 partly because Menem aspired to regain controlof the Peronist Party and recapture the presidency in 2003.The problem is particularlyacute in the Peruvian and Argentine for-mats because an outgoing incumbent whose party retains the presi-dency will confront a copartisan who is eligible for reelection, too, atthe end of the required sitting-out period. The perverse incentiveswithin parties generated by punctuated eligibility suggest that if presi-dents are to be barred from reelection at all-whether after multipleterms or only one-they should be barred permanently.RE.F FCTION TO Ol'HR OFFICESThe matter of punctuated eligibility highlights the tension betweenreelection of current and former presidents and the progressive ambi-tions of other politicians. This, in turn, suggests the importance of con-sidering the presidency in the context of reelection more generally. Doprohibitions on reelection to other offices mirror those on the presi-dency? Are restrictions for other offices based on the same rationale?The answer to the first question is, for governors, generally yes; forothers, no. The empirical asymmetry implies, moreover, that the matterof reelection for chief executives is distinct, theoretically and politically,from other elected positions.When the positions are popularly elected, restrictions on subna-tional governors are common. In Mexico, state governors are constitu-tionally limited to a single six-year term, just as the president is (Article116). Venezuelan state governors are limited to two consecutive terms,as is the president, although gubernatorial terms are only four yearslong, whereas the presidency is six (Article 160). In Colombia, depart-mental governors serve three-year terms and cannot be reelected(G6mez Albarello 2001). In Brazil, state governors were, like the presi-

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dent, ineligible for reelection, until the 1997 constitutional reformallowed one consecutive reelection for each office (Article 82). InArgentina, the federal constitution does not stipulate rules; and hetero-geneity prevails across provincial charters,with many, but not all, allow-ing consecutive reelection (Eaton 2001).Prohibitions on legislative reelection are much rarer; three LatinAmerican countries currently impose constitutional limitations.Venezuela's 1999 Constitution (Article 192) allows two, or possibly three,consecutive terms.4 Mexico and Costa Rica prohibit all consecutivereelection for legislators-a provision slightly less restrictive than theirpermanent bans on presidential reelection. In both countries, however,there is discussion of relaxing or abolishing restrictions on legislativereelection, with the goal of enhancing members' expertise and strength-ening Congress as a policymaking institution in regard to the executive.

Apart from these cases, legislators are eligible for unlimited reelec-tion. Constitutional restrictions on municipal executives are rarer still.Mexico (Article 115) prohibits immediate reelection; Venezuela (Article174) limits mayors to two consecutive terms. Prohibitions are absent inother cases.Whereas presidents in every country face at least some restrictionon

reelection, restrictions on other major elected offices are more varied.Restrictions on governors-where they are elected-are common; onlegislators and mayors, they are rare.Why do we observe this particularbrand of asymmetry, but not the reverse (for example, cases in whichlegislative reelection is restrictedbut presidential is not)?The issue is notexplicitly discussed in any constitutional debates of which I am aware,but there are at least two plausible explanations-one based on princi-ple, the other on the alignment of politicians' ambitions.First, to the extent that prohibitions are necessary to guard againstmanipulation of the electoral processes, this principle is more com-pelling the greater the capacity of the office to act unilaterally and, per-haps, secretly to usurp power and perpetuate tenure in office by illicitmeans. Alternatively, even if chief executives could be expected not totamper with the electoral process, politicians fartherdown the politicalladder have every reason to support constitutionally mandated turnoverat the top, which ensures that the most sought-after offices will period-ically be available. It would be difficult to secure acquiescence amongthose who draftconstitutions to an arrangement that allows unrestrictedpresidential reelection while it compels turnover for lower posts.REAlITNG THE BoLVARIAN IDEAL?Clearly, the general contours of the debate over presidential reelectionhave remained remarkably stable over time. Arguments in favor

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emphasize a number of points. One is that the prospect of reelec-tion-and, conversely, the threat of its denial-induces politicians to beresponsive to the demands of citizens. Another is that in principle,restrictions on reelection are restrictions on voter choice, and in thatsense are antidemocratic. A third is that reelection lengthens the presi-dent's time horizon, as well as those of the other political actors withwhom the president interacts, thus mitigating the problem of ineffec-tual, lame duck executives.The most compelling counterargument continues to be, as it hasbeen since the founding of the American republics, that allowing reelec-tion invites the abuse of executive power and, ultimately, tyranny. Boli-var's argument, that long terms are unproblematic as long as the officeis weak, appears to assume away the central problem-that presidentsmay seek to expand and manipulate executive power in the pursuit ofthe presidencia vitalicia. Bolivar's basic insight suggests, nevertheless,that reforms to allow presidential reelection may be distinguishedaccording to how they are engineered.For example, when reforms are brought about by negotiationsbetween the president and political opponents, these deals tend toinvolve concessions that limit presidential power, mitigating the dangerthat presidential perpetuation will transform itself into presidentialtyranny. This is a variant of the Bolivarian ideal, and among the recentcases of presidential reelection, it is best approximated in Argentina andBrazil. To secure reforms that allowed for reelection, both Menem andCardoso had to make concessions to their opponents, the effects ofwhich ultimately limited the power of their office. In these cases, thethreat of continuismo through the subversion of democracy appears tohave been allayed, and the potential advantages of presidential reelec-tion may have been realized.

When reforms to allow reelection are brought about by plebiscite,in contrast, concessions to other political actors tend to be absent, andsubsequent constraints on presidential authority are weaker as a result.This is the antithesis of the Bolivarian ideal, in that even the Liberatoracknowledged the danger of tyranny inherent in prolonged rule by apowerful chief executive. Brazil's experience under the first Vargasregime, Argentina's under Per6n, and Peru's after Fujimori's constitu-tional reform of 1993 all conform to this model. In terms of how thereelection reform was engineered, so, too, does the case of Chavez inVenezuela. It is too early to tell whether Chavez's administration and theother institutions he has established will move along a path parallel tothose of the other plebiscitary reelected presidencies, but the initial sim-ilarities are troubling.

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NoTEsAn earlier version of this essay was published as "Reelecciones presiden-ciales: pros y contras" in Foreign Affairs en Espanol (2): 77-92, May 2001. Someof the ideas were first developed for a project of the Inter-AmericanDialogueand the book ConstructingDemocratic Governance, 2d edition, edited by JorgeI. Dominguez and Michael Shifter,to be published by Johns Hopkins UniversityPress in 2003. Thanks to the following for sharing their historical expertise on

presidential reelection in specific countries: on Brazil, Octavio Amorim Neto; onCosta Rica, Kevin Casas; on Peru, Gregory Schmidt; and also Brian Crisp,JuanGabriel Gomez Albarello, Kent Eaton, Jorge I. Dominguez, MarkJones, andKathleen O'Neill.1. Much of the specific information about constitutional prohibitions onreelection in the following section is drawn from Nohlen 1993 and Serrafero1997.2. Fujimori'smajorityin Congress had ratified language specifically approv-

ing two consecutive presidential terms under the current constitution. The Con-stitutional Tribunal voted 3-0 (but with the remaining four members abstaining)that the law was inapplicable to Fujimori.The abstentions rendered the decisiondubious. The doubts themselves were rendered moot, however, by Congress'sensuing impeachment of the antireelection judges. I thank one of the anony-mous reviewers for LAPS or clarifying the specific sequence of events here andthe legal and constitutional issues at play.

3. It is not surprising that in the wake of Fujimori'sfall, the issue of presi-dential reelection has been opened to debate once again in Peru. A reform toprohibit immediate reelection was considered in Congress in 2001, but as of Jan-uary 2002 it had yet to be ratified as a constitutional amendment. See Congresodel Peru 2001.

4. Article 192 states that deputies "maybe reelected for two periods, max-imum." This could be read to mean that two periods are the maximum periodof service allowed. The language, however, leaves open the possibility of reelec-tion to two subsequent periods after a deputy's first period.

REFERENCESAlberdi, Juan Bautista. 1915. Bases y puntos de partida para la organizaci6n

politica de la Republica Argentina. Buenos Aires: La CulturaArgentina.Barbosa, Rui. 1933. Comentarios d constituicao federal brasileira, vol. 3. SaoPaulo: LivrariaAcademica.Bierck, Harold A., Jr.,ed. 1951. Selected Writings of Bolivar. New York:ColonialPress.Carey, John M. 1996. Term Limits and Legislative Representation. New York:

Cambridge University Press.Congreso de Argentina. 1948. Diarios de sesiones de la Camarade Diputadosde la Naci6n. Buenos Aires.Congreso del Peri. 2001. Diario de los debates June 14, sesion nro. 27,Comisi6n Permanente Coppedge, Michael. 1994. Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Part-yarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela. Stanford:StanfordUniversity Press.

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Eaton, Kent. 2001. Personal communication. January 14.G6mez Albarello, Juan Gabriel. 2001. Personal communication. January 14.Gonzalez Viquez, Cleto. 1958. Personal del poder ejecutivo de Costa Rica,1821-1936. Updated by Ricardo Fernandez Peralta [1974?].SanJose.Hamilton, Alexander. 1789 [1961]. The Federalist Papers. New York:Signet.Jones, Mark P. 1997. Evaluating Argentina's Presidential Democracy. In Presi-dentialism and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Scott Mainwaring andMatthew Soberg Shugart. New York:Cambridge University Press. 259-99.Linz, Juan J. 1994. Presidentialism or Parliamentarism: Does It Make a Differ-ence? In TheFailure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America,vol. 2, ed. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela. Baltimore:Johns HopkinsUniversity Press. 3-87.Madison,James. 1787 [1966].Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1 787,ReportedbyJames Madison. Columbus: Ohio University Press.Nohlen, Dieter, ed. 1993. Enciclopedia electoral latinoamericana y del Caribe.SanJose, Costa Rica:CAPEL.Sampay, Arturo. 1949. Convenci6n nacional constituyente. Buenos Aires: Con-greso de la Naci6n.Serrafero, Mario D. 1997. Reelecci6n y sucesion presidencial: poder y con-tinuidad. Argentina, America Latina, y EE.UU Buenos Aires: Belgrano.Stokes, Susan C. 2001. Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise inLatin America. New York:Cambridge University Press.El Universal (Caracas). 2000. March6: 1-10.

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