NORKIS DISTRIBUTORS, INC. AND ALEX D. BUAT, Petitioners, vs DELFIN S. DESCALLAR,Respondent.G.R. No. 185255, March 14, 2012FACTS:Respondent Delfin S. Descallar was assigned at the Iligan City Branch of petitioner Norkis Distributors, Inc., a distributor of Yamaha motorcycles. He became a regular employee and was promoted as Branch Manager. He acted as branch administrator and had supervision and control of all the employees. Respondent was also responsible for sales and collectionIn a memorandum, petitioners required respondent to explain in writing within 48 hrs why he should not be penalized or terminated for being absent without official leave (AWOL) or rendering under-time service on certain dates. Respondent explained that he reported to the office on those dates, but he either went to the bank or followed-up on prospects. As he was still within city limits, he did not file any official leave or travel record.Norkis conducted an investigation. Finding that respondent was not able to prove that he was really in the branch or on official travel, petitioners suspended him for 15 days without pay. According to petitioners, respondent admitted during the investigation that he used company time for his personal affairs, but only for a few hours and not the whole day.While respondent was still suspended, Norkis also found that Respondent committed some inappropriate and irregular acts such as unexplained low performance of his branch, missing funds, unauthorized disbursement of funds, irregular transactions.Petitioners terminated respondents services for loss of trust and confidence and gross inefficiency. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal. LA favored respondent. Petitioners appealed to NLRC. NLRC reversed the LAs decision and found respondent to have been validly dismissed. The NLRC, however, upheld the LAs finding that petitioners are liable to respondent for unpaid wages. Respondent filed MR. It was denied so he filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. CA reinstated with modification the decision of the LA. Respondent filed a motion for clarification as to the awards of separation pay and back wages while petitioners filed MR. CA issued a Resolution stating that as regards respondents motion for clarification, the separation pay and back wages shall be reckoned from the time respondent was illegally suspended until finality of its earlier Decision. The CA likewise denied petitioners MR. Hence, petitioners filed the present petition.ISSUE:Was the failure of respondent to reach his monthly sales quota a valid basis for loss of trust and confidence?RULING:NO. Loss of trust and confidence as a ground for termination of an employee under Article 282 of the Labor Code requires that the breach of trust be willful, meaning it must be done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse. The basic premise for dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is that the employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. It is the breach of this trust that results in the employers loss of confidence in the employee.Here, there is no question that as petitioners Branch Manager in Iligan City, respondent was holding a position of trust and confidence. He was responsible for the administration of the branch, and exercised supervision and control over all the employees. He was also incharge of sales and collection.In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause and failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal. The quantum of proof required in determining the legality of an employees dismissal is only substantial evidence. CA correctly held that petitioners failed to discharge this burden.Failure to reach the monthly sales quota cannot be considered an intentional and unjustified act of respondent amounting to a willful breach of trust on his part that would call for his termination based on loss of confidence. This is not the willful breach of trust and confidence contemplated in Article 282(c) of the Labor Code. Low sales performance could be attributed to several factors which are beyond respondents control. To be a valid ground for an employees dismissal, loss of trust and confidence must be based on a willful breach. To repeat, a breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse.Petitioners having failed to establish by substantial evidence any valid ground for terminating respondents services, we uphold the finding of the Labor Arbiter and the CA that respondent was illegally dismissed.An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: back wages and reinstatement. The two reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee and the employer, separation pay is granted. The normal consequences of respondents illegal dismissal, then, are reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, and payment of back wages computed from the time compensation was withheld from him up to the date of actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service should be awarded as an alternative. The payment of separation pay is in addition to payment of back wages.The CA merely clarified the period of payment of back wages and separation pay up to the finality of its decision modifying the LAs decision. In view of the modification of monetary awards in the Labor Arbiters decision, the time frame for the payment of back wages and separation pay is accordingly modified to the finality of the CA decision.WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

PRUDENTIAL VS. MAURICIOPRUDENTIAL BANK (now Bank of the Philippine Islands), Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO S.A. MAURICIO substituted by his legal heirs, MARIA FE, VOLTAIRE, ANTONIO, JR., ANTONILO, EARL JOHN, and FRANCISCO ROBERTO all surnamed MAURICIO, Respondent. G.R. No. 183350; January 18, 2012FACTS:Respondent Mauricio was the Branch Manager of Prudential Banks Magallanes Branch in Makati City when he was dismissed from employment.Spouses Marcelo and Corazon Cruz (Spouses Cruz) opened a dollar savings account (FXSD No. 221-6) with an initial cash deposit of US$500.00, in the Banks Magallanes Branch. At that time, Mauricio was already its Branch Manager. Spouses Cruz also executed Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage over their properties in San Juan in favor of the bank.An audit investigation was conducted in the Magallanes Branch. The reports of the audit team showed that from March 1991 to August 1991, credits to FXSD No. 221-6 consisted mostly of dollar check deposits composed of U.S. Treasury Warrants (USTWs), U.S. Postal Money Orders, Travellers Express and Amexco Money Orders. Despite the fact that Spouses Cruz were not the payees of said instruments and neither of them endorsed the same, Mauricio allowed immediate withdrawals against them. Most of the proceeds of the encashments were then deposited to a peso savings account, S/A No. 3396, also in the name of the Spouses Cruz.The dollar checks were eventually returned by their drawee banks for having forged endorsements, alterations to the stated amounts, or being drawn against insufficient funds, among other reasons. Allegedly, upon receipt of the returned checks at the Magallanes Branch, Mauricio debited FXSD No. 221-6, but such debits were made against the uncollected deposits of the Spouses Cruz. Some of the returned checks and USTWs were lodged to accounts receivable because the balance of FXSD No. 221-6 was not sufficient to cover the returned checks. Simultaneously, cash withdrawals were allowed even if S/A No. 3396 did not have sufficient balance to cover the withdrawals at the time they were made.Mauricio was directed to report for work at the Head Office immediately. The Prudential Bank President issued a Memorandum to Mauricio furnishing him with a copy of the audit teams report and directing him to report in writing within 72 hours from receipt of the memorandum why the bank should not institute an action against him. The report showed that the bank was exposed to losses amounting to $774,561.58.While the investigation against Mauricio was ongoing, as conducted by a Hearing Committee, the property subject of the Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage executed by the Spouses Cruz was extrajudicially foreclosed by the Bank for. Spouses Cruz, however, sought the annulment and/or declaration of nullity of foreclosure in a complaint or civil case filed with RTC- Makati.The Bank claimed that it sent the proper demand letters to the Spouses but to no avail. Thus, it was constrained to foreclose the mortgaged property extrajudicially for the settlement of the obligations of the Spouses Cruz including the returned USTWs, checks and drafts. Later, while the investigation against Mauricio was still ongoing, the Bank filed an Amended Answer to implead Mauricio in its counterclaim in the case filed by the Spouses against the former, contending that he conspired and confederated with the Spouses Cruz to commit the fraud.The Hearing Committee of the Bank found that there was sufficient evidence to hold Mauricio guilty of the charges against him. The Board of Directors issued Resolution considering the recommendation of the Hearing Committee and the Board found Antonio S.A. Mauricio to have violated Bank policies and regulations and committed imprudent acts prejudicial to the interests of the Bank, resulting in monetary loss to the Bank and giving rise to loss of trust and confidence. The services of Mr. Mauricio was terminated and that his retirement benefits was forfeited.Mauricio filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for back wages, retirement and provident benefits, vacation and sick leave credits, and actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees. While the illegal dismissal complaint was pending, the Makati RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Spouses Cruz and Mauricio. It was affirmed by the CA and Supreme Court.On the other hand, LA rendered a Decision holding that the Bank was justified in terminating Mauricios employment. The LA ruled that even if Mauricio, as branch manager, was clothed with discretion, he gravely abused it to the detriment and prejudice of the Bank and that he was afforded procedural due process before he was dismissed. However, LA ordered the bank to pay Mauricio his 13th month pay and sick leaves earned and reimburse him his actual contributions to the provident fund, all with legal interest at 12% per annum from date of the decision until actual payment and/or finality of the decision.Mauricio filed a partial appeal of the LAs decision with the NLRC, which, however, affirmed the LAs decision. On appeal, CA set aside the NLRC decision and ruled in favor of Mauricio. Bank filed the instant petition.ISSUE:Whether the acts of Mauricio with respect to the accounts of Spouses Cruz can be considered as grounds for his termination due to loss of trust and confidence.RULING:Civil and labor cases require different quanta of proof the former requiring preponderance of evidence while the latter only calls for substantial evidence. Despite the dissimilarity, this does not spell closing our eyes to facts conclusively determined in one proceeding when the determination of the very same facts are crucial in resolving the issues in another proceeding pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata.The present labor case is closely related to the civil case that was decided with finality. In the civil case, the Banks counterclaim for actual and exemplary damages against Mauricio was grounded on his alleged violations of office policies when he allowed the encashment and/or withdrawal prior to clearing of numerous USTWs and dollar checks and allegedly tried concealing from the Bank the fact that said instruments were returned.The RTC in the civil case ruled:Further, this court finds that PRUDENTIALs branch manager MAURICIOs act of allowing SPOUSES CRUZ to immediately withdraw the instruments is well within his functions as a branch manager. A person occupying such position exercises a certain degree of discretion with respect to the accommodations extended to certain valued clients such as herein SPOUSES CRUZ. Having been recommended by the legal counsel himself of PRUDENTIAL and in view of the fact that they have substantial deposit with the same bank, it cannot be doubted that SPOUSES CRUZ were valued clients.The court also holds that MAURICIO was not in anyway prompted by any malicious motive in approving the encashment and/or withdrawal.The acts and omissions alleged by the Bank in the civil case as basis of its counterclaim against Mauricio, are the very same acts and omissions which were used as grounds to terminate his employment. Mauricio cannot be held to have abused the discretion he was clothed with absent some semblance of parameters. In the absence of such guidelines, the validity of Mauricios acts can be tested by determining whether they were justified under the circumstances. In exercising his discretion to allow the questioned withdrawals, Mauricio took into consideration the fact that the Spouses Cruz have substantial deposit and security, and enjoyed a favorable credit standing with the Bank. No malice can be inferred from Mauricios acts who tried to collect from the Spouses Cruz and reported all the transactions to the head office; in fact, the Bank never called his attention to any irregularity in the transactions but even continued to credit the account of the spouses for the value of the returned checks. Under the circumstances, Mauricio indeed fully considered the interest of his employer before approving the questioned transactions.For a dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence to be valid, the breach of trust must be willful, meaning it must be done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse. Loss of trust and confidence stems from a breach of trust founded on dishonest, deceitful or fraudulent act. This is obviously not the case here.Office Order No. 1596, one of the office orders allegedly violated by Mauricio, provides:Approving officers shall exercise extreme caution in allowing deposit of, encashment or withdrawals against foreign and out-of-town checks. Refund to the bank of the amount involved shall be the personal responsibility and accountability of the officer who authorized the deposit or encashment over the counter when the check should be returned by the drawee bank for any reason whatsoever.The above company directive is an explicit admission that Mauricio was clothed with such discretion to enter into the questioned transactions as well as a forewarning that in case the foreign and out-of-town checks were returned for whatever reason, the approving officer, in this case, Mauricio, shall be personally responsible and accountable. personal responsibility and accountability could only mean the reimbursement of the value of any dishonored check but does not mean termination of the approving officers employment for breaching the banks trust and confidence.WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

COLEGIO VS. VILLASG.R. No. 137795 March 26, 2003COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN CALAMBA, petitioner,vs.BELEN P. VILLAS, respondent.FACTS: respondent Belen Villas was employed by the petitioner School as high school teacher in September 1985. On May 15, 1995, she applied for a study leave for six months, from June to December 31, 1995. In a letter dated June 2, 1995, Mrs. Angelina Quiatchon, principal of the high school department, told Villas that her request for study leave was granted for one school year subject to the following conditions:1. The requested study leave takes effect on June 5, 1995 and ends on March 31, 1996;2. The requested study leave involves no remuneration on the part of the School;3. The documents that justify the requested study leave should be submitted upon return on April 1, 1996;4. Faculty Manual Section 40 Special Provisions on the Granting of Leave of Absence should be observed:a. Once proven beyond reasonable doubt during the period of the approved leave of absence that the faculty member shall engage himself in employment outside the institution, the administration shall regard the faculty member on leave as resigned;b. The maximum length of leave of absence that may be applied for by the faculty member and granted by administration is twelve (12) months. If, at the lapse of the period, the faculty member fails to return for work, the administration shall regard the faculty member as resigned.RESPONDENT ALLEGED: that she intended to utilize the first semester of her study leave to finish her masteral degree at the Philippine Womens University (PWU). Unfortunately, it did not push through so she took up an Old Testament course in a school of religion and at the same time utilized her free hours selling insurance and cookware to augment her familys income. However, during the second semester of her study leave, she studied and passed 12 units of education subjects at the Golden Gate Colleges in Batangas City. In response to the letters sent her by petitioner to justify her study leave, she submitted a certification from Golden Gate Colleges and a letter explaining why she took up an Old Testament course instead of enrolling in her masteral class during the first semester.President and Rector of the School, Fr. Ramonclaro G. Mendez, O. P., wrote her, stating that her failure to enroll during the first semester was a violation of the conditions of the study leave and that the reasons she advanced for failure to enroll during the first semester were not acceptable and thus:In the first place, prudence dictates that you should have ascertained first that you are still eligible to study at PWU to finish your masteral degree before applying and securing the approval of your leave by the School. In the second place, you should have informed the School at once that you could not enroll in the first semester so that your leave could have been adjusted for only one-half (1/2) year. Thirdly, your engaging in some part-time business instead of studying in the first semester of your leave is sufficient justification for the School to consider you as resigned under the Faculty Manual. And lastly, your failure to study in the first semester of your study leave without informing the School beforehand constitutes deception, to say the least, which is not a good example to the other teachers.Voluntary Arbitrator Mayuga who found that respondent was illegally dismissed. MR denied. CA affirmed, Hence, this petition.ISSUE: whether or not respondents alleged violation of the conditions of the study grant constituted serious misconduct which justified her termination from petitioner School.HELD: NOUnder the Labor Code, there are twin requirements to justify a valid dismissal from employment: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code (substantive aspect) and (b) the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself (procedural aspect).7 The procedural aspect requires that the employee be given two written notices before she is terminated consisting of a notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts/omissions for which the dismissal is sought and the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him.In the case at bar, the requirements for both substantive and procedural aspects were not satisfied.petitioner School argues that the conduct of respondent breached not only the provisions of the study grant (which was a contractual obligation) but also the Faculty Manual. Respondent was thus guilty of serious misconduct which was a ground for termination.Misconduct is improper or wrongful conduct. It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment.9 Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, the misconduct, to be a just cause for termination, must be serious. This implies that it must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant.The alleged infractions of the respondent could hardly be considered serious misconduct:1. Her alleged failure to report for work EXACTLY on April 1, 1996 (respondent reported on May 15, 1996) is not equivalent to failure to return for work, a sanctionable offense under the Faculty Manual. Although we give credence to petitioners argument that a private high school teacher still has work at the end of the schoolyear to assist in the graduation preparations and in the beginning of the school year to assist in the enrollment such tasks cannot be considered a teachers main duties, the failure to perform which would be tantamount to dereliction of duty or abandonment.2. With regard to her alleged failure to enroll during the first semester, although we agree with the President and Rector, Fr. Mendez, that respondent should have first ascertained whether she was still eligible to study at the PWU before applying for a study leave,17 such lapse was more of an error in judgment rather than an act of serious misconduct. If respondent intended to use her study leave for other unauthorized purposes, as petitioner would like us to believe, she would not have enrolled at the Golden Gate Colleges during the second semester. Yet she did, as borne out by the certification18 prepared by the Registrar of Golden Gate Colleges.3. Respondent did not violate the prohibition on engaging in employment outside the school as specified in her study leave grant and as provided in the Faculty Manual. Section 40 (a) of the Manual. The prohibition against outside employment was enacted to prevent the teacher from using the study leave period for unsanctioned purposes since the School pays the teacher while pursuing further studies. That rationale was not violated by respondent for the reason that her part-time activity of selling insurance and cookware could not have prevented her in any way from studying and, more importantly, she was not being paid by the School while on leave. How did the school expect her and her family to survive without any income for one whole year?Petitioner also failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid dismissal. Petitioner failed to give respondent the first notice which should have informed the latter of the formers intention to dismiss her. Petitioner argues that it complied with this requirement as there were several exchanges of communication between the School and respondent regarding the cause of her termination. However, we find that these letters did not apprise respondent that her dismissal was being sought by petitioner School as said letters only required respondent to submit proof of enrollment.PETITION DENIED.________________________NOTES: Examples of serious misconduct justifying termination, as held in some of our decisions, include: sexual harassment (the managers act of fondling the hands, massaging the shoulder and caressing the nape of a secretary);11 fighting within company premises;12 uttering obscene, insulting or offensive words against a superior;13 misrepresenting that a student is his nephew and pressuring and intimidating a co-teacher to change that students failing grade to passing. respondent is not entitled to the six-month study leave and vacation pay, the same was expressly waived by complainant when she signed conforme to the letter dated June 2, 1995 approving her study leave which states among others, to wit: 2. The requested study leave involves no remuneration on the part of the schoolVICENTE VS. CAG.R. No. 175988 August 24, 2007MA. FININA E. VICENTE, Petitioner,vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Former Seventeenth Division and CINDERELLA MARKETING CORPORATION, Respondents.FACTS: Petitioner Finina E. Vicente was employed by respondent Cinderella Marketing Corporation (Cinderella) as Management Coordinator in January 1990. Prior to her resignation in February 2000, she held the position of Consignment Operations Manager with a salary of P27,000.00 a month.5 She was tasked with the oversight, supervision and management of the Consignment Department dealing directly with Cinderellas consignors.Petitioner alleged that it has been a practice among the employees of Cinderella to obtain cash advances by charging the amount from the net sales of Cinderellas suppliers/consignors. Request for cash advances are approved by Mr. TECSON (AVP-Finance).After some time, one of Cinderellas suppliers complained about the unauthorized deductions from the net sales due them. Accordingly, an investigation was conducted and upon initial review of respondents business records, it appears that petitioner was among those involved in the irregular and fraudulent preparation and encashment of respondents corporate checks amounting to at least P500,000.00.Petitioner alleged that Mr. Tecson demanded her resignation on several occasions. On February 15, 2000, Mr. Tecson allegedly told her MAG-RESIGN KANA AGAD KASI MAIIPIT KAMI, in the presence of Lizz Villafuerte, the Accounting Manager.9 As a result of this alleged force and intimidation, petitioner tendered her resignation letter.Three (3) years after her resignation, petitioner filed a complaint against Cinderella alleging that her severance from employment was involuntary amounting to constructive dismissal. Cinderella denied the charge of constructive dismissal.LA ruled in favour of petitioner; NLRC affirmed. MR denied;CA reversed on stating that, totality of evidence on record showed that petitioner voluntarily resigned from her employment; that the subsequent acts of petitioner belie the claim of constructive dismissal; that after the alleged forced resignation, petitioner attended the meetings concerning her involvement in the anomalous transactions and even arranged for the settlement of her consequent liabilities as may be determined during the investigation; that the belated filing of the complaint militates against petitioner because it is hardly expected from an aggrieved employee to wait three years before instituting the case. MR denied.Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.ISSUE: WON petitioner was constructively dismissed by Cinderella (or was there voluntary resignation on the part of petitioner?)HELD: NO, respondent voluntarily resigned.In termination cases, burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause and failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal wasillegal.19In Mobile Protective & Detective Agency v. Ompad, the Court ruled that should an employer interpose the defense of resignation, as in the present case, it is still incumbent upon respondent company to prove that the employee voluntarily resigned.From the totality of evidence on record, it was clearly demonstrated that respondent Cinderella has sufficiently discharged its burden to prove that petitioners resignation was voluntary. In voluntary resignation, the employee is compelled by personal reason(s) to disassociate himself from employment. It is done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act ofabandonment.21To determine whether the employee indeed intended to relinquish such employment, the act of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered.Petitioner relinquished her position when she submitted the letters ofresignation.Theresignation letter submitted on February 15, 2000 confirmed the earlier resignation letter she submitted on February 7, 2000. The resignation letter contained words of gratitude which can hardly come from an employee forced to resign.A careful scrutiny of the said letter shows that it bears the signature of petitioner (contrary to what the LA stated). More importantly, petitioner admitted having submitted the said letter, albeit, due to an alleged intimidation.Subsequently, petitioner stopped reporting for work although she met with the officers of the corporation to settle her accountabilities but never raised the alleged intimidation employed on her. Also, though the complaint was filed within the 4-year prescriptive period, its belated filing supports the contention of respondent that it was a mereafterthought.24Taken together, these circumstances are substantial proof that petitioners resignation was voluntary.Having submitted a resignation letter, it is then incumbent upon her to prove that the resignation was not voluntary but was actually a case of constructive dismissal with clear, positive, and convincingevidence.26Petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of constructive dismissal.Bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence.In St. Michael Academy v. National Labor Relations Commission,28 we ruled that mere allegations of threat or force do not constitute substantial evidence to support a finding of forced resignation. We enumerated the requisites for intimidation to vitiate consent as follows:(1) that the intimidation caused the consent to be given; (2) that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real or serious, there being evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of doing the act which is forced on the person to do as the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury to his person or property. x x xNone of the above requisites was established by petitioner. Neither can we consider the conduct of audits and other internal investigations as a form of harassment against petitioner. Said investigation was legitimate and justifiedMoreover, we note that petitioner is holding a managerial position with a salary of P27,000.00 a month. Hence, she is not an ordinary employee with limited understanding such that she would be easily maneuvered or coerced to resign against her will.PETITION DENIED.__________NOTES:In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required is substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.BARCENAS VS. NLRCG.R. No. 87210 July 16, 1990FILOMENA BARCENAS, petitioner,vs.THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), Rev. SIM DEE the present Head Monk of the Manila Buddha Temple, MANUEL CHUA, in his capacity as the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the Philippines, Inc., and in his private capacity,respondents.FACTS: The Buddhist Temple has hired petitioner who speaks the Chinese language as secretary and interpreter. The head monk, Chua Se Su, had sexual relations with petitioner, which resulted to the latter giving birth to a child. In May, 1982, of five months before giving birth to the alleged son of Su on October 12, 1982, petitioner was sent home to Bicol. Upon the death of Su in July, 1983, complainant remained and continued in her job. In 1985, respondent Manuel Chua (Chua, for short) was elected President and Chairman of the Board of the Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the Philippines, Inc. and Rev. Sim Dee for short) was elected Head Buddhist Priest. Thereafter, Chua and Dee discontinued payment of her monthly allowance and the additional P500.00 allowance effective 1983. Petitioner and her son were evicted forcibly from their quarters in the temple by six police officers. She was brought first to the Police precinct in Tondo and then brought to Aloha Hotel where she was compelled to sign a written undertaking not to return to the Buddhist temple in consideration of the sum of P10,000.00. Petitioner refused and Chua shouted threats against her and her son. Her personal belongings including assorted jewelries were never returned by respondent Chua.Chua alleges that she was never an employee of the temple, but only attended to the personal needs of the former head monk, hence was co-terminus with such.LA ruled in favour of the petitioner. NLRC reversed.ISSUE: WON petitioner is an employee of the templeHELD:Petitioner is an employee of the temple as secretary and interpreter.Moreover, the work that petitioner performed in the temple could not be categorized as mere domestic work. We find that petitioner, being proficient in the Chinese language, attended to the visitors, mostly Chinese, who came to pray or seek advice before Buddha for personal or business problems; arranged meetings between these visitors and Su and supervised the preparation of the food for the temple visitors; acted as tourist guide of foreign visitors; acted as liaison with some goverment offices; and made the payment for the temples Meralco, MWSS and PLDT bills. Indeed, these tasks may not be deemed activities of a household helper. They were essential and important to the operation and religious functions of the temple.In spite of this finding, her status as a regular employee ended upon her return to Bicol in May, 1982 to await the birth of her love-child allegedly by Su. The records do not show that petitioner filed any leave from work or that a leave was granted her. Neither did she return to work after the birth of her child on October 12, 1982, whom she named Robert Chua alias Chua Sim Tiong. The NLRC found that it was only in July, 1983 after Su died that she went back to the Manila Buddhist Temple. Petitioners pleadings failed to rebut this finding. Clearly, her return could not be deemed as a resumption of her old position which she had already abandoned.Thus, her return to the temple was no longer as an employee but rather as Sus mistress who is bent on protecting the proprietary and hereditary rights of her son and nephew. Finally, while petitioner contends that she continued to work in the temple after Su died, there is, however, no proof that she was re-hired by the new Head Monk.BACSIN VS. WAHIMANG.R. No. 146053, April 30, 2008DIOSCORO F. BACSIN, petitioner,vs.EDUARDO O. WAHIMAN, respondent.FACTS: Petitioner is a public school teacher of Pandan Elementary School. Respondent Eduardo O. Wahiman is the father of AAA, an elementary school student of the petitioner.AAA claimed that on August 16, 1995, petitioner asked her to be at his office to do an errand. Once inside, she saw him get a folder from one of the cartons on the floor near his table, and place it on his table. He then asked her to come closer, and when she did, held her hand, then touched and fondled her breast. She stated that he fondled her breast five times, and that she felt afraid. A classmate of hers, one Vincent B. Sorrabas, claiming to have witnessed the incident, testified that the fondling incident did happen just as AAA related it.In his defense, petitioner claimed that the touching incident happened by accident, just as he was handing AAA a lesson book.6 He further stated that the incident happened in about two or three seconds, and that the girl left his office without any complaint.CSC found petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct (Acts of Sexual Harassment), and dismissed him from the service. Specifically, the CSC found the petitioner to have committed an act constituting sexual harassment, as defined in Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.CA determined that the issue revolved around petitioners right to due process, and based on its finding that petitioner had the opportunity to be heard, found that there was no violation of that right. The CA ruled that, even if petitioner was formally charged with disgraceful and immoral conduct and misconduct, the CSC found that the allegations and evidence sufficiently proved petitioners guilt of grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal from the service.Petitioner argues that the CSC cannot validly adjudge him guilty of an offense, such as Grave Misconduct (Acts of Sexual Harassment), different from that specified in the formal charge which was Misconduct. He further argues that the offense of Misconduct does not include the graver offense of Grave Misconduct.ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of Sexual HarassmentHELD: The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877, The Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, imputes on the petitioner acts covered and penalized by said law.Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the demand of a sexual favor need not be explicit or stated. In Domingo v. Rayala, it was held, It is true that this provision calls for a demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor. But it is not necessary that the demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender.The CSC found, as did the CA, that even without an explicit demand from petitioner his act of mashing the breast of AAA was sufficient to constitute sexual harassment. Moreover, under Section 3 (b) (4) of RA 7877, sexual harassment in an education or training environment is committed (w)hen the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the student, trainee or apprentice. AAA even testified that she felt fear at the time petitioner touched her.In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule must bemanifest.14The act of petitioner of fondling one of his students is against a law, RA 7877, and is doubtless inexcusable. The particular act of petitioner cannot in any way be construed as a case of simple misconduct.He is dismissed from servicePetitioner was not denied due process of law, contrary to his claims. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. It is clear that petitioner was sufficiently informed of the basis of the charge against him, which was his act of improperly touching one of his students. Thus informed, he defended himself from such charge. The failure to designate the offense specifically and with precision is of no moment in this administrative case.YRASUEGUI VS. PALG.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,vs.PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL.In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an extended vacation until November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all the excess weight. But the problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks, which he failed to comply with.On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates, which he did not report to.

On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being discriminated as those similarly situated were not treated the same.On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, and considering the utmost leniency extended to him which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years, his services were considered terminated effective immediately.LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the performance of his duties.NLRC affirmed.CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.HELD: YESA reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioners claims that obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that [t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company physician, per the advice of PAL.In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, [v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).NOTES:The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees.The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety.Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.SABEROLA VS. SUAREZG.R. No. 151227 July 14, 2008GREGORIO S. SABEROLA, Petitioner,vs.RONALD SUAREZ and RAYMUNDO LIRASAN, JR., Respondents.FACTS: Case is for illegal dismissal with money claims filed by respondents against petitioner. Latter is the owner and manager of G.S. Saberola Electrical Services, a firm engaged in the construction business specializing in installing electrical devices in subdivision homes and in commercial and non-commercial buildings. Respondents were employed by petitioner as electricians. They worked from Monday to Saturday and, occasionally, on Sundays, with a daily wage of P110.00.Petitioner averred that respondents were part-time project employees and were employed only when there were electrical jobs to be done in a particular housing unit contracted by petitioner. He maintained that the services of respondents as project employees were coterminous with each project. As project employees, the time of rendition of their services was not fixed. Thus, there was no practical way of determining the appropriate compensation of the value of respondents accomplishment, as their work assignment varied depending on the needs of a specific project.LABOR ARBITER: they are project employees, not entitled to benefitsNLRC: affirmed, but said they were illegally dismissedCA: affirmedISSUE: What is their status? And were they illegally dismissed?HELD: Project employees (BUT were illegally dismissed)Petitioner, as an electrical contractor, depends for his business on the contracts that he is able to obtain from real estate developers and builders of buildings. Thus, the work provided by petitioner depends on the availability of such contracts or projects. The duration of the employment of his work force is not permanent but coterminous with the projects to which the workers are assigned. Viewed in this context, the respondents are considered as project employees of petitioner.A project employee is one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.However, respondents, even if working as project employees, enjoy security of tenure.Nonetheless, when a project employee is dismissed, such dismissal must still comply with the substantive and procedural requirements of due process. Termination of his employment must be for a lawful cause and must be done in a manner which affords him the proper notice and hearing.A project employee must be furnished a written notice of his impending dismissal and must be given the opportunity to dispute the legality of his removal. In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause. Employers who hire project employees are mandated to state and prove the actual basis for the employees dismissal once its veracity is challenged.Petitioner failed to present any evidence to disprove the claim of illegal dismissal. No evidence was presented by petitioner to show the termination of the project which would justify the cessation of the work of respondents. Neither was there proof that petitioner complied with the substantive and procedural requirements of due process.RBC VS. BALUYOTG.R. No. 172670, January 20, 2009RBC CABLE MASTER SYSTEM AND/OR EVELYN CINENSE, Petitioners,vs.MARCIAL BALUYOT, Respondent.FACTS: Herein petitioner RBC Cable Master System (petitioner RBC) is a cable firm engaged in the business of providing home cable service. Sometime in March 1996, petitioner RBC hired herein private respondent Marcial Baluyot as a Lineman.In the middle part of the year 2000, private respondent learned that his outstanding loan from cash advances accumulated to P18,000.00. The cash advances he made [were] pursuant to a long time practice for the employees of petitioner RBC to advance amounts of money in the form of cash vales with the condition that the same be deducted from their monthly salaries on a staggered or periodic basis. Respondent alleged that he delivered his motorcycle as a security for said loans. But petitioner avers that such motorcycle was actually leased, which lease only ceased when respondent no longer owned said vehicle because of non-payment of its financing.On February 1, 2001, when private respondent reported for work, he was informed that no blank official receipts could be issued to him for his collection job for that day or for a month because he is being suspended. Thus, for one month, he did not report for work and when he reported back to duty, he was told by petitioner RBC that he is now out of job and is considered terminated.Petitioner RBC denied dismissing private respondent by contending that it was private respondent who abandoned his work when, sometime in March 2001, he left without any notice and never returned back for work. They also alleged that respondent committed several infractions such as misappropriations and falsification of documents.LABOR ARBITER ruled that private respondent abandoned his job and committed acts of dishonesty such as theft of company funds and property.NLRC ruled that private respondent did not abandon his job but was illegally dismissed.ISSUE: WON respondent was illegally dismissedHELD: YESAfter respondent was punished with suspension by petitioners, he was admitted back to work on the condition that he will not repeat the same violations and he will pay back the sums he owed. This proved that petitioners had condoned the infractions previously committed by the respondent.To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur:(1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and(2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Mere absence is not sufficient. The employer has the burden of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment without any intention of returning.In the case at bar, the charge of abandonment is belied by the following circumstances: First, the high improbability of private respondent to intentionally abandon his work considering that he had already served a penalty of suspension for his infractions and violations as well as the petitioners tacit condonation of the infractions he committed, by permitting him to go back to work and by asking him to execute a promissory note. It is incongruent to human nature, that after having ironed things out with his employer, an employee would just not report for work for no apparent reason. Secondly, there was no proof that petitioner sent private respondent a notice of termination on the ground of abandonment, if indeed it is true that he really failed to go back to work. Section 2, Rule XVI, Book V, Rules and regulations implementing the Labor Code provides that any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular act or omission constituting the ground for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, the notice shall be served at the workers last known address. For this reason, We are constrained to give credence to private respondents assertion that he attempted to report back to work but he was just asked to leave as he was considered terminated. And lastly, private respondents filing of a case for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter negates abandonment. As held by the Supreme Court, a charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, more so when it includes a prayer for reinstatement.Finally, an employee who is illegally dismissed is entitled to the twin reliefs of full backwages and reinstatement. If reinstatement is not viable, separation pay is awarded to the employee. In awarding separation pay to an illegally dismissed employee, in lieu of reinstatement, the amount to be awarded shall be equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service.LEYTE GEOTHERMAL VS.PNOCG.R. No. 170351, March 30, 2011LEYTE GEOTHERMAL POWER PROGRESSIVE EMPLOYEES UNION ALU TUCP, Petitioner,vs.PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.FACTS: Respondent is a GOCC while petitioner is a legitimate labor organization. Among [respondents] geothermal projects is the Leyte Geothermal Power Project located at the Greater Tongonan Geothermal Reservation in Leyte. Thus, the [respondent] hired and employed hundreds of employees on a contractual basis, whereby, their employment was only good up to the completion or termination of the project and would automatically expire upon the completion of such project.Majority of the employees hired by [respondent] in its Leyte Geothermal Power Projects had become members of petitioner. In view of that circumstance, the petitioner demands from the [respondent] for recognition of it as the collective bargaining agent of said employees and for a CBA negotiation with it. However, the [respondent] did not heed such demands of the petitioner. Sometime in 1998 when the project was about to be completed, the [respondent] proceeded to serve Notices of Termination of Employment upon the employees who are members of the petitioner.On December 28, 1998, the petitioner filed a Notice of Strike with DOLE against the [respondent] on the ground of purported commission by the latter of unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain collectively, union busting and mass termination. On the same day, the petitioner declared a strike and staged such strike.Secretary of Labor intervened and ordered all workers to return to work. However, petitioner did not abide.NLRC: ruled that the employees are PROJECT EMPLOYEES, and the strike as ILLEGALPetitioner Union contends that its officers and members performed activities that were usually necessary and desirable to respondents usual business.ISSUE: WON they are project employeesHELD: They are PROJECT EMPLOYEESArticle 280 of the Labor Code contemplates four (4) kinds of employees:(a) regular employees or those who have been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer;(b) project employees or those whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking[,] the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee;(c) seasonal employees or those who work or perform services which are seasonal in nature, and the employment is for the duration of the season; and(d) casual employees or those who are not regular, project, or seasonal employees.Jurisprudence has added a fifth kind a fixed-term employee.By entering into such a contract, an employee is deemed to understand that his employment is coterminous with the project. He may not expect to be employed continuously beyond the completion of the project. It is of judicial notice that project employees engaged for manual services or those for special skills like those of carpenters or masons, are, as a rule, unschooled. However, this fact alone is not a valid reason for bestowing special treatment on them or for invalidating a contract of employment. Project employment contracts are not lopsided agreements in favor of only one party thereto. The employers interest is equally important as that of the employee[s] for theirs is the interest that propels economic activity. While it may be true that it is the employer who drafts project employment contracts with its business interest as overriding consideration, such contracts do not, of necessity, prejudice the employee. Neither is the employee left helpless by a prejudicial employment contract. After all, under the law, the interest of the worker is paramount.Unions own admission, both parties had executed the contracts freely and voluntarily without force, duress or acts tending to vitiate the worker[s] consent. Thus, we see no reason not to honor and give effect to the terms and conditions stipulated therein.The litmus test to determine whether an individual is a project employee lies in setting a fixed period of employment involving a specific undertaking which completion or termination has been determined at the time of the particular employees engagement.NOTES:WHAT IS A PROJECT? In the realm of business and industry, we note that project could refer to one or the other of at least two (2) distinguishable types of activities. Firstly, a project could refer to a particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of the employer company, but which is distinct and separate, and identifiable as such, from the other undertakings of the company. Such job or undertaking begins and ends at determined or determinable times. The typical example of this first type of project is a particular construction job or project of a construction company. A construction company ordinarily carries out two or more [distinct] identifiable construction projects: e.g., a twenty-five-storey hotel in Makati; a residential condominium building in Baguio City; and a domestic air terminal in Iloilo City. Employees who are hired for the carrying out of one of these separate projects, the scope and duration of which has been determined and made known to the employees at the time of employment, are properly treated as project employees, and their services may be lawfully terminated at completion of the project.The term project could also refer to, secondly, a particular job or undertaking that is not within the regular business of the corporation. Such a job or undertaking must also be identifiably separate and distinct from the ordinary or regular business operations of the employer. The job or undertaking also begins and ends at determined or determinable times.