PART TWOWORKER RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION

I. BASIS OF RIGHTS.S. Ventures International v. S.S. Ventures Labor Union, 559 SCRA 435 (08)facts of the caseSS Ventures is a PEZA-registered export firm located in Mariveles, Bataan. SSVLU is a labor organization registered with DOLE. On March 21, 2000, the Union filed with DOLE a petition for certification election in behalf of the rank-and-file employees of Ventures. 542 signatures were gathered, 82 of which belonged to terminated employees of Venture.

Ventures filed a petition to cancel the certificate of registration of the Union because: 1. The Union deliberately and maliciously included the names of more or less 82 former employees no longer connected with Ventures in its list of members who attended the organizational meeting and in the adoption/ratification of its constitution and by-laws held on January 9, 2000 in Mariveles, Bataan; and the Union forged the signatures of these 82 former employees to make it appear they took part in the organizational meeting and adoption and ratification of the constitution;2. The Union maliciously twice entered the signatures of three persons namely: Mara Santos, Raymond Balangbang, and Karen Agunos;3. No organizational meeting and ratification actually took place; and4. The Union's application for registration was not supported by at least 20% of the rank-and-file employees of Ventures, or 418 of the total 2,197- employee complement. Since more or less 82 of the 500 signatures were forged or invalid, then the remaining valid signatures would only be 418, which is very much short of the 439 minimum (2197 total employees x 20% = 439.4) required by the Labor Code.

Union answered the allegations in the following manner:1. The organizational meeting actually took place on January 9, 2000 at the Shoe City basketball court in Mariveles;2. The 82 employees adverted to in Ventures' petition were qualified Union members for, although they have been ordered dismissed, the one-year prescriptive period to question their dismissal had not yet lapsed; 3. It had complied with the 20%-member registration requirement since it had 542 members; and 4. The "double" signatures were inadvertent human error.

The DOLE regional director found for Ventures, however in a subsequent Motion for Reconsideration, the BLR reversed the DOLE decision. This was affirmed by the CA.

issueWON Ventures may have the Union de-certified for violation of Art. 239 (a) of the Labor Code. NO.

ratioThe right to form, join, or assist a union is specifically protected by Art. XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution and such right shall not be abridged. Once registered with the DOLE, a union is considered a legitimate labor organization endowed with the right and privileges granted by law to such organization.

To decertify a union, it is not enough to show that the union includes ineligible employees in its membership. It must also be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud in connection with the application for registration and the supporting documents, such as the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto and the minutes of ratification of the constitution or by-laws, among other documents.

The employees' withdrawal from a labor union made before the filing of the petition for certification election is presumed voluntary, while withdrawal after the filing of such petition is considered to be involuntary and does not affect the same.

After a labor organization has filed the necessary registration documents, it becomes mandatory for the BLR to check if the requirements under Art. 234 of the Labor Code have been sedulously complied with. If the union's application is infected by falsification and like serious irregularities, especial those appearing on the face of the application and its attachments, a union should be denied recognition as a legitimate labor organization. The issuance to the Union of Certificate of necessarily implies that its application for registration and the supporting documents thereof are prima facie free from any vitiating irregularities.

The assailed inclusion of the said 82 individuals to the meeting and proceedings adverted to is not really fatal to the Union's cause for, as determined by the BLR, the allegations of falsification of signatures or misrepresentation with respect to these individuals are without basis. The procedure for acquiring or losing union membership and the determination of who are qualified or disqualified to be members are matters internal to the union and flow from its right to self-organization.

The relevancy of the 82 individuals active participation in the Unions organizational meeting and the signing ceremonies therefore comes in only for purposes of determining whether or not the Union, even without the 82, would still meet what Art. 234(c) of the Labor Code requires to be submitted:

Art. 234. Requirements of Registration.Any applicant labor organization x x x shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following requirements:x x x x(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate.

In its union records on file with this Bureau, respondent union submitted the names of [542] members x x x. This number easily complied with the 20% requirement, be it 1,928 or 2,202 employees in the establishment. Even subtracting the 82 employees from 542 leaves 460 union members, still within 440 or 20% of the maximum total of 2,202 rank-and-file employees.

The issue surrounding the involvement of the 82 employees is a matter of membership or voter eligibility. It is not a ground to cancel union registration.

"[F]or fraud and misrepresentation [to be grounds for] cancellation of union registration under Article 239 [of the Labor Code], the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members."

The Union points out that for almost seven (7) years following the filing of its petition, no certification election has yet been conducted among the rank-and-file employees. If this be the case, the delay has gone far enough and can no longer be allowed to continue. A certification election is exclusively the concern of employees and the employer lacks the legal personality to challenge it.

A. Constitution, 1987 Constitution Arts. III, Sec. 8, and XIII, Sec. 3See also: 1935 Constitution Art. III, Sec. 6; and 1973 Constitution Art. IV, Sec. 71987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.1987 Constitution, Article XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and growth.1935 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 6. The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.1973 Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 7. The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to the law shall not be abridged.

B. Statutory 243; 244; 245; 269; 212 (g); 212 (f)Art. 243. Coverage and employees right to self-organization. All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical, or educational institutions, whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, May 1, 1980)Art. 244. Right of employees in the public service. Employees of government corporations established under the Corporation Code shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively with their respective employers. All other employees in the civil service shall have the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law. (As amended by Executive Order No. 111, December 24, 1986)Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own. (As amended by Section 18, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)Art. 269. Prohibition against aliens; exceptions. All aliens, natural or juridical, as well as foreign organizations are strictly prohibited from engaging directly or indirectly in all forms of trade union activities without prejudice to normal contacts between Philippine labor unions and recognized international labor centers: Provided, however, That aliens working in the country with valid permits issued by the Department of Labor and Employment, may exercise the right to self-organization and join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining: Provided, further, That said aliens are nationals of a country which grants the same or similar rights to Filipino workers. (As amended by Section 29, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)Art. 212. Definitions.(f) "Employee" includes any person in the employ of an employer. The term shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Code so explicitly states. It shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a result of or in connection with any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice if he has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and regular employment.(g) "Labor organization" means any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment.

UST Faculty Union v. Bitonio, 318 SCRA 186 (99)FACTS: Private respondents are duly elected officers of the UST Faculty Union (USTFU). The union has a subsisting five-year CBA with UST.

The petitioners on the other hand, questioned before the Med-Arbiter, that the COMELEC was not constituted in accordance with USTFUs constitution and by-laws (CBL) and that no rules had been issued to govern the conduct of the October 5, 1996 election.

Med-Arbiter issued a TRO enjoining the conduct of elections. However, a general faculty assembly was held as scheduled. The general assembly was attended by members of the USTFU and, as admitted by the appellants, also by non-USTFU members [who] are members in good standing of the UST Academic Community Collective Bargaining Unit.On this occasion, appellants were elected as USTFUs new set of officers by acclamation and clapping of hands.

On 03 December 1996, appellants and UST allegedly entered into another CBA covering the period from 01 June 1996 to 31 May 2001. Said CBA was ratified by a majority of the UST faculty community.

ISSUE:WON the election of the officers was valid.

HOLDING/RATIO: NO. The importance of a unions constitution and bylaws cannot be overemphasized. They embody a covenant between a union and its members and constitute the fundamental law governing the members rights and obligations.As such, the unions constitution and by-laws should be upheld, as long as they are not contrary to law, good morals or public policy.

A union election is held pursuant to the unions constitution and by-laws, and the right to vote in it is enjoyed only by unionmembers.A union election should be distinguished from a certification election, which is the process of determining, through secret ballot, the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, for purposes of collective bargaining. Specifically, the purpose of a certification election is to ascertain whether or not a majority of the employees wish to be represented by a labor organization and, in the affirmative case, bywhichparticular labor organization.

In a certification election,allemployees belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit can vote.Therefore, aunionmember who likewise belongs to the appropriate bargaining unit is entitled to vote in said election. However, the reverse is not always true; an employee belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit but who is not a member of the union cannot vote in the union election, unless otherwise authorized by the constitution and by-laws of the union. Verily, union affairs and elections cannot be decided in a non-union activity.

In both elections, there are procedures to be followed. Thus, the October 4, 1996 election cannot properly be called aunionelection, because the procedure laid down in the USTFUs CBL for the election of officers was not followed. It could not have been a certification election either, because representation was not the issue, and the proper procedure for such election was not followed. The participation of non-union members in the election aggravated its irregularity.

National Union of Bank Employees v. Minister of Labor 110 SCRA 274 (81)FACTS: Petition for Mandamus to compel public respondents (Minister of Labor, Deputy Minister of Labor, Director of Bureau of Labor Relations) to conduct a certification election among the rank and file employees of respondent employer Producers Bank of the Philippines.

Petitioner Union filed a petition to be directly certified as collective bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of respondent. When required to submit a payroll of employees, respondent agreed that as soon as the registration certificate of the local union was issued by the Ministry of labor and that it was shown that the local union represents the majority of the rank and file, the Bank would recognize said union and would negotiate accordingly.

The registration certificate was issued, which petitioner submitted together with the union membership application of 183 members out of 259 rank and file employees of respondent, authorizing the NUBE to represent them as their sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent. Respondent, nonetheless, failed to submit the required payroll and the list of rank and file workers based on said payroll.

Med Arbiter: Ordered the holding of a certification election.

Respondent: Motion to suspend further proceedings in view of a prejudicial issue consisting of a pending proceeding for cancellation of the registration of petitioner for allegedly engaging in prohibited and unlawful activities.

Deputy Minister of Labor: Assumed jurisdiction over the certification election case and the application for clearance to terminate the services of 13 union officers by respondent. Issued an order directing Chief of the Med-Arbiter Section, Atty. Piezas, to conduct summary investigations for the purpose of determining the definition of the appropriate bargaining unit sought to be represented as well as compliacnce with the 30% mandatory written consent.

Respondent: Pressed for the exclusion of the following personnel from the bargaining unit: Secretaries, Staff of Personnel Department, Drivers, Telephone Operators, Accounting Department, Credit Investigators, Collectors, Messengers, Auditing Department Personnel, Signature Verifiers, Legal Department Personnel, Loan Security Custodians, and Trust Department Personnel.

Med Arbiter: Ordered the holding of a certification election but sustained the respondent as to the exclusion of certain employees. Petitioner has substantially complied with the mandatory and jurisdictional requirement of 30% subscription of all the employees in the bargaining unit (submission of copies of the application and membership forms of its members wherein they have duly authorized petitioner as their sole and exclusive bargaining agent), it appearing that out of the 264 total rank and file employees, 188 are union members who have authorized petitioner to represent.

Petitioner: Filed a partial appeal to the Director of Bureau of Labor Relations questioning the exclusions of those employees who are not among those expressly enumerated under the law to be excluded and urged the holding of certification elections allowing all those excluded to vote but segregating their votes as challenged in the meantime.

Respondent: The Minister of Labor, and not the Med-Arbiter, has jurisdiction over the petition. The order directing the holding of certification election is premature in view of the fact that petitioners union registration was subject of cancellation proceedings. The bargaining unit was not appropriately defined.

Director of Bureau of Labor Relations: Affirmed Med-Arbiters order. Respondent should not unduly press the jurisdictional issue, as it does not lead nor contribute to the resolution of the real pressing issue of certification election. What is at stake is the right of the employees to organize and be represented for collective bargaining purposes by a union at respondent bank where none existed up to the present time.

The matter of defining the bargaining unit usually presents for determination 3 questions, to wit: 1. the general type of bargaining unit whether it should be an industrial unit embracing all the employees in a broad class; or a craft unit that is confined to a small specialized group within a broad class2. the scope of the bargaining unit whether it would embrace all employees in a given class at only one plant or at several plants of the employer3. the specific composition of the bargaining unit whether the unit should include employees of different occupational groups, like clerks, inspectors, technical employees, etc.The petition for certification election, whether filed by a legitimate labor organization or by an employer in an appropriate case shall contain the description of the bargaining unit which shall be the employer unit unless circumstances otherwise require. Thus, the policy under the Labor Code on the matter of fixing the bargaining unit is to favor larger units, which is sought to be implemented on a 2-tiered basis. On the lower tier, the law mandates the employer unit as the normal unit of organization at the company level, thus discouraging fragmentation into small craft or occupational units. But the Code envisions further consolidation into larger bargaining units. Thus, on the higher tier, the law mandates the eventual restructuring of the labor movement along the one union, one industry basis. Applying this rule, the appropriate bargaining unit should embrace all the regular rank and file employees at the head as well as branch offices of respondent. An exception is when circumstances otherwise require, which circumstances respondent has not shown.

The definition of the appropriate unit refers to the grouping or the legal collectivity of eligible employees for purposes of collective bargaining. The presumption is that these employees are entitled to rights to self-organization and collective bargaining, otherwise, they would not be, in the first place, considered at all in the determination of the appropriate bargaining unit. Therefore, the question of excluding certain rank and file employees for being allegedly confidential, managerial or technical does not simply involve a definition of the bargaining unit, but rather raises the fundamental issue of coverage under or eligibility for the exercise of the workers rights to self-organization and collective bargaining. The pertinent provisions on coverage and exclusion are Arts. 244 (all persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises, including religious, charitable, medical or educational institutions operating for profit shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining), 245 and 246 (security guards and managerial employees are not eligible to form, assist or join any labor organization) of the Labor Code. A managerial employee is defined as one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies, and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such managerial actions. All employees not falling within this definition are considered rank and file employees for purposes of self-organization and collective bargaining.

The Med-Arbiters order, insofar as it excludes all managerial and supervisory employees, etc. should be modified for being either superfluous, discriminatory or simply contrary to law. Exclusion as managerial employee is not based on the personality of the occupant but rather on the nature and function of the position. There was no clear showing that they were managerial employees. The mere fact of being a supervisor or confidential employee does not exclude him from coverage. He must strictly come within the category of a managerial employee as defined by the Code. The Constitution assures to all workers such rights to self-organization and collective bargaining. Exclusions, being the exception and being in derogation of such constitutional mandate, should be construed in strictissimi juris.

It is a policy that the exclusion of confidential employees from the bargaining unit is a matter for negotiation and agreement of the parties. Absent such agreement, coverage must be observed. In any event, any negotiation and agreement can come after the representation issue is resolved.

Unless there is an order of cancellation which is final, the unions certification of registration remains and its legal personality intact. It is entitled to the rights and privileges accorded by law.

The rights of workers to self-organization is found in Sec. 7, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution (the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged) and Sec. 9, Art. II (the State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure and just and humane conditions of work). A healthy respect for the freedom of association demands that acts imputable to officers or members be not easily visited with capital punishments against the association itself.

The definition of the appropriate bargaining unit does not call for an actual head count or identification of the particular employees belonging thereto. That is done in the pre-election conference. It is sufficient that the bargaining unit is defined such that the employees who are part thereof may be readily ascertained for purposes of exclusions and inclusions during the pre-election conference when the list of eligible voters are determined.

Since 188 of the 264 employees subscribed to the petition, which constitutes 70% of the total employees in the bargaining unit, the 30% consent requirement has been more than sufficiently complied with.

Petitioner: Petition for Mandamus to hold the certification election, as the Director nor the Minister of Labor did not proceed with said process.

ISSUE: Whether a certification election should be held despite the pendency of the petition to cancel petitioners certificate of registration. YES.

RATIO: The pendency of such proceeding is not a bar to the holding of a certification election. The pendency of the petition should not suspend the holding of a certification election because there is no order directing such cancellation. Such petition was also evidently intended to delay the early disposition of the case for certification election, considering that it was filed only after the Order directing the holding of a certification election was issued. Furthermore, the Court observes the liberal approach as to matters of certification election. The whole democratic process is geared towards the determination of representation, not only in government but in other sectors as well, by election. A certification election is crucial to the institution of collective bargaining, for it gives substance to the principle of majority rule as one of the basic concepts of a democratic policy.

The institution of collective bargaining is a prime manifestation of industrial democracy at work. The 2 parties to the relationship, labor and management, make their own rules by coming to terms. That is to govern themselves in matters that really count. As labor, however, is composed of a number of individuals, it is indispensable that they be represented by a labor organization of their choice. It is the fairest and most effective way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force. The will of the majority, if given expression in an honest election with freedom on the part of the voters to make their choice, is controlling. No better device can assure the institution of industrial democracy with the 2 parties to a business enterprise establishing a regime of self-rule.

Cancellation of the registration certificate is not the only resultant penalty in case of any violation of the Labor Code. The penalty imposable should be commensurate to the nature or gravity of the illegal activities conducted and to the number of members and leaders of the union staging the illegal strike. (The Court cited the decision of the Director of BLR see underlined paragraph).

DISPOSITIVE: Writ of mandamus granted.

C. Universal Declaration of Human Rights Preamble; Arts. 2; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Arts. 2 and 8 (a); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Art. 22UDHR, PreambleWhereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people, Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law, Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations, Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.UDHR, Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.ICESCR, Article 2 1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures. 2. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 3. Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their national economy, may determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the present Covenant to non-nationals. Article 8 1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure: (a) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, for the promotion and protection of his economic and social interests. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; (b) The right of trade unions to establish national federations or confederations and the right of the latter to form or join international trade-union organizations; (c) The right of trade unions to function freely subject to no limitations other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; (d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country. 2. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces or of the police or of the administration of the State. 3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or apply the law in such a manner as would prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention. ICPPR, Article 22 1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the armed forces and of the police in their exercise of this right. 3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or to apply the law in such a manner as to prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention.

D. ILO Convention No. 87, Art. 2, 11 and 98ILO 87, Art. 2. Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join organisations of their own choosing without previous authorisation.ILO 87, Art. 11. Each Member of the International Labour Organisation for which this Convention is in force undertakes to take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that workers and employers may exercise freely the right to organise.

Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union v. Confessor, 432 SCRA 308 (04)FACTS: After several negotiations over their CBA terms and conditions, the parties couldnt agree on the economic provisions, except for signing bonus and uniforms. TheUniondeclared a deadlock and filed a Notice of Strike before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). On the other hand, the Bank filed a complaint for ULP and Damages before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Manila. The SOLE Nieves R. Confesor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute at the Bank and consolidated the complaint for ULP filed by the Bank before the NLRC with the complaint over which the SOLE assumed jurisdiction.After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the SOLE issued an Order directing the parties to execute a CBA incorporating the dispositions stated in the Order. The SOLE dismissed the charges of ULP of both theUnionand the Bank, explaining that both parties failed to substantiate their claims. Dissatisfied, both Union and Bankfiled a MR but SOLE issued a Resolution denying the motions.TheUnionfiled a second MR, which was, likewise, denied. The Bank and theUnionsigned the CBA and immediately thereafter, the wage increase was effected and the signing bonuses based on the increased wage were distributed to the employees covered by the CBA. Afterwards, theUnionfiled a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Procedure: (1) TheUnionalleges that the SOLE acted with GAD amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it found that the Bank did not commit unfair labor practice when it interfered with theUnions choice of negotiator.(2) TheUnion, likewise, pointed out that the public respondent failed to rule on the ULP charges arising from the Bankssurface bargaining.(3) TheUnionalso accused the Bank of refusing to disclose material and necessary data, even after a request was made by theUnionto validate its guestimates.

ISSUE (relevant):WON the Union was able to substantiate its claim of unfair labor practice against the Bank arising from the latters alleged interference with its choice of negotiator; surface bargaining; making bad faith non-economic proposals; and refusal to furnish the Union with copies of the relevant data?

HELD:No. Petition is bereft of merits. Dismissed.DISCUSSION:Interference under Article 248 (a) of the Labor Code (dito pinasok ung ILO)Under the International Labor Organization Convention (ILO) No. 87 FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE to which the Philippines is a signatory, workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, to job organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization.Workers and employers organizations shall have the right to draw up their constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom to organize their administration and activities and to formulate their programs.Article 2 of ILO Convention No. 98 pertaining to the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining, provides:1.Workers and employers organizations shall enjoy adequate protection against any acts or interference by each other or each others agents or members in their establishment, functioning or administration.2.In particular, acts which are designed to promote the establishment of workers organizations under the domination of employers or employers organizations or to support workers organizations by financial or other means, with the object of placing such organizations under the control of employers or employers organizations within the meaning of this Article.The aforcited ILO Conventions are incorporated in our Labor Code, particularly in Article 243 and Articles 248 and 249 respecting ULP of employers and labor organizations.Article 248(a) of the Labor Code, considers it an unfair labor practice when an employer interferes, restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization or the right to form association.The right to self-organization necessarily includes the right to collective bargaining.Parenthetically, if an employer interferes in the selection of its negotiators or coerces the Union to exclude from its panel of negotiators a representative of the Union, and if it can be inferred that the employer adopted the said act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise to right to self-organization or on the right to collective bargaining of the employees, ULP under Article 248(a) in connection with Article 243 of the Labor Code is committed.In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to support the claim.Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.In the case at bar, the Union bases its claim of interference on the alleged suggestions of Diokno to exclude Umali from theUnions negotiating panel. The circumstances that occurred during the negotiation do not show that the suggestion made by Diokno to Divinagracia is an anti-union conduct from which it can be inferred that the Bank consciously adopted such act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise of the right to self-organization and collective bargaining of the employees. The records show that after the initiation of the collective bargaining process, with the inclusion of Umali in theUnions negotiating panel, the negotiations pushed through. The complaint was made only after a deadlock was declared by theUnion. It is clear that such ULP charge was merely an afterthought.The Duty to Bargain CollectivelyTheUnionalleges that the Bank violated its duty to bargain when it engaged in surface bargaining. Surface bargaining is defined as going through the motions of negotiating without any legal intent to reach an agreement. The determination of whether a party has engaged in unlawful surface bargaining is usually a difficult one because it involves, at bottom, a question of the intent of the party in question, and usually such intent can only be inferred from the totality of the challenged partys conduct both at and away from the bargaining table.It involves the question of whether an employers conduct demonstrates an unwillingness to bargain in good faith or is merely hard bargaining. TheUnionhas not been able to show that the Bank had done acts, both at and away from the bargaining table, which tend to show that it did not want to reach an agreement with theUnionor to settle the differences between it and theUnion.Admittedly, the parties were not able to agree and reached a deadlock.However, it is herein emphasized that the duty to bargain does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. Hence, the parties failure to agree did not amount to ULP under Article 248(g) for violation of the duty to bargain.In view of the finding of lack of ULP based on Article 248(g), the accusation that the Bank made bad faith provisions has no leg to stand on.The records show that the Banks counter-proposals on the non-economic provisions or political provisions did not put up for grabs the entire work of theUnionand its predecessors.As can be gleaned from the Banks counter-proposal, there were many provisions which it proposed to be retained.The revisions on the other provisions were made after the parties had come to an agreement.Far from buttressing the Unions claim that the Bank made bad-faith proposals on the non-economic provisions, all these, on the contrary, disprove such allegations.TheUnionalso failed to substantiate its claim that the Bank refused to furnish the information it needed.While the refusal to furnish requested information is in itself an unfair labor practice, and also supports the inference of surface bargaining, in the case at bar, Umali, in a meeting datedMay 18, 1993, requested the Bank to validate itsguestimateson the data of the rank and file.However, Umali failed to put his request in writing as provided for in Article 242(c) of the Labor Code.TheUnion, did not, as the Labor Code requires, send a written request for the issuance of a copy of the data about the Banks rank and file employees.Moreover, as alleged by theUnion, the fact that the Bank made use of the aforesaidguestimates, amounts to a validation of the data it had used in its presentation.

II. WORKER QUALIFICATION 277 (c) AND REQUIRED ACTION CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWArt. 277. Miscellaneous provisions. (c) Any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall, beginning on his first day of service, be considered as an employee for purposes of membership in any labor union. (As amended by Section 33, Republic Act No. 6715)

UST Faculty Union v. Bitonio, 318 SCRA 185 (99)Facts: Petitioner USTFU is the exclusive bargaining representative of the faculty of UST. In September 1996, the Union announced the convening of a general assembly on 05 October 1996. Among the agenda in the general assembly is the election of USTFU. The proposed election was contested by some members of the Union alleging that the preparations for the said election as demanded by the Unions constitution and by-laws (CBL) were not satisfied. The meeting was moved earlier to 04 October 1996. On 04 October 1996, the general faculty assembly was held. It was attended by both members of USTFU and non-members thereof. In the said general assembly a new set of USTFUs officers was elected by acclamation and clapping of hands. Respondents filed a petition with the med-arbiter alleging the illegality of the election conducted on 04 October 1996 as it did not conform to the requirements of the CBL. In the meantime a new CBA was declared to be ratified purportedly by a majority of USTs academic community. The med-arbiter rendered a decision declaring the election done in 04 October 1996 as null and void for not having been executed conformably to the CBL of the Union. The said decision was affirmed by public respondent Bitonio Jr., hence this petition.Issue: WON the election conducted on 04 October 1996 is null and voidHeld: Yes the election is null and void. Petitioners argue that the anomalies allegedly comtted by the respondents impelled them to conduct the election on 04 October 1996 and that such exercise was pursuant to their right to self-organization. Self-organization is a fundamental right guaranteed by the workers by the Philippine Constitution and the Labor Code. Such right is better understood in the context of ILO Convention No. 87 to which the Philippines is a signatory. It provides that the incident of the assertion of the right to self-organization is reflected in the promulgation of the unions CBL which governs the relationship between the members of the union. It is where the rights, duties and obligations, powers, functions and authority of the officers and as well as the members is defined. It determines the validity of the acts done by any officer or member of the union. Clearly the election conducted on 04 October 1996 was tainted with irregularities as: The assembly was not convened in accordance with the provision of the CBL There was no commission of elections to oversee the election as mandated by Sections 1 and 2 of Article IX of the CBL The purported election was not done thru secret balloting as provided by Section 6 Article IX of the CBL as well as Article 241 (c) of the Labor Code The foregoing infirmities more than justifies the conclusion by the public respondents that the proceedings were rendered void due to lack of due process.As to the contention that the 04 October 1996 assembly suspended the operation of the CBL, such argument is bereft of merit. Such is in fact, an implied admission that the election held on that date could not be considered as valid under the existing USTFU constitution.

III. EXTENT AND SCOPE OF RIGHT 243, 246Art. 243. Coverage and employees right to self-organization. All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical, or educational institutions, whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, May 1, 1980)Art. 246. Non-abridgment of right to self-organization. It shall be unlawful for any person to restrain, coerce, discriminate against or unduly interfere with employees and workers in their exercise of the right to self-organization. Such right shall include the right to form, join, or assist labor organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in lawful concerted activities for the same purpose for their mutual aid and protection, subject to the provisions of Article 264 of this Code. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, May 1, 1980)

Reyes v. Trajano, 209 SCRA 484 (92)Facts:The certification election was authorized to be conducted by the Bureau of Labor Relations among the employees of Tri-Union Industries Cor. The competing unions were Tri-Union Employees Union-Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA), and Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS). Of the 348 workers initially deemed to be qualified voters, only 240 actually took part in the election. Among the 240 employees who cast their votes were 141 members of the INK.The ballots provided for three (3) choices: (a) TUPAS and (b) TUEU-OLALIA; and, conformably with established rule and practice,for (c) a third choice:"NO UNION."The final tally of the votes showed the following results: TUPAS 1, TUEU-OLALIA 95, NO UNION 1, SPOILED 1, CHALLENGED 141.The challenged votes were those cast by the 141 INK members. They were segregated and excluded from the final count in virtue of an agreement between the competing unions, reached at the pre-election conference, that the INK members should not be allowed to vote "because they are not members of any union and refused to participate in the previous certification elections."The INK employees promptly made known their protest to the exclusion of their votes. They filed a petition to cancel the election alleging that it "was not fair" and the result thereof did "not reflect the true sentiments of the majority of the employees." TUEU-OLALIA opposed the petition. It contended that the petitioners "do not have legal personality to protest the results of the election," because "they are not members of either contending unit, butof the INK" which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization."The Med-Arbiter saw no merit in the INK employeespetition, and certified the TUEU-OLALIA as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees. The petitioners brought the matter up on appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations. Trajano, then Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations, denied the appeal. He opined that the petitioners are "bereft of legal personality to protest their alleged disenfrachisement" since they "are not constituted into a duly organized labor union, hence, not one of the unions which vied for certification as sole and exclusive bargaining representative." He also pointed out that the petitioners "did not participate in previous certification elections in the company for the reason that their religious beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor organizations."Issue: W/N the INK employees votes of NO UNION should be excluded from the certification election. NORatio: Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the "right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining." Article 243 LC provides as follows:ART. 243. Coverage and employees right to self-organization. All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical, or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall havetheright to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes or collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection.Article 248 (a) declares it to be an unfair labor practice for an employer, among others, to "interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization." Similarly, Article 249 (a) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to "restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization."The same legal proposition is set out in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, as might be expected Section 1, Rule II (Registration of Unions), Book V (Labor Relations) of the Omnibus Rules provides:Sec. 1. Who may join unions; exception. All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises, including employees of government corporations established under the Corporation Code as well as employees of religious, medical or educational institutions, whether operating for profit or not, except managerial employees, shall have theright to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining.Ambulant, intermittent and without any definite employers people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection.The right of self-organization includes the right to organize or affiliate with a labor union or determine which of two or more unions in an establishment to join, and to engage in concerted activities with co-workers for purposes of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing, or for their mutual aid and protection.Logically, the rightNOTto join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and todisaffiliate or resignfrom a labor organization, is subsumed in the right to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to maintain membership therein. The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising said right. Section 8 (rule VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules) entitled "Marketing and canvassing of votes,"provides that:. . .(a) The voter must write a cross (X) or a check (/) in the square opposite the union of his choice. If only one union is involved, the voter shall make his cross or check in the square indicating "YES" or "NO."Withal, neither the quoted provision nor any other in the Omnibus Implementing Rules expressly bars the inclusion of the choice of "NO UNION" in the ballots. Indeed it is doubtful if the employee's alternative rightNOTto form, join or assist any labor organization or withdraw or resign from one may be validly eliminated and he be consequently coerced to vote for one or another of the competing unions and be represented by one of them. Besides, the statement in the quoted provision that "(i)f only one union is involved, the voter shall make his cross or check in the square indicating "YES" or "NO," is quite clear acknowledgment of the alternative possibility that the "NO" votes may outnumber the "YES" votes indicating that the majority of the employees in the company do not wish to be represented by any union in which case, no union can represent the employees in collective bargaining. And whether the prevailing "NO" votes are inspired by considerations of religious belief or discipline or not is beside the point, and may not be inquired into at all.The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of the wishes of the majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to be represented by a labor organization, and in the affirmative case, by which particular labor organization. If the results of the election should disclose that the majority of the workers do not wish to be represented by any union, then their wishes must be respected, and no union may properly be certified as the exclusive representative of the workers in the bargaining unit. The minority employees who wish to have a union represent them in collective bargaining can do nothing but wait for another suitable occasion to petition for a certification election and hope that the results will be different. They may not and should not be permitted, however, to impose their will on the majority who do not desire to have a union certified as the exclusive workers' benefit in the bargaining unit upon the plea that they, the minority workers, are being denied the right of self-organization and collective bargaining. As repeatedly stated, the right of self-organization embraces not only the right to form, join or assist labor organizations, but the concomitant, converse rightNOTto form, join or assist any labor union.That the INK employees, as employees in the same bargaining unit in the true sense of the term, do have the right of self-organization, is also in truth beyond question, as well as the fact that when they voted that the employees in their bargaining unit should be represented by "NO UNION," they were simply exercising that right of self-organization, albeit in its negative aspect.The respondents' argument that the petitioners are disqualified to vote because they "are not constituted into a duly organized labor union" is specious. Neither law, administrative rule nor jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any labor organization may take part in a certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote to allbona fideemployees in the bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor organization or not. Neither does the contention that petitioners should be denied the right to vote because they "did not participate in previous certification elections in the company for the reason that their religious beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor organizations," persuade acceptance. No law, administrative rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past certification elections.Pan-American World Airways, Inc. v. Pan-American Employees Association, 27 SCRA 1202 (69)FACTS: Respondent Union filed a strike with the Department of Labor against the petitioner company. On that same day, the union declared and maintained such strike. The strike, being an industrial dispute affecting the national interest, was certified by the President to CIR. Several conferences were held to settle their dispute. The position of the Union was that they would not return to work unless its officers were also included in the return-to-work order. However, petitioner company alleged that the strike that the union held was illegal. Hence, its officers should be liable for dismissal.The CIR issued an order requiring petitioner company to accept the five union officers pending resolution on the merits of the dispute involved in the strike. An MR was filed but was denied by the same court. Hence, the union filed the instant petition, alleging a grave abuse of discretion of the said court.ISSUES & HELD: 1. WON CIR has jurisdiction over the case.Yes.The case comes under the operation of CA 103 which empowers the CIR to act on cases of labor disputes in industries indispensable to the national interest. Since the court was granted authority by the president to find a solution in an industrial dispute and such solution consists in ordering of employees to return back to work, it cannot be said that the CIR does not have jurisdiction over such case. 2. WON the five union officers should be included in the return-to-work order.Yes. The record is bereft of the slightest indication that any danger is to be expected from their return to work. However, the Court said that the greater offense is to the labor movement itself, mores specifically the right to self organization. There is both a constitutional and statutory recognition that laborers have the right to form unions which would take care of their interests vis-avis their employers. Their freedom would be rendered nugatory if they could not choose their own leaders who would represent them to the management.

Union of Supervisors (R.B.)-NATU v. Sec. of Labor, 109 SCRA 139 (81)Facts:In 1970, a Provident Fund was established pursuant to the CBA between the union and the bank for the benefit of the employees of Republic Bank. The sources of its fund include contributions from members and of the bank. It is managed by a Board of Trustees composed of five (5) members, of which three (3), are supposed designated by the bank, and the other two are the presidents of the Republic Bank Union of Supervisors and of the Republic Bank Employees' Union. Luna, president of the petitioner union, became the fund's administrator and secretary.

In 1974, the bank decided to establish a money market department. At the meeting of the BoT, de Vera (AVP of the bank & member of the BoT) proposed a reorganization of the fund to carry out the instruction of the Board of Directors (of the bank), which wants to have control of the fund so as to tie it up with the Money Market Operations. Luna objected and a heated discussion followed. The reorganization move was carried by a 3 to 2 vote. It was during the ensuing discussion that Luna allegedly uttered the libelous remarks as follows:The present Board of Trustees decided against giving out a loan to Mr. de Vera who was considered a poor credit risk. Now how can we expect a person who cannot be given a loan and who will now have a say in the PF I don't think the PF will allow that.As I have said before the personal standing of a trustee is very important so that if a man has a very poor standing and crooked (sic) at that he will be very bad for the interest of the PF. I repeat that the trustees had in the past denied a loan application of Mr. de Vera for the reason that his salary is under garnishment and for a man to be appointed as trustee when his records show that his salary was under garnishment, definitely, the intention of the RB is to appoint unscrupulous people

After which, Luna walked out. Later, the bank asked Luna to turn over the all records of the fund to the new administrator. Luna refused claiming that the appointment of a new administrator was invalid. Later, the banks BoD suspended Luna as branch manager pending investigation of Abads charges against him for making libelous remarks. The investigation was held ex-parte and resulted in the dismissal of Luna for grave misconduct and insubordination.

Petitioner filed a complaint w/ the NLRC against the bank for ULP. The NLRC Arbitrator ruled in favor of the bank. This was affirmed by the NLRC and the Secretary of Labor.

Issues:1. WON dismissal was for valid and just cause2. WON dismissal constitutes ULP

Held / ratio:Granted, reinstatement proper.

1. No.ON GRAVE MISCONDUCT (uttering libelous remarks)The evidence presented does not support the findings. Luna challenged the accuracy of the stenographic notes of the said meeting on the ground that Mrs. Unson was not a court stenographer and her notes do not truly reflect all that transpired during the meeting. Since there is nothing in the records to indicate that Luna has been changed as secretary, the minutes should have been signed by him before being officially released. Without such signature, neither probative value nor credibility could be accorded to such minutes; for the one who signed, Abad, is also the accuser of, and therefore biased against Luna.

This leaves only the testimonial evidence. It appears, however, that of the seven witnesses presented only the three (3) positively testified as to the alleged derogatory statements. This is understandable, considering that Abad is the accuser, Galicia is the successor, and de Vera was the prime mover of Luna's ouster. Thus, the weakness of the evidence for respondent bank is easily discernible.

Even if it were not so, and had the alleged derogatory or libelous statements been substantially established, still the same will not justify Luna's dismissal. For one thing, his allegations were never controverted. On the contrary, the said allegations were confirmed by the takeover by the Central Bank of the distressed respondent bank which was of public knowledge.

Moreover, Luna's remarks are privileged in nature as a valid exercise of his constitutional freedom of expression. Luna's remarks were intended to protect the interests of the members of the Provident Fund. His protests could be treated as union activity by the Industrial Peace Act, which assures the employees' right "to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and othermutual aid and protection ...". This is so because Luna's membership in the BoT was by virtue of his being president of the Union. Luna was therefore acting out his role as protector of his constituents.

The joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated.

ON INSUBORDINATION (refusal to turn over records of the fund)The "order" referred to was not an order but a letter-request. Luna answered in writing explaining why he feels justified to keep them. The BoT, upon receipt of such written explanation, should have referred the matter to the grievance machinery under the CBA. But this was not done. Instead, management preferred as many charges as it could frame against Luna.

That the respondent bank tried to maneuver Luna's ouster is evident from the way the investigation was conducted. The testimonies of witnesses who were not even under oath were taken without notice to Luna and without giving him a chance to cross-examine them. And corporate actions through, such as filing of charges, suspension and termination, were taken against Luna just as soon as, and on the very same dates the reports are made.

2. YesLuna had more than 21 years of service with respondent bank and for 11 years the president of the Union. The Union had caused the filing of several cases against the bank with the NLRC. Some of these cases had been decided or were settled by the parties.

The respondent bank argues that Luna's union activities had nothing to do with his dismissal. If Luna's union activism indeed caused his separation, the bank contends, how come it never took action against Canizares the president of the RB Employee's Union?

To this, WE may ask the following: Why was not Caizares cited for dereliction of duty when he also walked out of the meeting on February 1974? The answers are obvious: Canizares and the other union officers were not as active and militant in their defense of union rights, much less did they pose any threat against the respondent bank's plan to control the Provident Fund. Only Luna posed such threat.

These circumstances indubitably show that Luna's discharge was discriminatory and constituted unfair labor practice under paragraph (5) Section 4 of the Industrial Peace ActIV. WORKERS WITH RIGHT OF SELF-ORGANIZATION Art. III, Sec. 8; and Art. XIII, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.1987 Constitution, Article XIII, Sec. 3. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. A. All Employees 243, 212 (f)Art. 243. Coverage and employees right to self-organization. All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical, or educational institutions, whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, May 1, 1980)Art. 212. Definitions.(f) "Employee" includes any person in the employ of an employer. The term shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Code so explicitly states. It shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a result of or in connection with any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice if he has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and regular employment.

1. Non-Profit OrganizationFEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation, Inc. v. Trajano, 152 SCRA 725 (87)FACTS: Alliance Filipino Workers, members of which are employees of petitioner FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Memorial Foundation, Inc., filed a petition for Consent/or Certification Election with the Ministry of Labor. The petitioner opposed the petition on the ground that a similar petition is pending resolution before the SC. AFW admitted that it filed a similar petition, but this petition was denied by MED Arbiter and the Secretary of Labor on appeal, on the ground that the petitioner was a non-stock, non-profit medical institution. Pursuant to Art. 244 of the Labor Code, the employees may not form, join, or organize a union.The Med Arbiter declared that a certification election be conducted to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the company's employees. This order was affirmed by the respondent director.ISSUE: WON respondent director gravely abused his discretion in granting the petition for certification of election.HELD: No. At the time the petition for certification election was filed, Article 244 was already amended by BP Blg 70, which added the phrase whether operating for profit or not. Under the Art. 244 LC, there is no doubt that rank and file employees of non-profit medical institutions are now permitted to form, organize or join labor unions of their choice for purposes of collective bargaining. Since private respondent had complied with the requisites provided by law for calling a certification of election, it was incumbent upon respondent Director to conduct such certification election to ascertain the bargaining representative of the employees.

Victoria v. Inciong, 157 SCRA 339 (88)Petitioner Saturno Victoria was employed on March 17, 1956 by private respondent Far East Broadcasting Company, Incorporated as a radio transmitter operator. Sometime in July 1971, he and his co-workers organized the Far East Broadcasting Company Employees Association. After registering their association with the then Department of Labor, they demanded recognition of said association by the company but the latter refused on the ground that being a non-profit, non-stock, non-commercial and religious corporation, it is not covered by Republic Act 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act, the labor law enforced at that time. Several conciliation meetings were held at the Department of LaborDirector of Labor Rel: no right to bargain collectivelyAssociation held strike Company sued for damages and injunction which CFI granted, later company asked that strike be declared illegalCase on strike transferred to NLRC created by PD 21LA:employees to return to work without prejudice to the pending CFI caseLA affirmed by NLRC, SOLE and OPCFI: strike illegal, FEBC is a non-profit/non-stock org which does not issue dividends, cannot compel to recognize labor org because not covered by RA 875Because of CFI decision, FEBC dismissed Victoria as an officer in the illegal strike to which Victoria filed ID case with LA (another issue altogether)SKIPPING TO THE ACTUAL RELATED ISSUE: Whether or not right to self-organization and collective bargaining exists vis. non-profit/non stock orgSC: The strike staged by the union in 1972 was a futile move. The law then enforced, Republic Act 875 specifically excluded respondent company from its coverage. Even if the parties had gone to court to compel recognition, no positive relief could have been obtained since the same was not sanctioned by law. Because of this, there was no necessity on the part of private respondent to show specific acts of petitioner during the strike to justify his dismissal. This is a matter of responsibility and of answerability. Petitioner as a union leader, must see to it that the policies and activities of the union in the conduct of labor relations are within the precepts of law. Petitioner should have known and it was his duty to impart this imputed knowledge to the members of the union that employees and laborers in non- profit organizations are not covered by the provisions of the Industrial Peace Act and the Court of Industrial Relations [in the case at bar, the Court of First Instance] has no jurisdiction to entertain petitions of labor unions or organizations of said non-profit organizations for certification as the exclusive bargaining representatives of said employees and laborers.As a strike is an economic weapon at war with the policy of the Constitution and the law at that time, a resort thereto by laborers shall be deemed to be a choice of remedy peculiarly their own and outside of the statute, and as such, the strikers must accept all the risks attendant upon their choice. If they succeed and the employer succumbs, the law will not stand in their way in the enjoyment of the lawful fruits of their victory. But if they fail, they cannot thereafter invoke the protection of the law for the consequences of their conduct unless the right they wished vindicated is one which the law will, by all means, protect and enforce.(PLEASE NOTE THAT UNDER THE CURRENT LAW, even employees of non-profit orgs have a right to self-organization)

2. Members Religious GroupVictoriano v. Elizalde Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54 (74)facts of the caseVictoriano, a member of Iglesia ni Cristo, had been in the employ of Elizalde Rope since 1958. As such, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter referred to as the Union) which had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows:Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement.

The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed the following day, March 4, 1964.

Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees."

On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".

The INC, as a religious sect, prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization, and as a member of the INC, Victoriano therefore presented his resignation to the Union in 1962, and when no action was taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974. In response, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Victoriano from service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. The management of the Company in turn notified Victoriano and his counsel that unless he could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service. This prompted Victoriano to file an action for injunction in the CFI Manila to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing him.

CFI ruled in favor of Victoriano and enjoined the Company from dismissing him, as well as sentencing the Union to pay attorneys fees and costs. The Union appealed to the SC, stating that the CFI erred in NOT ruling that RA 3350 was unconstitutional, as well as questioning the payment of attorneys fees.

issueWON Victoriano should be dismissed from employment due to the termination of his membership in the Union. NO.

WON the assailed RA 3350 is unconstitutional. NO.

ratioThe SC, in affirming the CFI decision, states that the right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights such as the right to self-organization. As such, an INC member may refuse to join a labor union and despite the fact that there is a closed shop agreement in the factory where he was employed, his employment could not be validly terminated for his non-membership in the majority therein.

Furthermore, the right to join a union includes the right NOT to join a union. The law recognizes both the rights of unions and employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it recognizes the workers right to join or not to join union. But the RA recognizes as well the primacy of a constitutional right over a contractual right.

A right comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from Joining an association. It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any time.

The right to join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor organization. The Act has given substance to such right by prohibiting the compulsion of workers to join labor organizations.

What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union.

It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join.

Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association.

Kapatiran sa Meat and Canning Division v. Calleja, 162 SCRA 367 (88)From 1984 to 1987 TUPAS was the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of the workers in the Meat and Canning Division of the Universal Robina Corporation, with a 3-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which was to expire on November 15, 1987. On October 8, 1987, the NEW ULO, composed mostly of workers belonging to the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect, registered as a labor union. On October 12, 1987, the TUPAS staged a strike. ROBINA obtained an injunction against the strike, resulting in an agreement to return to work and for the parties to negotiate a new CBA. The next day, October 13, 1987, NEW ULO, claiming that it has "the majority of the daily wage rank and file employees numbering 191," filed a petition for a certification election at the Bureau of Labor Relations.TUPAS moved to dismiss the petition for being defective in form and that the members of the NEW ULO were mostly members of the Iglesia ni Kristo sect which three (3) years previous refused to affiliate with any labor union. It also accused the company of using the NEW ULO to defeat TUPAS' bargaining rights On November 17, 1987, the Med-Arbiter ordered the holding of a certification election within 20 days TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations BLR. In the meantime, it was able to negotiate a new 3-year CBA with ROBINA, which was signed on December 3, 1987 and to expire on November 15, 1990. MA, affirmed by BLR, ordered cert electionI: whether or not Iglesia members can form a labor org which can be a legitimate labor organization Whether or not cert election barred by newly signed CBA between TUPAS and Robina Meat factorySC: the right of members of the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect not to join a labor union for being contrary to their religious beliefs, does not bar the members of that sect from forming their own union. As held in the case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, upholding the right of members of the INC sect not to join a labor union for being contrary to their religious beliefs, does not bar the members of that sect from forming their own union. At the same time, NEW ULO was able to file a timely petition for certification election within the 60 day freedom period and was able to ascertain the majority of the workers who prefer their union.

The fact that TUPAS was able to negotiate a new CBA with ROBINA within the 60-day freedom period of the existing CBA, does not foreclose the right of the rival union, NEW ULO, to challenge TUPAS' claim to majority status, by filing a timely petition for certification election on October 13, 1987 before TUPAS' old CBA expired on November 15, 1987 and before it signed a new CBA with the company on December 3, 1987.a "certification election is the best forum in ascertaining the majority status of the contending unions wherein the workers themselves can freely choose their bargaining representative thru secret ballot.

C. Government Corporation Employees 244Art. 244. Right of employees in the public service. Employees of government corporations established under the Corporation Code shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively with their respective employers. All other employees in the civil service shall have the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law. (As amended by Executive Order No. 111, December 24, 1986)

D. Supervisors 245; 212 (m)Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own. (As amended by Section 18, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)Art. 212. Definitions.(m) "Managerial employee" is one who is vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this Book.

1. TestPaper Industries Corporation v. Laguesma, 330 SCRA 295 (00)FACTS: Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP), engaged in the manufacture of paper and timber products, has over 9000 employees, 944 of whom are supervisory and technical staff employees, and more or less 487 of said 944 are signatory members of PICOP-Bislig Supervisory and Technical Staff Employees Union (respondent).

Respondent instituted a petition for certification election to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisory and technical staff employees of PICOP for CBA purposes. Federation of Free Workers (FFW) and Associated Labor Union (ALU) filed their respective petitions for intervention.

Med-Arbiter: Granted petitions for intervention and set the holding of a certification election among PICOPs supervisory and technical staff employees with 4 choices, namely: (1) respondent, (2) FFW, (3) ALU, and (4) no union.

Secretary of Labor: Upheld Med-Arbiters order.

PICOP: objected to the inclusion of some section heads and supervisors in the list of voters, whose positions were reclassified as managerial employees in light of the Revised Organizational Structure effected by PICOP. The company was divided into 4 main business groups, namely: Paper Products Business, Timber Products Business, Forest Resource Business and Support Services Business. A Vice-President or Assistant Vice-President heads each of these business groups. A Division Manager heads the divisions comprising each business group. A Department Manager heads the departments comprising each division. Section Heads and Supervisors, now called Section Managers and Unit Managers, head the sections and independent units, respectively, comprising each department. Considering the present authority of these section managers and unit managers to hire and fire, they are classified as managerial employees, and hence, ineligible to form/join any labor organization.Med-Arbiter: Supervisors and section heads of PICOP are managerial employees and therefore excluded from the list of voters for purposes of certification election.

Undersecretary of Labor: Reversed. Subject supervisors and section heads are supervisory employees eligible to vote in the certification election.

Hence this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the subject section heads and supervisors are managerial employees ineligible to vote in the certification election. NO.

RATIO: Managerial Employees are ranked as Top Managers, Middle Managers and First Line Managers. Top and Middle Managers have the authority to devise, implement and control strategic and operational policies, while the task of the First-Line Managers is simply to ensure that such policies are carried out by the rank-and-file employees. Under this distinction, managerial employees fall in 2 categories, namely, the managers per se composed of Top and Middle Managers, and the supervisors composed of First-Line Managers. Thus, the mere fact that an employee is designated as manager does not ipso facto make him one, for it is the job description that determines the nature of employment.

In this case, the job description of the supervisory employees and section heads show that they are not actually managerial but only supervisory employees, since they do not lay down company policies. The contention that they exercise the authority to hire and fire is ambiguous and quite misleading because such authority is not supreme but merely advisory in character. Theirs is not a final determination of the company policies, inasmuch as any action taken by them on matters relative to hiring, promotion, transfer, suspension and termination of employees is still subject to confirmation and approval by their superior. Thus, where such power, which is in effect recommendatory in character, is subject to evaluation, review, and final action by the department heads and higher executives of the company, the same is not effective and not an exercise of independent judgment as required by law.

There was no denial of due process when the Undersecretary did not allow PICOP to present additional evidence on the implementation of its program inasmuch as the appeal before the former, PICOP even then had already submitted voluminous supporting documents. What the law prohibits is the lack of opportunity to be heard. PICOP only voiced out its objection to the holding of certification election after the Undersecretary affirmed the holding thereof, which leads to the conclusion that PICOP raised the issue merely to prevent and thwart the concerned section heads and supervisory employees from exercising a right granted them by law.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed.

Samson v. NLRC, 330 SCRA 460 (00)FACTS:Petitioner Samson receiveda lettercalling the attention of petitioners conduct during a Sales andMarketingChristmas gatheringwhere Samson allegedly made utterances of obscene, insulting and offensive words towards the SPSs Management Committee. Complainant was given two days to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him and he was thereafter placed on preventive suspension. Samson replied stating that such utterances were only made inreferenceto a decision taken by the management committee on the Cua Lim Case and not to any specific person. Petitioner was thereafter informed ina letterthat his employmentwas terminated. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal. Both parties appealed the decision; petitioner filed a partial appeal of the denial of his claimfor holidaypay and the cash equivalent ofthe ricesubsidy; respondent company sought the reversal of the labor arbiters ruling of illegal dismissal. The NLRC found that dismissal was made for just cause.ISSUE:W/N petitioner was validly dismissed. HELD:No. Misconduct. Petitioners dismissal was brought about by utterances made during an informal Christmasgathering. For misconduct to warrant dismissal, it must be in connection with the employees work. In this case, the alleged misconduct was neither in connection with the employees work, as such utterances of petitioner is expected in informal gatherings; also, such conduct was not even of such serious and grave character. Furthermore, petitioners outburst was in reaction to the decision of the management in a certain case and was not intended to malign on the person of the respondent companys president and general manager. Respondent company itself did not seem to consider the offense serious to warrant an immediate investigation. It is also provided in respondent companys rules and regulationsthat for conduct such as that of the petitioner, a first offense would only warrant a verbal reminder and not dismissal. Petitionerspositiondoes notfallwithin the definition of a managerial employee; and even assuming that he is, the ground for loss of confidence is without basis as it was not clearly established. Therefore, there was no just caus